

National Identity: Conceptualization and Measurement, Antecedents and Consequences -An Exploration of the Sources of Heterogeneity

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Introduction

The "reality"

"Humans live in a dual-reality," says Harari (2015). The first reality is objective. Given the physical/material conditions on Earth, an apple will always fall to the ground due to its lighter weight compared to the weight of the planet. Humans cannot escape this "objective" reality governed by what physicists call the classical Newtonian laws of the universe. However, humans also experience another reality in an "inter-subjective" way. There is no hard evidence to suggest a God; still more than half of the world's population (55 %) believes in some form of deity according to PEW's estimates¹ (Hackett & McClendon, 2017). For the sake of argument, one can say God exists not in the "objective" reality but s/he exists because more than four billion people collectively believe in the idea. This is what Harari (2015) calls the "inter-subjective" reality, and this reality is as important as the "objective" reality because these collective consensuses have been shaping history and human experience in dramatic ways.

The non-objective side of human reality is not only "inter-subjective"; it is also "subjective." Since God is nothing but a fictional entity that exists in the minds of billions of people, the concept is very much open to subjective interpretation. One individual can interpret and experience this fictional entity in his/her viewpoint; another individual can experience and interpret God in a completely different viewpoint². To the best of our knowledge, unlike gravity, God cannot be measured objectively. But can we objectively measure the "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities? Can we measure the belief(s) in God objectively? Further to that, can we objectively measure the relationship between the individual and the nation?

Nations are not different from God. They are also fictional entities; nations and countries are nothing but "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities. That is not to say these fictional entities do not govern human experience. One way of these fictional realities that govern human experience take effect via legal procedures. However, in many ways, the legal procedures are also nothing but collective consensuses – legal rules are also "inter-subjective". Legally speaking, Michael, a hypothetical individual born in Heringsdorf today, is considered a German. Eight km to the east is another small town called Swinoujscie; another hypothetical individual called Michał, born in this town, is legally Polish. Today, these hypothetical individuals born eight km apart are both legally European citizens. There is no objective reason to assume eight kilometers make a significant difference to make an individual German or Polish. Similarly, there is also no objective reason to assume, Mikhail, a hypothetical Russian born in Kaliningrad, (about four hundred km away from Heringsdorf & Swinoujscie) is not European. Almost a century ago, neighbors living in the same four km² village in Cyprus were Turks and Greeks³; legally they were both British subjects. One can think of dozens of similar examples. Geographical distance or legal borders cannot objectively explain the nations.

The legal borders between the nations are geographical and historical semi-accidents. The psychological borders are another story. To make a long story short, all these fictional entities, including the legality, are ad-hoc, temporary collective consensuses. They are "inter-subjective" realities with psychological

¹ This statistic simply means 45 % of the world's population does not adopt a deity belief. Spirituality manifests itself in various non-(mono)theistic ways. Other organized religions do not provide any hard proof for their beliefs either.

² In fact, this very notion of "the belief in God is single" vs. "nobody has the monopoly on faith, the relationship between God and the individual do not need an authority" has costed millions of human lives over the centuries. We call the outcome secularism.

³ For many centuries Greeks and Turks on the island did not even call themselves Greeks and Turks. They referred to themselves as Muslims, Romans or Hellen.

implications, which go down to the individual "subjective" level. Britishness, Greekness, Turkishness, Russianness, Polishness and Germanness are different imaginations to different individuals. Just like there is no monopoly on the belief in God, there is no monopoly on the cognition of a given nation. In fact, social-units like nations are better off with distributed knowledge (Kaufmann, 2016), which may or may not be different conceptions of the same nationhood. This distributed knowledge⁴ is just one way of the workings of complexity (Benham-Hutchins & Clancy, 2010; Phelan, 2001).

To add another absorbing layer to the frame I drew above; I must add that these fictional entities manifest themselves as "identity-statements". So, individuals define themselves as German, Polish, Russian, British, Greek and Turkish. Not only that, but under certain circumstances, they kill one another in the name of these "identity-statements". Therefore, nobody can deny the power of these "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities.

Again, the big question here is to what extent can we objectively measure and how meaningfully can we compare these "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities?

The "(social-)scientific-reality"

Social sciences emulate the natural sciences (Wendt, 2015). We aspire to the natural scientists having the ability to objectively measure gravity and predict this phenomenon's outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, many predictions in the natural sciences are either deterministic or probabilistic. In the classical Newtonian physics, gravity is the multiplication of two masses divided by their distance squared, which in turn are multiplied by a gravitational constant⁵. This is a perfect relationship, in other words, it is a deterministic relationship. Again, to the best of my knowledge, we have no proven deterministic relationships in the social sciences.

As social scientists, when we quantify things, we almost always rely on probabilistic relationships⁶, not on deterministic relationships. As my first statistics professor, Bernhard Kittel very convincingly argued, social scientists, make a massive assumption by presuming that the relationships in the social world are probabilistic. With straightforward logic, if we can predict a country's democracy level from its gross domestic product, then we should also be able to predict when and where a revolution is going to take place in that country. This is an implicit assumption we make when we regress an outcome Variable *Y* on an explanatory Variable *X*. We also assume that we have the perfect measurements to predict one thing from the other. In a nutshell, every social and political relationship is probabilistic – the inferences are just a matter of probabilistic certainty. But then, of course, the questions are how do we operationalize a revolution, and what predicts/explains a revolution, and how do we operationalize those constructs or phenomena that should predict a revolution?

⁴ In the context of nation-state and the research on nation-state, distributed knowledge simply refers to the psychological processes of interaction between an individual and a collective-cognition (read "inter-subjective" reality). In other words, every individual is a consumer as well as a producer of a piece of information about what the nation-state is, who is a member of this nation state so on and so forth. ⁵ The formula is *gravitational force* = $G_{constant} \frac{mass_{mass_2}}{distance between the masses^2}}$. I apologetically acknowledge that this is as good as my high school physics knowledge gets. Most probably, some informed natural scientist will say, even though this formula's predictions are still somewhat useful, our knowledge about this natural force is updated by Einstein's relativity theory at the beginning of the last century. But, if I am not mistaken, the natural laws Newton discovered were very much instrumental in launching a spaceship to the moon from Earth. ⁶ I cannot even dare to type and explain a probabilistic physics formula here because I do not fully understand a single one of them. But, in a few commonly known theories, the concept might be easily comprehensible. Take Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as an example. The idea is simple; on the sub-atomic level an object's momentum and position cannot be simultaneously and precisely measured. However the uncertainties of both position and momentum can be accounted in the equations. Also, by mathematical abstraction, physicists can determine the positions of very small particles with certain probabilities. If probabilities allow, the behavior of sub-atomic particles can be predicted, thus manipulated. Hence, we have the technology and the instruments we build by exploiting the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics.

Revolution and its predictors are what social scientists call macro-level phenomena, which ideally involve specific characteristics of countries, not individuals. Any country-level or even supra-countrylevel phenomena are human-made. Speaking with the arguments of Harari (2015), countries are nothing but "inter-subjective" realities; they are fictional legal entities. Alexander Wendt (2015) argues precisely the same thing. A more scholarly or academically conventional way of putting it is saying that domestic politics and the relationships governed by international politics are socially constructed (Wendt, 1992, 1999). If my reasoning is not misguided, then, as social scientists, we study "inter-subjective" reality with research methods that investigate an "objective" reality. This very observation is the fundamental guide and the framework of my doctoral dissertation.

How can we bring together "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities with the research methods of the "objective" reality?

To what extent can we objectively quantify "inter-subjective" realities and meaningfully compare them across countries? How can we objectively account for "subjectivity" in the "inter-subjective" reality? In many ways, I aim to bridge a gap between positivist and interpretivist approaches in the social sciences. As I tried to hint above, positivist and interpretivist approaches in social sciences seem to be based on different epistemological and ontological assumptions which may be completely at odds with one another. However, they study the same phenomena – humans and social & political systems that emerge from human interactions. The interesting fact is both interpretivist and positivist approaches capture social realities. To what extent are these so-called possibly different social realities compatible? Do "social forces" that govern human experience have the same nature with the "objective" reality's laws?

In the framework of my doctoral dissertation these big questions mentioned above are narrowed down to the following ones. I see my work at the intersection of nationalism studies and political psychology. Assuming that in the "social-scientific-reality" things really are "inter-subjective" and "subjective" and the "social forces" follow "objective" reality's probabilistic laws

- 1) Can we meaningfully compare national identification across countries?
- 2) Can we precisely operationalize national identity?
- 3) What psychological constructs explain national identification?
- 4) How can we account for subjectivity in national identification?
- 5) Do the consequences of national identification have comparable patterns in distinct national contexts?

I address these broad questions in six empirical chapters. Below is the outline of the Ph.D. dissertation preceded by the titles of the chapters. I authored each chapter independently from one another because these chapters are the first drafts of the article projects that I aim to publish with my supervisors in peer-reviewed academic journals. I performed all the statistical data analyses and interpretation. I draft all the chapters by myself; however, in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6, I used the first person plural "we" since these pieces are the article projects that I plan to publish with my supervisor(s). I will submit the article projects to the journals after getting critical revisions from my supervisors. In Chapter 4, I am the solo-author. The chapter titles are the following.

1. What is national identity? An attitude network approach using cross-country data.

2. What does it mean to be [insert nationality or profile here]? Multi-method analysis of four civic and four ethnic national identities with representative samples.

3. A Multi-Method Approach to National Identity: From Individual Level Attachment to National Attachment.

4. Do individuals find comfort in their nations? Network map of emotions and attitudes toward the nation.

- 5. Attitudes toward migrants and refugees in Turkey.
- 6. Different ways of modeling German national identity and its effect on various forms of prejudice.

The first chapter/article project is a large *N* cross-country study. The second chapter/article project is another large *N* cross-country study; however, it includes only eight countries. Chapters/article projects 3 & 4 are case comparisons of Germany and Turkey. The fifth chapter/article project is a single case study of Turkey; the last chapter / article project is another single case study of Germany. So the dissertation has a shrinking *N* pattern; it starts with a many countries, goes down to fewer numbers of countries followed by comparisons of two countries. Finally, it ends with two single case studies.

Outline of the work

The project: The Ph.D. dissertation has three components: conceptualization & measurement issues around national identity; subjectivity & predictors of national identity; and the outcomes of national identification.

1. Conceptualization & measurement: There are two conventional approaches in nationalism studies literature. The first one focuses on national pride; the second one distinguishes patriotic and nationalistic attitudes (Grimm, Huddy, Schmidt, & Seethaler, 2016). Many times conceptualization and operationalization of these constructs are interchangeably used, which leads to a lack of distinct and uncontroversial definition of national identity and a "conceptual and definitional tangle" (Davidov, 2009; Huddy, 2016). I think both national pride and nationalistic & patriotic attitudes are proxies, and they should be treated as derivatives of national identity; national pride and patriotic and nationalist attitudes are of secondary importance. In the first three empirical chapters of my Ph.D. project, I scrutinize the conceptualization and operationalization of national identity with nationally representative samples as well as convenience samples of university students.

The first chapter uses the three national identity modules of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP-Research-Group, 1998, 2012, 2015), which is comprised of three cross-national surveys conducted in 1995 (23 countries, *N*=30.894), 2003 (34 countries, *N*=45.993) and 2013 (33 countries, *N*=45.297). Here, I use a state-of-the-art technique, which has come to be frequently used in psychometrics research (Epskamp, 2017), namely attitude network modeling. In this chapter, I tackle with ontological and conceptual issues around national identity and study whether national identity can be operationalized in a single universal way.

In Chapter Two, I work with the national identity measurement models of eight countries (Canada, New Zealand, the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Germany, Turkey, and Iceland). I also investigate the latent profiles to show the influence of subjectivity in national identification. This is a study, which compares a variable-centered-research-approach and a person-centered-research-approach. I, again, utilize the ISSP's national identity modules here, which provide nationally representative samples.

In Chapter Three, I have convenience samples of university students from Germany (N=476, data collection: 2016) and Turkey (N=217, data collection: 2016). While this study dives further

into the subjectivity in the national identification, it also highlights conceptualization and operationalization challenges around national identity. I stress and try to overcome these challenges with a multi-method approach, in which I utilize structural equation modeling and structural topic modeling. In this third study, I explain the subjectivity in national identification with individual differences in *attachment style*, which is a psychological trait that it deeply embedded in the individual with genetic and environmental influences (Gervai, 2009; Gillath, Shaver, Baek, & Chun, 2008). Thus, the third chapter also taps into the second component of my Ph.D. project; the antecedents (predictors) of national identity.

- 2. Subjectivity & predictors of national identification: Besides the individual differences in attachment style explaining the subjective viewpoints in perceiving national identity, I also utilize other psychological constructs to check their involvement in national identification. In the fourth chapter, I again, utilize convenience samples of university students and apply attitude network modeling to investigate whether need to belong and social & emotional loneliness are involved in national identification. Besides the university student samples I mentioned above, in this fourth study, I have two separate university student samples from Germany (N=190, data collection: 2012) and Turkey (N=105, data collection: 2012). With these samples, using multi-group structural equation modeling, I also inspect whether thirteen distinct emotions (i.e., joy, hope, shame, guilt) are involved in national identification.
- 3. Consequences (outcomes) of national identification: The third and final component of my Ph.D. dissertation looks at the outcomes of national identification. While prejudice against outgroups is known to be one universal outcome of national identification (Druckman, 1994), the manifestation of these various prejudices is sensitive to national contexts (Cohrs & Duckitt, 2012). In two separate case studies, I examine the national identify's influence on attitudes towards immigrants and refugees in Turkey and Germany.

In Chapter Five, I utilize two nationally representative samples from Turkey (N_1 =1666, data collection: 2015; N_2 =947, data collection: 2015) and one university student sample (N_3 =217, data collection: 2016) to model national identity in multiple ways and check its effect on antirefugee attitudes. In the sixth and final chapter, I model German national identity in several ways to examine its influence on various prejudice outcomes. This final chapter has twelve different models from four nationally representative samples (N_1 =1894, data collection: 1995; N_2 =1287, data collection: 2003; N_3 =1717, data collection: 2014; N_4 =1000, data collection: 2016) and two university student samples (N_5 =476, data collection: 2016 N_6 =570, data collection: 2017). In both the fifth and the sixth studies, my statistical analyses method is structural equation modeling again.

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PROJECT 1: What is national identity? An attitude network approach using cross-country data

Abstract:

Background/motivation: National identity definitions and operationalizations have been criticized as vague, oversimplified or fluid. Despite the theoretical and empirical shortcomings, civic vs. ethnic notions of national identity and their variants keep guiding research. Moreover, despite decades of research it is frustrating to observe the negligence of ontological questions in nationalism studies. Although a few fundamental questions were addressed in the field a few decades ago, the answers were seldom addressed with empirical approaches. Much of the previous literature on national identity either tried to answer ontological questions with philosophical arguments or skipped the challenging ontological questions and came up with tentative and pragmatic (and perhaps misleading) operationalizations of the construct. In this study we take a step back, ask an ontological question and adopt a completely exploratory empirical strategy to answer this question.

Methods: We analyze public opinion data from three different points in time (1995, 23 countries, *N*=30.894; 2003, 34 countries, *N*=45.993; 2013, 33 countries, *N*=45.297) with a novel technique to map out the attitude networks of individuals across the included countries. In our analyses, we include (1) eight survey items that tap into different *conceptions of nationhood*, (2) one item that reflects *symbolic boundary making* and (3) five items that indicate *prejudice* as an outcome of boundary making. Besides the large *N* cross-country analyses, we compare selected civic (Canada, New Zealand) and ethnic national identities (Japan, South Korea) for a detailed account of testing the differences between these distinct notions.

Results: We find evidence indicating that the nature of national identity is much more complex than the existing theoretical and empirical approaches suggest.

Relevance/Implications: We discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of our findings for further research.

Introduction:

There is a large amount of research on national identity, yet our accumulated knowledge on this concept remains compartmentalized at best and fragmented at worst. Just like in any other scholarly field or topic of research interest, we have contradictory evidence and unresolved debates. However, in the case of national identity, the problem may not be the mountain of evidence or different interpretations of the evidence or observations. There might be a more fundamental issue – we do not formally know what national identity is, we do not formally know how it behaves, we do not formally know how and why it effects other social phenomena. In other words, we are probably looking at an ontological problem. In this article, we take a step back and ask a neglected ontological question regarding national identity.

Identity is a statement which conveys information about who a subject is (Immerfall, Boehnke, & Baier, 2010) and who a subject is not. Identity is always composed of multiple components. Thus we define national identity as a set of information answering the following questions: "Who are we - what constitutes our nationhood?"; "can non-nationals (people who do not share our attributes) become one of us?"; "should we be skeptical of non-nationals (because they are not us)?". In sum, national identity is the answers to these questions, which are reflected in peoples' attitudes. We call the first component *conceptions of nationhood* (who are we – what constitutes our nationhood); we call the second component *symbolic boundary making*. We include *prejudice* against outsiders as a third component because it is a metaphor of distance towards others who are not "us" (Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016).

We treat national identity as an attitude and utilize a novel technique used in psychometrics, which literally can map out attitudes. We apply attitude network modeling on cross-country survey data to investigate the nature of national identity. This technique shows us how different evaluative reactions are connected to one another to form a global attitude – in our case the national identity.

This task is important because we address a gap in the literature, which compartmentalizes empirical and theoretical works. We believe the gap between empirical approaches and theoretical and interpretative approaches in the literature hinders fruitful research. Filling this gap would open new and informed research domains which would lead to a better and deeper understanding of the nature of the national identity.

Our discoveries challenge some of the established practices in the field and lay out the complexity of national identity. For example, we observe significantly different attitude structures not only across the so-called civic and ethnic cases but also across the ethnic cases themselves. Thus, we reveal the possibility of different paths leading to the same outcome. We may need to consider the uniqueness of every individual national identity, but more importantly, we need to embrace the complexity of national identity. In a broader discussion, we highlight why it might be misleading to make large *N* comparisons and why we should prefer small *N* studies in national identity research.

In the remaining part of this piece, we start with a brief literature review leading up to our research question. After describing our data and methods, we outline our discoveries under four specific research questions which add up to the big question of "what is national identity?" In the final section, we discuss the implications of our discoveries and suggest specific research agenda for further investigation.

Background/Motivation:

One can categorize the existing literature on national identity into different research approaches. We call the pioneers "the classics/early works." These works studied the subject within the framework of

interpretative approaches in social science as well as broad historical analyses, single and small *N* comparative case studies with qualitative approaches (Anderson, 1983; Breuilly, 1982; Gellner, 1983; Greenfeld, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kohn, 1944; Smith, 1991). Taking the lead from these pioneers, next-generation researchers advanced the field by scrutinizing civic and ethnic notions of nationalism and provided substantial empirical evidence confirming or refuting the existence of the concepts. While the civic vs. ethnic notions of national identity kept guiding research for a long time, much scholarship remained skeptical of this dichotomy and pointed to the blurry borders between the concepts (Ariely, 2013; Janmaat, 2006; Latcheva, 2010; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013).

Some other works offered valuable insights leading to slight paradigm shifts in the field. For example, Brubaker (2004; 2004) emphasized the importance of the cognitive mechanism of nationhood, ethnicity, and race and the contexts in which these constructs are formed. Wimmer (2012; 2013) lead the work on comparative theories of ethnic boundary making, pointing out the processes and mechanisms that influence the dynamics of the boundary making via constructs like ethnicity and nationhood. Recently, we are witnessing another paradigm shift, which focuses on the within-country differences as well as between-country differences (Bonikowski, 2009; Trittler, 2017). Another research tradition, which was semi-independent from the nationalism field, had the national identity itself in its focus. Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2006) scrutinized the concept of identity and guided researchers with regards to the available methodological toolkits for scholarly practices.

Our aim in this article is not to resolve any of the long-standing debates or to test hypotheses on a previously unanswered question. In fact, we take a step back and ask an ontological question. We aim to form a bridge between different research traditions in nationalism studies by addressing a fundamental gap. Despite decades of research, it is frustrating to observe the negligence of ontological questions. For any scientific field "what is this thing?" or "what is the nature of this thing?" are crucial questions because they lay the foundations for further questions like "how does this thing work?, "can we manipulate and change the mechanisms of this thing's workings?"

Although in the early nationalism studies, the foundational ontological questions were asked, the answers were seldom addressed with empirical approaches. Much of the previous research on national identity either tried to answer ontological questions with philosophical arguments or skipped the challenging ontological questions and came up with tentative and pragmatic (and perhaps misleading) operationalizations of the construct. Admittedly, our research question is not new; nevertheless, our contribution is valuable and ambitious because we bridge the gap between the theory and evidence in the field.

We have the following overarching question, which can be broken down into four research questions: What is national identity? (1) What are the factor structures in the attitude networks? (2) How predictable are the attitudes with network modeling? (3) Are there major differences between civic and ethnic national identities? (4) Are there gender differences in attitude toward national identity?

Methods:

Sample:

To answer the questions, we utilize the International Social Survey Program's national identity module (ISSP-Research-Group, 1998, 2012, 2015), which is comprised of three cross-national surveys conducted in 1995 (23 countries, N=30.894), 2003 (34 countries, N=45.993) and 2013 (33 countries, N=45.297). The

surveys reflect public opinions on various topics related to national identity. From this data, we filtered out eight survey items that tap into *conceptions of nationhood*; one item that reflects *symbolic boundary making*; and five items that indicate *prejudice* as an outcome of boundary making.

Measures:

Table 1 displays the item wordings and the theoretical constructs the items are expected to measure.

Theoretical constructs	Variable Abbreviation	Item wordings
Conceptions of nationhood		Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is [1] Not important at all [2] Not very important [3] Fairly important [4] Very important
	Brn	to have been born in [COUNTRY]
	Ctz	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship
	Liv	to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life
	Lng	to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]
	Rlg	to be a [religion]
	Rsp	to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws
	Fel	to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]
	Anc	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry
Symbolic boundary making		Now we would like to ask a few questions about minorities in [COUNTRY]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [1] Disagree strongly [2] Disagree [3] Neither agree nor disagree [4] Agree [5] Agree strongly
	shC	It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY's] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY].
Prejudice as an outcome of boundary making		There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [COUNTRY]. (By "immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in [COUNTRY]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? [1] Disagree strongly [2] Disagree [3] Neither agree nor disagree [4] Agree [5] Agree strongly
	ICR	Immigrants increase crime rates.
	IGE	Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY'S] economy. (Reverse coded)
	ImT	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].
	INI	Immigrants improve [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY] society by bringing new ideas and cultures.
	INR	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot reduced a lot

Table 1: Item wordings and theoretical constructs.

Higher values indicate the level of importance given to various nationhood characteristics, being exclusive in symbolic boundary making, and higher levels of prejudice against out-groups. Descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix. The lists of countries included in different modules are listed in the captions of the figures which show the relevant results.

Analysis techniques and procedure:

As an analysis strategy, we utilize network modeling of attitudinal data. This technique is becoming widespread in psychology and psychometrics (Epskamp, 2017). The nodes (small circles in the plotted graphs) represent the survey-items; the connections between these items are the unobserved relationships in the data, which are the unknown parameters to be estimated. These estimated connections between the items are referred to as the edges.

Network modeling of attitudinal data offers two notable advantages over some alternatives like the structural equation modeling (SEM). The first advantage is concerning the philosophy of science, and the second advantage is on empirical grounds.

Philosophy of science: In the general SEM framework, we think of an uncountable thing – a latent psychological trait or a construct explaining the relationships between different survey-items; so, the relationships (covariance) between survey-items are attributed to a common underlying construct. With the psychological networks, we can think of each survey-item as distinct evaluative reactions; here the aim is to see and understand which of those distinct and potentially independent attitudes are conditionally dependent on another, not a common cause. We can estimate the connections between every survey-item after controlling for the influence of all other survey items. Once the psychological network is estimated, the structure can be regarded as the "*causal skeleton*" of a more general cognition – a global attitude (Dalege et al., 2016). The differences between latent trait models and psychological networks lie in the drawn inferences and theoretical basis (Fried, 2017).

Empirical: On empirical grounds, attitude network models and latent trait models are complementary to one another (Epskamp, Rhemtulla, & Borsboom, 2017). Given certain assumptions, latent trait models and psychological network models are mathematically equivalent (Kruis & Maris, 2016; Marsman et al.) and complementary (Guyon, Falissard, & Kop, 2017). Each latent model has an equivalent network model that fits the data equally well and vice versa. Furthermore, attitude networks can and do expose the latent trait structure.

The estimation techniques for the attitude networks vary according to the nature of the data. Estimation is based on a correlation matrix if the data is continuous or ordinal; it is also possible to estimate attitude networks from binary and multiple types of variables. Regardless of the nature of the data, the estimation of attitude networks relies on a statistical regularization technique, referred as LASSO, which controls for and minimizes spurious correlations among the survey items, and therefore helps to obtain easier interpretable psychological networks. LASSO stands for least absolute shrinkage and selection operator; it shrinks all coefficients, and the small ones are set to zero. This regularization is useful for three reasons: 1) only the relevant connections among survey items are retained in the network, which conveys easier interpretability, 2) obtaining spurious connections between survey items is minimized or avoided, 3) in small samples, where statistical power is a vital issue regularization assures less parameters to be estimated. In short, regularization returns a sparse network for parsimony. This sparsity is achieved by using a tuning parameter; recommended values for this tuning parameter are .25 for binary data, .5 for continuous or ordinal data. The statistical procedure estimates many networks from the data and the best-fitting network is picked via EBIC (extended Bayesian Information Criterion), depending on the tuning parameter setting (Epskamp & Fried, forthcoming).

Procedure:

We use four different estimation techniques in the attitude networks framework to gain a comprehensive picture.

Exploratory graph analysis (EGA): This is the first technique to determine the number of factors in the data. Estimating the correct number of factors has been an unresolved issue in psychometrics. EGA claims to outperform many of the conventional methods that estimate the number of factors (Golino & Demetriou, 2017; Golino & Epskamp, 2017). Using ordinal data, EGA relies on the LASSO regularization mentioned above. The procedure utilizes the correlation matrix of the observed data; with the LASSO regularization a sparse inverse covariance matrix is obtained; finally, the procedure employs an algorithm called *walktrap* (Pons & Latapy, 2005) to find the number of clusters in the network. The clusters are the nodes/survey-items that are more connected to each other compared to the rest of the network, which correspond to the latent variables.

Ising Model: Our second technique is the Ising Model (van Borkulo et al., 2014), which estimates psychological networks with binary data. This technique is akin to a regularized partial correlation

network (based on ordinal data) and is based on a series of multiple logistic regressions. Networks estimated with binary data can also display the underlying latent trait structures by detecting the communities/clusters within the network (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, & Maas, 2017; Epskamp, 2017). We employ the Ising Model so that we check whether networks estimated via EGA (ordinal data) and Ising Model (binary data) will reveal the same latent variable structure. Another reason to employ the Ising Model is to use these models for simulations, which will provide further insights on the nature of national identities.

Mixed Graphical Models: This is a network estimation technique which can handle various types of data (binary, ordinal, continuous) simultaneously. We utilize mixed graphical models in two separate analyses. In the first procedure, we use gender and age as control variables (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al., 2017) for attitude network estimation. In the second procedure, we estimate the predictability of nodes/survey-items in the network. In other words, we get an explained variation estimate for each node (R²); note that in our study we present a pseudo R² (Haslbeck & Waldorp, 2017) since we rely mostly on the Ising Model with binarized data.

Network comparison: This is a formal test to quantify and empirically compare estimated networks. We utilize this technique to compare civic and ethnic cases of national identity.

To attain all the procedures mentioned above we use both the raw ordinal data and the binarized version of the data. In the results section, we report the results obtained with the binarized data. Some selected results which utilized the original ordinal data are included in the online appendix. We chose to rely on the binarized data for three reasons. The first reason is theoretical; we expect dense connections between the nodes in the networks due to latent variables. Epskamp, Kruis, and Marsman (2017) suggest the Ising Model estimation when the networks are dense and there is a common cause (latent) model. In fact, our results with the ordinal data were inconsistent and inexplicable with the existing theories but many of the results with the Ising model (binarized data) are in line with the existing theories. The second reason is empirical; since the *N*s are too large we believe we can afford to lose some information with the binarization. Lastly, we are mimicking the approaches of the researchers who applied these techniques to political data before us (*see* Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al. (2017); Dalege et al. (2016); Dalege, Borsboom, van Harreveld, Waldorp, and van der Maas (2017)).

The spread of the data before and after binarization is displayed in Figures 1 to 3 for each sample. After the binarization and removal of missing values, we ended up having 21.505 observations in Module 1 (1995), 29.487 observations in Module 2 (2003), and 34.561 in Module 3 (2013). Since the sample sizes are large, we used the most conservative tuning parameters.



Results:

The findings from various analyses are reported below under the listed questions. Supplementary analyses' results are reported in the online appendix.

What are the factor structures in the networks?

Figure 1 displays the attitude network mapped from Module 1 (1995) data. We observe three factors (indicated with the different colors of the nodes) in this network. One of these factors (nodes in green) corresponds to *symbolic boundary making* and *prejudice* components. The two other factors (colors orange and blue) can be interpreted as *civic* and *ethnic* notions of nationhood. Many of the negative edges (connections colored in red) are between the *civic* notion of nationhood and the *boundary making* and *prejudice* components.

Figure 2 is the attitude network of Module 2 (2003). Here, we observe a similar factor structure for the *civic* and *ethnic* notions of nationhood (nodes colored in orange and green). However, in this attitude network, the node for *symbolic boundary making* is marked as an independent cluster (colored in green); *prejudice* items (colored in yellow) form a single factor structure. Negative edges between the *civic* notion of nationhood and *prejudice* are less visible in this network.

Figure 3 is the Module 3 (2013) data network, which displays the most surprising results. This time *conceptions of nationhood* nodes (colored in blue) form a single factor structure. *Symbolic boundary making* and *prejudice* components form another single factor (colored in orange). We observe fewer negative edges between different factors.

We can think of at least three possible explanations for the visual differences in factor structures between the three attitude networks. The first explanation is randomness; since these observations are nothing but snapshots of public opinion, they are not free of randomness. The second explanation is the observations themselves. The numbers of countries, the countries themselves, most probably the individuals in the samples drawn from the countries are not the same in these datasets. The third explanation is time. It is also likely that the relationships between these observed attitudes change over time. We believe the truth is a mixture of these three interpretations.



abbreviations of the nodes.

How predictable are the attitudes with network modeling?

The grey circles around the edges correspond to the explained variance (pseudo R² since we relied on binarized data and the estimation based on a series of logistic regressions). The average predictability for the Module 1 network is 26 %; 33 % for Module 2 and 32 % for Module 3. The accuracies (pseudo R²) for each node in the networks are listed in the captions next to the graphs. The node *Ctz* (finding citizenship important to be truly the national of a country) always has the highest accuracy with 45%, 45%, 47% respectively for Modules 1, 2 and 3. The lowest node accuracy is .005 % for *INI* (the statement that immigrants improve the national society with new ideas and culture) in the Module 1 data. The same item has 43 % explained variance in Module 2 network and 34 % in Module 3 network. Note that the node accuracies in our models reflect how well each node is predicted by all other nodes it is connected to in the network.

Are there major differences between civic and ethnic national identities?

Up until this point, our unit of analysis was individuals in cross-country datasets. On theoretical grounds, we can subset the three datasets into separate ethnic and civic national identities. However, on empirical grounds, it would be time consuming and inefficient to decide which countries are on the ethnic or the civic side of the spectrum. Therefore, we investigate the differences between civic and ethnic national identities by comparing four selected cases we subset from the Module 2 (2003) data. We subset Japan & South Korea as ethnic national identity examples; Canada & New Zealand are our civic national identity examples. We chose these four countries because a prior analysis by Bonikowski (2009, p. 44) suggested six different national identity constellations on a two-dimensional space; in that analysis, these four countries constitute the most similar and most different cases on one dimension. Note that we take the cues from Bonikowski (2009) because, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only work that applies network modeling to national identity data.

Besides the visual inspection, we conducted network comparisons of these national identities. This procedure is an empirical approach, which answers the question of whether the networks belong to the same population or not. We assume there are distinct ethnic and civic populations of national identities on theoretical grounds. Thus, we made: ethnic vs. ethnic; civic vs. civic; and four ethnic vs. civic comparisons. This procedure provides us empirical information on the overall network structures. In other words, we can formally quantify the global attitudes, which in our case are the ethnic and civic national identities themselves.

Additionally, we examined *connectivity* of the four different cases, which is another measure of the dynamics of the network structure. This measure provides further information about the strength of a global attitude. There is more than one way to examine attitude network connectivity. *Small-worldness* is one option; if the network is highly clustered and has a low average path length (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al., 2017; Dalege et al., 2016), then we observe *small-worldness* in that network. Simulation is another approach investigating network connectivity (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al., 2017). We apply both of these approaches.

Figure 7 a-d below shows the attitude networks of the four national identities with their factor structures. A visual inspection of these networks reveals many differences. *Conceptions of nationhood* in the Japanese national identity have a one-factor structure, and the prejudice component of the Japanese national identity also constitutes a single factor - the item that reflects symbolic *boundary making* (shC) is not connected to any other node. The Korean national identity network also has a single factor for the *conceptions of nationhood* side of the model; interestingly though, the *symbolic boundary making* node is a part of this factor. The *prejudice* component of the Korean network also has a single factor structure.

When we look at the civic cases, we see that the Canadian national identity attitude network has a single factor for the *conceptions of nationhood* component; the *symbolic boundary making* and the *prejudice* components form a single factor. In the *conceptions of nationhood* part of New Zealander national identity, there is almost a one-factor structure, but one item (respecting country's laws and institutions) is denoted as an independent cluster in the network. Additionally, the *prejudice* component of the New Zealander identity is composed of two factors. Thus, the clustering in the New Zealand network is more fragmented compared to all the other networks. Also, note that some of the edges in the networks are noticeably different.



identities can be seen as the most different cases (see Bonikowski (2009)).

The formal network comparison test results are displayed in Table 2 below. As mentioned above, these are the quantified empirical results that go beyond the visual comparisons.

	Canada		New Zealand		Japan		(South) Korea	
	Global	Network	Global	Network	Global	Network	Global	Network
	Strength	Structure	Strength	Structure	Strength	Structure	Strength	Structure
Canada								
New Zealand	Significantly different at a p<.05 level [p<.044]	Not significantly different						
Japan	Not significantly different	Significantly different at a p<.001 level	Not significantly different	Significantly different at a p<.001 level				
(South) Korea	Not significantly different	Significantly different at a p<.001 level	Not significantly different	Significantly different at a p<.001 level	Not significantly different	Significantly different at a p<.001 level		
Table 2 Formal network comparisons. The estimated global strengths (the quantified strength of the national identities) are the following. CA=21.8; NZ=16.9; JP=18.0; KO=19.9.								

(South) Korea Canada New Zealand Japan Canada New Zealand None Japan Born-Ancs; Citz-Ancs; Born-Relg; ImmCriRat-Citz-ImmCriRat: ImmTjobs; ImmGfEco-ImmCriRat-ImmGfEco; ImmNewIdeas ImmCriRat-ImmTjobs; ImmGfEco-ImmNewIdeas (South) Korea Born-Citz; Lang-Feel; Born-Citz; Citz-Live; Lang-Born-Citz; Citz-Live; Lang-Born-Ancs; Lang-Ancs; Relg; Live-Resp; Born-Relg; Citz-Feel; Live-Feel; Feel-Ancs; Citz-shrCust; Feel; Lang-Feel; Resp-Lang-Feel; Citz-shrCust; Live-ImmGfEco; Ancs; Citz-shrCust; ImmCriRat-ImmTjobs; ImmGfEco ImmNewIdeas; ImmGfEco-ImmNewIdeas ImmCriRat-ImmNumRed ImmTjobs ImmNewIdeas Table 3 The significantly different edges in the national identity networks. All differences are significant at a p<.001 level.

Japanese and Korean identity networks are significantly different from one another and the civic cases regarding their network structures. The network structures of the Canadian and New Zealander networks, however, are not significantly different from one another. Table 3 lists the edges that contribute to the structural differences among the networks. For example, Japanese and New Zealander networks have different structures due to the two significantly different edges (ICR-ImT & IGE-INI) in the *prejudice* component and the connection between Brn-Rlg (finding religion and being born in the country to be important to be a truly national). When we look at the global strength of the attitude networks, we see that none of the networks are significantly different from one another except the New Zealander vs. Canadian national identity. The Canadian national identity network's global strength is significantly higher than the global strength of the New Zealander national identity network.

With regards to connectivity, although we report some quantified measures above (small-world index and average shortest path lengths) in the captions of Figure 7, those numbers hardly correspond to a meaningful comparison. We choose to rely on the formal network comparison test for meaningful comparisons of the national identity networks. Note that even the formal quantified network comparisons hardly allow a meaningful interpretation of several questions, such as for example why there is a significant global strength difference between the chosen civic cases but not between the ethnic cases. These network comparison tests just reveal, given these samples, that the global strength of the Canadian identity (21.8) seems to be significantly larger than the New Zealander national identity (16.9).

So, why would the global attitude toward the Canadian national identity be stronger compared to the global attitude toward the New Zealander national identity? We have three competing interpretations here. The first two are only a little better than speculations. One might suggest that the significant global strength difference between New Zealander and Canadian national identities is a meaningful case-specific finding. Attitudes toward the Canadian identity, in general, is stronger because of various contextual reasons -- the history behind it, the normative content of the identity (narratives that constitute the identity) renders the Canadian identity to be stronger when compared to the New Zealander identity. The second (speculative) interpretation would suggest that, in Canada, national identity is a more salient social category when compared to New Zealand due to population characteristics. The inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in Canada are more salient due to socio-demographic reasons such as ethnicity and how different ethnicities relate to one another. Our last interpretation is straightforward. The observed significant difference is still random; we should see the p<.44 level as almost not significant.

A technical note at this point is insightful and thought-provoking. The network comparison test compares the sum of absolute edge weights of the network. So, although the New Zealander network visually looks denser, when added up, its absolute edge weights are not as strong as the Canadian network. The more fragmented clustering, in general, is probably another sign of a network being less strong regarding the global strength of the attitude.

This inference, though, can lead to a theoretical expectation and perhaps even to further interpretations. Note that the global strength of the Canadian network is 21.8 and the Korean network, it is 19.9 - there is no significant difference between the quantified global strength. The edge between Brn-Anc and IGE-INI in the Canadian network seems to be the largest contributor to the global strength of the network; in the Korean network, the edge Brn-Ctz is the largest contributor to the global strength. All these edges (Brn-Anc, Brn-Ctz & IGE-INI) are significantly (all p<.001) different from one another in these networks. These observations may suggest that (1) in a theoretically civic national identity, the connections between the nodes which tap into ethnic notions are still the most powerful; (2) in a theoretically ethnic case, edges between nodes that tap into ethnic and civic notions can be the most powerful. So, it may be misleading to assume different populations of civic and ethnic cases after all. Perhaps what matters in inclusion vs. exclusion mechanisms is the normative content of the national identities and how they relate to symbolic boundary making and prejudice mechanisms.

In the follow-up procedure, we simulated 5000 networks from the observed data to further investigate the connectivity, therefore the strength of ethnic and civic national identities in a different way. Results are listed in Table 4. The high-temperature networks at the bottom of the table show the networks' dynamics when there is much randomness, and low-temperature networks on the top of the table display the simulated networks' dynamics when randomness is low (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al., 2017, pp. 532-534). The histograms next to the networks are the distribution of the sum scores of the simulated networks, which again reflect the overall state of a causal attitude network model (Dalege et al., 2016). These distributions can also be seen as another indicator of the global attitude. Again, in our case, the global attitude is the national identity composed of *conceptions of nationhood, symbolic boundary making,* and *prejudice;* in other words, inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in the civic and ethnic national identities.

The distribution of the sum scores has a normal distribution for all cases when there is much randomness (high-temperature networks). The sum score distributions of the civic and ethnic cases' simulations seem to be unique to cases when there is not much randomness (low-temperature networks). If the global attitude object were a category (or a powerful attitude), the distribution of the sum scores would have been bimodal, and we would have observed kurtosis (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al., 2017; Dalege, Borsboom, van Harreveld, & van der Maas, 2017). Given these observations, we can at least hypothesize that the global attitude (inclusion and exclusion mechanisms going on in both civic and ethnic cases) is a continuum and not necessarily a category in both civic and ethnic cases. These observations also suggest that we can again hypothesize that the national identity as a global attitude object is weak; meaning that different evaluative reactions (nodes in the network/survey items) do not add up to a very powerful attitude. In sum, the global attitude of national identity is open to change.



sum scores, which are indicators of connectivity, thus the overall state of the networks.



Discussion:

With regards to factor structure, we observe somewhat inconsistent results. The datasets from Modules 1 & 2 are congruent with the theoretical expectations of the existing literature. Module 3 data, however, is puzzling. The picture becomes even more puzzling when we further investigate sample cases (two examples of civic and ethnic national identities). The attitude networks of all the civic and ethnic identity examples (almost) suggest single factor structures for the components of *conceptions of nationhood* as well as the *symbolic boundary making* and *prejudice*.

When we treat these factor structure findings as hypotheses and try to replicate them with another technique (confirmatory factor analysis), we observe that the measurement models do not explain the data well. That is to say; researchers should be cautious in interpreting the clustering in attitude networks; these clusters may or may not correspond to the latent variables. Furthermore, findings from the exploratory graph analyses (of the original ordinal data) and the Ising model (obtained from the binarized version of the data) do not suggest the same factor structures. This finding is another reason to be cautious about the factor structures suggested by the attitude network analysis (*see* supplementary analyses in the appendix). We can think of at least two technical reasons to explain these inconsistencies; both of the reasons are due to the data itself. The first reason is the high number of observations, which brings in inherent challenges into a factor analysis. Also, the exploratory graph analysis does not take cross-loadings into account (one latent construct influencing the manifest variables of other latent constructs). Finally, we are dealing with a nested structure since we have cross-country datasets; the techniques we applied in attitude network analyses cannot handle this type of nested data, which requires multi-level analyses.

These limitations do not mean that our analyses are pointless and have no value. On the contrary; we believe we provide useful insights into the nature of national identity with an empirical approach. We demonstrate that attitude networks provide decent predictability (explained variance in the survey items/node accuracies). We reveal the gender differences in the attitude networks of national identity (*see* supplementary analyses in the appendix).

Our chosen case comparisons indicate that national identity structures are unique for every case. We observe significantly different network structures not only between civic and ethnic cases but also across ethnic cases themselves. Note that we do not eliminate the possibility of significantly different attitude structures in different civic cases. Juxtaposing Tables 2 & 3 we see that the edges contributing to the significantly different network structures are tangled. The significantly different edges of national identity networks are heterotaxic - they exhibit asymmetrical arrangement between parts. Such a nature means that the relationships between the different elements and components of national identity may be unique in every case when we do not assume common latent variables (like ethnic, civic or a third category like nativity) influencing responses to the survey items. In other words, when we check the conditional dependence of the survey items on one another, the relationships (edges) they exhibit are different. It is not hard to envisage that the arrangements, the presence or absence of these edges (relationships) are subject to the normative contents of the national identities. Perhaps another way of thinking about this would be the following question: do different sets of relationships still lead to the same outcome, which may be civic or ethnic or perhaps another type of national identity? Simply put, are we looking at different paths leading to the same outcome? The answer is "we do not know for sure yet."

Note that the overall results also indicate that, despite the significantly different attitude (network) structures, the global strengths of the attitudes (networks) are consistently not significantly different

from one another. That is to say, the connections between the different nodes of the network eventually add up to a somewhat approximate quantity, which brings us to our next point.

The simulations from the observed data (of the chosen civic and ethnic cases) suggest that national identities have a continuous nature rather than a categorical one. Thus, the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in a given national identity are theoretically fluid in both ethnic and civic cases. In other words, we have three questions in hand: "what constitutes our nationhood?"; "can non-nationals become nationals?"; "should we be skeptical of non-nationals?" The attitudes providing answers to these questions are not categorical like a "yes/no" or "these attributes but not those attributes." The whole cognitive process of evaluative reactions toward a national identity is conditional and tentative according to the simulations of observed data from two theoretically distinct civic and ethnic cases.

We treat this evidence as hypotheses and suggest more rigorous testing. We recommend that the scholars who are interested in applying attitude network modeling to national identity data to prefer small *N* comparisons rather than large *N* studies for two reasons; the first reason is merely the early and explorative stage we are in. The second reason is the uncertainty – we are not 100 % sure if we can treat different national identities as a comparable thing. The findings we report in this study can only be a head-start and are therefore far from generalizable. For further evidence, we recommend future studies to compare the most similar and the most different cases. Taking the lead from Bonikowski (2009) our suggestions for case comparisons would be the following. Most similar cases: Chile and Venezuela, Germany and Austria, United States and Australia, Sweden and Denmark, Check Republic and Slovenia; most different cases: Philippines and France, Russia and Great Britain, Hungary and Switzerland.

Appendix:

Centrality plots of attitude network analyses:

Centrality measures assess the connectedness of variables to one another in a given network. These measures can be thought of as descriptive measures which summarize and further investigate the overall structure of the attitude network. Below, we report commonly used centrality measures, namely strength, closeness, and betweenness. These measures can be used for further interpretations. Strength shows how strongly a node (survey item) is directly connected to other nodes; it is the accumulative impact of the node's connections. Closeness is the accumulative influence of the direct and indirect connections of a given survey item. *Betweenness* is the bridging function of a survey item in the network, connecting multiple items. In other words, betweenness reflects how well one node connects other nodes to one another. For example, "ancestry" (Ancs: the importance given to common ancestry for given nationhood) and "born" (Born: the importance given to being born in the country) seem to be the most central nodes in all samples as their strength, closeness, and betweenness are all high. In contrast, the item "shrCust" (related to symbolic boundary making) seems to be not very central in samples from 1995 & 2013 except for its *closeness* in the samples from 2003 & 2013. Note that we do not report the stability (Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 2017) of these centrality measures since we report three networks with (almost) identical survey items. "Ancestry" was not included in the first round by the International Social Survey Program.



Figure 8 Centrality plots of the three National Identity Modules' samples. See table 1 for the abbreviations.





Comparison of factor (latent construct) structures in the networks:

Below are the networks with clusters shown with different colored edges. These clusters in the network correspond to the true dimensions of the latent variables (Dalege, Borsboom, Harreveld, et al., 2017; Golino & Demetriou, 2017; Golino & Epskamp, 2017). In our analyses, the results are inconsistent (the Gaussian graphical models and the Ising models do not match); also the Gaussian graphical model results are contradictory with the existing theoretical expectations.



GGM: Factor structure suggested by EGA IM: with clusters

Figure 10 ISSP National Identity Module 1 (1995): Network on the left is estimated with the original ordinal data; the colors of the nodes show the factor structure suggested by the exploratory graph analysis (EGA). Network on the right is the same network after the data is binarized; the latent variable structure here is different from the one suggested by EGA. Countries in this module are Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, USA. See Table 1 or 6 for the abbreviations of the nodes.


GGM: Factor structure suggested by EGA IM: with clusters

Figure 11 ISSP National Identity Module 2 (2003): Network on the left is estimated with the original ordinal data; the colors of the nodes show the factor structure suggested by the exploratory graph analysis (EGA). Network on the right is the same network after the data is binarized; the latent variable structure here is different from the one suggested by EGA. Countries in this module are Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland (Republic), Israel, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela. See Table 1 or 6 for the abbreviations of the nodes.



GGM: Factor structure suggested by EGA IM: with clusters

Figure 12 ISSP National Identity Module 3 (2013): Network on the left is estimated with the original ordinal data; the colors of the nodes show the factor structure suggested by the exploratory graph analysis (EGA). Network on the right is the same network after the data is binarized; the latent variable structure here is the same as the one suggested by EGA. Countries in this module are Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United States. See Table 1 or 6 for the abbreviations of the nodes.

Networks with covariates:

Below are the original networks we report in the results section (without the clusters highlighted in different colors); next to them, we plot the same networks estimated when gender and age are controlled for. The edges in all networks are estimated to be weaker after accounting for the influence of age and gender; this implies that the attitude networks of women and younger people have weaker connections between the survey items.

Ising Model Network

Ising Model Network after controled for gender & age



Figure 13 ISSP National Identity Module 1 (1995): Ising Model network and the same network after controlled for gender and age. See Table 1 or 6 for the abbreviations of the nodes.



Ising Model Network after controled for gender & age

Figure 14 ISSP National Identity Module 2 (2003): Ising Model network and the same network after controlled for gender and age. See table 1 or 6 for the abbreviations of the nodes.

Fel Fel Ctz Ctz Rsp Rsp Lng Lng Liv Liv Brn Brn INI INI Anc Anc IGE IGE ImT ImT Rlg Rlg INR INR shC shC ICR ICR Maximum: 1.52 Maximum: 1.52

Figure 15 ISSP National Identity Module 3 (2013): Ising Model network and the same network after controlled for gender and age. See table 10r 6 for the abbreviations of the nodes.

Gender differences in attitude networks:

Ising Model Network

The networks that include the gender and age covariates provide visual output. Out of these two variables, we tested the effect of gender on the attitude networks. Results reveal that the attitude structure of women is significantly different than men in all the three samples. We find no significant difference in attitude strength.

Formal t	Formal test of male & female attitude network differences						
	Attitude	Attitude Structure	Significantly different edges				
	Strength						
Module	Not significantly	Significantly different	Relg-Feel; Born-ImmCriRat; ImmCriRat-ImmTjobs; ImmCriRat-ImmNewIdeas; shrCust-				
1	different	at a p<.001 level	ImmNumRed; ImmCriRat-ImmNumRed (all at a p<.001 level)				
Module	Not significantly	Significantly different	Live-Relg; Lang-Feel; Ancs-ImmCriRat; shrCust-ImmCriRat; ImmCriRat-ImmTjobs;				
2	different	at a p<.001 level	ImmGfEco-ImmTjobs; ImmCriRat-ImmNumRed (all at a p<.001 level)				
Module	Not significantly	Significantly different	Born-Live; Born-Lang; Citz-Lang; Born-Resp; Citz-Resp; Live-Resp; Lang-Feel; Resp-Feel;				
3	different	at a p<.001 level	Lang-Ancs; Resp-Ancs; Live-shrCust; Resp-ImmCriRat; Resp-ImmNewIdeas; ImmCriRat-				
			ImmNumRed (all at a p<.001 level)				
Table 5 The estimated global strengths (the quantified strength of the national identities) are the following. Module 1: male=27.1							
female=28	3.1; module 2: male=	=28.1 female=29.1 ; modu	ıle 3: male=28.8 female=28.7				

Ising Model Network after controled for gender & age

			1995 (23 countries, <i>N</i> =30.894)		2003 (34 countries, <i>N</i> =45.993)			2013 (33 countries, <i>N</i> =45.297)				
Variable Abbreviation	Variable Name	Item Wording	Mean	SD	% Missing	Mean	SD	% Missing	Mean	SD	% Missing	Range
Brn	Born	to have been born in [COUNTRY]	2.95	1.02	2.38	3.10	0.96	2.48	3.04	0.97	2.04	
Ctz	Citz	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	3.34	0.83	2.36	3.38	0.79	2.42	3.36	0.80	1.86	1-4 Not
Liv	Live	to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life	3.04	0.91	2.89	3.14	0.88	2.82	3.10	0.88	2.30	important at
Lng	Lang	to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	3.44	0.79	2.01	3.45	0.77	2.15	3.43	0.80	1.73	all
Rlg	Relg	to be a [religion]	2.19	1.14	4.89	2.38	1.16	4.33	2.33	1.17	3.80	Very
Rsp	Resp	to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	3.38	0.78	3.69	3.35	0.78	3.15	3.34	0.80	2.64	important
Fel	Feel	to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	3.50	0.75	2.92	3.44	0.75	2.87	3.39	0.78	2.35	
Anc	Ancs	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry	-	-	-	2.82	1.05	7.63	2.80	1.05	2.84	
shC	shrCustom	It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY's] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY].	3.35	1.25	5.19	3.39	1.22	7.20	3.41	1.22	3.23	1-5 Disagree
ICR	ImmCriRat	Immigrants increase crime rates.		1.22	6.37	3.34	1.18	10.80	3.36	1.18	4.98	strongly -
IGE	ImmGfEco	Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY'S] economy.	3.14	1.07	9.72	2.98	1.05	13.23	2.97	1.07	6.09	Agree strongly
lmT	ImmTjobs	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].	3.08	1.21	6.15	3.09	1.21	9.79	3.18	1.21	3.74	
INI	ImmNewIdeas	Immigrants improve [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY] society by bringing new ideas and cultures.	2.65	1.12	9.94	2.77	1.07	12.23	2.88	1.09	5.09	
INR	ImmNumRed	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be	3.85	1.01	12.60	3.71	1.05	15.94	3.64	1.11	10.54	1-5 increased a lot - reduced a lot

Descriptive statistics (whole samples by year)

Table 6: Descriptive statistics of survey items

Descriptive statistics (by country)



Please refer to table 6 for the item wordings of the variables listed here.

Figure 16 National Identity Module 1 (1995) - conceptions of nationhood barplot, means by country;



Figure 17 National Identity Module 1 (1995) - boundary making barplot, means by country



Figure 18 National Identity Module 2 (2003) - conceptions of nationhood barplot, means by country



Figure 19 National Identity Module 2 (2003) - boundary making barplot, means by country



Figure 20 National Identity Module 3 (2013) - conceptions of nationhood barplot, means by country



Figure 21 National Identity Module 3 (2013) - boundary making barplot, means by country

Multi-Level Confirmatory Factor Analyses:

The network models suggest different factor structures for different datasets. For Modules 1 & 2 (1995 & 2003), two factors are suggested for *conceptions of nationhood;* a single factor structure is suggested for *boundary making* (including *prejudice* component) in Module 1; one item seems to belong to a different factor in the *boundary making* (including *prejudice* component) cluster of Module 2 (see the Ising Model in Figures 10 & 11). For Module 3, a single factor structure is suggested for *boundary making* (including *prejudice* component) (see the Ising Model in Figure 13).

On theoretical grounds, we acknowledge that we measure constructs that vary across countries as well as across individuals. On empirical grounds, the ISSP National Identity module data have a nested structure. The three datasets are the attitudes of individuals nested within regions (of countries). In short, the variance in the data has multiple levels: within-group level (individuals within regions) and between-group level (regions of countries). There are 301 regions from 24 countries in Module 1 (1995); in Module 2 (2003) 470 regions from 34 countries; and in Nodule 3 (2013), there are 433 regions from 33 countries.

As supplemental analyses to the network models, we conducted multilevel confirmatory factor analyses accounting for the nested data structure. Stapleton, Yang, and Hancock (2016) note that latent constructs have differing natures, thus different meanings in multilevel settings. Researchers should contemplate what they are measuring before modeling it – what is the nature (ontology) of the constructs at hand and how it should be modeled in a multilevel setting. We hypothesized that national identity is a shared and configural construct (Stapleton et al., 2016, pp. 496-498): this means that there is a latent construct at hand, but there is also a shared latent effect influencing the measurement model. In our case, this modeling strategy implies that the configural construct represents the averages of the national identities of the regions (of countries); for this study, the shared construct reflects the contextual effect of regions. We acknowledge that this shared construct might be any spurious contextual effect. However, our theoretical reasoning is that this shared construct should capture regional variations in the national identities, but admittedly it cannot capture cross-country differences. It is likely because of this reason many of the results from the multilevel CFAs are either uninterpretable or inconclusive. Note that our modeling strategy assumes invariance in the manifest variables. We also modeled the same latents without assuming invariance following the guideline of Castanho Silva, Bosancianu, and Littvay (in press), however, did not always get meaningful and interpretable results either⁷ so we are not reporting them. An ad hoc and equivocal deduction from our MLCFAs is that we cannot assume invariance in the measurement models suggested by the attitude network analyses.

Below are the results of our analyses.

⁷ The models which do not assume invariance use a Bayes estimator and allow random factor loadings. Note that the models we tested which do not assume invariance are not entirely tested for measurement invariance because the suggested strategy by Castanho Silva et al. (in press) is only available in Mplus version 8, which we do not have access to.



ISSP NI Module 1 (1995) National Identity Module 1 (1995) multilevel CFA hypothesized model; loadings below are standardized estimates. Scon: conception of nationhood shared; BconC: civic conception of nationhood between-group level; BconE: ethnic conception of nationhood between-group level; Sbm: boundary making shared; Bbm: boundary making between-group level. WconC: civic conception of nationhood within-group level; WconE: ethnic conception of nationhood within-group level; Wbm: boundary making within-group level. Residual variances are not shown for simplicity. # of regions (clusters in the dataset): 272

				Fact	or Loadings					
	Civic	Ethnic	Civic	Ethnic [Petwoon]	Conceptions of	BoundaryM	BoundaryM	BoundaryM		
	נייינוווון	[vvicinii]	[Between]	[Between]	[Between]		[Between]	[Shared]		
Born		0.730***		0.960***	-0.205*					
Citz	0.699***		0.918***		-0.409***					
Live		0.740***		0.999***	-0.133					
Lang	0.582***		0.910***		-0.070					
Relg		0.466***		0.793***	-0.207*					
Resp	0.374***		0.679***		-0.475***					
Feel	0.502***		0.919***		-0.012					
shC						0.402***	0.772***	-0.027		
ICR						0.649***	0.885***	0.217**		
IGE						0.560***	0.859***	0.418***		
ImT						0.625***	0.910***	0.086		
INI						0.522***	0.811***	0.587***		
INR						0.655***	0.959***	-0.042		
				Co	ovariances					
		١	Vithin		Between					
Civic-E	thnic		0.83	33***	0.950***					
Civic-BoundaryM 0.362***			52***	0.949***						
Ethnic-BoundaryM 0.472***				0.936***						
Concep	Conceptions of Nationhood Shared-BoundaryM Shared 0.670***									
				Fit St	atistic/Index					
Model	χ2: 6009.830 ³	*** (df=123); C	FI: 0.894; RMSEA	A: 0.047 not sign	ificant CI: [0.046 0.048]]; SRMR: 0.048 [V	Vithin] 0.438 [Betv	ween]		

Note that some of the estimated manifest variable variances are negative, which indicates the output is not interpretable.



National Identity Module 2 (2003) multilevel CFA hypotesized model; loadings below are standardized estimates. Scon: conception of nationhood shared; BconC: civic conception of nationhood between-group level; BconE: ethnic conception of nationhood between-group level; Sbm: boundary making shared; Bbm: boundary making between-group level. WconC: civic conception of nationhood within-group level; WconE: ethnic conception of nationhood within-group level; Wbm: boundary making within-group level. Residual variances are not shown for simplicity. # of regions (clusters in the dataset): 392

Factor Loadings										
	Civic	Ethnic	Civic	Ethnic	Conceptions of	BoundaryM	BoundaryM	BoundaryM		
	[Within]	[Within]	[Between]	[Between]	Nationhood Shared	[Within]	[Between]	Shared		
					[Between]			[Shared]		
Born		0.740***		0.983***	0.084***					
Citz	0.707***		0.913***		0.363***					
Live		0.686***		0.970***	0.195***					
Lang	0.555***		0.720***		0.523***					
Relg		0.484***		0.789***	-0.167***					
Resp	0.368***		0.618***		0.757***					
Feel	0.573***		0.880***		0.342***					
Ancs		0.705***		0.961***						
shC						0.408***	0.785***	0.421***		
ICR						0.630***	0.855***	0.338***		
IGE						0.580***	0.857***	0.453***		
ImT						0.616***	0.932***	-0.074		
INI						0.595***	0.907***	0.299***		
INR						0.655***	0.858***	0.407***		
				Co	variances					
		W	/ithin			Betwe	en			
Civic-Ethnic 0.832			2***	0.999***						
Civic-BoundaryM 0.296***				6***	0.867***					
Ethnic-BoundaryM 0.490***					0.890***					
Conceptions of Nationhood Shared-BoundaryM Shared 0.734***										
Fib Chabitatio (Index										
Madel		** (4f_140): 0		FIL 3L		. CDMD. 0.040 [M		voonl		
Widdel	Model x2: 9671.027*** (df=148); CFI: 0.897; RMSEA: 0.047 not significant CI: [0.046 0.048]; SRMR: 0.048 [Within] 0.566 [Between]									



National Identity Module 3 (2013) multilevel CFA hypotesized model; loadings below are standardized estimates. **Scon**: conception of nationhood shared; **Bcon**: conceptions of nationhood between-group level; **Sbm**: boundary making shared; **Bbm**: boundary making between-group level. **Wcon**: conceptions of nationhood within-group level; **Wbm**: boundary making within-group level. Residual variances are not shown for simplicity. **# of regions (clusters in the dataset)**: 420

			Factor Loadings				
	Conception of Nationhood [Within]	Conception of Nationhood [Between]	Conception of Nationhood Shared [Between]	Bound [Wit	aryM hin]	BoundaryM [Between]	BoundaryM Shared [Shared]
Born	0.711***	0.948***	-0.278***				
Citz	0.671***	0.975***	0.114**				
Live	0.689***	0.971***	-0.130**				
Lang	0.531***	0.793***	0.399***				
Relg	0.473***	0.639***	-0.540***				
Resp	0.365***	0.656***	0.683***				
Feel	0.537***	0.903***	0.135**				
Ancs	0.672***	0.876*** -0.411***					
shC			0.368***		**	0.752***	0.067
ICR		0.596*		**	0.881***	-0.027	
IGE				0.571*	**	0.927***	0.215***
ImT				0.593*	**	0.916***	-0.418***
INI				0.574***		0.932***	0.147**
INR				0.548***		0.802***	0.397***
	Covariances						
	Within Between						
Concep	Conceptions of Nationhood-BoundaryM 0.392*** 0.897***						0.897***
Concep	Conceptions of Nationhood Shared-BoundaryM Shared 0.771***						
Fit Statistic/Index							
Model χ2: 15742.544*** (df=151); CFI: 0.844; RMSEA: 0.55*** CI: [0.054 0.055]; SRMR: 0.058 [Within] 0.425 [Between] Note that some of the estimated manifest variable variances are negative, which indicates the output is not interpretable.							

Confirmatory factor analyses of the chosen civic and ethnic national identities:

Below we report the measurement models with the factor structures suggested by the ethnic and civic national identity network models. The goodness of fit statistics for all the models suggests a bad fit to the data.





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PROJECT 2: What does it mean to be [insert nationality or profile here]? Multi-method analysis of four civic and four ethnic national identities with representative samples

Abstract:

Background/motivation: Much research revealed national identity differences across countries. Previous findings also concluded that there are different perceptions of national identity in a given single country. However, researchers seldom simultaneously address the between and within-country differences in national identities.

Methods: We fill this gap with a multi-method approach using representative samples by choosing four theoretically civic (Canada, New Zealand, United States & United Kingdom) and four theoretically ethnic (Japan, Germany, Turkey & Iceland) national identities. We apply both variable-oriented and person-oriented analyses strategies within the general structural equation modeling framework.

Results: Our findings unveil the massive complexity underlying national identities. Given the theoretically chosen eight cases, we find peculiar patterns of within as well as between-country variations in national identities.

Relevance/Implications: We discuss our findings by comparing and contrasting the cases with regards to their within and across variations in the theoretical civic and ethnic dichotomy.

Introduction

Following the footsteps of the pioneering national identity researchers, for decades, scholars of nationalism were convinced that the civic vs. ethnic typology of national identities provided a decent framework. This paradigm suggested that nations with civic identities were communities founded upon common political principles and territorial ties. In contrast, nations with ethnic identities were based on descent and ascriptive elements, which were not achievable. In other words, the ethnic identities were the ones which could not be acquired later unlike the civic ones. So, by character, these ideal-types were portrayed as inclusive vs. exclusive.

Taking the lead from Meinecke ([1907] 1970), Kohn (1944) argued that the western nations are the ones with civic identities and liberal orientations, the eastern nations adopt the ethnic orientation with illiberal practices. Many different labels were used by various researchers (van der Zwet, 2015) throughout the years but almost all of them assumed the same principal argument.

The dominant paradigms of ethnic vs. civic notions were tested using various empirical approaches, which used broad methodological toolkits that reflected the state of the art of a particular era. Researchers, at different times, presented evidence that either confirmed (Ariely, 2013; Breuilly, 1982; Greenfeld, 1992; Wright, 2011a, 2011b) or contradicted (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013) the dichotomy. The literature is also not devoid of mixed evidence (Janmaat, 2006; Latcheva, 2010; Wright, Citrin, & Wand, 2012) on the dichotomy.

Due to mixed evidence and consistent criticism of the reductionist paradigm, the civic vs. ethnic notions of national identity dichotomy lost its popularity in the field. According to B. Bonikowski (2017), the criticism of this reductionist paradigm was well-grounded due to empirical inaccuracy as well as normative and analytical shortcomings. However, the abandonment of the civic vs. ethnic paradigm lead to unintended consequences, that is the declining number of country comparisons in the literature (B. Bonikowski, 2017, p. 148). Another delinquency in nationalism studies is that the problematic dichotomy and its disputing evidence are leaving the theoretical approaches fragmented.

We think nationalism studies need more systematic comparative research that investigates the similarities and differences between various national identities. A recent paradigm shift in the literature pointed out to different perceptions of national identity in a given country (Brubaker, 1996; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Fukuoka, 2016; C. Miller-Idriss, 2006; C. Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). In other words, scholars of national identity addressed the within-country variation. To this day, there is research which lays out the between-country variation (B. Bonikowski, 2009) in national identities; there is further research proving within-country variation in national identities (B. Bonikowski, 2013).

Much of the contemporary research on national identity relies on large *N* approaches. Although we appreciate the studies that scrutinize the complexities of national identities in dozens of countries with survey data, we argue that the ideal comparative approaches should utilize a lower number of cases. While two case comparisons such as the ones by Bonikowski (2017) and Trittler (2016) are helpful, we believe comparisons of two and four might still fall short to drawing broader inferences. This is why, in this study, we take eight national identities, and compare them with a multi-method approach. On theoretical grounds, four of the countries we select are civic, four of them are ethnic. We aim to better understand the sources of variation in national identity both across and within countries. As Kaufmann (2016) outlines, national identities are complex, and we need novel applications to compile the between- and within-country variations in national identity. To achieve this task, we utilize nationally-

representative survey data and apply a person-centered approach besides a variable-centered approach.

Our research question appears humble: "What are the different notions of nationhood in these eight countries and what explains the variation in national identities?" We can even reformulate these research questions in a caricaturized and metaphorical manner, which we chose as the title for this study: "What does it mean to be [insert nationality or profile here]?" The underlying unifying question here is twofold. Firstly, we know different countries have distinct national identities but what are the best measurement models to capture those distinctions in survey data? This is our variable-centered approach. With such an approach, we measure the cross-country variation as an attitude object. Secondly, we take subjectivity into account. Although the attitude object is a single thing (perhaps with multiple dimensions), different subjective viewpoints perceive this object in distinct ways. Therefore we need to reveal the subjectivity in national identity perceptions as well. This is our person-centered approach. Hence, we capture the between- and within-country variation by juxtaposing these variable and person-centered approaches.

In the following, we present and justify our case selections and outline the themes in the national identities. We then outline the methods we employ and list the results. Finally, we discuss the results by comparing and contrasting the cases.

Case selection:

We chose four civic and four ethnic case examples on theoretical grounds. The countries that represent the civic notion are Canada, New Zealand, United States and the United Kingdom; the ethnic case examples are Japan, Germany, Turkey, and Iceland. We believe these cases exemplify civic and ethnic notions with different characteristics.

According to Greenfeld (1992), the United States and the United Kingdom are the two prototypical countries with civic national identities. Both have been experiencing political turmoil recently with the Brexit and the election of a polarizing president, respectively. Much literature discusses these developments with references to nationalism and populism. An apparent crisis is less salient in the New Zealander and Canadian cases. However, this is not to say that these countries are entirely free of political issues related to nationalism and prejudice (Sibley et al., 2011; Sibley & Liu, 2007; Sibley, Liu, & Khan, 2008; Sumino, 2017; Watson, 2017; Winter, 2014).

The prototypical ethnic nationalism cases are Japan and Germany (Breuilly, 1982, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992; Wright et al., 2012). Japan is perceived to be an ethnically homogeneous country with a longstanding tradition of promoting a national culture (Larsen, 2016). Germany, on the other hand, faces multiculturalism challenges and migration dilemmas with a stigmatized national identity, which is still being haunted by its past (Alexander, 2004; Giesen, 2004). Another saliently problematic national identity that cannot make peace with its past and present is the Turkish case (Ozdemir, 2000). Similar to Japan, Iceland is another country which is thought to be ethnically homogeneous; however, it is not a subject of conspicuous crisis or stigmatization. Below we briefly mention some of the most salient themes and issues in the national identities of the chosen cases.

Canada: The major themes in the Canadian identity include challenges against national unity (i.e., separatist tendencies coming from the Québécois nationalists), recognition of various native Aboriginal and ethnic groups' rights and other multiculturalism struggles which includes the assimilation of different immigrant cultures into the society. Canada's ethnic diversity is astounding; the country

refrains from openly adopting a prevalent founding-group discourse. That is why one of the most salient discourses in the country features a liberal patriotic idea (Bashevkin, 1991), which promotes an inclusive and civic understanding of national identity.

New Zealand: The history of the colonial context is among the central features that shape the notions of national identity in New Zealand. These notions are convoluted in race, ethnicity, colonizers, and natives. The adjective "New Zealander" signified different racial and ethnic groups in the country in different eras (Cormack & Robson, 2010). Various ethnic groups and cultures migrated to this geographically isolated land throughout its history. A need for a renewed and renationalized collective identity arose in New Zealand after the official dissolution of the British Empire. After this time the New Zealander national identity was subject to many public debates, which had contested views on national history and culture. Contemporary New Zealand is home to numerous ethnic groups from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Despite the celebration of ethnic and cultural diversity and the inclusive definitions of national identity, immigration and increasing ethnic diversity stemming from Asia are perceived as a threat (Revell, Papoutsaki, & Kolesova, 2014).

United States: American exceptionalism (Fuller, 2006), patriotism (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Li & Brewer, 2004) and national pride (Suhay, Calfano, & Dawe, 2016; Wolak & Dawkins, 2017) are probably the most outstanding motives of the national identity in the United States. The melting pot narrative, "Americanness" as something that anybody can blend into, has been a functional but elusory element (Smith, 2012) of American nationalism. An alternative approach to the melting pot component addresses the question of whether America has a constituent and core culture the country has to protect (Huntington, 2004). Thus, the normative content of the American national identity is not uncontested (Wright et al., 2012).

United Kingdom: One of the significant aspects of the British identity relates to the complicated relationship between this supra-national category and the sub-national categories it encompasses (Kumar, 2010). Social class is another major theme (Aughey, 2012) besides multiculturalism challenges (Asari, Halikiopoulou, & Mock, 2008; Black, 2016; Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010). The loss of the British Empire and its psychological consequences on contemporary issues is another topic that keeps drawing scholarly attention (Kenny, 2015; Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 34; Kumar, 2006a, 2006b).

Japan: The contemporary Japanese national identity incorporates inconsonant elements. After the defeat in WWII, the country had to espouse a pacifist national identity while the Emperor who denoted the atrocities of imperial Japan remained in office and was given a symbolic role. The country was stripped of its imperial past in record time; unlike Germany, the war crimes were not directly and instantly confronted. Furthermore, the Japanese people and the Emperor were portrayed as the innocent victims rather than deliberate perpetrators. Such a paradoxical narrative allowed the nation to keep identifying with the ultra-nationalist symbols while these symbols were the grounding of the Japanese aggression in the first place. This paradox left the Japanese collective psyche with simultaneous feelings of humiliation and liberation. Despite the perceptions of a resilient rebranding, the Japanese national identity is entangled (Conrad, 2003; Fukuoka, 2016; Sasaki, 2004).

Germany: German national identity has been studied in so many aspects; much which points to five overlapping themes. The first theme is issues of coping with the past (Kopf-Beck, Gaisbauer, & Dengler, 2013; C. Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). The second topic scrutinizes re-unification (Blank, 2003; Dalton & Weldon, 2010; Eldad Davidov & Braun, 2012; Kühnen et al., 2001; Joyce Marie Mushaben, 2010). There is no shortage of studies about multiculturalism, issues around integration, inter-group relations and prejudices (Holtz, Dahinden, & Wagner, 2013; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, &

Schmidt, 2010; Zick, Wagner, Van Dick, & Petzel, 2001). Right-wing and radical movements in the country (Graef, 2017; Koehler, 2014; Cynthia Miller-Idriss, 2014; Virchow, 2016) constitute the fourth broad topic. Finally, the fifth theme in the German national identity is regarding the reluctant leadership role of Germany in the EU as well as the country's hesitant involvement in world affairs (Rattinger, Endres, Jungkunz, Mader, & Potzschke, 2016; Schoen, 2007; Siddi, 2016; Thomas, 2013).

Turkey: Many of the themes in Turkish national identity revolve around ethnicity, religion, and relations with the western world (Kadioglu & Keyman, 2011). After the liberation war that followed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a nation-building process took place within the framework of a rapid modernization which emulated the western nation-state models of the time. A top-down process forced contemporaneous territorial and ethnic understandings of nationhood aiming to assimilate a heterogeneous population into Turkishness. Islam played an ambivalent role; on the one hand, it was seen as an impediment to the modernization progress, on the other hand, it was an instrumental category to include various ethnicities and exclude non-Muslims (Cagaptay, 2002). In contemporary Turkey, the paradoxes of the early republican era keep shaping the societal cleavages in the country. The country is drifting away from the West; in other words, from Europe, which once was the ambivalently aspired role model, and from the United States – the untrusted strategic ally. While there is an ongoing cultural and political clash between the secular and conservative segments of the society, the unresolved Kurdish issue constitutes another acute matter.

Iceland: Iceland has the youngest (official) national identity among the cases under investigation. The people of the geographically isolated island have had positive feelings toward autonomy and independence for quite a long time. Since the complete independence in 1944, the country promotes a patriotism based on romantic notions of its nature and folklore (Dibben, 2009; Earnest, 2013; Halink, 2014; Oslund & Cronon, 2011; Sigurdsson, 1996) instead of illusionary superiority feelings. That is not to say that the country is entirely free of nationalism or exclusion. Iceland, as an isolated and homogeneous nation, is also facing the challenges of accommodating and integrating a small but growing number of immigrants – the country has 6 % of its population from foreign origins.

Methods:

Our data is from the international social survey program's national identity module. We subsetted samples from the United States (*N*=1274), United Kingdom (*N*=904), Japan (*N*=1234), Germany (*N*=1717), Turkey (*N*=1666) and Iceland (*N*=1082) using the module 3 (ISSP-Research-Group, 2015). Additionally, we filtered out the Canadian (*N*=1211) and New Zealander (*N*=1036) samples from module 2 (ISSP-Research-Group, 2012). All the variables of interest are listed in Table 1.

As for our analytical choice, in a nutshell, we examine the variation in the data by comparing and combining the results of a variable-centered approach (confirmatory factor analysis - CFA) and a person-centered approach (latent profile analysis - LPA). See the Methods section in the online appendix for more detail on the methods used.

The national identity is the attitude object in our analyses. The CFAs, as the measurement models for the attitude object, disclose the dimensionality of the national identities for the distinct cases. The attitude object being different across countries cannot be the whole picture, though. LPA reveals the subjectivity in perceiving the same attitude object. So, we expect to find within-country differences as well; in other words, individuals in countries perceive their national identities in distinct ways. Once we have the more comprehensive picture at hand with the CFAs & LPAs, in the final step we refit the measurement models while accounting for the heterogeneity (subjectivity) in the samples.

Variable	Variable	
Abbreviation	Name	Some people southat the following things are important for being truly
		Some people say that the following things are important for being thuy
		following is Not Important at all (1) - Very important (4)
Anc	Ancs	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry
Brn	Born	to have been born in [COUNTRY]
Ctz	Citz	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship
Fel	Feel	to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]
Lng	Lang	to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]
Liv	Live	to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life
Rlg	Relg	to be a [religion]
Rsp	Resp	to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws

Table 7: Survey-items measuring national identity.

Results:

Below we report the selected measurement model and the Latent Profile Analysis results. The extended results for the best measurement model selection are reported in the online appendix.

Canada:

We find that the best measurement model that explains the data from the Canadian sample has three dimensions. We labeled the first dimension as *achievable* since this dimension suggests that to be truly Canadian, one needs to speak English or French, feel Canadian, respect the laws and institutions of the country and have the citizenship. The second dimension is *ascriptive* – only those who have Canadian ancestry and are Christian can be truly Canadian. The third dimension suggests a notion of *nativity*; those who are truly Canadians are the ones who were born and spent most of their lives in the country.

The latent profile analysis results reveal only a single profile. Almost 94 % (1141 out of 1211) individuals in the Canadian sample are grouped as having a very similar response pattern for the survey-items we used in the analysis. This simply means that subjectivity does not play much of a role regarding perceiving these items when it comes to what it means to be Canadian.



Table 8: CFA and LPA results for the Canadian sample.

New Zealand:

The theoretical model for civic vs. ethnic conceptions of nationhood fit the New Zealander sample best. The *civic* notion is influencing survey-items which give importance to being a citizen, speaking English, respecting the laws and institutions and feeling New Zealander. The *ethnic* notion, on the other hand, is influencing the survey-items on having New Zealander ancestry, being Christian, being born and having spent most of one's life in the country.

We find two distinct profiles in the New Zealander sample that have significantly different response patterns to the survey-items. Profile-1 constitutes approximately 56 % (587/1036) of the sample; Profile-2 constitutes 33 % (337/1036). While Profile-2 gives high importance to all the listed survey-items, Profile-1 attributes much less importance to religion and a little less importance to items on ancestry



and spending most of the lifespan in the country. So, in the New Zealander case, we observe the involvement of subjectivity regarding assessing what it means to be truly New Zealander.

Table 9: CFA and LPA results for the New Zealander sample.

United States:

The best measurement model for the American national identity has three dimensions. We use the same labels we have for the Canadian model; however, the latent constructs influence different surveyitems. In public opinion, one way of being truly American is being *native* to the country, which means being born and spending most of one's lifespan in the country. Americanness is also something *achievable*; to be truly American one has to have the citizenship, speak English, respect the American laws and institutions and feel American. The last dimension suggests that there is also an *ascriptive* perception of Americanness. A person can be truly American by being Christian and having American ancestry.

We find three distinct types of people in the American sample. Compared to the other profiles, Profile-3 (37 % of the sample) finds all the items to be highly important. Profiles 2 (46 %) and 1 (6 %) give less importance to the items that measure *ascriptive* and *nativity* dimensions. The items that measure the importance given to speaking English to be truly American seems to be the most contested item between Profiles 2 & 1. While Profile 1's general tendency to endorse higher importance to all the items is lower compared to the others, Profile-2 attributes utmost importance to language and citizenship, which falls into the *achievable* dimension of American national identity. In the American case, we see the prominence of subjectivity – American national identity (as perceived in the public opinion) has three dimensions; these notions are perceived differently by different types of individuals.





Table 10: CFA and LPA results for the American sample.

United Kingdom:

Our last theoretically-civic case, the United Kingdom, also has three dimensions in its national identity. Similar to the Canadian and American cases, we label the latent constructs as *nativity, achievable* and *ascriptive*. However, in contrast to other cases, the *nativity* dimension taps into three items: giving importance to being born and spending most of one's lifespan in Britain and having the British citizenship. We believe this notion of being truly British reflects the citizenship policies applied by the state. The *ascriptive* dimension is the same with the Canadian and American cases; to be truly British, one needs to be Christian and of British descent. Finally, the last dimension suggests Britishness is something *achievable*; a person is considered to be truly British as long as they respect the British laws and institutions, speaks English and feels British.

Latent profile analysis suggests four subjective viewpoints in perceiving the British national identity. Compared to Profiles 1 (36 % of the sample) and 4 (4 %), Profiles 2 (27 %) and 3 (25 %) give high importance to almost all the items except religion. So, the contested trait between Profile 2 and Profile 3 for being truly British is being Christian or not. Similar to Profile 2, Profile 1 finds religion to be not very important, but in contrast, the importance given to ancestry is also lower in Profile 1. Profile 4 is similar to Profile 1, but this response pattern attributes much higher importance to religion – almost as high as Profile 3. The prominence of subjectivity is evident in the British case; the same attitude object is perceived differently by diverse subjective viewpoints. Note that the contested attitude object in the American case was the *achievable* dimension; in the British case, the items of the *ascriptive* dimension are contested among the different profiles.



 Table 11: CFA and LPA results for the British sample.

Japan:

The best measurement model for Japanese national identity has three dimensions. What is different here is the *mixed* dimension: in the public opinion, to be truly Japanese, one needs to have Japanese ancestry, be a believer of Buddhism or Shintoism, respect the country's laws and institutions and feel Japanese. The nationhood in Japan is something *achievable* according to the second dimension. One can be considered truly Japanese if the person speaks Japanese and has spent most of their lifespan in Japan. Finally, the third dimension *nativity* suggests that one is truly Japanese if they have the citizenship and is born in the country. Note that the *mixed* dimension harbors an unexpected constellation. The same construct, on the one hand, influences two items (ancestry and religion), which reflect an ethnic orientation on theoretical grounds. On the other hand, two items (respecting laws &

institutions and feeling), which reflect a civic orientation on theoretical grounds are also influenced by the same latent construct.

Latent profile analysis results reveal four distinct response patterns in the Japanese sample. Profile 3 (16 %) finds all the attributes to be highly important to be truly Japanese. Profile 2 (40 %) is likely to attribute high importance to all the survey-items except religion. Profile 1 (25%) is also low on the religion item, but in contrast to Profile 2, Profile 1 tends to be lower on four other items, which are ancestry, being born in the country, citizenship and speaking the language. The last profile (4 which constitutes only 3 % of the sample) is low on the *mixed* dimension but high on *nativity*. The Japanese case also highlights the importance of subjectivity in national identity's perception. Compared to the previously discussed national identities, we are looking at a more complicated picture in the Japanese case. All the dimensions of the Japanese identity seem to be contested among the different profiles.





Table 12: CFA and LPA results for the Japanese sample.

Germany:

German national identity is ethnic on theoretical grounds, but like the civic cases discussed above, it has three dimensions, which we again labeled as *nativity*, *achievable* and *ascriptive*. In fact, the measurement model is the same as for the British case. In the *nativity* dimension, an individual is perceived to be truly German if the person is born in the country, spent most of their life in Germany and has the citizenship. Similar to the British case, this conception of being German reflects some aspects of the citizenship policies of Germany (Low, 2014; Joyce Marie Mushaben, 2010). The *ascriptive* dimension of the German national identity suggests that one is truly German with ethnic heritage and Christianity. The third dimension of the German national identity, on the other hand, reflects an *achievable* construct. Germanness is achievable by speaking German, respecting the laws and institutions in the country and by feeling German.

We observe five latent profiles in the German sample. Only one of these profiles finds religion to be important for being truly German – Profile 4 (14 %). Finding religion important or not seems to be the only difference between Profiles 4 and 5 (16 %). Apart from Profile 2 (27 %), all the profiles find language to be very important for being truly German; Profile 2 attributes the highest importance to respecting the German laws and institutions. The items influenced by the *nativity* dimension seem to be setting Profile 1 (28 %) and Profile 3 (7 %) apart; Profile 3 gives higher importance to the items on this dimension. We observe another complicated picture in our second theoretically ethnic case. All the survey-items on the question for what constitutes German nationhood are highly contested among the different profiles. The German sample is the most heterogeneous among the cases we investigate.



Table 13: CFA and LPA results for the German sample.

Turkey:

Turkish national identity is best measured with a two-dimensional model. However, one of the revealed constructs is a bit anomalous. As displayed in Table 8, we observe one latent construct that influences the responses to the items regarding being born in Turkey, having spent most of one's life in the country, being a Turkish citizen, speaking Turkish, being a Muslim and respecting the Turkish laws and institutions. We labeled this dimension as a *cultural* notion. The responses to two items in the Turkish sample arise from a *mixed* notion of Turkish nationhood. According to this conception of nationhood, an individual can be truly Turkish if they have Turkish ancestry and feels Turkish. This is an unusual concourse. On theoretical grounds, these two items should belong to two distinct and opposite constructs – civic vs. ethnic. Feeling the nationhood is something achievable (civic in theory) and having the ancestry as something ascriptive (ethnic in theory).

The latent profile analysis of the Turkish sample reveals four distinct subjective viewpoints in perceiving the national identity. Profile 2 constitutes the majority of the sample (62 %), which gives importance to all the survey-items. Profile 1 (20 %) is just a little lower than Profile 2's responses on all the items. Profile 3 (11 %) attributes even lower importance to all the survey-items; religion has the lowest score in this profile. The scores of Profile 4 (4 %) is somewhere between the scores of Profile 3 and Profile 1, but for this profile, being Muslim is the most important characteristic of being truly Turkish and respecting the laws an institutions is the least important. The Turkish case is another clear demonstration of the relevance of subjectivity in perceiving the national identity.



Table 14: CFA and LPA results for the Turkish sample.

Iceland:

The data from the Icelandic sample is best explained with the theoretical measurement model (civic vs. ethnic). In the public opinion, the national identity in Iceland has both *civic* and *ethnic* notions. While the *ethnic* notion influences the items on ancestry, religion, being born and spending most of the lifespan in the country, the *civic* notion gives importance to citizenship, language, respect towards the country's laws & institutions and to feeling Icelandic.

We observe two latent profiles in the Icelandic sample. Profile 2, which consists of 26 % of the sample, attributes a high importance to all the elements that constitute the nationhood in Iceland. Profile 1 (70 %) attributes higher importance to citizenship, language, feeling Icelandic and respecting the laws and institutions of the country to be truly Icelandic. Thus, subjectivity is also at work in the sample from Iceland regarding the perception of the national identity.





Table 15: CFA and LPA results for the Icelandic sample.

In the next step, we check if the measurement models of the different national identities can account for the heterogeneity in the samples. In other words, we ask if the measurement model is good for all the different profiles. Since the results reveal a single profile in Canada, we do not do any further analysis for that sample. The detailed results of the following findings can be seen in the online appendix.

In the New Zealander sample, the correlation between the civic and ethnic factor is higher for Profile 2 compared to Profile 1; also the factor loading of religion is not significant for Profile 2. In the U.S. sample, the correlation between the factors is strongest for Profile 2; additionally, the item regarding respect is not significant for Profile 3. The measurement model for the British national identity fails to capture the attitudes of Profiles 3 and 4; factor correlations for Profile 1 are lower than Profile 2's factor correlations. The Japanese national identity's measurement model is good for Profiles 1 and 3 but not for 2 and 4; Profile 4's factor correlations are higher than Profile 2's. The measurement models used for the German and Turkish samples do not converge when the heterogeneity in the sample is accounted for. In the Icelandic sample, the factor correlations are very close to one another.

Discussion:

Two apparent inferences stand out from the analyses. First, it is only fair to say that there is no pure ethnic or civic national identity. Even ethnically homogeneous nations like Japan and Iceland have either both civic and ethnic notions or mixed notions. This is no news; many studies before us argued the same (Ozkirimli, 2017) and provided evidence to support their arguments. We just confirm co-occurrence and provide further evidence. We guess that these concepts are not applicable to many cases. Six out of the eight national identities we investigate in this study deviate from the theoretical notions of civic vs. ethnic. Secondly, the overall results indicate that one model cannot measure it all; that is to say, researchers need to be very cautious about two sources of variability in the national identities. As mentioned above, the first variability is across countries, but there is a second variability within the countries.

One model does not fit all - between-country variation:

It is unexpected to observe the theoretical civic-ethnic model explaining countries like New Zealand and Iceland since one might think that these countries are dissimilar. The first commonality that likely comes to mind for these countries is their geographical isolation, which we believe is not necessarily related to the theoretical model in a meaningful way. Interestingly, we observe two distinct subjectivities in perceiving the national identities in these countries. If we leave aside the mean differences between these profiles across countries, the response patterns have (at least) visual similarities. As a supplementary procedure, we also applied multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to check whether Icelandic and New Zealander identities are meaningfully comparable in their quantified form⁸. We find items on religion, language and living in the country for most of one's lifespan are impacted differently by the latent factors across Iceland and New Zealand. So, even though the measurement models and the latent profiles appear to be similar, the attitude object (national identity) is most probably distinct, to begin with.

The second overlapping measurement model belongs to U.S. and Canada. These countries are known to have a similar political culture in many respects but the supplementary multi-group CFA, again, suggests caution here. The impact of *nativity* on religion is very distinct across the U.S. and Canada. Moreover, three more items on the achievable *dimension* are also impacted differently. Additionally, Canadian identity is not contested within the country as the single profile suggests; we cannot say the same for the American national identity. Particularly Americanness as an *achievable* notion seems to be much disputed among the Americans themselves.

German and British national identities share a common measurement model as well. As we mentioned earlier, we believe this is at least partially due to similar aspects of citizenship policies and perceptions of those policies. Nonetheless, these countries are most heterogenetic regarding latent profiles, which is to suggest that national identities in these countries are very much contested in the public opinion. Note that the British deliberate the *ascriptive* side of their identity; Germans are contentious on every dimension of their identity. Multi-group CFA reveals that at least one item in each dimension is very distinct across countries, which is an indication for further caution to make meaningful comparisons between the quantified forms of British and German national identities.

Japanese and Turkish national identities are distinct in almost every way from one another as well as from other cases in this study. However, we spot one commonality – both countries have identities with mixed theoretical notions in a single dimension. The Japanese measurement model brings together descent, religion, feeling, and respect; Turkish national identity assembles ancestry and feeling in one dimension, religion, respect and other theoretically civic elements on the other dimension.

One model does not fit all - within-country variation:

Canadian national identity seems to be the only one without contention. In New Zealand, religion is by far the most contested element of national identity; this is probably because religion here is the marker of ethnicity across many groups. Despite the dominant melting-pot narrative that constructs the image of a supra-national category, the debates of what it means to be American seem far from being resolved. Significant differences across profiles stem from perceptions towards ancestry and religion on the *ascriptive* dimension, and language on the *achievable* dimension. These items are indubitably the markers of race and ethnicity in each country. The heterogeneity in the U.K. is to be expected due to the imperial past and the multi-ethnic composition of the nation.

⁸ In this procedure, at least a metric invariance (same factor-loadings) is desired for cross-cultural/country research (E. Davidov, 2009). See the online appendix for the extended MGCFA results.
Germany has slightly more of an intricate heterogeneity; according to Behr (2007) migrationmembership dilemma (Triadafilopoulos, 2012) seems to be "at the heart of the German national identity." The country still seems to be in denial that it is a de facto immigrant country. In the words of Behr (2007, p. 467) " ... [G]ermans firmly delineate, and jealously protect, their identity as an ethnic category", which keeps on drawing symbolic boundaries between ethnic-Germans and non-ethnic-Germans in the country. The apparent answer to the question of what it means to be German seems to be multifold as revealed by the latent profile analysis results. The perceptions around Japanese and Turkish national identities are considerably heterogeneous as well. Though, the subjective viewpoints in the Turkish and Japanese samples reflect the peculiarities of the *mixed* notions of the national identities in these countries. The contest around Icelandic nationhood seems to be encapsulated by the ethnic notion, but the most prominent difference seems to be the importance given to religion for being truly Icelandic.

When we take the whole complexity into account and check whether the measurement models can capture the attitudes of the different profiles within the countries⁹, Icelandic and New Zealander cases do not pose huge problems. In fact, in the pseudo-mixture CFAs, we find that the Icelandic measurement model can account for subjectivity differences very well. New Zealand's model is mediocre due to religion not being significant for one of the profiles. Subjectivity is relatively well captured with the U.S.'s measurement model as well, but the model fails to reflect the third profile's attitudes accurately due to the respect item being not significant. Again, Canadian case does not pose an issue due to the single profile.

The pseudo-mixture CFA models fall short of capturing more than one profile's attitudes in Japan and the United Kingdom. The problematic items are ancestry and religion in the British sample; in the Japanese sample, the model cannot reflect the attitudes of Profiles 2 and 4. The measurement models for the Turkish and German national identities do not work at all. The measurement models of Turkish and German identities are far from being able to account for subjectivity².

Limitations, conclusion and further research suggestions:

We draw a self-evident conclusion from the overall findings. Normative content of the national identities matter, as does the subjectivity in perceiving the normative content. What we mean by normative content is the narratives that constitute the ingredients of the national identities. It is only natural some, or many, of these narratives are going to be incoherent and conflicting with one another (Kaufmann, 2016; Özkırımlı, 2005). Almost all the cases we investigated have contested ideas on what constitutes nationhood in the studied country. We show that subjectivity plays a crucial role in the perceptions of national identity. Although the attitude object is the same (national identity: a multi-dimensional latent construct), different subjective viewpoints perceive this object in distinct ways. We believe normative content and subjectivity interact all the time. In sum, we argue that not only is there plurality in the meaning of nationhood in the social/cultural/political environment; that environment is represented differently in people's minds as the latent profile analysis reveals.

Although our work is no pioneer in revealing this subjectivity (Kopf-Beck, 2015; Kopf-Beck et al., 2013) we believe we highlight its significance even more. Additionally, our work reveals a few not recently detected (potential) patterns. We believe further, and more in-depth research on the cases of Germany and Turkey, would be particularly interesting since the environment (context) and person (agency) interaction remains to be unclear in these countries. Another exciting line of inquiry could delve into the

⁹ See all the extended results in the online appendix.

Japanese and British cases to scrutinize the normative content of the national identities in these former empires.

Appendix:

Descriptive statistics:

Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 10 below.

Descriptive sto	itistics:																	
			CA 2003		NZ 2013		US 2013		UK 2013		JP 2013		DE 2013		TR 2013		IS 2013	
Variable	Variable		(N=1211) Mean SD		(N=1036)		(N=1274)		(N=904)		(N=1234)		(N=1/1/)		(N=1666)		(/v=1082)	
Abbreviation	Name		Ivicali	30	Wear	30	wiedii	30	wiean	30	wiean	30	IVICAL	30	IVICALI	30	IVICALI	30
clC	clsCnty	[Instrumental variable used in the SEMs]: How close do you feel to [COUNTRY] Not close at all (1) - Very close (4)	3.30	0.80	3.56	0.61	3.26	0.79	2.96	0.77	3.59	0.55	3.17	0.68	3.36	0.84	3.40	0.66
		Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is Not Important at all (1) - Very important (4)																
Anc	Ancs	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry	2.65	1.03	2.80	1.08	2.42	1.11	2.71	1.07	2.85	0.98	2.33	0.99	3.35	0.91	2.61	0.97
Brn	Born	to have been born in [COUNTRY]	3.11	1.00	3.20	0.96	2.97	1.05	3.16	0.90	3.03	0.93	2.72	0.94	3.39	0.85	2.75	0.95
Ctz	Citz	to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	3.71	0.58	3.49	0.75	3.63	0.68	3.39	0.75	3.37	0.77	3.18	0.83	3.48	0.77	3.41	0.69
Fel	Feel	to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	3.54	0.69	3.53	0.72	3.39	0.85	3.25	0.84	3.37	0.80	3.03	0.86	3.30	0.97	3.54	0.67
Lng	Lang	to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	3.60	0.69	3.60	0.67	3.64	0.66	3.72	0.56	3.10	0.89	3.63	0.62	3.42	0.82	3.55	0.66
Liv	Live	to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life	3.24	0.86	3.14	0.87	3.05	0.96	3.21	0.81	2.98	0.86	2.94	0.87	3.32	0.86	2.83	0.86
Rlg	Relg	to be a [religion]	2.60	1.18	2.19	1.18	2.47	1.25	2.05	1.11	1.93	0.90	1.90	0.97	3.52	0.80	1.92	1.04
Rsp	Resp	to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	3.61	0.58	3.38	0.78	3.55	0.69	3.45	0.77	2.91	0.87	3.45	0.69	3.39	0.82	3.33	0.76
shC	shrCustom	[Outcome variable used in the SEMs]: It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY's] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY]. Disagree Strongly (1) - Agree Strongly (5)	3.02	1.29	2.96	1.20	2.68	1.09	3.45	1.12	3.30	1.25	3.36	1.21	3.68	1.22	2.55	1.05

Table 16: Descriptive statistics.

CFA model comparisons (construct validity) and SEMs (predictive validity):

Analyses procedure:

We apply different analysis techniques within the general structural equation modeling framework to answer our research question. Our approach is composed of three sequential steps: the first step is the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the second step is the latent profile analysis (LPA), and the final step is what we call pseudo-mixture modeling – a pseudo-mixture CFA.

We start by fitting a two-dimensional theoretical measurement model with CFA assuming *civic* and *ethnic* conceptions of nationhood. We compare this model to two more measurement models which were guided by parallel analysis (John L. Horn, 1965), very simple structure (Revelle & Rocklin, 1979) and exploratory factor analysis (EFA). One of the models guided by the EFA is checked for two dimensions but with an alternative configuration, the other model for three dimensions. After getting the goodness of fit statistics, we move on to check the best two measurement models' predictive validity with a full structural equation model (SEM). We follow the suggestion of Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, and Lalive (2010), and use an instrumental variable in the SEM. The instrumental variable (how close an individual feels oneself to the country (Herrmann, 2017)) predicts the latent variables of the measurement model as well as the outcome variable, which we determine as *symbolic boundary making* (whether somebody can become or grow into the nationhood). In all the analysis at this stage, we use a robust maximum likelihood estimator, and full information maximum likelihood (FIML) to account for the missing data. We use the guidelines suggested by Kline (2016) for the goodness of fit assessments of the measurement models; for the structural models (with instrumental variables) we follow the suggestions of Antonakis et al. (2010).

After the initial step of determining the best measurement model, we apply LPA to the measurement model items. Here we assessed models having 1 to 9 class/profile solutions using maximum likelihood with a fit of varying means, equal variances, and covariances. We utilize this model due to software availability. An alternative would have been, for example, a less parsimonious approach such as varying means, varying variances, and varying covariances, which would have been the most complex model to understand more aspects of the observed indicators. However, the package we used produces the most stable and interpretable results with the varying means, equal variances, and covariances approach that we adopted. We compare the relative fit of the models with BIC and by carrying out a bootstrapped likelihood-ratio test.

After getting the latent profile analysis results, in the final step, we refit the best measurement model (previously chosen CFA) accounting for the second variation in the data, which is the latent profile. Here we use maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and a mean- and variance adjusted test statistic -aka the Satterthwaite approach- (Maydeu-Olivares, 2017) while fitting the models separately to the profiles. This last step is what we call the pseudo-mixture CFA.

More practical and shorter options could be a better substitute to the analysis procedure we describe above (such as the genuine mixture CFA modeling). However, to the best of our knowledge, such options are available in commercially available statistical packages like MPlus, which we do not have access to. Thus, we adopt the procedure we describe above. On a related note, for full transparency and replication, we conduct all the analyses in a free and open source software environment – R (using the packages lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) and tidyLPA (Rosenberg, Schmidt, Beymer, & Steingut, 2018) among others).

All the results of these procedures are reported below except the response pattern plots of the latent profiles, which are reported in the Results section. See Table 10 for manifest variable abbreviations and their items wordings. The following denotes the statistical significance codes *** p<0.001; **p<0.01; **p<0.05; "n.s." not significant. Note that, in the SEMs, there is always a path ([clC -> shC]) from the instrumental variable (how close an individual feels oneself to the country) to the outcome variable (*symbolic boundary-making*: level of agreement on whether it is possible for someone to become the given nationhood). This path is not always visible in the figures below due to limited layout options.

Canada:

The goodness of fit statistics (GoFs) of the three-dimensional CFA is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional theoretical model. In the SEMs, the third dimension *nativity* is predicted by the instrumental variable (.26***); however, this third dimension is not significantly associated with the outcome variable. The GoFs of the SEMs suggest acceptable and good fits to the data.¹⁰ Given all the evidence, we decided to use the three-dimensional model for two reasons. The empirical results for the three-dimensional model are mixed but acceptable. Also, on theoretical grounds, a *nativity* perception to Canadian national identity makes sense. The country is home to diverse ethnicities like English, Irish, Scottish, French & German among many others. We believe the nativity dimension reflect the jus soli principle of Canadian citizenship and also acts as a supra-national category for diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Additionally, previous studies have demonstrated that perceptions about national identity in Canada have to be described in more than two dimensions (Grant, 2016).



¹⁰ For these types of models, Antonakis et al. (2010) suggest to pay more attention the chi-square being significant or not. The χ 2 being significant suggests a bad fit and this is true for all the SEMs in our study but we believe this is always because of the large Ns (Barrett, 2007). For all the models we rely on alternative measures of fit, which are less sensitive to sample size.



New Zealand:

The three-dimensional model is problematic for the single-indicator in the third dimension. The GoFs of the theoretical model (civic vs. ethnic) is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional model (suggested by EFA). Factor loadings are higher in the theoretical model. We see the same predictive validity in the SEMs. However, the GoFs of the theoretical model's SEM is better again. We decide the model with the ethnic vs. civic dimensions is better on purely empirical grounds.





United States:

The GoFs of the three-dimensional CFA is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional model (suggested by EFA). The GoFs of the SEMs mimics the CFAs' goodness of fit statistics. *Nativity* and *ascriptive* dimensions are both predicted by the instrumental variable (both .08*); however, both do not predict the outcome variable. Given that the two-dimensional model (*ascriptive* vs. *achievable*) has the same predictive validity (*achievable* dimension do not predict the outcome variable either), we decide to keep the three-dimensional model because a former study by Bonikowski (2008) suggest three notions of American national identity, and many interpretative studies also point to the multiplicity that go beyond civic and ethnic conceptions (Song, 2009; Walzer, 1990).





United Kingdom:

The goodness of fit statistics of the three-dimensional CFA are better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional theoretical model (civic vs. ethnic). Here, we use the same heuristics we used for selecting the American national identity measurement model. The instrumental variable in the three-dimensional SEM predicts all three latent constructs (.21*** for *nativity*, .14*** for *ascriptive*, .35*** for *achievable*) but two of the constructs do not predict the outcome variable. The lack of predictive validity is similar to the alternative theoretical model (civic vs. ethnic); therefore, we make a decision based on theory and previous findings. We think while the *ascriptive* and *achievable* dimensions roughly correspond to the ethnic and civic notions, *nativity* dimension reflect the public opinion on legal ties to Britain, in other words, the citizenship regime of the country.





Japan:

We retain the three-dimensional measurement model for the Japanese national identity both on empirical and theoretical grounds. GoFs of the three-dimensional CFA is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional theoretical model (civic vs. ethnic). The dimensions in the theoretical model

have no predictive validity, but *mixed* (the third dimension) has a positive association with the outcome variable. Additionally, Fukuoka (2016) shows the existence of multiple discourses and reveals many factors that influence the perceptions of Japanese national identity. We think the only model that gets close to capturing this multiplicity is the three-dimensional model.





Germany:

GoFs of the three-dimensional CFA is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional model (suggested by EFA). The predictive validity of the latent constructs in both of the SEMs are beleaguered. However, the GoFs of the three-dimensional SEM is more acceptable. Moreover, the model makes more sense on theoretical grounds. While the *nativity* dimension reflects some aspects of the German citizenship laws (Anil, 2007; Low, 2014; J M Mushaben, 2008; Joyce Marie Mushaben, 2010), the *ascriptive* dimension reflects the ethnic notion. *Achievable* is the inclusive and civic notion, which acknowledges the ethnic and religious diversity in the country (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; C. Miller-Idriss, 2006; C. Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012).





Turkey:

The GoFs of the three-dimensional CFA is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional model (suggested by EFA). The SEM with the three-dimensional model also has better GoFs. However, the three-dimensional modal lacks predictive validity; only one dimension is positively associated with the outcome variable. The two-dimensional model, on the other hand, has acceptable GoFs and has good predictive validity. So, we disregard the empirical evidence coming from the GoFs and choose our model on theoretical grounds. We believe the two-dimensional model captures the Turkish national identity better. The model explains the legacy of the citizenship regime during the early republican era in Turkey. Kemalism, the dominant ideology of the time, was swinging between its contemporary French and the

German models of citizenship (Keyman & Kanci, 2011). While the former was based on cultural identity, the latter was based on ethnicity. This ambivalent citizenship regime not only constructed the modern Turkish national identity but also kept molding the Turkish nationhood throughout the decades (Cagaptay, 2002, 2006) along with an ambiguous relationship with Islam (Brockett, 2011). We labeled the first dimension as the *cultural* notion; the second dimension is the ambivalent *mixed* notion. See Ayturk (2011) for a very detailed account of this mixed and ambivalent conception of Turkishness.





Iceland:

Here, the GoFs of the three-dimensional CFA is better at a *** level compared to the two-dimensional theoretical model (civic vs. ethnic). However, the three-dimensional model is problematic for the single-indicator in the third dimension. Also, the predictive validity of the theoretical model is better despite the slightly worse GoFs. We discard the three-dimensional model on empirical grounds and retain the theoretical civic vs. ethnic model.





Expanded latent profile analysis results:









Pseudo-mixture-confirmatory factor analysis modeling:

Numbers in the left upper corner of the CFA plots denote the different profiles.



New Zealand:



United States:



United Kingdom:

Here, some estimated indicator variances are negative.



Japan:

Here covariance matrixes of latent variables are not positive-definite for Profiles 2 and 4.



Germany:

The model does not converge; sample covariance matrix is not positive-definite.

Turkey:

The model does not converge; sample covariance matrix is not positive-definite.



Multi-group confirmatory factor analyses:

Since we discover that the same measurement model explains the data of different countries, we also checked the invariance between the measured constructs. In other words, we control the degree of which the quantified national identities of different counties are comparable. We fit multi-group confirmatory factor analyses models to samples from Canada &United States; New Zealand & Iceland; the United Kingdom & Germany to check the invariance. Here, invariance refers to measurement operations yielding the same attributes (J.L. Horn & McArdle, 1992). Checking the invariance across samples is done in multiple steps by checking the fit information of the measurement models. It is common practice to go from less strict assumptions to more conservative constraints on the model, namely from a configural model to a strict scalar model. We went up to the most conservative approach, which is the strict scalar model. Results reveal that although the same measurement models explain the data of samples from different nationalities well, the latent constructs are not actually measuring the exact same thing. Many factor loadings are different, which suggests that the latent constructs do not have the same impact on the same survey-items across samples. This result is not surprising given the vast differences of the normative content in the national identities.

Canada and United States:

Results reveal that the measurement models of Canada and United States are not invariant. The model does not even achieve metric invariance, which would have indicated that the factor loadings in the models are equal. Four item loadings need to be released to achieve partial-metric invariance, meaning their parameters need to be estimated freely across the samples. These items are "religion", "feel", "citizen," and "language." We guess that all these elements (religion, language, citizenship, and feeling like a Canadian/American) have different meanings and connotation in Canada and the U.S. Judging by these findings, we would be very hesitant to conclude that the same measurement model measures the same construct in the Canadian and American samples. In sum, Canadian and American national identities are so distinct that they cannot be easily and meaningfully compared in a quantified manner.



New Zealand and Iceland:

Results reveal that the measurement models of New Zealand and Iceland are not invariant either. Again, the model does not even achieve metric invariance. To achieve partial-metric invariance, three item loadings need to be released, which are "live", "religion" and "language." Common sense would suggest that these items have different meanings and connotations given the histories of the two countries. Therefore, we repeat our previous inference: New Zealander and Icelandic national identities are so distinct that they cannot be easily and meaningfully compared in a quantified manner.



The United Kingdom and Germany:

Similar to the previous two multi-group CFAs, the measurement models are not invariant. The model does not achieve metric invariance; partial-metric invariance can be achieved by relasing the four item loadings, "citizenship", "live", "respect" and "religion." Our interpretation is based on the same principle: the national contexts attribute different connotations to these elements in the United Kingdom and Germany, which contributes to the significantly different factor loadings in the models. We would be cautious to infer that, when quantified, British and German national identities are similar enough to be meaningfully compared in their quantified form.



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PROJECT 3: A Multi-Method Approach to National Identity: From Individual Level Attachment to National Attachment

Abstract:

Background & motivation: The elusive nature of national identities poses a challenge for researchers. We overcome this challenge by adopting a multi-method approach to bring together the qualitative (national identity narratives) and quantitative (measurable dimensions) elements of national identities in compelling ways.

Methods: Using convenience samples of German and Turkish university students (two countries with different political climates), we apply structural equation modeling and structural topic modeling to examine the subjective viewpoints in national identity perceptions. We also check what individual differences would potentially explain this subjectivity.

Results: We discover three subjective viewpoints of national identification in the German sample; in the Turkish sample, students framed Turkish nationhood in four distinct ways. Our results also reveal that attachment style (a psychological trait, which is deeply embedded in an individual) plays a role in these subjective identification processes.

Relevance & Implications: The overall results reveal the intricate subjective processes in national identification processes. We highlight the importance of multi-method research and suggest further research agenda.
Introduction:

The elusive nature of national identities poses many challenges for researchers (Abdelal, 2009). Due to its intangible nature, research on national identity has been fragmented and compartmentalized. On the one hand, scholars studied this phenomenon within the framework of broad historical analyses, single and comparative case studies with small *N* qualitative approaches. On the other hand, the same phenomenon was treated as a measurable attitude on the individual level, which made cross-country research conceivable with large *N* studies (Asal, Shellman, & Howard, 2010). Despite the need for transdisciplinary collaboration and multi-method approaches, such fertilization has been rare.

Many qualitative approaches embraced the elusive and protean nature of national identities (Gellner & Smith, 1996). According to some scholars (Calhoun, 1997; Özkırımlı, 2005, 2010), the phenomena of national identity and nationalism are best understood when we think about these constructs as discourses that structure populations' cognition. Such conceptualization of national identity is very expedient, in our opinion, because then we can account for multiple discourses assembling multiple elements for any given national identity. We call these various elements of national identities the "normative content", which are nothing but social representations that are transmitted within and between populations via narratives. The normative content of national identities always consisted of conflicting narratives; multiple narratives compete to be the dominant/most salient one, but there is never a full hegemony (Özkırımlı, 2011), meaning one narrative can never be the only story for a given national identity.

A complementary line of thinking suggests that national identities are narratives that are psychologically inherited. Individuals are exposed to these multiple narratives in various overt or covert ways during their socialization processes (Billig, 1995). These narratives provide the information for cognitive processes of meaning-making by constituting particular ways of thinking. The collective memories, the nation's specific social representations of history and collective identity (Liu & László, 2007), and their social and political concepts all derive from these narratives. These narratives, which are nothing but stories of "spoken or written account of connected events," (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012, 2014) are the qualitative components of national identities.

Besides these qualitative approaches, much research has quantified national identity. In political psychology literature, the common sense is to treat national identity as a measurable construct – an attitude with multiple dimensions. Until recently, researchers frequently measured national pride, or patriotic & nationalist attitudes. Many times the operationalization of these constructs were interchangeably used, which led to a lack of a distinct and uncontroversial definition of national identity (Davidov, 2009) and a "conceptual and definitional tangle" (Huddy, 2016). We believe national pride and patriotic & nationalist attitudes are proxies and should be treated as derivatives of national identity; these derivative concepts are of secondary importance.

Bringing together the qualitative and quantitative expressions of national identity poses a challenge for researchers. On the one hand, we are looking at social representation with multifaceted narratives; on the other hand, these narratives are embodied in individuals as measurable attitudes. Jost, Federico & Napier (2009) call this condition the "elective affinities" and recap the further complexities. In their words, "people choose ideas, but ideas choose people as well."

It is impossible to think about "people choosing ideas and ideas choosing people" without subjectivity. Subjectivity guides and diverts individuals' attention to particular narratives. However, this selective attention does not necessarily prevent individuals from internalizing the contents of multiple narratives. Since the population is constantly exposed to multiple and conflicting narratives simultaneously, it is reasonable to think that more than one narrative will be represented on an individual's mind. Subjectivity in national identity research requires at least three levels of inquiry: (1) how many different national identity narratives are there in a given country; (2) how similar and different are these narratives; (3) what are some of the individual differences that would explain identification with particular narrative preferences over others.

In this research article, we aim to bring "person in the context" (Pettigrew, 2006) approaches and subjectivity together in national identity research to juxtapose the qualitative (narratives) and quantitative (measurable dimensions) aspects of national identities in compelling ways. Social sciences, in general, are witnessing growing interest in the person and context interaction; recent advancements in methods allow scrutinizing this interaction in various ways (see, i.e. Ciavolino et al., 2017; Salvatore et al., 2018). Despite the availability of an amplitude of newly developed methods, scholars of nationalism studies rarely utilized these toolkits to examine the individual-context interaction. We adopt a multimethod approach to bring together the qualitative and quantitative aspects of national identity while accounting for subjectivity.

Our aim is not only to demonstrate the complexity of person and context interaction in national identification but also to reveal the workings of subjectivity in the process. Hence, we address the second and the third line of inquiry we mentioned above with regards to subjectivity in national identification. To address the second issue, besides quantitative measures of national identification, we rely on an open-ended question. We postulate that participants who were asked "what does it mean to be German/Turkish to you" in an open-ended question will report some of the contents of the narratives they were exposed to during their lives. So the content analyses of the open-ended responses will reveal the similarities and differences in the narratives' contents. To juxtapose the qualitative and quantitative aspects of national identity, we use a text analysis technique that can quantify these open-ended responses.

With regards to addressing the individual differences in being selective to the content of different narratives, we think attachment style is central because this is a trait that is deeply embedded within the individual-self with genetic dispositions and environmental influences (Gervai, 2009; Gillath, Shaver, Baek, & Chun, 2008). Previous research has shown that the attachment patterns that stem from the close emotional bond between parents and their children also manifest themselves in various close relationships later in adult life (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1973). Individual differences in attachment style are known to have impacts on many different types of relationships. What is more, these attachment styles are also discovered to be related to political beliefs and ideologies (Boccato, Capozza, Trifiletti, & Di Bernardo, 2015; Pettigrew, 2016; Polek, van Oudenhoven, & ten Berge, 2008; Roccato, 2008; Weber & Federico, 2007). Likewise, a recent study by Hermann (2017) shows that national attachment is motivated reasoning, which shapes world beliefs, rather than world beliefs shaping national attachment. We consider this finding as a person and context interaction as well. If the national attachment has the power of influencing word beliefs, where does this power stem from?

We think attachment style, a trait deeply embedded in the individual, is being hijacked by national identity narratives. Providing evidence to this hypothetical statement furthers our understanding of why and how individuals are attached to their nations. In the following, we illustrate our conceptual model and briefly describe the constructs we use to test the theoretical framework we are proposing; we then state our hypotheses before moving on to the methodological details of the study.

Our conceptual and theoretical framework is very much influenced by Haslam, Cornelissen and Werner's (2017) work on social interactionalist model. We illustrate this framework in the figure below.



Figure 22: Conceptual framework of national identity.

There is the collection of narratives on an abstract level, which provides the normative contents of the national identity. The population internalizes this normative content. However, the content is framed in various ways, and at any given time only some of the content constitutes the social category/identity. Although much of the normative content has been internalized, on the individual level, the perception of the national identity is subjective and negotiable. This conceptual framework represents the uncountable aspects of the national identity. Measures of national identity acknowledge the uncountable nature of national identity and operationalize it as a latent construct. This operationalization taps into multiple dimensions and multiple components of the national identity but lacks the normative content.

Overall, our reasoning is to tap into the multiple reflections of the group-self represented in the individual-self. In the current research, we use the following constructs to capture this process.

Attachment style: As we mentioned above, this is the psychological trait that is deeply rooted in the individual.

Hierarchic self-interest (HSI): This is a value based cognitive pattern that is "typical for highly competitive market-oriented societies" (Hadjar, Baier, & Boehnke, 2008; Hagan, Rippl, Boehnke, & Merkens, 1999). It includes competitiveness, being achievement-centered and Machiavellian (Hadjar, 2004). HSI has close proximity to the ideological beliefs¹¹ (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), it overlaps with self-

¹¹ In fact, this scale measures a latent construct that is very close to social dominance orientation. While SDO assesses ideological beliefs about the world, and how these beliefs are related to inter-group relations and group hierarchies, HSI measures how the individual perceives their surrounding world/environment and how they should act in this world. HSI gives researchers information about the following: whether an individual thinks the world is a "competitive jungle", whether one is "achievement-focused, success-oriented and individually-competitive" in this "jungle", and finally, whether the individual leans toward Machiavellianism, that is to say certain morally wrong sounding actions can be just, if they are means to an end.

enhancement items from Schwartz's basic human values¹². We include this measure in our study because we think it bridges the individual-self and the collective-self.

Collective narcissism: This construct taps into a particular type of national identification, which is "an unrealistic and psychologically-fragile belief in the nation's greatness contingent on external validation" (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2017). This type of identification reflects an exaggerated emotional investment in one's nation as well as a passionate belief in the inimitability of the nation. By referring to Adorno et al. (1950), Golec de Zavala (2017) notes that the exaggerated emotional investment in the group-self may be involved in compensation for the weaknesses of the individual-self. Thus we include this construct as the connection between the individual-self and the actual national identity. **National identity**: Since our primary attitude object is national identity, we focus on understanding how the individual relates to this collectively shared construct. What is being investigated and quantified here is what aspects of a collectively shared construct are represented in the individual-self, to what degree, and for which purposes. In other words, how the individual-self pertains to the group-self (Roccas & Berlin, 2016). For this specific purpose, we use direct measures of national identity rather than derivative constructs like national pride or patriotic and nationalist attitudes.

Given the theoretical framework mentioned above, we formulate a process that stretches from the individual-self to the collective-self. We expect gradual associations going from the individual-self to the group-self. We depict the hypothesized path model below. While + indicates a positive association (-) means there is a competing hypothesis of a negative association. We test this proposed model within the structural equation modeling framework.



Figure 23: Hypothesized model of associations between constructs.

We expect to observe multiple viewpoints (different constellations of national identity narratives) on the group-self side of the model, which we should detect with quantitative text analysis. We do not have a priori expectations here. In other words, we do not hypothesize on the number of different viewpoints we expect to observe. Finally, once we reveal and quantify the multiple viewpoints of national identity on the group-self side of the model, we account for this multiplicity in a follow-up path model, in which we test whether attachment style and HSI (on the individual-self of the model) are involved in the subjective processes of national identification.

Methods:

We present the highlights of our methodolological applications in this section; please see the online appendix for an extended discussion of methods and findings.

¹² Personal conversation and correspondence with Professor Klaus Boehnke.

Case selection and sample:

We test our hypotheses with convenience samples of university students from Germany (*N*=476) and Turkey (*N*=217). We have theoretical, empirical and practical reasons for working with German and Turkish national identities. On theoretical grounds, these countries are known to have ethnic conceptions of nationhood, different levels of economic development and democracy; also they have different citizenship and ethnicity regimes (Akturk, 2011), which makes them suitable for comparison. On empirical grounds, an earlier study which accounted for subjectivity in the national identities, revealed that German and Turkish national identity measurement models fail to capture the different subjective viewpoints in the countries (Ardag, Cohrs, & Selck, 2018). We also acknowledge the practical side of our research: we have ease of access and familiarity with these two national identities. The sample characteristics and the descriptive statistics of our measures can be found in the appendix.

Measures:

Direct measures of national identification: Multiple scales have been proposed to quantify national identification, such as the ones by Roccas et al. (2008) and Leach et al. (2008). We use the latter in Germany, the former in Turkey. Although our measurement instruments' dimensions differ, on theoretical grounds, we claim we are tapping into the relationship between the individual-self pertaining to the collective-self in both cases.

Collective narcissism: We use the short version of the scale developed by Golec de Zavala et al. (2009).

Hierarchic self-Interest (HSI): Although this cognitive-pattern is a second-order latent construct which influences competitiveness, achievement-obsession and Machiavellism, by using the short version (Hadjar, 2005) we operationalize *HSI* in one single dimension.

Attachment style: To assess the attachment style, we used the German (Ehrenthal, Dinger, Lamla, Funken, & Schauenburg, 2009) and Turkish (Selcuk, Gunaydin, Sumer, & Uysal, 2005) short versions of the Revised Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR-R) (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000).

Analysis strategy:

Latent trait modeling: We first use structural equation modeling to show the relationships between the measured latent constructs. In the next step, we compute the factor scores for each construct to use them in further analyses. We calculate composite scores of national identity measures since the instruments we use have higher-order constructs. In the German sample, we multiply the factor scores of the three dimensions (*centrality, satisfaction & solidarity*) of *self-investment*; the multiplication of *in-group homogeneity* and *self-stereotyping* on the other dimension is the composite measure of *self-definition*. In the Turkish sample, the multiplication of the *superiority* and *deference* factor scores is the *glorification* composite; *attachment* composite score is the multiplication of the *importance* and *commitment* factor scores.

Topic modeling: Topic modeling is a general framework that can classify different texts into topics (Lucas et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2014), which in our study are the subjective viewpoints of what it means to be German/Turkish. We utilize structural topic modeling (STM), which is a mixed-membership model that does not assume exclusive/unique national identification with only one subjective viewpoint. With STM, not only can we detect the level of identification with different meanings of Germanness/Turkishness, we can also see the correlates of each meaning separately. To utilize this analysis technique, we asked an open-response question to the participants about their national identity; we used the following wording: "Sometimes survey-items cannot fully capture the attitudes of participants, therefore we would like to ask you what it means to be German/Turkish to you personally. Please use the text space below. There are no space or time limitations."

Although some solutions are available in the general topic modeling framework, determining the number of topics (subjective viewpoints of Germanness & Turkishness) is not the strongest feature of STM. Therefore, as an a priori supplementary analysis, we also utilize latent profile analysis (LPA) to guesstimate and confirm the number of possible topics/different viewpoints of being German/Turkish. To achieve this end, we use the factor scores and the composite measures. Before actually estimating the structural topic model, we compare the results of the LPA and the output of the suggested number of topics, which we get within the STM framework. See the online appendix for the details of this procedure and the discussion of the results.

In the next step, we estimate the structural topic models; get the topic proportions (percentages of different topics in the texts); and use all the estimations in path models, in which we reveal the relationships between *attachment style*, *HSI*, different ways of seeing nationhood, *collective narcissism* and national identification.

Results:

We report SEMs with latent constructs first. We then report the SEM results with factor scores and composite measures, which also include the topic proportions in the models. For the expanded results, see the online appendix.

Germany:

Structural equation model with latent variables: Here, the national identity measure has two higher-order constructs; *self-definition* and *self-investment*. *Self-definition* influences two latent constructs: *in-group homogeneity* (whether individuals perceive their nation to be homogeneous) and *self-stereotyping* (to what extent individuals see themselves as typical Germans). *Self-investment* on the other hand has three sub-dimensions: *centrality* (how central the national identity is for the individual), *solidarity* (how much solidarity is perceived among Germans) and *satisfaction* (how satisfied are the individuals to be German).

Both *self-definition* & *self-investment* are strongly predicted by *collective narcissism*, which in turn is strongly predicted by the *hierarchical self-interests* (*HSI*). *Avoidant attachment* style predicts *HSI*. *Anxious attachment* style has no significant association with *HSI*. See Figure 3 for the coefficients, significance levels and the goodness of fit statistics of the model.

Findings from the German sample reveal that those who are dismissive and aloof in their close relationships tend to be more competitive, achievement-centered and Machiavellian (high on *HSI*). This cognitive pattern leads to exaggerated emotional investment in the greatness of German identity. There is an ambivalent pattern here, though. Since the merit of the German national identity is psychologically fragile, and is contingent upon external approval this exaggerated emotional investment is double-barreled.

At this point, it is necessary to remark the stigma around the German national identity. Many studies revealed that an ambivalent national pride and shame are still constituent elements in German national identity due to the national humiliation and guilt after the Holocaust (Miller-Idriss, 2006; Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). The historical baggage, the transgenerational guilt and psychological coping mechanisms with this humiliation still influence national identification in the country (Kopf-Beck, Gaisbauer, & Dengler, 2013, 2017). Thus, at least part of collective narcissistic manifestation in Germany revolves around the overwhelming psychological burden of the salience of the Holocaust. Even though there is a sense of allegiance (Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012) this is accompanied by mixed feelings of

a cautious national pride, shame and helplessness and the suppression and/or rationalization of these negative emotions (Kopf-Beck, 2015).

Furthermore, we believe the strong positive association between *collective narcissism* and *HSI* in the German sample is meaningful because it reflects an overlap between the two constructs. This overlap indicates a degree of embeddedness of *HSI* & *collective narcissism* in the German national identity. Many participants in the German sample report the German national identity as a "high-status-group" identity (please refer to the STM results). Despite the negative connotations, there is either a symbolic or a realistic benefit of being German. So the identity is stigmatized but as a secondary-benefit it is "valuable".

Thus, we think the collective narcissism in the German sample reflects a vulnerable narcissism, which is sensitive to in-group humiliation. But, because the identity is perceived to be valuable (with either direct or secondary benefits), it is also something to compete for, to take advantage of and use as a means to an end. That is also another reason why competitive, achievement-centered and Machiavellian individuals feel that they are more "symbolically entitled".

The strong positive association between *collective narcissism* and both of the higher-order constructs of the national identity imply that those who are high on collective narcissism are also likely to invest in the national identity more and define themselves as Germans.



Structural topic modeling: We find that a three-topic model yields the most meaningful results for the German sample, so we observe three distinct national identity perceptions. The first topic identifies Germanness in a bittersweet frame. Responses in this topic mention the advantages and privileges of being German. Participants who frame Germannes as such and who are low on *collective narcissism* mention not feeling a sense of national pride. As the *collective narcissism* factor scores go up, the framing in Topic 1 shifts towards a notion of Germanness defined in cultural and linguistic terms; but note that participants with high *collective narcissism* scores tend not to think about Germanness within the frame of Topic 1 (see Figure 4 a). We label the topic as *bittersweet attachment* to the national identity. Overall, this *bittersweet attachment* has a negative association with collective narcissism. *HSI* negatively predicts this topic. We also observe a positive association between this *bittersweet* way of framing Germanness and self-definition composite score. Mimicking the latent trait model we tested above, the *avoidant attachment* style has a positive association with *HSI* but has no other significant associations with the other constructs.



Figure 25 a - Topic 1 from the German Sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model. Y axis is the topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis is the collective narcissism factor score. While the radius of the observations indicates the self-investment composite score of German national identity, the color indicates the avoidant attachment factor score.



Figure 4 b German Sample *N=362;* Robust χ^2 : 4.402 (not significant, p-value: 0.11); df: 2; Robust CFI: .986; Robust TLI: .894; Robust RMSEA: .058 (not significant, pclose .334) 90% lower bound .000, upper bound .142; SRMR: .021 *** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.01; * p <.05;

Topic 2 hinges on collective narcissistic themes as well. However, in this topic, participants frame the collective narcissistic elements in much more manifest ways. Therefore, we label this topic as *reactions to national humiliation*. Unlike the first topic, the second topic has a positive association with *collective narcissism* but is not significantly predicted by the *HSI* factor score. Framing Germanness as *reactions to national humiliation* leads to a negative association with *self-definition* dimension of German national identity. However, the topic has a positive association with the *self-investment* composite score, which suggests that despite the negative connotations, people who perceive Germannes in this frame still emotionally invest in the national identity. Although this seems paradoxical, it makes sense when we consider the double-barreled context we described above. Participants who defined Germanness within the first topic framings) but are more sensitive to *national humiliation*. And since they perceive their nationhood with many benefits, they are not hesitant to invest in this national identity, although they do not necessarily define themselves as (typical-) Germans. Note that the *avoidant attachment* style has no significant association with this topic either. Figures 5 a and b display the results.



Figure 26 a - Topic 2 from the German Sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model.

Y axis: topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis: collective narcissism factor score, radius: self-investment composite score of national identity, color indicates: avoidant attachment factor score.



The third topic frames Germanness within citizenship ties and some traits. Participants who reported Germanness within this frame touch upon many auto-stereotypes (such as punctuality, having a direct and confrontational communication style, enjoying various German cuisines etc.) besides defining Germanness as a legal tie to the country. Some of the responses mention the stigma, the negative and ambivalent aspects of the national identity in a very detailed intellectual manner. Our impression is that this frame rationalizes the double-barreled context. Although the label we use for this topic is not 100 % accurate, we call this topic *cultural traits and citizenship*. This topic has no significant statistical association to the *collective narcissism* factor score but is positively and significantly predicted by the *HSI* factor score. Framing the nationhood also leads to a significant but a weak negative association with the *self-investment* composite factor score. The *Self-definition* composite factor score is not significantly predicted by this third topic. *Avoidant attachment* style is not associated with this topic either.



Figure 27 a - Topic 3 from the German Sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model.

Y axis: topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis: collective narcissism factor score, radius: self-investment composite score of national identity, color indicates: avoidant attachment factor score.



*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05;

Turkey:

Structural equation model with latent variables: In the Turkish sample, we have two higher-order latent constructs as well – the first one is *glorification*, the second one is *attachment*. While *glorification* influences a national *superiority* feeling and *deference* (loyalty to the nation's norms and leaders), *attachment* influences *commitment* (to the nation) and *importance* (given to the national identity). Similar to the German case, the higher-order constructs are strongly predicted by *collective narcissism*; however, in the Turkish sample, *HSI* does not predict *collective narcissism*. Also in contrast to the German case, *HSI* is predicted by *anxious attachment* style, but not by *avoidant attachment* style. Coefficients, significance levels and goodness of fit statistics are displayed in Figure 7.

On the one hand, the very high coefficients signal the embeddedness of *collective narcissism* in the Turkish national identity. On the other hand, the lack of a significant association between *HSI* and *collective narcissism* indicates the perceived "low-status-group" of the Turkish national identity unlike Germany. So, one can say, in this sample, Turkish national identity is not necessarily perceived as something to compete for, or use as a means to an end. Participants in the Turkish sample rarely mention a heightened national pride; on the contrary, many of the responses have critical orientation toward Turkishness from various angles – this is not to say that there are no positive feelings expressed in the Turkish sample; in fact, there is quite a bit of heightened ethnocentrism. This ethnocentrism just manifests itself differently (see the STM results).

The association between *anxious attachment* style and *HSI* signals that those who are "rejectionsensitive" in their romantic relationships are also likely to be competitive, achievement-centered and Machiavellian as well. But, perhaps one of the most interesting observations in the latent construct SEM of the Turkish sample is the association between *anxious attachment* style and *collective narcissism*. Here we observe a direct significant connection between an individual level psychological-trait and a collectively shared construct. So, findings from the Turkish sample suggest that those who adopt the pursuer-role in their close relationship, those who seek approval and reassurance from their partners tend to be high on *collective narcissism*. We interpret this finding as evidence that would support the hypothetical statement we made earlier: an aspect of the national identity can hijack a psychological trait, which is deeply rooted in the individual. An alternative or complementary interpretation can suggest a confounding variable or a common underlying cause like individual level narcissism.



Structural topic modeling: When we analyze the open-ended responses of the Turkish sample, we find that a four-topic solution explains the data best; hence Turkish participants perceive Turkishness in four different ways. The responses in the first topic frame Turkishness in Kemalism's paradigm, which is the founding nationalist ideology of Turkey that swung between German (ethnic) and French (territorialcivic) nationhood models of the time (Keyman & Kanci, 2011). The Kemalist ideology had its own ambiguities (Ayturk, 2011): one the one hand, it asserted a territorial notion of Turkish nationhood, which suggested voluntary membership. On the other hand, it practiced exclusionary policies against non-Muslims and non-Turkish speaking groups (Cagaptay, 2002). The first topic in the open ended responses addresses this issue. Those who are low on *collective narcissism* frame the ambiguity in a critical manner; those who are high on *collective narcissism* frame the issue by praising the Kemalist ideology. We labeled this topic as Kemalism (feeling Turkish is being Turkish). This topic has negative associations with both of the dimensions of national identity – the *attachment* composite score and the *glorification* composite score. We observe no statistically significant relationship to *collective narcissism*. Anxious attachment style does not predict this topic, but note that the anxious attachment factor score is always positively associated with *collective narcissism* in the SEMs, which include the topic proportions. See the topic proportion scatter plots and the SEM in Figures 8 a & b.



Figure 29 a- Topic 1 from the Turkish sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model. Y axis is the topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis is the collective narcissism factor score. While the radius of the observations indicates the national attachment composite score of Turkish national identity, the color indicates the anxious attachment factor score.



The second topic discusses Turkish nationhood with references to race and ethnicity. Those who framed their responses within this topic touch upon the Central Asian roots of the modern Turks with glorifying tones. We label this topic as *Turkishness as an ethnic/racial category*. Even the responses of the individuals with lower *collective narcissism* factor scores mention exclusionary views against the non-Turkish minorities in the country. This topic positively predicts the *attachment* dimension of the national identity but does not have a significant association to the *glorification* dimension. *Turkishness as an ethnic/racial category* topic is not significantly associated with *collective narcissism* factor score either (results are displayed in Figures 9 a & b). We think the lack of significant associations is due to sample-bias; many of the respondents in our Turkish student sample have secular and liberal backgrounds. Only a small portion of the Turkish sample self-reported to identify themselves in ethnic/racial and religious/conservative categories. *Anxious attachment* style has no statistically significant association with this topic.



Figure 30 a - Topic 2 from the Turkish sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model.

Y axis: topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis: collective narcissism factor score, radius: national attachment composite score of national identity, color: anxious attachment factor score.



The third topic tones down the ethnic/racial perception of Turkishness and discusses the workings of religion in being Turkish. While higher *collective narcissism* factor scores lean to a more religiously conservative tone, participants with lower *collective narcissism* scores mention the boundary making mechanisms that stem from religion. Our label for this topic is the *role of religion in Turkishness*. Unlike the second topic, this topic significantly and positively predicts *collective narcissism*. *HSI* and *anxious attachment* scores have significantly and negatively predicted this topic, and the topic has no significant association with any dimension of the Turkish national identity (see Figures 10 a & b).



Figure 31 a - Topic 3 from the Turkish sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model.

Y axis: topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis: collective narcissism factor score, radius: national attachment composite score of national identity, color: anxious attachment factor score.



Figure 10 b; Turkish Sample *N=192*; Robust χ^2 : 1.512 (not significant, p-value: 0.47); df: 2; Robust CFI: 1.0; Robust TLI: 1.0; Robust RMSEA: .000 (not significant, pclose .633) 90% lower bound .000, upper bound .137; SRMR: .018; *** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05; † p <.1

The final topic intercepts with Kemalist ideology as well. The responses in the fourth topic emphasize Kemalism's territorial-civic aspect more in contrast to the first topic. Respondents in this topic frame Turkishness as a category that one can assimilate into. We think the best label for this topic would be *Kemalism (assimilation into Turkishness via acculturalization & language).* While respondents with lower *collective narcissism* factor scores tend to highlight the ethno-symbolic codes and language, the higher *collective narcissism* scores praise Kemal Atatürk himself and emphasize the priority of national interest and service to the homeland. This topic has significant and positive associations with both the *attachment* and *glorification* composite scores of the national identity but has no significant association with collective narcissism. Moreover, the topic is positively predicted by *anxious attachment* style. The *anxious attachment* style also predicts the *attachment* dimension of national identity but with a negative association. Results are displayed in Figures 11 a & b.



Figure 32 a - Topic 4 from the Turkish sample: visualization of the topic and covariate relationships computed from the structural topic model. Y axis: topic proportion (% of the text that falls into the topic), X axis: collective narcissism factor score, radius: national attachment composite score of national identity, color: anxious attachment factor score.



Discussion:

Overall, the results show the ontological intricacy of national identity. The first inference is the importance of the narratives that constitute national identity. These countries' national identities are indisputably different with regards to their normative content, but the workings of the identities have similarities. Both national identities' narratives harbor collective narcissist elements. However, collective narcissism manifests itself differently in the German and Turkish contexts. In the German context, we think collective narcissism has vulnerable narcissism notions due to national shame, guilt, and humiliation. In the Turkish context, we observe an exaggerated and illusionary grandiosity, which somewhat reflects a nostalgic longing rather than the reality.

Furthermore, the perceived symbolic values of these identities differ. German participants, on average, attribute high symbolic value to their national identities in contrast to Turkish participants. This discrepancy is reflected in the different statistical relationships between the quantified *hierarchical self-interest (HSI)* and *collective narcissism* scores. In the perceptions of many German participants, their national identity is something that gives them leverage; Turkish participants do not necessarily perceive their national identity as such. However, this second inference that we draw is just one side of the coin. When we account for subjectivity and individual differences, we cannot say these patterns apply to all the participants in the samples.

Individual differences in *HSI* and *attachment style* seem to play a role in the perceptions of national identity. We observe different patterns in statistical relationships when we account for subjectivity in national identity perceptions. As the structural topic modeling results reveal, there are significant differences in how participants perceive the same attitude object. The path models, which include the topic proportions, reveal that individual differences in *HSI* and *attachment style* relate differently to various subjective viewpoints of national identities, which in turn influence the relationships to collective narcissism and the national identities.

In the German case, we do not observe a direct association between *attachment style* and national identification, but the *HSI* has different relationships with *collective narcissism* and the subjective perceptions of national identity. In both samples, subjective viewpoints of national identity influence whether participants feel collective narcissistic sentiments or not, so we reiterate and stress that there is an interaction between individual differences and the normative content and national identities. It is this interaction that affects the type and level of national identification. In the Turkish case, we observe a direct, significant and positive relationship between *attachment style* and *collective narcissism*, and in one path model, a direct and significant relationship between *attachment style* and *national attachment*. Therefore, finally, the results from the Turkish sample suggest that at least some aspects of national identities (some narratives, some dimensions, or some subjective viewpoints of national identities) can hijack a deeply embedded psychological trait like attachment style.

We believe, in this study, we could account for the protean and complex nature of national identities and subjectivity. We brought together qualitative (uncountable) and quantitative (measurable) elements of national identities in meaningful and interpretable ways. We strongly suggest political psychologists adopt multi-method approaches; our attempt is just one example, certainly not free of shortcomings. Our sample is a convenience sample; we can only cautiously generalize our results to a population of university students with left-leaning political ideologies in both Germany and Turkey. The different subjective viewpoints we discovered from these samples may or may not be notable in the general German and Turkish populations. Nonetheless, on theoretical grounds, we did not discover a particularly new notion of Germanness or Turkishness; all the different viewpoints that we found are either complementary to the findings of the previous literature or have already been discovered by others – this leads us to our next point.

We confirm that structural topic modeling (STM) is useful for studying the different narratives of national identities. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use STM in national identity research. We showed that this technique is helpful and provides insightful results with regards to various questions on national identity. Within this framework, we investigated whether attachment styles play a role in the subjectivity of national identity perception. We discovered that it does. We think this discovery is new and expands our knowledge in the field. There is some evidence to suggest the hijacking of deeply embedded psychological traits like attachment style by discourses/narratives. We believe this hijacking might be one of the reasons of national identities being very powerful and polarizing. On that note, we should mention another limitation of our research. We relied on just two dimensions of attachment style, however *anxious* and *avoidant* are not the only styles (Fraley, Hudson, Heffernan, & Segal, 2015). Other available techniques and measures can provide further insight into attachment styles' influence on national identity. An interesting question would be checking the differences between secure attachment and insecure attachments (anxious-preoccupied, dismissive-avoidant, fearful-avoidant).

Appendix:

Expanded Methods:

Recruitment strategy for the samples: Participants took an online survey in their native language. They were invited to take the survey through online invitation letters, or with postings on off-campus platforms like Moodle. In many cases, faculty members who we were in contact with in the universities also informed and encouraged students to take the surveys. We also posted the call on some universities' social media web pages.

German sample characteristics: As a sampling scheme, we decided to include Northern, Southern, Central and Eastern German universities because these geographic regions were expected to reflect regional, cultural and political differences in Germany¹³. We ended up with an N = 476¹⁴; mean age of the participants is 26 (62 % female and 36 % male). 94 % of the participants are either ongoing students or have a university degree and higher. The majority of our participants (\approx 75 %) self-reported to be on the left side of the political spectrum (*see* Figure 12). We estimate that our convenience sample is not free of a self-selection bias¹⁵. Hence, we can only generalize our results to a young group of German university students with left-leaning or leftist political views.



Figure 33: Self-Report Political Orientation (German sample)

Turkish sample characteristics: We used a similar sampling scheme that we applied in Germany. Turkey has seven geographical regions, which are known to have cultural and political differences. We

 $^{^{13} \}approx 43\%$ of the participants are from North Germany, $\approx 21\%$ from Central Germany, $\approx 12\%$ from Eastern Germany and $\approx 21\%$ from Southern Germany.

¹⁴ 912 people saw the first page of our survey and started filling out; yet completion rate was 53 %. Approximately 43 % of the participants were from North Germany, 21 % from Central Germany, 12 % from Eastern Germany and 21 % from Southern Germany. Approximately, 25 % of the participants reported to grow up in a town with a population smaller than 5000; 23 % with a population between 5000-20.000 residents; 22 % with a population between 20.000-100.000 residents; 16 % with a population between 100.000-500.000; and 13 % of the participants grew up in cities with populations larger than 500.000 residents.

¹⁵ In our invitation letter, we announced the name of the study as "*the European Union, Refugees and National Identity in Germany*", therefore it is very much likely that leftist and left-leaning students who tend to have a more critical stance on these issues preferred to take part in our survey. We think that students on the opposite side of the political spectrum are more likely to either not participate in the first place or drop out during the survey.

tried to reach as many universities as possible in these regions with the same approach that is mentioned above¹⁶. However, the completion rate was low in Turkey compared to Germany. We ended up with an N = 217¹⁷; mean age of the participants is 25 (51 % female and 45 % male). 74 % of the participants are either an ongoing university student or have a university degree and higher. While almost 50 % of the participants placed themselves to the left side of the political orientation scale, about 35 % placed themselves to the right, and the rest are in the middle (*see* Figure 13). Despite the somewhat uniform looking distribution of self-report political orientation, we again estimate a self-selection bias in our Turkish sample as well¹⁸. We cautiously claim to generalize our results to university students in metropolitan cities of Turkey with heterogeneous backgrounds.



Figure 34: Self-Report Political Orientation (Turkish sample)

¹⁶ Yet, an overwhelming majority of the participants were from various public and private universities in three biggest cities in Turkey; Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir.

¹⁷ 671 people saw the first page of our survey and started filling out; yet completion rate was \approx 33 %. Approximately, 64 % of the participants reported to have been born in a metropolitan city or its suburbs; 29 % reported to have been born in rural areas. 85 % of the participants resided in a metropolitan city at the time of the data collection; 9 % were living in a rural region.

¹⁸ Besides the conventional self-placement scale we asked Turkish participants how they would define themselves politically and gave them multi-response options like liberal, democrat, Marxist, conservative, socialist, social-democrat, feminist, anarchist, Kemalist, Islamist, nationalist, ülkücü (particular fraction of a Turkish ultra-nationalist ideology). Judging by self-assigned labels like these, our sample probably has a general leftist and or liberal tendency. We acknowledge this intricacy without dwelling much into the peculiarities of Turkish political space.

Descriptive statistics.				
Item wordings of the German Sample Measures	Missing	Mean	SD	Range
	%			Disagree
				to
				Strongly
				Agree
Anxious Attachment Style				
I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me. (R)	2.94	2.66	1.57	
When I show my feelings for romantic partners, I'm afraid they will not feel the same about me.	3.15	3.00	1.68	
I worry that romantic partners won't care about me as much as I care about them.	3.15	2.65	1.67	
When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in someone else.	2.94	2.45	1.50	
I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me.	2.94	2.54	1.57	
I worry that I won't measure up to other people.	3.36	3.43	1.74	
Sometimes romantic partners change their feelings about me for no apparent reason.	2.73	2.64	1.54	
My romantic partner makes me doubt myself.	3.78	2.44	1.45	
I worry a lot about my relationships.	3.15	3.13	1.67	
Avoidant Attachment Style				1 - 7
I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner.(R)	3.15	2.13	1.18	
I tell my partner just about everything.(R)	3.15	2.39	1.40	
I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner.(R)	2.73	2.18	1.28	
I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner.(R)	2.73	2.62	1.53	
It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need.(R)	2.73	2.18	1.45	
I find it easy to depend on romantic partners.(R)	3.15	2.19	1.33	
It's not difficult for me to get close to my partner. (R)	2.73	3.17	1.95	
I talk things over with my partner. (R)	3.15	2.06	1.21	
I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down.	2.73	2.49	1.53	
Hierarchic Self-Interest				
In order to excel, one must be able to stand alone.	1.47	2.62	1.64	
Without achievement there is no happiness.	1.89	2.96	1.69	
The most important thing in life is achievement.	1.68	2.16	1.38	
I would like to be among the best in all areas of life (job, sport, etc.).	2.10	4.14	1.86	
It is always my ambition to be better than the average.	1.89	4.60	1.76	1 - 7
It is not important how you win but that you win.	2.10	1.93	1.30	
One has to judge people's deeds according to their success.	2.10	2.27	1.42	
Differences in rank between people are acceptable because they essentially illustrate what people have	1 89	2 51	1 64	
made of their opportunities.	1.05	2.51	1.01	
Collective Narcissism				
Germany deserves special treatment.	1.26	1.68	0.89	
I will never be satisfied until Germany gets all it deserves.	1.47	1.67	0.86	
It really makes me angry when others criticize Germany.	1.26	1.79	0.93	1 - 5
If other countries listened to Germany more, the world would be a much better place.	1.05	2.20	1.02	
Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of Germany.	1.47	2.22	1.03	
National Identity				
I often think about the fact that I am German.	1.89	2.07	1.09	
The fact that I am German is an important part of my identity.	1.89	2.58	1.21	
Being German is an important part of how I see myself.	1.68	2.10	1.07	
I feel a bond with Germans.	1.68	2.79	1.04	
I feel solidarity with Germans.	1.68	2.44	1.03	
I feel committed to Germans.	1.47	2.56	1.02	
I am glad to be German.	1.89	3.22	1.10	
It is pleasant to be German.	1.47	3.31	1.07	1 - 5
Being German gives me a good feeling.	1.89	2.76	1.06	
I have a lot in common with the average German person.	1.89	3.06	1.13	
I am similar to the average German person.	1.68	3.14	1.08	
I am a typical German.	1.68	2.32	1.12	
German people have a lot in common with each other.	1.68	2.65	1.01	
German people are very similar to each other.	1.89	2.69	1.05	
German share a lot of the same characteristics.	1.89	2.47	1.00	

Descriptive statistics:

Item wordings of the Turkish Sample Measures	% Missing	Mean	SD	Range Strongly Disagree to Strongly
				Agree
Anxious Attachment Style				
I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me. (R)	1.38	3.92	1.90	
When I show my feelings for romantic partners, I'm afraid they will not feel the same about me.	2.76	4.07	1.90	
I worry that romantic partners won't care about me as much as I care about them.	1.84	4.16	1.96	
When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in someone else.	2.30	3.50	2.00	
I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me.	1.38	2.82	1.83	
I worry that I won't measure up to other people.	1.84	3.18	1.89	
Sometimes romantic partners change their feelings about me for no apparent reason.	2.30	3.82	1.86	
My romantic partner makes me doubt myself.	2.30	2.45	1.59	
I worry a lot about my relationships.	2.76	4.45	1.86	
Avoidant Attachment Style				1 - 7
I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner.(R)	2.30	2.41	1.32	
I tell my partner just about everything.(R)	1.84	2.78	1.70	
I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner.(R)	1.84	2.46	1.52	
I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner.(R)	2.30	3.01	1.85	
It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need.(R)	2.30	2.21	1.38	
I find it easy to depend on romantic partners.(R)	1.84	2.98	1.62	
It's not difficult for me to get close to my partner. (R)	2.76	2.79	1.79	
I talk things over with my partner. (R)	1.84	2.16	1.33	
I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down.	1.84	2.99	1.89	
Hierarchic Self-Interest				
In order to excel, one must be able to stand alone.	1.84	3.17	1.89	
Without achievement there is no hanniness	0.92	3.80	1.85	
The most important thing in life is achievement	0.92	2.89	1.00	
I would like to be among the best in all areas of life (job sport_etc.)	1 38	5.43	1.50	
It is always my ambition to be better than the average	0.92	5.78	1.75	1 - 7
It is not important how you win but that you win	1 38	2.05	1.50	1,
One has to judge neonle's deeds according to their success	2 30	2.05	1.67	
Differences in rank between neonle are accentable because they essentially illustrate what neonle have	1.38	2.55	1.05	
made of their opportunities	1.50	5.72	1.75	
Turkey deserves special treatment	2.76	3 75	1 00	
Turkey deserves special treatment.	2.70	4.00	2.04	
It really makes me anony when others criticize Turkey	2.70	4.30	1 00	1 - 5
If other countries listened to Turkey more, the world would be a much better place	2.70	2.40	2.02	1-5
Not many people score to fully understand the importance of Turkey	3.23	3.40	2.03	
Not many people seem to rany understand the importance of rankey.	5.25	4.74	1.97	
I feel strength offiliated with this group	4.15	2.20	1.56	
Other groups can learn a let from us	4.15	3.38	1.50	
Other groups can learn a lot from us.	3.69	3.38	1.34	
belonging to this group is an important part of my identity.	4.15	3.40	1.50	
In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the group leaders.	4.61	2.17	1.24	
am giad to contribute to this group.	4.15	3.96	1.26	
Compared to other groups of this kind, this group is particularly good.	3.69	2.86	1.49	
It is important to me that I view myself as a member of this group.	4.15	3.30	1.47	
All group members should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of the group.	4.15	3.25	1.49	1 - 5
i am strongly committed to this group.	4.15	2.74	1.59	
Relative to other groups, we are a very moral group.	4.15	2.93	1.46	
It is important to me that others see me as a member of this group.	6.45	3.02	1.49	
It is disloyal to criticize this group.	4.15	1.94	1.16	
I like to help this group.	4.15	3.83	1.31	
This group is better than other groups in all respects.	3.69	2.69	1.42	
When I talk about the group members, I usually say "we" rather than "they."	3.69	3.54	1.39	
There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the group leaders propose.	4.61	2.71	1.25	

Extended structural topic modeling results:

As a precursor step to determine the number of topics, we investigated the latent profiles of the participants. Our aim in this preliminary analysis strategy is not to decide on the number of latent profiles but to have a sense of the data with regards to subjectivity. For the German sample, we used the factor scores of *avoidant attachment* style, *HSI, collective narcissism* and the composite factor scores of *self-investment* and *self-definition*. We used factor scores of *avoidant attachment* style, *HSI, collective narcissism* and the composite factor scores of *self-investment* and *self-definition*. We used factor scores of *avoidant attachment* style, *HSI, collective narcissism* and the composite factor scores of *glorification* and *attachment* for the Turkish sample. We investigate the latent profiles with these scores because these are the variables we use in the structural topic modeling estimation.

Before actually estimating the structural topic models, we also investigated the diagnostic values of models with a different number of topics and juxtaposed this output with the LPA results before deciding on the exact number of topics. Below are the results for each sample.

Germany:

Latent profile analysis: We assessed models having 1 to 9 class/profile solutions using maximum likelihood with a fit of varying means and variances, covariances are fixed to zero. We used a bootstrapped likelihood-ratio test and plotted some topics to explore the profiles visually.



Figure 35: profile solution comparisons for the German sample.

The bootstrapped likelihood-ratio test suggests a three-class solution for the German sample. Below we report solutions with 2, 3 and 4 classes with fit measures next to the plotted profiles.



Number of topics for the STM analysis: We pay attention to semantic coherence and residuals in the following plots (smaller residuals and close to zero semantic coherence are desired); judging by these two diagnostic values a two-topic solution is ideal. However, a two-topic solution indicates a single dimension and two poles. When we estimated two topic models and compared that to models with more topics, we saw that much nuance in the open-ended answers is lost. Moreover, judging from the LPA results, there is considerable heterogeneity in the sample. Thus we find two subjective viewpoints to be unlikely. Therefore, we estimated many models with three to five topics to get interpretable results with STM. Eventually, a three-topic solution provided the most meaningful results.

As the preprocessing strategy, we applied standard text preparation steps before computing the STM (*see* (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Lucas et al., 2015)). These steps are stemming (removal of "the endings of conjugated verbs or plural nouns"), removal of numbers, punctuation, and stopwords (which are common in a language, but do not have substantive meaning for analyses, such as "the" or "and").



Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics

Figure 36: Diagnostic values plots from the German sample.

The responses in the first topic overwhelmingly touch upon the "coping-with-the-past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung)" theme of German national identity. In contrast to this subjective viewpoint, the coping-with-the-past theme has much less saliency in the third topic. Many responses in the third topic frame and discuss Germanness with certain traits and characteristics as well as citizenship ties. We guess the first and the third topic are the actual poles on the single dimension. Regarding semantic content, the second topic and the first topic has many overlaps, for example, both topics mention the advantages and privileges that come with the nationhood. However, we think the first topic and the second topic are distinguishable due to collective narcissism scores. As collective narcissism goes up, individuals become less likely to frame and critically discuss Germanness and the specifics of the advantages the nationhood provides. Below are the words that are highly associated with each topic.

Words:

Topic 1: deutsch, deutschland, bedeutet, geboren, geschicht, verantwortung, privilegien, find, fühle, sprach, eher, welt, wichtig, bewusst, stolz, identität, verbunden, vergangenheit, aufgrund, fühlen Topic 2: land, leben, bedeutet, deutscher, froh, glück, bildung, welt, sicherheit, ländern, wohlstand, frei, stolz, sehe, freiheit, reisen, möglichkeiten, sicheren, zugang, gewiss Topic 3: deutsch, deutschen, deutschland, deutscher, typisch, nationalität, wert, denk, etc, eigenschaften, heißt, pünktlichkeit, einfach, kultur, ausland, identität, sagen, stolz, pass, bestimmt

Topic 1 Top Words:

Highest Prob: deutsch, deutschland, bedeutet, geboren, geschicht, verantwortung, privilegien FREX: verantwortung, vergangenheit, fühlen, politisch, bedeutung, deutschsein, besitzen Lift: fragen, hinaus, hinsicht, nationalitäten, privilegiert, sozialsystem, zumindest Score: verantwortung, fühlen, vergangenheit, deutschsein, bedeutet, privilegien, tragen

Topic 2 Top Words:

Highest Prob: land, leben, bedeutet, deutscher, froh, glück, bildung FREX: bildung, sicherheit, wohlstand, freiheit, sicheren, zugang, system Lift: aktuell, angeht, beruf, bezüglich, bildungschancen, brd, bürger Score: land, sicherheit, leben, frieden, chancen, bildung, freiheit

Topic 3 Top Words:

Highest Prob: deutsch, deutschen, deutschland, deutscher, typisch, nationalität, wert FREX: typisch, nationalität, wert, eigenschaften, heißt, bestimmt, lassen Lift: art, besteht, bild, bundesrepublik, fleiß, herkunft, interessen Score: eigenschaften, nationalität, identifizieren, lassen, typisch, bundesrepublik, meisten

The highest probability indicates a higher association with the topic; FREX words are the frequently appearing exclusive words; lift & score add weights to distinguish words across topics and to provide a better understanding of the relations between topics.

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Representative Quotes:

	Quote in the original language	Quote translated into English					
	Topic 1: bittersweet attachment to the national identity						
Low on	Ich denke in der Tat viel darüber nach, was es	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
Collective	bedeutet, dass ich Deutsche bin. Ich bin nicht stolz						
Narcissism	darauf. Deutsche zu sein. zumal ich allgemein die						
	Vorstellung. Stolz auf eine Nation, die mit mir nichts						
	zu tun hat seltsam finde. Ich lehne einen solchen						
	Stolz ab. da nationale Identitäten in der Regel nicht						
	nur ein gesteigertes Selbstwertgefühl dort schaffen.						
	wo es fehl am Platz ist und nationale oder kulturelle						
	Identitäten sich lediglich über (vermeintlich) positive						
	Aspekte konstruieren. Meine Gedanken zur Frage.						
	was Deutsch sein bedeutet, versuchen vor allem						
	die negativen Aspekte in den Vordergrund zu						
	stellen. Eine Nation, welche vor 70 Jahren 6						
	Millionen Jüdinnen und Juden ermordet hat. zur						
	Sicherung eben dieser deutschen Identität. Eine						
	Nation, welche vor 20 Jahren Applaus klatschte, als						
	Geflüchtetenunterkünfte brannten und welche						
	heute mit Pegida und der AfD einen neuen						
	gefährlichen Nationalismus feiert und welche die						
	Aufklärung des NSU darauf beschränkt, drei						
	vermeintlich alleine agierende Einzeltäter zur Schau						
	zu stellen, mit einer solchen Nation will und kann ich						
	mich nicht verbunden fühlen. Und doch bedeutet						
	deutsch sein für mich auch, dass ich mich und						
	meine Stellung reflektieren muss. Eine Ablehnung						
	der Nationaliät führt ja nicht dazu, dass ich dieser						
	nicht mehr angehöre. Also frage ich mich auch oft,						
	was bedeutet es für mich, ob gewollt oder nicht,						
	dass ich deutsch bin? Ich muss mir eingestehen,						
	dass ich das Glück habe, eine der priviligiertesten						
	Menschen auf der Welt zu sein. Im globalen Schnitt						
	bin ich eine Person, deren Existtenz mehr oder						
	weniger immer gesichert sein wird. Dazu besitze ich						
	den Multipass. Ein deutscher Personalausweis						
	bedeutet, dass ich mich fass überall auf der Welt frei						
	bewegen kann. Das ist ein verdammt großes						
	Privileg, welches wir nicht vergessen dürfen.						
	Deutsch sein bedeutet für mich darüber hinaus						
	auch Verantwortung. Verantwortung, die schlimmen						
	Dinge, die unter der NSDAP passierten niemals zu						
	vergessen und auch nicht zu vergeben. Und vor						
	allem dafür zu Sorgen, dass sich so etwas nicht						
	wiederholt. Verantwortung dafür zu tragen, dass						
	Nationalismus nicht erneut Überhand nimmt und						
	dass es verhindert wird, dass Deutsche						
	Geflüchtetenunterkünfte anzünden oder						
	Geflüchtete erschlagen.						
High on	Ich bin froh in Deutschland geboren zu sein und den	I am happy to have been born in Germany and I enjoy the					
Collective	Genuss der vorzüge die dieses Land mir und meinen	benefits that this country provides to me and my children.					
Narcissism	Kindern bietet zu haben.Es ist mir aufgrund der	It is embarrassing / unpleasant to be German because of					
	Vergangenheit peinlich/ unangenehm deutsch zu	the past.					
	sein.						
	Topic 2: reactions	to national humiliation					
Low on	Für mich bedeutet es, seine Meinung frei äußern zu	For me, it means, that I am able to express my opinion					
Collective	können ohne direkt belangt zu werden. Ich habe	freely without being prosecuted directly. I have many					

Narcissism	viele Freiheiten wie aber auch Pflichten der Gesellschaft gegenüber. Als Deutscher hat mein meiner Erfahrung nach entweder sehr gute Wirkung auf andere (Einflussreiches Industrieland) oder man hat z.B. in Frankreich mit Vorurteilen zu kämpfen (begründet auf dem 2. WK). Letzteres ist mir während einem Austausch nach Frankreich sehr schnell klar geworden, nachdem mich der Großvater meines Austauschschülers, wüst auf französisch als Nazi beschimpft hat, nur weil ich dem typischen arischen Männerbild sehr sehr ähnlich sehe. An sich bin ich aber sehr stolz darauf Deutscher zu sein, denn unser Land hat schon vieles überstanden und hat immer noch viel Einfluss in der gesamten Welt. Ferner ist unserer Geschichte zwar teils sehr schlecht geprägt, jedoch ist dies bei fast jedem Land der Fall.	liberties as well as I comply with requirements towards society. According to my experiences, as a German you have either a very good impression on others (influential industrial country) or you have, to fight prejudices like for example in France (based on the 2nd world war). The latter became very clear to me during an exchange with France. My exchange student's grandfather, abominably insulted me in French as a Nazi, just because I look very much like the typical Aryan male image. Actually, I'm very proud to be German, because our country has survived many things and still has a lot of influence in the whole world. Furthermore, our history is partly coined very bad, but this case is similar in almost every country.
High on Collective Narcissism	 in Frieden leben (kein Krieg mehr zwischen europäischen Ländern; Sicherheit & Frieden für die Bevölkerung zu gewährleisten, ist für mich der Sinn einer EU!) 2) Sicherheit 3) als Frau selbstbestimmt sein können und das tun können, was ich mir für meinen Lebensweg vorstelle 4) eine gute Ausbildung (Schule & Studium) zu erhalten 5) jeder hat hier alle Möglichkeiten 6) Ordnung und ein gesundes Maß an Bürokratie leben 7) Mitmenschlichkeit, ich empfinde es so, dass wir Deutschen im allgemeinen sehr Hilfsbedürftig sind und uns für an andere Nationen und Menschen, die es schlechter haben, engagieren. 8) Traditionen 9) Ehrlichkeit 10) Innovationen leben 11) Reisefreudig (wenn auch nicht unbedingt weltoffen) 12) guter Lebensstandard - wenngleich das Leben hier teurer geworden ist die letzten Jahre 13) im Ausland ausgelacht zu werdenfür die miserable Politik, die hierzulande gemacht wird. leider habe ich innerhalb der vergangenen 18 Monate immer wieder deutschfeindliche Sprüche gehört. Die andere EU- Staaten LACHEN UNS AUS!!!! Die schütteln alle nur den Kopf, warum wir tag ein tag aus arbeiten gehen 	1) Living in peace (no war between European countries, ensuring safety and freedom for the population, for me that is the meaning of the EU) 2) Safety 3) Living self- determined as a woman and being able to do whatever I imagine for my way of life 4) Getting a good education (school & university) 5) Everyone has all possibilities 6) Organization and a healthy level of bureaucracy 7) Humanity, in general I have the impression that we Germans are very helpful and we are campaigned for other nations and people, who stay in a worse situation 8) Traditions 9) Honesty 10) Living innovation 11) Excited for traveling (though not necessarily cosmopolitan) 12) High standard of living - although life here has become more expensive the last few years 13) To be laughed at abroad for the miserable policy that is made in this country. Over the past 18 months unfortunately again and again, I've heard anti-German slogans. The other EU states are LAUGHING AT US !!!! They all just shake their heads, why we work day in and day out and feed half of the world.
	Topic 3: cultural	l traits and citizenship
Low on Collective	Deutsch ist für mich nicht viel mehr als die Bezeichnung für meine Nationalität auf meinen	For me, being German is not much more than a labeling for my nationality in my passport. As a citizen of the
Narcissism	Personalausweis. Als Bürgerin der Bundesrepublik leiste ich meinen Beitrag für das Zusammenleben im deutschen Staat, indem ich meine Ausbildung	Federal Republic of Germany I do my contribution to the communal life in the Federal Republic of Germany, where I will finish my education, prospectively pay taxes and
	abschließe, künftig meine Steuern bezahle und mich an die deutschen Gesetze halte. Gleiches erwarte ich von anderen Deutschen, sofern es ihnen möglich ist. Ist es ihnen warum auch immer nicht	observe the German law. In return, that is what I expect from other Germans, as far as it is possible for them. If it is not possible for them, for whatever reason, they earn support. Where they themselves or their ancestors come
	möglich, so haben sie Unterstützung verdient. Wo	from is completely irrelevant for a peaceful coexistence. I
	sie oder ihre Vorfahren herkommen, ist für ein friedliches Zusammenlehen erst einmal völlig	am not at all afraid, that the German culture is effected by immigration. For me, there is no German guiding culture 1
	unerheblich. Ich fürchte mich nicht im Geringsten	feel more European than German, and I support a
	davor, dass die deutsche Kultur durch Einwanderung	comprehensive European integration. I perceive the
	beeinträchtigt wird. Eine deutsche Leitkultur gibt	strong dissociation of national states as a step backwards.
	es für mich nicht. Ich fühle mich mehr als Europäerin	Primarily I am neither German nor European, I am a

	denn als Deutsche und ich befürworte eine umfassende europäische Integration. Die strenge Abgrenzung der Nationalstaaten würde ich als Rückschritt empfinden. In erster Linie bin ich weder Europäerin noch Deutsche, sondern ich bin Mensch. Meine Solidarität erfährt jeder Mensch, der sie nötig hat, ganz unerheblich von Nationalität, Glaube oder Äußerlichkeiten. Lange Zeit habe ich geglaubt, dies sei etwas, dass mich mit den meisten Deutschen und den meisten Europäern verbindet. Die Flüchtlingskrise hat diese Sicht ein wenig geändert, die Reaktion vieler europäischer Staaten und inzwischen auch der Bundesrepublik, hat mich erschüttert. Noch scheint die EU mehr eine Wirtschafts- als eine Wertegemeinschaft zu sein und ich hoffe, dass sich das ändert. Wenn ich sage, dass ich es als angenehm empfinde, Deutsche zu sein, dann meine ich, dass ich mich glücklich schätzen darf, in einem der wohlhabendsten Länder der Welt zu leben. Schon milden Patriotismus halte ich für gefährlich. Nationalismus sowieso. Die Deutschen können einander nicht ähneln oder viele Eigenschaften teilen, weil die Bundesrepublik nicht aus einer homogenen Menschenmasse besteht, sondern schon längst ein Einwanderungsland mit einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft ist. Jede Kultur und jeder Lebensentwurf ist mir willkommen, solange er mit dem Grundgesetz vereinbar ist.	human being. Every human being who needs it will receive my solidarity, irrelevant which nationality, religion or outwards appearance he or she has. For a long time, I thought, this is what connects me with other German or European citizen. The refugee crisis has slightly changed this view, the reaction of many European states and now also the Federal Republic of Germany, really shocked me. The EU still seems to be more based on economics than a community of values, and I hope this will change. Once I say that it is a pleasure to be German, and then I mean that I consider myself lucky to live in one of the most prosperous states in the world. To my mind even mild patriotism is dangerous. Nationalism anyway. Germans cannot resemble each other or share many qualities, because the Federal Republic does not consist of a homogeneous mass of people. Since a long time, it has already been an immigration country with a multicultural society. Every culture and every life script is welcome as long as it is compatible with the Basic Law.
High on Collective	∞ Deutscher ist jeder mit einem deutschen Pass, also der Deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft; auch	∞ German is anyone with a German passport, thus the German citizenship; Even people with a migration
Narcissism	Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund sind daher Deutsche, wenn sie die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit haben ∞ Deutsch sind alle, die sich mit der Deutschen Kultur und dem geografischen Gebiet Deutschland identifizieren ∞ Wie sehr ich mich mit der deutschen Kultur identifiziere merke ich am stärksten, wenn ich längere Zeit (2 monate) im Ausland bin ∞ Deutsche sind sehr geradeaus und sagen ihre Meinung offen(im Gegensatz zu Amerikanern) ∞ Ehrlichkeit und Direktheit: Wenn etwas nicht passt, darf ich der anderen Person das ins Gesicht sagen ∞ Die Deutsche Streitkultur- laut und aufgeregt mit gegenteiligen Meinungen Diskutieren ist gesund ∞ im Biergarten den Feierabend ausklingen lassen, Deutsche gehen auch unter der Woche mal für ein Bier raus oder sitzen abends gerne unter der Woche unter Leuten in Bars und Cafés, da ist nicht alles aufs Wochenende gelegt Deutsche schätzen Gesellschaft ∞ Fußball ∞ Nachbarschaft, besonders in kleineren Dörfern aber auch in Vorstadtsiedlungen und in Städten wird die Nachbarschaft sehr hoch geschätzt. Man kennt seine Nachbar, stellt sich vor wenn man neu einzieht und manchmal leit man sich ein Ei , wenn es Sonntag ist und der Kuchen noch gebacken werden muss ∞ Vertändnis, wenn Sonntags die Läden geschlossen bleiben, Geschmack an Tante Emma	background are therefore German if they have German citizenship. ∞ German is anyone who identifies with German culture and the geographical area of Germany. How strong I identify myself with the German culture, I especially notice, if I am abroad for long time (2 months). ∞ Germans are very straight forward and advance their opinions (unlike Americans). ∞ Honesty and directness: If something does not fit, I am allowed to communicate this to the other person's face. ∞ The German dispute culture –discussing loud and excited with contrary opinions is healthy. ∞ Finishing the evening in the beer garden, Germans go out for a beer or sit together in bars or cafes in the evening during the week, because not everything is focused on the weekend - Germans appreciate society. ∞ Soccer. ∞ Neighborhood, especially in smaller villages but also in suburban settlements and in cities, the neighborhood is very much appreciated. You know your neighbor, you introduce yourself when you move in and sometimes you borrow an egg, if it is Sunday and the cake still has to be baked. ∞ Appreciation, when the shops keep closed on Sundays, cotton to Tante-Emma-shops. The baker or the butcher are still esteemed stores that still are, not always but often, preferred to the big capitalism supermarkets. ∞To live in an economically strong and therefore rich country - social security high pensions, low food prices

Läden- Der Bäcker oder der Metzger sind immer	
noch geschätzte Geschäfte die man nicht immer	
aber immer noch oft dem großen Kapitalismus	
Supermärkten vorzieht ∞ in einem wirtschaftlichen	
Starken und daher reichen Land zu Leben-	
Sozialversicherungen, hohe Renten, niedrige	
Lebensmittelpreise	

Topic correlations:

Variable	AvdAtt	HSI	ColNar	NIsiv	NIsdf	topic1	topic2
Anxious Attachment Style Factor							
Score (AvdAtt)							
Hierarchical Self-Interests Factor	.12*						
score (HSI)	[.02, .22]						
Collective Narcissism Factor Score	.11	.49**					
(ColNar)	[.01, .21]	[.40, .56]					
National Identity Self-Investment	01	.25**	.41**				
Composite Factor Score (NIsiv)	[11, .09]	[.15, .35]	[.32, .50]				
National Identity Self-Definition	09	04	.01	.03			
Composite Factor Score(NIsdf)	[19, .01]	[14, .06]	[10, .11]	[07, .14]			
topic1 %	04	23**	23**	08	.13*		
	[14, .07]	[32,13]	[33,13]	[18, .02]	[.03, .23]		
	- 00	06	1/1**	16**	- 10**	51**	
topic2 %	00	.00	.14		[20 00]	[58, -	
	[11, .10]	[05, .10]	[.05, .24]	[.00, .20]	[29,09]	.43]	
	04	16**	08	- 10	07	42**	57**
topic3 %	.04 [- 06 14]	[05 26]	.00 [_ 02 _ 19]	[- 20 00]	.07 [_02_17]	[50, -	[64, -
	[00, .14]	[.05, .20]	[02, .10]	[20, .00]	[05, .17]	.33]	.50]

Table 17 correlations matrix of the variables from the STM estimation. **p <.01; * p <.05; confidence intervals are reported within the square brackets.
Turkey: *Latent profile analysis:* All the heuristics we describe above apply here as well.



Figure 37: profile solution comparisons for the Turkish sample.

The bootstrapped likelihood-ratio test suggests a four-class solution for the Turkish sample. Below we report solutions with 3, 4 and 5 classes with fit measures next to the plotted profiles.



Number of topics for the STM analysis: All the heuristics we mention above for the German case also apply here. By paying attention to semantic coherence and residuals in the plots, a four-topic solution is ideal. We estimated many models with three to five topics to get interpretable results with STM. Eventually, a four-topic solution provided the most meaningful results.

Responses in the first and fourth topic have much semantic overlap; they both delve into the official nationalist founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey. This ideology had its peculiarities in many aspects. Responses that are highly associated with the first topic and fourth topic emphasize and highlight different aspects of the topic; while a symbolic-patriotism tone is more salient in the first topic's responses, the fourth topic responses frame their perception of the founding nationalist ideology in more ethnocultural or linguistic terms. Thus, we concluded these are notably distinct subjective viewpoints. The second and the third topics discuss Turkish nationhood with many more references to race, ethnicity, and religion. The responses highly associated with the second topic have noticeably glorifying and ethnocentric tones.



Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics

Figure 38: Diagnostic values plots from the German sample.

Words with highest probabilities for each topic:



Topic 1 Top Words:

Highest Prob: türk, türkiy, vatanda, cumhuriyeti, türkiyed, ayan, hissetmektir FREX: türkiy, vatanda, cumhuriyeti, hissetmektir, topraklar, türktür, gelen Lift: adland, buraya, büyümü, cumhuriyeti, cumhuriyetind, devleti, gelen Score: türkiy, vatanda, cumhuriyeti, topraklar, türkiyed, hisseden, türktür

Topic 2 Top Words:

Highest Prob: türk, demek, sahip, ortak, demektir, ulus, türklük FREX: demek, ortak, demektir, icin, unu, atatürkün, korumak Lift: korumak, mensup, ortak, icin, unu, adalet, atatürkün Score: ortak, demek, demektir, icin, mensup, ulus, dayanan

Topic 3 Top Words:

Highest Prob: ifad, farkl, nda, vatan, insan, müslüman, etnik FREX: ifad, vatan, müslüman, üst, alt, kimlik, kimliktir Lift: vatan, kendimi, olmaktan, yoktur, anlam, ann, baba Score: müslüman, farkl, alt, üst, ifad, olmaktan, vatan

Topic 4 Top Words:

Highest Prob: türk, turk, etnik, tan, kavram, kim, ini FREX: kavram, olmakt, lar, kar, köken, kürt, milli Lift: hissetmek, kürt, milli, nas, olmakt, önem, adil Score: kavram, lar, nas, turk, kim, türkçe, olmakt

Representative Quotes:

	•							
	Quote in the original language	Quote translated into English						
	Topic 1 Turkishness as Kemalism (feeling Turkish is being Turkish)							
Low on	Türk olmak çoğu kesimce milliyetçi bir tutumla	Despite it being usually interpreted in a nationalist manner,						
Collective	yorumlansa da bence Türk olmak, Türkiye'de	in my opinion being Turkish means living in Turkey in						
Narcissism	kardeşçe yaşayabilmek ve kendini ait hissetmektir	fraternity and feeling a belonging. And in my opinion, one						
	ve bence Türk olmak için illa Türkiye'de doğmak ya	does not have to be born in Turkey or been cultivated in the						
	da bu toprakların kültüründe büyümüş olmak	region, whoever feels a belonging to here and who adopts						
	gerekmez, kendini buraya ait hisseden ve	into here can call themselves Turkish.						
	benimsemiş olan herkes Türk olarak adlandırabilir							
	kendini.							
High on	Türk olmak yalnız Türk bir Anneden doğmak yada	For me being Turkish does not only mean having been born						
Collective	Türk bir ailede dünyaya gelmek değildir benim	from a Turkish mother or being born into a Turkish family.						
Narcissism	için.Benim için Türk olmak Türk	Being Turkish is feeling Turkish. In the words of the veteran						
	hissedebilmektir.Gazi Mustafa Kemal'inde dediği	Mustafa Kemal "how happy to call oneself a Turk!"						
	gibi Ne Mutlu Türk'üm Diyene!							
	Topic 2 Turkishness	as an Ethnic/Racial category						
Low on	Türk, Türk Milleti'nin ferdi olan birey demektir.	A Turk is an individual who is a member of the Turkish						
Collective	Peki nedir Türk Milleti? Her şeyden önce, kökeni	nation. What is the Turkish nation then? Above all, it is a						
Narcissism	Orta Asya'ya dayanan, dili, harsi bir olan Turani	race with Central Asian roots, a Turani race with a unified						
	irka Turk denir. Fakat bunun yani sira, zamanla	language and culture. But besides this group, those tribes						
	Turkî toplumlar ile kaynaşan, Turkçe konuşan,	[peoples] who has united with the Turkic societies, who						
	lurk'e duşman olmayan, ayrılık istegi gutmeyen	speak [adopted speaking] Turkish, who have not been						
	kavimier de Turk kabul edilmelidir. Oguziar,	nostile against Turks, tribes [peoples] without secessionist						
	latarıar, Hazar ötesi Türkler, Pomaklar, Abazalar,	Intentions should also be considered Turkish. For example,						
	Laziar vb. Turk kabul edilmelidir. Genelleme	Ognuzs, Tatarians, Turks beyond Hazar, Pomacs, Abknasians						
	yapmak yaniiş olsa da, şunu ranatlıklar	and Lazs should be considered Turkish. Despite it is wrong						
	soyleyebiliniz ki: Kurtier gerek konuştukları dil,	to make generalizations; we can connuently say that Kurus,						
	gerek bagimsizlik istekieri, gerek ise mensup	due to their language, due to their heritage, due to their						
High on	Dünya tarihinin on oski kültürüne sahin olan ırka	It moons belonging to the race with the world's eldest						
	monsun olmak domok. Tanrı'nın yoryüzünde	culture. It means being God's intermediany to restore order						
Narcissism	düzeni sağlayan aracısı olmak demek	on Earth						
1401013313111	Tonic 3: role o	f religion in Turkishness						
Low on	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulusunu ulus-devlet olarak	Actually during the nation-huilding era, the Republic of						
Collective	tanımladığı zaman yantığı ayrım aslında din	Turkey defined itself with regards to religious differences						
Narcissism	üzerinden olmustur. Müslüman olan ve olmavan	The distinction was between Muslims and non-Muslims						
	seklinde tanım yanılmış ve Müşlüman olmayan	those who were not Muslims were defined as the						
	grun azınlık kabul edilmiştir. Oysa ki Türkiye	minorities But still Turk as an ethnic category is still used						
	Cumhuriveti adında etnik bir unsur olarak Türk adı	Turk was tried to be intrumentalized as an umberall/supra-						
	gecmektedir. Osmanlı'dan Türkiye'ye miras olan	national category for those with various ethnic and religious						
	farklı etnik ve dini unsurlar Türk üst kimliği catısı	backgrounds. It is still debatable to what extent the super-						
	altında toplanmak istenmistir. Türkiye'de yaşayan	ordinate category of Turkishness is adopted by those who						
	Türkiyeli olan çoğu kişi farklı alt kimliklere sahip	have various subcategory identities. During the nation-state						
	olmakla beraber Türklük üst kimliğinin ne kadar	building those who were not Turk and/or Muslim were						
	benimsendiği bence hala tartışmalıdır.Ulus-devlet	defined as the Other. While this perception is inherited from						
	inşası sürecinde Türk ve/veya Müslüman olmayan	the Ottoman times, this discourse also corresponds to						
	grup 'öteki' olarak inşa edilmiştir.Bunda Osmanlı	exclusion of distinct background and perceiving them as						
	zamanından kalan anlayışın etkisi görülmekle	uncanny. This is a general nation-state problem. I think						
	beraber söylem çoğu zaman farklılıkları dışlama ve	being Turkish is a superordinate category, but individuals						
	güvensiz olarak tanımlama şeklindedir. Bu sorun	should not identify themselves with only one identity.						
	genel olarak ulus-devlet anlayışı ile ilintilidir. Türk	Superordinate identities are only important for your						
	olmak bence bir üst kimliktir,ancak bireyler	belonging to the country that you are a citizen of, but the						
	kendilerini tek bir kimlik ile ifade etmemelilerdir.	sub-identities are of existential value.						
	Üst kimlik sadece vatandaşı olduğumuz ülkeye							
	aidiyetiniz için önemlidir ancak sahip olduğumuz							
	alt kimlikler varoluşsal değerlerimizdir.							
High on	Bir insanın ulusunun ve ırkının ne olduğu, insanın	A person's nation or race does not mean that s/he is a good						

Collective	iyi veya kötü biri olduğu anlamına gelmez; fakat	or a bad person; however we experience this frequently in
Narcissism	ülkemizde bu çok sık yaşanıyor. Ben ırk söz	our country. With regards to race, I am Laz [an ethnicity
	konusu olduğunda hem anne tarafından hem baba	with Southern Caucasian roots and with a distinct language
	tarafından Laz'ım, bununla gurur duymakla	 many Laz people reside in the North East regions of the
	birlikte; kendimi Lazlıktan önce Türk olarak	country] from both my mother's and father's family, I'm
	tanımlıyorum, ben Türküm; dedelerim bu vatan	proud of this but I define myself as Turkish first, I'm Turkish;
	için kanını hiç şüphe etmeden döktü, bu benim için	my grandfathers have given up their their lives without any
	ırkımın farklılığından daha onurlu ve şereflidir.	hesitation for this country, this is much more honorable for
	Ama hepsinden önce kendimi Müslüman olarak	me than my race. But beyond and above all I define myself
	tanımlarım, benim milletimin vatan aşkı ve bin	as a Muslim. My nation has no prominence other than being
	yıldır ümmet lideri olan bir millete sahip olmaktan	the leader of the Muslims [ümmet] and other than having
	başka ehemmiyeti yoktur, benim ile Müslüman bir	the love for the country. A Turkish Muslim and an Arap
	Arapla Müslüman bir Türkün ya da Müslüman bir	Muslim have no difference for the God, also humans are all
	Avrupalının Allah katında bir ayrılığı yoktur, ayrıca	equal, we all go to the same place [after death]. A Buddhist
	insanoğlu zaten eşittir, çıktığımız yer ve gittiğimiz	and a Muslim is the same as human beings and all humans
	yer aynıdır; bir Budist ile bir Müslümanın insan	have equal rights. What I'm trying to say is that being
	olma vasfında bir ayrımı yoktur ve tüm insanlar	Turkish, for me, means being honorable and being the
	eşit haklara sahiptir. Demeye çalıştığım şey Türk	leader of Muslims. My name is Muslim, my last name is
	olmak benim için şerefli, ümmet lideri bir millete	Turkish, and my nickname is Laz.
	sahip olmak anlamına gelir, ismim Müslüman,	
	soyadım Türk lakabım ise Lazdır.	
	Topic 4: Turkishness as Kemalism (assimilat	ion into Turkishness via acculturalization & language)
Low on	Benim anladığım şekliyle Türk olmak, esas olarak	As I understand it, being Turkish is basically adopting Turkish
Collective	etno-sembolik kodlarla oluşmuş ve dilsel olarak	identity, which is comprised of ethno-symbolic codes and is
Narcissism	belirlenmiş bir Türk kimliğini benimsemektir. Üç ya	defined with language. I knowing that my 3rd or 4th
	da dört kuşak öncesinde Türkçe konuşmayan,	generation ancestors were not Turkish and did not speak
	etnik olarak Türk olmayan atalara sahip olduğumu	Turkish does not change the fact that I was born into a
	bilsem de bu benim Türk etnisitesinin kültürel	family who adopted Turkish cultural codes and [Turkish]
	kodlarını, dilini benimsemiş olan bir aileye doğmuş	language. Therefore I have a Turkish identity due to socio-
	olmam gerceğini değiştirmiyor. Dolayısıyla	historical reasons.
	tarihsel-toplumsal nedenlerle bir Türk kimliğine	
	sahibim.	
High on	Vatana millete faydalı, dürüst, tüm yurdu aynı	Somebody who is of good service to the homeland and the
Collective	gören, ülke çıkarlarını gözetip, her türlü siyasi	nation, somebody who has an identical notion of homeland
Narcissism	kimliğin önünde tutan. Atatürk'ün evladı.	for all regions, somebody who prioritizes [Turkishness]
		among any other political identities and who watches out
		for national interests. Atatürk's child [/follower].

Topic correlations:

	Anx	HSI	CN	Nlatt	NIglo	topic1	topic2	topic3
Anxious Attachment Style Factor Score (Anx)								
Hierarchical Self- Interests Factor score (HSI)	.21** [.07, .34]							
Collective Narcissism Factor Score (CN)	.21** [.07, .34]	.11 [03, .25]						
National Identity Attachment Factor Score (NIatt)	10 [24, .04]	10 [24, .04]	17* [30,03]					
National Identity Glorification Factor Score(NIglo)	.03 [11, .17]	09 [22, .06]	08 [22, .07]	.56** [.46, .65]				
topic 1 %	.01 [13, .15]	.09 [05, .23]	08 [22, .06]	36** [48,23]	32** [44,18]			
topic 2 %	02 [17, .12]	00 [14, .14]	.08 [07, .22]	.22** [.08, .35]	.09 [05 <i>,</i> .23]	46** [57,35]		
topic3 %	17* [31,03]	30** [42,17]	.08 [07, .22]	.05 [09, .19]	.08 [06, .22]	45** [55,33]	18* [31, - .04]	
topic4 %	.15* [.01, .29]	.12 [03, .25]	03 [17, .11]	.23** [.10, .36]	.28** [.14, .40]	54** [64,43]	24** [36, - .10]	01 [16, .13]

Table 18 correlations matrix of the variables from the STM estimation. ******p <.01; ***** p <.05; confidence intervals are reported within the square brackets.

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PROJECT 4: Do individuals find comfort in their nations? Network map of emotions and attitudes toward the nation

Abstract:

Background/motivation: Anomie (a feeling of perceived disorder in societal norms and morals) is known to be a predictor of many political attitudes including national identification. Early scholars of nationalism studies argued that national identity provide ontological security and a sense of belonging to the individuals especially in times of anomie and uncertainty, which is to say that individuals find psychological-comfort in their nations. In this research, I utilize psychological constructs associated with anomie to check if they are also involved in national identification. The psychological constructs I use are *need to belong* (an intrinsic motivation to affiliate with others and be socially accepted) and *social and emotional loneliness*, which are the outcomes of anomie. Additionally, I examine the involvement of distinct positive (happiness, hope, joy, pride) and negative (anger, anxiety, contempt, disgust, fear, fury, guilt, hate, shame) emotions in national identification. I examine these associations in Germany, a country that has an ambivalent relationship with its national identity; and Turkey, a country that is not shy of heightened nationalist sentiments.

Methods: I utilize convenience samples of German and Turkish university students in two separate studies. In study 1 (2012; N_{DE} =190 N_{TR} =105 Turkey) I estimate the psychological network of national identity and the emotions evoked by the national flag of the country. In study 2 (2016; N_{DE} =476 Germany, N_{TR} =217), I estimate the psychological network of national identity and social & emotional loneliness and the need to belong.

Results: The overall results suggest that there is little evidence showing a link between national identification and psychological comfort-seeking. Results of study 1 reveal that, although national flags evoke distinct emotions in two countries, the global attitude (general cognition) that involves emotions and national identity is weak and this global attitude is not significantly different across the countries. In study 2, I find that *need to belong* and *social & emotional loneliness* have weak associations with the national identities of German and Turkish students. However, similar to the first study's findings, the global attitude that involves the *need to belong* and *social & emotional loneliness* and national identity is weak in both countries, and this global attitude is not significantly different across samples either. Additional analysis reveals the sample sizes are not sufficient to make robust inferences from the findings.

Relevance/Implications: I discuss the results by referring to the limitations of the study.

Introduction:

Recent years have witnessed a revival in nationalist sentiments; populist movements espouse nationalism that opposes the loss of national sovereignty. Many scholars point to globalization as the cause of eroding national identities (Roshwald, 2015). Eroding national identities are an important subject of academic inquiry in political psychology because scholars argue that much psychologically rewarding cognition stems from national identity. According to Giddens (1990), national identity provides ontological security to the individual as it is a stable psychological reference in a context of change and uncertainty. Druckman (1994) sees it as a sense of belonging and Greenfeld (1992) argues that national identities are a source of dignity for individuals. Social identity theory also suggests that individuals get some aspects of their self-esteem from their group identities (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Turner, 1982).

There is a complementary line of research, which points to the unconscious motivational processes that influence many attitudes related to national identity. According to terror management theory, anxiety caused by mortality (knowing or remembering individuals are mortal) is involved in many intergroup processes (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008). For example, individuals become more prejudiced when conscious or unconscious cues increase human mortality's salience. According to the theory, mortality salience enhances stereotypical thinking (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009) and therefore increases prejudice (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013) as well as in-group-favoritism in the form of a nationalistic bias (Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, & Scott, 1997). Furthermore, there is evidence indicating national symbols like the flags enforce and strengthen national identification following mortality salience cues (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Jonas & Greenberg, 2004). Group membership is also known to reduce threat experiences (Branscombe & Wann, 1991), feelings of uncertainty (Hogg, 2007) and help regain a feeling of psychological control (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011). Some researchers interpret these findings as individuals finding psychological comfort in their groups. When an individual focuses on the in-group membership, the anxiety experienced due to mortality salience becomes more bearable due to an unconscious belief that the group outlives the individual.

One other line of research highlights the importance of the need to belong and social connection. Much research has shown the involvement of personal significance (Jasko, LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2013; Webber et al., 2017) and the need to belong (Belanger, Caouette, Sharvit, & Dugas, 2014) in political radicalization and violence. Those who have a high need to belong to an entity and those who thrive for meaning and certainty, as well as personal significance, are more likely to be drawn to political ideologies that promote radicalism and violence.

Anomie is a general feeling that stems from the perceived derangement of societal norms and morals. Researchers showed that the feeling of anomie is a significant predictor or many political outcomes (Teymoori, Bastian, & Jetten, 2016) including national identification (Blank, 2003). Another outcome of anomie on the individual level is the perceived breakdown of social bonds between an individual and the society. Thus individuals feel more socially and emotionally alone. All these findings hint that there are meaningful connections between national identity and psychological comfort-seeking. However, to this day, no study has brought these different lines of research together to meaningfully investigate the relationship between national identity and psychological comfort-seeking. When individuals feel a social disconnect, when they experience social and emotional loneliness, do these feelings influence their national identification? Are people with a high need for belonging more likely to identify with their nations? In sum, do individuals find comfort in their national identities? In this study, I explore the

associations between individuals' psychological comfort seeking mechanisms and their national identifications.

While national identity is a potential psychological comfort zone for individuals, this comfort zone is certainly not free of emotions (Suny, 2004). Psychologists agree there is no cognition without emotion and vice versa. Recent scholarship on national identity has a heightened interest in emotions that are associated with national identities (Sullivan, 2014). Much of the existing literature investigating the link between emotions and national identity focus on sports (Ismer, 2011), collective trauma (Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, & Sztompka, 2004), commemoration (McCrone & McPherson, 2009), national symbols (Eriksen & Jenkins, 2007) and national pride (Condor, 2000; Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). Besides these approaches, which generally utilize interpretative and qualitative methods, some other works study the emotion and national identity relationship with surveys (Becker et al., 2017; Heinrich, 2016) and experiments (Kopf-Beck, 2015).

Despite the increasing number of works on emotion and national identity link, only a handful studies adopt a comparative approach. In this study, I adopt a multi-method and comparative approach to delve into the relationship between national identity and emotions. I use university student samples from two countries with very different national identities. The first case is Germany – a country that tends to restrain the expressions of timid national pride to sports events (Becker, Enders-Comberg, Wagner, Christ, & Butz, 2012). The second country in the current study is Turkey – a country that is not shy in expressing ethnocentrism and national pride. I believe such a contrast makes the comparison of these cases informative and fruitful.

Finally, it is important to understand the link between emotions and national identity, and it is essential to study this relationship comparatively because the normative content of national identities evokes and attract distinct emotions (Kopf-Beck, 2015). What I mean by normative content are the narratives that constitute the ingredients of national identities. Moreover, Heinrich (2012) argues that different dimensions of national identity are distinct emotional expressions. In other words, distinct emotions guide different dimensions of national identity. Germany and Turkey constitute good examples to investigate the same dimensions of two national identities that are potentially guided by different emotions.

In the following, I investigate two relationships; the first between emotions and national identity, and the second between the need to belong and social & emotional loneliness and national identity in two separate studies. In the first study, I operationalize national identity in two dimensions; one dimension is ethnocentrism, the other dimension is a composite measure of national pride and the importance of national identity to the individual. In the second study, I operationalize national identity in three dimensions. The first dimension is symbolic patriotism, which is an affective attachment (Parker, 2010) to the nation through its symbols. The second dimension is often labeled as nationalism or nationalistic attitudes; Otten and Cohrs (2010) define this construct as a comparative orientation. Individuals compare their countries and nationalities to others, and obtain a feeling of superiority as a result of this comparison. Although an accurate label would be nationalist comparative orientation, for the sake of simplicity, I use the label nationalism for this construct. The third dimension of national identity in the second study is collective narcissism, which is "an unrealistic and psychologically-fragile belief in the nation's greatness contingent on external validation (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2017)." This dimension reflects an exaggerated emotional investment in the nation as well as a passionate belief in the inimitability of the nation. By referring to Adorno et al. (1950), Golec de Zavala (2017) note that the exaggerated emotional investment in one's nation may be done as compensation for the weaknesses of

the individual. Thus, this construct is potentially a great tool to examine whether individuals seek psychological comfort in their nations.

Methods:

Samples: The first study's sample comes from a cross-cultural study by Becker et al. (2017), in which university students from 11 countries saw their national flags before answering a set of questions. This survey included many items (concepts and emotions to be associated with the flag, cultural values and measures of patriotism and nationalism). From this big dataset, I subsetted the German and Turkish samples and filtered out all the variables except socio-demographics and the items on emotions and nationalism (the original data is publicly available at https://osf.io/6jjaa/). The sample characteristics from the two countries are the following: the German sample is composed of 190 participants (75% female, 25% male); the mean age is 22. 84% of the participants reported to have been raised in West Germany; 48% of them placed themselves on the left-side of the political spectrum. The Turkish student sample has 105 participants (88% female, 12% male); mean age is 21. The overwhelming majority of the Turkish participants are from the city of Istanbul; 64 % of the sample reported to be on the left-side of the political spectrum.

The second study is also composed of a convenience sample of university students. The data was collected in Spring 2016. The German sample has 476 participants (mean age: 26; 62 % female, 36 % male). The Turkish sample's N is 217 (mean age: 25; 51% female, 45 % male). Approximately 75% of the German students reported to be on the left side of the political orientation scale; almost half of the Turkish students placed themselves to the left, about 35 % placed themselves to the right, and the rest were in the middle. Regarding the place of residence, the German sample is more heterogeneous. German students were from various federal states (43 % from North Germany, 21 % Central Germany, 12 % from Eastern Germany, 20 % from Southern Germany). The majority of the Turkish participants are from public and private universities in three major cities of Turkey (İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir).

Measures: In the first study, I examine the influence of negative and positive emotions on *national identification* and *ethnocentrism*. Here, I tap into *ethnocentrism* with three items; the level of national pride and the importance given to national identity by the individual constitute the *national identification* measures. See Table 1 for item wordings and variable names.

Table 19: Survey-items used in study 1 – samples from 2012							
Theoretical Construct	Variable Name	Item Wording					
		Please describe what you think of when you see the xxx flag.					
Negative Emotion	Anger	Anger					
Negative Emotion	Anxiety	Anxiety					
Negative Emotion	Contempt	Contempt					
Negative Emotion	Disgust	Disgust					
Negative Emotion	Fear	Fear					
Negative Emotion	Fury	Fury					
Negative Emotion	Guilt	Guilt					
Positive Emotion	Happiness	Happiness					
Negative Emotion	Hate	Hate					
Positive Emotion	Норе	Норе					
Positive Emotion	Joy	Joy					
Positive Emotion	Pride	Pride					
Negative Emotion	Shame	Shame					
	nat1	Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible.					
Ethnocentrism	nat2	Generally, the more influence xxx has on other nations, the better off they are.					
	nat3	Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes xxx to do things in a big way.					
National Identification	pat2	I am proud to be a xxx.					
	pat4	The fact that I am a xxx is an important part of my identity.					

The second study expands these theoretical constructs. I use three constructs which reflect different dimensions of national identification. *Symbolic patriotism* is measured by two items, *nationalism* includes three items, and I use the short version of *collective narcissism* scale by Golec de Zavala et al. (2009). *Need to belong* is measured with a single-item, which is recommended by Nichols and Webster (2013) as the short version of the scale. I use the Turkish (Akgul & Yesilyaprak, 2015) and German (de Jong Gierveld & van Tilburg, 1999) versions of the De Jong Gierveld short scales for *social and emotional loneliness* (2010). Table 2 displays the item-wordings and variable names.

Table 20: Survey-items used in study 2 – the samples from 2016						
Theoretical	Variable	Item Wording				
Construct	Name					
		The statements below reflect various experiences of emotions and thoughts in social relationships. What is meant by social relationships are the ties between friends and acquaintances. Please state to what extent you garee or disagree with the statements.				
Need to belong	n2b08	I have a strong need to belong.				
	Sels04R	There are plenty of people I can lean on when I have problems. (R)				
Social	Sels07R	There are many people I can trust completely. (R)				
Ioneliness	Sels08R	There are enough people I feel close to. (R)				
Frankingal	sEls03	I experience a general sense of emptiness.				
Emotional	sEls09	I miss having people around me.				
IOHEIIHESS	sEls10	I often feel rejected.				
		Below are some statements regarding [country]. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with				
Currela ella	anat01	triese statements.				
Symbolic	spatul	seeing the [country] hag makes me reel not proud at all – very proud				
patriotism	spat02	When I hear the national anthem, it makes me feel not proud at all – very proud				
	nat01	I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the World.				
Nationalism	nat02	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].				
	nat03	Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries.				
	cn2	[COUNTRY] deserves special treatment.				
Callesting	cn3	I will never be satisfied until [COUNTRY] gets all it deserves.				
narcissism	cn5	It really makes me angry when others criticize [COUNTRY].				
1101 (15515111	cn6	If [COUNTRY] had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.				
	cn8	Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of [COUNTRY].				
Note: Items mark	ed with (R) ar	e reverse coded				

All descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix.

Analysis techniques: I employ a variety of analysis strategies to answer the research questions. As preliminary analyses, I apply multi-group structural equation modeling to investigate the differences in relationships between constructs across countries. Since the current study includes samples from two countries, the multi-group analysis is necessary to reveal cross-cultural similarities and differences in the perceptions of the constructs. In the main analyses, I employ attitude network modeling, which became a popular technique in psychometric research. Survey-items are the nodes in the attitude networks; the circles in the network plots represent these nodes. The connections between the nodes are called the edges; these edges are the unknown parameters in the analyses and they are estimated from the data. Attitude network analysis is a very powerful tool because it allows researchers to get a much more fine-grained picture of the connections between the latent constructs' indicators compared to alternative analysis strategies like the structural equation modeling.

Attitude network modeling has at least two advantages over comparable analysis techniques like structural equation modeling (SEM). One of these advantages is with regards to the philosophy of science; the other is empirical. While SEM posits a latent/uncountable construct that influences the responses to the survey-items (which are assumed to be countable), attitude networks rely on the presumption that each survey-item is a distinct evaluative reaction. While the former technique's aim is to reveal the common cause and its effects, the latter technique aims to model the conditional dependence of survey-items (different evaluative reactions) on one another. So, what is estimated in the attitude networks are the connections between every survey-item after controlling for the influence of all other survey items (Costantini et al., 2015; Fried, 2017). The estimated attitude network can be regarded as the causal psychological structure of a more general cognition or a global attitude (Dalege et al., 2016). Given certain assumptions, latent trait models and psychological network models are mathematically equivalent on empirical grounds (Kruis & Maris, 2016; Marsman et al.) and complementary (Guyon, Falissard, & Kop, 2017). Each latent model has an equivalent network model that fits the data equally well and vice versa (*see* S. Epskamp, Maris, Waldorp, and Borsboom (in press); S. Epskamp, Rhemtulla, and Borsboom (2017); Marsman et al. (2018)).

Procedure: I apply three separate techniques within the framework of attitude network analysis. **EBIC Graphical LASSO Networks:** This technique is an estimation based on the partial correlations between ordinal-scaled survey-items. Least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) shrinks all coefficients and sets the small ones to zero. The LASSO works as a statistical regulation technique that controls and minimizes spurious correlations among survey-items, and thus only retains the relevant connections/edges in the network. This regularization is particularly helpful for small sample studies (such as the current research), where statistical power is crucial. LASSO ensures fewer parameters to be estimated. In summary, EBIC gLASSO is a regularized partial correlation network which returns a sparse and therefore parsimonious attitude network. The sparsity is achieved with a tuning parameter, which is recommended to be .5 for ordinal data (S. Epskamp, 2017) – this tuning parameter (.5) can be adjusted for less parsimonious networks. During the procedure, many networks are estimated from the data and the best-fitting network is picked via EBIC (extended Bayesian Information Criterion), depending on the tuning parameter setting (S. Epskamp & Fried, forthcoming). I report the networks with .5 tuning parameter in the Results section; I also report the same networks with .25 tuning parameter in the Appendix.

Network comparison: While visual inspections are not uncommon, in the general attitude network modeling framework, it is possible to make formal comparisons of networks from different samples (van Borkulo et al., 2015; van Borkulo et al., 2016). I compare the attitude networks of German and Turkish university students in the two studies to reveal if there is a statistical difference between the global

strength of the attitudes under investigation; I also report the statistically significant differences in attitude network structures.

Joint Estimation of Between-Subject Networks with Fused Graphical LASSO: One recent development in attitude network research extends the LASSO regularization mentioned above. Between-subject attitude networks use similarities as well as differences across groups to improve estimation (Costantini et al., 2017). This joint estimation of multiple group networks is particularly useful for cross-cultural research. This technique jointly estimates different networks of groups by exploiting their similarities without masking the groups' differences.

Results:

Preliminary analyses: Multi-group structural equation modeling results reveal that there are significant differences across the samples. Please see the Appendix for the concrete figures, the goodness of fit statistics and the reliability. In the context of rating national flags, the emotions joy, contempt and guilt mean different things to German and Turkish students – these are the items that need to be freely estimated in the measurement models. Results also suggest that the regression coefficients must also be freely estimated across groups. In the German sample, positive emotions are positively and significantly associated with both national identification and ethnocentrism; negative emotions have a negative and significant association with *national identification* but have no statistical associations with *national identification* and *ethnocentrism*; negative emotions are not significantly related to these endogenous variables.

These results are not surprising given the national identity characteristics. Germans are known to have cautious and ambivalent national attachment due to the historical legacy of the Holocaust (Becker et al., 2012; Becker & Tausch, 2014; Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). The emotions around national identity are generally negative and psychologically challenging (Kopf-Beck, 2015; Kopf-Beck, Gaisbauer, & Dengler, 2017). In contrast, Turkish national identity harbors a lot of heightened pride, especially with regards to the secular and nationalist founding Kemalist ideology. Becker et al. (2017) report that the Turkish flag used in the cross-cultural study had the portrait of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who symbolizes this particular nationalist ideology. This specific flag has been the symbol of urban and secular movements in the country against ethnic minorities and the conservative government.

Samples from 2016 also significantly differ in their attitudes. The factor loadings of two items¹⁹ in the emotional loneliness scale and one item²⁰ in the collective narcissism scale are significantly different across German and Turkish students. Regression coefficients need to be estimated freely in this model as well. *Social loneliness* positively and significantly predicts *nationalism* and *symbolic patriotism* in the German sample. *Need to belong* also positively and significantly predicts *symbolic patriotism* of the German students; no other regression coefficient is significantly predict *symbolic patriotism*. In the Turkish sample, the exogenous variables only significantly predict *symbolic patriotism*. While *emotional loneliness* of Turkish students is positively associated with their *symbolic patriotism*, their feelings of *need to belong* negatively predict this construct.

Results from the second study's preliminary analyses are somewhat unexpected and new. It is hard to make sense of why Turkish students' need to belong is negatively associated with *symbolic patriotism*

¹⁹ I miss having people around me & I often feel rejected.

²⁰ [COUNTRY] deserves special treatment.

while those who feel *emotional loneliness* tend to feel higher levels of *symbolic patriotism* – these might be spurious associations, or these relationships may have some meaning in the context of Turkish national identity. The interpretation of the German sample's results is straightforward – those who feel socially isolated and lonely and have a high need to belong tend to have higher levels of *symbolic patriotism* in the German context. Social loneliness also makes German students focus more on the perceived superiority of their country.

The overall results of the preliminary analyses reveal that there is evidence to suggest that people might, in fact, find psychological comfort in their nation. However, the form of psychological comfort is subject to the national context and the normative content of national identities. For example, in their cross-cultural study Becker et al. (2017) found that German students were least likely to associate their flags with aggression-related concepts, whereas Turkish students' perceptions of their flag had strong associations with these concepts. Egalitarian and power related concepts' associations were also different across the samples in 2012. Therefore, if the symbols of the nations have different connotations, it is anticipated that individuals seek different forms of psychological comfort in these constructs. Moreover, as the first study's analysis suggests the strengths of the evoked emotions are different when German and Turkish students think of their country and nation. These distinct emotional processes must guide people in their psychological comfort seeking process in discrete ways.

The preliminary analyses with multi-group SEM provide some useful insights for the different relationships between the constructs across samples. In the next section, I investigate these relationships further with more fine-grained item-level analyses.

Study 1 – Samples from 2012:

EBIC Graphical LASSO networks: Figure 1 shows attitude networks of both samples plotted side by side. The colors of the nodes (circles/survey-items) denote the theoretical constructs; blue edges (connections) are positive associations, red edges are the negative associations. A visual inspection suggests that the attitude networks have different structures with regards to their densities.

The negative connections between hate & disgust and the level of national pride (pat02) in the Turkish sample are much stronger. That implies national pride in the Turkish sample evokes less hate & disgust. Additionally, Turkish students feel less guilt when they think "other countries should try to make their government like theirs as much as possible" (nat01). In the German sample, the edges between the negative emotions and items related to ethnocentrism and national identification are visually denser, but the edge strengths seem to be weaker. The negative connections imply that negative emotions are not very strongly evoked in the German sample either. For example, "I am proud to be a German" (pat02) does not evoke anxiety or shame; "the fact that I am a German is an important part of my identity" (pat04) does not evoke fear and disgust. Also, note that the edges between the ethnocentrism items and national identification items are visually different across samples. Turkish students have a stronger connection between "other countries should try to make their government like theirs as much as possible" and "the fact that I am a Turk is an important part of my identity" (nat1-pat4), which again signals the normative content differences of national identifies. Finally, the edges between "the fact that I am a German/Turk is an important part of my identity" (pat04) & the emotion pride and "I am proud to be a German/Turk is an important part of my identity" (pat04) & the sample content differences are also visually different across the samples.



Figure 39: Attitude networks of samples from 2012, obtained with EBIC gLASSO.

Network comparison: A formal network comparison test reveals that none of the visual differences are statistically significant. See Table 3 below. The global cognition, which involves emotions and two national identity dimensions, are not statistically different across German and Turkish university students. The overall network structure is not significantly different either. Only one edge is statistically significant across samples, and that is the connection between "other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible" and "the fact that I am a German/Turk is an important part of my identity" (nat1-pat4). This means that, although different levels of distinct emotions are evoked across samples after national flag exposure, one cannot conclude that emotion-strengths between German and Turkish samples are different. The only distinct character of German and Turkish students' attitude networks stem from the normative content differences in national identities, not from the emotions that these contents evoke. Note that it is very likely that non-significant differences across networks are actually due to statistical power issues since the sample sizes are small (see Borsboom et al., 2017); network comparison test requires a lot of power. Thus, non-significant results can mean either the networks are really not different or there is not enough power to detect significant differences. See the Appendix for network accuracy and replicability analyses.

Table 21: Study 1 – samples from 2012. Results from the formal network comparison test						
German sample Turkish Samp						
Global attitude strength [no significant difference; p<.992]	7.97	7.96				
Network structure [no significant difference; p<.09]						
Significantly different edges across samples nat1-pat4 [p<.000]						

Joint Estimation of Between-Subject Networks with Fused Graphical LASSO: The joint estimation strategy with fused graphical LASSO provides further insights regarding the similarities and dissimilarities of German and Turkish attitude networks. The visual information from the network plots

signal that the densities of both networks (all the edges/connections between the survey-items) are larger than suggested by EBIC gLASSO networks. In the plots on Figure 2, green edges (connections) denote the positive associations; red edges denote the negative associations. After the joint estimation, I compute the small-worldness index for each network – a network with a small-worldness index of >3 is considered to have a dense structure and high connectivity. If the network is highly clustered and has a low average path length (potentially fast information flow from one node to another) *small-worldness* is observed in that network. Neither of the attitude networks passes the threshold of >3; both small-worldness index of the value of 1. That is to say, the general cognition that involves emotions and two national identity dimensions do not have high connectivity and does not necessarily translate into a powerful attitude in either of the samples. This finding provides counter-evidence to some of the previous literature, which attributed high importance and strength to national identities. At this point, I again cautiously attribute this inference to statistical power issues and sample bias. The samples sizes are small. Also university students, in general, are liberal and progressive in their national attitudes.



Figure 40: Attitude networks of samples from 2012, obtained with fused gLASSO (joint estimation).

Study 2 – Samples from 2016:

EBIC Graphical LASSO networks: Figure 3 plots the attitude networks of the university student samples from 2016. Visual inspection of the networks reveals that the connection between *social and emotional loneliness* & *need to belong* and national identity dimensions are not very strong in the samples. While there are more edges in the German sample, the only visual (but weak) connection in the Turkish sample is between *"I have a strong need to belong"* and *"I will never be satisfied until Turkey gets all it deserves"* (n2b08-cn03). There is also a visible edge between *"I will never be satisfied until Turkey gets all it deserves"* and *"there are many people I can trust completely* (R)" (Sels07R-cn03). Judging from the weaknesses of the edges, I suppose that *social and emotional loneliness* and *need to belong* are not meaningfully related to national identity dimensions in the Turkish sample. In the

German sample, the weak but dense edges signal a stronger connection between *social and emotional loneliness* & *need to belong* and national identity dimensions.



Figure 41: Attitude networks of samples from 2016, obtained with EBIC gLASSO

Network comparison: Similar to the results of Study 1, a formal comparison of German and Turkish students' attitude networks reveals that neither the global strength nor the structure is significantly different across samples. However, this time, many edges are significantly different across samples. See Table 4. All the statistically different edges are the connections between the survey-items that tap into different dimensions of national identity. This again implies the normative content differences between German and Turkish national identities. In a nutshell, many of the *symbolic patriotism* edges are the significantly different ones.

For example, in the Turkish sample, the connection between "I would rather be a citizen of Turkey than of any other country in the World" and "seeing the Turkish flag makes me feel proud" (nat01-spat01) is negative and strong in contrast to the same edge in the German sample. This particular edge difference shows that a symbolic attachment to the nation does not necessarily translate into an in-group preference bias in the Turkish sample. Additionally, all the negative edges between symbolic patriotism items and collective narcissism items (cn2-spat01, cn3-spat01, cn5-spat01, cn8-spat01, cn3-spat02, cn8-spat02) imply that exaggerated emotional investment in the greatness of the Turkish nation does not transform into a symbolic national attachment for the Turkish students. Vice versa, a symbolic national attachment to the Turkish nation does not mean an exaggerated emotional investment in the Turkish students. Vice versa, a symbolic national attachment for this finding. One interpretation would point to the peculiarities of the normative content of Turkish national identity. An alternative interpretation is sample-bias. I believe the real inference from these findings lies somewhere in between these two alternative interpretations.

Table 22: Study 2 – samples from 2016. Results from the formal network comparison test							
	German sample	Turkish Sample					
Global attitude strength [no significant difference; p<.419]	6.52	7.07					
Network structure [no significant difference; p<.9]							
Significantly different edges across samples cn2-spat01, cn3-spat01, cn5-spat01, cn8-spat01, nat01-spat01, nat03-spa							
	cn3-spat02, cn8-spat02; all at a [p<.000] level						

Note that, similar to the results from Study 1, the distinctions across German and Turkish students' attitude networks stem from the normative content differences in national identities in Study 2. In both samples, the edges that stretch from the items of *need to belong, social* & *emotional loneliness* to the items of national identity dimensions seem not to contribute much to the network differences. In other words, one cannot confidently infer whether the normative contents of German and Turkish national identities provide different psychological comfort seeking mechanism or not.

Joint Estimation of Between-Subject Networks with Fused Graphical LASSO: The results from jointly estimated networks are depicted in Figure 4. Here, with a visual inspection, we see that the densities of the networks are less than the EBIC gLASSO networks suggest. The weak but dense edges in the German sample are no longer visible. Both small-worldness index values are <3 again, implying that the general cognition that involves *social* & *emotional loneliness, need to belong* and the national identity dimensions do not constitute a strong attitude.



Figure 42: Attitude networks of samples from 2016, obtained with fused gLASSO (joint estimation).

From the main analyses done within the general framework of attitude network modeling, I infer that there is only minor evidence to suggest that individuals find psychological comfort in their nations. This result contradicts with the evidence coming from the preliminary analyses with multi-group SEM.

Discussion:

To recap, preliminary analyses conducted with multi-group structural equation modeling (mgSEM) suggest that emotions are good predictors of national identification, but normative content still matters. MgSEM results also suggest that there are significant associations between feelings of *social and emotional loneliness, need to belong* and national identification, but here also, normative content matters.

Attitude network models, which go down to an item level analysis, suggest otherwise. With this alternative analysis strategy, the first study reveals that what distinguishes German and Turkish students' attitude networks are not the emotions evoked by the national flags. The distinction between German and Turkish national identities stems from a cognition. The relationship between the level of national pride and the ethnocentric thought that other countries should aspire to be like either the German/Turkish government are statistically different across samples. This finding points to the perceptions that revolve around the normative content of distinct national identities.

In the second study, I asked the question of whether people seek and find psychological comfort in their national identities. Again, contrary to the mgSEM results, the evidence from the attitude networks suggests that there is only a minor connection between feelings of emotional and social loneliness, need to belong and national identity. Attitude network analysis results again pointed to the normative content differences across German and Turkish identities. However, from this minor evidence, one cannot infer that the normative contents of German and Turkish national identities provide different psychological comfort seeking mechanisms.

Finally, Study 1 shows that the general cognition which involves emotions and national identification is not a very strong attitude. Similarly, the global attitude in Study 2, which involves the feelings of loneliness, needing to belong and national identification is not strong either. I suppose the main reason for these findings is the sample bias. Both studies utilize university student samples who are known to be less nationalistic than the population at large; also, university students are less likely to be lonely compared to adults. Most importantly, the sample sizes are not adequate to detect small effects.

Admittedly, both studies are underpowered, and the lack of statistical power does not allow for robust and meaningful inferences (see the Appendix). However, I, very cautiously, propose that there is a minimum amount of evidence to suggest that both negative and positive emotions are good predictors of national identification. However, different normative content evokes diverse emotions, and the strength of the evoked emotions are again subject to the normative content of the identities. Moreover, although the current study's (underpowered) evidence cannot strongly confirm it, there is reason to believe people seek psychological comfort in their nations.

Despite the lack of robust evidence, this paper is valuable in two ways. First, it highlights the importance of the normative content of national identities. The national context influences the specific psychological processes related to national identification. In other words, in different countries, national context specific cultural and historical connotations influence individuals' national identification in distinct ways. Secondly, this paper can serve as a tutorial for those who would like to apply attitude network analysis in the context of nationalism studies and political psychology. I strongly recommend political psychologists replicate this study or design similar studies with larger samples.

Appendix:

Descriptive statistics:

Survey-items used in Study 1 – samples from 2012											
			G	ermany		Turkey					
Theoretical Construct	Variable Name	Item Wording	% Missing	Mean	SD	% Missing	Mean	SD	Range		
		Please describe what you think of when you see the xxx flag.				-	1				
(-) emotion	Anger	Anger	0.00	2.27	1.92	0.00	2.68	2.30			
(-) emotion	Anxiety	Anxiety	0.00	2.28	1.80	0.00	2.93	2.36			
(-) emotion	Contempt	Contempt	0.00	2.22	2.00	0.00	2.27	1.88			
(-) emotion	Disgust	Disgust	0.00	2.07	1.89	0.00	1.87	1.66			
(-) emotion	Fear	Fear	0.00	2.62	2.04	0.00	2.79	2.19			
(-) emotion	Fury	Fury	0.00	2.05	1.83	0.00	2.33	1.78	1-9		
(-) emotion	Guilt	Guilt	0.00	3.06	2.11	0.00	2.41	2.14	Not at all - Very Much		
(+) emotion	Happiness	Happiness	0.00	3.99	2.30	0.00	5.59	2.56			
(-) emotion	Hate	Hate	0.00	1.72	1.45	0.00	1.68	1.34			
(+) emotion	Норе	Норе	0.00	4.41	2.29	0.00	5.60	2.58			
(+) emotion	Joy	λοί	0.00	4.59	2.41	0.00	4.20	2.52			
(+) emotion	Pride	Pride	0.00	4.72	2.56	0.00	6.16	2.64			
(-) emotion	Shame	Shame	0.00	3.27	2.26	0.00	2.45	2.10			
	nat1	Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible.	0.00	3.22	1.57	0.00	2.94	1.82			
Ethnocentrism	nat2	Generally, the more influence xxx has on other nations, the better off they are.	0.00	2.70	1.41	0.00	3.13	1.73	1-7		
	nat3	Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes xxx to do things in a big way.	0.00	2.08	1.42	0.00	3.48	1.68	Strongly Disagree - Strongly Agree		
National	pat2	I am proud to be a xxx.	1.05	3.78	1.94	0.00	4.91	2.00			
Identification	pat4	The fact that I am a xxx is an important part of my identity.	0.00	3.62	1.89	0.00	4.35	2.01			

Survey-items used in Study 2 – the samples from 2016									
				Germany			Turkey		
Theoretical	Variable	Item Wording	%	Mean	SD	%	Mean	SD	Range
Construct	Name		Missing			Missing			
		The statements below reflect various							
		experiences of emotions and thoughts in							
		social relationships. What are meant by							
		social relationships are the ties between							
		friends and acquaintances. Piedse state							
		with the statements							
Need to	n2h08	L have a strong need to belong							
belong	112000	Thave a strong need to belong.	1.89	3.00	1.28	0.92	3.09	1.39	
	Sels04R	There are plenty of people I can lean on							
		when I have problems. (R)	1.68	1.78	1.02	0.92	1.90	1.13	
Social	Sels07R	There are many people I can trust	4.60	2.00	1.12	4.20	2.25	1.20	
loneliness		completely. (R)	1.68	2.06	1.13	1.38	2.35	1.30	
	Sels08R	There are enough people I feel close to.	1 60	1 07	1.02	2 76	1 74	0.00	
		(R)	1.08	1.87	1.03	2.70	1.74	0.99	
	sEls03	I experience a general sense of	2 10	1 99	1 26	1 3 8	2 72	1 30	
Emotional		emptiness.	2.10	1.55	1.20	1.50	2.72	1.55	
loneliness	sEls09	I miss having people around me.	1.68	2.35	1.26	1.84	2.22	1.41	
	sEls10	I often feel rejected.	1.89	1.83	1.06	1.38	1.99	1.22	
		Below are some statements regarding							
		[country]. Please rate your level of							
		agreement or disagreement with these							
		statements.							
	spat01	Seeing the [country] flag makes me feel	1.47	2.22	1.14	1.84	1.87	1.07	1-5
Symbolic	cmat02	not proud at all – very proud [1-5]							C+rongly
patriotism	spatuz	makes me feel not proud at all	1 / 7	2 20	1 10	1 9/	2.02	1 1 9	Disagroo
		proud [1-5]	1.47	2.25	1.15	1.04	2.02	1.10	Disagiee
	nat01	I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY]							-
	nator	than of any other country in the World.	1.89	2.77	1.13	2.76	2.95	1.62	Strongly
	nat02	The world would be a better place if							Agree
		people from other countries were more	1.47	2.01	1.03	2.30	2.23	1.29	
Nationalism		like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].		_			_		
	nat03	Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a							
		better country than most other	1.47	2.74	1.22	2.30	2.97	1.40	
		countries.							
	cn2	[COUNTRY] deserves special treatment.	1.26	1.68	0.89	2.76	2.89	1.26	
	cn3	I will never be satisfied until [COUNTRY]	1 / 7	1.67	0.86	2 76	3 57	1 31	
		gets all it deserves.	1.47	1.07	0.80	2.70	5.57	1.51	
	cn5	It really makes me angry when others	1 26	1 79	0.93	2 76	2 91	1 30	
Collective		criticize [COUNTRY].	1.20	1.75	0.55	2.70	2.51	1.50	
narcissism	cn6	If [COUNTRY] had a major say in the							
		world, the world would be a much	1.05	2.20	1.02	3.23	2.65	1.32	
		better place.							
	cn8	Not many people seem to fully	1 47	2.22	1.02	2.22	2.40	1.25	
			1.47	2.22	1.03	3.23	3.48	1.25	
Note: Itoms m	l arked with /¤	are reverse coded	1						

Results from study 1 – samples from 2012							
$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 0.3 \\ Fry \\ 0.3 \\ Har \\ 0.45 \\ 0.80 \\ 0.41 \\ 0.80 \\ 0.41 \\ 0.75 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.45 \\ 0.79 \\ 0.24 \\ 0.79 \\ 0.79 \\ 0.25 \\ 0.72 \\ 0.71 \\ 0$	German sample $N=190$; Robust χ 2: 334.746 p<.000 Only the significant paths are plotted. Minimum level of significance is p<.001 All coefficient are standardized. # of missingness patterns: 2 ω_3 (McDonald, 1999) are the following. Negative emotions (ngm): .92 Positive emotions (psm): .92 National identification (ntd): .77 Ethnocentrism (eth): .81						
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Turkish sample $N=105$; Robust $\chi 2$: 220.405 p<.000 Only the significant paths are plotted. Minimum level of significance is p<.001 All coefficient are standardized. # of missingness patterns: 1 ω_3 (McDonald, 1999) are the following. Negative emotions (ngm): .90 Positive emotions (psm): .83 National identification (ntd): .85 Ethnocentrism (eth): .85						
Robust X2: 555.151***; df: 258 Robust CFI: 0.899 Robust RMSEA: 0.094*** 90 % CI 0.083 0.105 SRMR: 0.062 Only the significant paths are plotted, except the regression coefficient going from the negative emotions national identification is not significant (ngm -> ntd;15). Minimum level of significance is p≤.001. All coefficients are standardized. Statistical power for this analysis is very low. The biggest contributors to bad model fit are the regression coefficients and factor loadings of joy, contempt and guilt. Model fit increases significantly when these coefficients are estimated freely across groups. Chi Square Difference Test Df AIC BIC Chisq chisq diff Df diff Df AIC BIC chisq chisq diff Df AIC BIC Chisq							
fit.configural 258 19181 19623 620.27 fit.loadings 272 19223 19613 690.58 70.312 14 1.694e-09 *** fit.intercepts 286 19376 19715 871.49 180.916 14 < 2.2e-16 *** fit.residuals 304 19516 19789 1047.77 176.279 18 < 2.2e-16 *** fit.means 308 19538 19796 1077.43 29.653 4 5.759e-06 *** Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1							

Multi-group structural equation model plots:

Results from study 2 – samples from 2016					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	German sample N=476; Robust χ2: 179.319p<.000 Only the significant paths are plotted. Minimum level of significance is p≤.001 All coefficient are standardized. # of missingness patterns: 14 ω_3 (McDonald, 1999) are the following. Emotional loneliness (eml): .65 Social loneliness (scl): .83 Symbolic patriotism (sym): .92 Nationalism (ntc): .64 Collective narcissism (cln): .80				
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 0.52 \text{ str} \\ 0.69 \text{ erm} \\ 0.46 \text{ seco} \\ 0.73 \text{ erm} \\ 0.46 \text{ seco} \\ 0.71 \text{ ord} \\ 0.72 \text{ ord} \\ 0.72 \text{ ord} \\ 0.77 \text{ ord} \\ 0.80 \text{ ord} \\ 0.77 \text{ ord} \\ 0.81 \text{ sol} \\ 0.77 \text{ ord} \\ 0.81 \text{ sol} \\ 0.77 \text{ ord} \\ 0.82 \text{ ord} \\ 0.97 \text{ ord} \\ 0.97 \text{ ord} \\ 0.97 \text{ ord} \\ 0.97 \text{ ord} \\ 0.82 \text{ ord} \\ 0.97 $	Turkish sample N=217; Robust χ2: 139.863p<.000 Only the significant paths are plotted. Minimum level of significance is p≤.001 All coefficient are standardized. # of missingness patterns: 13 ω_3 (McDonald, 1999) are the following. Emotional loneliness (eml): .76 Social loneliness (scl): .85 Symbolic patriotism (sym): .93 Nationalism (ntc): .79 Collective narcissism (cln): .88				
Robust x2: 319.181***; df: 208Robust CFI: 0.975Robust RMSEA: 0.041 not significant (p<0.985) 90 % CI 0.032 0.050	al power for this analysis is very low. mple, when the regression coefficients and the ificantly. Note that the covariations of the				

EBICglasso with .25 tuning parameter:

Attitude network modeling aims to determine the true network structure. Thus, statistical regulation is crucial for sparsity and parsimony, which is achieved by a tuning parameter. The recommended tuning parameter for EBIC gLASSO networks with ordinal data is .5. However, EBIC gLASSO with .5 tuning parameter is not the single solution. Attitude networks can be estimated via some alternative correlation techniques since the estimation depends on a correlation matrix (S. Epskamp, 2017). Below, I report the networks with a less conservative approach. I plot the EBIC gLASSO networks with the tuning parameter adjusted to .25 – this compromises sparsity and parsimony to see if there will be more edges in the networks. In other words, will we see denser networks? As the figures below show, adjusting the tuning parameter did not result in more edges in the networks.



Centrality plots and network stabilities and replicabilities:

Centrality measures (Figures 5 & 6) provide additional information about the network structures. These measures can be used for further inference by understanding the connectedness of the nodes (surveyitems) to one another. The commonly used centrality measures are strength (sum of the direct connections), closeness (accumulative influence of the direct and indirect connections) and betweenness (how well a node connects other nodes in the networks). For example, in the Turkish sample from 2012, pat2 ("I am proud to be a Turkish") seems to be the most central node in the EBIC gLASSO estimation. In contrast to that, nat1 ("other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible") is not a very central node for the German sample from 2012. All the estimated network structures and the centrality measures are subject to sampling variation; replicability is an issue just like in other statistical analyses (Sacha Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 2018). Note that to make meaningful inferences by interpreting the centrality measures, one needs to be informed about the accuracy of the centrality measures. Table 5 provides some additional information on this accuracy. For example, see the top-right plot in Table 5 for the centrality difference test of the Turkish sample from 2012. The black-colored-cells indicate that pat2's centrality is significantly larger than many other nodes' centralities but not from nat2's centrality. The plots on the bottom row of tables 5 & 6 show the centrality measures' stability, which is calculated with the following procedure: participants are randomly dropped from the original sample, and a new network is estimated with a smaller N; this is done 1000 times. The blue, green and red lines are the centrality measures of these newly estimated networks with smaller and smaller N. The y-axis is the average correlation with the original sample, the x-axis shows the percentage of participants kept in the sample. If the average correlation with the original sample remains high, the network is assumed to be stable. Unfortunately, the centrality measures turned out to be not very stable for both samples from the two studies, which raise doubts about the replicability of the findings.



Figure 43: Study 1 – Samples from 2012. Centrality measures of the EBIC gLASSO networks.



Table 23: Study 1 – Samples from 2012 Centrality measures and the stability of EBIC Graphical LASSO networks. Centrality measure accuracy of the German sample is on the top-left, centrality measure stability of the German sample is on the bottom-left; Turkish sample's measures are on the right column.



Figure 44: Study 2 – Samples from 2016. Centrality measures of the EBIC gLASSO networks.



Table 24: Study 2 – Samples from 2016 Centrality measures and the stability of EBIC Graphical LASSO networks. Centrality measure accuracy of the German sample is on the top-left, centrality measure stability of the German sample is on the bottom-left; Turkish sample's measures are on the right column.

Below, I also report the edge-weights accuracies as well as the edge-weight difference tests. The widths in the network plots correspond to the edge-weights; thicker edges imply stronger connections. With these tests, we can see whether the strengths of the edges are significantly different from another or not within a given network. In other words, the question is whether the network plots are misleading or not. For example, in the EBIC gLASSO network of the 2012 Turkish sample, the edge between pat2-disgust is plotted to be thicker than pat2-hate – the question is whether the edge between pat2-disgust is significantly stronger than pat2-hate. On the top row of the Tables 7 & 8, the red dots are the edge-weights with their confidence intervals. The bottom row of Tables 7 & 8 show the significant differences between specific edges – the black cells correspond to statistical significance in edge-weight differences. The overlapping confidence intervals reveal that many edge-weights are not actually significantly different from one another, so the network plots are, by and large, misleading. In both samples from 2016, only the edge between symbolic patriotism items is significantly different from all the other edges in the network. These inaccuracies are due to small sample sizes. 190 & 105 participants do not constitute enough statistical power for a network with 18 nodes in Study 1. In the second study, 17 nodes require more than 476 and 217 participants for perfectly accurate and stable attitude networks.



Table 25: Study 1 – Samples from 2012 edge-weight accuracies and differences of EBIC Graphical LASSO networks. Edge-weights accuracy of the German sample is on the top-left, edge-weights different test of the German sample is bottom-left; Turkish sample's measures are on the right column.



Table 26: Study 2 – Samples from 2016 edge-weight accuracies and differences of EBIC Graphical LASSO networks. Edge-weights accuracy of the German sample is on the top-left, edge-weights different test of the German sample is bottom-left; Turkish sample's measures are on the right column.

Finally, the graphs below show the stability of the edges in the networks. Straight lines correspond to more stable edge-strengths.


Table 27: Study 1 & 2 – Samples from 2012 on the top, samples from 2016 are at the bottom. Left column plots the edge stabilities of the German samples, the plots on the right column show the edge stabilities of the Turkish samples.

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PROJECT 5: Turkish national identity and attitudes toward migrants and refugees in Turkey

Abstract:

Background/motivation: Turkey has become an immigrant country by taking in millions of refugees over the last few years. Although much research documented the general impacts of this refugee influx in various ways, there is almost no research investigating the influence of Turkish national identity on attitudes towards newcomers.

Methods: In three separate studies, with two nationally representative samples (N_1 =1666, data collection: 2015; N_2 =947, data collection: 2015) and one convenience sample of university students (N_3 =217, data collection: 2016), we examine the different dimensions of Turkish national identity and their influence on distinct manifestations of prejudices against immigrants and refugees.

Results: Structural equation modeling results reveal that prejudices stem from different threat perceptions, denial of responsibility, not seeing the benefits of immigration. Another prejudice manifestation seems to be due to possible citizenship prospects that the government might grant to the newcomers. These prejudices are predicted by various dimensions of the Turkish national identity and by President Erdoğan's disfavored refugee policy.

Relevance/Implications: Overall results suggest that there might be an elephant in the room. We observe that the attitudes towards refugees may not be entirely independent of existing societal cleavages. These complications hinder a constructive public debate about the integration of refugees. We believe political actors should urgently address the elephant in the room and try to eliminate the possibility of a potential escalation in the future.

Introduction:

In the last few years, Turkey transformed into an immigration country by receiving more than three million people who fled war-torn regions in the Middle East, Africa, and the surrounding regions. This rapid development raised many new challenges for Turkish national identity with regards to socio-economic, demographic and ethnic issues. The relationship between national identity and attitudes toward immigrants and refugees in Turkey remains understudied despite its pressing importance. In this study, we delve into this intricate relationship with three interrelated motivations.

Our first motivation is to investigate and model the different dimensions of Turkish national identity. Public opinion of Turkishness is diverse. Turkey is certainly not a unique case of nationalism when it comes to its elusive and protean nature; however, the Turkish case demonstrates some puzzling unique characteristics given the antagonistic and contradictory discourses (Kadioglu & Keyman, 2011) that construct the Turkish national identity. Many aspects of the Turkish national identity have been investigated with research methods, which include historical accounts and content analysis; however, studies that quantify national identity via representative samples are still scarce.

The second motivation in this paper is to model and understand the attitudes towards refugees in the Turkish public opinion. According to UN statistics (2018), there are more than 3,5 million registered Syrian refugees in the country, which corresponds to more than 4 % of the Turkish population. It is becoming more and more likely that these newcomers will be permanent dwellers. Many scholars discussed the broad impacts of the refugee flow into Turkey (Memisoglu & Ilgit, 2016; Orhan, 2015). There is no shortage of studies documenting the exploitation and vulnerability of the refugees in the labor market (i.e., see the special issue on *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 54 (2016); İçduygu and Diker (2017)). Some experimental evidence shows the impact of the refugee influx on the labor market (Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun, & Tumen, 2017), and on the voting behavior (Altindag & Kaushal, 2017).

Moreover, we are starting to learn more about various prejudice manifestations against refugees in Turkey (Toğral Koca, 2016; Yıldırım & Yurtdaş, 2016). Hostilities seem to stem from a number of issues like access to education (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2017; Uyan-Semerci & Erdoğan, 2018), possible citizenship prospects (Baban et al., 2017), socio-economic concerns (Dinçşahin, 2017), perceived demographic threats (Çağaptay & Menekşe, 2015). Further experimental evidence reveals that prejudice reduction may be possible with an emphasis on shared religion but an economic burden perception washes away the effect of this framing (Lazarev & Sharma, 2015).

In sum, the grievances of the host society against the refugees are manifold in Turkey. Despite a few excellent and comprehensive studies (Erdoğan, 2018) that utilize public opinion to investigate the refugee issue in Turkey, much remains undiscovered regarding different manifestations of anti-refugee attitudes. We fill this critical gap not only by modeling the attitudes in multiple ways with various samples, but we also investigate how these attitudes are related to Turkish national identity. So, exploring the relationship between Turkish national identity and prejudices against immigrants and refugees is the third motivation of this paper.

We investigate the relationship between Turkish national identity and attitudes toward refugees in three separate studies by utilizing two nationally representative samples (N_1 =1666, data collection: 2015; N_2 =947, data collection: 2015) and one convenience sample of university students (N_3 =217, data collection: 2016). In each study, we model national identity and attitudes towards newcomers in different ways to scrutinize the relationship and find the different causes and effects. Below, before

moving on to the methods and results sections, we briefly explain the theoretical constructs in all the studies.

Theoretical constructs to model national identity

Conceptions of nationhood: It is common practice to model national identities with this theoretical construct. This construct is the answer to the question "What does it mean to be Turkish?". Although early conventional approaches were based on the ideal types of civic vs. ethnic national identities (Ariely, 2013), recent scholarship has revealed that assuming two fixed notions is misleading (Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013). In the first study, we investigate different conceptions of nationhood in the Turkish public opinion by using eight survey items.

National pride: It is also not uncommon to model national identity with survey-items related to national pride (Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003). National pride is not uniform either. Individuals are proud of their countries for different reasons. Different sources of national pride were shown to have distinct effects on prejudices against out-groups (Cohrs et al., 2004; Cohrs & Moschner, 2008), thus national pride is the second theoretical construct with which to model Turkish national identity in our first study. We use ten survey-items to tap into the different dimensions of national pride in Turkey.

Nationalistic attitudes: Various scholars use different labels for this theoretical construct such as "nationalism" or "ethnocentrism." We think this construct is best explained as a comparative orientation; individuals compare their countries and nations to others to obtain a feeling of superiority (Otten & Cohrs, 2010). For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we stick to the "nationalistic attitudes" label, which is common in the literature. We use four survey-items to measure this construct in the Turkish public opinion.

Different types of patriotism: While the nationalist attitudes reflect a comparative orientation, patriotism, as a separate construct, reflects an attachment to the nation. Previous research has shown that national attachment can be uncritical, critical (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999) or affective (Parker, 2010). These constructs are often labeled as "blind patriotism", "constructive patriotism" and "symbolic patriotism". Blind patriots are known to have an uncritical allegiance to their countries; constructive patriots, on the other hand, believe in a possible positive change through questioning and criticizing national practices. Symbolic patriotism stems from an affective relations to the nation through its symbols. All these constructs are known to have different predictive relations to out-group prejudices. In the third study, we use three survey-items to measure the blind and critical patriotisms and two items for symbolic patriotism.

Collective narcissism: The final theoretical construct, which we use in the third study, reflects a particular type of national attachment, which is "an unrealistic and psychologically-fragile belief in the nation's greatness contingent on external validation" (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2017). This construct reflects an exaggerated emotional investment in the nation as well as a passionate belief in the inimitability of the nation.

Theoretical constructs to measure attitudes toward refugees

This is the domain where we have fragmented and limited knowledge for the Turkish national context. Thus, our research strategy here is more explorative than theoretical. See the Expanded Methods Section for a more detailed account of our exploratory empirical strategy. Nonetheless, we take previous literature's findings as a theoretical base and always interpret the exploratory results in their guidance. On theoretical grounds, we expect some common prejudice manifestations in the Turkish national context such as threat perception (both symbolic and realistic; see Stephan and Stephan (2000)). However, the manifestation of threat perception is very context-specific, thus we expect the threat perceptions to appear in various forms. As cited above, previous literature tells us the following topics are the core issues: (1) possible citizen prospects, (2) access to public services like education, social security, (3) demographic concerns, (4) competition in the labor market, and (5) security concerns over terror. One can argue the first four issues correspond to a realistic threat perception as a result of inter-group competition; the fifth issue is again a threat perception, but not due to inter-group competition. We take all these into account in Studies One and Three.

In Study Two, we also try to account for the role of various state level actors and their policies toward refugees. A previous report by the International Crisis Group (2016) point out the public perception that the governing party AKP and President Erdoğan are exploiting the refugee influx by trying to consolidate power as well as trying to redesign and transform Turkish national identity through demographic policies. So we check whether trust or support of various political actors is involved in prejudice against refugees. We also have a single item here, which we use as a proxy for collective narcissism.

Methods:

Our first nationally representative sample is from the International Social Survey Program's national identity Module 3 (ISSP-Research-Group, 2015), which is a cross-country dataset that includes many survey-items on various constructs related to national identity. After filtering out the Turkish sample (N=1666) from the dataset, we utilize four sets of survey-items – (1) conceptions of nationhood, (2) national pride, (3) nationalist attitudes, and (4) attitudes toward immigrants. Item wordings are below in Table 1.

The second representative sample (*N*=947; data collection year is 2015) is from PEW's Global Attitudes Survey, which includes a direct question about the Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Turkey. We utilize eight more items from this survey as explanatory variables. See the item-wordings in Table 2 below. Note that four of the explanatory variables in the PEW survey should be thought as proxy questions. One item is a proxy of collective narcissism; three items are the proxies for support of government, military and religious leaders respectively.

Finally, in 2016, we conducted an online survey among university students (*N*=217) in Turkey to further investigate the relationship between the Turkish national identity and attitudes towards refugees. In this survey, to assess the attitudes towards refugees, we utilized survey-items from a study conducted by Erdoğan (2015). We explain the attitudes toward refugees with four predictors in this study. The first three predictors are the different types of patriotism (Yazıcı & Yazıcı, 2010); as the fourth predictor we utilized the short scale of collective narcissism (Zavala, Peker, Guerra, & Baran, 2016). Item wordings are listed in Table 3.

As for our statistical analyses strategy, we employ structural equation modeling to investigate the relationships between the constructs. In Studies One and Three, we use the robust maximum likelihood estimator, and full information maximum likelihood (Graham, 2003) to account for the missing data. PEW global attitudes' response categories are all ordinal. Therefore, in the second study, we utilize the diagonally weighted least square estimator, and bootstrap the standard errors for a robust analysis. We use the guidelines suggested by Kline (2016) to assess the goodness of fit statistics of the models. Sample characteristics of study three, a more detailed account of the statistical procedure and the descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix.

Theoretical	Variable Name	Item Wording
Construct		
		Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Turkish. Others say they
		are not important. How important do you think each of the following is
	Born	to have been born in Turkey
	Citz	to have Turkish citizenship
	Live	to have lived in Turkey for most of one's life
Conception	Lang	to be able to speak Turkish
of Nationhood	Relg	to be a Muslim
	Resp	to respect Turkish political institutions and laws
	Feel	to feel Turkish
	Ancs	to have Turkish ancestry
		How proud are you of Turkey in each of the following?
	PrdDem	the way democracy works
	PrdPolInfW	its political influence in the world
	PrdEcoAch	Turkey's economic achievements
	PrdSocSec	its social security system
National Drida	PrdSciAch	its scientific and technological achievements
National Price	PrdSpoAch	its achievements in sports
	PrdArtAch	its achievements in the arts and literature
	PrdArmF	Turkish armed forces
	PrdHist	its history
	PrdFToG	its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society
		How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
	NatCOcb	Generally speaking, Turkey is a better country than most other countries.
Nationalist	NatCOcitz	I would rather be a citizen of Turkey than of any other country in the world.
Attitudes	NatCOwbp	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Turks.
	BliPat	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
		There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Turkey. (By
		"immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in Turkey. How much do you agree or disagree
		with each of the following statements?
	ImmCriRat	Immigrants increase crime rates.
	ImmGfEco	Immigrants are generally good for Turkey's economy. (R)
	ImmTjobs	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Turkey
	ImmNewIdeas	Immigrants improve Turkish society by bringing new ideas and cultures. (R)
Attitudes toward Immigrants	ImmUndCul	Turkey's culture is generally undermined by immigrants.
	ImmLegSamRght	Legal immigrants to Turkey who are not citizens should have the same rights as Turkish citizens. (R)
	ImmIlegShdBeExcld	Turkey should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.
	ImmLegEqAcsEdu	Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as Turkish citizens. (R)
	ImmNum	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot - reduced a lot
(R) are reverse code	d.	

Table 28: Item wordings from study 1 – international social survey program, national identity module 3 (2015)

Table 29: Item wordings from study 2 – PEW global attitudes survey (2015)

Variable	Item Wording
Name	
AntiRef	In your opinion, should we allow more refugees from Syria and Iraq into our country, fewer refugees or about the same as we do now?
	Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Tayyip Erdogan is handling each of the following areas?
RTEsyria	the situation in Syria
RTEisis	the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS
RTErefugee	refugees from Syria and Iraq
DemSat	How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country – very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied
	or not at all satisfied?
ColNarPROX	Which statement comes closer to your own views, even if neither is exactly right? Turkey is as respected around the world as
	it should be OR Turkey should be more respected around the world than it is?
	As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way
	things are going in Turkey. Is the influence of (INSERT ITEM) very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in
	Turkey?
GovSuppPROX	our national government
MilSuppPROX	the military
RelSuppPROX	religious leaders

Table 30: Item-wordings from study 3 – convenience sample of university students (2016)

Theoretical Construct	Variable Name	Item Wording			
		Below is a list of statements about Turkey. Please indicate your level of agreement to these statements.			
	bpat01	Turkey is virtually always right.			
Blind Patriotism	bpat02	I support Turkey's foreign policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.			
	bpat03	There is too much criticism of Turkey in the world, and we its citizens should not criticize it.			
	cpat01	If you love Turkey, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.			
Constructive Patriotism	cpat02	If I criticize Turkey, I do so out of love for my country.			
	cpat03	I oppose some Turkish policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.			
Cumh alia Datriations	sympat01	Seeing the Turkish flag makes me feel not proud at all - very proud			
Symbolic Patriotism	sympat02	When I hear the national anthem, it makes me feel not proud at all - very proud			
	cn2	Turkey deserves special treatment.			
	cn3	I will never be satisfied until Turkey gets all it deserves.			
Collective Narcissism	cn5	It really makes me angry when others criticize Turkey.			
	cn6	If other countries listened to Turkey more, the world would be a much better place.			
	cn8	Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of Turkey.			
	aref01	Refugees are not Turkey's problem. They should be sent back to their countries.(T)			
	aref02	Refugees should only temporarily take a shelter in the camps. (T)			
	aref03	Refugees disrupt societal peace and morality by taking part in crimes such as violence, theft,			
Attitudes toward Immigrants		smuggling and adultery. (T)			
	aref04	I oppose my tax being spent on refugees when a lot of Turkish students are in need of help. (T)			
	aref05	The issue of refugees causes new security problems with regards to fight against the terror. (T)			
	aref06	Refugees will have a negative impact on our country's population equilibrium due to their high			
		birth rates. (T)			
(T) Rough translations fron	n Turkish; for the	e original scale in Turkish see Erdogan (2015).			

Results:

Study 1:

Figure 1 below shows all the relationships between the Turkish national identity and the attitudes toward the immigrants. The goodness of fit statistics of the model and the reliabilities of the latent constructs are displayed in the caption under the figure.



In the first study, we discover that Turkish national identity is best modeled in six dimensions, and attitudes toward immigrants have three dimensions. See the Expanded Methods Section in the online appendix for a detailed account of the measurement models of these constructs. We find two conceptions of nationhood – one echoes a *cultural* understanding of Turkishness, the other is what we labeled as *mixed*. The *mixed* notion reflects the ambivalence and ambiguity of the founding secular nationalist ideology (Kadioglu & Keyman, 2011, pp. 10-57), which simultaneously harbors ascriptive and achievable elements. According to this notion, one is truly Turkish if they have Turkish ancestry and feels Turkish. Nothing summarizes this cognition better than the famous "how happy to call oneself a Turk" (Brockett, 2011) quote. We also discover that Turkish national pride has three distinct sources. We labeled one of these sources *nationalistic pride* since it stems from the history and the Turkish Armed Forces. The second dimension taps into a *cultural pride* that stems from the achievements in scientific, artistic and sports domains. We labeled the third national pride dimension as *state-level achievements* because the items are related to state-level practices such as democracy, social security and fair

treatment of groups. The final dimension in the Turkish national identity measurement model is the *nationalist attitudes*, which correspond to a feeling of superiority obtained by comparing the nation and the state to others (Otten & Cohrs, 2010).

All these different dimensions of Turkish national identity predict attitudes toward immigrants, which are best measured as three latent constructs. The first construct is a *threat perception* from the immigrants. The second dimension of immigrant attitudes perceives no benefit from the immigrants; we labeled this construct as *not seeing the benefits of immigration*. The third dimension is with regards to the immigrants having equal rights with Turkish citizens and having equal access to education. Our label for this construct is *no equal rights and access to education*; higher levels in this construct indicate not wanting to grant equal rights to immigrants and wanting to limit immigrants' access to education in Turkey.

While the *mixed notion of nationhood* positively predicts the *no equal rights and access to education, cultural notion of Turkish nationhood* and *cultural pride* are the negative predictors. These relationships mean that those who adopt the ambiguity of "how happy to call oneself a Turk" oppose the idea of giving equal rights to immigrants and do not want them to have equal access to Turkish education. Those who have high levels of *cultural pride* and a *cultural conception* of Turkishness support immigrants having equal rights and access to education. On the other hand, those who have the *mixed* notion of Turkish nationhood and those who are proud of the *state level achievements* perceive benefits from the immigrants. However, those who have a heightened *nationalistic pride* do not perceive the *benefits of immigrants*. A *threat perception* of immigrants is positively predicted by the *cultural notion of Turkish nationhood, cultural pride,* and the *nationalistic attitudes*. So, those who feel Turkey has a national superiority, those who are proud of the country's cultural achievements and those who adopt the *cultural notion* of Turkishness feel a threat coming from the immigrants. In contrast, those who adopt the *mixed notion* of Turkishness and those who are proud of the Turkish state's achievements do not feel the threat from the immigrants.

Finally, those who do not see the benefits of immigration, those who feel a threat from the immigrants think that immigrant numbers should be reduced, and Turkey should take higher measures to exclude the illegal immigrants. However, those who do not want immigrants to have equal rights and access to education do not enforce the idea that Turkey should exclude illegal immigrants. We believe the overall results of Study 1 reflect the ambivalent opinions about the immigrants. On the one hand, the population in Turkey has noticeable prejudices against the immigrants. On the other hand, these prejudices are buffered by some aspects of national pride and some notions of what it means to be Turkish.

At the time of data collection (2015), there were already millions of refugees that took shelter in Turkey waiting to move on to countries in the European Union (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016). Therefore there is reason to think that participants who completed this public opinion survey had these refugees in mind when responding to survey items. However, we cannot be all too confident in this assumption. The precise item wording in the survey is immigrant (göçmen), which is defined by the survey conductors as "people who come to settle in Turkey." We acknowledge this item wording limitation and the obscurity that accompanies it, and we think that it is best to conceptualize this multidimensional latent construct as attitudes toward "immigrants", not toward "refugees".

Study 2:

In Study 2, we have a clear item wording. The survey question uses the word "refugees" (from Syria and Iraq) and asks whether the numbers of these refugees should be reduced or increased. Those who think

"Turkey should be more respected around the world than it is" and those who disapprove of President Erdoğan's refugee policy are more likely to prefer lower numbers of refugees. None of the other predictors are significantly associated with the attitudes toward refugees. Thus, according to the results from this nationally representative sample, indicating support for the government, military or religious leaders and not being satisfied with the level of Turkish democracy are not involved in the anti-refugee attitudes. The results for this study are displayed in Figure 2.



Study 3:

In Study 3, we modeled the attitudes toward refugees in a different way. Items adapted from another public opinion survey suggest that attitudes of Turkish university students have two dimensions. One dimension reflects what we label as *threat perception*; the second dimension reveals a *denial of responsibility* towards the refugees. *Threat perception* points to the perceived potential security and terrorism problems, crime and cultural deterioration and the concerns over a demographic change in the Turkish population due to the high numbers of refugees. The *denial of responsibility* dimension reflects favoring short-term humanitarian solutions to the refugee crisis and prioritizes the Turkish population's problems over refugees. In this study, we discover that only *symbolic patriotism* is a significant predictor of attitudes toward refugees. Those who feel proud when they see the Turkish flag and hear the national anthem have higher levels of anti-refugee attitudes. After controlling for the effects of other predictors, having a critical vs. an uncritical national attachment does not predict attitudes toward refugees in the university student sample. An exaggerated emotional investment in the

Turkish nation is not significantly associated with the anti-refugee attitudes either. See the goodness of fit statistics of the model and the reliabilities of the latent constructs in Figure 3.



Discussion:

Turkey is facing a multifaceted humanitarian crisis. Our results alarmingly show that this humanitarian crisis is not free of inter-group prejudices. We provide empirical evidence revealing the multidimensional manifestation of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments in Turkey. In Study One, we show that threat perception and not seeing the benefits of immigration are the reasons for wanting decreased number of immigrants. While the same sources also favor stricter policies against illegal immigrants, unwillingness to grant equal rights to the newcomers do not necessarily translate into favoring stricter policies against illegal immigrants. The latter finding signals that the Turkish population, in 2015, at least partially, acknowledged the immigrant's legal eligibility for benefiting from public services.

The second study highlights that wanting fewer refugees is linked to the disapproval of President Erdoğan's refugee policies. In this second study, we also see an indication that collective narcissism (desiring external approval in the form of international respect) is also involved in anti-refugee attitudes.

The third study confirms the pending threat perception from the refugees but also reveals there is a tendency for denial of responsibility in the form of in-group-favoritism instead of out-group derogation. In the third study, we do not find further evidence confirming the direct involvement of collective narcissism in anti-refugee attitudes. However, symbolic patriotism is a proximate construct; in a biased university student sample like ours, symbolic patriotism may be the substituent of collective narcissism.

In the first study, we also expose that the diverse anti-immigrant prejudice manifestations are heavily influenced by different dimensions of Turkish national identity, which harbors ambivalent elements itself. For a while, Turkey's response to the refugee crisis and hospitality had been perceived as a source of national pride (International Crisis Group (2016)). Our results show that, paradoxically, some aspects of national pride are actually the very source of anti-immigrant sentiments in Turkey; however, we also discover that some other sources of national pride perceive the benefits of immigrants.

Pride of the state's achievements negatively predicting the prejudice dimensions indicates that Turkish population does not feel a threat from the refugees as long as the state fulfills its responsibilities stemming from the refugee crisis. We believe Turkish people feel proud of their state when the state provides some benefits to the newcomers who are in need of help. However, when the handling of refugee policies is juxtaposed with the existing societal cleavages in the state, the newcomers are perceived as a threat and the picture changes into an inter-group competition game. The second and third studies' findings can be interpreted in a complementary manner.

Another discovery, which stands out from the findings of Study One, signals that Turkish nationhood is paradoxical. This is no news. However, the paradox provides a somewhat functional permeability regarding the integration of newcomers. Despite the ambiguity of the quote "how happy to call oneself a Turk", its ambivalence is actually its power. We believe, in the nationally representative sample, different individuals interpret "feeling Turkish" and "having Turkish national ancestry" in different ways in line with the "how happy to call oneself a Turk"'s ambiguity. If Turkishness is something achievable by feeling it, then the newcomers can eventually become Turkish. Therefore, no threat is perceived, and the benefits of immigration are recognized. However, if Turkishness is something ascriptive, then the newcomers cannot become Turkish, thus they should not be granted citizenship and should not be given equal access to education. The *cultural* dimension of Turkish nationhood is not free of the ambivalence either. If Turkishness is nativity (being born & having spent the most of lifespan in Turkey and speaking Turkish), then, the newcomers are strangers who pose a threat. If Turkishness is being Muslim and respecting the Turkish laws & institutions, then, the newcomers can be considered Turkish, therefore they can be granted citizenship and equal access to education.

In Studies Two and Three, we find more evidence revealing further complications. The polarized views around Erdoğan's refugee policies are involved in preferring fewer refugees. The symbolic prestige of Turkey (wanting Turkey to be respected more internationally) is also involved in anti-refugee sentiments. Considering the highly polarized public opinion around Erdoğan and what he symbolically represents, one might ruminate that the grievances between the secular and conservative segments of society might be misguidedly overlapping with the prejudices of the Turkish population towards the refugees. At this point, it would be helpful to remember that certain segments of society have high mistrust toward the Turkish president and the ruling governing party. The segments of Turkish society who are suspicious of the state's refugee agenda cannot be underestimated. There is a perception that president Erdoğan and the governing party are exploiting the refugee population for redesigning the Turkish national identity and for consolidating power (Çağaptay & Menekşe, 2015).

The findings from Study Three suggest having a symbolic national attachment is enough to deny responsibility for the refugees and feel threatened, which partly stems from demographic concerns over the high numbers of the refugee population. When all these findings are juxtaposed, it becomes clear that we are looking at a very complicated and nuanced picture. These complications hinder a constructive public debate about the integration of refugees. We believe such a political context might create a hazardous atmosphere. Turkey already suffers from the strife between the secular and the conservative segments of the society; Turkish-Kurdish ethnic cleavages, unfortunately, keep being another conflict domain. The country cannot handle another dimension of conflict resulting from intergroup prejudices. We believe political actors should urgently address the elephant in the room and try to eliminate the possibility of a potential escalation in the future.

Appendix

Descriptive statistics

Survey items used in study 1 – International Social Survey Program National Identity Module III							
Theoretical Construct	Variable Name	Item Wording	Mean	SD	% Missing	Range	
		Some people say that the following things are					
		important for being truly Turkish. Others say they are					
		not important. How important do you think each of the					
		following is					
	Born	to have been born in Turkey	3.39	0.85	1.44		
	Citz	to have Turkish citizenship	3.48	0.77	1.44		
	Live	to have lived in Turkey for most of one's life	3.32	0.86	1.68	1 Not	
Conception	Lang	to be able to speak Turkish	3.42	0.82	1.56	important at all	
of Nationhood	Relg	to be a Muslim	3.52	0.80	1.26	to	
	Resp	to respect Turkish political institutions and laws	3.39	0.82	2.04	4 very	
	Feel	to feel Turkish	3.30	0.97	1.92	Important	
	Ancs	to have Turkish ancestry	3.35	0.91	2.04		
		How proud are you of Turkey in each of the following?			-		
	PrdDem	the way democracy works	2.60	1.03	2.64		
	PrdPolInfW	its political influence in the world	2.68	1.01	3.48		
	PrdEcoAch	Turkey's economic achievements	2 75	1.03	2 52	-	
	PrdSocSec	its social security system	2.75	1.03	3.06	-	
	PrdSciAch	its scientific and technological achievements	2.71	0.99	4 20	1 Not proud at	
National Pride	PrdSnoAch	its achievements in sports	3 10	0.90	3.96	all to 4 Very	
	PrdArtAch	its achievements in the arts and literature	3.10	0.00	6.48	proud	
	PrdArmE	Turkish armod forcos	2 21	0.55	2 1 2		
	DrdHict	its history	2.21	0.94	2.12		
	PrdEToC	its fair and equal treatment of all groups in seciety	2.54	1.07	2.00	-	
	PIUFIUG	Its fail and equal treatment of all groups in society	2.04	1.07	5.64		
		statements?					
	NatCOcb	Generally speaking, Turkey is a better country than most other countries.	3.93	1.04	2.82		
Nationalist	NatCOcitz	I would rather be a citizen of Turkey than of any other country in the world.	3.97	1.20	2.52	1 Disagree	
Attitudes	NatCOwbp	The world would be a better place if people from	3.61	1.16	4.50	Strongly to 5 Agree strongly	
	BliPat	People should support their country even if the	3.71	1.20	3.84		
		country is in the wrong.					
		There are different opinions about immigrants from					
		other countries living in Turkey. (By "immigrants" we					
		mean people who come to settle in Turkey. How much					
		ao you agree or alsagree with each of the following					
	ImmCriPat	Statements increase crime rates	2 74	1 22	7.02		
	Immerikat	Infinigrants increase crime rates.	3.74	1.22	7.02	-	
	ImmGTECO	(R)	3.35	1.15	6.78		
	ImmTjobs	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Turkey	3.72	1.10	5.88		
Attitudes toward Immigrants	ImmNewIdeas	Immigrants improve Turkish society by bringing new ideas and cultures. (R)	3.33	1.11	6.42	1 Disagree	
	ImmUndCul	Turkey's culture is generally undermined by		1.14	8.28	strongly to 5	
	Imml og Sam Paht	Infinitigrants to Turkov who are not sitizons			6.66	Agree strongly	
	mmegsaminght	should have the same rights as Turkish sitizans (P)	2.78	1.16			
	Immilion Challen Frederik	Turkov should take stronger measures to evaluate	<u> </u>				
	minnegsnaketxcla	illegal immigrants.	4.01	1.00	0.54		
	ImmLegEqAcsEdu	Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as Turkish citizens. (R)	2.60	1.19	6.66		
	ImmNum	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot - reduced a lot	3.42	1.14	8.28	1-5	

Survey items used in study 2 – PEW global attitudes							
Variable	Variable Item Wording % N Response Categories and their percentages						
Name		Missing					
AntiRef	In your opinion, should we allow			1	2	3	
	more refugees from Syria and Iraq			More refugees	About the same as	Fewer	
	into our country, fewer refugees or				now	Refugees	
	about the same as we do now?						
		11.4	839	08 %	13 %	79 %	
	Do you approve or disapprove of the			1 Approve	2 Disapprove		
	way President Tayyip Erdogan is						
	handling each of the following areas?						
RTEsyria	the situation in Syria	17	805	32 %	68 %		
RTEisis	the Islamic militant group in Iraq and	20	776	34 %	66 %		
	Syria known as ISIS						
RTErefugee	refugees from Syria and Iraq	17	807	29 %	71 %		
DemSat	How satisfied are you with the way			1	2	3	4
	democracy is working in our country			Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Not too	Not at all
	 very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, 					satisfied	satisfied
	not too satisfied or not at all						
	satisfied?						
		2.3	925	14 %	34 %	24 %	29 %
ColNarPROX	Which statement comes closer to			1	2		
	your own views, even if neither is			TR is as	TR should be more		
	exactly right? Turkey is as respected			respected	respected around		
	around the world as it should be OR			around the	the world than		
	Turkey should be more respected			world as it	it is		
	around the world than it is?			should be			
		8.5	867	39 %	61 %		
	As I read a list of groups and			1	2	3	4
	organizations, for each, please tell			Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat	Very bad
	me what kind of influence the group					bad	
	is having on the way things are going						
	in Turkey. Is the influence of (INSERT						
	ITEM) very good, somewhat good,						
	somewhat bad or very bad in						
	Turkey?						
GovSuppPROX	our national government	7.4	877	21 %	27 %	22 %	31 %
MilSuppPROX	the military	9	862	23 %	19 %	35 %	23 %
RelSuppPROX	religious leaders	17	782	23 %	25 %	22 %	30 %

Survey items used in study 3 – Convenience sample of university students							
Theoretical Construct	Variable Name	Item Wording		SD	% Missing	Range	
		Below is a list of statements about Turkey. Please indicate your level of agreement to these statements.					
	bpat01	Turkey is virtually always right.	1.65	1.01	1.84		
Blind Patriotism	bpat02	I support Turkey's foreign policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.	1.89	1.14	2.30	1 Diseases	
	bpat03	There is too much criticism of Turkey in the world, and we its citizens should not criticize it.	1.79	1.11	2.76	strongly	
Construction	cpat01	If you love Turkey, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.	4.49	0.85	2.76	to 5 Agree	
Detriction	cpat02	If I criticize Turkey, I do so out of love for my country.	4.19	1.12	2.30	strongly	
Patriotism	cpat03	I oppose some Turkish policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.	4.28	0.95	2.76		
Symbolic	sympat01	Seeing the Turkish flag makes me feel not proud at all - very proud	4.13	1.07	1.84	1-5	
Patriotism	sympat02	When I hear the national anthem, it makes me feel not proud at all - very proud	3.98	1.18	1.84		
	cn2	Turkey deserves special treatment.	3.75	1.99	2.76		
	cn3	I will never be satisfied until Turkey gets all it deserves.	4.90	2.04	2.76	1 Disagree	
Callesting	cn5	It really makes me angry when others criticize Turkey.	3.73	1.99	2.76	strongly	
Collective Narcissism	cn6	If other countries listened to Turkey more, the world would be a much better place.	3.40	2.03	3.23	to 7 Agree	
	cn8	Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of Turkey.	4.74	1.97	3.23	strongly	
	aref01	Refugees are not Turkey's problem. They should be sent back to their countries.(T)	2.45	1.35	1.84		
Attitudes toward Immigrants	aref02	Refugees should only temporarily take shelter in the camps. (T)	3.27	1.43	2.30		
	aref03	Refugees disrupt societal peace and morality by taking part in crimes such as violence, theft, smuggling, and adultery. (T)	3.28	1.28	2.30	1 Disagree strongly to	
	aref04	I oppose my tax being spent on refugees when a lot of Turkish students are in need of help. (T)	3.14	1.49	1.84	5 Agree strongly	
	aref05	The issue of refugees causes new security problems with regards to fighting against the terror. (T)	4.04	1.15	2.30		
	aref06	Refugees will have a negative impact on our country's population equilibrium due to their high birth rates. (T)	3.92	1.22	2.30		
(T) indicate rought translations from Turkish. For the original scale in Turkish see Erdogan (2015).							

Expanded methods for Study 1

We start with a preliminary exploratory analysis since the first study has the highest *N* and many surveyitems. In the first step, we check the correlations between the variables of interest to investigate the latent variable structures. We exploit correlations based on full information maximum likelihood since many survey-items have high missingness percentages. Figures 4 & 5 below show the correlations across survey-items before and after item-level clustering. These graphs provide excellent visual cues on expected theoretical constructs. By paying attention to the triangular shapes, toward the top of Figure 5, we see the items on immigrants forming two clustering. Items related to national pride form their own clustering; so do the items on conceptions of nationhood. Finally, at the bottom corner, we see the four items which are related to nationalist attitudes clustered together. The different color shades of the circles (varying correlations coefficients) suggest multiple dimensions for the latent constructs.



Figure 48: Study 1 - correlations between variables of interest based on full information maximum likelihood.



Figure 49: Study 1 - correlations between variables of interest after item-level clustering.

In the next step, we employ parallel analysis (PA; (Horn, 1965)), very simple structure criterion (VSS; (Revelle & Rocklin, 1979)) and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) before fitting a measurement model to the latent constructs with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). After carefully considering the results suggested by PA, VSS & EFA, we decided to retain two factors for the conceptions of nationhood; three factors for national pride. We operationalized nationalist attitudes as a separate dimension. PA, VSS, and EFA results for the attitudes toward immigrants turned out to be the hardest to interpret theoretically; this is probably due to missingness, which we tentatively attribute to social desirability bias. See the next heading for our comment on missingness. Eventually, we decided on a three-factor solution for the attitudes toward immigrants. We kept two survey-items as manifest variables and used all the other operationalized latent variables as predictors for these manifest variables, which we used as the outcome variables. Below, we describe the latent variables we discover. See the measurement models of the constructs at the end of the heading.

Cultural conception of nationhood: On theoretical grounds, we think this latent construct corresponds to the civic and territorial notion suggested by the founding Kemalist ideology (Keyman & Kanci, 2011). The latent variable influences items on being born in Turkey, having spent most of one's life in the country, being a Turkish citizen, speaking Turkish, being a Muslim and respecting the Turkish laws and institutions. Thus, we label the construct as a *cultural* notion of Turkish nationhood.

Mixed conception of nationhood: The remaining two items, on the theoretical construct of conceptions of nationhood, are influenced by what we label as the *mixed* notion of Turkish nationhood. According to this conception of nationhood, an individual can be truly Turkish if they have Turkish ancestry and feels Turkish. This is an unusual constellation. On theoretical grounds, these two items should belong to two distinct and opposite constructs – civic vs. ethnic. Feeling the nationhood is something achievable (civic in theory) and having the ancestry is something ascriptive (ethnic in theory). However, this construct make sense when we consider the paradox (Kadioglu, 1996) and ambivalence (Cagaptay, 2002, 2006) of the Kemalist ideology. We believe this latent construct is the manifestation of the famous "how happy to call oneself a Turk" motto (Brockett, 2011).

State level achievements: This construct influences the level of national pride on Turkish democracy, Turkey's influence in the world, the economic achievements of the country, social security system and the fair treatment to all groups in the country. All these sources of national pride stem from the state's achievements. Thus our label for this latent variable is *state level achievements*.

Cultural national pride: Three items that are influenced by this latent construct are achievements on sports, science and arts & literature. We label this dimension as *cultural national pride*.

Nationalistic pride: Two items are influenced by this construct – pride on history and army. Such a latent construct again has connotations for the founding nationalist ideology since the Turkish Armed Forces had been the self-appointed guardian of the secular nationalist regime in Turkey for decades. Since history is among the fundamental sources of nationalism, and since the military in Turkey is associated with a secular nationalism, we decided *nationalistic pride* would be an appropriate label for this latent construct.

Nationalistic attitudes: This is a universal cognitive pattern, which many scholars label differently. Common labels are *nationalism*, *nationalistic attitudes*, *ethnocentrism* and *xenophobia*. Otten and Cohrs (2010) describe this cognition as a comparative orientation; individuals compare their nations and states to others to obtain a feeling of superiority. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we label this latent construct as *nationalistic attitudes*. Note that one item here actually taps into another theoretical construct ("people should support their country even if the country is in the wrong", an indicator of *blind patriotism*). Nonetheless, the factor loading for this survey-item is acceptable (.60), and blind patriotism and the comparative orientation Otten and Cohrs (2010) describe are quite proximate.

Up until this point we described the exogenous / explanatory variables in the structural equation model. The following are the endogenous / outcome variables in the model. Three dimensions that best describe the variation in attitudes toward immigrants in Turkey are the following.

Threat perception: Integrated threat theory of prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) suggests that the host societies perceive realistic and symbolic threats from foreigners such as immigrants. While the realistic threats typically involve anxieties over job loss and increasing crime rates, symbolic threats involve, for example, perceived cultural degeneration due to the presence of newcomers. The first latent construct we discover in the Turkish attitudes toward immigrants is this *threat perception*. The construct that reflects this dimension influences three items two of which belong to the typical realistic threat perception (items related to job loss & crime), one item is related to a symbolic threat perception (immigrants undermining culture).

Not seeing the benefits of immigration: Another source of prejudice against immigrants is denying the benefits of immigration. This is sometimes referred as the migration-membership dilemma, which is the "contradiction between state practices of admitting migrants to fill labor shortages or pursue

political aims, and the lack of commitment to include these migrants into the national community" (Triadafilopoulos, 2012). The second latent construct we discover in the Turkish attitudes toward immigration reflects this dilemma in certain ways. This dimension taps into the thoughts of *not seeing the benefits* of immigration by endorsing the items "immigrants are not good for the Turkish economy" and "immigrants do not bring new ideas to the Turkish culture".

No Equal access: There has been much public debate with regards to refugees' access to Turkish schools and universities, and whether these newcomers should be given citizenship or not (Erdoğan, 2015). Our final latent construct reflects the negative attitudes toward these debates. On theoretical grounds, this dimension can be thought of as another realistic threat component. The influenced items are "legal immigrants should have the same rights as citizens" and "legal immigrants should have equal rights to public education as citizens". We label this latent construct as *equal access*.



Comment on missingness patterns in study 1

We code "no response" and "can't choose" options as missing data points. We apply a statistical test checking for missingness completely at random (Jamshidian & Jalal, 2010) and reveal that the missingness is not random in the items related to attitudes toward immigrants. Figure 6 plots the patterns; the red color shows the "no response" and "can't choose" data points; as can be clearly seen from the figure, the non-response patterns are quite a few. In the next step, we investigate some of the possible sources of these missingness patterns.



Figure 50: Missingness patterns in the survey-items related to attitudes towards immigrants.

The graphs below show the results of our examination whether missingness can be attributed to differences in gender, age, income ethnicity (socio-demographic). We use the item with the highest missingness percentage in our analysis; that is "do you think the number of immigrants to Turkey nowadays should be increased a lot ... reduced a lot". If the red and blue box-plots and/or data points on the axis are similar to one another that is an indication of missing completely at random. As can be seen from the four plots on socio-demographics, the missingness around these characteristics and the "immigrant numbers opinion" are completely at random. Two items signal social desirability issues that stem from other political attitudes. The margin plots of "there are some things about Turkey today that make me feel ashamed of Turkey" and "[level of national pride on] fair and equal treatment of all groups in society" suggest missingness patterns are not completely random. Thus, we guess that the missingness in the attitudes toward immigrants is not free of social desirability bias but seems not to be influenced by socio-demographics. In the structural equation model, we utilize full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach to account, repel and balance the negative effect of missingness in the data (Graham, 2003).



Sampling scheme and sample characteristics for Study 3

Participants took an online survey in Turkish. They were invited to take the survey via online invitations, or with postings on off-campus platforms like Moodle. We also posted the call on some universities' social media web pages. In many cases, our academic associates within the universities also informed and encouraged students to take the surveys. As a sampling scheme, we targeted various universities in the seven geographical regions in Turkey. We tried to reach as many universities as possible in these regions; however, an overwhelming majority of the participants were from various public and private universities in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Out of 671 first page views, 217 (\approx 33 %) people completed the survey. The mean age is 25 (51 % female and 45 % male). 74 % of the participants are either an ongoing university student or with a university degree and higher. While almost 50 % of the participants placed themselves to the left side of the political orientation scale, about 35 % placed themselves to the right, and the rest are in the center. Approximately, 64 % of the participants reported to having been born in a metropolitan city or its suburbs; 29 % reported to having been born in rural areas. 85 % of the participants resided in a metropolitan city at the time of the data collection; 9 % were living in a rural region. Thus, the results from Study 3 can be very prudently generalized to university students in metropolitan cities of Turkey with heterogeneous backgrounds.

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PROJECT 6: Different ways of modeling German national identity and its effect on various forms of prejudice

Abstract

Background/motivation: Germany has an enormous ethnic, cultural and religious diversity but there is also a reluctance to acknowledge this diversity; which is sometimes manifested by various prejudices against out-groups like immigrants and refugees. The academic literature investigated the relationship between out-group prejudices and German national identity intensively. However, many studies relied on patriotism and national pride (two constructs, which were operationalized interchangeably). In this study, we not only clarify and expand the national identity constructs, but we also model out-group prejudices in many ways to get a comprehensive picture about the relationship between German national identity and out-group prejudices.

Methods: We have four nationally representative samples (N_1 =1894, from 1995; N_2 =1287, from 2003; N_3 =1717, from 2014; N_5 =1000, from 2016), and two convenience samples of university students (N_4 =476, from 2016; N_6 =570, from 2017). By utilizing structural equation modeling, we scrutinize the relationship between German national identity and out-group prejudice by constructing twelve separate models.

Results: We reveal the nuance of German national identity by showing which dimensions lead to prejudice, and which dimensions are not involved in prejudice. The overall results suggest that a feeling of *national superiority, collective narcissism* (a fragile psychological belief focusing on the uniqueness of the nation) and *symbolic patriotism* (an affective attachment to the nation via its symbols) are the best predictors of different sorts of prejudices in Germany.

Relevance/Implications: We discuss the results with regards to the migration-membership dilemma, which refers to the "contradictory practices states pursue to economic or political goals with a simultaneous lack of commitment to include the newcomers in the society" (Triadafilopoulos, 2012).

Introduction:

According to the statistics of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2018), Germany witnessed a sharp rise of asylum application in 2013. The numbers have grown exponentially between 2013 and 2016, before taking a sharp decline in 2017. In 2018, the estimated number of asylum-seekers in Germany is over 1.5 million. Asylum seekers are not the only newcomers to the German society. Germany's immigrant population has dramatically increased since the end of the World War II due to multiple migration waves. According to the official statistics, more than 9 million residents in the country are foreign born in 2018 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018a). Furthermore, in Germany, if one of the parents of an individual is born abroad, this individual is considered as having a migration background residing in the country; almost 30 million of the 82.6 million population are not ethnically German (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018a).



Figure 51a Number of Refugees in Germany (Source: BAMF); Figure 1b: Population in Germany broken down into groups. (Source: DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt)

According to official population projections, the number of non-Germans is likely to rise even more in the next few decades (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018b). All these numbers suggest that Germany is a migration country with immense ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. However, many scholars highlight that there is still a persistent reluctance to acknowledge that the country is much more diverse than the Germans would like to admit (Krech, 2015; Mushaben, 2010, 2011; Street & Hansen, 2015; van der Will & Burns, 2015; Wegmann, 2014). In the words of Behr (2007) "the spread of foreign ... elements seem to strike at the heart of German identity since Germans have firmly delineated and jealously protected their identities from other peoples and cultures."

The reluctance of diversity acknowledgment and concerns over potential demographic changes have not been isolated developments. PEGIDA, an anti-Islam societal movement, quickly became salient in a short span of time in late 2014 (Patton, 2017). AfD, a political party founded in 2013 as a reaction to the European debt crisis, quickly started to exercise political influence. The party gradually gained ground in local and national elections; in a short time, the party was influential at a level where it was able to set the agenda for many public debates (Arzheimer, 2015; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, & Siri, 2015; Kim, 2017). AfD's rhetoric included many themes and tones ranging from technocratic economic nationalism to xenophobic anti-foreigner sentiments (Marx & Naumann, 2018).

Since the refugee influx in 2015, Germany started to experience increased political violence and hate crimes (Adam, 2015). Deutsche Welle reports that in 2015 there were more than a thousand attacks on asylum centers in 2015. In 2017, the country witnessed almost another thousand anti-Muslim crimes

according to Germany's Interior Ministry (Dockery, 2017; Jones, 2018). Some scholars see these developments as a rise in the radical right (Jäckle & König, 2017) and populism (Vorländer, Herold, & Schäller, 2018). There is no denying populism plays a significant role. However, the flip side of the coin is nationalism and anti-foreigner sentiments. Although the recent literature points to the proximity of populism and nationalism (Bonikowski, 2017; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017), we think that German national identity and anti-foreigner prejudice are at the core of all of these worrisome changes. In a series of surveys and in-depth interviews, Busse et al. (2018) reveal how a perceived taboo around German history and national identity casts a shadow on immigration debates. Similarly, Funk (2016) observes that Germany, especially in the last few years, is torn between a welcome culture and discomfort of integration concerns over the rising number of foreigners in the country.

We believe all these issues are wrapped around a big predicament, which Triadafilopoulos (2012) calls the "migration-membership dilemma". Migration, on the one hand, is beneficial for filling labor shortages and for other economic purposes especially in aging societies. Sometimes newcomers are accepted by the states due to advancements of ideological or political interests. On the other hand, these immigration agendas have serious consequences such as the conflicting materialistic and economic interests across different segments of the receiving societies. Moreover, there are always the normative priorities such as the protection of national identity. In the words of Orgad (2009, p. 737) "... immigrants are never an immigration issue alone. Immigrants shape global politics, make up the economy, and redefine national identity." Thus, newcomers do not only bring labor, they also bring new languages, life-styles and culture. Consequentially, immigration policies are not exclusively about "whom to admit, on what grounds and for whose interests (Triadafilopoulos, 2012, p. 2)". Immigration is inherently about who the nation is and who the nation wishes to be. There are these fundamental and existential questions behind all the debates about multiculturalism and integration.

There was never a shortage of debates on immigration, integration, and multiculturalism in Germany (Bauder, 2009; Bauder & Semmelroggen, 2009; Eckardt, 2007; Manz, 2004; Piwoni, 2015; Takle, 2011). These topics have always been on the public's and media's agenda. Academic work never fell behind the public debates (Davidov, Thörner, Schmidt, Gosen, & Wolf, 2011; Zick, Küpper, & Krause, 2017). However, previous research tended to compartmentalize the issues, which gave a limited fraction of a broader picture.

While one line of work focused on multiculturalism struggles and integration challenges, another line of research investigated prejudice. Although both lines of research have touched upon the links between prejudice, multiculturalism, integration and national identity, many studies focused either on specific or generalized prejudice. Moreover, the operationalization of national identity in the previous literature almost exclusively utilized *patriotism* and *national pride*. In fact, often, *national pride* and *patriotism* have been the common labels for the same measured construct. Many scholars point to the pitfalls of fluidly defined and operationalized concepts. According to Huddy (2016), there is a "conceptual and definitional tangle" in nationalism studies, which stems from a lack of distinct and uncontroversial definition of national identity.

Furthermore, scholarship on German nationalism still could not finalize an ongoing debate about the relationship between a harmful and non-harmful national pride. According to this debate, two distinct latent constructs (different dimensions of German national identity; to be more precise different sources of national pride in Germany) have different associations to out-group prejudice (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). One dimension of national pride (which in a nutshell is related to Germany's democratic achievements) is negatively associated with out-group prejudice. In contrast, another dimension (national pride of history and sports) has a positive association with the same outcome. Although this

finding later was disproved (Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2010), the explanations around the different predictive validities of different sources of national pride were manifold (J. C. Becker, Wagner, & Christ, 2007; Cohrs, 2005; Cohrs et al., 2004; Cohrs & Moschner, 2008; Heinrich, 2012, 2016).

In this study, we not only clarify the operationalization of various constructs that constitute German national identity, but also we expand the out-group prejudice operationalizations. By doing so, we think we provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between German national identity and attitudes towards multiple non-German groups in the country. Using four nationally representative samples and two convenience samples of university students, we operationalize German national identity in multiple ways across four separate studies. We also operationalize attitudes toward immigrants and refugees separately. In the final study, we use a scale that measures a more abstract but also more overarching concept – attitudes towards cultural diversity. We think the multiple analyses we report below shed light onto the intricate relationships between the German national identity and out-group prejudices by expanding the conventional operationalization of national identity and out-group prejudice.

In the Methods section below, we present the multiple samples and briefly discuss our statistical analysis strategy; which is then followed by the individual studies. We list the measures and results of the analyses under each unique study's headings. We refer the readers to the online appendix for the descriptive statistics and expanded methods section.

Methods:

Samples

Study 1 (a & b & c): Our first study utilizes the International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) national identity modules (ISSP-Research-Group, 1998, 2012, 2015), which include many survey-items on national identity related constructs. After filtering out samples from Germany, we ended up having the following sample sizes: N_1 =1894, data collection: 1995; N_2 =1287, data collection: 2003; N_3 =1717, data collection: 2014. We first analyzed the most recent data from 2014. After determining the measurement models and checking the relationships between the theoretical constructs, we checked whether our structural model is stable over time. That is to say; we applied the same model to the other samples from earlier years. However, our endogenous constructs are slightly different due to fewer items on immigrant-attitudes in Modules 2 (2003) & 1 (1995). We report the results from the 2014 and 2003 samples in the Results section below. We comment on the 1995 sample's results in the online appendix. **Study 2:** In 2016, we conducted an online survey among German university students (N_4 =476). For the sampling scheme and sample characteristics, please refer to the online appendix.

Study 3: Our third study's data (*N*₅=1000) comes from PEW's 2016 Global Attitude Survey, which includes items on conceptions of nationhood and attitudes towards Jews, Muslims, and Roma as well as attitudes towards refugees.

Study 4: Our final sample is again a convenience sample of German university students with N_6 =570, and data collection: 2017. We refer the readers to the online appendix again for the sampling scheme and sample characteristics.

Measures

Item-wordings and the theoretical constructs are discussed under the studies' headings. Descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix.

Statistical analysis strategy

We employ structural equation modeling to investigate the relationships between the constructs. In Studies 1,2,3 and 4 we use the robust maximum likelihood estimator, and full information maximum likelihood (FIML, (Graham, 2003)) to account for the missing data. PEW global attitudes' response categories are all ordinal. Therefore, in the third study, we utilize the robust variant of the weighted least square estimator (WLSMV (Brown, 2006; Muthén, du Toit, & Spisic, 1997)). To assess the models' fits, we follow the guidelines suggested by Kline (2016). A more detailed account of the statistical procedure can be found in the online appendix.

Studies:

Study 1

Measures

Our variables of interest here are the conceptions of nationhood, national pride, and nationalist attitudes. All the ISSP national identity modules include items on attitudes toward immigrants; however, the number of items on immigrants differs across modules. Items wordings are below.

Theoretical Construct	Item Wording
	Some people say that the following things are important for being truly German. Others say they are not important.
	How important do you think each of the following is
	to have been born in Germany
	to have German citizenship
	to have lived in Germany for most of one's life
Conception	to be able to speak German
of Nationhood	to be a Muslim
	to respect German political institutions and laws
	to feel German
	to have German ancestry
	How proud are you of Germany in each of the following?
	the way democracy works
	its political influence in the world
	Germany's economic achievements
	its social security system
No. Concert Dates	its scientific and technological achievements
National Pride	its achievements in sports
	its achievements in the arts and literature
	German armed forces
	its history
	its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society
	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
	Generally speaking, Germany is a better country than most other countries.
	I would rather be a citizen of Germany than of any other country in the world.
National superiority	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Germans.
	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
	There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Germany. How much do you agree or
	disagree with each of the following statements?
	Immigrants increase crime rates. [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3]
	Immigrants are generally good for Germany's economy. (R) [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3]
	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3]
Attitudes toward	Immigrants improve German society by bringing new ideas and cultures. (R) [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3]
Immigrants	Germany's culture is generally undermined by immigrants. [ISSP NI M 3]
	Legal immigrants to Germany who are not citizens should have the same rights as German citizens. (R) [ISSP NI M 3]
	Germany should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. [ISSP NI M 3]
	Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as German citizens. (R) [ISSP National Identity

	Module 3]			
	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants. [ISSP NI M 2]			
	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot - reduced a lot [ISSP NI			
	M 1, 2, 3]			
(R) are reverse coded. [IS	SP NI M 1, 2, 3] means item is available in all modules (1995,2003,2014); [ISSP NI M 2] only in module 2; [ISSP NI M 3]			
only in module 3.				

A – Multi-dimensional national identity on attitudes toward immigrants (nationally representative sample from 2014)

Results: We discover that attitudes toward immigrants in Germany are best modeled in two dimensions. The first dimension is a *threat perception* from the immigrants; the second is what we labeled as *not seeing the benefits* of immigrants. While both of these dimensions are positively associated with wanting fewer immigrants in the country, *not seeing the benefits* has a negative association to the statement that "the German state should take tougher measure to exclude illegal immigrants". However, the same statement is positively associated with the *threat* perception from the immigrants.

We also discover that German national identity is best measured in eight dimensions, three of which belong to the theoretical concept notions of nationhood; national pride stems from four latent constructs. We modeled *national superiority* as a separate dimension. The notions of nationhood in Germany are what we label as *nativity* (having been born, lived in the country and being a citizen), *achievable* (speaking the language, feeling German and complying with the laws and institutions) and *ascriptive* (the idea that only Christians with German ancestry are the true Germans).

The German public has what we label as the *democratic* pride – pride of democracy, political influence in the world and fair treatment of all groups in the country. Another dimension of national pride is the *economy* together with the social security system and the scientific achievements that derive from the development and prosperity. There is also what we label as the *folkish* pride, which influences the level of pride on achievements in sports and art. The last dimension is what we label as the *nationalist* pride since the item, which are influenced by the construct are being proud of German history and army.

In the German public, those who have higher *democratic pride* tend to perceive the benefits of immigrants; in contrast, having higher *national superiority* (a national superiority feeling) makes seeing the *benefits of immigration* less likely. *Democratic pride* is also negatively associated with the *threat perception* from the immigrants. However, those who have higher *economic pride*, *nationalist pride* and *national superiority* tend to feel a threat from the immigrants.

The goodness of fit statistics of the model and the reliabilities of the constructs are acceptable. Figure ... below shows all the relationships between the constructs. The dashed arrows denote the statistically insignificant paths.


Figure 52: N = 1717 (ISSP National Identity N	/lodule 3, 2014)		
Goodness of fit statistics			
		ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) omega) are (total:.88)
Robust χ2 : 1833.479***; df : 386	Nativ: <i>nativity</i> .80	DePrd: <i>democratic</i> pride .70	Not seeing the benefits of immigration .67
Robust CFI: .90	Achie: <i>achievable</i> .61	VoPrd: folkish pride .59	Threat perception .75
Robust RMSEA: .049 (not sig. P close: .996) 90 % Cl .047 .051	Ascrip: <i>ascriptive</i> .62	NatPrd: nationalistic pride .55	R ² s: Not seeing the benefits .34; threat .56; immigrants should be excluded .49; # of
SRMR: .053	EcPrd: economic	NatAt: national	immigrants should be decreased .51
# of missigness patterns: 522	pride	superiority	
	.77	.72	
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators i	not shown due to sim	plicity; all measurement n	nodel paths ***

B – Multi-dimensional national identity on attitudes toward immigrants (nationally representative sample from 2003)

Results: We replicate the model from Study 1A with another nationally representative sample from 2003. The full structural model is rather stable across time. However, we needed to make a few adjustments to the endogenous side of the model since the number of items that tap into immigrant attitudes are not the same across ISSP's National Identity Modules 2 and 3. Here, we use fewer numbers of items to model the two dimensions of attitudes toward immigration. The *threat* dimension has an item, which is not present in the previously reported model (the item states "immigrants abuse the social security system"). Also note that, in contrast to the model above, one of the manifest endogenous outcome variables is missing here. This is again because this item was not included in the Module 2 of ISSP's national identity study.

All the latent constructs and indicator variables are the same on the exogenous side of the structural model. We find that *democratic pride* again is negatively associated with both dimensions; *national superiority*, again has a positive association with both dimensions of immigrant attitudes. All the other significant paths in the model of 2014 sample are not significant for the sample from 2003. However, *nativity* in 2003 is positively associated with *threat perception*. This is to say, immigrants are a threat to those who adopt the notion that suggests one is truly German if one has a German citizenship, is born in the country and has spent most of their life in Germany.

The goodness of fits statistics and the reliabilities are again acceptable. See Figure 3.



Figure 53: N = 1287 (ISSP National Iden	tity Module 2, 2003)		
Goodness of fit statistics			
		ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) ome	ga) are (total:.86)
Robust χ2 : 1201.477***; df:304	Nativ: nativity .78	DePrd: democratic pride .67	Not seeing the benefits of immigration .66
Robust CFI: .90	Achie: achievable .64	VoPrd: folkish pride .61	Threat perception .78
Robust RMSEA: .050 (not sig. P close:	Ascrip: ascriptive .60	NatPrd: nationalistic pride .49	R ² s: Not seeing the benefits .29; threat .43;
.898) 90 % CI .047 .053			# of immigrants should be decreased .52
SRMR: .54	EcPrd: economic pride	NatAt: national superiority	
# of missigness patterns: 421	.71	.70	
*** p < .001: ** p < .01: * p < .05. Indicators not shown due to simplicity: all measurement model paths ***			

Discussion of Study 1 A & B

The difference in the structural relationships over time has more than one interpretation. The first interpretation would stress the endogenous/outcome constructs not being exactly the same since (the number of) indicators differ. Therefore, one cannot infer that different dimensions of the German national identity have different predictive validities across time. Another interpretation would suggest that since we are dealing with uncountable latent constructs, it does not matter much whether the indicators are the same or not, the constructs must be the same on theoretical grounds. An empirical approach to test the invariance of the latent constructs is only possible when the indicators are also exactly the same, which in our case is unfortunately not possible. We have the exact same indicators and latent constructs on the exogenous/explanatory variables side; but on the endogenous/outcome variables side we do not.

Given the circumstances, we concentrate on the relationships that are stable over time. These relationships are *democratic pride* having a negative association with anti-immigrant attitudes and *national superiority* having a positive association with the anti-immigrant attitudes. These findings are only somewhat new. We just confirm some previous findings. There has been extensive research and discussion about the democratic pride and nationalism in Germany (J. C. Becker et al., 2007; Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Cohrs, 2005; Cohrs & Moschner, 2008; Heinrich, 2016; Wagner et al., 2010). Although the constructs in the previous research are operationalized differently, the current consensus suggests that different dimensions of German national identity relate differently to out-group attitudes. But the

precise nature of these relationships is at the core of the ongoing debate. Outgroup derogation in Germany is known to be positively associated with a harmful national pride (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Wagner et al., 2010); we confirm this in study 1A. However, there was some evidence to suggest that a positive/non-harmful national pride also has a positive association with out-group derogation (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). We find further evidence for this argument as well in two studies (1A & 1B).

We also attempt to replicate the structural model with the sample from 1995 in Study 1C. See our comments on this study in the online appendix.

Study 2

Measures

In this study, we modeled national identity in two ways. The first model uses a direct measure of national identification. This instrument (Leach et al., 2008; Roth & Mazziotta, 2015) is a multidimensional, multi-component scale, which assesses *self-investment* and *self-definition* as the secondorder latent constructs. So, students rated how much they psychologically invest in their nation and to what degree they define themselves as typical Germans. This theoretical model of national identity reflects how the individual-self pertains to the group-self (Roccas & Berlin, 2016). Besides the direct national identification scale, we used the short version of collective narcissism scale as an exogenous variable in the model. *Collective narcissism* is a peculiar national identification, which is an exaggerated emotional investment in the greatness of the nation. This is "an unrealistic and psychologically-fragile belief that is contingent on external approval (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2017)."

Our second model of national identity consists of *national superiority* feeling and three types of patriotism, namely *blind*, *constructive* and *symbolic*. Since the sample sizes are not too large, we limited the *superiority* and *patriotism* scales to three items (Hayduk & Littvay, 2012) per construct.

We have two outcome variables in this study. The first one is attitudes toward immigrants; the second one is attitudes toward refugees. To model the attitudes toward immigrants, we adopted items from multiple sources such as the Euro-Barometer (53, 66.3 (2012a, 2012b)) and the ISSP's National Identity Module. As for the second endogenous variable; at the time of data collection, we had no access to standardized or validated scales that measured attitudes toward refugees. Therefore, we took items from an existing study (Erdoğan, 2015), which assessed attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Turkey. We translated selected items into German with a committee approach (Douglas & Craig, 2007; Peters & Passchier, 2006). In Studies 2A & 2B, we check the influence of national identity (modeled in two ways) on attitudes toward immigrants; in Studies 2C & 2D, we check the same two national identity models' influence on attitudes toward refugees.

Components of the theoretical	Item wordings of the German Sample Measures	
constructs		
	Below is a list of statements about Germany. Please indicate your level of agreement to these	
	statements.	
	Collective Narcissism	
	Germany deserves special treatment.	
Unidimensional construct: all items manifest the same latent variable	I will never be satisfied until Germany gets all it deserves.	
	It really makes me angry when others criticize Germany.	
	If other countries listened to Germany more, the world would be a much better place.	
	Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of Germany.	
	National Identity	
Centrality manifested by Self-	I often think about the fact that I am German.	
Investment second-order latent	The fact that I am German is an important part of my identity.	
construct	Being German is an important part of how I see myself.	
Satisfaction manifested by Self-	I feel a bond with Germans.	

Investment second-order latent	I feel solidarity with Germans.
construct	I feel committed to Germans.
Solidarity manifested by Self-	I am glad to be German.
Investment second-order latent	It is pleasant to be German.
construct	Being German gives me a good feeling.
Self-Stereotyping manifested by Self-	I have a lot in common with the average German person.
Definition second-order latent	I am similar to the average German person.
construct	I am a typical German.
In-Group Homogeneity manifested by	German people have a lot in common with each other.
Self-Definition second-order latent	German people are very similar to each other.
construct	Germans share a lot of the same characteristics.
	National superiority
	Generally speaking Germany is a better country than most other countries
Unidimensional construct: all items	I would rather be a citizen of Germany than of any other country in the world
manifest the same latent variable	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Germans
	Pretriction
	The desiries of Cormony are always practically correct
Plind	Deeple chould support their sountry over if the sountry is in the urang
Біта	Laurnert Cormany's policies for the year reason that they are the policies of my country
	Support Germany's policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.
	People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.
Constructive	If I criticize Germany, I do so out of love for my country.
	I oppose some German policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.
Symbolic	Seeing the German flag makes me feel not proud at all – very proud
	When I hear the national anthem, it makes me feel not proud at all – very proud
	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
	Attitudes toward Immigrants
	In schools where there are too many immigrant children, the quality of education suffers.
	Immigrants get poorer housing, largely because of discrimination.(R)
	Immigrants abuse the system of social benefits.
	Without immigrants. Germany would do less well in international sports. (R)
	The religious practices of immigrants threaten our way of life.
	Where schools make the necessary efforts, the education of all children can be enriched by the
	presence of children of immigrants. (R)
	Immigrants do the jobs which others do not want to do.
See the dimensionality analysis	When hiring personnel, employers should only take account of qualifications, regardless of the
	person's race, religion or culture. (R)
	Immigrants keep entire sections of Germany's economy going. (R)
	Immigrants are being discriminated against in the job market. (R)
	Immigrants increase crime rates
	Immigrants are generally good for Germany's economy (R)
	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany
	Immigrants take jobs dway norm people who were born in definitity.
	Germany's culture is generally undermined by immigrants
	Attitudes toward Refugees
	Refugees nose serious security threats against terror provention measures
	Refugees are not the problem of Germany, they should be sent back
See the dimensionality analysis	Lyculd pet mind by ing a refugee as my peighber. (P)
	Covernment chould work on providing education and jobs for refuzees. (D)
	Government should work on providing education and jobs for refugees. (R)
	In general, rerugees can be integrated into the German society. (R)
	Refugees cause problems and social unrest in the places that they settle by being involved in crimes.
	Relugees are a burden to the German economy.
	Kerugees will take away jobs from the Germans.
	Germany cannot take care of refugees when they are admitted in huge numbers.
	I do not want my taxes to be spent on refugees when there is already enough number of people in
(D)	Germany who are also in need.
(K) are reverse coded.	

A – Direct measure of national identity on attitudes toward immigrants (student sample from 2016)

Results: Here, instead of relying on proxy constructs like national pride, we use a direct measure of national identity. This scale measures national identification with five theoretical constructs, three of

which are influenced by a second-order latent construct called *self-investment*; two of the theoretical constructs are influenced by another second-order latent construct called *self-definition*. *Self-investment* is manifested by *centrality* (how central Germanness is to the individual); *solidarity* (how much of a solidarity the individual feels among Germans); and *satisfaction* (how satisfied the individual is of being German). *Self-definition*, on the other hand, is manifested by *in-group homogeneity* (how homogeneous the nation is perceived by the individual) and *self-stereotyping* (to what degree the individual sees him/herself as a typical German).

In this study which has mostly university students as subjects, we discover that attitudes towards immigrants are best explained with four latent constructs. The first construct is a *denial of discrimination*. The second attitude towards immigrants is an *economic threat* perception; the third is a *cultural threat* perception. The final endogenous construct is, again, *not perceiving the benefits of immigration*.

As can be seen from Figure 4 below, *collective narcissism* has a strong and positive association with the higher-order constructs of national identification. Collective narcissism also has a positive association with three of the distinct attitudes toward immigrants; the only dimension of immigrant attitudes not influenced by collective narcissism is the *cultural threat* perception. Interestingly, the constructs of direct national identification scale has no significant associations with immigrant attitudes.



Figure 54: N = 476 (convenience san	nple of university st	udents, 2016)		
Goodness of fit statistics				
		ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) omega) are (total:.94)		
Robust χ2: 703.169***; df: 438		Cent: centrality .77	CN: collective narcissism .79	R ² s: denial of discrimination
Robust CFI: .96	Simu colf	Sol: solidarity .83	DoD: denial of	.24;
	SINV: Self-		discrimination .74	economic threat .43;
Robust RMSEA: .036 (not sig. P	mvestment	Sat: satisfaction .85	ReTh: economic threat .77	cultural threat .48;
close 1) 90 % CI .032 .042				not seeing the benefits of
SRMR: .051		InGH: in-group	CuTh: cultural threat .80	immigration .22;
	SDef: self-	homogeneity .90		self-investment .41;
# of missigness patterns: 27	definition	SSt: self-stereotyping	Not seeing the benefits of	self-definition .46
		.87	immigration .78	
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Ind	icators not shown d	ue to simplicity; all measu	rement model paths ***	

B - National superiority & patriotism on attitudes toward immigrants (student sample from 2016)

Results: Here we check the influence of *national superiority* feeling and three distinct types of patriotism on the immigrant attitudes. We find that *constructive patriotism*, a critical national attachment to Germany, has a negative association to the *economic threat* from the immigrants. Such a critical national attachment is also involved in perceiving benefits from immigration. *Symbolic patriotism*, on the other hand, as an affective attachment to the nation through its symbols, always has positive associations with anti-immigrant attitudes. A *national superiority* feeling has the same effect; the only non-significant association of this dimension is with *denial of discrimination*. Interestingly, *blind patriotism*, in this sample has no statistically significant relationship with the outcome variables.



Figure 55: N = 476 (convenience sample of u	niversity students, 2016)			
Goodness of fit statistics				
	(ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) omega) are (total:.94)		
Robust χ2 : 370.483***; df : 202	CP: constructive	DoD: denial of discrimination .74	R ² s: denial of discrimination .29; economic threat .52:	
Robust CFI: .96	BP: blind patriotism .67	ReTh: economic threat .77	cultural threat .41;	
Robust RMSEA: .044 (not sig. P close: .98) 90 % Cl .037 .051	SP: symbolic patriotism .92	CuTh: cultural threat .80	not seeing the benefits of immigration .30	
SRMR: .044	NatA: national	Not seeing the benefits of		
# of missigness patterns: 20	superiority .64	immigration .78		
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators no	ot shown due to simplicity; a	II measurement model paths ***		

C – Direct measure of national identity on attitudes toward refugees (student sample from 2016)

Results: We find that the university students' attitudes towards refugees are best measured in two dimensions. One dimension reflects a *denial of responsibility* towards the refugees; the second dimension is, similar to immigrant attitudes, a *threat perception* from the newcomers. The *denial of responsibility* reflects favoring short-term humanitarian solutions to the refugee crisis and prioritizes the German population's problems over refugees. The *threat perception* expresses concerns over security/terror, sees refugees as a burden to the German economy and as competitors in the job market.

Neither *self-investment* in the German nation, nor a strong *self-definition* of one's self as a German has statistical associations with the attitudes toward refugees. *Collective narcissism*, on the other hand, only has a positive association with the *denial of responsibility*.



Figure 56: N = 476 (convenience sample of university students, 2016)				
Goodness of fit statistics				
		ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) omega) are (total:.94)		
Robust χ2 : 640.804***; df: 390		Cent: centrality .77	CN: collective narcissism	<i>R</i> ² :
			.79	denial of
Robust CFI: .96	SInv: self-	Sol: solidarity .83	DoR: denial of	responsibility .36;
	investment		responsibility .84	threat perception .41;
Robust RMSEA: .37 (not sig. P close: 1)		Sat: satisfaction .85	ReTh: threat perception	self-investment .41;
90 % CI .033 .044			.84	self-definition .46
SRMR: .053	(Def: celf	InGH: in-group		
	SDet: Self-	homogeneity .90		
# of missigness patterns: 22	definition	SSt: self-stereotyping .87		
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators not shown due to simplicity; all measurement model paths ***				

D - Nationalism & patriotism on attitudes toward refugees (student sample from 2016)

Results: Interestingly, when we model German national identity as a *national superiority* feeling and as three distinct patriotic attitudes, the only significant predictor of anti-refugee sentiments is *symbolic patriotism*. So, an affective attachment to Germany's symbols is positively associated with feeling a *threat* from refugees and with *denying responsibility* to the new comers.



Figure 57: N = 476 (convenience sample of university students, 2016)				
Goodness of fit statistics				
	ω_3 (Μα	Donald's (1999) omega) are (tot	al:.93)	
Robust χ2: 346.150***; df: 174	CP: constructive patriotism	DoR: denial of responsibility	R ² :	
	.71	.84	denial of responsibility	
Robust CFI: .96	BP: blind patriotism .66	ReTh: threat perception .84	.35;	
Robust RMSEA: .48 (not sig. P close .843) 90 % Cl	SP: symbolic patriotism .92		threat perception .39	
.041.055				
SRMR: .047	NatA: national superiority			
# of missigness patterns: 14	.65			
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators not shown due to simplicity; all measurement model paths ***				

Discussion of Study 2 A & B & C & D

Overall results indicate that only particular ways of national identification lead to out-group prejudice. For example, a *symbolic* attachment and an exaggerated emotional investment (*collective narcissism*) seem to always have a positive association with out-group prejudice. A critical (*constructive*) patriotism, on the other hand seems to buffer some of the prejudices against immigrants. *Constructive patriotism*, though, seems to fall short of protecting German university students from anti-refugee attitudes. Additionally, a *national superiority* feeling also seems to be the contributor to the out-group prejudice in German university students. *Self-investment* and *self-definition* not being directly involved in out-group prejudice confirms that it is actually particular ways of national identification that leads to out-group hostility.

Study 3

Measures

The German sample's data from PEW's 2016 Global Attitudes survey includes four items on conceptions of nationhood, three items on a generalized prejudice which can be conceptualized as group-focusedenmity (GFE (Davidov et al., 2011; Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011)), and four items on attitudes toward refugees. In Study 3A, we check the influence of conceptions of nationhood on generalized prejudice; in Study 3B, we use the same endogenous variables on attitudes toward refugees.

Attitudes toward Refugees	I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns. Do you think that a large number of refugees leaving countries such as Iraq and Syria is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to Germany?
	Does Statement #1 or Statement #2 comes closer to your own views:
	refugees make our country stronger because of their work and talents OR refugees are a burden on our country because they take our jobs and social benefits
	refugees in our country today are more to blame for crime than other groups OR refugees in our
	country today are no more to blame for crime than other groups
	refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country OR refugees will not increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country
Generalized prejudice/	I'd like you to rate some different groups of people in Germany according to how you feel about them. Please tell me whether your opinion is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable.
Group-focused-enmity	Jews
	Roma
	Muslims
Conceptions of nationhood	Some people say that the following things are important for being truly German. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?
	to have been born in Germany
	to be able to speak German
	to be a Christian
	to share German customs and traditions

A – Conceptions of nationhood on attitudes toward refugees (nationally representative sample from 2016)

Results: In this sample, we modeled German public's conceptions of nationhood in two dimensions because (1) the empirical dimensionality analysis suggests this (Stokes, 2017); (2) we know from the previous studies a uni-dimensional construct is not feasible, therefore given the limited number of items, a two-factor solution is optimal. The responses to the three dichotomous statements are manifested by a latent anti-refugee sentiment, which also has a strong positive association with a threat perception from the refugees. The dimension we labeled as *cultural* (someone truly German is one who speaks the language and who shares customs and tradition) notion of nationhood is positively associated with *anti-refugee* attitudes. The other notion (*mixed*: a true German is somebody born in the county and is Christian) has no statistically significant relationship to the outcome variable.



Figure 58: N = 1000 (PEW global attitudes, 2016) 817 used in analysis		
Goodness of fit statistics		
	<i>R</i> ² :	
Robust χ2 : 25.519***; df : 14	AntRef: ant-refugee attitudes .31;	
CFI: .99	Refugees are threat .65	
RMSEA: .32 (not sig. P close .907) 90 % CI .004 .054		
WRMR: .66		
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. All category thresholds of all the indicator variables are ***		
Indicators not shown due to simplicity; all measurement model paths ***		

B – Conceptions of nationhood on generalized prejudice (nationally representative sample from 2016)

Results: The same dimension of the national identity model in this representative sample also has a positive association with the *generalized* prejudice.



Figure 59: N = 1000 (PEW global attitudes, 2016) 802 used in analysis	
Goodness of fit statistics	
	R ² :
Robust χ2 : 46.561***; df : 10	GPre: generalized prejudice.22
CFI : .96	
RMSEA: .068 (not sig. P close .092) 90 % CI .045 .092	
WRMR: .89	

*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. All category thresholds of all the indicator variables are *** Indicators not shown due to simplicity; all measurement model paths ***

Discussion of Studies 3 A & B

The findings from this nationally representative sample indicate that the same dimension of national identity is involved in a particular out-group prejudice (*anti-refugee attitudes*) as well as a generalized prejudice.

Study 4

Measures

In the final study, the outcome variable is a scale that assesses the value that is given to cultural diversity (Asbrock & Kauff, 2015) in a country. We use the same national identity measures from Study 2. However, here we do not have the *symbolic patriotism*. Study 4A looks at the influence of collective narcissism and the national identity on *pro-diversity beliefs*. In Study 4B, we have two patriotism dimensions, *national superiority*, and conceptions of nationhood as the explanatory variables for the same *pro-diversity beliefs*.

Components of the theoretical	Item wordings of the German Sample Measures		
constructs			
	Below is a list of statements about Germany. Please indicate your level of agreement to these		
	statements.		
	Collective Narcissism		
	Germany deserves special treatment.		
Unidimonsional construct: all itoms	I will never be satisfied until Germany gets all it deserves.		
manifest the same latent variable	It really makes me angry when others criticize Germany.		
mannest the same latent variable	If other countries listened to Germany more, the world would be a much better place.		
	Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of Germany.		
	National Identity		
Centrality manifested by Self-	I often think about the fact that I am German.		
Investment second-order latent	The fact that I am German is an important part of my identity.		
construct	Being German is an important part of how I see myself.		
Satisfaction manifested by Self-	I feel a bond with Germans.		
Investment second-order latent	I feel solidarity with Germans.		
construct	I feel committed to Germans.		
Solidarity manifested by Self-	I am glad to be German.		
Investment second-order latent	It is pleasant to be German.		
construct	Being German gives me a good feeling.		
Self-Stereotyping manifested by Self-	I have a lot in common with the average German person.		
Definition second-order latent	I am similar to the average German person.		
construct	I am a typical German.		
In-Group Homogeneity manifested by	German people have a lot in common with each other.		
Self-Definition second-order latent	German people are very similar to each other.		
construct	German share a lot of the same characteristics.		
	National superiority		
	Generally speaking, Germany is a better country than most other countries.		
Unidimensional construct: all items	I would rather be a citizen of Germany than of any other country in the world.		
mannest the same latent variable	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Germans.		
	Patriotism		
	The decisions of Germany are always practically correct.		
Blind	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.		
-	I support Germany's policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.		
	People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.		
Constructive	If I criticize Germany, I do so out of love for my country.		
	I oppose some German policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.		
	Some people say that the following things are important for being truly German. Others say they are		
	not important. How important do you think each of the following is		
Conceptions	to have been born in Germany		
of Nationhood	to have German citizenship		

	to have lived in Germany for most of one's life
	to be able to speak German
	to be a Christian
	to respect German political institutions and laws
	to feel German
	to have German ancestry
	Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.
	Pro-diversity beliefs
	A society with high cultural diversity is more capable to deal with new problems.
	Problems can best be solved by groups consisting of individuals with different cultural backgrounds.
	For a country it is better if there is variety of different cultures. (R)
Unidimensional construct: all items	Only a society with a considerable amount of cultural diversity can handle the challenges of the
manifest the same latent variable	future.
	Different ethnic and cultural groups enrich German culture.
	Culturally diverse groups are usually more productive than very homogenous groups.

(R) are reverse coded.

A – Direct measure of national identity on pro-diversity beliefs (student sample from 2017)

Results: We find that only collective narcissism has a significant association with pro-diversity beliefs; self-investment and self-definition are not directly involved in not favoring a culturally diverse society. This means that only an exaggerated emotional investment leads to preferring a culturally homogeneous society.



Figure 60: N = 570 (convenience sample of university students, 2017)								
Goodness of fit statistics								
		ω_3 (McDonald's (1999	9) omega) are (total:.91)					
Robust χ2 : 535.600***; df : 287		Cent: centrality .78	CN: collective narcissism .82					
Robust CFI: .97	Sinv: self-	Sol: solidarity .82	ProDiv: pro-diversity beliefs					
	investment		.91					
Robust RMSEA: .41 (not sig. P close 1) 90 % Cl .035	investment	Sat: satisfaction .85	R ² s: pro-diversity beliefs .27;					
.046			self-investment .48;					
SRMR: .044		InGH: in-group homogeneity	self-definition .32					
	SDef: self-definition	.84						
# of missigness patterns: 30		SSt: self-stereotyping .90						
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators not shown	due to simplicity; all me	asurement model paths ***						

B – Conceptions of nationhood, nationalism & patriotism on pro-diversity beliefs (student sample from 2017)

Results: In this final analysis, our findings reveal that having a *national superiority* feeling and thinking that Germanness is something *ascriptive* are negatively associated with *pro-diversity beliefs*. This result indicate that German students who adopt the *national superiority* feeling are more likely to prefer a culturally homogeneous society. Furthermore, thinking Germanness is something that cannot be acquired later in life also leads to preferring a culturally homogeneous society.



Figure 61: N = 570 (convenience sample of university students, 2017)								
Goodness of fit statistics								
	ω_3 (McDonald's (1999	9) omega) are (total:.82)						
Robust χ2 : 404.085***; df : 236	Ach: achievable. 63	NatA: national superiority .65						
Robust CFI: .97	Asc: ascriptive .73	ProDiv: pro-diversity beliefs .91						
Robust RMSEA: .37 (not sig. P close 1) 90 % CI .030 .043	CP: constructive patriotism .80	R ² pro-diversity beliefs .38						
SRMR: .044	BP: blind patriotism .71							
# of missigness patterns: 28								
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators not shown due	e to simplicity; all measurement m	odel paths ***						

Discussion of Study 4 A & B

We find that not preferring cultural diversity has multiple sources. The first source stems from the notion of nationhood which draws a non-achievable symbolic boundary of Germanness. The second and third sources might seem controversial at first because one is a psychologically-fragile belief in the nation's greatness; the other is the *national superiority* feeling. According to Golec de Zavala (2017), the former feature an acknowledged weakness; *collective narcissism* reflects a vulnerable narcissism. It is this psychological vulnerability that requires the recognition of the greatness of one's nation by others. *National superiority*, on the other hand, is grandiose narcissism. While *national superiority* is related to high self-esteem and dominance, *collective narcissism* reflects a low self-esteem with an unfulfilled sense of self-entitlement. In sum, one is "subjectively-defensive", the other is "actively-aggressive"; however, both psychological motivations lead to the same outcome – not favoring cultural diversity. Although the outcome is the same, Golec de Zavala et al. (2016) emphasizes the difference in the motivation. Collective narcissists focus on the image of the group against the external threats; those who believe in national superiority assert an in-group dominance over others (Cichocka, 2016).

General discussion:

The overall results indicate that German national identity is much nuanced. We confirm the previous findings which suggested different sources of national pride have different relationships to out-group

prejudice. A *democratic pride* (of Germany's democratic achievements), in fact, protects individuals from prejudice against out-groups. A *national superiority* feeling, on the other hand, is always involved in prejudices.

Constructive patriotism (having a critical national attachment) also protects individuals from some of the anti-immigrant prejudices, but not from anti-refugee prejudices. Having a critical and questioning national attachment is associated with not feeling an economic threat from the immigrants and with acknowledging the benefits of immigration. In contrast, *symbolic patriotism* is always positively associated with all dimensions of prejudice. Both on empirical and conceptual grounds, *symbolic patriotism* (an affective attachment to the nation via its symbols) is just another dimension of national pride. In the student sample, we observe that this symbolic pride is also a potentially harmful one because the more students feel this symbolic pride, the more likely they are to perceive various threats from foreigners, not to see the benefits of immigration and also be in denial.

Collective narcissism (a psychologically fragile belief in the greatness of the nation that is contingent upon external approval) is another type of national attachment that we observe to be always involved in out-group prejudice. In all the studies and analyses in which we utilize this construct, *collective narcissism* has a statistically significant association with the outcome variable. The more students focus on Germany's importance and uniqueness, the more they tend to deny (1) benefits from immigration, (2) discrimination towards foreigners, and (3) responsibility towards refugees. Furthermore, this belief in the nation's uniqueness is also involved in perceiving a threat from immigrants and not favoring diversity.

We also discover that different notions of German nationhood are involved in various prejudices. The notions that draw more exclusive boundaries to what it means to be German, such as the *nativity* and *ascriptive*, are positively associated with a threat perception from immigrants and with not favoring cultural diversity. Moreover, we also find that a *cultural* way of drawing symbolic boundaries also leads to a generalized as well as a specific (anti-refugee) prejudice.

Another overall finding we would like to highlight is the direct national identity measure. We show that emotional investment in the national identity and defining one's self as a prototypical member of the nation does not necessarily lead to out-group prejudice. That is to say, feelings of *solidarity* & *satisfaction*, perceiving Germanness as a *central* element of the individual-self are not directly involved in prejudices. Perceiving *in-group homogeneity* in Germany and *self-stereotyping* do not directly lead to prejudice either. Therefore, we believe the comprehensive picture we portrayed via these analyses reveals that it is the type of national identification that leads to various out-group prejudices. This finding is no big news; nonetheless, our contribution is showing which constructs (dimensions of national identity) lead to which sort of prejudice.

We rigorously test various national identity dimensions and prejudice types. We discover that many of the prejudices stem from a feeling of *national superiority, collective narcissism* (focusing on Germany's uniqueness) and exclusive boundary making (defining German nationhood in excluding ways). For further studies, we advocate prioritizing these constructs instead of national pride. *Symbolic patriotism*, as a short measure is also recommendable. We believe the predictive validity of this symbolic and affective attachment is better than different sources of national pride with regards to prejudice detection.

Perhaps one of the most important take away messages from this article is the confirmation of Behr's (2007) statement about Germans delineating and protecting their national identity from foreign

elements. We show that Germany's immigration-membership dilemma is not likely to be solved by imprudently encouraging patriotism and national pride. As much previous work has extensively shown, due to the historical legacy of the Holocaust, these concepts are very ambivalent in Germany (Kopf-Beck, Gaisbauer, & Dengler, 2013, 2017; Miller-Idriss, 2006; Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). Besides the ambivalence, there is evidence to suggest that encouraging particular sources of German national pride is dangerous (J.C. Becker et al., 2017; J.C. Becker, Enders-Comberg, Wagner, Christ, & Butz, 2012; Miller-Idriss, 2014, 2018; Wagner et al., 2010). Moreover, there are increasing numbers of studies that highlight the importance of the normative content of national identities (Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009); drawing exclusive boundaries and highlighting differences across cultures lead to higher levels of prejudices against out-groups. Therefore, we think Germany's immigration-membership dilemma is best addressed by encouraging and reminding of democratic norms and diversity.

In a final note, we would like to highlight the empirical challenge the scholars of German nationalism face. On empirical grounds, all the constructs we model in this article have large common variation. The general structural equation modeling framework helps researchers in overcoming this empirical challenge to a certain degree. As we comment in the online appendix, some latent constructs are hardly distinguishable. Besides variable-centered empirical strategies, we recommend alternative strategies like latent class/profile analysis, mixture models and item-level analyses methods (such as attitude-network-modeling).

Appendix:

Survey items u	sed in Study 1 – Inter	rnational Social Survey Program N	ational Id	entity N	/lodules 2 8	43			
				2014			200	3	
Theoretical Construct	Variable Name	Item Wordings	Mean	SD	% Missing	Mean	SD	% Missing	Range
		Some people say that the following things are important for being truly German. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is							
	Born	to have been born in Germany	2.72	0.94	3.15	2.76	0.97	3.42	
	Citz	to have German citizenship	3.18	0.83	2.39	3.15	0.84	2.33	4 1 1 - 1
Live	to have lived in Germany for most of one's life	2.94	0.87	2.21	2.85	0.88	2.95	important at	
of	Lang	to be able to speak German	3.63	0.62	1.63	3.58	0.65	1.40	ali
Nationhood	Relg	to be a Christian	1.90	0.97	3.49	1.97	1.04	4.43	to A Voru
	Resp	to respect German political institutions and laws	3.45	0.69	2.04	3.24	0.73	2.72	important
	Feel	to feel German	3.03	0.86	3.26	2.99	0.90	3.57	
	Ancs	to have German ancestry	2.33	0.99	3.55	2.54	1.03	3.57	
		How proud are you of Germany in each of the following?							
	PrdDem	the way democracy works	2.82	0.73	7.34	2.47	0.79	8.31	
National	PrdPolInfW	its political influence in the world	2.74	0.74	9.73	2.53	0.73	10.64	1 Not proud
Pride	PrdEcoAch	Germany's economic achievements	3.14	0.67	6.35	2.51	0.82	6.84	Very proud
	PrdSocSec	its social security system	2.98	0.70	5.65	2.52	0.83	6.06	

Descriptive statistics:

	PrdSciAch	its scientific and	3.30	0.64	6.17	2.97	0.69	9.87	
	PrdSpoAch	its achievements in sports	3 00	0.78	7 69	2.88	0.74	7 30	
	PrdSpOAch	its achievements in the arts	3.09	0.78	7.03	2.00	0.74	7.30	
		and literature	3.05	0.68	13.98	2.89	0.74	15.15	
	PrdArmF	German armed forces	2.17	0.83	19.98	2.16	0.80	19.50	
	PrdHist	its history	2.21	0.89	11.42	2.28	0.86	10.96	
	PrdFToG	its fair and equal treatment	2.52	0.78	13.16	2.27	0.77	14.84	
		of all groups in society							
		How much do you agree or							
		statements?							
		Generally speaking,							
	NatCOcb	Germany is a better country	3.39	1.08	5.13	3.01	1.09	5.67	
		than most other countries.							
		I would rather be a citizen of							
	NatCOcitz	Germany than of any other	3.70	1.12	3.73	3.53	1.17	5.36	1 Disagree
National		The world would be a better							strongly to 5
superiority		place if people from other							Agree
	NatCOwbp	countries were more like the	2.88	1.11	5.13	2.61	1.04	8.24	strongly
		Germans.							
	BliPat	People should support their							
		country even if the country	2.55	1.13	4.60	2.51	1.18	5.05	
		Is in the wrong.							
		about immigrants from other							
		countries living in Germany.							
		How much do you agree or							
		disagree with each of the							
	Jun an Cail Dat	following statements?							
	Immerikat	rates IISSP NI M 1 2 31	3.35	1.16	6.23	3.65	1.03	7.38	
	ImmGfEco	Immigrants are generally							
		good for Germany's	2.00	0.02	6.22	2 10	0.05	9 70	
		economy. (R) [ISSP NI M 1,	2.69	0.93	6.23	3.18	0.95	8.70	
		2, 3]							
	ImmTjobs	Immigrants take jobs away							
		in Germany [ISSP NI M 1 2	2.69	1.10	3.73	3.22	1.15	6.92	
		31							
	ImmNewIdeas	Immigrants improve German							
		society by bringing new	2 /1	0.94	4.08	2 66	1 00	7 23	
		ideas and cultures. (R) [ISSP	2.41	0.94	4.08	2.00	1.00	7.25	
		NI M 1, 2, 3]							1 Disagree
	ImmUndCul	Germany's culture is	2 01	1 1 1	7 1 1	NIA	NIA	NA	strongly to 5
Attitudes		immigrants. <i>IISSP NI M 3</i>	2.01	1.11	7.11	NA	INA	INA	Agree
toward	ImmLegSamRght	Legal immigrants to							strongly
Immigrants		Germany who are not							
		citizens should have the	2.80	1.17	5.77	NA	NA	NA	
		same rights as German							
	line we like a Chiel Die Frankel	citizens. (R) [ISSP NI M 3]							
	ImmilegShaBeExcla	stronger measures to							
		exclude illegal immigrants.	3.67	1.15	7.05	NA	NA	NA	
		[ISSP NI M 3]							
	ImmLegEqAcsEdu	Legal immigrants should							
		have equal access to public							
		education as German	1.77	0.78	2.33	NA	NA	NA	
		Identity Module 31							
	ImmWFare	Government spends too							
		much money assisting	NA	NA	NA	3.86	1.06	9.71	
		immigrants. [ISSP NI M 21							

	ImmNum	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot - reduced a lot [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3]	3.59	1.06	12.81	4.15	0.95	9.56	1-5
(R) are reverse only in module	coded. [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3.	3] means item is available in all r	modules (1995,20	003,2014); [ISSP NI N	1 2] only	in module 2;	[ISSP NI M 3]

Survey items used in study 2 – Convenience sample of university students (2016)										
Theoretical construct	Variable names	Item Wordings	Mean	SD	% Missing	Range				
		Below is a list of statements about Germany.								
		Please indicate your level of agreement to								
		these statements.								
		Collective Narcissism								
	cn2	Germany deserves special treatment.	1.68	0.89	1.26					
	cn3	I will never be satisfied until Germany gets	1.67	0.86	1 47					
		all it deserves.	1.07	0.00	1.47					
All items manifest the same	cn5	It really makes me angry when others	1.79	0.93	1.26	1 Disagree				
latent construct		criticize Germany.	1.75	0.50	1.20	strongly to 5				
	cn6	If other countries listened to Germany more,	2.20	1.02	1.05	Agree strongly				
		the world would be a much better place.								
	cn8	Not many people seem to fully understand	2.22	1.03	1.47					
		the importance of Germany.								
		National Identity		-						
	nc01	I often think about the fact that I am	2.07	1.09	1.89					
Centrality manifested by Self-		German.								
Investment second-order latent	nc02	The fact that I am German is an important	2.58	1.21	1.89					
construct		part of my identity.								
	nc03	Being German is an important part of now i	2.10	1.07	1.68					
Castisfantian manifested by Calf	nico01	see myself.	2 70	1.04	1 60					
Satisfaction manifested by Self-	nisa01	I feel a bond with Germans.	2.79	1.04	1.68					
investment second-order latent	nisa02	I feel solidarity with Germans.	2.44	1.03	1.68					
	nisa03	I feel committed to Germans.	2.56	1.02	1.47					
Solidarity manifested by Self-	niso01	Tam giad to be German.	3.22	1.10	1.89	1 Disagree				
investment second-order latent	niso02	It is pleasant to be German.	3.31	1.07	1.47	strongly to 5				
construct	nisou3	Being German gives me a good feeling.	2.76	1.06	1.89	Agree strongly				
Self-Stereotyping manifested by	nssul	I have a lot in common with the average	3.06	1.13	1.89					
Self-Definition second-order		German person.	2.14	1.09	1 60					
latent construct	nss02	Lam a tunical Corman	3.14	1.08	1.08					
	nss03	Tama typical German.	2.32	1.12	1.08					
	nnoi	German people have a lot in common with	2.65	1.01	1.68					
In-Group Homogeneity	nh02	Corman poople are very similar to each								
manifested by Self-Definition	11102	other	2.69	1.05	1.89					
second-order latent construct	nh03	German share a lot of the same								
	11105	characteristics	2.47	1.00	1.89					
		National superiority								
		Generally speaking. Germany is a better								
	nat01co	country than most other countries.	2.77	1.13	1.89					
		I would rather be a citizen of Germany than				1 Disagree				
All items manifest the same	nat02co	of any other country in the world.	2.01	1.03	1.47	strongly to 5				
latent construct		The world would be a better place if people				Agree strongly				
	nat03co	from other countries were more like the	2.74	1.22	1.47	с с <i>,</i>				
		Germans.								
		Patriotism								
	h 102	The decisions of Germany are always	4.42	0.64	4.60					
	opatuz	practically correct.	1.43	0.61	1.68	1 Discourse				
Blind	hnat02	People should support their country even if	1 26	0 64	1 47	I Disagree				
Βιπα	opatos	the country is in the wrong.	1.30	0.64	1.47	Agree strongly				
	hpat05	I support Germany's policies for the very	1 5 2	0.71	1.69	Agree strongly				
	spatos	reason that they are the policies of my	1.52	0.71	1.00					

		country.				
	cpat01	People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.	3.03	1.09	2.10	
Constructive	cpat03	If I criticize Germany, I do so out of love for my country.	2.66	1.18	2.10	
	cpat04	I oppose some German policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.	2.60	1.10	1.89	
	spat01	Seeing the German flag makes me feel not	2.22	1.14	1.47	
Symbolic	spat02	When I hear the national anthem, it makes	2.29	1.19	1.47	
		Attitudes toward Immigrants				
		To what extent do you garee or disgaree				
Cas the dimensionality methods		with the following statements?				
see the almensionality analysis below	ep01mc	in schools where there are too many immigrant children, the quality of education suffers	2.67	1.20	1.26	
	ep02mcR	Immigrants get poorer housing, largely because of discrimination.	2.38	0.97	1.47	
	ep03mc	Immigrants abuse the system of social benefits	2.10	1.00	1.26	
	ep04mcR	Without immigrants, Germany would do less well in international sports.	2.51	1.03	2.10	
	ep05mc	The religious practices of immigrants threaten our way of life.	1.80	1.01	1.68	
	ep06mcR	Where schools make the necessary efforts, the education of all children can be enriched by the presence of children of immigrants.	1.78	0.86	1.26	
	ep07mcR	Immigrants do the jobs which others do not want to do	2.35	0.85	1.47	1 Disagree
	ep08mcR	When hiring personnel, employers should only take account of qualifications, regardless of the person's race, religion or culture	1.32	0.66	1.26	strongly to 5 Agree strongly
	ep09mcR	Immigrants keep entire sections of Germany's economy going.	2.40	0.81	1.89	
	ep10mcR	Immigrants are being discriminated against in the job market.	2.12	0.89	1.68	
	ep11	Immigrants increase crime rates.	2.18	1.09	2.73	
	ep12R	Immigrants are generally good for Germany's economy. (R)	2.17	0.83	1.47	
	ep13	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany.	1.56	0.70	1.26	
	ep14R	Immigrants improve German society by bringing new ideas and cultures. (R)	1.86	0.84	1.26	
	ep15	Germany's culture is generally undermined by immigrants.	1.74	0.96	1.47	
		Attitudes toward Refugees				
See the dimensionality analysis below	ar01	Refugees pose serious security threats against terror prevention measures.	2.27	1.15	1.26	
	ar02	Refugees are not the problem of Germany, they should be sent back.	1.29	0.69	1.05	
	ar03R	I would not mind having a refugee as my neighbor. (R)	1.69	1.00	1.26	
	ar04R	Government should work on providing education and jobs for refugees.(R)	1.59	0.76	1.26	1 Disagree strongly to 5
	ar05R	In general, refugees can be integrated into the German society. (R)	1.63	0.77	1.05	Agree strongly
	ar06	Refugees cause problems and social unrest in the places that they settle by being involved in crimes.	2.23	1.17	1.05	
	ar07	Refugees are a burden to the German economy.	2.12	1.07	1.05	

	ar08	Refugees will take away jobs from the Germans.	2.10	1.06	1.05	
	ar09	Germany cannot take care of refugees when they are admitted in huge numbers.	2.72	1.28	1.05	
	ar10	I do not want my taxes to be spent on refugees when there is already enough number of people in Germany who are also in need.	1.61	0.93	1.26	
	ar11	For more effective integration, refugees should be scattered all around <i>Germany.</i> [dropped due to low factor loadings]	4.03	0.82	1.26	
	ar12	Refugees should not be let to settle where ever they want in Germany. [dropped due to low factor loadings]	2.40	1.20	1.05	
(R) are reverse coded.	-	•				

Survey items used in study 3 – PEW Global Attitudes 2016										
Item Wording	Variable	%	N	Resp	onse Categories and t	heir percentages	5			
	Name	Missing								
Attitudes towards refugees										
I'd like your opinion about some	REFthr			1	2	3				
possible international concerns. Do				Not a threat	Minor threat	Major threat				
you think that a										
large number of refugees leaving										
countries such as Iraq and Syria is a										
major threat, a minor threat or not a										
threat to Germany?										
				% 27	% 46	% 27				
Does Statement #1 or Statement #2	REFeco			0	1					
comes closer to your own views: a.				refugees make	refugees are a					
refugees make our country stronger				our country	burden on our					
because of their work and talents				stronger because	country because					
OR refugees are a burden on our				of their work and	they take our jobs					
country because they take our jobs				talents	and social benefits					
and social benefits										
				% 70	% 30					
Does Statement #1 or Statement #2	REFcri			0	1					
comes closer to your own views: b.				refugees in our	refugees in our					
refugees in our country today are				country today are	country today are					
more to blame for crime than other				more to blame	no more to blame					
groups OR refugees in our country				for crime than	for crime than					
today are no more to blame for				other groups	other groups					
crime than other groups				0 1	0 1					
				% 66	% 34					
Does Statement #1 or Statement #2	REFter			0	1					
comes closer to your own views: c.				refugees will	refugees will not					
refugees will increase the likelihood				increase the	increase the					
of terrorism in our country OR				likelihood of	likelihood of					
refugees will not increase the				terrorism in our	terrorism in our					
likelihood of terrorism in our				country	country					
country										
				% 41	% 59					
Group-focused-enmity										
I'd like you to rate some different				1	2	3	4			
groups of people in Germany				verv favorable	mostly favorable	mostly	verv			
according to how you feel about					inoutly involuble	unfavorable	unfavorable			
them Please tell me whether your						unavolubic	unavolubic			
opinion is very favorable, mostly										
favorable, mostly unfavorable or										
very unfavorable.										
a lews	lews			% 31	% 65	% 04	% 00			
h Roma	Roma		<u> </u>	% 07	% //7	0 04 0/ 11	% OF			
	Muelime			% U7 % 10	% 60	/0 41 0/ 2/	% 05			
C. IVIUSIIIIIS	iviusiiiiis	1	1	70 IU	70 00	70 24	70 05			

Conceptions of nationhood					
Some people say that the following		1	2	3	4
things are important for being truly		Not at all	Not very	Somewhat	Very
German. Others say they are not		important	important	important	important
important. How important do you					
think each of the following is?					
a. to have been born in Germany	Born	% 26	% 44	% 19	% 11
b. to be able to speak German	Lang	% 31	% 38	% 19	% 12
c. to be a Christian	Relg	% 01	% 01	% 17	% 82
d. to share German customs and	CuTr	% 05	% 25	% 43	% 27
traditions					

Survey items used in study 4– 0	Convenience	sample of university students (2017)				
Theoretical construct	Variable	Item wordings of the German Sample				
	Name	Measures				
		Below is a list of statements about Germany.				
		Please indicate your level of agreement to these				
		statements.				
		Collective Narcissism	Mean	SD	%	Range
					Missing	
	cn2	Germany deserves special treatment.	1.77	1.25	1.58	
	cn3	I will never be satisfied until Germany gets all it	1.79	1.26	1.58	
		deserves.				
Unidimensional construct: all	cn5	It really makes me angry when others criticize	2.09	1.44	1.75	1 Disagree
items manifest the same	-	Germany.				strongly to 7
latent variable	CN6	If other countries listened to Germany more,	2.81	1.57	1.58	Agree strongly
		the world would be a much better place.				
	cn8	Not many people seem to fully understand the	2.82	1.64	1.75	
		Importance of Germany.				
	nico01	Leften think about the fact that Lam Corman	2 21	1 1 1	1 75	
Controlity manifested by Solf	nice01	The fact that I am German is an important part	2.21	1.11	1.75	
Investment second order	niceoz	of my identity	2.74	1.22	1.58	
latent construct	nico02	Boing Cormon is an important part of how I soo				
	Inceos	myself	2.14	1.09	1.75	
Satisfaction manifested by	nisa01	I feel a hond with Germans	2 98	1 00	1 75	
Self-Investment second-order	nisa02	I feel solidarity with Germans	2.50	1.00	1.75	•
latent construct	nisa03	I feel committed to Germans	2.71	1.05	1.58	
Solidarity manifested by Self-	niso01	I am glad to be German.	3.38	1.11	1.58	1 Disagree
Investment second-order	niso02	It is pleasant to be German.	3.45	1.01	2.11	strongly to 5
latent construct	niso03	Being German gives me a good feeling.	2.98	1.10	1.93	Agree strongly
	niss01	I have a lot in common with the average				
Self-Stereotyping manifested		German person.	3.20	1.14	1.75	
by Self-Definition second-	niss02	I am similar to the average German person.	3.27	1.04	1.58	
order latent construct	niss03	I am a typical German.	2.36	1.15	1.75	
	nih01	German people have a lot in common with each	2.04	0.00	2.44	
In-Group Homogeneity		other.	2.84	0.98	2.11	
manifested by Self-Definition	nih02	German people are very similar to each other.	2.87	1.05	1.75	
second-order latent construct	nih03	German share a lot of the same characteristics.	2.63	1.05	1.58	
		Some people say that the following things are				
		important for being truly German.Others say				
		they are not important. How important do you				
		think each of the following is				
	Born	to have been born in Germany	1.60	0.76	1.23	
	Citz	to have German citizenship	2.58	0.95	1.40	1 Not important
	Live	to have lived in Germany for most of one's life	2.19	0.87	1.75	at all
Conceptions	Lang	to be able to speak German	3.40	0.72	1.75	to
of Nationhood	Relg	to be a Christian	1.26	0.57	1.40	4 Verv
	Resp	to respect German political institutions and laws	3.44	0.74	1.58	important
	Feel	to feel German	3.00	0.98	1.40	
	Ancs	to have German ancestry	1.50	0.75	1.40	
	1	National superiority	1		1	1

	nat01co	Generally speaking, Germany is a better country	2.85	1.18	1.75	
Unidimensional construct: all	nat02co	I would rather be a citizen of Germany than of	2.03	1.03	1.58	1 Disagree
items manifest the same		any other country in the world.	2.00	1.00	1.00	strongly to 5
latent variable		The world would be a better place if people		4.20	.26 1.40	Agree strongly
	nat03co	from other countries were more like the	2.85	1.26		
		Germans.				
		Patriotism				
	bpat02	The decisions of Germany are always practically correct.	1.41	0.64	1.75	
Blind	bpat03	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	1.32	0.63	1.93	
		I support Germany's policies for the very reason			3 1.75	
	bpat05	that they are the policies of my country.	1.54	0.83		1 Disagree
	cpat01	People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.	2.88	1.17	1.75	strongly to 5 Agree strongly
Constructive	cpat03	If I criticize Germany, I do so out of love for my country.	2.69	1.26	1.58	
	cpat05	I oppose some German policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.	2.99 1.37	2.11		
		Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.				
		Pro-diversity beliefs				
	pdb1	A society with high cultural diversity is more capable to deal with new problems.	5.11	1.49	1.58	
	pdb2	Problems can best be solved by groups consisting of individuals with different cultural backgrounds.	4.88	1.47	2.28	
	pdb3	For a country it is better if there is variety of different cultures. (R)	5.51	1.46	1.93	
Unidimensional construct: all items manifest the same latent variable	pdb4	Only a society with a considerable amount of cultural diversity can handle the challenges of the future.	5.03	1.63	1.75	1 Disagree strongly to 7 Agree strongly
	pdb5	Different ethnic and cultural groups enrich German culture.	5.80	1.39	1.40	
	pdb6	Culturally diverse groups are usually more productive than very homogenous groups.	4.89	1.56	1.93	
(P) are reverse coded	pdb7	When the people in a community are very similar dealing with new problems is easier. (R) Item dropped due to low factor loading.	4.14	1.51	1.58	

Expanded methods for Study 1 a & b:

We start with an exploratory preliminary analysis. The correlation plots below provide excellent visual cues to detect the dimensionality of the theoretical constructs. In the first step, we check the correlations between the variables of interest to investigate the latent variable structures. We compute correlations based on full information maximum likelihood since many survey-items have high missing percentages. Figures 12 and 13 below show the correlations across survey-items before and after item-level clustering.



Figure 62: study 1 - correlations between variables of interest based on full information maximum likelihood.



Figure 63: study 1 - correlations between variables of interest after item-level clustering.

By paying attention to the triangular shapes, at the top of Figure 13 we see the items on attitudes towards immigrants are highly correlated with one another. The different color shades of the circles (varying correlations coefficients) suggest multiple dimensions for the latent constructs. The items that tap into distinct theoretical constructs such as the conceptions of nationhood, national pride and national superiority seem to be interwoven. This interwoven data structure suggests an intricate measurement model with many dimensions. To minimize potential overlap in the constructs (and cross-loadings among latent-constructs) we employ dimensionality analysis separately to theoretical constructs. In the next step, we employ parallel analysis (PA; (Horn, 1965)), very simple structure criterion (VSS; (Revelle & Rocklin, 1979)) and exploratory factor analysis (EFA), before fitting a measurement model to the latent constructs with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

After carefully reviewing the results suggested by PA, VSS & EFA, we decided to retain three factors for the conceptions of nationhood and four factors for national pride. We operationalize national superiority as a separate dimension on purely theoretical grounds. Dimensionality analysis of the immigrant attitudes suggested a two-factor structure explains the data best. We kept two survey-items as manifest variables and used the other operationalized latent variables as predictors of these two manifest variables, which we instrumentalized as the outcome variables. Below, we describe the latent variables we discover. See the measurement models of the constructs at the end of the heading.

Nativity: This is the first notion of nationhood in the German public opinion. According to this notion, an individual is perceived to be truly German if the person is born in the country, spent most of their life in Germany and has the citizenship.

Achievable: This construct views Germanness as something *achievable*. This notion reflects the opinion that one can be considered to be truly German by speaking German, respecting the laws and institutions in the country and by feeling German.

Ascriptive: This conception of nationhood, in contrast to the one above, perceives Germanness as something *ascriptive*. This notion in the public opinion suggests that one is truly German with ethnic heritage and Christianity.

Democratic Pride: The first dimension of the national pride in the public opinion is democracy. Participants in the sample are proud of Germany's democracy, its influence in the world and its fair and equal treatment of all groups in the country.

Economic Pride: The second dimension of national pride stems from Germany's economic achievements. The German public is proud of the German economy, the social security system and the scientific achievements this prosperity brings.

Folkish Pride: The third separate dimension stems from what we labeled as the *folkish pride*; by which we mean the national pride of the ordinary people. National pride has been close to a "taboo" in Germany due to the historical legacy of the Holocaust (Kopf-Beck et al., 2013, 2017; Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012). Many researchers argued that the only domain Germans were publicly allowed to express their national pride was sports (Ismer, 2011; Peetz & Wilson, 2013). For a long time, national pride expression outside of sports events has been frowned upon (J.C. Becker et al., 2012). Expressing national pride outside of context was almost discouraged and was seen as something a sensitive citizen should not do (J.C. Becker & Tausch, 2014). This construct taps into this ambivalent national pride which influences achievements in sports and arts.

Nationalistic Pride: One last source of nationalist pride stems from country's history and armed forces. We labeled this as the *nationalistic pride* because due we think these items has close connotations to the National Socialist era's historical legacy.

National superiority: This dimension is what Otten & Cohrs (2010) call the comparative orientation. Individuals compare their nation and country to others to obtain a national superiority feeling. Note that

this construct, which we operationalized on theoretical grounds, also includes an item that taps into blind patriotism (which is an uncritical attachment to the country).

Threat Perception from the immigrants: Typically, attitudes toward out-groups stem from two proximate psychological processes. According to integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), the host societies perceive realistic and symbolic threats from foreigners such as the immigrants. While the realistic threats typically involve anxieties over job loss and increasing crime rates, symbolic threats involve, for example, perceived cultural degeneration due to the presence of newcomers. The first latent construct we discover in the attitudes towards immigrants in Germany is a mixture of this threat perception. The items influenced by this construct are related to job-loss, crime, and German culture being undermined by the immigrants.

Not seeing the benefits of immigration: The second dimension of immigrant-attitudes stems from what Triadafilopoulos (2012) calls the "migration-membership dilemma." This is the "contradiction between state practices of admitting migrants to fill labor shortages or pursue political aims, and the lack of commitment to include these migrants into the national community" (Triadafilopoulos, 2012). We labeled this latent construct as *not seeing the benefits of immigration*. This reflects the public opinion which suggests that the immigrants are not good for the economy; immigrants do not bring new ideas, illegal immigrants should not have the same rights and should not be given access to public services like education.

	Study 1a – sample from 2014
	Goodness of fit statistics for the endogenous/explanatory
	latent variables in the structural equation model
0.39 Bm	Robust x2: 1213.460***; df: 181
0.44 Ctz nat 100	Robust CFI: .89
	Robust RMSFA: .061*** 90 % CL.057 .064
0.84 Rsp (ach 91.00	SRMR: 0.054
0.68 trg	# of missignoss nattorns: 221
	Boths show the standardized coefficients, all paths are
	Paths show the standardized coefficients; all paths are

0.55 PrD 4	nat: nativity
0.50 PPI 4 DPr 2000	ach: achievable
	EcP: economic pride
0.68 PAA	Dpr: democratic pride
0.53 PAF 4 0 69	VPr: folkish pride
0.68 Pril 0:57 NtP 891,00	NtP: nationalistic pride
0.43 Noon	NtA: nationalist attitudes (comparative orientation)
0.48 mcod	WA. hatohalist attitudes (comparative orientation)
0.82 91	



We established the measurement models above with the nationally representative sample from 2014. The structural model that reveals the predictive relationships were also established with this sample (Study 1a). In Study 1b, we checked the stability of the whole structural model with the sample from 2003. The only difference between the models was in the endogenous constructs (*threat perception* and *not seeing the benefits*) – both dimensions had fewer numbers of items in the measurement models. Also one of the manifest endogenous variables ("Germany should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants") was not available for the sample from 2003. Additionally, the sample from 2003 includes a unique item, "government spends too much money assisting immigrants," which loaded on the *threat* factor. Despite these differences, the model is considerably stable across time. Below we report the measurement models from the 2003 sample.





Comment on Study 1c:

The number of items in the sample from 1995 is even lower. On the endogenous side, there are five items in total; on the exogenous side the item "ancestry is important to be truly German" is not included in the survey. We tried to replicate the same structural model from above with minor revisions. On the exogenous side, we modeled conceptions of nationhood in two dimensions, adding religion to the *nativity*. We built the same two-dimensional model on the endogenous side, but with fewer indicators.

In this model, *nativity*, *nationalist pride* and *national superiority* positively predicted *not seeing the benefits*. *Nationalist pride* and *national superiority* also positively predict *threat perception from the immigrants*. In this sample, interestingly, *democratic pride* overestimates both of the *threat perception* (β = -1.13**) and the *not perceiving benefits* (β = -1.09*) from the immigrants. This overestimation suggest either a bad model specification, or there are alternative explanations, which derive from the empirical results of the structural model (for a good account of standardized coefficients >1 *see* (Deegan, 1978; K. Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996; K. G. Jöreskog, 1999)). The structural model is below.



Figure 64: N = 1894 Whole Sample (ISSP National Identity Module 1, 1995)								
Goodness of fit statistics								
	ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) omega) are (total:.86)							
Robust χ2: 1899.519***; df: 262	Nativ: nativity	DePrd: democratic pride	Not seeing the benefits of immigration					
Robust CFI: .89	Achie: achievable	VoPrd: folkish pride	Threat perception					
Robust RMSEA: .060*** 90 % CI .058 .063	Ascrip: ascriptive	NatPrd: nationalistic pride	R ² s: Not seeing the benefits .40; threat .70;					
SRMR: .56	EcPrd: economic pride	NatAt: national superiority	# of immigrants should be decreased .47					
# of missigness patterns: 608								
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators not shown due to simplicity; all measurement model paths ***								

We believe the overestimated standardized coefficient in the model above has an alternate explanation rather than model misspecification. An overestimation might also indicate that the latent constructs are indistinguishable (very high multi-collinearity). Then the question is why would democratic pride be very strongly and negatively correlated with attitudes towards immigrants in 1995, but not in 2003 and 2014? We think the German re-unification context explains the unexpected data structure. This data is collected not long after the official German reunification, so to a West-German, the word immigrant might mean a "non-German foreigner" or perhaps even a "newcomer East-German".

When we refit the model in a multi-group structural equation model separating East and West Germans, the coefficient is again overestimated in the West German sample, but not in the East-German sample. This is clear indication --not substantial empirical evidence-- that in the data from the 1995 sample, East and West Germans have different perceptions of these concepts. It is likely that the West Germans in the sample includes the East Germans in the immigrant category, but the East Germans have a different group in mind for immigrants. We provide only partial and ad-hoc evidence for this explanation with the multi-group SEM results and invariance tests. The invariance test shows that the concepts are partially invariant. The factor loadings of the measurement models can be estimated to be the same, so we have metric invariance in the measurement models.

	df	Chi ²	∆ Chi²	$\triangle df$	CFI	RMSEA	\triangle CFI	Model comparison
Configural invariance (1)	524	1333.4	NA	NA	0.893	0.061	NA	
Metric invariance (2)	540	1355.1	21.691	16	0.892	0.060	0.001	2 vs. 1
Scalar invariance (3)	557	1615.3	260.258***	17	0.860	0.068	0.032	3 vs. 1

Additionally, we fit two structural equation models; one in which the regression coefficient is restricted to be the same across groups, while in the other structural equation model, the regression coefficients are freely estimated across groups. If the model for which the regression coefficient is freely estimated is significantly better, we can, infer that the concepts have different meanings across samples and this difference manifests itself in the overestimated regression coefficient in the West German sample. Unfortunately, we cannot confirm or reject this hypothesis because the model which freely estimates regression coefficients, does not converge. Therefore, we stick to our previous interpretation in an adhoc manner. It is likely that, in the sample from 1995, the concepts in the East and West German groups are not invariant; and this invariance manifests itself as the overestimated regression coefficient in the West German sample.

The different regression coefficients are illustrated in Figure ... below. The descriptive statistics of study 1c with the 1995 sample are also reported below.



Figure 65: multi-group structural equation model f	for study 1c (ISSP Natio	nal Identity Module 1, 19	95). East and West German samples' results					
are distinguished in the regression paths. N =1894	[W]est: 1282 [E]east: 6	512						
Goodness of fit statistics								
	ω_3 (McDonald's (1999) omega) are (total:.86)							
Robust x2: 1963.902***; [West:1281.167/East:	Nativ: nativity	DePrd: democratic	Not seeing the benefits of immigration					
682.734] df : 524		pride						
Robust CFI: .90	Achie: achievable	VoPrd: folkish pride	Threat perception .78					
Robust RMSEA: .056** 90% CI .054 .059	Ascrip: ascriptive	NatPrd: nationalistic	R ² s: Not seeing the benefits					
		pride	West:.47/East:.28;					
SRMR: .54	EcPrd: economic	NatAt: national	threat West:.72./ East:.58;					
# of missigness patterns: West: 428/East: 246	pride	superiority	# of immigrants should be decreased					
			West.49/East:.45					
*** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p <.05. Indicators not shown due to simplicity; all measurement model paths ***								

Survey items used in Study 1c – International Social Survey Program National Identity Modules 1							
Theoretical	Variable Name	Item Wording	Mean	SD	% Missing	Range	
Construct							
		Some people say that the following					
		things are important for being truly					

		Turkish. Others say they are not				
		important. How important do you				
		think each of the following is				
	Born	to have been born in Germany	2.66	1.07	2.80	
	Citz	to have German citizenship	3.20	0.89	3.75	
	Live	to have lived in Germany for most of	2.00	0.04	4.75	
		one's life	2.86	0.94	4.75	1 Not important
Conception	Lang	to be able to speak German	3.41	0.74	2.85	at all
of Nationhood	Relg	to be a Christian	1.98	1.12	6.34	to
	Resp	to respect German political		0.70	4.75	4 very
		institutions and laws	3.41	0.72	4.75	Important
	Feel	to feel German	3.12	0.97	4.86	
	Ancs	to have German ancestry	NA	NA	NA	
		How proud are you of Germany in				
		each of the following?				
	PrdDem	the way democracy works	2.62	0.81	7.18	
	PrdPolInfW	its political influence in the world	2.63	0.77	10.98	
	PrdEcoAch	Germany's economic achievements	3.06	0.75	7.44	
	PrdSocSec	its social security system	2.69	0.89	5.60	
	PrdSciAch	its scientific and technological				
		achievements	3.05	0.69	10.82	1 Not proud at
National Pride	PrdSpoAch	its achievements in sports	2.84	0.87	10.35	all to 4 Verv
	PrdArtAch	its achievements in the arts and			_0.00	proud
		literature	2.86	0.78	16.58	
	PrdArmF	German armed forces	2.03	0.89	18.16	
	PrdHist	its history	2.13	0.93	10.30	
	PrdFToG	its fair and equal treatment of all				
		groups in society				
		How much do you agree or disagree				
		with the following statements?				
		Generally speaking, Germany is a			.8 8.66	1 Disagree strongly to 5
	NatCOcb	better country than most other	3.01 1.18	1.18		
		countries.				
		I would rather be a citizen of Germany				
National	NatCOcitz	than of any other country in the	3.82 1.20	1.20	5.70	
National		world.				
superiority		The world would be a better place if				Agree strongly
	NatCOwbp	people from other countries were	2.49	1.15	1.15 9.66	
		more like the Germans.				
	BliPat	People should support their country	2 27	1 17	6.97	
		even if the country is in the wrong.	2.27	1.17	0.57	
		There are different opinions about				
		immigrants from other countries living				
		in Germany. (By "immigrants" we				
		mean people who come to settle in				
		Germany. How much do you agree or				
		alsource with each of the following				
		statements?				
	immerikat	immigrants increase crime rates. [ISSP	3.56	1.14	8.55	
	line in CfF e e					
	IMMGTECO	immigrants are generally good for	2.00	0.00	11 50	
		Germany's economy. (R) [ISSP NI NI 1,	2.98	0.99	11.56	
	ImmTiohs	2, 3]				
	mmijous	noningrants take jobs away from	2.04	1 20	7 4 4	
Attitudes toward		IISSP NI M 1 2 31	2.94	1.20	7.44	1 Disagree
Immigrante	ImmNewIdeas	Immigrants improve German society				strongly to 5
initigiants	mminewideds	hy bringing new ideas and cultures (P)	2 41	1 00	10 72	Agree strongly
		IISSP NI M 1 2 31	2.44	1.00	10.72	
	ImmUndCul	Germany's culture is generally		1		
		undermined by immigrants. <i>IISSP NI</i>	I NA NA NA	NA		
		M 3]				
	ImmLegSamRght	Legal immigrants to Germany who are				
		not citizens should have the same	NA	NA	NA	

	rights as German citizens. (R) [ISSP NI M 3]				
ImmIlegShdBeExcld	Germany should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. [ISSP NI M 3]	NA	NA	NA	
ImmLegEqAcsEdu	Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as German citizens. (R) <i>[ISSP National Identity</i> <i>Module 3]</i>	NA	NA	NA	
ImmWFare	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants. [ISSP NI M 2]	NA	NA	NA	
ImmNum	Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot - reduced a lot [ISSP NI M 1, 2, 3]	4.26	0.90	10.30	1-5

Expanded methods for Study 2

The empirical exploratory strategy we describe above also applies here. In this study, we have previously tested and validated measurement instruments as the predictors (collective narcissism, direct measurement scale of national identity, patriotism, and national superiority). Therefore, we just confirm the validity of these instruments. However, on the endogenous/outcome side of the models, we have unexplored dimensionality. Here, we adopt the same empirical strategy we describe above; all the heuristics apply. We rely on parallel analysis, very simple structure and exploratory factor analysis. We then test the measurement models with confirmatory factor analysis. We tested whether models with different numbers of dimensions were significantly better or worse than each other. We dropped items with low factor loadings when necessary. Our final decisions to retain the number of factors were based on both empirical and theoretical evidence. Eventually, we decided the attitudes toward immigrants are best modeled in four dimensions; and the measurement model of attitudes toward refugees has two dimensions. Below are the explanations of the constructs in the outcome variables. The CFA models are reported after the explanations.

Attitudes towards immigrants

Denial of discrimination: This construct influences two items that state immigrants face discrimination in the housing and job markets.

Realistic threat perception: This constructs taps into items that state immigrants take away jobs from the natives, abuse the social security system and increase crime rates. We think the best label for this latent construct is a *realistic threat perception* from the immigrants.

Cultural threat perception: The items that are influenced by this construct state that the religion of immigrants is not compatible with the German way of life, German culture is undermined by the immigrants and immigrant children decrease the education quality in schools.

Not seeing the benefits: The final dimension we discovered reflects the idea that immigrants are not beneficial. The items state immigrants not being beneficial for the economy, not enriching the German culture, immigrants not being a major workforce in the economy, and schools should not make the necessary efforts because education is not enriched immigrant children.

We think these findings we uncover expand the two dimensions (in the previous Study 1) to a more meaningful four-dimensional construct. Please note that in the full structural model, the *cultural threat* dimension of this model is overestimated (1.03) by *self-definition*, which is one of the higher-order constructs of national identity. However, the path is not statistically significant. We think this finding is again interesting in itself. One interpretation for this finding would suggest model misspecification, but another interpretation can suggest the overlap of *self-definition* and *cultural threat* perception. We do

not do further empirical testing to confirm or reject these hypothetical statements since the path is statistically insignificant.

Attitudes towards refugees

Denial of responsibility: This construct reflects the opinion that Germany is not and cannot be responsible for refugees. The construct taps into items which state that refugees are not Germany's concern and they should be sent back; they cannot be integrated into society, the government should not provide them an education and jobs; and the state should prioritize Germans over refugees when it comes to people who are in need.

Threat perception: Item that are influenced by this construct state that refugees pose a security/terror problem; they increase crime rates and unemployment in Germany; they are a burden to the economy; and Germany cannot handle high numbers of refugees.



Sampling scheme and sample characteristics for Study 2 2016

Participants took an online survey in their native language. They were invited to take the survey through online invitation letters, or with postings on off-campus platforms like Moodle. In many cases, faculty members who we were in contact within the universities also informed and encouraged students to take the surveys. We also posted the call on some universities' social media web pages. We included various Northern, Southern, Central and Eastern German universities because these geographic regions were expected to reflect regional, cultural and political differences in Germany. 912 people saw the first page of our survey and started filling it out, yet the completion rate was only 53 %. Approximately 43 % of the participants were from North Germany, 21 % from Central Germany, 12 % from Eastern Germany and 21 % from Southern Germany. Approximately, 25 % of the participants reported growing up in a town with a population smaller than 5000; 23 % with a population between 5000-20.000 residents; 22 % with a population between 20.000-100.000 residents; 16 % with a population between 100.000-500.000; and 13 % of the participants grew up in cities with populations larger than 500.000 residents. The mean age of participants is 26 (62 % female and 36 % male). 94 % of the participants are either ongoing students or have a university degree and higher. The majority of our participants (≈75 %) self-reported to be on the left side of the political spectrum (**see** Figure ...).



Figure 66: political orientation of university students in study 2 – 2016.

We estimate that our convenience sample is not free of a self-selection bias. In our invitation letter, we announced the name of the study as "the European Union, Refugees and National Identity in Germany," it is very likely that leftist and left-leaning students who tend to have a more critical stance on these issues preferred to take part in our survey. We think that students on the opposite side of the political spectrum are more likely to either not participate in the first place or drop out during the survey. We cautiously generalize our results to a group of young German university students with left-leaning or leftist political orientation.

Sampling scheme and sample characteristics for Study 4 2017

All the heuristics from above apply here as well. We announced the title of the study as "Democracy and national identity in Germany." After 961 total first page views, 570 people completed the survey. 56 % of the participants are female. The mean age is 26. 88% of the sample are ongoing university students.

10 % were born in Eastern Germany; 30 % were born in Western Germany; 19 % in Southern Germany, 41 % of the sample were born in Central Germany. 25 % of the sample was born in cities larger than 100.000 inhabitants. 39 % of the participants reported residing in cities with >100.000 people. Finally, 3 % reported living in one of the eastern federal states; 32 % reside in north-western Germany; 13 % reside in southern Germany; more than half of the sample (51 %) reported to reside in one of the central federal states. The political orientation is again slightly right-skewed. See the Figure below. We, again, cautiously generalize our results to left-leaning university students.



Figure 67: political orientation of university students in study 4–2017.

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Conclusion

In this Ph.D. dissertation, I raise five broad questions with regards to the nature of national identity, its antecedents, and its consequences. The general framework that bounds these questions are the remarks on the philosophy of (social)-science, which I discuss in the introduction. How can we bring together "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities with the research methods of the "objective" reality? I discuss this framework and give answers to the posed five questions in light of the empirical evidence from the six article projects. I answer each question under the separate headings.

1. Can we meaningfully compare national identification across countries?

The short answer is no; the long answer is more nuanced than a simple no.

We can compare national identities across countries only to a limited extent. Moreover, we have to be very cautious; we need to proceed by acknowledging the epistemological and ontological limitations, and we need to try addressing the limitations with the capabilities of the research methods we have.

Previous studies discuss the same question by stressing measurement invariance in the constructs (Davidov, 2009, 2011; Sarrasin, Green, Berchtold, & Davidov, 2013). Another way of putting the same question is the following: "can we assume we measure the same thing across countries?" The methods-toolkit that can address this question has become much more sophisticated in the last few decades (Davidov, Schmidt, Billiet, & Meuleman, 2018). We can check this assumption by assuming exact or approximate measurement invariance (Cieciuch, Davidov, Schmidt, Algesheimer, & Schwartz, 2014; Zercher, Schmidt, Cieciuch, & Davidov, 2015).

However, we must not forget that the answer to the measurement invariance question is not independent of how accurately we are operationalizing our construct. Even when we can assume exact measurement invariance with the minimal operationalization, how should we interpret the outcome? For example, Davidov (2011, p. 97) discovers that West Germany's *constructive patriotism* mean score (operationalized as individuals being proud of their country's democratic & economic achievements) has significantly decreased from 1995 to 2003. (-.192; p <.05). What does the almost -.2 mean score in *constructive patriotism* correspond to? Does this quantity (of mean difference) lead to more anti-immigrant prejudice in West Germany? In other words, is .2 a critical threshold or is it statistically negligible? Also, why did West Germans' *constructive patriotism* mean score go down by \approx .2? We do not have answers to such questions yet. I even doubt that many social scientists ask these questions.

Furthermore, as the evidence from the first and second chapters of this dissertation suggest, when we change the epistemological and ontological assumptions results are very likely to change as well. Things become very blurry when we go down to the item-level analyses with attitude network models. Attitude network comparisons of different countries reveal that the global strengths or the structures of the general cognition of national identities are significantly different across most similar and most different cases²¹. Moreover, the attitude networks of International Social Survey Program's National Identity Modules 1, 2 and 3 (ISSP-Research-Group, 1998, 2012, 2015) suggest different factor structures.

Additionally, when we account for subjectivity, in other words, when we go from a variable-centeredstatistical-approach to a person-centered-statistical-approach, the limitations become more apparent.

²¹ At this point I remind the readers that Bonikowski's (2009) analysis reveal that the mean scores cluster most similar countries together, and scatter different countries apart. When I take this finding one step further by plotting the attitude networks of these national identities and formally compare the attitude networks I find that the structures are significantly different.

The paradigms and assumptions we have seem to falter when we account for subjectivity within the nation-states.

Following the approaches of Bonikowski (2009, 2013), I suggest large *N* comparisons with personcentered approaches or comparative case studies of 6-8 countries with large *N* survey data. Going back to the nuanced, long answer's point; statistically speaking we cannot meaningfully compare national identification across countries. However, we are now much better equipped with statistical toolkits to model national identities. By seeing the peculiarities of similar and different national identities, we can make inferences on why and how they are different.

2. Can we precisely operationalize national identity?

Yes, but not universally. The evidence from multiple chapters of this Ph.D. dissertation suggests a unique national identity model for different countries. In chapter 1, I demonstrate that attitude network is a powerful item-level modeling technique that can reveal the connections between different elements of national identities. In Chapter 2, I show that the national identity measurement models (national identity operationalized as different conceptions of nationhood) can appear identical at first. However, when I account for subjectivity (within country variation) and check invariance (across country variation), it becomes impossible to infer that the same model explains the same variation. The measurement models cannot always adequately capture the attitudes of different psychological profiles within a given country. Moreover, the same measurement models that seem to explain the variation in two different countries, do not have the same statistical explanatory power across countries (factor loadings are statistically different across countries; the models do not achieve metric invariance). In Chapter 3, I show that the same particular national attachment (*collective narcissism*: a fragile psychological belief in the greatness and uniqueness of the nation) manifests itself differently in two countries. In Chapters 5 and 6, I reveal that the latent constructs that constitute German and Turkish national identities are completely different although the same indicators from the same cross-country survey (ISSP-Research-Group, 2015) are used. Therefore, I argue that yes the statistical toolkit we have enable social scientists to model national identities precisely, but certainly not universally.

3. What psychological constructs explain national identification?

In Chapter 3, I show that *attachment style* (a psychological trait that influences close social and romantic relationships) is, directly and indirectly, involved in national attachment. In Chapter 4, I find some minimum evidence that suggests *need to belong* (an intrinsic motivation of wanting to be socially accepted) and *social & emotional loneliness* are involved in national identification. Another ad-hoc discovery from the Chapter 4 highlights the role of emotions in national identification. I also discover the national context plays a role in how these psychological constructs are involved.

4. How can we account for subjectivity in national identification?

I utilize two methodologies to account for subjectivity. In Chapter 2, the method is the latent profile analysis, which is a person-centered statistical procedure. This method turns out to be very fruitful regarding revealing how different individuals interact with the same collectively shared constructs. In plain words, different individuals perceive the same national identity differently. In Chapter 3, I utilize structural topic modeling, which is a quantitative text analysis technique that can quantify and assign texts to estimated topics. In the context of my research design, these topics (open-ended responses to the question of what it means to be German/Turkish) correspond to different subjective viewpoints of national identities in Germany and Turkey. Combined with the survey data and structural equation modeling, this technique also turned out to be very fruitful and provided precious insights about the subjectivity in national identification in two different national contexts.

5. Do the consequences of national identification have comparable patterns in distinct national contexts?

Yes, there is reason to believe national identification leads to the similar types of out-group prejudices. However, this is an equivoque and possibly a misleading answer because the empirical evidence to this question comes from two separate case studies; not from a multi-group analysis. Therefore, I acknowledge that I make an ad-hoc inference here. In Chapter 5, I reveal that the Turkish public feels a threat from immigrants, they do not see the benefits of immigration, and are not willing to share citizenship rights and public services like education with the immigrants. Additionally, the Turkish population wants fewer refugees in the country; and Turkish university students feel a threat from the refugees, and deny responsibility towards the refugees who are in need of humanitarian aid. The results of the final chapter show that German public also feels a threat from the immigrants, and they also tend not to see the benefits of immigration. However, in the German context, although the threat perception from the immigrants seems to be similar to the Turkish context, the other latent construct (not seeing the benefits of the immigration) manifests itself differently across the national contexts. Nevertheless, German university students, similar to the Turkish university students, feel a threat from the refugees, and they also deny responsibilities towards the refugees. In Chapters 5 and 6, the measurement models of the prejudices somewhat overlap. However, this is most probably not entirely independent of the limitations of the utilized measurement instruments. The real answer to this question requires a different research design than the ones I adopted for my Ph.D. dissertation. While the empirical answer to this question remains incomplete, I believe at least the threat perception and the denial of responsibility overlap signal a comparable pattern.

Closing remarks

The answers to these five questions indicate the following statement. Assuming human experience juxtapose "inter-subjective" and "subjective" realities, we can gain fruitful insights from studying these realities with research methods that assume an "objective" reality. In the words of my most recent statistics teacher, Levente Littvay, "an imperfect-measure is better than a no-measure." That being said, I end by reminding that, as social scientists, we all must take all our results with a grain of salt; we should acknowledge the ontological and epistemological limitations we face and then try our best to further social scientific knowledge.

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Appendix for the Ph.D. Dissertation

Datasets used in the chapters

	Chapter 1	Chapter 2	Chapter 3	Chapter 4	Chapter 5	Chapter 6
ISSP National Identity Module I	Х					Х
ISSP National Identity Module II	х	х				х
ISSP National Identity Module III	Х	Х			Х	Х
PEW Global Attitudes (Data Collection 2015)					Х	
PEW Global Attitudes (Data Collection 2016)						х
Student Sample from Germany (Data Collection: 2012)				Х		
Student Sample from Turkey (Data Collection: 2012)				Х		
Student Sample from Germany I (Data Collection: Spring 2016)			х	Х		Х
Student Sample from Turkey (Data Collection: Spring 2016)			х	Х	х	
Student Sample from Germany II (Data Collection: Spring 2016)						Х

Theoretical constructs included in the datasets

	URL	Constructs in the dataset	Constructs used in the studies
ISSP National	http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.2880	Miscellaneous including socio-demographics, national or ethnic	Conceptions of nationhood, national pride, nationalism,
Identity Module I*		identification, attitudes towards national and international issues	attitudes towards immigrants
ISSP National	http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.11449	Miscellaneous including socio-demographics, national or ethnic	Conceptions of nationhood, national pride, nationalism,
Identity Module II*		identification, attitudes towards national and international issues	attitudes towards immigrants
ISSP National	http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.12312	Miscellaneous including socio-demographics, national or ethnic	Conceptions of nationhood, national pride, nationalism,
Identity Module III*		identification, attitudes towards national and international issues	attitudes towards immigrants
PEW Global	http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-in-turkey-	Miscellaneous	Attitudes towards refugees, support for President Erdoğan's
Attitudes* (Data	as-election-nears/		policies on various issues, support for government, support
Collection 2015)			for religious leaders, support for the Turkish Armed forces,
			level of satisfaction with the Turkish democracy, opinion
			whether Turkey deserves more or less international respect
PEW Global	http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/02/01/what-it-takes-to-truly-	Miscellaneous	Attitudes towards refugees, generalized prejudice,
Attitudes* (Data	<u>be-one-of-us/</u>		conceptions of nationhood
Collection 2016)			
Student Sample	https://osf.io/6jjaa/	Miscellaneous including national identification, patriotism,	national identification, patriotism, emotions attributed to
from Germany*		prejudice, social values, emotions attributed to the national flags,	the national flags
(Data Collection:		ideology, political knowledge, socio-demographics	
2012)			
Student Sample	https://osf.io/6jjaa/	Miscellaneous including national identification, patriotism,	national identification, patriotism, emotions attributed to
from Turkey* (Data		prejudice, social values, emotions attributed to the national flags,	the national flags
Collection: 2012)		ideology, political knowledge, socio-demographics	
Student Sample	Datasets sent to the Ph.D. defense committee members over Uni	socio-demographics, various constructs on ideology, social-trust,	patriotism & nationalism, collective narcissism, direct
from Germany I	Oldenburg Cloud (including all the replication files as R syntax)	patriotism & nationalism, collective narcissism, direct measures of	measures of national identification, various items on out-
(Data Collection:		national identification, populism, various items on out-group	group prejudice, hierarchic self-interests, attachment style,
Spring 2016)		prejudice, attitudes towards the EU, hierarchic self-interests, big five	need to belong, social & emotional loneliness
		personality, attachment style, need to belong, social & emotional	
		loneliness	
Student Sample	Datasets sent to the Ph.D. defense committee members over Uni	socio-demographics, various constructs on ideology, social-trust,	patriotism & nationalism, collective narcissism, direct
from Turkey (Data	Oldenburg Cloud (including all the replication files as R syntax)	patriotism & nationalism, collective narcissism, direct measures of	measures of national identification, various items on out-
Collection: Spring		national identification, populism, various items on out-group	group prejudice, hierarchic self-interests, attachment style,
2016)		prejudice, attitudes towards the EU, hierarchic self-interests, big five	need to belong, social & emotional loneliness
		personality, attachment style, need to belong, social & emotional	
a. 1 . a. 1		loneliness	
Student Sample	Datasets sent to the Ph.D. defense committee members over Uni	socio-demographics, political ideology, RWA, social-trust, patriotism	patriotism & nationalism, collective narcissism, direct
from Germany II	Oldenburg Cloud (including all the replication files as R syntax)	& nationalism, collective narcissism, direct measures of national	measures of national identification, conceptions of
(Data Collection:		identification, conceptions of nationnood, populism, pro-diversity	nationnood, pro-diversity beliets
Spring 2016)		beliefs, conceptions of democracy & good citizenship, hierarchic	
* 0 1 1 1 1 1 1		seif-interests, big five personality, attachment style	
* Publiciv available			

Abstract:

The dissertation is composed of six articles that delve into three components. The first component delves into the measurement issues around national identity. The second component investigates individual differences (in attachment style, need to belong and social & emotional loneliness) and subjectivity in national identification. The third component looks at various prejudices as the consequence of national identification. I investigate all these three components in a comparative perspective. In study one; I use three cross-country data-sets to check if national identity can be modeled in a universal way. In the second study, using nationally representative samples, I compare the national identity measurement models of eight countries and check if these measurement models can also capture the attitudes of different latent profiles. In study three, using convenience samples of German and Turkish students, I apply a multi-method approach to compare subjectivity in national identification in Germany and Turkey. In chapter four, I compare the German and Turkish national identities and their relationships with distinct positive and negative emotions, need to belong and social & emotional loneliness. The last two chapters of the dissertation are case studies of Turkey and Germany, in which I look at the consequences of national identity with regards to attitudes towards refugees and immigrants.

Zusammenfassung:

Diese Dissertation besteht aus sechs Artikeln, die sich mit drei Themenbereichen befassen. Der erste Themenbereich beschäftigt sich mit Messungsproblemen bei nationaler Identität. Der zweite Themenbereich untersucht individuelle Unterschiede (im Anhangs Stil, im Bedürfnis dazu zugehören, in der sozialen & emotionalen Einsamkeit) und Subjektivität in nationaler Identifikation. Der dritte Themenbereich befasst sich mit verschiedenen Vorurteilen als Konsequenzen von nationaler Identifikation. Ich untersuche diese drei Themenbereiche aus einer vergleichenden Perspektive. In dem ersten Forschungsartikel wende ich drei internationale Studien an, um zu sehen, ob sich nationale Identität universell modellieren lässt. In dem zweiten Forschungsartikel benutze ich national repräsentative Daten und vergleiche Modelle von nationaler Identität in acht Ländern und analysiere ob diese Modelle angewandt werden können um verschiedene latente Profile zu erfassen. In dem dritten Artikel wende ich einen Multi-Method Approach an, um Subjektivität in nationaler Identifikation in studentischen Samples in der Türkei und Deutschland zu erfassen. Im vierten Kapitel vergleiche ich die Deutschen und Türkischen nationalen Identitäten und deren Beziehungen mit unterschiedlichen positiven und negativen Emotionen (das Bedürfnis dazu zugehören, in der sozialen & emotionalen Einsamkeit). Die letzten zwei Kapitel der Dissertation sind Fallstudien der Türkei und Deutschland, in welchen ich die Konsequenzen von nationaler Identität in Bezug auf die Einstellung gegenüber Migranten und Geflüchteten untersuche.

Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich M. Murat Ardag, dass die Dissertation von mir selbstständig angefertigt wurde und wurde und alle von mir genutzten Hilfsmittel angegeben wurden. Ich erkläre, dass die wörtlichen oder dem Sinne nach anderen Veröffentlichungen entnommenen Stellen von mir kenntlich gemacht wurden.

Darüber hinaus versichere ich hiermit, dass ich mich bisher keiner weiteren Doktorprüfung unterzogen habe. Ich habe die Dissertation in der gegenwärtigen oder einer anderen Fassung an keiner anderen Fakultät eingereicht. Ich habe die Standards der guten wissenschaftlichen Praxis der CvO-Universität angehalten.

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Multouter 7