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Emergency on Planet Cape Town?

(Re-)Conciliation as a Tool for Urban Planning in a Post-Apartheid City

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List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
CBD	Central Business District
CCTV	Closed Camera Surveillance System
CID	City Improvement District
DP	Democratic Party
DA	Democratic Alliance
Muni-SDF	Municipal Spatial Development Framework
NP	National Party
NNP	New National Party
OCF	One City Festival
PAC	Pan African Congress

Acknowledgements

Shortly after completing this research project I had the great opportunity to work with SINANI, KwaZulu Natal Programme For Survivors of Violence, a community development organisation situated in Durban supporting processes of healing and reconciliation of individuals and communities affected by political and other forms of violence in KwaZulu Natal. SINANI's work has enabled me to create a much deeper understanding of extent and dimension of traumatisation of South African people and its impact on the formation and maintenance of social relationships as well as on processes of community development. My work with SINANI has greatly inspired me and confirmed the relevance of research around psychosocial aspects of both socio-economic development as well as the production of urban space. This book is just a start, and remains largely on a theoretical level. I hope it

inspires more research to follow, in particular around questions of how to operationalize psychosocial aspects in the day to day practice of urban development.

Section 1

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"We, the people of South Africa,

Recognise the injustices of the past;

Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;

Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and

Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.

We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to –

Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on a democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights;

Lay the foundations for a democratic open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law;

Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and

Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.

May God protect our people."

(From the Preamble, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa)

1   Introduction

Reconciliation and the City

South Africa has surprised and inspired the world as only few countries have done before. Since the 'small miracle' of what Nelson Mandela called South Africa's negotiated revolution from Apartheid to democracy, a conscious effort is being made under the new democratic government to overcome the structured divisiveness of South African society. The creation of a new unified South Africa is envisioned, based on a common and shared vision of society that usually takes on the image of the 'Rainbow Nation', which symbolises the coming together of disparate pasts in a new common cause. The development of a new South African Constitution was the first and most important project of the Government of National Unity that came into power in 1994. The content of this document attempts to create a dispensation that provides for the co-existence of all people that regard South Africa as their home. This deliberately includes all ethnic, racial and other identities that have been divided in the past and who are now to be united in diversity. The Bill of Rights to which the Constitution and laws of the country are accountable, enshrines the right and freedom to diversity and guarantees equal recognition and treatment of all ethnic and racial identities by the state. The character of the Constitution is at its heart integrative: it recognizes the right to difference and thus recognizes the divergent histories of South African people. It seeks to incorporate those very differences into a coherent new whole that allows unity based on equality. As a result, the Constitution represents a fundamental break with 350 years of colonialism and Apartheid that had conceptualised and used difference to establish and maintain unequal relationships of power, segregation and exclusion, which sought to prevent the creation of a shared South African identity.

In addition to the Constitution, the Government of National Unity commissioned the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as the second, and most visible national project of the first government period from 1994 to 1999. The TRC identified reconciliation and forgiveness as a central prerequisite that would be instrumental in achieving integration and national unity. Its task was to deal with the violent past of South Africa, and specifically with the gross human right violations that occurred between 1960 and 1994

during the heydays of Apartheid and its immediate aftermath. In his book, There is no future without forgiveness, Desmond Tutu, chairperson of the TRC, describes the TRC's approach to reconciliation as one that seeks to overcome the conflicts and divisions of the past by communication and mutual comprehension of the different interpretations and experiences of the past (1999, p. 34-35). Reconciliation means to make divergent interpretations consistent with each other, to create an understanding for each other to enable forgiveness to occur (ibid.).

The project of the TRC is based on the concept of ubuntu, which is, in Tutu's words, "a central feature of the African "*Weltanschauung*"":

"Ubuntu" … "speaks of the very essence of being human". Persons who have ubuntu are "generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say, 'a person is a person through other people'." […] "I am human because I belong. I participate, I share. A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are. Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good" (Tutu 1999, p. 34-35).

The *Weltanschauung* of ubuntu is central to the envisaged aim of the TRC: ubuntu allows us to understand South Africa today as a nation of victims, or rather more correctly, as a nation of survivors – survivors of an inhuman system that had dehumanised Whites[1] as much as Blacks, albeit in a different way. Ubuntu is the spiritual condition in which communication, comprehension, reconciliation and forgiveness for divergent histories and their interpretations is possible.

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1   During Apartheid, the South African population was classified into four racial categories, that is, White, Coloured, Indian/Asian and Black/African. The use of the capital letter when referring to these racial categories in this thesis indicates the social constructiveness of such categories. While their use should be rejected because of their implied biological codation and generalisation, they are, however, necessary for the description of historical processes and have not lost their significance as social categories.

The TRC created an institutional framework to publicly explore and expose the divergent histories and truths of the past. Over two years, public hearings were held in various places and were followed closely over radio and TV programmes and in newspaper reports, as well as later in the 3500 pages long final report of the TRC that was available in major bookshops. The stories of victims, their friends and families as well as of the perpetrators revealed the brutal character, the dimensions and causes of South Africa's violent political culture. They revealed in an eye-opening way that the structured divisiveness of South Africans does not only exist on a social, economic, political, legal or physical level, but also on an emotional level: deprivation, humiliation and physical violence had left behind not only physical scars but even more so emotional scars, hatred and fear. They revealed what might have not been really clear at the beginning of the hearings even to those that commissioned the TRC – that reconciliation of divergent interpretations of the past and, indeed, of deep seated anger and hatred, is of fundamental importance for the creation of a new united South Africa. It showed that integration in South Africa, as envisioned by the Constitution, cannot happen without reconciliation.

It is one of the fundamental assumptions of this research that the process of reconciliation has to be extended to the level of everyday life. In other words, reconciliation has to be sensed and lived in the everyday experience of the new South Africa. From this perspective, this research directs its focus to a local level of everyday experience, that of the city.

What can reconciliation mean for the city? What can and should reconciliation mean for the transformation of cities and urban spaces, both as a place of the immediate experience of the old and the new South Africa and as a conceptual framework that reflects the value system of society at large? These are questions that are rarely tackled in debates on reconciliation in South African society or in urban transformation policies. This research report explores those questions in the context of the city of Cape Town, the first European settlement in South Africa, where the history of 350 years of European colonisation and supremacist rule had its beginning.

The national discourse of unity in diversity is reflected in new urban policies that seek to transform the fragmented landscapes and societies of South African cities. When the African National Congress (ANC) was elected into power in the Municipality of Cape Town in 1996, with the first democratic local government elections, the new political leadership developed a vision

for Cape Town as a "city that works for all"(City of Cape Town 1998). At the same time, it also aspired to celebrate the social and cultural diversity of the city and its new cosmopolitanism (ibid.). New urban policies consequently sought to transform the structured divisiveness of Cape Town's urban society and to build an inclusive and democratic urban culture.

Emotions and the City

In western sociological imaginations, the city as a social and cultural construct has always been the place associated with the hope to create democratic societies. There is a long-standing tradition in western sociological thought that conceives of cities as crucibles for participatory democracies, exactly because they are heterogeneous and diverse places: the everyday experience of diversity is thought to transform primordial social identities and to create tolerance (Wirth 1938; Mumford 1961; Sennett 1970; Young 1990).

Many western urban scholars, such as Berman (1982), Habermas (1990), Jacobs (1961), Sennett (1970; 1976; 1990) and Young (1990) have linked this hope, that the city will contribute to the building of democratic societies, to public urban space." In their writings, public spaces seem to be critical in the expansion of the public sphere: Public urban space in its normative ideal is celebrated as a place of difference in that it brings together difference in a productive way. Public spaces allow and encourage encounters and confrontations between individuals and groups that might not otherwise meet; they bring together people of different ethnic groups, religions, ages, gender, ideologies, classes or lifestyles. In public urban space, too, people can confront each other on an equal basis, by interacting and learning to understand their "otherness" (Young 1990, p.240). Moreover, as public urban space is seen as the common ground for diverse people, it may provide the context where, through interaction, sharing and public debate, a commonness of society is developed (Berman 1982; Jacobs 1961; Young 1990).

The possibility of creating such spaces that function as a crucible for a society's social and cultural diversity has been increasingly questioned in recent years by scholars who have identified and analysed the processes involved in the construction, maintenance and contestation of social identities and social relationships in and through urban public space (Berman 1982; Jacobs 1996; Rose 1993; Ruddick 1990; Sibley 1995).

Social anthropologists and sociologists have described the construction of social identities as a process of 'othering', in which boundaries are formed and imposed between different social groups (e.g. Barth 1969a; Barrett 1987; Butler 1990; Douglas 1966; Erikson 1980). These processes of 'othering' are understood as being structured by and in accordance with the power relations that form social discourses, such as ethnicity, class, gender and race. These provide the social context in which 'othering' occurs, and define who belongs and does not belong to different social groups (Barrett 1987; Butler 1990; Rattansi 1994; Brah 1996; Hall 1991).

In this thesis, I suggest that, in order to understand these processes of social in- and exclusion, it is helpful to consider psychoanalytically oriented literature, which is concerned with the inner workings of the self and allows a deeper understanding of the construction of self/other relationships. Authors writing in the tradition of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, for example, suggest that, in western modern societies[2], individual identity is constructed from an infant age onwards with a sense of border, separateness and self (Klein 1960; Frosh 1989; Hoggett 1992). As the self is thus constituted in an oppositional relationship to others, it is suffused with anxiety and the fear of incompleteness and dissolution by the other (Klein 1960). Internal fears of incompleteness are externalised, and security is thus gained through associating fear with an external threat. This creates a desire to expel or abject the other; it furthermore creates an awareness of boundaries, which becomes the basis for the self socially and spatially distancing itself from others (Klein 1960; Kristeva 1982). From the viewpoint of these readings, the encounter of the other, and thus of other identities in public space, becomes an ambivalent experience that requires control and separation to be able to maintain the coherence and integrity of the identity of the self. However, the construction of the self must be understood as a social and cultural process: The urge to expel is encouraged most especially in western modern societies and capitalist forms of social organization, in which people are highly individuated and are assumed to have control over their own destinies. It is a construction of the self that sets purity as a value, locates it in the self and simultaneously

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2   Psychoanalysis introduced by Sigmund Freud as a therapy at the turn of the 19th to 20th century has been developed in particular within and against the background of western modern societies (Richards 1989a, p. 49). It is for this reason that I describe the characteristics of the construction of individual identity as a researched phenomenon of western modern societies, by which I do not intend to suggest the inevitability of alternative identity constructions.

defiles the other, the outside (Kristeva 1982). Understanding the construction of individual identity as being socially constructed suggests, on the one hand, that there is a social construction of anxiety that is imbued with power, whereas on the other hand it suggests that there is a 'politics of emotion' (Frosh 1989) that serves to form and maintain social identities and their separations through emotional boundaries of desire and fear. These dynamics in the construction of social relationships in the city will be discussed in Chapter 2, where I seek to show that a socio-cultural analysis of emotion is an important approach for understanding the culture(s) of cities and the social dynamics within them.

But how do these sociological, anthropological and psychoanalytical discussions on the formation of social relationships relate to the construction of public urban space?

Psychosocial Readings of the Construction of Public Space

Recent urban scholars have argued that public urban space must be understood as not being simply the passive and innocent arena for the manifestation of predetermined social identities, but as being crucial in their formation and maintenance (Berman 1982; Massey 1995; Rose 1993, Ruddick 1990; Wilson 1991; Young 1991). Scholars such as Wilson (1991) and Young (1990) argue that social boundaries are reflected in spatial boundaries, and they showed that gendered and racialized identities function to constrain equal participation, both in the public sphere as well as in public space. In Chapter 3, I will discuss urban space as the spatial context in which processes of 'othering' occur. I suggest that as social boundaries can be understood as being formed and maintained by a 'politics of emotion', and as urban space is made in the process of making and bounding social identities, the 'politics of emotions' are crucial in the understanding of the making of space and place - both in its political as well as in its everyday production.

Social and psychic dynamics of subjectivity and power that shape social relationships are deeply involved in the production of space in modern urban societies (Rose 1993; Sibley 1995). In this reading, the spatiality of the city, which structures how people are living together in the city, can, on the one hand, be understood as an expression of desires – desires for completeness, control and security – which are met through a positive identification with space that allows people to feel at home in the city. These desires, as they are spatialised, charge urban space with symbolic and emotional meaning,

thereby turning urban spaces into sacred places for the re-production of social identities. On the other hand, the spatiality of the city must also be understood as an expression of fears – fears of losing control and being invaded and defiled by an uncertain other, as well as of losing one's home or not having a home in the city. The complexity of the production of urban space lies in this ambivalence of desires and fears that must be understood as being engendered together: specific desires create spatialities of fear and fears create specific spatialities of desire. The western modern city seeks to dissolve the ambivalence of desires and fears by separating from and excluding those things and people that were perceived as threatening. Poststructuralist, postcolonial and feminist authors in their analysis of the western modern city have shown that urban space can be understood as both a site and a product of (mostly hidden) struggles over identity and power, in which images of the city (the concepts, the rational plans) and images in the city (the specific character of place) are being contested and negotiated in and through the production of urban space (Epstein 1997; Jacobs 1996; King 1996; Lefevbre 1974; Mitchel 1988; Ruddick 1996; Sandercock 1997/2000a). Understanding these struggles as being informed by a politics of emotion that is played out in the political as well as in the everyday production of urban space, I suggest, allows a deeper understanding of processes of spatial in- and exclusion that prevent the role of public urban space as a crucible for a participatory democracy.

A debate on these social and psychic dynamics of subjectivity and power in the production and imagination of urban space, as well as an understanding of urban space in its emotional dimension as a site for the formation, maintenance and representation of social and cultural identities, in its materiality but also in its political and cultural imaginations, is of central importance for the transformation of urban space in South Africa today.

Politics of Emotion in the Making of an Apartheid City

Throughout history, South Africa and its cities have been shaped by the discourse of power of first colonialism and then Apartheid, both of which were informed by the needs, desires and fears of a White minority of primarily European descent. They had sought to solve perceived problems by means of western modern planning conceptions and instruments. South Africa's cities have thus been shaped by a construction of difference that established an unequal and dualistic relationship between the White self and the 'Non-white' other. In colonial, and more explicitly in Apartheid discourse, cities were conceived as the rightful home of South Africa's White population. Coloureds, and especially Blacks, were conceived as contemporary sojourners in the cities, but having their 'real homes' in rural areas (Mabin et al 1997).

Conceptually, in terms of Apartheid rationality, White urban spaces of order, rationality, cleanliness, civilization and power were thus opposed to Black and Coloured rural and urban spaces of disorder, irrationality, barbarism and dependency, which had to be kept apart to secure the purity and superiority of the White race (Western 1981). The increasing urbanization of Blacks from the beginning of the 20th century onwards caused a political ambivalence (Western 1984a): On the one hand, the increasing integration of Blacks and Coloureds into urban economies was necessary for the expansion of the labour intensive industrialisation of the country. On the other hand, the increasing presence of Blacks and Coloureds in close proximity to Whites posed a threat to the rulers' concept of a social order that strived for racial purity and dominance.

The political answer was control and separation of the races in and through space – in other words, racial segregation, which can be understood as a crucial part of a discourse of power designed to legitimate White domination over the other races (Rallis 1992; Western 1984a). The confinement of different race groups to specific spaces of the city (i.e. to specific residential areas as well as to public spaces, such as public transport, bars, restaurants, cinemas, parks and beaches) led to a complex and multiple entanglement of identity, space and the construction of difference that dominated people's daily urban experience: "Migrant, Boer, Sowetan, …, squatter, … maid – each category also invokes, to a greater or lesser extent, a spatialized conception of the self. Each history also invokes a history of domination …" (Dixon 1997, p. 17). Urban space in general and urban public spaces in particular

have the character of territorial ground that keeps people of different race groups apart thus prevents the city and its public spaces from becoming places of encounter and interaction with other races (Awotona et al 1995, p. 1; Dixon 1997, p. 17).

In comparison to other big cities in South Africa, such as Johannesburg, Durban or Port Elizabeth, Cape Town is a special case: It is a city, in which struggles over the image of the city as a European city and as the home for the White South African population, have played a more obvious role in the construction of urban space than in other South African cities (Chidester 2000; Western 1981; Worden 1997). Cape Town has been consistently presented as the 'Mother City' of the Nation, as the crucible of White settlement in South Africa and as the "gateway" to Southern Africa in general. Its landscapes have been charged with 'sacred' meaning embedding narratives of colonialism and Apartheid, domination and subordination. Symbolic meaning and emotional investment are inscribed in the urban landscapes through architecture, statues and monuments, as well as through the physical scars of the city where entire neighbourhoods have been eradicated from the urban landscape during the implementation of racial segregation (Chidester 2000). In Chapter 4, I seek to show that politics of emotions, in other words, desires for control, purity and security, as well as desires for a home of the White Nation and the fear of being invaded by the disorderly other, the fear of loosing control and power have all been strong forces in the rulers' production of urban space in Cape Town.

Exploring the Politics of Emotion in Transforming Cape Town

In recent years, South African cities have been undergoing a transformation process that is due, especially, to the political change in the country, which seeks to achieve a democratisation of society. Since 1994, the socio-political transformation of South African society has been most strongly felt in the metropolitan areas, and specifically among those people who were previously confined to the homelands or the countries beyond the borders of South Africa, and who have been coming to the cities to claim the promise of a better life (Bremner 1999, p. 51). South Africa ranks among the most unequal countries in the world, and its cities are the sites where the conflict between extreme wealth and extreme poverty, luxury and subsistence, idyll and inferno, excess and need, are most intensely felt (ibid.). After the abolition of the political and judicial basis for racial segregation, the question arose how

the future development of South African cities could be encouraged / facilitated with regard to their potential to integrate and reconcile their populations.

Under the new government, cities and their fragmented and divided urban landscapes and people are a central focus in both national and local policies that seek to redress the legacies of the past. Urban policy papers, such as the national "Urban Development Framework" or the "Municipal Spatial Development Framework" for the City of Cape Town, formulate the aim to build inclusive and democratic urban societies by bridging the divisions between people, and by integrating fragmented people and landscapes into compact and integrated cities (City of Cape Town 1999). Because of the huge levels of socio-economic inequalities, however, an increasingly influential point of view holds that South Africa's primary challenges towards achieving such aims are of a materialistic nature: both urban research as well as urban policy formulation are focussed on the reconstitution of the urban economy, on the integration of the physical structure of the city, on poverty alleviation and on the upgrading of material living conditions in hitherto disadvantaged communities in order to manage and narrow the huge socio-economic disparities inherited from Apartheid (see e.g. Rogerson 1992; Smith 1992; Swilling et al 1991; IFHP International Conference Proceedings 1999). Integration into unity, in these approaches to the transformation of the city, means the balancing of socio-economic inequalities, redistribution and restitution to heal the huge gap between the haves and the have-nots inherited from Apartheid, which will give rise to unity in terms of social equality.

Clearly, restitution and redistribution are central to reconciliation, as well as to contemporary urban transformation policies that seek to redress the legacies of the past and to build a democratic society. This research report suggests, however, that this view as the only or the primary context, in which to interpret the challenges of South African cities today, is both incomplete and misleading. As Jennifer Robinson, following French sociologist Michel Foucault, suggests, it can be expected that, despite progressing institutional reforms in South Africa, both old and less institutionalised power structures continue and new forms of power emerge (1992; cf. Mabin 1995; Marcuse 1995). The growing literature on identity constructions during and after Apartheid suggests the continuity of the entanglement of identity, space and difference as a challenge for the social integration of South Africa's fragmented urban landscapes (e.g. Alexander 1999; Bank et al 1999; Field 1999;

Levett et al 1997; Robins 1999a; Simone 1998; Ward 1995). The exhibition Blank___ Architecture, Apartheid and after (1999)[3] that was initiated by the Netherlands Architecture Institute and documented a one–and-a-half years long research project, to which 60 South African scholars, photographers, writers and film makers contributed, pointed at the continuity of architecture and urban planning in the new South Africa as being inextricably connected with identity politics and culture. The significance of the exhibition lies in its excellent illustration of the complexity of the transformation process that results from the multiple entanglements and overlaps of discourses and practices in public and private spheres of life. Illustrating past and present architectural and spatial formations in South Africa in a cacophony of pictures, original documents, textual quotes, architectural models, street noises and military marches were arranged in such a way that conceptual affinities were represented as proximity, tendencies as directions and intensities by accumulation, leaving the visitor searching for linearity. The exhibition acts as a starting point for debates on post-Apartheid spatial politics that seek to redress the legacies of the past.

In accordance with the abovementioned aim, this research explores the relationships of identity, urban space and difference and how these have been connected, disconnected and shaped by specific desires and fears of a White minority. I suggest that, after the abolition of Apartheid urban laws, the city has become a site, where identities in their formation and maintenance in and through space are contested in a new form and where the city, both in its materiality as well as in its symbolic meaning, is being struggled over in a new form.

Strict Apartheid regulations governing the use of certain places and the activities that are permitted there are now being deregulated; spaces and boundaries are changing, moving and shifting: In previously exclusive and sacred spaces of the White population, such as the historic centres of the cities, new forms of use and appropriations of space are occurring; of these, informal activities, such as trading and the parking and so-called 'safeguarding' of cars, are the most visible and at the same time the most contested

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3   The exhibition, which is curated by South African Hilton Judin, has, since its first opening in Rotterdam in 1999 travelled to Paris, Berlin and Johannesburg. It has been accompanied by a comprehensive catalogue edited by Hilton Judin and Ivan Vladislavic, with a collection of essays describing the multiple ways in which colonialism and Apartheid have been inscribed into urban and rural landscapes (Judin et al 1999).

activities. The political ideology that rejected encounters between and the merging of social identities may be gone, but the multiple entanglements of space, identity and the construction of difference are still part of the everyday experience of the city.

The challenges for urban transformation policies today also lie, therefore, in the recognition of the cultural and emotional production and reproduction of urban space, in an understanding of how cultural identities are expressed, lived and reproduced in and through both political and everyday production of urban space. The challenge lies – as the TRC suggests with regard to the creation of national unity – in reconciling the desires and fears that are shaping the encounters between urban dwellers as well as the production of urban space. Moreover, because desires and fears are socially constructed in and through space, the challenge lies, too, in reconciling concepts of the city as a socio-cultural construct. To work towards reconciliation in the city in this double sense, in other words, as the reconciliation of emotional divisions and of urban concepts as an expression of specific systems of knowledge, means not only that urban transformation must be approached from a different angle, but it means that we must work towards the city as a space of experience that makes the national project of reconciliation tangible and sustainable.

Given that the institutional framework that positioned people of different races in a hierarchical social and spatial order has been abolished, the question is whether and how struggles over identity and power informed by a politics of emotion play a role in contemporary productions and reconstructions of urban space. This research report focuses on the question of how concepts of the city as a socio-cultural construct are re-imagined and re-shaped and how the emotional dynamism of cities is re-conceptualised and incorporated in new urban policies.

The empirical part of this research sought to understand how the discourse of unity in diversity enshrined in South Africa's new Constitution is translated to the level of local urban politics in Cape Town. Jane Jacobs in The Edge of Empire has suggested that the politics of production is in itself a social and material formation whose effects not only precede but reach well beyond the space under contest (Jacobs 1996, p. 10). Consequently, I am concerned with the complicated politics involved in the production of urban space in post-Apartheid Cape Town rather than with the object (urban space) produced. Hence, the exemplary objects of this study are not that which is but that which is not yet: In conducting the empirical research of this study, I have

not been reading post-Apartheid urban space, but the process of change itself. The empirical research was structured around detailed readings of different sites of transformation of the city as a place where South Africa's cultural diversity can be experienced first-hand. It focuses on three different examples of current urban politics in the Municipality of Cape Town. The first two examples seek to engage pro-actively with urban transformation to redress the legacies of the past by developing a new spatial concept for the city, which is expressed in the Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Chapter 5), and by implementing a strategy of social intervention by means of an arts and culture festival, namely the One City Festival (Chapter 6). The third example focuses on forms of new urban management that are being implemented in Cape Town's central city; these are a reaction react to the new openness of urban society and space, and can be interpreted as an example of the state's and its citizens ambivalence towards the ongoing transformation process (Chapter 7).

Based on the analysis of new urban discourses and practices in the City of Cape Town with regard to recognising and redressing the emotional production of urban space, it is the aim of this research to understand the discursive as well as the practical approach of dealing with difference and ambivalence in the 'new' Cape Town, and to illustrate how concepts of a city that has been shaped by a discourse of racial segregation, control and order can be reinterpreted, restructured or continued.

Section 2

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'With cities, it is as with dreams: everything imaginable can be dreamed, but even the most unexpected dream is a rebus that conceals a desire or, its reverse, a fear. Cities like dreams, are made of desires and fears, even if the thread of their discourse is secret, their rules are absurd, their perspective deceitful, and everything conceals something else. 'I have neither desires nor fears', the Khan declared, 'and my dreams are composed either by my mind or by chance'. 'Cities also believe they are the work of the mind or of chance, but neither the one nor the other suffices to hold up their walls. You take delight not in a city's seven or seventy wonders, but in the answer it gives to a question of yours'. 'Or the question it asks you, forcing you to answer, like Thebes through the mouth of the Sphinx'.

(Italo Calvino 1974/1976 p. 36/37)

Imagining Cities and their Spaces: Realms of Desire and Fear

This section seeks to explore what reconciliation can mean for a city in general and for Cape Town in particular as both a place for the immediate experience of social relationships and a socio-cultural construct reflecting the value systems of society at large. Assuming that after the abolition of Apartheid and its institutionalised forms of power such as discriminative laws and regulations, more subtle forms of power embodied in the urban form and in discourses concerning urban governance persist, I suggest that multiple entanglements of space, identity, and power, informed by a politics of emotions – apart from economic and geographical factors – can be understood as crucial forces in the production of urban space in Cape Town. The section focuses on theoretical discussions of the culture(s) of cities and the production of their spatialities that facilitate recognition of the importance of emotional dynamics and of social and psychic dynamics of subjectivity and power, which can be understood in the light of ambivalent constructions of identities in and through urban space.

Since the production of urban space in South Africa can be understood as being specifically informed by western and modernist concepts of what a city is, the theoretical illustrations focus on theorizations of the western modern city to facilitate identification of the relevant characteristics in the historic development of Cape Town.

2   The Culture(s) of Cities

"Stadtluft macht frei" – as this German proverb suggests, city air makes people free. However, in the abundant literature on the culture of cities, the city appears as a rather ambivalent object of desire and fear. As Pike reflects, the idea seems to "trigger conflicting impulses, positive and negative, conscious and unconscious" (Pike 1981, p. 243). The myth of the city as perfection and the fascination it exerts as a place has often been celebrated as an arena of intellectual and cultural dynamism, of constant cycles of social and cultural revival, and as a place where the pulse of life is most strongly felt (Hill 1994, p. 1-2). As such it is perceived as a cosmopolitan place that is a playful space, where the own, the known, and the familiar meet and interact with the unknown and the other. It appears as an international mosaic of diverse communities and people with multiple identities, as a realm of unlimited possibilities for the individual's freedom, creativity, opportunities, and successes (Christopherson 1994, p. 409). At the same time there is a contrary myth of the city as a place of corruption "associated with the evils of human nature" and as a place of chaos, confusion, disorder and crime (Hill 1994, p. 1-2). In particular in more recent literature on the urban crisis, interpreted as "physical dereliction, multiple deprivation, fiscal inadequacy, the decline of manufacturing employment, the flight of population and business to the suburbs and small free-standing towns, crime and disorder", the city appears to be a realm of personal powerlessness, of danger and menace to the individual's freedom, where manipulation, oppression, and separation dominate (Ibid.).

The ambivalent image of the city and the ambivalence of urban life, is an important theme in past and present western urban studies that seek to generate a sociological imagination within which to frame the city (Westwood et al 1997, p. 1). From the German sociologist Georg Simmel onwards, the ambivalence of urban life has been conceptualised in and projected onto the figure of the "stranger". The stranger lies at the centre of all western sociological definitions of urbanity (Siebel 1997, p. 31) and the ambivalence and ambiguity in the experience of the city has often been linked to him or her. It is the stranger who makes cities places of encounter, who is the resource for urban culture fundamental to the life and vitality of cities, but it is also the stranger who is the source of tension, conflict and struggle (Robins 1995, pp. 53).

2.1 The Ambivalence of Urban Life: Living in a World of Strangers

Reflecting on his own role as a Jew living in Berlin at the beginning of the 20th century, Georg Simmel, in his essay "The Stranger", highlights the productive and revitalising contribution of the stranger to the city (1908). For him, the stranger is a "person who comes today and stays tomorrow" (Ibid., p. 402). He writes about the stranger against the background of a clearly identifiable host society. Central to his definition of the stranger is the notion of community as fixed to place and based on familiarity: Coming and going is equated with entering and exiting; to enter a new space means to enter an unfamiliar community and to present oneself as a stranger. He/she comes from a strange country that was his/her home, and he/she comes to stay where other people have their home. For Simmel, the fact that the stranger did not belong to a community from the beginning and that he/she is not a member of the new group, is what enables him or her to make a revitalising contribution to the city: "Because he is not bound by the roots to the particular constituents and partisan dispositions of the group" says Simmel, "he confronts all of these with a distinctly "objective" attitude, an attitude that does not signify mere detachment and non-participation, but is a distinct structure composed of remoteness and nearness, indifference and involvement" (Simmel 1908, p. 404). It is not only the fact that the stranger brings something new into a fixed community (as a trader of new goods, stories, ideas, attitudes), which he regards as the productive and revitalizing contribution of the stranger to the city, but also the ambivalence that derives from spatial proximity and social distance (unfamiliarity) since it provokes reflection.

Robert Park, founder of the famed "Chicago School" who translated Simmel's essay "The Stranger" into English, applied Simmel's thoughts to the growing phenomena of European immigrants to Chicago in the context of urban industrialization processes at the beginning of the 20th century (1925; in: Shack 1979). Park sought to create a conceptual framework to explain processes of integration, assimilation, or incorporation of culturally diverse immigrant groups into larger societal wholes (Shack 1979, p. 4). Similar to Simmel, he identifies the emancipative potential of the stranger: Because of the stranger's freedom from "local proprieties and conventions", he or she is more "enlightened" and "cosmopolitan". Park suggests that as a "result of contact and collision with a new invading culture…..energies that were formerly controlled by custom and tradition are released", and local loyalties are substituted by the freedom of the cities (Park 1925, p. 887). However, Park

and his students such as E.W. Burgess and Everett Stonequist transmuted what Simmel had conceived as a social phenomenon into a cultural phenomenon: they argue against the concept of community as a backgrounds fixed in space and familiarity. For them the tension that derives from the presence of strangers results not from spatial proximity but from cultural dissociation, which in Park's view is overcome by the immigrant seeking to become a part of the new community, to become part of the familiarity of the urban community (Harman 1988, p. 21).

The social and cultural heterogeneity came to be conceptualised as a central characteristic of the city with Louis Wirth's first attempt to create a coherent sociological definition of the specific quality of the city. Wirth, also a member of the "Chicago School", in his essay "Urbanism as a Way of Life", written in 1938, identifies, beyond size and density, social and cultural heterogeneity as the central characteristic of the city and urban life (1938, p. 193). Drawing both on Simmel and Park, Wirth argues that the coexistence of differences within the city is not only liberating in that it vests individuals with more flexibility and opportunity. He argues that apart from this freedom the coexistence of differences also produces another quality, namely greater tolerance amongst urban dwellers despite occurring conflicts which arise between them. He therefore sees positive possibilities and potential for an urban way of life that is rational and secularised: "The juxtaposition of divergent personalities and modes of life tends to produce a relativistic perspective and a sense of toleration of differences which may be regarded as prerequisites for rationality and which lead toward the secularisation of life" (1938, p. 193). Wirth acknowledges the specific quality of the city as a place of unfamiliarity, characteristic of a distinct "urban personality", that is more tolerant and more impersonal at the same time.

The significance of social and cultural diversity for the development of civil society has also been an important theme in the writings of American historian Lewis Mumford. Critiquing tendencies of cultural conformity in the United States emerging in the 1950s he repeatedly points to the social and cultural importance of cities for the development of human culture and the human personality. In "The City in History" (1961) he points out the need for cities to be more than containers guaranteeing the coherence and continuity of urban cultures over time. He emphasises that the urban experience is about "mobilisation and mixture", about "encounter" and "challenges", since it offers an opening to "strangers" and "outsiders" For him the stranger adds to

the city, which is not a city without him or her (Mumford 1961. p. 54). For Mumford this cultural "intermixture" makes the urban experience vital and exciting; it makes the city a civilized place and poses a challenge to what he calls "somnolent provincialism" (Ibid.). Unfamiliarity in the face of spatial proximity allows – as he already pointed out in his earlier essay "What is a City" (1937) – for citizens to become "many-faceted" as well as more reflective about self and about society as a whole. He says: "What men cannot imagine as a vague formless society, they can live through and experience as citizens in a city" (1937/1996, p. 185). Mumford likens the city to a stage and a theatre, upon which identities can be displayed and played with, and Jonathan Raban in 'The Soft City' notes that the city is a place, "where people are given to acting, putting on a show of themselves" (1974, p. 37). For Raban this theatre can only happen amongst strangers, since it is strangers who turn the city into a theatre where social conventions can be broken and where participants are allowed to communicate things to each other which are not licit under normal circumstances (Ibid.). It is easy to hang out in a city bar or coffee shop and to relate intimate stories about yourself or to reveal and experiment with a new or usually hidden side of yourself, since it does not have to have consequences. The stranger does not know where you come from and you do not necessarily have to see him or her again. Similarly, the city provides niches for different lifestyles and it is not without reason that minority groups for example gays or lesbians are most likely to be found in cities (Bell 1991; Lauria et al 1985; Wotherspoon 1991). The city provides spaces, as shelter and as platforms for minorities, to live free of strict social control according to their personal convictions.

In the 1980s and 1990s, in the context of international migration patterns that have changed the social-cultural composition of western cities dramatically, the theme of the "stranger" has gained new popularity amongst urban sociologists who have tried to understand social dynamics in western urban cities. Again, urban theorists conceptualise the ambivalence of spatial proximity and social distance as a characteristic of urban sociation processes deriving from the encounter of strangers in cities. However, in these discussions on contemporary western urban societies, the 'stranger' who was described by Georg Simmel at the turn of the century as a single phenomenon in urban societies, now seems to be regarded as the prototype of the contemporary urban dweller. Western urban societies are understood as a permanent coming and 'being together of strangers' (Young 1990, p. 237). This new awareness among urban scholars can be partly understood as a response to the

increasing reality of cities as places where dissimilar ways of life come together as a result of a growth in volume and impact of international migration patterns after 1945 and in particular from the mid 1980's onwards: people are moving, settling and resettling across space, within or across national boundaries blurring the distinctions between 'here' and 'there' (Sandercock 2000, p. 8). However, the conceptualisation of the 'stranger' as the prototype of the urban dweller should also be understood as caused and accompanied by three interrelated processes: firstly, an increasing interest in the concept of 'identity' in the social sciences from the 1950s onwards; secondly, on a philosophical level by the challenge to the 'grand narratives' and acknowledgement of the plurality of truth since the 1970s; and thirdly, the rise of civil society from the 1960s onwards.

Firstly, slowly from the 1950s, but increasingly from the late 1970s onwards social sciences, in particular sociology and social anthropology focused on the concept of 'identity' to understand how social groupings come into being, how they change and how they are maintained (Barth 1969a, pp. 9-38). The concept of identity has been the subject of much academic debate, and has changed and developed further in different academic fields. The classical definition of identity, popularised by social anthropologist Erik H. Erikson, according to who "the term 'identity' expresses …. a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (selfsameness) and a persisting sharing of some kind of essential characteristics with others" (1980, p. 150) has become increasingly criticised for its tendency to essentialize identity. More recent discussions, in particular the contributions of feminist and Black authors, as well of authors writing about 'hybrid' identities of international migrants, have pointed at the importance of difference to others and of the social construction of identities. Feminist authors in particular have shown that there are differences within: the identity of women for example is understood as being subject to all kinds of differences such as class, race and ethnicity (Barrett 1987; Butler 1990). Their insistence on difference as a challenge to essentialized identities has been extended to a generally different notion of identity as an acting subject: "… subjects and the social, and thus both individual and collective identities, are seen as not essentially given, but as constantly under construction and transformation, a process in which differentiation from Others is a powerful constitutive force" (Rattansi 1994, p. 29). Moreover, identities are seen as never "pure", but as being always and continually "crossed-through" and intersected by differences (Brah 1996; Hall 1991) and they are self-ascribed and ascribed upon in

different social contexts (van Beek 2000). The increasing interest in social science in the concepts of identity and difference has resulted in a new interest in Simmel and his writings on the stranger in order to understand urban societies that concentrate as well as express multiplicity of difference and diversity.

Secondly, on a philosophical level, "the grand narratives" with the assumed possibility to identify one truth relevant for all, have been increasingly challenged since the 1980s and seem to have given way to a celebration of difference and to an acceptance of a plurality of truth (Lyotard 1982). This implies that difference is never a singular but always a plural. To conceptualise difference in the context of the city means that the 'grand narrative' which defines host and stranger falls away and instead creates a dispensation that – at least theoretically – acknowledges plurality of difference as a condition of being.

And thirdly, the conceptualisation of the stranger as the prototype of the contemporary urbanite should also be understood in the context of the rise of civil society. As Leonie Sandercock argues in "Towards Cosmopolitanism", the development of social movements of women; Blacks in particular in the United States; formerly colonized groups such as the Aborigines in Australia; or migrants to the former hearts of the Empire; has resulted in claims of a right to the city by different social and cultural groups, and of the right by previously marginalized groups to take ownership of the city without being assimilated (1997, pp. 16). The claimed right to difference reflects and reinforces the notion of the city as an ambivalent place, where strangers, or those who are different, live together in spatial proximity yet where social distance is defined by the right to difference.

Again, in this new reality and its theoretical understanding, urban theorists emphasize the productive possibilities derived from the encounter and togetherness of strangers in cities. The city is seen as a place that enables the possibility to break up essentialized identities and to break down divisive social boundaries. City air still seems to make free. Paul Virilio describes the city as a realm where strangers "delinked from fixed parameters of belonging" are more capable of configuring more mobile and provisional forms of attachment and identity" (1986, in Simone 1998, p. 19). For Virilio the city becomes a place "where one can be what one wants to be" and where individuals can experiment with many different aspects of themselves without an obligation for these different aspects to fit together into a coherent whole

(Ibid.). Being exposed to different lifestyles, religions, nationalities, gender, and cultures, fixed identities find themselves "interrupted", and "intersected with influences, and eventually, by taking the other into consideration, they themselves become part of the other". … "Likewise, city life also becomes a process of continuous border crossing and hybridity, i.e., where the existence of social and cultural distinction becomes increasingly an occasion for mixture" and the negotiation of essential(ized) identities (Virilio 1986 in Simone 1998, p. 19). American urban sociologist Richard Sennett, in his substantial writing and critique on homogenizing forces of modernist conceptualisation of and practices in western cities, reinforces Louis Wirth's notion of the city being a potential place for tolerance and argues for the value of encountering strangers in urban culture (1990). Urban dwellers, being exposed to different cultures and social identities, can become foreigners to themselves, "by doing things or entering into feelings that do not fit the familiar framework of identity, the seemingly social fixities of race, class, age, gender or ethnicity" (1990, p. 148). Sennett argues that to be able to expose and open oneself to "the other", "one must do the work of accepting oneself as incomplete" (Ibid.). For Sennett "the attempt to deal with 'otherness', to become engaged beyond one's own defined boundaries", is not only central to a civilised and civilising social life, but also the essence of mature identity, and a mature culture (1970, p. 109).

The ambivalence of spatial proximity and social distance, 'strangeness' and unfamiliarity as a characteristic of urban culture, can be understood as central categories with which western urban scholars theorize about modern urban societies today, and at the same time lie at the centre of an understanding and image of the city as a productive and liberalizing place. The way ambivalence as conceptualised by urban scholars contributes to the city as a productive place, can however only be understood against the background of the construction of western modern societies themselves. As Zygmunt Bauman argues in "Modernity and Ambivalence," the ambivalence of the stranger originates in his/her violation of societies social order (1991, p. 25). Bauman argues with Simmel that sociation processes in western modernist societies follow a dualistic matrix of friendship and enmity: friends and enemies are opposed to each other, the one is what the other is not, friends are the inside, enemies the outside. The opposition of friends and enemies separates the true from the wrong, the good from the bad, beauty from ugliness. This binary, as most other binary poles, orders the world we live in and orders life in this world. The stranger, argues Bauman, violates and endangers the familiar

opposition of friends and enemies. He is neither nor, he or she could be all and we do not know what he/she is (Ibid.). This indetermination of the stranger is his/her potency: strangers put an end to the ordering power of the opposition and by doing so they discover the fragility and sham of separations, of the order of the world (Ibid. p. 26). The indetermination of the stranger, and his/her presence and questioning of the fixed social order is understood by urban sociologists as already noted as a revitalising contribution to the city. The city in turn then, as a place of bringing together strangers, is a place of indetermination, a place where sociation processes are more open-ended and less fixed into dualisms, and a place where fixed dualisms in the social order are potentially crossed, undermined and challenged.

2.2 Ambivalent Reactions

As pointed out earlier, the figure of the stranger is ambivalent. There is an ambivalent reaction to and interpretation of the ambivalence of the urban sociation process by urban dwellers that seem to be shared by urban sociologists. The city's positive image of richness of diversity, activities and opportunities, of stimulation, mobility and liberation is counterpoised with an oppositional, seemingly even stronger image of the city as a 'jungle', as a place where the abundance and inundation of possibilities lead to loss and dereliction, fear, confusion and aggression, isolation and anonymity (Langer 1984, pp. 105).

Georg Simmel, in his essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life" clearly describes the disintegrating forces of city life that have been repeated in much of urban sociological literature up to today: the intensity of stimulation and the 'crowding of impressions', the anonymity, and the seeming soullessness. Simmel suggests that the number and variety of human contacts are such that no individual can respond to them all and preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence (1908, p. 414). For Simmel the strategy of survival lies in the development of a blasé attitude, a posture of social reserve and impersonality (Ibid., p. 415). Lewis Mumford interprets fear and aggression as a reaction to these disintegrative forces working in the city. In "The City in History" (1961), where he reflects on the beginnings of urban culture, he points out the other side of the stimulation and challenge associated with the encounter of strangers in the city. For him "human antagonism and enmity" invoke the urban dweller's fear of the "human enemy, his other self and counterpart, possessed by another god, congregated in another city, capable

of attacking him…..without provocation" (Mumford 1961, p. 50-51). He describes "deepened collective anxieties" as a characteristic of urban culture and suggests that urban life may promote a "paranoid psychical structure" provoked not only by a sense of external threat, but also by the "intensified struggle within: a thousand little wars are fought in the market place, in the law courts, in the ball game or the arena (Ibid., p. 39/52).

The city as a set of densely populated boundless places, seems to lend itself to a 'natural' sense of fear: the fragmentation of the city, the loss of wholeness gives reason for the urban dweller's fear. However, as other urban sociologists have shown, this fear of and in the city has a form – the stranger. As much as 'the stranger' plays a central role in conceptualisations of the city as a productive and creative place, the stranger is the source of anxiety and he/she stands for the reification of the ambivalence constitutive for the modern city itself.

In attempts to understand the fear caused by the stranger it is helpful to consider the social dynamics involved in the construction of social identities. Social anthropologists have shown that the construction of social identities occurs through a process of "othering", in which boundaries are formed and imposed between different social groups: the self is constructed in distinction and separation from other social identities (Barth 1969a; Douglas 1966). In particular feminist, Black, and postcolonial authors have deconstructed these social constructions of social identities as being structured by power that forms social discourses such as on ethnicity, class, gender and race which provide the social context in which 'othering' occurs and define who belongs and does not belong to specific social groups (e.g. Heintz 1993; hooks 1990; Said 1978; Young 1989). In these processes of identity construction the encounter with the stranger becomes a confusing, if not threatening experience. Zygmunt Bauman argues that because the stranger stands for in-determination, his or her presence in society causes an ambivalent reaction (Bauman 1991, p. 26). In-determination, as it blurs cognitive clarity, creates hermeneutical problems of how to read a situation and how to respond to it. This behavioural uncertainty at best is felt as discomfort, and at worst as danger and threat (Ibid.). It is perceived as a threat since the stranger seems to challenge the self-evidence of social habits: "Strangers bring the outside in ..." and in doing so, the stranger threatens to bring chaos into the social order (Bauman 1991, p. 26). As a reaction, to solve this ambivalence and to reestablish behavioural certainty, the logic of order and identity is reasserted

through a process of 'othering': "us" against "them". "We" must secure our centrality, and "they" must be pushed out from the centre. "Difference" must become an attribute of "them"; "otherness" must stick to them. "They" are different, other, alien because they are not "us", because they are not like "us" (Ibid.).

Urban sociologists in their attempts to understand the ambivalent attitude towards the stranger focus on human connections and relationships that occur within specific social settings. In doing so they give clues to understanding why there is confusion and from where some of the (resulting) dynamics of fear and aggression and processes of social in- and exclusion spring. But by confining themselves to cognitive reasoning, they do not explain the emotional dynamic of these processes; they cannot explain the fear, the aggression, and the anxiety that the stranger seems to bring about and that seems to be a central characteristic of urban culture, a fundamental condition of urban life.

In this context, psychoanalytical literature concerned with the construction of individual identity and the inner workings of the self provides a deeper level of understanding of our ambivalent social relationships with strangers. Of course, and this is of central importance in my reading and use of psychoanalytic literature, the construction of the self does not occur in a vacuum but is rather a result of continual processes of materialization and reiteration of social norms and values that are in turn produced by power relations[4]. Inner and outer worlds therefore should be understood as being deeply interrelated; there is a dialectical relationship between the two.

As much as fragmentation, disintegration, and the construction of boundaries are themes in the understanding of the experience of the modern city, fragmentation, disintegration and boundaries of the psyche are strong ideas in contemporary psychoanalysis. Barry Richards argues that one of the major contributions of contemporary psychoanalysis is its vision of the 'demolished ego', fragmented and disintegrated, as the condition of the modern psyche, which constitutes our ambivalent and contradictive relationships with others (1989, p. 49). Psychoanalysts writing in the tradition of Jaques Lacan de-

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4   See for example Judith Butler's contribution on the sexed subjected: in "Gender Trouble" (1990). Butler shows that the binary opposition of the categories woman/man, male/female repeated in much of feminist discourses on 'gender' are themselves social constructions that serve to perpetuate fundamental power relations in society.

scribe the ego in western modern society as a 'fortress against fragmentation', but one that is in itself unstable as is constructed in oppositional terms to an other and built upon an imaginary identification with something outside (Frosh 1989, p. 232). Lacan describes the 'mirror stage' as the first traumatic experience in an infants life, when it recognizes that it is not 'completely one' (i.e. whole), but a fragmented self and (m)other. This recognition leaves the imprint that the "imagined wholeness of the body must be continually reiterated and symbolically repeated in order for the subject to retain a unified identity and not to dissolve into fragments" (Epstein 1998, p. 218). What remains is the fear that one's imagined bodily wholeness can and will be taken away, can and will be revealed for the fragmented and demolished thing that it is, can and will lose its structure through the threat of an other. Thus, it is in the very constitution of the subject that fear is engendered. It is a fear that the other who actively constitutes the subject could eclipse or dissolve the subject's existence by revealing the truth of its own incompleteness. It is the fear that the very other that defines and constitutes the subject will so desire the subject's objectification that the other will dispossess the subject of its subjectivity (Epstein 1998, p. 219). In other words, individual identity is suffused with anxiety, a mixture of feelings constituted by the desire for identification and at the same time fear of it, because it might dissolve the self. And it is this anxiety, as Dora Epstein argues in her paper "Afraid/Not" (1998) that is engendered in the encounter of the other, the stranger in the city. It is this anxiety that reflects our ambivalence towards the stranger, towards the one we do not know to be friend or enemy. Ambivalence expresses desire and fear fused into one (Wilson 1991, p. 157).

Psychoanalytical approaches following the tradition of Melanie Klein (1960) are also concerned with the fragmentation and disintegration of the self describing it through the concept of the 'paranoid-schizoid position' of love and hate relationships with others, and through the concept of 'projective identification' that guides us to understanding fear of the stranger as a process of social construction and projection of internal desires and fears hiding conflicts within the self. The projection of fears onto the stranger is not only a cognitive strategy, but rather a deep emotional need (Frosh 1989, p. 236). Klein suggests that there is something indwelling within our subjectivity which could be likened to a basic fear, an imminent catastrophe, a nameless anxiety that is felt as terror (1960). Paul Hogget in his reading of Klein likens this terror to the experience of what we call in everyday language a 'breakdown', "it is akin to the experience of drowning, of falling through space, of

the nameless dread" (1992, p. 345). In Kleinian psychoanalysis this anxiety and terror is explained as the result of the traumatic experience a child has when it loses the first medium in which it exists namely the amniotic sea of the mother's womb. This original medium is a physical medium that needs to be replaced by a social medium once the child is born. This social medium can be 'good enough', but unlike the physical medium it can never be perfect, and therefore there is always a chance that it will fail us. It is this failure that is experienced as catastrophe, and it is the fear of this catastrophe that is – as it hovers upon us constantly – experienced as terror which is central to our way of thinking about the world (Hoggett 1992, p. 345). The problem with this fear is that it is nameless, but as soon as we have the means to do so, we seek to represent it despite the fact that it cannot be represented. We therefore construct an endless series of misrepresentations, "all of which share one essential quality, the quality of otherness, of being not me" (Ibid., p. 346). This is what Klein calls the 'paranoid-schizoid position', a state of presub-jectivity, a primitive world of good and evil, a world lacking in dimensional-ity and perspective, where everything is seen and ordered as good and bad, us or them, black or white (1960). This is a world – as Hoggett describes it in his reading of Klein – "that is ordered in its fragmentariness, regimented in its chaos, safe in its fearfulness" (1992, p. 346).

The power of Klein's work lies in her explanation of how this fear becomes a threat through the process of "projective identification". In our attempt to escape our own fears, we project them onto the outside world: 'I fear' be-comes 'I am frightened of' and the 'danger within' becomes a 'danger with-out' allowing to place and locate the danger, albeit inappropriately. Internal fears of incompleteness (engendered by unfulfilled internal desires for com-pleteness) that cannot be contained within the self are externalised, projected upon the external world where it fuses and blends with the real violence and poison of our social environment. Security is gained "through associating fear with an external threat", which comes from an array of 'others' and pro-vides protection for the self. The fear that was imminent within us becomes the danger imminent within the other. That is why we potentially always have to expect the worst from the other, that is why we have to fear the other and that is why the other is a threat. The threat is not subject of the expulsion, rather the threat is created by the act of expulsion: "the alien exists as a con-sequence of my fear, indeed is constituted by my fear" (Ibid.). The expulsion of fear and the creation of threat are in psychoanalytical terms the starting point for the mobilisation of defensive violence, of defensive emotional rela-

tionships with the outside world, which creates an emotionally charged sense of border between the self and the threatening other. Julia Kristeva in her essay on abjection (1982) calls 'the opposed to I', the 'abject'. It is radically excluded but always a presence; it is a form of incomplete separation: the other is separated from the self, since it is abjected and degraded, but it is still there. Elisabeth's Grosz (1990) in her reading of Kristeva argues that the view of the 'abject' as something always there, hovering "on the borders of the subject's identity, threatening apparent unities and stabilities with disruption and possible dissolution' points to the importance of anxiety, a desire to expel or to distance from the abject other as a condition of existence (in Sibley 1995, p. 8).

Psychoanalytical studies of the construction of the self show not only why there is fear of the other as projective identification, as an externalisation of internal fears which are in turn engendered by internal desires for completeness projected onto the other. They also point to the ambiguity of self/other relationships: while there seems to be a desire for positive identification with others, the abject, the fearful other is needed as an escape from internal fears, it is a way of creating a space of social experience, a 'benign social medium' that prevents the dissolution of the self in the context of a world which is experienced as threatening rather than containing, as confusing rather than secure. Faced with the experience of inner destructiveness, the self is defended against by projection and abjection on to and of external objects (Frosh 1989, p. 237). The significance of 'projection' and 'abjection' lies in its definition of relationships to others; it registers in nervousness about other cultures or about things out of place (see Grosz 1990). The concept of projective identification indicates moreover the geographical and temporal mobility of feeling and can be understood as one of the major contributions of psychoanalysis to the understanding of social, that is, organizational and institutional life. It enables us to fix for inspection some moments in the bewildering processes of reflection and amplification between inner and outer worlds (Hinshelwood 1989, p. 75). The process of projective identification of desires and fears at a psychoanalytical level explains the moment of alienation at the social level: in order for the self to retain a semblance of constant identity and to retain control over it, the subject must also retain both a psychic and a spatial distance, an 'alienation', not only from the truths of one's own incompleteness, but from the other, who continually threatens to reveal the truth of the image of the self (Hinshelwood 1989, p. 81).

What does the perspective of psychoanalytic literature mean for the understanding of social dynamics in the city, for the city as a social context and for urban spatial urban politics in so far at it negotiates human relationships in the city? Can there be a productive relationship between the analyses of inner and outer worlds?

Barry Richards in his paper "Psychoanalysis in Reverse" looks at the relationship of inner and outer world in the metropolis, the place of the immediate experience of the modern world (1989a). He argues that psychoanalysis as a profession has been developed in response to the context of dislocations wrought upon the social experience in and by the general process of modernization. Richards points to the parallels in early accounts of metropolitan experience as found in Simmel's and Mumford's writings on the city which were as concerned with fragmentation and disintegration on a social level as psychoanalysis is on an individual level. While Richards suggests that the development of psychoanalysis as a profession can therefore be understood as a product of changing social conditions, he argues that urban sociological explanations of the specific social experience in the modern metropolis remain meaningless as long as individual's symptoms, dreams, associations, and fears are not explored and understood (1989, pp. 49).

The psychoanalytical focus on the dynamics of the inner world in the encounter of the other, the stranger in the city, helps as I have pointed out earlier, to understand the deeper causes for and nature of ambivalent relationships with strangers in the city. The city then is not only a place where individuals can assume and play out different roles and identities with comparative ease, "but where they run the risk of losing themselves in the process, or being harmed by the violence of others" (Patton 1995, p. 115). Moreover, psychoanalysis shows that our 'natural sense of fear' of the city and the stranger is not quite as natural as it appears in its historical treatment in urban sociology, but that it is a projection of internal anxieties onto the city and onto the stranger (Epstein 1998, p. 213). It is anxiety, the tension of internal desires and fears fused into one, which constitutes both ambivalent relationships with others in the city and the ambivalent image of the city as both holy place and Babylon, as a place of encounter, freedom and tolerance, but also as a place of confrontation, struggle, tension and conflict, because the borders of the self are constantly threatened to be crossed and violated (Robins 1995, p. 54). To understand these emotional dimensions of our being in the world has one important implication for the reflection on ways to deal with differ-

ence in the city. It shows the difficulties entailed in maintaining the integrity of self in an outer world that is fragmented and disintegrated and more importantly indicates that this integrity can only be achieved if the apparently opposing forces of internal desires and fears are reconcile and made consistent with each other. A reconciliation of internal desires and fears allows for relationships with others that are not suffused with anxiety and not determined by the projections of internal fears which turn the other into a threat.

French psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva in "Foreigners To Ourselves" suggests a way to achieve this by recognizing and accepting that the foreigner lives within us (1982, p. 1). For her, the foreigner is "the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder" (1982, p. 1). Kristeva draws on Freud's semantic study of the German adjective "heimlich" and its antonym "unheimlich" and points out that a negative meaning close to that of the antonym is already tied to the positive term "heimlich". "Heimlich" means homely, comfortable, familiar, but also secret, clandestine, hidden, inscrutable, and insidious (Kristeva 1982, p. 199). Thus in the word "heimlich", the familiar and intimate is brought together with the contrary meaning, "uncanny strangeness" harboured in "unheimlich". Kristeva argues that such an immanence of the strange within the familiar is considered etymological proof of the psychoanalytical hypothesis that the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads us back to that which is known of old, and long familiar (Ibid.). Uncanny strangeness is removed from the outside, where fright had anchored it, to locate it inside, not inside the familiar, but the familiar potentially tainted with strangeness through the process of repression. In this reading, the other is my unconscious. Freud, as Kristeva shows, does not speak of the stranger, instead he teaches us to track down strangeness in ourselves and to acknowledge our own being as disintegrated and incomplete (Ibid., p. 209). Thus we neither have to integrate the stranger nor persecute him or her, but we should take up (or integrate) the uncanny, the strangeness, which is as much theirs as ours. If we understand the strangeness in ourselves, then we do not suffer from or enjoy strangeness outside us. The stranger is in myself, thus we are all strangers. If I am a stranger, then there are no strangers. To Kristeva the ethics of psychoanalysis imply a politics: a cosmopolitanism of a new sort that might work for a mankind whose solidarity is founded on the consciousness of its unconscious – desiring, destructive, fearful, empty, impossible (ibid.). To Kristeva, the notion of uncanny strangeness sets difference within us instead of outside us or in relation to others, and presents it as the ultimate con-

dition of our being with others (Ibid., p. 210). Reconciliation then, has to take place within ourselves, and then we can reconcile ourselves with others.

However, this recognition of the importance of the inner world in order to understand social relationships, should under no circumstances lead to neglect of the outer world. The construction of the self as explored by psychoanalysts occurs in a specific social context and must itself be understood as a product of specific social and cultural formations in society. Constance Perin for example, in "Belonging in America," argues that the construction of identity as it is conceptualised by contemporary psychoanalytical literature is itself a product of western modern society (1988, p. 178). The notion of individual identity seems to be a characteristic in particular of western societies that developed a vision of the self based on the idea of human individuality reinforced by capitalist forms of social organisation according to which people are highly individuated and assumed to have control over their own destinies. It is a construction of the self that sets purity as a value, locates it in the self and defiles the other, the outside (Ibid.). This suggests for one that constructions of the outer world influence processes in the inner world; specific social discourses and practices have a significant impact on our emotional inner world which can be understood as partly produced and manipulated by specific social relations and discourses. But it also suggests that there might be other forms of constructions of the self in other societies that might allow qualitative different relationships with others that are not suffused with anxiety.

The importance of processes in the self to explain the persistence and power of social forces has been analysed productively in the context of racism. Racism must be understood as a fundamentally social phenomenon. It is a discourse and practice of power that has roots in economic oppression and imperialism, that is institutionalised in the structures of Western society and that serves the specific political and economic interests of dominant social groups. However, while racism is a social phenomenon, psychoanalytically influenced theorizing about racism, particularly in the tradition of Theodor Adorno's et al account of "The Authoritarian Personality" (1950)[5] has shown

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5   After Second World War the theorists of the Frankfurt School of critical theory Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford engaged in an ambitious project to understand anti-Semitism and the possibility of mass-mobilization for fascist systems, in particular for Adolf Hitler's Nazi Regime. Today "The Authoritarian Personality" published in 1950 is

that racism operates at more than just the macro-social level and is inextricably bound up with the subjective experience of individuals which in turn contributes to its perpetuation and reproduction. Racism as a social force, as Steven Frosh in his review of the authoritarian personality research states, achieves part of its power through being deeply inscribed in individual psychology (1989, p. 229). Psychoanalytically oriented research on racism clearly shows that there is a politics of emotion within racist discourses: Moral and social panics for example mobilized by anti-Semitism, touch the inner insecurities of the anti-Semite and help him/her to project inner fears on the threatening other (Frosh 1989, p. 236). Frosh suggests that in order to therefore fully understand the workings and power of racism, a deeper understanding of processes in the self and in particular their connections to the outer world are needed (1989, p. 231). Moreover, this suggests that discourses of power gain their force by making use of individuals' desires and fears: there is a politics of emotion. To allow reconciliation, as I have suggested before, it is therefore also necessary to deconstruct and reconcile the discourses of power of the outer world that shape our constructions of the self.

The references to sociological, anthropological and psychoanalytical literature, which I have used to reflect on the city as a social context and as a space of social experience, indicates the complexity of the processes determining self/other relationships in the city and simultaneously indicate conceptual departure points for possible ways of thinking about reconciliation in the city. The complexity, as suggested, lies particularly in the dialectical relationship of inner and outer worlds on the one hand, and in the interrelatedness of social and political discourses with emotions on the other hand. The recognition of these dialectical relationships is helpful in understanding the ambivalent image of cities, as both productive and fearful places, as well as the social dynamics within them.

This theme will be further explored in the next chapter, where I elaborate on the dialectical relationship of inner and outer worlds in regard to the conceptualisation and experience of the city by focusing on the outer world of the western, modern city in its spatial dimension. I seek to show that not only our knowledge about the city, but also the actual spatiality of the city is deeply

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still regarded as one of the most substantial attempts at unravelling the racist psyche (see Frosh 1989, p. 234).

grounded in and entangled with emotional life; the spatiality of the city is both a reflection of internal desires and fears, moreover it is an actual force that produces and perpetuates these desires and fears.

3 Spatialities of Desire and Fear – Spatial Politics of Emotions

The image of the city as a productive and creative place that allows the building of democratic societies has been linked by many western urban scholars such as Berman (1982), Habermas (1990), Jacobs (1961), Sennett (1970, 1976, 1990), and Young (1990) to public urban space for it is here where the (unplanned) encounter of strangers takes place. As much as urban culture in general has been celebrated and postulated as the social context in which a tolerant and democratic culture can prosper, public space has been celebrated as the specific spatial context, the actual crucible for participatory democracies. In a normative ideal, public urban space is characterized in particular by two qualities: firstly, it allows and encourages the encounter and confrontation of individuals and groups that might not otherwise meet, in other words people of different ethnic groups, religions, ages, genders, ideologies, classes or lifestyles. It is here, where people are able to confront each other on an equal basis and where they can interact and learn to understand 'otherness' (Young 1990, p. 240). Secondly, public urban space is seen as the common ground for diverse people. It is linked to the hope that public urban space can be the context where through interaction, sharing, and public debate, a common society is developed (Berman 1982; Jacobs 1961; Young 1990).

In the previous chapter I pointed out the importance of emotional dynamics in urban culture and showed, with the help of psychoanalytic literature, that relationships with others are suffused with anxiety. Psychoanalytic literature is concerned with the pathologies of boundary and space in the individual's construction of social relationships, and with the individual's mechanisms to contain or project internal desires and fears in order to create a space of experience that allows coherence of integrity (Hoggett 1992, p. 348). Social anthropologists and sociologists have also pointed out the importance of social boundaries in the construction of social identities (Barth 1969a).

In this chapter I explore the spatiality of the city as the context in which the foregoing processes occur. The notion that space is socially constructed by specific systems of knowledge has been increasingly acknowledged amongst urban scholars from various perspectives (e.g. Castells 1976; Davis 1990;

Harvey 1989; Jacobs 1996; Keith et al 1993a; Lefebvre 1974; Massey 1995; and Soja 1995). Economic and geographical factors as primary categories to explain spatial urban structures have been complemented and partly succeeded by an increased focus on the political production (in the form of concepts and visions) and the social production of urban space (in the form of the everyday productions of space as people appropriate and make use of it), in which questions of power play a central role. Contemporary urban scholars have also become more aware of the interplay between space and identity and argue that public urban space must be understood as not simply the passive and innocent arena for the manifestation of predetermined social identities but as crucial in their formation and maintenance (Berman 1982; Massey 1995; Rose 1993; Ruddick 1990; Wilson 1995; Young 1990).

The aim of this chapter is twofold: I firstly seek to show that there is an emotional dynamic which plays an important role in the political and social production of public urban space. Secondly, I aim to illustrate how public urban space is charged with ambiguous emotional meaning which produces and reproduces feelings towards others that pose a fundamental challenge to the normative ideal of public urban space as playing the role of crucible for a participatory democracy.

In a first part of the chapter I focus on the spatialities of desire – spatialities that seek to allow a positive identification with space. In the second part of the chapter I focus on the spatialities of fear constituted by negative or non-identification with space illustrating how spatialities of desire and fear are interrelated and enacted together, both producing and reproducing each other.

3.1   Spatialities of Desire

Desire is an emotion. It is more than an interest that can be explained by rational arguments. Collins dictionary defines desire as an expressed wish, a request; a sexual appetite; and a person or a thing that is desired, wished, longed and craved for (1994). Psychoanalytical literature describes desire as a kind of longing and craving for security, integrity, purity and completeness. What about spatialities of desire? It seems awkward to think of the city, in particular the western modern city, as a place of emotion because it is often deconstructed and criticised for the overly rationalistic approach in understanding and planning it. However, as I seek to show in this chapter, the rational approach to the city often conceals the specific desires of those in

power and can be understood as a tool for cultural hegemony; the desire of those in power to create images of the city that enable a positive identification with space. My argument follows three strands, which I think are important for an evaluation of current transformation policies in Cape Town: in the first part of the chapter I focus on the political production of urban space showing that in the modern city urban politics are fundamentally concerned with the creation of spatial wholeness, order, and security. Here, I focus in particular on discussions engendered by modernist thought which plays a fundamental role in the conception and construction of South African cities. In the second part of the chapter I focus on the everyday production of urban space referring in particular to literature which argues that the spatiality of the city is expressive of social and cultural identity and produces a specific kind of sacredness of urban space. And in the third part of the chapter I argue that spatialities of desire are informed by a new impetus in the context of global economic restructuring process which renders the commodifiable identity and image of the city increasingly important.

Spatialities of the city, I will argue, are the product of a cultural politics of identity and power which is concerned with the production of images for, in, and of, the city through the materiality of the city. The spatiality of the city can be understood as being produced by emotional dynamics – as a product of externalised and projected desires for wholeness, security, social containment, and for home, which gains new significance in the context of processes of global economic restructurings.

Images For the City: The Political Production of Urban Space

From Lewis Mumford's "The Culture of Cities" (1961) onwards, an increasing number of scholars (e.g. Castells 1976; Davis 1990; Foucault 1975, 1980; Harvey 1989; Jacobs 1996; Keith et al 1993a,b; Lefebvre 1974; Massey 1995; Soja 1995; Sandercock 1997; and Shields 1996) provide valuable insight into the social and political production as well as into the significance of urban forms by deconstructing what has been conceptualised as the rationalist modernist approach to planning and the city. The spatiality of the city, the space that surrounds us and that we live in, can be understood as more than just the product of inevitable factors such as economic and geographical conditions. It is rather a representation of socially produced images (ideas) for the good city, a representation of social values informed by specific knowledge systems and power relations.

Western modernist planning developed during the period from the Baroque to the Enlightenment when cities began to be planned, superseding the ad hoc growth of the medieval city (Wilson 1991, p. 18). Modern planning at its inception introduced the idea of a scientific and rational plan that allowed for reflection and reform to address the effects of industrial capitalism and rapid urbanisation at the end of the 19th century in Europe which had created huge problems such as poverty, housing shortage, and the rapid spread of diseases in growing cities. It was fuelled by good intentions, intentions of reform to achieve better living conditions for the urban poor, and has often been propagated in the context of attempts to achieve social justice in the city (Ellin 1997a, p. 21). However, despite this central value, it came to function not simply as the emancipatory practice it was theorized to be, but as participatory in new forms of social control of urban processes and human behaviour. It became a new way to exercise power (Hooper 1998, p. 229). Postmodern, poststructuralist, and postcolonial authors have voiced this critique against modern planning and the modern city on three different levels:

On the first level, modernist planning is critiqued for its delusive belief that cities can be made 'right', that they can be ordered according to a plan and a concept, and that the problems of the city can be solved by intervening in space without transforming fundamental social and economic relations (Epstein 1997, p. 211).

Two prominent examples of these efforts in the architecture and urban planning professions in Europe are those of Ebenezer Howard and his concept of the "Garden City" in England, and Le Corbusier's "radiant city" and "Musee Social" in France. They are classic examples of a tradition of modernist planning codified in the Charter of Athens (written by Le Corbusier and based on discussions at the international Congress of Modern Architecture in 1933) that has shaped planning around the world for the past almost 70 years (Madani-Pour 1995, p. 21). Even though the various architects and planners envisioned different urban forms, these modern planning approaches all express the belief that urban life can be spatially created in ways that will generate a particular urban social order, transforming "society by forging new forms of collective associations and personal habits, …by precluding those considered undesirable" – without transforming fundamental social and economic relations (Holston 1989, p. 52; Mooney et al 1999, p. 352). The application of this belief is particularly obvious in colonial societies throughout the world. In "Colonizing Egypt" Timothy Mitchell shows for example how

French and British colonial powers sought to re-order local urban and rural societies by destroying indigenous spatial structures and replacing them with new ones, such as the grid system for streets and new ground plans for houses (1988, p. 38).

On the second level, modernist planning has been critiqued for its claim to rational objectivity and the possibility of a universal truth. Increasingly since the 1970s and 1980s, poststructuralist, postmodern, postcolonial, and feminist theorists have argued from various perspectives that all knowledge and there-fore all truth is socially constructed (Benhabib 1990; Bhabha 1990, 1994; Butler 1990; Derrida 1981; Flax 1990; Foucault 1975; Harding 1987; Hooks 1990; Lyotard 1982; and Nicholson 1990). From various perspectives these authors reject the Enlightenment's claim that the world can be known objec-tively, and that reason and rationality will lead to one knowledge and one truth. Instead, the critics argue that all knowledge and truth are socially con-structed, historically situated, shaped by language, and embedded in power relations. Truth therefore, is not a singular but a plural, is not determined and certain, but in-determined and uncertain. These critiques open the way for an understanding of truth and the way we give meaning to the world not only as multiple and multidimensional, but also as increasingly political.

This epistemological shift also led to a critique of the modernist approach to the city, deconstructing the modern city as a specific system of knowledge based on the value system of western modern society which claims the possi-bility of universally applicable answers to difficult questions such as how to solve increasing problems of health and housing around the world (Ellin 1997a, p. 22). The abundant literature of feminist, postcolonial, Black, and gay writers that deconstructs the modern industrial city and its urban forms as a representation and manifestation of a patriarchal, racist and homophobic society, illustrates how modernist planning's claim of objective rationality has marginalized and discriminated against other possible systems of knowl-edge and value systems. Feminist authors such as Bauhardt et al (1997), Dörhoefer/Terlinden (1987), Hayden (1981), Kennedy (1994), Massey (1995), Wahrhaftig (1982), Weisman (1992), and Sturm (1993) for example, deconstruct the modern city as a patriarchal social order with a specific spa-tial form, as an arrangement of space in which the sexual division of labour, the ascription of men to the public, and women to the private sphere, and domination of men over women, is written into the architecture, urban de-sign, and form of the city: Cities are built and planned by men, for men, con-

fining women to the suburbs, to the home, to the private sphere of reproduction; and then, having imposed segregation, doubly disadvantaging women by not recognising that their needs in the city are different from those of men, based as they are primarily around the home, neighbourhood, and caring for children and the elderly.

This leads to the third level of critique of modern planning and the modern city namely its affinity to power, which is twofold. On the one hand, while planning the process of envisioning and conceiving a (better) future enables reflection and emancipation, it allows planners to 'fantasise' cities, and to engage in the power of definition of what is 'good' and what is 'bad'. It legitimises interventions in urban space; planning the city according to an imagined artefact informed by the social values of those in power (Miles 1997, p. 23). In "The Production of Space" Henri Lefebvre argues that concepts of space are themselves signifiers of power because power to control urban concepts and discourses also means power to define what is 'good' or 'bad', 'legal' or 'illegal', 'orderly' or 'disorderly', 'desirable' or 'threatening', 'public' or 'private', 'civilised' or 'uncivilised', and these definitions are the prerequisites and legitimisation for urban intervention strategies (1974, p. 33). Developed in a time of rapid industrialisation and urban growth, the vision of the good city in modern planning professions was one of an orderly, hygienic, scientific, technologically superior and 'civilised' place (see e.g. Ellin 1997a, p. 22; Epstein 1997; Sennett 1990). The power of definition, the conceptual distinction between the 'good' and the 'bad', the 'legal' and 'illegal', gives rise to the power to control and dominate behaviours that are defined as deviant or illegal and henceforth marginalized instead of recognised as other, equally rightful concepts of good and bad (Kaviraj 1997, p. 84; Mitchell 1988).

On the other hand, space should not only be understood as a product and mirror of specific power relations. It is not merely a passive arena in which power is exercised, or inscribed upon but serves as "a tool of thought and of action". It should be understood as a constitutive component in the production and reproduction of power (Epstein 1997; Keith et al 1993b; King 1996; Lefebvre 1974; Massey 1995; Mitchell 1988; and Shields 1996). Space as it is conceived and shaped by urban planners interacts with social and political discourses and hence is a crucial and constitutive component in the production, circulation, and reproduction of power in modern societies. Space, the materiality of the city, is needed to ascribe meaning to social and political

discourses and to enforce concepts of social order which serve to stabilise and reproduce power relations.

Social anthropologist Rob Shields argues that words and ideas used as signifiers develop not only within particular social, cultural and historical settings, but also require spatialisation from which to derive their meaning (1996, p. 233). Referring to dual concepts such as city/country and good/bad he illustrates that these concepts refer to material experiences and relationships as well as each other. Used in the city, city/country often has the opposite sense from when used by a person that lives in the country. To Shields spatial setting inflects the meanings of even the most basic metaphors of the most elementary moral division of good and bad (ibid., p. 234). If space – as outlined above – can be understood as a representation and a carrier of meaning then these "communicative properties" of space can be understood as affecting the meaning of even simple messages of societal discourses, and in turn societal discourses are affected by built form, architectural style, material etc. This suggests that societal discourses and along with them the power relations that produce them, depend not only on linguistic and other cultural sign systems, but also on material culture and the spatialisation of societal discourses for their meaning and stability (Ibid.). Discourses create images, but images create discourses, undermine, or stabilise them. Paul Rabinow in "French Modern" provides a study of how in the nineteenth century social reformers refashioned themselves into social scientists and urban planners and began to define and valorise norms – along the binaries healthy/pathological, normal/abnormal, productive/non-productive, etc. – and shows that linking these norms with architectural and urban forms, rising professions such as urban planning were responsible for the creation of disciplinary practices which served to control and regulate people and bodies in space (Rabinow 1989).

The disciplining character of space and spatial planning as a means to exercise power is elaborated upon in particular by French sociologist Michel Foucault. In Foucault's analysis, power, as exercised in modern societies is above all, disciplinary. Its goal is normalisation and the production of docile and useful bodies. He understands power not as the exercise of some dramatic force emanating from a single point at the apex of the state, but rather as centreless; as a function of a multiplicity of discursive practices that fabricates and positions subjects (1980). In "Discipline and Punish" he explores entirely new and different ways of understanding the operation of power in

spatial arrangements (1975). He shows how knowledge and power converge in modern disciplinary practices such as architecture, to order space as well as shape and control patterns of behaviour and social activity.

Building on Foucault, Timothy Mitchell (1988) in his analysis of the imposition of colonial power in Egypt describes how the French and English colonial governments experienced Egyptian society and their cities according to their own moral, social, and spatial concepts of order as illegible and disorderly and therefore undermining (dodging); as resistant to their power. Fundamental to the process of colonisation – understood as a the imposition of a new order and the destruction of inherent social, spatial and political forms and established concepts of order by means of power – is, according to Mitchell, the use of space to enframe and therewith control and discipline human behaviour (1988, p. 33). A conceptual spatial framework appears to only order things, but it also circumscribes and excludes certain forms of behaviour and ways of thinking. "A plan or a framework would create the appearance of objectness….. by seeming to separate an object world from its observer" (Ibid.) As Mitchell argues, this sort of framework was not just a plan which colonialism brought to Egypt, "but an effect that it would build in". The colonial process was aimed at re-ordering Egypt "to appear as a world enframed", to make Egypt "picture-like" and "legible" and therefore rendered available to political and economic calculation: the country had to become readable, like a book, in our sense of the term, in order to establish colonial power (Ibid.). Mitchell argues that urban planning practices of structuring and enframing space – for example, by laying out streets according to a grid pattern, and by standardizing and codifying a visible hierarchy – were essential techniques of Western powers to establish control in colonial societies (1988). Spatial plans, for example those that replaced the old spatial order of villages in the countryside, can, according to Mitchell, be understood as an attempt to create both a material as well as conceptual moral order (Ibid., p. 38): "The new (social) order introduced a new mode of authority, which operated by the physical confinement of groups, the continuous monitoring of behaviour, the control of movement and gestures, and the careful construction of hierarchies" (Ibid., p. 40). Space was used to enframe, contain, and control human behaviour in order to establish and stabilise western concepts of social order.

Against the background of these critiques, the rational approach to the city can be understood as a hegemonic discourse and practice of power, as a cru-

cial force in the outer world, in which the formation, negotiation, and maintenance of social and individual identities occur.

However, as I want to suggest in the remaining part of this chapter, the rational approach to the city conceals the specific desire of those in power to create images of the city that enable positive identification with space. Considering the psychoanalytical literature on the construction of individual identities in modern western societies and comparing them to the contents of modern planning, its concern with the creation of spatial wholeness, order, security, and separation, one finds striking similarities, suggesting the interrelatedness of the inner world and the outer world of urban space in its political production.

Kevin Robins in "Collective Emotion and Urban Culture" argues that the history of the modern city can be seen as a continuous struggle to impose order and coherence in the face of impending disorder and chaos (1995, p. 50). This is most apparent in Le Corbusier's visions of the good city. In "The City of Tomorrow" he argues that the house, the street, the town,

> "should be ordered, otherwise they counteract the fundamental principles round which we revolve; if they are not ordered, they oppose themselves to us, they thwart us, as the nature all around us thwarts us"… "Order is indispensable to him [the urban dweller], otherwise his actions would be without coherence and could lead nowhere" (1947, p. 33/35 in Robins 1995, p. 50).

The threat of confusion is central in Le Corbusier's writing. As I pointed out earlier, modern planning was invented at a time of rapid industrialisation and urban growth. This process was accompanied in Europe not only by fragmentation and disintegration of social and spatial structures and orders, but also by the achievement of greater legal, political, and material equality between people. Richard Sennett observes in "The Fall of the Public Man" (1976/1992) that already in the 19th century, changing material conditions with the adoption of more uniform dress and codes of conduct, decreased the ability of those in public to distinguish their peers from the general populace. In particular for the bourgeoisie who predominantly inhabited public places of the city until then, being in public became confusing, reduced their confidence in their ability to master the public sphere, and resulted in less sociability and greater passivity in interaction with others. Moreover, because physical appearance conveyed no certainty of status, a defensive withdrawal

from revelations of feelings and opinions in public, occurred. The notion that public spaces in the modern city are to be feared and avoided became established and led on the one hand for those who could afford it to shield themselves in the private sphere, and on the other hand to governments making extraordinary efforts to regulate and control inherently dangerous behaviour in public spaces instead of engaging the diversity of city life which resulted in a continuous undermining the city's capacity to support a vital public culture (Sennett 1990, p. 78). What remains as public culture is, for Sennett, meaningless: a 'trivialisation of the city as a stage of life' as opposed to a public sphere as platform for collective political action. Even though it seems as if he idealises 18th century public culture, shown by some feminist authors to be very exclusive (e.g. McDowell 1999, and Wilson 1997), the points he makes are in themselves important: precisely the opening of the public sphere to a wider public resulting in the erosion of difference and diversity in an emerging more equal society, has been perceived and conceptualised as a threat and has resulted in the individual developing mechanisms to escape the increased intensity and challenges of this diversity.

Against the background of this example the overall modernist concern with the order of space – at least in western society where it does not impose itself on an existent social and spatial order – should therefore also be understood as an attempt to allow coherence, integrity, and legibility of space which in turn could create a space of social experience necessary for the maintenance of individual integrity in times when the outside world became increasingly threatening as existent social and spatial structures fell apart. This concern with coherence and integrity is understandable and even desirable in my view. What is problematic are the specific means of the modernist approach to achieve coherence: central to the concept of order in the modern city is the separation and hierarchization of the world into binaries of self/other, public/private, male/female, nature/mind, spirit/flesh, good/evil, normal/pathological, healthy/diseased, order/disorder etc. where each of the binaries are defined as being in opposition to the other (e.g. Ellin 1997a; Hooper 1998, p. 233; Sandercock 1997; Wilson 1991, p. 37-9) – a characteristic that psychoanalysts suggest as typical for the construction of individual identity in western modern societies (see Chapter 2.2). The one is what the other is not, public is what is not private[6]. Respectively, the way towards the good and or-

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6   The distinction and separation of public and private space with a clear assignment of functions to each of the two spheres can be understood as being part and parcel of the European

derly city focuses on deconcentration, sterilization, homogenisation, segregation, and clear-cut geometrical forms reflecting and striving for the spatialisation of a world conceived of in binaries. Modern planning with this consciousness and establishment of boundaries that orders the spatial world of the city into 'good' and 'bad', seeks 'security': a 'safe' space of experience in the clear-cut identification and association of certain functions with certain spaces, and creates this order through repression, separation, and exclusion. It allows the projection of the bad onto the outside 'other' and thereby legitimises its separation and/or exclusion.

The envisioned characteristics of modern urban spaces of cleanliness, hygiene, order, determination, functionality, and control, represent striking similarities with psychoanalytic discussions of the paranoid-schizoid position that only knows 'good' and 'bad' and nothing in between or beyond. Modern urban space carries the characteristics that Theodor Adorno et al describe as typical traits and values for the authoritarian personality: rigid over-simplified thinking, obedience, cleanliness, inhibition and denial of emotions, abhorring all immoral sexual feelings, an urge to follow rules and regulations, upholding law and order to maintain stability, and projection of everything bad onto an outside group who therefore cannot be trusted (see Chapter 2.2).

The political production of urban space along the lines of modernist thought (re-) creates an inside and an outside, in which the inside is safe and the outside is unsafe, dangerous, and threatening. The very creation of this outside world in opposition to the inside enables the projection of internal, individual and collective fears that enable the stability and safety of the self, the inside.

Similarities between the way psychoanalysts make sense of the construction of individual identity in western modern societies and the way urban sociologists deconstruct the rationality and spatiality of the modern city suggest that urban space as it is constructed in this way and that, carries these characteristics and must therefore be understood as more than just the product of specific interests, or rational considerations in order to develop the perfect city. Instead, urban space should be understood as a product of insatiable but often hidden desires to control, to render unambiguous what causes ambivalence

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civilization process itself (Göle 1997; Goheen 1998; Kaviraj 1997; Sennett 1976) and is particularly important in current transformation politics in Cape Town. I will elaborate on this topic in Chapter 4, 5 and in particular in Chapter 7.

by repression and separation, and by making rational what is at its heart emotional.

Images In the City: The Production of Sacred Urban Space

So far, I have focused on the political production of modern urban space, on images of the city as they are expressed in concepts and plans for the city. In this chapter I focus on images in the city, on the cultural production of urban space to further explore urban space as the spatial condition in which the negotiation of social identities and relationships in the city occurs, and to illustrate the importance of emotional dynamics in the production of urban space.

Thinking of different cities across the world at different points in time, it seems obvious that the materiality of urban space is an expression of social and cultural values and practices such as living, working, playing or believing: Space is appropriated through the actual interventions of building or reconstructing houses, streets, gardens, parks, churches, Mosques, etc, and also through the actual use of space namely walking, driving or cycling in or on the streets, standing on street corners, chatting in the front yard, hanging up the washing, walking or picnicking in parks, sitting in cafés, busking in front of them or sleeping in the streets.

Writing in the context of new socio-cultural forces in cities in times of global migration and the age of postcolonialism, where indigenous formerly colonized peoples reclaim the spaces they have been expelled or marginalised from, contemporary urban scholars have started to link the significance of the materiality of urban space to mechanisms of cultural hegemony thereby understanding the materiality of the city as being formed by the practice of representation (Carter 1987; King 1996; Mitchell 1994) and a cultural politics of territory (Jacobs 1996; Keith et al 1993). Pointing to the symbolic meaning inscribed in the built environment, these authors read the built environment and spatial formations of the city not merely as an expression of social and cultural values, but rather as a cultural practice of representation that serves to represent social identities and stabilise power relations: a house, a church, a street, a square, the whole layout of the city cannot be reduced only to practical function or physical appearance, but there are codes and symbols which mediate messages of cultural hegemony. Mitchell (1994) argues that the practice of naming places such as streets, squares, and areas, can be understood as an act of memorising a specific point in history which turns a

"geographical territory into a culturally defined landscape" (in Darian-Smith 1996, p. 3). Carter in "The Road to Botany Bay" (1987) argues that the imperial landscape of Australia for example was created through the European naming and mapping of its geographical features by White explorers, administrators, and settlers (in Darian-Smith et al 1996, p. 5). He shows that the act of naming and the names themselves either ignored or subverted and incorporated pre-existing Aboriginal names and histories of the land (Ibid.). Competing or overlapping histories are either presented or silenced through the cultural power of codes and symbols such as maps and place names. Hence the practice of representation involved in the production of urban space turns the space into a site for the contestation of culture (Jordan and Weedon 1995, p. 8).

In "The Edge of Empire" (1996) Jane M. Jacobs illustrates this practice of cultural hegemony in and through space, in her detailed accounts of the cultural politics of identity and place in four contemporary urban settings in Britain and Australia. Central to her argument is the view that the production of space is a cultural production; that expressions and negotiations of imperialism do not just occur in space but that negotiations about space have to be understood as a politics of identity and power articulated through the design and structure of space, and is fundamentally about space: this is revealed not only in the building of the Grand Empire but also in contemporary processes of urban redevelopment (1996, p. 13f). In her account of the redevelopment of Bank Junction in Central London first debated in the 1960s but only decided upon in the early 1990s, Jacobs shows that conflicts evolved not primarily about how this place had to look or about competing planning ideologies, even though this took the discursive form of the struggle. Not one party in the struggle challenged the centrality of the city to the international status of the nation. Rather, as Jacobs suggests, the opponents argued about different ways (conservation versus demolition and new built development) and architectural styles (continental/German versus Victorian/English) to monumentalise the grandness of the place that was considered 'the heart of the Empire', a symbolic site of a Britain made great by its global reach whose international status was under transformation and possibly threat (1996, p. 67). The highly publicised 'planning' battle became a nodal point "in the imaginative reaffirmation of the identity and status of the City in relation to the nation and the rest of the world" negotiating London's and the nation's identity as Empire in a postimperial age (Ibid., p. 39). Jacobs interprets this place-based struggle around the redevelopment of Bank Junction as an arena

in which various coalitions express their sense of self and their desires for the spaces that constitute their "home" (Ibid.). Local resistance to change resonate "with the reactionary nostalgias of royalty and a yearning for the purity of the idea of empire". The final decision for the "No.1 Poultry" scheme by English architects James Stirling and Michael Wilford to focus on architectural preservation and enhancement of the local, became a nostalgic gesture for a time when the city more surely centred its geography around Bank Junction (1996, p. 68). Jacobs concludes that struggles around urban space can be understood as a cultural politics of territory in times of rapid political and economic transition, as a geography in which centre and margin, self and other, here and there, are in anxious negotiation wherever there is displacement, interaction, and contest (Jacobs 1996, p. 68).

These examples of the contestation of culture through urban space and its symbolic meaning suggest another significant aspect of images in the city: they are contested because of the importance of space for the re-production and stabilization of individual and social identities (hooks 1992; Lorde 1984; Rose 1993; Ruddick 1996). Spatial formations tell stories and histories that have happened over time. They are witnesses, references, and representations of cultures past and present and at times also of an imagined future. They hold, represent, and trigger memories; they make a space legible or illegible. They invoke moods and feelings related to place and trigger associations with specific social discourses. The materiality of the city, in this view, is the space of affection. It invokes feelings of attachment and detachment; it provides orientation and points of identification that create a sense of belonging or not- belonging. The materiality of the city provides the spatial context which allows certain ways of living. Architecture and the built and non-built environment create a sense of place. It gives character to place which allows or disallows identification with space. The spatiality of the city provides the cultural context that allows identification with place which allows one to feel at home in the city (Sandercock 2000, p. 4; Jacobs 1996, p. 13). 'Home', as Santu Mofokeng suggests, is created through another kind of appropriation of space namely the investment of spiritual meaning: "it does not exist objectively in reality. The notion of 'home' is a fiction we create out of our need to belong". Home, he says, is a fictional space, "a place most people have never been to". It serves a function similar function to zero in mathematics: "it provides us with a beginning or a basis from which to evaluate other spaces; how they fulfil the functional and aesthetic needs as we relate to or move through them in the business of living" (1999, p. 68). This kind of spiritual invest-

ment suggests a certain kind of sacredness of urban space, not in the narrow sense of the term of being devoted to some religious ceremony and ritual, but rather, following French sociologist Emile Durkheim's definition of the "sacred", as space being "set apart" (Chidester 2000, p. 30). In that sense, appropriations of space as a 'home' through symbolic and material invest-ments in space can be understood as ritual and interpretative labour that sets spaces apart – practically and metaphorically – for the production and repro-duction of identities. In other words, through the ritual and interpretative labour of building and inscribing meaning to a house, a church, a river, a neighbourhood, space is sacralised. Space becomes precious, inviolable, con-secrated, protected, but also secure as it provides 'shelter'; it is a space of social experience that serves as a point of orientation which helps one to navigate through other spaces. This notion of sacredness suggests that space is not only charged with symbolic meaning but also with emotional meaning. The spatiality of the city can be understood as a spatiality of desire insofar as its cultural production is motivated by the desire to create positive identifica-tions with space which provide people with security; it is motivated by the desire to find one's own identity reflected in urban space and by the desire to feel at home in the city. These desires, as they are spatialised, charge urban space with emotional meaning.

However, since the cultural production of urban space is structured by power, the significance of the city's spatiality also lies in its contribution to practices of cultural hegemony turning the spatial practices into a cultural politics of territory mediating messages of positioning the self and the other, messages of belonging and not belonging (Darian-Smith 1996; Jacobs 1996; Sander-cock 1998).

The understanding of space as cultural practice charging space with emo-tional meaning becomes increasingly important for urban planners and politi-cians in culturally diverse societies where different cultures cross space and time and different cultural groups seek to create a home in the city. The sacredness of urban space involves a form of privatisation of space as it is symbolically set apart for the re-production of specific identities, and ques-tions the notion of what is public in public urban space. The recognition of the sacredness of urban space is of particular importance in Cape Town where after the abolition of Apartheid laws and regulations positioning peo-ple in a strict social and spatial order, various coalitions can be expected to battle for their spiritual and material homes in the city.

Images of the City: The Creation of Marketable Identities

In recent years another cultural practice seminal to the production of urban space has been increasingly discussed in the context of processes of global economic restructurings and the changing role of cities in national and global economies. It is the practice of creating appearances of specific places within the city, and of the city as a whole so that it creates a specific marketable identity to the outside world, to the global community (Zukin 1996; Boyer 1998, Ronneberger et al 1999).

Various authors have argued that cities not only play an increasingly important roles in national and international economies in the competition for footloose international capital and tourists, but that they are also restructured from places of production to places of consumption (e.g. Castells 1989; Harvey 1989; Keith et al 1993; Lefevbre 1974; Soja 1995; Sorkin 1992; Zukin 1989, 1991, 1995). In these restructuring processes urban culture and quality of life as well as visual representations of the city gain significant importance in city politics. Sharon Zukin in "The Cultures of Cities" describes the restructuring process of cities as one where the synergy of capital investment, service economies, and consumption create a "symbolic economy" which features two parallel production systems that are crucial to a city's material life: "the production of space, with its synergy of capital investment and cultural meanings, and the production of symbols, which constructs both a currency of commercial exchange and a language of identity" (1995, p. 23). The symbolic economy creates an urban environment that in turn creates, represents and markets signs and symbols of which culture industries, gastronomic services, fashion saloons, galleries, and museums become crucial components and means in the financial representation of the city and the establishment of a marketable identity for the city (ibid.). Images, here understood as strategies of visual representations and marketable identities based on the symbolic economy of the city, are of political and economic importance in establishing competitive advantages over other cities, nationally and internationally in the quest for attracting new businesses, corporate elites, and tourists. These strategies operate with two seemingly contradictory elements: firstly the emphasis on uniqueness compared to other cities, and secondly-k on homogeneity guaranteeing international standards of living and services (Ronneberger et al 1999, p. 68). In this process images require to be not only commodifiable but are also constructed with regard to global standards, and the increasingly important role of private and corporate

entities in the production of space have brought about a shift from public to private institutions in the construction of images and places (Zukin 1991, p. 24). The images are however not constructed around a larger public even though they shine in the light of the global community; they address or focus on financially potent businesses as well as middle classes around the world.

Moreover, as Christine Boyer in 'Cities for Sale' argues, the production of city images in this sense derives not from the whole city as an entity, but from selective, distinct, often isolated archiples of economic investment such as shopping malls, redeveloped Waterfronts or gentrified areas such as inner cities (1995, 192). Spaces in between, such as derelict industrial or residential areas of the poor population, are systematically excluded in the image production but also from investment "resulting in an ever-widening gap between neglected land and revalued places" (ibid., p. 204). Selected and isolated places and objects vouch for the quality of the whole: the myth of the postindustrial era radiates from places of high consumption across the whole city (Ronneberger et al 1999, p. 69). The economic as well as political significance of marketable images of cities in the context of global economic restructuring processes are by many authors seen as critical to decisions made by urban officials with regard to allocations of budgets and the definition of spatial policies in the city in general, and the design of the materiality in particular (e.g. Castells 1989; Davis 1990; Soja 1995; Sorkin 1995; Zukin 1995). The materiality of the city is sought to comply with the imagined character and identity of the city which is globally marketable and reflect an ideology of economic rationality to attract foreign investors and tourists, but in effect merely seems to mirror the social and cultural values of upper middle classes around the world.

The significance of these economic urban policies in the context of this research lies in the centrality of emotional factors in the production of marketable identities. In 'Cities for Sale' Christine Boyer describes the character of the redeveloped mercantile area, South Street Seaport in New York, as a gentrified, historicized, commodified and privatised new marketplace that above all, is "the stage for a particular kind of experience – that of pure desire" (1995, p. 201). Spatialities of this kind, developed in many cities around the world, she argues, "broker" desire, in two different ways: they broker the desire to consume, to possess, and to appropriate – and they broker the desire to repossess and to re-experience something untouched by the ravages of time and informed by nostalgia; the "sweet sadness generated by a feeling that

something is lacking in the present, a longing to experience traces of an authentic, supposedly more fulfilling past" (ibid.). Commodities are sold as in any marketplace, but placing the commodity within a system of signs symbolizing entire life-styles and supporting environments, the system itself seeks to increase consumption by suggesting that a particular life-style not only requires one, but a whole series of goods (ibid., p. 200). Moreover, placing the commodity in a nostalgic milieu stimulates not only a desire to fill the shopping bags with souvenirs from this journey into the past, or into 'an other present', but also to come back, to do the journey again (ibid., p. 201).

The spatiality of cities informed by desire to create a marketable identity of the city situates the discussions in the previous subchapters into a new perspective and gives the argument on urban spatialities as being both produced by and being a crucial force in the interactions of identity, space power a new relevance: For one, the level from which the materiality of the city is seen has shifted to a global scale. The gaze, the vantage point from which decisions about the materiality of the city are made, is not only the skyscraper from which local urban planners look down on the city (Certeau 1988, p. 929), but it is also the office tower of a corporate business not even in the same city but somewhere on the other side of the globe. The materiality of the city is shaped by urban politics fundamentally concerned with the appearance and image of the city as it is reflected to an office tower elsewhere.

The economic imaginability of the city becomes an important asset that promises the city's economic viability and reinforces the significance of the materiality of the city to produce an image of itself. The concepts of what the city should look like, of the social and spatial order in the city, are informed by standards and concepts from elsewhere. This has an important impact on the negotiations of identities in and through space. As the commodifiable image of the city is built on the symbolic economy of the city, which gives identity and character to place by creating emotional attachment to place (of local consumers, of international investors and tourists), cultural expressions and productions of and in the city gain importance and have an impact on how difference in form of cultural diversity is negotiated. It might allow for more diversity insofar as more cultural expressions are given a viable platform, since symbolic economies rely on diverse cultural industries (Zukin 1995). But since cultural industries need to support a commodifiable image of the city and the scale of the 'audience' has shifted to a global scale, the

relationship of space, identity, and difference is reconstituted and revalidated in terms of whose culture is represented and expressed, and in terms of the line between self and other which is or can be redrawn. Cultural politics of identity and power in and through space do not only occur within the city, but occur in the light of global commodification.

3.2   Spatialities of Fear

Fear as desire is an emotion. Psychoanalytical literature, concerned with the construction of individual identity in western modern societies, describes fear as a basic human experience indwelling in our subjectivity; an experience of anxiety which is both enacted and explained by specific desires for wholeness and completeness. Characteristic of these indwelling fears is that they are often projected onto the outside world in the quest for integrity of individual identity.

And spatialities of fear? This chapter seeks to show that as much as the spatiality of the city is constructed by the desire to create a specific social experience which allows positive identification with space, it is also constructed by fears. If only specific desires are considered, the production of spatiality in the city is only half understood.

In the following subchapters I seek to illustrate three different dimensions in which the spatiality of the city can be understood as being produced by fear. While I refer in the first subchapter to the fear of impending danger in the form of crime and victimisation as the most obvious definition and conceptualisation of the spatialities of fear, I focus on more subtle forms and sources of fear that are enacted together with desire, and the spatialities of desire, in the subsequent two subchapters. This translates into the fear that is enacted by the construction of 'safe places', and the fear that is enacted when a positive identification with space is denied.

Dangerous Places - The Fear of Crime and Victimisation

The most obvious discourse which defines and conceptualises spatialities of fear is found in sociological and criminological discussions about fear of crime and fear of victimisation in the city. There is the fear of falling victim to petty crimes like mugging or to more violent crimes; the fear of having one's privacy intruded upon, and the fear of being hurt or killed. In the increasing literature on urban crisis, crime and disorder are seen as some of the

major problems in contemporary metropoles around the world. Crime and the fear of crime seem to have become both increasingly normal and fundamental to the experience of urban life and the subject of increased focus in urban research and urban spatial politics (Hill 1994, p. 1-2; Davis 1990; Ellin 1997).

Spatialities that derive from the fear of crime can on the one hand be understood as a spatiality of defence and fortification and on the other hand, as feminist authors in particular, and Black authors have illustrated, a spatiality of avoidance, a spatiality of 'no-go areas'.

Spatialities of defence and fortification have emerged increasingly from the 1980s onwards and are conceptualised as the new spatiality of cities particularly in the United States and Europe as well in so-called developing countries, like Brazil and South Africa where gaps between the haves and the have-nots are widening or as in the case of South Africa, where since the end of Apartheid laws the separation of people and spaces has been abolished (Bremner 1999; McLaughlin et al 1999). Authors such as Davis (1990), Blakely et al (1997), Caldeira (1996), Mc Laughlin et al (1999) and (Wehrheim 2000) describe the proliferation and the character of security-oriented 'gated communities' as a new form of urban residential settlements, while authors such as Boyer (1992), Davis (1990), Friedmann et al (1982), Kasinitz (1984), Keil et al (2000), Ronneberger et al (1999), Zukin (1991) describe the increasingly tangible and intangible fortification, militarization, and surveillance of public urban space around the 'citadels of capitalism' as inner urban areas with headquarter functions, suburban shopping malls or office parks. (Meaning of the last sentence not clear) It is a spatiality that is marked by a notion of 'defensible space' developed by American architect Oscar Newman who argues that much crime could be curtailed by specific urban designs which reduce the spatial opportunities for its committal (1972).

While the spatialities of defence fortification in the case of privatised spaces such as gated communities take primarily a physical form by employing devices such as locks, bolts, electric fences, walls, guard dogs, security guards, policing, closed circuit camera systems, and alarms (Fyfe et al 1998; McLaughlin 1999, p. 119; Marcuse 1995a), the fortification of public spaces is, besides policing and camera control, achieved by symbolic techniques of urban design. Specific urban designs, for example monumental buildings such as courts, museums, churches and various public and private institutions, create spaces of "authority" (Sennett 1970), generating a "sense of membership", a sense of belonging or not belonging with the intention to ex-

clude undesirables in the imagined order of a space (Lefebvre 1974/1991). Urban design functions as a mechanism to informally prescribe what may and may not take place in a particular building or a particular location. The buildings and spaces of a global finance house in New York or London, for example, or even the financial districts of which they form part, would effectively erase the traces of others, the undesired, in those spaces through a series of gestures, mannerisms, and other assorted practices. Deutsche shows that a strategic part of the gentrification of public spaces is signage, designating who should be using a particular space and who not. It is a signage of in- and exclusion (in Wagner 1993, p. 287) that in the processes of gentrification serves to achieve social "purification" of public space through the expulsion of disturbing and undesired people, in particular the homeless (e.g. Herbert 1998; Ruddick 1996). The signage is an elitist set of symbols, as Wagner shows, which consists of commodities suggesting luxury, objects of modern art, and artificial landscape elements such as waterfalls and palm trees, unintelligible to many people (Ibid.). And as Lefebvre argues, the monumentality of such spaces draws its meaning from the represented sounds, images, and even scent of those recognised as 'members' (1974). Boundaries are constructed through the symbolic meaning and soft images of space which have the effect of creating exclusion and silencing rhythms and movements which do not accord with the dominant interpretation and use of such spaces (Allen 1999, p. 78).

Characteristic of these spatialities of fear seems to be the privatisation of space, a tendency to create security by limiting access to these spaces. Be they walls and fences, booms, surveillance cameras, security guards or specific urban designs, the created spatiality aims at limiting access to certain spaces and to control who is inside and who outside, excluding those who are perceived as a threat. Public spaces are eroded by the privatisation of space marked by multiple physical and symbolic boundaries dividing urban spaces and people (e.g. Davis 1990; Blakely et al 1997; Boyer 1992; Caldeira 1996; Kasinitz 1984; Keil et al 2000; Ronneberger et al 1999; Wehrheim 2000; Zukin 1991).

There is however another reaction to the fear of crime and victimisation: conceptualised and also politicised in particular by feminist, gay and Black authors in Europe and the United States (e.g. Epstein 1997; Hunter 1985; FOPA e.V. 1991). Feminist authors show how women's fears of rape and other violent crimes limit the way they use public urban space: women are

confined to certain spaces and limit their use of these spaces to "safe" hours[7]. Gay and Black authors record a similar tendency amongst gays, Blacks, and other marginalized groups who avoid certain places in the city in fear of hate crimes. The fear of crime and victimisation in these texts leads to the perception of socially defined 'dangerous places' that become 'no-go areas' for specific social groups. Interestingly, feminist architects in particular, and planners, also highlight the supportive role of environmental design in the prevention of crime and the reduction of fear in the city: local authorities are lobbied for more street lighting and for an architecture that allows surveillance by decreasing the many 'dark' corners and spaces of the city where crime can be committed unseen (see FOPA e.V. 1991).

The fear of crime and victimisation is a deadening one. Fear of crime as I will show in Chapter 4.4 has become a dominant theme in South Africa since the end of Apartheid, and, as the above illustrations indicate, can be understood as an important challenge for contemporary local politics. While the spatialities of fear in the form of the fortification and militarization of space can and should be criticised for its tendency to privatise public spaces which leads to forms of social exclusion, Black, gay and feminist authors writing about fear show that it is a terror that hovers above us and thus confines and constrains our activities as well as our openness towards strangers. Safety gives freedom. Freedom is being able to walk down any street in the city at any time of day or night. Freedom is being able to leave the windows open on a hot summer's night; to keep the door unlocked so that friends and neighbours can come in. This kind of freedom is only possible where there is trust that you will be safe. The problem is that the safety created through the creation of boundaries is built on exclusion; the exclusion of an assumed threatening other. The dynamic involved in the creation of safe places as a response to the perception of dangerous places will be discussed in the next subchapter. Here I will turn the argument on its head by saying that the definition of safe places in one part of the city creates and reproduces fear thereby becoming a constitutive component of power.

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7   And this despite the fact that most rapes happen in private spaces and in the home; the offender is usually a familiar face (Hunter 1985, p. 17).

Safe Places: Fearing as Learning

Fear of crime and victimisation seem to be obvious, even natural. But there is more to it than meets the eye. Fear is also a learning; an association of certain dangers with certain places over time. Fear, as I seek to show in this chapter, is in a precarious way deeply involved in the social and political production of urban space. The production of "safe places" or "safe cities" both conceptually as in the idea of the good city, and practically in the form of the actual production of safe places such as gated communities, contributes in its own way to the construction of fear in that it defines and produces dangerous places. Furthermore, the definition and production of safe and dangerous places can be understood as an instrument of power as it legitimises and stabilizes the power relations that promote a specific concept of the good city.

Considering the conceptual structure of the modern city which I have outlined in Chapter 3.1 as one that is characteristically constituted by thinking in exclusive binaries and the need to separate the one from the other in order to secure self, fear is deeply entrenched in the concept of the modern city. Dora Epstein argues in "Afraid/Not: …", the construction of city fear is "manifested, linguistically and materially, within the modern discourse on the metropolis and the metropolitan mind-body" (1998, p. 213). In the definition of the good and safe city as an orderly, clean, hygienic, rational, and homogeneous space lies the definition of the bad and unsafe city, the disorderly, chaotic, filthy, unhygienic, irrational, and heterogeneous city. This means that the chain of conceptual associations of good and safe with order and homogeneity, and bad and unsafe with disorder and heterogeneity, prescribes the ways in which we should fear the city. The concept of the modern city, argues Epstein in "Abject Terror:…", teaches us to fear diversity, to fear the crowd and to fear situations that are seemingly chaotic (1997, p. 140). Fear in the modern city can be understood as "a reaction to a cultural impetus, a representation of an ideology that fears otherness" (ibid.). And furthermore, because of the conceptual definitions of safe and unsafe, this fear of otherness is politically legitimised: in the logic of the modern city it is considered "a rational emotional response to the real and perceived menacing deeds and misintentions of strangers in public spaces" (Epstein 1997, p. 139).

In a similar vein Elisabeth Wilson in "The Sphinx in the City" (1991) shows that fear is enacted when the conceived and the real do not comply with each other. She characterizes fear in the city as the fear of being seduced into becoming something other. She argues that concepts of a patriarchal order have

produced an imagination which conceives of the city as a threatening, infested, and disorderly other during the 20th century, as single women were increasingly being seen in public places in the city (1991). The presence of women in public spaces came to symbolise the city as a place which promises "untrammelled sexual experience", where "the forbidden – what is most feared and desired – becomes possible" (Wilson 1992, p. 6). This promise was converted into a "general moral and political threat" which has turned the women in public places into "bad" women, because they were breaking conventions or breaking the concept of the social order that confined them to the private sphere, and the presence of "bad" women in the public sphere also turned the city into a fearful space. This fear, as Barbara Hooper in "The Poem of Male Desires" argues, is the male fear of erotic desire, and more specifically the psychological fear of being seduced by one's own erotic desire, to become what is forbidden and immoral (1998, p. 238). As a result, Wilson argues, women have been disadvantaged in western modern visions of the city: because they seem to represent disorder, rigid control of women in cities has been considered necessary to avert the danger. "Urban civilisation", so she concludes, "has come, in fact, to mean an authoritarian control of the wayward spontaneity of all human desires and aspirations" (Wilson 1991, p. 221). The social construction of fear through specific concepts of the good city is complemented on a practical level, on the level of the actual production of safe places, as socially homogeneous spaces.

In the previous subchapter I have shown that the creation of safe spaces such as gated communities, shopping malls or inner urban areas, involve the construction of boundaries which can be understood as spatialisation of the fear of crime and victimisation. But spatial boundaries, be they tangible or intangible, are more than just a means of protection from real danger. Rather, there seems to be a psychological and emotionally motivated need for them. Spatial boundaries, argues David Sibley in reference to social anthropologist Edmund Leach (1976), serve to prevent liminal zones; spaces of ambiguity and discontinuity combined with uncertainty about where the edge of one category turns into the edge of another, where a clear distinction between e.g. the good and the bad, the familiar and the unfamiliar, is impossible (1995, p. 33). Sibley argues that for the individual or for the group "socialized into believing that the separation of categories is necessary or desirable", the liminal zone is a source of anxiety. It is a zone of abjection, one which should be eliminated in order to reduce anxiety (ibid.).

The construction of safe places through strict control and classification of space such as gated communities as a means to dissolve fear, is however, precarious and paradox. Instead of decreasing fear, as Sibley argues, it perpetuates and reinforces fear, in particular the fear of difference and otherness. In the enclosed spaces, be it the suburb, or fortress-like gated communities and inner urban areas, there is concern with order, conformity and social homogeneity which are secured by strengthening external boundaries. The strong classification and the strong framing of space, however, raises the consciousness of difference, makes difference visible and turns it into deviance. Deviance extends from the concept of homogeneity and conformity; it is defined as being 'other', 'other' than the defined conception of normality, but deviance is needed to create and stabilise the self, and normality (Sibley 1995, p. 39). As James Davis (1990) says, "the greater the search for conformity, the greater the search for deviance; for without deviance, there is no self-consciousness of conformity and vice versa" (quoted in Sibley 1995, p. 39).

This process, argues Sibley, creates consciousness of a condition morally superior to one where there is mixing, for mixing of social groups and of diverse activities in space "carries the threat of contamination and a challenge to hegemonic values" (1995, p. 39). Hence, spatial boundaries are moral as well as emotional boundaries, and spatial separations symbolize a moral and emotional order of things and people. They are as Sibley argues both a result of anxiety inflicted on the human being, and derived from the continuing need to "define the contours of normality and to eliminate difference" (ibid., p. 40). Along with the raising of consciousness of difference and deviance, Sibley argues, abjection is more likely to be experienced (1995, p. 80). Using the example of young males perceived as "unruly groups" in shopping malls he suggests that it is not adolescent males as a social category per se who are threatening, but their presence in spaces which comprise 'normal family space' which renders them discrepant and threatening (Sibley 1995, p. XII; Sibley 1992). In this vein, the above illustrated symbolic and material fortification of inner urban areas seems not to serve as protection of real danger from dangerous people; what is protected is the purity of the desired image of these spaces which becomes regarded as defiled by the presence of specific people such as the homeless. The desire for specific spaces thereby creates the threat.

Fear in the city must therefore be understood as socially constructed, per-petuated and reinforced, both in the form of conceptual definitions of what is safe, which includes definitions of its opposite, the unsafe, and in the form of the construction of strongly classified and homogenized space itself as it makes differences more visible and causes fear. The construction of safe places that seems to be characteristic of modern urban planning, and seems to be perpetuated in the so-called postmodern landscapes of contemporary cities represents, as Epstein argues, a way of thinking which prioritises fear and anxiety and neglects desire as the other possible experience enacted in the meeting of strangers as described in Chapter 2.1 (1998, p. 216). Understand-ing fear as socially constructed suggests that fear itself must be understood as both an expression and a spatial signification of power that defines something 'other' as dangerous and threatening (Epstein 1998, p. 216). Moreover, the labelling of something other as threatening can also be understood as an instrument of power which stabilizes power relations that promote a specific concept of order.

Timothy Mitchell in "Colonising Egypt" shows how fear of the other, the in-digenous, was central in the constitution of the notion of colonial order and the securing of colonial power (1988). He characterises the identity of the modern city in colonial times as one created and stabilised by what it defines as 'other' and by what it keeps out. "Its modernity is something contingent upon the exclusion of its own opposite. In order to determine itself as the place of order, reason, propriety, cleanliness, civilisation, and power, it must represent outside itself what is irrational, disordered, dirty, libidinous, bar-barian, and cowed" (1988, p. 165). The modern city requires this 'outside' in order to present itself, in order to constitute its singular, uncorrupted, iden-tity" (Mitchell 1988, p. 165). Mitchell shows that during the restructuring of Cairo under colonialism the colonial government's argument that the 'native town' should remain "Oriental" "did not mean preserving it against the im-pact of colonial order, but that "the 'Oriental'" (conceived as the disorderly, barbarian and irrational) was the creation of that order, and was needed for such order to exist. Edward Said has analysed this technique of establishing one's identity over, and in terms of, another identity in a larger intellectual and political context, as "Orientalism" (1978). The modern city, in order to represent itself as modern, is dependent upon maintaining the distinction between self and other; the barrier that keeps the other out. This dependence makes the other, the outside, the 'oriental', paradoxically an integral part of the modern city (Mitchell 1988, p. 165). The need for the other to stabilise

the self then, turns dealing with fear in western, modern practice into a para-doxical exercise. Fear of the other is the emotional force that secures the self and legitimises a politics of exclusion.

Teresa Caldeira in her study on gated communities in Sao Paulo highlights the entanglement of social discourses about crime and boundaries in the city illustrating how fear of crime is utilised to sell a certain spatial order. She writes:

> "… the proliferation of everyday talk about crime becomes the context in which residents generate stereotypes as they label different social groups as dangerous and therefore as people to be feared and avoided. Everyday discussions about crime create rigid symbolic differences between social groups, as they tend to align them either with good or with evil. In this sense, they contribute to a construction of inflexible separations in a way analogous to city walls. Both enforce unforgiving boundaries." (1996, p. 352).

Analysing the advertisements of new gated communities, Caldeira describes how urban developers create an image of the enclaves as secure, homoge-nous, island-like, and luxurious in their facilities and services as opposed to the image of the rest of the city as deteriorated, noisy, and polluted, not only in environmental terms but also in terms of social heterogeneity. The adver-tisements build on the fears and anxieties of urban dwellers who are con-fronted with the challenges of urban life, and promise a life of calm and security, happiness, harmony and even freedom (Caldeira 1996, pp. 354).

Building on Caldeira's study Leonie Sandercock in "Difference, Fear and Habitus: ..." argues that urban discourses of fear function ideologically to shape our attention, and provide reasons for how we should act in response to fear. Moreover, she argues that there is a political economy of fear, which has consequences in terms of policy: fear becomes institutionalised in urban management strategies and serves the construction of multiple boundaries in the city (2000a).

The creation of security through the homogenisation of space as I have sought to show in this chapter is a central feature of modern urban planning, but it is also a central feature in so-called postmodern urban landscapes of the 1980s and 19090s (e.g. Davis 1990; Caldeira 1996; Marcuse 1995a; Sibley 1995). Homogeneity is an ambivalent and precarious concept as well as an instrument (of what?). The socialist modernist movement that emerged at the

beginning of the 20th century in Europe and has been a driving political force also in liberation struggles in most colonial societies including South Africa located a liberating and emancipative potential in the concept of homogeneity as it applies equal standards and aims at the creation of social justice. Homogeneity, however, as a central indicator for safety, is precarious as it produces fear of everything that is not included in the definition of homogeneity and has often been used by western power holders to stabilise power relations that produce inequality rather than equality. There is a profound lack of an imagination of the city that translates both desires and fears into a social and spatial framework which enables feelings of safety in the face of otherness.

The Spatialisation of Identity and the Construction of Fear

Fear is in another precarious way deeply involved in the production of urban space. In my illustration of the cultural production of urban space I have shown how social identities are spatialised, and how important space is for their construction and reproduction, that is, for a feeling of being 'anchored' in a way that provides security. 'Home', I argued, is a place of affection; the notion of 'home' charges urban space with intense emotional investment and sacralises it. In this chapter I argue that as much as identity is spatialised, as much as space is needed for positive identification, identity and a feeling of security are also dependent on space, and is therefore vulnerable to the change of space. In this sense alienation and insecurity at least and fear and terror at worst are produced or enacted where positive identification with space is denied, where own identity is not reflected or is denied either in the materiality of space or in the social interactions that occur within it.

So far little research has been undertaken in this field. There are however some interesting studies to which I will refer in the following paragraphs to show that fear in its relation to spatialised identities is an important dimension to help us understand social dynamics in the production of urban space.

Since space is produced by power, I suggest that it is important to identify the two generic kinds of alienation and fear which are enacted through the non-identification with space and its social content: the fears of the powerful or those who inhabit and have appropriated certain spaces on the one hand, and the fears of the socially and spatially marginalized or those who enter certain spaces that are already appropriated by others.

Alienation, and fear of those who have appropriated certain spaces are enacted when certain others, usually socially marginalized groups, enter the spaces of the powerful. Leonie Sandercock illustrates this in a recent paper "Difference, Fear and Habitus …" (2000a). Citing the Australian city of Perth where international migration patterns have changed the locality of local neighbourhoods, Sandercock looks at socio-spatial dynamics that arise when the boundaries of communities are crossed by the threatening other, which for her in this context is the immigrant, the newcomer in the city or neighbourhood (2000a, p. 4). Building on Julia Kristeva's book "Stranger in Ourselves" (1982) and on Bourdieuian sociology of 'habitus,' Sandercock argues that the stranger or the immigrant invokes "the destruction of our socio-spatial sense of place: in everyday talk, this is the destruction of our comfort zone, of all the familiar and homely, all that we have grown up with and take for granted, including the socio-spatial knowledge of our neighbourhoods and indeed, the nation as a whole" (2000a, p. 4).

Referring to Ghassan Hage's book 'White Nation' (1988), in which he discusses nationalist practices of exclusion that categorize otherness/ethnicity in the practice of domesticating the social environment in pursuit of a homely space, Sandercock suggests that the national issue of migration becomes a struggle which is played out at the local level of e.g. the neighbourhood "in terms of an experience of threat and loss and the desire to reassert control over one's territory, one's home space" (2000a, p. 5). She argues that although national space is imaginary, "it is an imaginary which is actually, literally, embodied in the real local spaces of one's street, neighbourhood and city, where it is either reinforced or undermined" (ibid., p. 5). This imaginary, according to Sandercock, involves a sure knowledge that down the street there is, for example, the Aussie's Butcher, pub or protestant church, but not a Buddhist Temple, a Halal Butcher, or a gay bar (ibid.). In times when the locality changes, there is no longer congruence between one's imaginary idea of the national and the actual experience of the local. The nation via locality looses its homely character. This lack of congruence produces insecurity; loss is experienced and fears are generated in residents and "replay the primordial scene of whether to fight or flee" (ibid., p. 1). Sandercock's example from Perth shows that local residents, instead of being able to incorporate and adapt to the social changes around them, perceive these changes as threats and resist in a variety of possible ways, such as hate crimes, behaving offensively, lodging complaints through local councils, and leaving the neighbour-

hood for more secure, that is, in this logic, more homogeneous neighbourhoods (Sandercock 2000a, p. 5).

But as much as fear is generated in those who have appropriated space, when this space changes, a similar form of alienation, insecurity, and fear is enacted in those who are marginalized in these spaces. It can be described, as Black and feminist authors such as Hooks (1992), Lorde (1984) and Tutu (1999) suggest, as a fear of a negation of one's own identity, and a fear of being subordinated and humiliated. The fear is enacted through social interactions that take place in public urban space. Audrey Lorde's account of her childhood experience on a subway in New York describes this instructively :

> "The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother's sleeve, her arms full of shopping bags, Christmas heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes, the trains lurching. My mother spots an empty seat, pushes my little snow suited body down. On one side of me a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur hat staring at me. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down, pulling mine with. Her leather gloved hand plucks at the line where my new blue snow pants and her sleek coat meet. She jerks her coat closer to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible things she is seeing on the seat between us – probably a roach. But she has communicated her horror to me. It must be something very bad from the way she is looking, so I pull my snowsuit closer to me, away from it too. When I look up the woman is still staring at me, her nose and eyes huge. And suddenly I realize that there is nothing crawling up the seat between us; it is me she doesn't want her coat to touch" (Lorde 1984, pp. 147-148, in Jordan and Weedon 1995, p. 251).

In their analysis of Lorde's account Jordan and Weedon point out two aspects, which are important in this context: firstly, the sense of horror and repugnance in the reactions of White people encountering Blacks. Secondly, and this is an even more fundamental problem, Lorde's story shows not simply an ideology of racism, but "the White woman knows that the brown child is repugnant – knows it in her bones, knows it before she thinks it" (1995, p. 251). Lorde describes in a highly enlightening way the deep-lying sources of fear that determine the encounter of strangers and are in turn informed by stereotypes and prejudices, discourses of fear and danger. The jerking of the coat closer to her body, away from the body of the child to avoid contact illustrates the fear of spatial proximity. To experience and to be

confronted with this form of repugnance and horror, however, has a flipside: the experience of White people as terrorizing.

bell hooks describes this dynamic in her account of moving into a new neighbourhood (1992, p. 170). For hooks, as a young Black woman growing up in White America, moving out of the safety of her Black neighbourhood was a potentially life-threatening experience, one of "that terrifying white-ness – those white faces on the porches staring down on us with hate" (1992, p. 170). This imagery of terror is not commonly brought to light and under-researched, because as hooks notes "in the old days of racial segregation where black folks learned to "wear the mask", many of us pretend to be com-fortable in the face of whiteness only to turn our backs and give expression to intense levels of discomfort" (hooks 1992, p. 169).

Desmond Tutu writing about his own experience in Apartheid South Africa as a Black person describes in an enlightening way the experience of humilia-tion in social interactions with Whites (1999). Tutu writes that it is the daily pinpricks, the little discourtesies, the minute humiliations that gnaw at one's self-esteem and dignity.

From his own experience as a child he recalls:

> "It was the occasions such as going into a shop with my father, this dignified and educated man, and a slip of a girl behind the counter, just because she was white, addressing him. 'Ja, boy'. I died many deaths for my father, who would often then be ingratiating and obse-quious to this badly brought up child[8]: I knew there was little he could do about it. If he took his custom to another shop, he would inevitably be subjected to the same treatment there. There were exceptions, but they were as rare as snow in hell. This kind of treatment demeaned our people and had a deeply corrosive effect on their dignity" (1999, p. 14).

And further:

> "It is difficult to describe the daily public humiliation of having to produce your pass or else join the human crocodile of those who had fallen foul of the law and were now handcuffed together, a public

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8   Respect for and courtesy towards the elderly plays an important part in the social order of Black African culture. Boy was the "universal" term to address Blacks regardless of the age of both the Black and the White person involved, whereas all Whites, again regardless their age, had to be addressed as "Baas" (boss) or Madam.

spectacle, whilst the police waited to have a large enough quota to fill their troop carrier. … Decent men were driven to prison with hardened criminals … only because they had forgotten to carry their pass while they were out on a lunch break" (1999, p. 13)[9].

And from the times when Tutu himself was a father, spending an afternoon with his family at the beachfront in East London in South Africa, he describes the humiliation rooted in the Apartheid system that denied access to certain spaces of the city:

"Not far away was a playground with a miniature train, and our youngest, who was born in England, would say, 'Daddy, I want to go on the swings,' and I would have to reply in a hollow voice, a dead weight in my stomach, 'No, darling, you can't go'. What was I to say when my baby insisted, 'But Daddy, there are other children playing there' – how could I tell her that she could not go because she was not the right kind of child. I died inside many times and was not able to look my child in the eyes because I felt so dehumanised, so humiliated, so diminished. Now I probably felt as my father must have felt when he was humiliated in the presence of his young son." (1999, p. 19).

These humiliations described by Tutu marked the boundaries of domination and subordination confining Non-whites to a mental space of inferiority and preventing their free development as human beings and as citizens of the South African state.

The fear of being terrorized, coupled with the fear of the experience of repugnance and humiliation is described by the authors cited, as enacted in particular through social interactions in space. However, as these social interactions take place in particular places, most commonly in those where the socially marginalized enter the space that is considered and appropriated by the powerful as their 'home', the fear of these social interactions might be extended to the space they occur in. The fear of other people, the fear of being rejected, terrorized or humiliated, becomes a fear of place.

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9   Pass controls in public and also pass raids on people's homes were regular exercises of the Apartheid system. Annual pass prosecutions reached 24,000 in the year 1975 (Bickford-Smith et al 1999b, p. 182).

This fear of being rejected and humiliated can also be understood as enacted and reinforced through the built environment itself. As the example cited above of Sandercock suggests, if a specific environment does not reflect one's own identity, a positive identification with a particular place is impossible and the fragmentation of the outer world causes fear of the disintegration of self as own identity is silenced and denied in and through space. Space then is at least intelligible, and at worst pro-actively subordinates those those whose identities are not represented in urban space. And there seems to be logic behind it. As I described in the subchapter of fear of crime, specific spaces of the city are designed to create a sense of non-membership of undesired people with the aim of excluding them. Specific 'exclusive' urban designs described by Wagner (1993), or the practice of naming streets, squares and other public spaces, which I have described in Chapter 3.1, as a practice of inscribing identity upon space, may be understood as creating senses of membership or non-membership in that they turn specific places unintelligible for certain undesired people. They create a sense of boundaries, separating and distancing one culturally codified space from others and preventing the undesired, those that are imagined as not belonging to the imagined identity of a place, from appropriating the space. The undesired are kept out by hidden messages of intimidation, of not being welcomed or at home in a particular place. This form of intimidation through the spatiality of the city creates a sense of fear of being rejected, humiliated or subordinated.

Spatialities of desire and fear point at the complexity of processes of spatial production. Understanding space as a site for the production and reproduction of desires and fears that charges urban spaces with intense emotional meaning which provide spaces of security not only of impending real danger, but for the integrity and coherence of individual and social identities, radically limits the notion of the equal accessibility of public spaces. It challenges the celebration of public urban space as a space where strangers can meet on an equal basis, where difference can be integrated. While exactly the dis-accordance of the social and spatial context with the self has been celebrated by urban sociologists as the liberating and productive potential of the city, in the readings of fear in the city, the fragmentation of the spatial context is seen as the cause of the fear.

However, recognising space, but also specific desires and fears that shape urban space both through its political as well as cultural production as being socially constructed and as an expression of power relations, opens the way

to understanding urban space as being an expression of the combination of inner and outer worlds, of psychological and structural conflicts played out, in, and through space. This recognition of desires and fears and the politics behind them as important dimensions in the production of urban space helps us understand the complexity of Apartheid urban space and its transformation.

4 Cape Town – Desires and Fears in the Making of an Apartheid City

The politics of emotion as described in the previous chapters played an important role in the historic development of Cape Town's urban culture and urban space. At the same time, Cape Town's history represents a good illustration of the theoretical debates and assumptions. In this chapter, under in section 4.1, I will discuss how Cape Town's urban culture has been formed by a colonial and Apartheid discourse of power that established unequal relationships between the immigrant 'self' and the indigenous 'other,' and defined the city as a place of 'crossing' and 'mixing' of cultures in terms of a threat rather than a desirable condition of urban life. Cape Town's urban culture, I will argue, can be understood as being constituted by the togetherness of socially constructed strangers who were meant to be enemies. People have been forcefully alienated from each other by a political discourse of White fear of the other in order to allow the dominance of the White population. In section 4.2, I focus on how an urban spatial politics of separation, control and regulation was informed by this discourse of power, which was crucial to its enforcement and stabilisation. Urban spatial politics served to prevent the spatial proximity of different racial groups, leading to social proximity as well as to the 'mixing' of different race groups; it aimed at enforcing strangeness and alienation amongst urban dwellers and, as I will argue in the third section, resulted in the fragmented urban landscape of Cape Town which has led on the one hand to the entanglement of identity, space and difference, and on the other to the development of "sacred" spaces, to images and imaginations of urban space, which are charged with the emotions of desire and fear (Chapter 4.3). The final section of this chapter identifies the central challenges involved in the ongoing transformation of urban space in Cape Town, arguing for the need of a spatial politics of reconciliation.

4.1 The City of Strangers: The Social Construction of Ambivalence

Cape Town as a whole has consistently presented itself as the "Mother City" of the Nation, the crucible of White settlement of Southern Africa (Worden 1997, p. 32). Founded by the Dutch East India Company as a refreshment station and stop-over port for sea traffic between the East Indies and Holland in 1652, Cape Town can be understood as the origin and the heart of European colonialism and settlement in Southern Africa (UPRU 1990b, p. 5f; Worden et al 1998). White European settlers who immigrated to South Africa from the 17th century onwards and classically would be regarded as 'strangers' (see Chapter 2.1), considered themselves the rightful owners of the land they settled on, since no permanent settlement existed at the Cape at the time of their arrival (Western 1984, p. 205; Worden 1997, p. 37). Indigenous inhabitants of the land around the Cape were hunter-gatherer and nomadic pastoral San and Khoikhoi people who had not established any permanent settlements. Thus, White settler history in South Africa was founded on the myth of the 'empty land', in terms of which the Cape 'belonged' to them as discoverers and first settlers (Worden 1997, p. 37). The San and Khoikhoi people were decimated after the arrival of the White settlers by warfare, dispossession of pasturage, and disease. Some fled to the remoter Northern Cape and Namibia, whereas others were incorporated, together with slaves, into the labour force of White owned farms (ibid.).

Although the idea of the city itself can be understood as having been imposed on the indigenous people at the Cape who were lacking an urban tradition, the culture of South African cities must also be understood as having been shaped by White power-holders' perceptions of the perceived cultural gulf between themselves and local peoples, and the conceived validation of themselves as the 'civilised', 'orderly', 'superior' and rightful owners of the land, and the local peoples as 'uncivilised', 'disorderly', 'inferior' and intruders on the land[10]. It is an urban culture that has been shaped, above all, by the political will to enforce and maintain White cultural and political hegemony, but at the same time by the economic need for a cheap labour force, especially in the context of capitalist industrialization – it is an urban culture of difference that sought to establish and maintain the domination of a White minority over a Non-White majority (Western 1984, p. 205).

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10 Since, in the European tradition, the achievement of civilization is inextricably bound to the city, the fact that indigenous people at the Cape had not established a city justified European settlers perceptions of indigenous people as 'uncivilised' (see Chidester 2000, p. 6).

However, Cape Town also had a reputation of being unique in the South African context for its tradition of racial tolerance – although the dictates of the National Party government put an end to this in 1948. The non-racial franchise and formal equality of all citizens before the law and the possibility and practice of mixed racial marriages between Whites, Coloureds and Indians, as well as comparatively little residential segregation, are the main reasons for Cape Town's reputation as having been a place of racial harmony and integration (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 67). The actions of the liberal Cape administrators from the 1830s to the 1880s were informed by the idea of a civilising mission with regard to the indigenous population. Taking the supremacy of European civilisation for granted, they believed that assimilation was possible and desirable. Education, labour, conversion to Christianity, proximity to Whites and urbanization, were thus seen as major agencies for change and assistance in the desired project of their mission (Bickford-Smith 1995, pp. 68-69). The strategy of assimilation and urbanization of indigenous people was already in the 19th century linked to economic interests, with Blacks and Whites providing a sufficient and moreover cheap labour force in the Western Cape's economy (Western 1981; Bickford-Smith 1995; Posel 1991).

Bickford-Smith and others have shown that the tradition of liberalism started to fade, as the numbers of Blacks and Coloureds increased. Until the 1950s, the majority of urban dwellers, in particular in Cape Town, were White[11]. The number of Coloured people, to which belonged the indigenous San and Khoikhoi people, the imported slaves from the East Indies, as well as those born out of mixed relationships between Whites and Non-Whites, were however almost equally strong in numerical terms. Until the 1970s, Black Africans were a clear minority in the Western Cape, but this changed in the 1980s with the introduction of the 'strategy of orderly urbanization'. The increasing proportion of Black and Coloured people as well as a growing Black and Coloured bourgeoisie challenged the privileged status occupied by people

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11 In 1865, the proportions of the different population groups were as follows: 53,13% White, 45, 9% Coloured and Asian, 0,96% Black Africans. This changed in 1946 to 47,1% White, 44,75% Coloured and Asian and 0,98% Black Africans. In 1975, there were 30% Whites, 57,9% Coloureds and Asians and 11,9% Black Africans (see Western 1981, p. 48). In the year 1996, the total population of the Cape Metropolitan Area was estimated to have been about 2.7 million, comprising 23,5% Whites, 48,9% Coloureds, 1% Asians, and 26,16% Black Africans with Black African urbanization projected to become the highest in the next 30 years (1996 Census results, see http://www.cmc.gov.za).

with a light complexion in spite of their supposed liberalism (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 73). In response, the Colonial government created social distance between Whites, Coloureds and Blacks by increasingly limiting the right to urban citizenship from the first part of the 20th century onwards through a set of different national and local laws and regulations. In terms of these, cities were seen as the "white men's creation" and thus the living spaces of the White population, as set out in a government paper of 1904: "let them [the Black and Coloureds] understand that the towns of the Colony are the special places of abode for the white men, who are the governing race" (quoted in Western 1984, p. 209).

This notion conceptually turned Blacks especially into 'aliens', and 'temporary sojourners', limiting their role to that of guest workers, their presence to mere economic activity in urban areas. In 1923, the Native Act limited Black migration into urban areas to those who worked there, thereby enabling Whites to expel 'the idle, the dissolute and disorderly' and enforcing the compulsory residence of Blacks in locations separate from the city (Bickford-Smith et al 1999, p. 87). In 1939, Cape Town was declared a 'closed city' by the national Native Affairs Department, making immigration and residence for Blacks in Cape Town impossible without a working permit stamped into a Passport, which had to be carried at all times (Bickford-Smith et al 1999, p. 107).

The notion of limited citizenship, the creation of social distance set in a space of domination and subordination, as well as a conceived need for social and spatial separation, all culminated in the system of 'Apartheid' introduced by the National Party in 1948 (see Bickford-Smith 1995; Maylam 1995; Western 1984a). 'Apartheid', the Afrikaans word for apartness, which was officially regarded as the only possible way for different races to co-exist, has been described by critics of the system as the only way for the White race to sustain its supremacy and to reverse the increasing racial and economic integration, especially in urban areas (e.g. Western 1984a, p. 114; Adam 1969, p. 11; Parnell et al 1995; Posel 1991; Atkinson 1991). As Adam points out, the ideology of Apartheid can in theory be understood as an extreme form of cultural and social pluralism (1969, p. 40). The project of Apartheid did not aim at the eradication and replacement of traditional communities or other forms of sociation nor at the totalitarian homogenisation and assimilation of divergent forms of living, ideologies, and other belief systems. Instead, the National Party government ruled according to the principle of "divide et

impera": separatist tendencies in language, religion and ethnocentric tradi-
tions were encouraged and the separation institutionalised in a hierarchised
order (ibid.).

In theory, Apartheid aimed at a division of the country so that different race
groups could live under equal conditions, and pursue conflict-free 'separate
development' (ibid., p. 48). In practice, this was never realized though – nei-
ther in its extent nor in its promise of equal living conditions – due to the
economic dependency of the White regime on the Non-white cheap labour
force in the country and its cities (Western 1981, 1984; Adam 1969). In the
cities, the Apartheid order displayed its most fundamental contradiction
(Maylam 1995, p. 20). The Apartheid politics of racial segregation had to
solve the anomaly it had created with the notion that cities are the "abode" of
Whites: after all, there were also Coloureds and Blacks in the urban space. It
sought to solve this ambivalence deriving from the presence of Blacks and
Coloureds in urban space by fixing people to racialised identities and creating
a rigid, hierarchised social order. In 1950, the Population Registration Act of-
ficially divided South Africans into 'White', 'Coloured', 'Asian' or 'Native'
('African'/'Black') groups, forcing all Capetonians older than 16 to carry
identity cards specifying their race (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 157). The laws
of 'Petty Apartheid', in particular the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (in
1949) and the Immorality Act (in 1950), which governed sexual conduct
between members of different race groups, thereby extending the prohibition
of sexual relations with Whites, which had already applied to Blacks since
1928, to Coloureds and Indians as well, aimed at preventing social contact
and the mixing of different races (Bickford-Smith et al 1999, p. 157).

Apartheid was based on the 'friction theory'[12], the belief that any contact
between races inevitably produces conflict, and on the conviction that pure
'racial', ethnic, and cultural identities were not only real but also "the desir-
able basis for ordering and controlling South Africa" (Field 1999, p. 227).

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12   After being elected into power in 1948, the National Party established the so-called
     Tomlinson Commission: a body of experts who were to provide both a scientific and theo-
     retical basis for the political project of racial segregation, plus to make practical recom-
     mendations on how to enforce racial segregation. A central component of the Tomlinson
     Report was the elaboration of a theoretical model of cultural contact, which was based on
     biological models of the development of organisms, and predicted that any cultural contact
     would eventually lead to the disappearance of the European culture (Ashforth 1990,
     p. 150).

As various authors writing on Apartheid urban policies suggest, an important ingredient in the development of Apartheid legislation was the racial fear of the White ruling minority, which became increasingly outnumbered, especially in urban areas (Ngubane 1963, p. 233). The escalating presence of Black Africans in the cities and their increasing incorporation into Cape Town's economy from the beginning of the 20th century generated fears of being "invaded" and "swamped" by Blacks or "native" Africans, of importing the African 'wilderness' into the cities, and thereby having the purity of the White race, and civilization, threatened by contamination (Western 1984a, p. 223).

The mixing and crossing of identities, the existence and development of cultural hybridity, which in European sociological imaginations was perceived as a productive quality of the city (see Chapter 2.1), was in Cape Town perceived as a threat to the social and political order of Apartheid (Field 1999, p. 231). Apartheid urban politics purposefully sought to undermine what urban sociologists also describe as the productive quality of the city – the crossing of boundaries and the in-determination and multiplicity of identities and relationships. In the light of the perceived numerical preponderance of Non-whites, the architects of Apartheid reasoned that cultural contact and intermixing had to be prohibited to prevent the integration and disappearance of European culture (Ashforth 1990, p. 156). Steven Robins in his essay "Out of Place: …" (1999) cites postcolonial author Homi Bhaba to highlight a crucial fear of the White ruling minority in South Africa. Bhaba notes that "the hybrid other who mimes the Master produces an anxiety and ambivalence in the colonizer that destabilizes the binary of self/other" (1985). In South Africa, Robins argues, "the culturally hybrid, 'westernised' urban African threatens to destabilize the established Self/Other binary.": At stake was not only cultural hegemony and the purity of the White race, but the very social and cultural order that was crucial to the establishment and maintenance of the White minority's dominance (1999, p. 459). And as Jordan K. Ngubane in "An African Explains Apartheid" notes in 1963, White South Africans feared the loss of political control and in particular the loss of social and economic privilege that was a crucial part and objective of Apartheid politics (1963, p. 233; Adam 1969; Western 1981, 1984a).

These fears escalated with the increasing urbanization of Blacks and with the increasingly organized resistance to the enforced discrimination against and subordination of Blacks, creating a sort of perpetual mobile of fear, which

informed White politics. For the Afrikaner National Party government not to hold on to the system of racial oppression meant the ultimate apocalypse for the White nation: "the sluice gates of vengeance would be opened, and the country would be drowned in a terrible blood bath" (Ngubane 1963, p. 234). There was the fear that the Black masses would take revenge and pay back the violence imposed on them, leading to complete devastation, even slaughter and eviction of White South Africans, which held the White government in a 'catch 22' situation (Ibid., see also Adam 1969, p. 11).

The new strategy of 'orderly urbanisation' in the 1980s that, for the first time, allowed and provided for permanent settlement of Black people in Cape Town and in other cities in the country, as well as the relaxation of other Apartheid laws, therefore did not mean that the fear was assuaged. Instead it can be understood as a new political course that was still informed by the fear of an apocalypse. However, vehement local protests that made the Townships increasingly ungovernable plus international sanctions, which led to the economic isolation of South Africa, made reform seem the only way to maintain power and settle the fundamental economic and political crises of the Apartheid state (Mabin 1991, p. 40).

However, fear was also an important political means for the legitimisation of the Apartheid system itself on the one hand and a means of oppression on the other hand. As oppressive and totalitarian as the colonial and Apartheid government may have been in many ways, there was no dictatorship that required public legitimisation (Adam 1969, p. 38). Even though governance was exclusive to the White population, there was still a democratic system under Apartheid, an elected government, and a Progressive Party, which functioned as opposition. There was also a parliament, which promulgated laws, and a judiciary system that sentenced people according to the laws of the country (Adam 1969, p. 51). Even though, in the heyday of Apartheid, opponents of the system were detained and often arbitrarily charged with crimes they did not commit, there was still a need for justification of the laws of the Apartheid state and of the racial system itself. These justifications were based on scientific explanations of White superiority, which defined Blacks and Coloureds as culturally and biologically other and inferior, as they were in the ideology of Apartheid, which conceived of racial separation as necessary for social harmony. The fundamental moral support was, however, generated by the fears of the White population (Biko 1971, p. 77). At the turn of the previous century, discourses and 'moral panics' of crime and disease had been

linked to Blacks as a racial group rather than to their living conditions, and this provided the justification for the implementation of social and spatial distance and the relocation of Blacks from Cape Town's docks (Van Heyningen 1981; Bickford-Smith 1995, Western 1984). White fears that the status quo was under threat because of the increasing urbanization of Blacks in the first decades of the 20th century underpinned the election campaign of the National Party in 1948 (Pinnock 1989, p. 150).

Many authors writing about the beginnings of Apartheid agree that the political slogan of the 'swart gevaar' (black peril), played a crucial role in helping the party seize power (Adam 1969; Minkley 1999; Pinnock 1989; Posel 1991; Western 1984). In the climate of the 'cold war' being waged between the USA and the Soviet Union, and virulent anticommunism in the western world, the fear of 'black peril' was coupled with 'red peril' by the National Party government, who were quick to point out the disasters that had befallen African countries that had adopted socialism after independence from colonial governments (Bussiek 1999, p. 47; Tutu 1999, p. 189). The ideology of 'total strategy' was devised by president P.W. Botha in the 1980s to respond to what was conceived as a 'total onslaught' from a communism that was seeking to overthrow a Christian government, as they thought of themselves, and replacing it with an 'ungodly, atheistic, undemocratic, Communist dictatorship' (Tutu 1999, p. 189). This 'total strategy' legitimised the effective militarization of the state ruled by the State Security Council, and justified the reckless methods of repression of those who opposed the government: these were identified as 'terrorists' who were also 'communists' (ibid.).

Blacks and Coloureds have to be understood as victims of these racial fears, since they were persistently on the receiving end of negative projections onto and White imaginary constructions of them. Apartheid laws such as the Pass Laws were extremely humiliating and wounding to the dignity and self-esteem of Black people. The stories of humiliations, some of which I have described in Chapter 3.2, are endless; they were a daily experience for Blacks and Coloureds, and in particular for Blacks in South Africa. These humiliations, as Desmond Tutu has argued, marked the boundaries of domination and subordination, confining Non-whites to a mental space of inferiority and preventing their free development as human beings and as a citizens of the South African state (1999, p. 13).

Apart from using humiliation in this way, the White government also used fear as a weapon to oppress any kind of resistance to the Apartheid system.

Steve Biko, political activist and leader in the Black Consciousness Movement of South Africa in the 1970s, and who died at the age of 30 resulting from torture while in police detention in 1977, wrote in his short essay on "Fear as an Important Determinant in South African Politics" in 1971 how the White government and the security police as its extended arm acted upon the maxim "if you cannot make a man respect you, then make him fear you" (1971, p. 76).

The multiple and arbitrary laws regulating and confining Blacks' activities, writes Biko, left Blacks in a situation, where "no average black man [sic] can ever at any moment be absolutely sure that he is not breaking a law" (1971, p. 75). The brutal and regular intimidations and harassments of Black people by the police of the White state, such as the Pass controls, house raids, arbitrary arrests under one of the many Acts, brutal tortures in police detention, and violent oppressions of public protests, left Black communities, especially those who were politically active, in absolute fear of the police, of detention, torture and death (Ibid.). The dimension of state brutality in the heyday of Apartheid in the 1960s until the 1990s was exposed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 20,000 statements of gross human rights violations that occurred between 1960 and 1994 were brought forward, including those that had been committed by the anti-Apartheid movement against Whites, but obviously excluding all sorts of harassments and intimidations that occurred at the hands of the White government on a daily basis (Tutu 1999, p. 39). Living in the city, especially for Blacks, was linked to daily experiences of deprivation (in both material and psychological terms) and intimidation, which, as I will argue in the next two chapters, was enhanced and reproduced through the spatial structure of the city.

Cape Town's urban culture can clearly be understood as a product of the discourse and practice of White domination, which took it for granted that cities were the creation and living space of Whites. The negotiation of self-other relationships in Cape Town can be understood as a constant process of defining and enforcing the clarity of boundaries between 'us' and 'them', which were informed by White fears of loss of control and privilege, and also of the 'purity' of European culture and White/European identities. However, the development of clear-cut distinctions between a White 'us' and a Non-white 'them' who threatened the conceived social order, occurred along a bumpy road on which the notion of 'us' and 'them' was fractioned in various ways.

Most clearly conceived of as 'other' were the Blacks in urban areas, not only in that they had a skin of different colour, but because they were perceived as responsible for bringing the 'uncivilized' and the 'barbarian,' that is, a rural way of life, into the city (slaughtering animals in backyards, grazing cattle on green fields in the city), thereby blurring the boundaries between rural ('the wilderness') and urban life[13]. Dealing with this otherness shifted from attempts at assimilation in the 19th century to segregation and exclusion in the 20th century. For Coloureds who were born in the city and who had achieved a relatively high social and economic status, there was, until the beginning of the 20th century, a possibility of being included in the 'us', as long as they had 'social respectability'. During the 20th century they were, however, increasingly excluded from White society and separated from Whites as a distinct social class through Apartheid laws.

To conceive of Whites as a unified group in the light of the described processes of exclusion and separation of Non-whites is tempting, but also misleading. The Anglo-Boer Wars (1880; 1886 and 1899-1902) in the north of the country over diamonds and gold fields, which ended in the victory of the British, as well as the First World War, deepened the tension, still perceptible today, between the descendants of English and Dutch immigrants respectively (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 58). Today, an important aspect of this tension are the respective relationships of the British and Dutch descendants to their countries of origin: whereas many British descendants still hold British passports and use English as their mother tongue, Dutch immigrants who are usually referred to as Boers or Afrikaners, normally no longer hold Dutch passports and have developed a new language, Afrikaans, which is close to Dutch, yet an independent language, making a return to their countries of origin more difficult than it would be for the British. The First World War also invoked conflict and hostility towards the German community in Cape Town, leading to violent acts against their businesses, to the restriction of German businesses in the city, and to German encampment outside the city (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 56). Bickford-Smith et al also describe the rising xenophobia of the British government towards increasing, 'undesired' immigration of Russian Jews, Italians, South Americans, and Portuguese, quoting a voice in the newspaper, "South African Review" in 1903: "if making the country a

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13 In "Waiting for the Barbarians" (1980), South African poet and writer J.M. Coetzee describes this fear of the 'African wilderness' threatening South African cities in an insightful way.

'white man's land' means filling it with such as these, then for goodness sake let us stick to the black worker" (Bickford-Smith et al 1999, p. 25). During the era of Apartheid, the National Party government promoted and supported a distinct Afrikaner Nationalism, encouraged Afrikaner urbanization, and created cultural institutions within the city (Western 1981, pp. 224-227). However, in the light of Whites increasingly becoming a minority in the city, the Apartheid government also saw the need to create solidarity and loyalty amongst Whites, as the pompous "Van Riebeeck Tercentenary" celebrations of 300 years of White rule in 1952 showcased: lauding the origin of a White South African Nation by acknowledging both the Dutch and British roots of South African culture, was an attempt to cut across social divides (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 164).

Despite the National Party's efforts to impose racialised identities on South Africans, these identities are in reality multiple and hybrid (Sharp 1997, p. 7), cross-cutting each other in multiple ways and in multiple contexts depending on factors of expedience, recruitment, mobilisation, and company (Thornton 1996, p. 150). As Thornton argues, "there is no fundamental identity that any South African clings to in common with all or most other South Africans" (Ibid.). The state imposed fundamental differences and identity is race, but beyond that there are Xhosas; the British and the Afrikaners; there are Zulus and Sothos; there are Greeks, Portuguese, Germans and Malays; there are refugees and immigrants from other African countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Burundi, Somalia and Ruanda. There are Christians representing various denominations, Jews, Muslims and Hindi; there are those who believe in their ancestors and those who do not believe in any religion at all (Da Costa 1994, p. 55). When you walk through Cape Town, you hear many different indigenous or indigenised languages, such as English, Afrikaans, Isixhosa, Isizulu, Sesotho, Portuguese, and German. English and Afrikaans are the lingua franca[14], and many people whose mother tongue is English do not understand or speak any of the other languages. Similarly, many people, whose mother tongue is one of the other languages, do not speak or understand English. All this, apart from the classification and alienation of race groups, contributes to a certain kind of strangeness amongst Capeto-

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14   South Africa has adopted 11 official languages: English and Afrikaans as languages of European origin, and nine African languages.

nians, where people's knowledge about each other is limited but imbued with a multitude of 'myths' and 'stereotypes'[15].

It is a strangeness, however, that, especially under Apartheid, was deeply imbued with an ideology that positioned strangers in a discriminative social order, seeking to take away in-determination by conceiving of and stigmatising the other, the Non-White, as inferior and threatening in order to legitimise separation and discrimination. Above all, it is a strangeness deeply imbued with fear[16].

4.2 The City of Control: Dealing with Fear through Separation, Control and Regulation of Space

Apartheid urban planning is probably one of the most extreme examples of how space can explicitly be used to enforce ideology. As many authors have argued, the practice of racial segregation has been an important device to perpetuate White social dominance (Dixon 1997, p. 17; Western 1981, p. 85; Awotona et al 1995, p. 1; Rallis 1992, p. 237) and to secure White economic and material interests (Maylam 1995; Marcuse 1995). This was done not only by structurally disadvantaging Blacks and Coloureds by designating them to spaces far away from urban opportunities (e.g. Western 1981, p. 85). It was also done by alienating them from each other in order to prevent the evolution of a common urban society as well as a cross-racial solidarity, in particular among the working class who could form resistance, which could destabilise existing power relations (Atkinson 1991, p. 272; Adam 1969, p. 68).

However, as I seek to show in this chapter, the production of urban space must be understood as more than a reflection of a racist ideology and of forms of state capitalism imposed by Apartheid. As much as the culture of

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15 This strangeness deriving from ignorance and non-contact is described by South African writer Nadine Gordimer in her novel "A World of Strangers" (1958), where she illustrates the separate worlds of Whites and Blacks in Johannesburg in the 1950s from the perspective of a young White Englishman who comes to work in Johannesburg for a couple of months, and who, as a stranger, has access to both worlds and finds himself lost in between.

16 The fact that almost every White household had Blacks and Coloureds – that is those that were feared as invaders, as carriers of diseases, as criminals and as terrorists – working for them as domestic servants, as cleaners, gardeners, cooks, and in particular as nannies taking care of White children, is one of the greatest paradoxes of South African society (see Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 194).

and social relationships in the city were informed by a fear of otherness, of being invaded, and of becoming something other, the production of urban space in Cape Town and today's fragmented urban landscape must also be understood as a product of a spatial politics of fear that has characterized urban development in Cape Town since the establishment of the first spatial structures, and that was expanded through the introduction of modernist planning approaches in the city from the early 20th century onwards. In the first part of this section I illustrate the tradition of concern with order and the increasing imperative of modernist thought in the production of urban space in Cape Town. In the second part of the section, I describe the actual spatial politics of segregation, arguing that urban planning in Cape Town can be understood as a means of assuaging the fears of Whites by creating safe places for them by means of separation, homogenisation, and strict regulation of both public and private space, thereby producing dangerous places, which in themselves legitimised the very system of Apartheid.

The Tradition of Fear in Cape Town's Urban Spatial Politics

In the two volumes of a detailed historical survey of Cape Town's social and spatial development, the historians Bickford-Smith, Elisabeth van Heyningen and Nigel Worden clearly identify the fear of disorder as a main characteristic of Cape Town's urban development throughout history (Bickford-Smith et al 1999; Worden et al 1998): The practice of ordering urban space in Cape Town can be understood as a persistent attempt at controlling, taming and civilizing the perceived wilderness – both the wilderness of the rough nature in the Cape and the 'wilderness' of human beings: firstly the San and Khoikhoi peoples; then the imported slaves, especially after they had been liberated under British Rule in 1838; later the urban poor who consisted of former slaves and of refugees fleeing the English-Boer war that was raging on the Rand in the north of South Africa between 1899 and 1902; of immigrating Blacks from rural areas; of European immigrants arriving in greater numbers in Cape Town from the beginning of the 20th century; and later again under Apartheid in particular and far more explicitly, everybody who was categorized Non-white (ibid.). In this ordering process, the construction of boundaries played an important role from the early days. An early spatial testimony of Dutch Company Rule from 1652-1790, for example, is the Castle, first built in 1666 as a fortress against indigenous peoples, but even more so against potential European enemies arriving from the sea (Dooling 1994, p. 9).

Other spatial testimonies of the time are the grid layout of the first city streets and the Company's Gardens, which had to be defended against the claims of Khoi-Khoi peoples using the land for pasture ground (Worden et al 1998; UPRU 1990). In the first approximately hundred years of British Rule from the 1790s onwards, no spatial restructuring occurred; new architectural styles were mainly added onto existing structures (Worden et al 1998). The British government, however, started to survey and map the colony and the city much more thoroughly than the Dutch government had done, and developed a scientific approach of measuring; essentially, this was a new form of controlling and ordering (ibid., p. 95). The ordering of society occurred in the light of an emerging new commercial class that was challenging the order and control of the political elite more consciously than before, albeit not by spatial means, but rather by social means: it established an exclusionary 'class of social respectability', defined by economic status, occupation, education, and the rather vague notion of a standard of civilization (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 67-72).

A discourse of racial segregation started to emerge in the 1880s, which was directed particularly against the urban poor and fused with 'sanitary discourses', fuelled by the outbreak of the smallpox epidemic in 1882 and the bubonic plague in 1901 (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 75). Referring to the studies of Maynard Swanson (1977) and Christopher Saunders (1979), as well as building on his own historic research of ethnic relationships in Victorian Cape Town at the end of the last century, Bickford-Smith deconstructs the myth of and pride taken in Cape Town as a spatially integrated city before 1948. The relocation of Blacks working and living on the docks and elsewhere in central Cape Town after the outbreak of the bubonic plague, to the outlying encampment of 'Uitvlugt Native Location'[17] that was later named Ndabeni, can be understood as the creation of the first Black Township in Cape Town, and the relocation itself interpreted as a sign of the emerging practice of urban residential segregation in the name of health and sanitation long before the National Party came into power (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 75).

Bickford-Smith in his paper "South African Urban History, Racial Segregation and the Unique Case of Cape Town?" argues that, while there were otherwise few forms of residential segregation, forms of exclusionary social seg-

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17 "Uitvlugt" is Dutch and can be translated as 'escape' or 'evasion'.

regation that separated all Blacks and Coloureds from Whites in many areas of potential social interaction in public institutions and spaces, such as hospitals, mission schools, prisons and sports fields, came into being at the end of the 19th century (1995, p. 67). Also, some public spaces, such as the Company Gardens in the inner city of Cape Town were reserved for 'Europeans' only, as were waiting rooms in courts, lavatories at Cape Town's railway station, day-nurseries, bath houses, and Cape Town's main beaches. This formal segregation provided separate spaces for 'Europeans' and 'Non-Europeans' (ibid.). In many new emerging institutions in the first part of the 20th century, such as cinemas, cafes, hotels, and restaurants, segregation occurred but was not reinforced by legislation. Many cinemas were reserved for Whites or Coloureds only; some put Whites on seats upstairs, whereas Coloureds sat in the stalls; many White-owned cafes, hotels, restaurants and hairdressers did not serve Coloureds or Blacks at all (ibid.). Religious institutions such as churches were formally open to all, but implemented some form of segregation, be it the separate training of ministers, congregations, confirmation classes, or seating arrangements with Coloureds and Blacks seated in the back rows (ibid.). Until 1948, segregation of public spaces was not part of a coherent political strategy, however, and many public spaces in Cape Town, such as public transport and gardens, zoos, libraries, museums, galleries, as well as the University of Cape Town, were still generally open to all (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 125).

However, it was during this time that notions of ethnic difference and separation were slowly transformed into discourses and practices of racism and racial segregation (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 67), which were in their character and implementation highly influenced by western modernist thought on the city on the one hand and by the greater need for exercising control to maintain White power on the other hand (Japha 1986; Parnell et al 1995; Pinnock 1989; UPRU 1990; Wilkinson 1981).

Susan Parnell and Alan Mabin in their paper "Rethinking Urban South Africa" (1995) point out the importance of the imperative of modernist thought, which was imported from Europe and took root in South Africa long before 1948. Parnell and Mabin argue that at the beginning of the 20th century rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, and foreign immigration radically transformed South African cities and required more comprehensive forms of urban management. It gave rise to the development of urban planning as a profession in South Africa, and was increasingly influenced by the modernist movement in

architecture and planning developed in Europe (1995, p. 53). It furthermore provided the conceptual and practical tools for a specific spatial politics of identity and emotion in the name of modernisation and progress.

The design model of the "Garden City", developed by English architect Ebenezar Howard, came to be seen as an appropriate solution to the rising housing problem from the end of the First World War onwards. In Cape Town, Maitland Garden Village was developed for Coloured municipal employees in 1919, Pinelands Garden City was developed for White occupation in 1922, and Langa for African people in 1923; all of them were, however, implemented in a reduced form, leaving out the socialist ideas that inform the concept (UPRU 1990, p. 42). The 'Garden City' concept, not only as a design model, but also as an idea of urban life, expresses and enforces an 'anti-city ethic' prevailing in Cape Town since the 19th century. It promotes an urban social and spatial order of decentralisation, low dwelling unit density[18] (de-crowding), homogenisation, and separation of land use – suburbia as the model of urban life (ibid.). Considering the theoretical discussions in Chapter 3, the 'Garden City' with its inward looking spatial form surrounded by green belts, provided the conceptual and practical tools for enforcing fragile social boundaries, and to create conceptual clearness of boundaries by making the boundaries between the self and the other, the inside and the outside, the safe and the unsafe, visible and tangible in and through space. It created spaces of containment, which served not only the perpetuation of White social, economic, and political domination – as most commentators of the Apartheid city suggest (e.g. UPRU 1990, p. 42; Western 1981) – but furthermore served to (re-)create spaces of safety and stability for the White population who feared the disintegration of their identity by allowing the projection of internal and collective fears onto an outside world (see below).

Another example illustrating how the emergence of modernist thought in urban planning projects in Cape Town allowed the pursuit colonial interests on the one hand and characterised urban planning as a spatial politics of identity and emotion on the other hand, are the plans for the redevelopment of the Foreshore, which began before the Second World War and were initiated by the railways administration in the name of modernisation and progress in terms of reclaiming the Foreshore from Table Bay for the location of

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18 Single-storey dwelling units on single plots are the dominant image of most of Cape Town (UPRU 1990, p. 99)

a new railway station (Pinnock 1989, p. 152; Parnell et al 1995). The ideas for this redevelopment were strongly influenced by Swiss architect LeCorbusier who had, at the Town Planning Congress held in Johannesburg in 1938, exhibited a model of the reconstruction of central Cape Town (Pinnock 1989, p. 155). The model showed huge free-standing slab constructions marching from the docks towards the mountain, sweeping away the residential areas of the docks, District Six, Salt River, and Woodstock (ibid.). South African architect Norman Hanson, introducing LeCorbusier's model at the congress, expressed an unambiguously colonialist spirit in referring to the character of the urban planning profession:

> "National sentiment fixes Cape Town as the focal point of South African history and character. White civilisation gained its first hazardous foothold on that southern peninsula and from there it has spread in successive waves into the great hinterland. The atmosphere and character that time alone can create can be sensed where man has established himself along the sculpturesque lower slopes of Table Mountain" (quoted in Pinnock 1989, p. 156).

Furthermore, in true modernist, progressive style, Hanson comments on the character of the planning:

> "We must concentrate our first activities at the city's centre, so that freedom of movement, accessibility and breathing space can be restored where they are vital. It is possible to achieve this radical reorganisation by drastic methods only, by fresh start on clear ground. This ruthless eradication directed towards a re-vitalising process we have, following LeCorbusier's lead, named the Surgical Method … through surgery we must create order, through organisation we must make manifest the spirit of a new age" (quoted in Pinnock 1989, p. 156).

Subsequent models for the redevelopment of the Foreshore developed by French architect E.E. Beaudouin for the Cape Municipality and by British planner F.L. Thompson and South African academic architect Professor L.W. Thornton White, maintained the monumental approach of the plans with its main objectives – apart from locating the station and providing roads and parks – to create a monumental 'Gateway of South Africa', placing a new Civic Hall at the head of the 'Monumental Approach' from the harbour to the heart of the city, and to "offer a dignified civic welcome to distinguished

visitors on ceremonial occasions," as the report of town planning advisers to the Foreshore scheme in 1940 states (quoted in Pinnock 1989, p. 152). Both these plans involved the destruction of areas perceived by the government as slums: the docks, District Six, and in the case of Beaudouin's plan, also the Malay Quarter (Pinnock 1989, p. 152). After settling a fierce dispute between the railways and the Cape Town Municipality, building began in 1947 (ibid.). Mainly because of financial constraints, these plans have never been implemented to the full, although they have, however, subsequently led to the separation of Cape Town's central city from the shoreline, and to the construction of high-rise buildings, "impersonal, totalitarian structures", housing offices of central or local government, and to the erection of a six lane high-rise freeway in the 1970s between the Foreshore and the harbour[19]. These plans and their manifestation on the Foreshore have since been stigmatised as "Cape Town's greatest planning disaster" (Cape Argus, quoted in Worden 1997, p. 36).

As Wilkinson (1981) and Japha (1986) argue, modernist thought clearly lent itself to Apartheid. Modernism conceived of urban planning as a product of rationality, that is, as "the logical product of sociological, psychological and technical analysis". rather than as a question of political choice (Japha 1986, p. 4), and thus provided the architects of Apartheid with powerful tools to set up an Apartheid state that would enforce White order and power: The belief in the rationality of Enlightenment as an ordering principle furthermore legitimised the strict conceptual ordering of categories and enforced the association of categories with different binaries. As was already true for colonial order, under the Apartheid order 'civilized' was bound to 'White', and 'uncivilized' to 'Non-white' or particularly 'Black.' The city was conceived as 'civilized' in terms of being healthy, clean, socially and racially homogeneous and segregated, decentralised and controlled; in contrast, disease and disorder became more clearly associated with the living areas of Blacks and Coloureds, thereby legitimising urban segregation. At the same time, urban areas were portrayed as especially dangerous and alien environments for Africans (Robins 1999, p. 458). In accordance with the notion of Apartheid enabling separate development for different races, 'detribalised' urban Africans were portrayed as increasingly "dysfunctional victims of the corrosive social forces of the city", which served as another argument for

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19 One lane of this high-rise freeway has still not been finished until today and is the object of many mockeries about the city.

urban segregation, which conceived of the true home of Blacks as being the homelands (ibid.). The belief in powerful orderly interventions by the state in social structure and in space, land-use zoning and concerted planning projects, surveillance, and control of space, provided the tools for social engineering in and through space and for the implementation of the Group Areas Act, which led to the relocation of thousands of Capetonians and will be described in the following subchapter (Japha 1986, p. 4; Bickford-Smith et al 1999, pp. 143-197; Pinnock 1989; Parnell et al 1995).

It is of central importance in the context of this research to understand the modernist approach to the city as a tool to disguise the political, irrational and emotional in Colonial and Apartheid urban politics. The imperative of rationality and modernisation comfortably hid the "anxious, premodern, theocratic spirit, which asserted that the locus of authority lay beyond reach in God himself" (Morphet 1999, p. 148). As Morphet points out, the modernist social engineering plan or "the instrumental rationality of modernity" was put to work to shape and enforce an Old Testament order of being the superiority of Whites over other races. An army of bureaucrats managed the machinery of universal control, but the sources of authority remained beyond question in the realm of the revealed truth granted to a chosen people to claim and domesticate the promised land" (Morphet 1999, p. 148). The imperative of modernist planning enabled the disguise of racial fears as the new rationality of modernisation. The election of the NP government and the official start of Apartheid contributed the last missing ingredient in the realisation of grand style urban intervention: the political will, which brought to a logical conclusion what had been conceived in theory (Pinnock 1989, p. 156).

Apartheid Politics of Racial Segregation in Cape Town

The Group Areas Act of 1950, which segregated residential areas, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which legalised separate and exclusive public facilities for different race groups, were important projects initiated by the Apartheid government soon after it came into power. They aimed to create safe places for the White population, where interracial contact did not occur or was strictly regulated. Social distance was enforced by creating spatial distance, and by making space exclusive to specific race groups.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 segregated races residentially by law and was imposed by the central state on local government. It can be understood as a

necessary means to stabilise the discourse of Apartheid itself. As I have argued in Chapter 3.1, the spatial order, the actual materiality of space, is needed to stabilise discourse and the very power relations that produce them. In other words, if the reality of the city does not comply with the discourse, there is a good reason to change the reality, the materiality, because a non-complying materiality would undermine and destabilize the power of the discourse. The famed District Six in Cape Town, adjacent to the central city, a place that was often described as cosmopolitan and as a place of racial mix and harmony, for example, was a threat to the idea of Apartheid that legitimated itself by emphasizing inevitable conflict between races who were living in close proximity: The very existence of District Six proved the opposite to be true, and therefore posed a challenge to the legitimacy of Apartheid ideology (Barnett 1994, pp. 178-180; Jeppie 1999; Jeppie et al 1990).

The relocations that occurred to enforce the Group Areas Act exemplify a grand style urban intervention in space both under the name of 'improvement' to sanitize urban space by clearing 'slums' like District Six, and to enforce the ideology of separate development and racial segregation (Western 1981, p. 85). While the displacement of people from space had already occurred in 1901, forced relocations occurred throughout the implementation of the Group Areas Act on a much larger scale. As has been described in many accounts of the history of Cape Town, in the course of the implementation of the Group Areas Act between the 1950s and 1980s, 29,337 Coloured, 1,506 Indian and 195 White families were forcefully removed from District Six, Mowbray, Newlands, Claremont, and Wynberg (Western 1981, p. xi). Coloureds were relocated to newly built Townships on the Cape Flats (10 to 15 km from the City Centre), such as Manenberg, Bonteheuwel, Heideveld and Hanover Park, and Blacks were mainly relocated to Gugulethu (UPRU 1990, p. 75). The Group Areas Act restructured Cape Town in a way that still characterizes the urban landscape of the Cape Metropolitan area today: The central area, the historic centre at the foot and around Table Mountain; the areas along the Atlantic coast towards the South including the Southern Peninsula and towards the north (Milnerton, Table View, Blouberg); the areas north of the historic Voortrekker Road (Bellville, Tygervalley); as well as the areas along the second historic development arm "Victoria Rd" (Mowbray, Wynberg, Plumstead, Tokai, Bergvliet), were designated for the White population. The Coloured and Black population was located in the residual space between the major development arms, far less attractive in their physical features and, in the case of the Black population,

far away from commercial and industrial centres. But there were a few anomalies to this racially structured urban landscape. For one, the 'Malay Quarter', was inhabited by the Muslim Cape Malays and saved due to the persistent lobbying of Du Plessis and the picturesque character of the place, which made it favourable for tourism (Western 1981, p. 123). The Malay Quarter was in itself racially homogeneous, an anomaly in the otherwise White central city. Another anomaly was Woodstock, an area close to the inner city inhabited by Coloureds and Whites who had successfully resisted relocation (Western 1981, p. 210). The different group areas were separated by roads, freeways, railway lines, industrial areas, or green belts – all of them conceived as necessary 'buffer' zones to prevent cross-racial interaction (Western 1981, p. 129).

The Group Areas Act, as it was implemented in Cape Town, sought to assuage the fears of Whites by creating safe places for them: racially homogeneous spaces at safe distances from Blacks and Coloureds. The spatial order that emerged was a reflection of the White fears of other race groups. Residential areas for Coloureds, who were less feared, were located closer to White residential areas, whereas Blacks, the most threatening group, were located furthest away (Western 1984a, p. 125).

The dissociation of Blacks and Coloureds from the White city was supported by administrational structures which had its roots in 1922, with the introduction of the 'Stallard Doctrine', which prevented wealthier White urban communities from subsidising Black Townships (Atkinson 1991, p. 273). The complete removal of Black African communities from the jurisdiction of White local authorities was implemented by introducing 'Black Local Authorities' in 1971, which, in Atkinson's words, created the institutional "Berlin Wall" in South African cities: Black Africans' geographical proximity to the White city became disassociated from White patterns of administration, political participation, and urban identity: "Africans were in the city, but they were not of the city." (Atkinson 1991, p. 273). This notion is also metaphorically reflected in the word "Township", the term used in particular under Apartheid to describe the residential areas dedicated to Blacks in urban areas: Townships and their populations were harboured on the edge of the city only temporarily, never being either conceptually or practically part of the White city (see Awotona et al 1995, p. 1).

However, this defensive mentality of separation and dissociation could not assuage fears; rather, it contained, perpetuated and ultimately enhanced them.

The way in which the Townships' Non-white urban space was designed and equipped with social and physical infrastructures in the name of Apartheid order, created spaces of disorder under that very same logic of order. Townships were by definition "native, tribal, backward and temporary"; they were conceived as rural spaces out of place (Minkley 1999, p. 217). They were planned and designed to a standard that was disparagingly lower than those of White areas: the houses were allowed to be damp (since the Native was used to huts, argued the government), there were often no water taps inside the houses, and no ablution facilities. Roads were not tarred and garbage was less often, if at all, collected. Health care institutions such as hospitals were scarce, and other public social facilities such as libraries almost non- existent, as were economic activities that could have provided employment opportunities (Minkley 1999, p. 211). Unemployment in these areas was and remains overwhelming, but there was no social welfare system for Non-whites. Crime was and continues to be rife and, as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed, was often fuelled by the state's so-called Third Force (Robins 1999, p. 464). Townships were and still are 'no-go areas' for the overwhelming majority of White South Africans. By the very means of the construction of safe places for Whites, the Apartheid system produced dangerous places, which paradoxically legitimised urban segregation. The places of dirt, disorder, and crime are feared, and so are its inhabitants.

The Group Areas enforced the creation of an urban landscape that consisted of racially homogeneous islands scattered across the urban area, separated rather than linked by roads and greenbelts. In Colonial and more expressively in Apartheid discourse, public urban space as a place of encountering, mixing and mingling was conceived of as a threat by the governing authorities – as a threat to the discourse of divide-and-rule, and as a threat to a social order that strove for cultural purity (Herwitz 1999, p. 409). The encounter of different race groups in public urban spaces in Cape Town was therefore meticulously regulated by Apartheid policies seeking to prevent that people of different racial backgrounds equally share public space and engage in public conversation, thereby allowing the development of shared concerns and shared identity.

Although public spaces were already limited in the first half of the century, and although they were exclusive in character, at least there were still places of encounter and mixing. This changed when the National Party government came into power. Initially, it moved cautiously in further segregating public

spaces. Train Apartheid was first introduced in 1948, justified by the new Prime Minister D.F. Malan as a response to the need to protect women, and a need to solve Cape Town's growing traffic problem. He stated:

> "Frequently Natives and Coloured people deliberately seat themselves next to White women … simply to show that they stand for absolute equality … Respectable European women … who not only have colour but odour next to them, have to resort to motor cars, and that has not only imposed a large additional burden on their shoulders, but has contributed … to the traffic congestion in Cape Town." (quoted in Bickford-Smith et al 1999, p. 157).

The government then reserved first class carriages for 'Europeans only' and left the other carriages mixed (Bickford-Smith 1999b, p. 157). In 1949, post office Apartheid followed by initially prescribing that Europeans and Non-Europeans had to queue in separate lines before converging at the same window. Later, separate counters were introduced (ibid.). The Separate Amenities Act of 1953 perfected the system of segregated urban space: sports facilities, theatres, cinemas, beaches, restaurants, shop entrances, parks and benches, public lavatories, public transport, bus-stops, taxis and ambulances, pedestrian subways and bridges, public institutions such as civic halls, post offices, police stations and their entrances, were designated either totally segregated or partitioned by law (Smith 1985, p. 6). Signs indicating "Europeans only" or "Non-Europeans" marked virtually every public urban space, segregating even walkways on bridges, entrances to public buildings and queues to tellars inside, benches at bus stops, etc. (Bickford-Smith 1999b, p. 156). Sitting on a bench not designated for one's own race for example became a criminal offence, punishable with up to three months in prison (Act No 49 of 1953, (3)). The only public spaces that remained racially mixed were some Churches[20] and, perhaps ironically, a few city centre clubs such as Catacombs and Navigator's Den, clubs known for prostitution and drug-dealing. Despite being raided regularly by the police, they were allowed to remain open because they catered primarily to foreign sailors (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 169). In an attempt to force Apartheid on private social gatherings, clubs and multi-racial organisations, the Group Areas Act was amended in 1959,

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20 The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1957 made it illegal for Blacks to attend church services in White group areas. This law was, however, never really enforced (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 167).

prohibiting anyone from attending entertainment or 'partaking of refresh-ment' in any space or premises not zoned for his or her own race group, and thereby preventing encounters with the 'other' even in private spaces (Bick-ford-Smith et al 1999, p. 167; Smith 1985, p. 6).

In short, in Apartheid ideology and practice, people were denied the opportu-nity to encounter one another in public as well as in private space; they were denied the opportunity to become more like one another and to create a com-monness, a public conversation, and a common identity as South Africans through shared use of public spaces and shared public institutions (Herwitz 1999, 412). Instead, wherever possible, contact was prohibited and under-mined, and boundaries legally produced and enforced where no physical boundaries existed. From the late 1970s onwards, however, in the light of the increasing impracticability of the enforcement of the Separate Amenities Act because of financial shortages in municipalities that made the policing of the Act difficult, public spaces in Cape Town began to be officially desegregated (McCarthy 1990, p. 12). In 1977 bus services were desegregated, in 1980 beach segregation was no longer enforced, in 1985 cinemas were opened to all and in 1990 the Separate Amenities Act was repealed altogether (ibid., p. 11). The major pillar for the enforcement of Apartheid, the Group Areas Act, however, persisted, meaning that residential segregation was still en-forced and that many public spaces remained effectively segregated since they lay within Group Areas out of the reach of people of other races.

Fear constitutes a crucial ingredient in the need and construction for social and spatial distance and separation in South Africa in general and its cities in particular; the fear of the other as felt by the White minority is the reason for the multiplicities of spatial boundaries that have been constructed thoroughly throughout colonialism and Apartheid and that are so characteristic of South African urban landscapes today. Urban space in colonial, and more forcefully in Apartheid ideology served as a means to alienate people from each other and to assuage the fears of the White minority. The great impact of modernist thought in Apartheid urban politics and planning is important to note in the context of my research. It points at the need for contemporary urban planning approaches that seek to transform urban space in Cape Town, not only to redress the legacies of a racist ideology of racial segregation, but also to re-dress the legacies of modernist thought in the construction of Cape Town in the 20th century. Modernist thought had enabled the disguise of racial fears behind the imperative of rationality and modernisation, which conceives of

homogeneity, cleanliness, low density, the separation of functions and urban activities, as central characteristics of the 'good' city. The underlying concept of urbanity, as I have argued in Chapter 3, is characterized by fear and rejection of heterogeneity and the urge to control and manipulate human behaviour in and through space to render urban life unambiguous. It is this conceptual vantage point that needs to be challenged and redressed by current urban transformation policies.

4.3 The Sacred and the Feared City: Inscribed Meaning in Cape Town's Urban Landscape

Sacred space, as I have argued in Chapter 3.1, is space set apart. It is a form of appropriation of and positive identification with urban space that in its character is always exclusive. The question is what the sacredness of specific places means to those who are not part of the ritual of sacralisation. Is that space secular, civil, non-spiritual, or profane? Is it feared? In this chapter, I seek to show that the sacredness of place has played a significant role in the development of Cape Town, and in particular, its central city. In the historic development of Cape Town's central city, the sacred has not operated as an integrating force in what Durkheim calls a "single moral community", but rather "as a multiple, fragmentary, and divisive constellation of forces that set people apart" (see Chidester 2000, p. 30). These sanctified divisions, as I will show in this chapter, were not primarily generated out of Christian, Muslim, or other conventional religious resources but most potently out of the history of the city itself: out of colonial and Apartheid discourses and practices, which set people and places apart. Statues and monuments commemorating only White settlers' histories, and in particular the symbolic and material exclusion and alienation of Coloured and Black people from the central city, mark out a human geography with multiple sacred significance as much as churches, Mosques and other places of religious worship do.

As I have shown in the previous chapter, in terms of Apartheid ideology, cities are the living spaces of South Africa's White population, with Cape Town being the "Mother City" of the nation (Worden 1997, p. 32). The history of urban planning and design in Cape Town's central city can be interpreted as an attempt to create a "little Europe" in Africa to make Cape Town an attractive destination for European immigration. In Cape Town's central city, there is a high concentration of public institutions that commemorate White settler's histories (Western 1981, p. 140; Chidester 2000, p. 10):

Fig. 1: The Company Gardens

Fig. 2: Jan Smuts Statue in the Company Gardens

There are – to name just a few – the Company's Gardens established by the East India Company in the 17th century, which served as a plantation for food supply for bypassing vessels and still exists today – even though much reduced in size – as a Botanical Public Garden right next to the Houses of Parliament (see Figure 1); there is St. George's Cathedral and the Groote Kerk; Monuments of Jan van Riebeeck, who led the expedition to the Cape in 1652 and established a refreshment station at the Cape; of Jan Smuts, military leader in the Boer War and holder of different Cabinet posts under Louis Botha (see Figure 2); as well as of the British Imperialist Cecil Rhodes, founder of the De Beers diamond company in 1880 and Prime Minister of the Cape from 1890 until his death in 1902 at the bottom and at the top of Adderley Street and further along that axis in the Company Gardens; a statue of Louis Botha, first president of South Africa marks the entrance of the Parliament buildings; there are the headquarters of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Castle, which was used for military purposes until the 1990s; there is the Grand Parade, where the South African Army paraded until 1905, and on its border there is the new City Hall, facing the sea, turning away from the continent and designed in Italian renaissance style and symbolizing at the time of its construction in 1905 the final rejection of the Dutch town and the victory of

British rule (see Figure 3); between Adderley and Long Streets lies the Greenmarket Square, where the slave market and later the fresh produce market was held. Many streets and places are named after White politicians of the past, e.g. Adderley Street, Wale Street, Hertzog Boulevard, and Riebeeck Square (Western 1981, p. 140). All of these institutions, monuments, and places are set beneath Table Mountain, which was referred to by Jan Smuts shortly before his death in 1951 as 'our national temple, our holy of holies' (quoted in Western 1984a, p. 126). All of these institutions symbolize the history of the city and yet celebrate

Fig. 3: The City Hall opposite the Grand Parade

White roots only (Western 1981, p. 140; Bickford-Smith et al 1999, p. 24).

These institutions, monuments and place names, moreover, symbolize Cape Town's image of itself as a global nexus that was located in Africa but not of Africa. Since its establishment, Cape Town has in many ways sought nearness to Europe and distance from the continent on which it lies. The construction of the dense hedge of bitter almond and hawthorn ordered by Van Riebeeck in 1660 encircled the first settlement and was intended, in Van Riebeeck's own words, to create a zone of protection, safety and security, to keep out the rest of Africa from the Dutch station at the Cape; it can be interpreted as a first enactment of denial of African location (Chidester 2000, p. 10). As a port city, Cape Town was, at least until the discovery of the diamond- and goldfields in 1867 and 1886, mainly oriented towards the sea, away from Africa, and towards Europe and the West (Western 1981, p. 33; Worden 1997, p. 36). After that, it became the point of entry for the interior (Western 1981, p. 33), while remaining at the same time still more attached to the European continent. The making of place in Cape Town from the early days was thus shaped by a particular kind of Eurocentrism, exemplified by the White settlers' "refusal to take on the project of remaking [one's] culture that reflects essentially new conditions of existence" and a "refusal of the sublime possibility of becoming a new subject as yet to be defined" in the

new world (Herwitz 1999, p. 405). Home in South Africa was modelled on Eurocentric norms and values (Mofokeng 1999, p. 68). Builders, planners, and the colonial government from the early beginnings of European settlement re-casted European modes, styles and concepts; it did not occur to them to blend them with local existing architectural and spatial forms. Streets that were laid out in grid patterns by the Dutch during the time of the East India Company rule between 1652 and 1790 still lie at the heart of Cape Town's central city; the architecture of buildings and churches is informed by Dutch and later British styles.

Fig. 4:   Overlapping Colonial and Modern Spaces

Public spaces, as Herwitz points out, were 'Eurocentristic' in design and mission, created to represent White power and culture and to complement the notion of a private sphere. In particular, public spaces were designed to divide and rule, that is, to incorporate and assimilate those who are 'respectable' into 'European culture' and to exclude all others (1999, p. 411). The colonial government created exclusive public spaces of representation in open spaces through design; galleries, museums, libraries and the University were exclusive, representing European culture and knowledge only (ibid.). Moreover, 'European' meant Northern Europe and Britain, rather than the Mediterranean. Hence, "public space for recreation was park rather than piazza, domesticated landscape rather than open meeting or dwelling space in streets, and squares" along the lines of Mediterranean public space such as in Italy or Spain (ibid.).

From the 1920s onwards, the concomitance of the increasing influence of the European modernist movement and the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism in

South Africa led to the development of corporate architecture that was to establish a modern public image and Afrikaner identity not only in opposition to Non-Whites but also in an attempt to overthrow British colonial styles, which had dominated the early years of the century after the British victory over the Boers in 1902 (Morphet 1999, p. 149; see Figure 4).

The rise of the Broederbond, a right wing Afrikaner political organisation, initiated the founding of 'Volkskas', the first Afrikaner Bank, and 'Sanlam', a life insurance company, both of which helped to consolidate White Afrikaner power across classes by dealing with Afrikaner poverty (Bunn 1999, p. 108). The high-rise buildings on the reclaimed Foreshore of Cape Town are supposed to represent the triumph of 'the European' in Africa (Morphet 1999, p. 150, see Figure 5).

Fig. 5:   View over the Central City and the Foreshore

Since the 1960s, they have housed Afrikaner corporations, parastatal institutions, and municipal offices such as the Civic Centre, as well as cultural institutions such as the 'Nico Malan' (a theatre and opera house) (Bunn 1999,

p. 108; Worden 1997, p. 36; Figure 6)[21]. Modern high-rise buildings as symbols of European and modern civilization were also important for Cape Town's proud claim to being a 'Gateway to Africa'. With increased air travel and Cape Town no longer being the only physical entry point to Southern Africa, the symbolic meaning of 'Gateway' to express Cape Town's identity as a city on the margin of Africa, but not African itself, has gained new significance (Pinnock 1989, p. 152). The slogan 'Gateway to Africa' is therefore still used in international marketing strategies by Cape Town tourism agencies and local government (see Cape Metropolitan Council 1998; Western Cape Department of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism 1999).

Fig. 6: The Civic Centre on the Foreshore

The construction of the symbolic meaning of the central city as representative of the White settlers' history and power, however, as the above discussions suggest, is marked by contradictions resulting from conflicts in the White population between British and Boer descendants, with one or the other

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21   The Sanlam Centre built on the Foreshore in 1962 was then the highest building in Southern Africa and, as Bunn notes, "intended as a rebuke to the great English civil and corporate engineering projects " in the beginning of the century under British rule (1999, p. 108).

group dominating the production of symbols and images at different times (see Chapter 4.1). Although there were attempts by politicians to solve these animosities, for example with the "Van Riebeeck Tercentenary" celebrations (see Chapter 4.1), the symbolic production of inner urban space over time, as shown above, had the same thing in common: the commemoration of White settlers' histories and the denial of its African location[22].

While the sacredness of the central city has been derived from the concentration of institutions sacred to the generalised White population, another dimension of its sacredness lies beyond this practice of representation: it lies in the conceptual and material practice of setting things and people apart, in the separation between colonial and indigenous, between civilised und uncivilised, between urban and rural, between domesticated and wild, which, as I described in the previous chapter, is central to the production of White hegemony. The sacredness of the central city, therefore, has to be understood as something produced through the exclusion and alienation of the Black and Coloured population groups.

Western argues, "coloured space in Cape Town is in a sense as old as that of the whites" (ibid., p. 139). Coloureds, descending mainly from the slaves brought into the country as early as 1657, were part of Cape Town from the early days. This situation was reinforced by government with the declaration of the Western Cape as the Coloured Labour Preference Area in 1960, giving automatic preference to Coloured people seeking work in that area over Black Africans (Western 1981, p. 291). Coloured people in Cape Town started to outnumber Whites in the late 1940s (see Chapter 4.1). Before the implementation of the Group Areas Act, Coloureds lived immediately adjacent to the central city and also had cultural and religious institutions such as Mosques[23], Churches and shrines there: there was the "Malayan Quarter", today called the Bo-Kaap, Schotsche's Kloof to the west; Hopeville in lower Gardens to the south, the Loader Street area towards Somerset West and Greenpoint; and to the east the biggest Coloured area around the central city, the famous District Six, where in the 1960s about 50,000 people lived, and

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22 With the development of the new urban node of 'Bellville' in the northern part of Cape Town, where the majority of the Afrikaner population lives today, the central city of Cape Town increasingly came to be seen as the symbolic heart of the English population (UPRU 1990; Rode, personal communication).

23 The majority of Cape Town's Muslim population (about 7,3% of the total) is Coloured (about 80%) (Da Costa 1994, p. 55; Flöel et al 2002).

which has often been described as the heart of Cape Town for its working class inhabitants (Jeppie 1999, p. 385). There are 9 Mosques in the central city area, most of them in the Bo-Kaap and in District Six; two are, however, in Loop and Long Streets, the two main axes through the central city (see Figure 7). Six shrines, or kramats, sacred spaces for Muslims in Cape Town, are distributed around the central city: two of them are located on Signal Hill directly above the central city, above the quarry in Strand Street and on the ridgetop of Signal Hill. These kramats form a sacred circle around the city, representing a Muslim map of the city and constituting the urban space of Cape Town as a zone of spiritual protection (Chidester 2000, p. 27).

Fig. 7: Mosque in Long Street

Through the legislation of the Group Areas Act, which declared the whole of Central Cape Town as a White Group Area, the Coloured population around the central city – albeit with the striking exception of the Malay Quarter – was relocated to the Cape Flats and, as in the case of District Six, the area has been obliterated, "with only a bulldozed wasteland left behind", except for the Churches and Mosques in that area that are still there and in use today (ibid.). The physical scar of the flattening of District Six is still to be seen today, since only 40 % of the land has been rebuilt. The remaining Mosques

and Churches stand isolated in the midst of green fields. Emotional scars deriving from the displacement and loss of a material and emotional home are revealed in many stories told and memorized by removed inhabitants (see e.g. Field 1999; Jeppie et al 1990). The forceful disruption of space and identity, which uprooted inhabitants from their neighbourhoods, their social lives and networks, has, as Field describes, often led to painful ambiguous belongings and in-between identities for those who have been alienated from their old homes (1998/99, p. 231). For Coloureds that used to have a home in the central area of Cape Town from its early days, these forced removals meant loss, dissociation and alienation from this space in general and from religious places such as Churches, Mosques and Shrines in particular (Western 1981, p. 4; Da Costa 1990, 134). Effectively, the sacred spaces were ripped out of people's lives. However, as Chidester describes in the case of District Six, the scar on the landscape paradoxically became sacred, a process of sacralisation enacted by the demolition of this neighbourhood (2000, p. 15). During the struggle against Apartheid, District Six was celebrated in music, art, literature, drama, in myth and memory as a site of racial and religious harmony, and in this way it came to be a sacred space that symbolized a counter-site to the Apartheid myth of separation (Jeppie et al 1990).

In contrast to Coloureds, Black Capetonians never played a role in the construction of the central city's public image. In fact, as Worden points out, prior to the 1990s, the visitor coming to the central city of Cape Town could sense little of Africa at all: Its buildings were more reminiscent of other British imperial towns, such as Melbourne or Toronto, with a Dutch tinge still slightly visible; its climate is Mediterranean rather than tropical[24], and its ambience is decidedly distinct from the continent that lay beyond its boundaries (1997, p. 37). Black people in Cape Town were never supposed to make a home in the city, to appropriate urban space and to invest it with meaning (Mofokeng 1999, p. 68). Black people were expelled and excluded from the spaces that had already been conceived as White and urban in 1901, as shown in the previous chapter. For the Black population, the central area was never a living space, and there was no way to appropriate inner urban space (Mandy 1980), despite the fact that, between 1950 and 1980, the Black population showed the most rapid growth rate in comparison to the other population groups, increasing by 326 % (UPRU 1990, p. 64). They settled and were

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24 The notion that an African climate is tropical rather than Mediterranean is, however, a cliché itself.

settled at the periphery of Cape Town, in accordance with the strategy of "orderly urbanization" adopted by the Apartheid government in the early 1980s, preferably in satellite towns"[25] well away from White residential areas and the main commercial and industrial areas (Mabin et al 1997, p. 212). Inner urban space, as Mofokeng states, "does not adequately fulfil the needs – or is deemed inappropriate for the ritual and spiritual needs – of the majority of Black people. As for other places of prayer, they frequently find them alienating" (1999, p. 68). The denial of the construction of sacred places for Blacks is also reflected in the design of Townships by the Apartheid government. Typical among the Xhosa-speaking people of the Eastern Cape who make up the majority of Cape Town's Black population, is the construction of the homestead as a sacred place: in Xhosa tradition, the homestead, in which the cattle enclosure, or kraal, represents the most important element of the sacred architecture, is the ordered space of communication and exchange with ancestral spirits (Chidester 2000, p. 16). The construction of Township houses, famously dubbed "matchbox houses", with no space to set up kraals, denied this construction of the homestead as a sacred space.

Space in the development of Cape Town can be understood as a crucial component in the White politics of identity and power that served the establishment and maintenance of White cultural hegemony even or rather especially in the face of increasing numbers of Blacks and Coloureds settling in the Cape. The central city was established and anxiously defended as the territory of the White European population. Its sacredness derives not only from the symbolic meaning of the European style of the architecture, the monuments and statues representing the heritage of White history in South Africa, but in particular from its symbolic and material isolation, its 'apartness' from the Black and Coloured spaces of the city.

The production of the sacredness of Cape Town's urban landscape in general can be understood as being enacted by the classification of the population with specific race categories on the one hand and with specific spaces of the city (with specific residential areas as well as with other public spaces such as public transport, bars, restaurants, parks or beaches enforced through the Group Areas Act) on the other hand. This has led to multiple entanglements

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25   In 1983 "Khayelitsha" (Isixhosa for 'new home') was constructed as the first planned Township for newly arrived and in future arriving Blacks in Cape Town in an area that is about 25 km away from the centre of the city (Cook 1992).

of identity, space and the construction of difference that dominated people's daily experience: „Migrant, Boer, Sowetan, ..., Squatter, ... Maid – each category invokes, to a greater or lesser extent, a spatialized conception of self. Each category also invokes a history of domination ..." (Dixon 1997, p. 17).

Apartheid's policies of racial segregation were undoubtedly an important factor for today's extremely fragmented landscape as a constellation of multiple sacred spaces set apart as living spaces for different population groups. John Western's observation in 1981 that "[R]ecognizing the dialectic of person and place is central to an appreciation of the texture of life in Cape Town today" is still valid today (1981, p. 4). If you name an area or a suburb of Cape Town, the next thing that comes to your mind is the colour of the skin of its residents: Sea Point, Camps Bay, Tamboerskloof, Gardens, Tokai, Durbanville, Bellville, Bergvliet are "White" Khayelitsha, Langa, Gugulethu, Crossroads are "Black"; Mitchell's Plain, Athlone, Bonteheuvel, Manenberg, Bo-Kaap are "Coloured". If you know a bit more about Cape Town, then you ascribe different ethnicities to specific areas: In Sea Point and Camps Bay live the "English" and "Jews", in Gardens and Tamboerskloof live many "Germans", in Tokai and Bergvliet the "English", in Bellville and Durbanville the "Afrikaners", in Gugulethu and Langa the "Xhosas" who have been in Cape Town a long time, whereas in Khayelitsha live those "Xhosas" who have arrived mainly in the 1980s, in the Bo-Kaap live descendants of the Malay, in Mitchell's Plain and Athlone the Muslims. Cape Town is thus characterised by a complex human geography marking an urban political economy of the sacred produced by White power holders anxiously defending both the spiritual home and the political territory of a generalized White population.

However, while Coloureds and in particular Blacks have been increasingly excluded from the White central city, the central city itself became a space of resistance, where the people who were excluded from and marginalized in South African society claimed their rights, often at great cost (being imprisoned, hurt or killed), thereby not only challenging the exclusiveness of those spaces but also violating their sacredness: After the end of its military use, the Grand Parade, from 1905 onwards, often came to be used as a platform for political protest for the Black and Coloured population, which was, however, increasingly forbidden and violently repressed by the State's police and military from the 1960s onwards (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 24/139).

In June 1952, the African National Congress launched its "Defiance Campaign" against discriminatory laws in Cape Town on the Grand Parade. Target of this campaign was also the newly introduced train and post-office Apartheid: The objective was to occupy, on purpose, 'European-only spaces". This led to the introduction of stricter laws to repress resistance. The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 made it a criminal offence to break a law "by way of protest, or in support of any campaign against the law". Effectively, this meant: if one sat unwittingly on the wrong park bench, one could be imprisoned for up to three months, but if one was sitting on the wrong bench as an act of protest, one could be imprisoned for up to five years.

In 1960, at the same time when the Apartheid state brutally crushed down a peaceful mass protest against the pass laws in Sharpeville near Johannesburg and killed 69 people, the Pan African Congress (PAC) initiated a mass protest march to the Central police station in Cape Town's central city. About 30,000 people from the two Cape Town Townships of Langa and Nyanga marched to the police station, leaving their passes at home with the intention of handing themselves in for arrest and thereby making influx control and pass laws unworkable (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 179). The group was dispersed with the promise that the PAC leader Philip Kgosana could meet the Minister of Justice later in the day. However, when Kgosana arrived for the appointment, he was arrested, and police and military cordoned off the Townships, breaking resistance with arrests and beatings; the pass laws were restored a few days later.

When police killed several protesting children in Soweto near Johannebsurg in June 1976, violent unrest also spread to Cape Town. The police tried to disperse initially peaceful marches with dogs and teargas, leading to 36 hours of full-scale rioting, including attacks on shops and government buildings, which in turn led to more brutal action of police and military. In the end, 125 Capetonians were killed and about 400 were injured (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 202). Public protest from then on became almost impossible, and if it did occur, then more violent, leading to the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1986, which allowed the state to crush any form of public protest even more reckless.

In February 1989, F.W. de Klerk became leader of the National Party; he introduced a new course in government politics, which eventually led to the abolition of Apartheid. In September that year, for the first time since the

PAC march in 1960, a peace march was held in Cape Town's central city that was not repressed by the police, and that can be seen as the starting point for ascribing a new meaning to this highly contested space – the triumph of the liberation struggle. The march gathered Capetonians across racial, religious and class lines: At its head were Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the City's Mayor Gordon Oliver, the president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches Dr Allan Boesak, the president of the Muslim Judicial Council, Sheikh Nazeem Mohamed, as well as the rector of the University of the Western Cape Jakes Gerwel. Behind them, as Bickford-Smith describes, "walked a multi-racial throng from all walks of life, including the chairmen of oil companies, civil rights leaders, workers, school children and unemployed Township residents" (Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 198). It was during this march that Archbishop Tutu 'branded' the metaphor of the 'Rainbow Nation of South Africa: "We are a new people, a rainbow people, marching to freedom" (in Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 198). And Mayor Gordon Oliver announced, "Today Cape Town has won. Today we will all have the freedom of the city" (in Bickford-Smith 1999, p. 199). The Grand Parade was also the place where 100,000s of South Africans gathered when Nelson Mandela gave his speech from the balcony of the City Hall after he had been released from prison in February 1990, inscribing the triumph of liberation onto the historic site of domination and resistance.

In the central city, which has been constructed by White power holders as a sacred place to the White nation, then, different histories of domination and subordination, of eviction and alienation overlap. Its sacredness to the White population has been produced out of conceptual and material sacralised separations of people and spaces. Yet, over time, the central city has also changed into a place of resistance and defiance, eventually becoming the site for the claim and triumph of the liberation struggle, challenging not only the exclusiveness of this space, but the exclusiveness of South African society in general.

4.4   Challenges for Policies of Transformation

Against the background of these considerations, both of the characteristics of the Apartheid city and of the theoretical reflections on the socio-spatial dynamics of the politics of emotions in urban space, I wish to suggest three major, but interrelated fields of challenges for new urban policies in Cape Town.

The first field of challenges concerns the reconciliation of emotional divisions, which have been produced by negative constructions of difference and by a social and spatial politics of fear creating an urban culture that is deeply imbued with fear. Whether they are morally and politically justifiable or not, fears in Cape Town are nonetheless prevalent and deeply entrenched in people's lives. They have different sources, they are real, perceived and constructed – but they are all there. The new government and its approach to urban planning is thus confronted with a huge challenge to deal with these fears and their entanglements, which generate the need for boundaries and spatial distance, while it seeks at the same time to dismantle the boundaries and walls that have been constructed by the Apartheid government. What is needed in this situation is the reconciliation of White fears with regard to the hitherto demonised other on the one hand, and the reconciliation of fears of Blacks and Coloureds with regard to White South Africans by whom they have been subordinated, dominated, humiliated, terrorized and tortured on the other hand. The need for reconciliation means for urban policies that the culture of the city as a culture of difference, which has been conceptualised and regulated under colonialism and Apartheid as a relationship of power, domination and subordination, has to be conceptualised and negotiated in a new way. A constructive approach to difference that allows the creation of trust in the face of otherness, and thereby allows the transformation of fear, is thus needed.

The discussions on spatialities of desire and fear illustrated in Chapter 3 suggest that space is inextricably bound up with the construction of social relationships and the construction of fear. The combination and interaction of inner and outer worlds materialises in the construction of urban space, indicating the importance of emotions in producing urban space and the importance of recognising these for an urban politics of transformation. The spatiality of the city is produced by and reproduces fear and strangeness, which indicates the second field of challenges for urban policies of transformation in Cape Town: The transformation of social relationships has to occur in and through space, both on the level of the production of images for the city in the form of conceptual approaches to the city, and on the level of the production of images in the city in the form of its cultural production, the materiality of space.

On the one hand, the recognition of the construction of fear in modernist thought of the city as well as the construction of fear in colonial and Apart-

heid space indicate that the deconstruction of the exclusive binaries that have previously shaped the conceptual approach to the city and that have produced the fragmentary and divisive sacredness of Cape Town's urban landscape can help to approach this task. What is needed, then, is a new conceptual approach to deal with fears, a new approach that thinks in between and beyond fixed binaries of White/Black, civilised/uncivilised, public/private and that finds solutions other than separation, control, and homogenisation – central characteristics of modernist thought. On the other hand, the discussions on spatialities of desire and fear suggest that, in order to be able to reconcile emotional divisions, a tangible space for a non-threatening experience of the hitherto demonised or feared other has to be created. The normative ideal of public urban space as a crucible for participatory democracy, as it is postulated by many urban sociologists, creates the hope for public urban space in Cape Town to play exactly that role: to provide a platform, where alienated and separated people can meet on an equal basis, where they can get to know each other and where they can learn about one another in a city, where residential segregation still persists. However, as I have shown, public urban space in Cape Town is sacred, and as such it has the character of exclusion and prohibition rather than social interaction. In particular, inner urban space in Cape Town is sacred to the White population, because it is the place of representation of a particular kind of 'Whiteness' and 'Europeanness'. To be able to create a non-threatening environment for the equal encounter of the other, then, means to negotiate the materiality of the city, and of the city as a socio-cultural construct that has been shaped by colonialism and Apartheid by a discourse and practice of White, European cultural hegemony. Precisely because urban space has been central for the maintenance of White cultural hegemony, it can be expected that interventions in the materiality of the city cause new fears and resistance of the hitherto powerful population groups.

Apart from these two major challenges for local urban transformation policies to negotiate images of and in the city of Cape Town, a third challenge can be located in the changing role of cities in the context of processes of global economic restructurings, in which (international) images of the city are increasingly gaining in importance. As I reveal in the following empirical chapters, the creation of an internationally marketable identity of Cape Town provides the context for, and strongly impacts on the negotiation of images for and in the city.

Section 3

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"Cape Town, a city that works for all"

(Vision statement of the City of Cape Town 1998)

"Cape Town, a dynamic, developing cosmopolitan city, reaches out to all its people and works towards creating a unified and harmonious environment in which everyone can enjoy all the benefits and amenities of a world-class city on an equal basis, in safety and freedom"

(Mission statement of the City of Cape Town 1998)

Urban Policies in the City of Cape Town: Redressing Discourses and Practices of Desire and Fear?

The new democratic national and local governments, which were elected into power in 1994 and 1996, abolished all laws and regulations of racial segregation, in order to promote a non-racial society that finds 'unity in diversity'. The new South Africa portrays itself as a Rainbow Nation, promoting a non-racial, open and inclusive society, in which all cultural groups have equal rights and opportunities. The ongoing political transformation has created a vacuum between the new conceptual social order of a non-racial society on the one hand, and the practice of everyday life on the other hand. Apartheid laws, which regulated all aspects of people's lives and specifically the interaction of different race groups, have all been abolished. They have left behind unregulated unfamiliarity, a multitude of stereotypes, prejudices and myths, and very little knowledge about and familiarity with each other.

Since the abolition of the Apartheid system, the discourse of the 'black peril' should theoretically have no more power and influence in the political arena of the country.[26] However, a 'new' fear has emerged: In the 1990s, the fear of crime became more pronounced, capturing the attention of public discourses, newspaper columns and political rhetoric, as well as every dinner party in the white suburbs (Bremner 1999, p. 63). Crime rates in Cape Town first started to increase from the mid-1980s, and suddenly accelerated from 1996 onwards (Valley 1999, p. 1). Levels of crime in South Africa in general are high. The Western Cape and Cape Town rank first nationally in respect of housebreaking at business and residential premises, theft, murder and attempted murder (Cape Times, 13. 5.1999). The crime victim survey carried out by the Institute for Security Studies in 1998 reveals that almost half of Cape Town's residents (49,6 %) were victims of crime between 1993 and 1997 (Camerer et al 1998, p. 24). From January to December 1998, the most frequent crimes in Cape Town were burglaries at residential (1085 per 100,000 inhabitants) and business premises (431/100,000), followed by robbery and mugging (233/100,000) and vehicle theft (285/100,000). In the same period, the Western Cape had a murder rate of 85 cases per 100,000

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26 However, already in the national government elections in November 2000, the New National Party used the term "swaart gevaar" to gain votes in Coloured communities by suggesting that the ANC was legislating and using unfair discrimination in favour of the Black population (Mail & Guardian, 8.-14.12. 2000).

inhabitants and an attempted murder rate of 99 (Cape Times, 13.5.1999; Camerer et al 1998, p. 27).

The exposure to violence in these dimensions, however, is a fairly recent phenomenon in particular for White South Africans, who were 'immunized' against crime by the state security system of the Apartheid government, whose strategies and tactics were designed to protect them in particular (Bremner 1999, p. 53)[27]. In the Black residential areas, the so-called Townships, to which impoverished people where confined, where unemployment rates were high and social facilities scarce, violent crime, often gang related and often fuelled by the so-called Third Force, was always high, but increased sharply in the 1980s (Biko 1971, p. 75; Bremner 1999, p. 53)[28]. And as National Transport Minister Dullah Omar points out in his address to the Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum in August 1999: "Our history has been one of domination, division and inequality. All these have left us with the terrible legacy of a culture of violence and intolerance" (1999, p. 1).

Considering the extent and character of the Apartheid system, which acted with increasing brutality against those who rose against it from the 1960s onwards, it is surprising that crime rarely seems to be explicitly racially motivated against Whites in the city. There is only one outstanding case of this, which happened in Gugulethu, one of Cape Town's Black Townships in 1993. Amy Biehl, an exchange student from the United States, was stoned and stabbed to death by a group of youths belonging to the Pan Africanist Student Organisation (PASO) and the ANC-supporting Congress of South African Students (COSAS) who were part of a campaign of street protests using slogans such as 'One settler, one bullet' and 'Kill the farmer, kill the Boer' (Tutu 1999, p. 119). Similar cases have not been reported since then. Amy Biehl's murder has been publicly condemned by all major parties and was also investigated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

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27 The response of urban dwellers, who can afford it, is to protect themselves by erecting walls or electric fences, installing burglar alarms, registering with an armed response company or moving to enclosed neighbourhoods or gated communities. Since the 1990s, security has become the biggest 'selling point' for both commercial and residential property purchase and rental, as a leading Cape Town based property economists suggests (expert 28, personal communication).

28 For example, out of the 253 murders that occurred between October 1, 1994 and March 30 1995 in the six magisterial districts of Mitchell's Plain, Manenberg, Phillippi, Bishop Lavis, Bellville South and Elsies River, which together make up the Cape Flats, 50% were gang related (Kinnes 1995, p.5).

The perception of Cape Town, both locally and internationally, as a crime infested and violent place was enhanced by a series of probably politically motivated bomb blasts in Cape Town between 1998 and 2000. In 19 different bomb blasts, 3 people were killed and 120 injured (Cape Times, 12.9.2000). Eight of the bombs were detonated in the wider inner city area – two at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in August and December 1998, one outside Caledon Square police headquarters in January 1999, one at a take-away restaurant in Camps Bay in November 1999, three outside restaurants in Somerset Road, Green Point, in November and December 1999 and August 2000, another outside a restaurant in Sea Point in June 2000 and one in Adderley Street, on the Foreshore of central Cape Town in August 2000 (Cape Times, 12.9.2000).These bomb blasts were publicly linked to the organisation known as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), an organisation that has its stronghold in the Muslim community of Cape Town and claims to fight gangsterism. However, none of the bomb blasts were ever solved and no convictions have been made.

Despite the deeply entrenched hostility between the races, despite the humiliations and despite the brutal subordination and torture of all who resisted Apartheid, the expected and feared bloody revolution never occurred. Instead, the revolution was negotiated, talked into and through (Sparks 1994). The dominant anti-Apartheid movement, the African National Congress (ANC), opposed the racial fears of White Nationalism with a concept of non-racism: They emphasised that it was the Apartheid system, which unfairly privileged Whites and oppressed Non-Whites, which was opposed and to be dismantled, not Whites themselves (Ngubane 1963, p.238). It was this promise that was given by Black leaders in the 1980s, which enabled a negotiated revolution to take place (Sparks 1994).

On a national level, South Africa embarked on a courageous and unique project to reconcile hostilities between the races and to heal the wounds that divided South Africans for so many years: The TRC conceives of South Africa as a nation of victims, or rather as a nation of survivors – survivors of an inhumane system that had dehumanised Whites as much as Blacks, albeit in a different way. The TRC is based on a view of humanity that emphasizes forgiveness for the past to ensure a future for the country, while recognising that forgiveness is only possible if the truth is revealed (Tutu 1999, p. 35). Reconciliation in this sense has to be translated to the level of everyday

experience if it is to be sustainable, and should thus be the focus of an urban politics of reconciliation.

The new government has moved most cautiously, however, in replacing public historic symbols (Worden 1997, p. 43). It chose not to eliminate or destroy the heritage symbols of Cape Town – as happened in East Germany after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, where the numerous statues of Marx and Engels were demolished. The new South African government chose not to delete the past, or to expel the creators, supporters and beneficiaries of the old Apartheid system. There have thus far been only a few name changes to celebrate the new order: D.F. Malan Airport is now known as 'Cape Town International Airport'; the building that is now simply 122 Plein Street, central Cape Town, used to be called the Hendrik Verwoerd Building, named after the chief architect of Apartheid; the State President's official residence has been renamed 'Genadendal' after the first mission station for the Khoisan. Other renaming projects, however, have failed: proposals to rename the Square outside parliament as 'Freedom Square' or 'Luthuli Square' – Albert Luthuli was ANC leader and Nobel Peace prize-winner in 1950 – were rejected in 1993 (Varsity 1993 in Worden 1997, p. 44). Land restitution processes are under way. One of the most prominent of these is the land restitution process in former District Six, where ex-residents and expelled landowners had the opportunity to reclaim the land from which they had been forcibly removed in the 1960s (Cape Times, 22.11.2000; Cape Times, 27.11.2000). However, the cut-off date for land restitution claims has been set to 1913, well after the Ndabeni forced removals in 1901, making it impossible for Black Capetonians to reclaim land in the inner parts of Cape Town.

There is, however, a strong consensus at national and local levels about the need for urban integration to redress the fragmented and divided urban landscapes and people, and to even out the contradictions and polarisations of cities that embody extreme wealth and extreme poverty[29]. Soon after coming into power, the new government produced a statement on urban policy that said: "The Urban Strategy seeks, foremost, the physical, social and economic integration of our cities and towns" (Ministry in the Office of the President

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29 The data of the United Nations Development Programme suggests that, if White South Africa was a country of its own, its per capita income would rank it 24th in the world, next to Spain; but if Black South Africa was a separate country, its per capita income would rank it 123rd in the world, just above the Democratic Republic of Congo (The Economist, 20.5.1995).

1995, p. 24). Change, transformation and development have been high up on political agendas at all levels of the new democratic government in South Africa since then.

In Cape Town, current local government politics of transformation have to be contextualised within a general shift in governmental thinking since the election of the new democratic government in 1994, on the one hand, and in the context of the political rivalry that is particularly apparent in the Western Cape, on the other hand.

The political strategies of the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliances, which are reflected in the "Freedom Charter" that was drafted in 1955 by ANC leaders during their exile in Zambia and in the ANC's "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" of 1989, were strongly characterized by modernist thought, and by the belief in an enlarged state in power of large interventions (Bekker 1997, p. 9, Parnell et al 1995, p. 60). Their ideas of homogenizing modernisation, state-led development, social and spatial planning to cure the economic inequalities, urban redistribution, housing for all and related themes reflected modernist thought of a socialist tradition. They were a central part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that was implemented by the new government in 1994 (Mabin 1999b, p. 275). This programme was a concerted effort of the state to redress the social and economic inequalities inherited by the Apartheid state. The circumstances, however, have changed in the 1990s – globally and increasingly locally in a way that Parnell et al (1995) suggest can best be captured by the concept of post-modernism (ibid.). Nationally and locally, the RDP has lost its power. The National RDP Office was closed early in 1996, two years after its inception and has been relocated to the local government section of the Department of Constitutional Development (Mabin 1999b, p. 277).

At the end of its first five years in government, the ANC formulated the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme as a primary strategy to facilitate the economic and social transformation of South Africa through job creation and economic growth, strict fiscal control and a tough deficit reduction schedule (Parnell et al 1999, p. 75). GEAR aims to stimulate economic development by integrating South Africa's economy into global markets, increasing the country's international competitiveness and attracting international investment (Bond 2000, p. 36). GEAR has major implications for urban areas, as they are seen as strategic sites in the achievement of South

Africa's global competitiveness (Ministry of Reconstruction and Development 1995, p. 17, 41) and as principles of privatisation and cost recovery are applied to the practice of local urban governance (Parnell et al 1999, p. 75). GEAR reflects a new way of thinking about the agents of transformation; it involves deregulating the 'strong state' and favouring, in particular, public-private partnerships whilst absolving the public sector of its traditional responsibilities to build a civil society and protect the common interest (ibid.). However, the government officially still holds on to the aims of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (Mabin 1999b, p. 277). The tension between GEAR and RDP will be contested at the local level, as Parnell et al (1999) suggest, within the context of the new concept of 'Developmental Local Government', the second major shift within local governance.

With the introduction of the "Local Government Transition Act" in 1996, the role of local authorities changed: The traditional main focus on service delivery has been shifted towards an emphasis on the social and economic development of the communities they serve. Although accountable to national and provincial government, local authorities assume enormous responsibility for defining and implementing development priorities; they become the primary agents "for poverty alleviation, the guarantor of social and economic rights, the enabler of economic growth, the agent of spatial and physical planning and the watchdog of environmental justice" (Parnell et al 1999, p. 76). Therefore, all local authorities are required by law to develop an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) that has an integrated approach to service delivery. The IDP has to focus on the development of communities and it has to develop a business plan for a period of three to five years showing how this will be done. Furthermore, municipal operations, budgets and resources have to be aligned with the strategic objectives of the IDP. The IDP is therefore a central mechanism to integrate all municipal functions in order to ensure development and change (City of Cape Town 1998, p. 1, 2, 4).

The strengthened role of local authorities in defining and implementing development priorities can be seen as a very important factor for enhancing political rivalry in local urban politics – next to the shift from RDP to GEAR it must be understood as a second important context for current urban politics in Cape Town in general and in the Municipality of Cape Town in particular, which is the main focus of my empirical research. The 1996 local government reform created six relatively autonomous municipalities with a weak

metropolitan tier, the Cape Metropolitan Council. With the New National Party[30] controlling four of the municipal councils, the metropolitan council and the province[31], and the ANC controlling the two largest municipal councils, the City of Cape Town and Tygerberg City Council as well as national government, Cape Town politics are characterized by considerable rivalry between the different power centres, enhanced also by both local and national elections taking place in two subsequent years as well as the anticipated restructuring of local government into the so-called 'unicity'. The aim of the unicity is to merge six municipalities into one central government and six administrational bodies thereby considerably enlarging the power base of the winning party. While the anticipation of the unicity has created a general condition of planning insecurity, as there is considerable doubt that the new government will continue projects initiated by the previous local governments because these had been dominated by a different party, local urban politics in the years before 1999 and 2000 have become strongly characterized by an urge of local government officials and politicians to demonstrate delivery and to endorse development options that are the simplest and involve the least resistance (Turok 2000, p. 25).

It is in this context of a general shift in governmental thinking and of political rivalry that the local urban politics of transformation in the Municipality of Cape Town – which are the focus of the following chapters – must be understood. When the ANC was elected into power in the Municipality of Cape Town in 1996, the new political leadership drafted an Integrated Development Plan for the city, whose vision and mission for the Municipality express the political will for the building and re-building of "the good city": The City's vision imagines Cape Town as "a city that works for all", whereas its mission is that "Cape Town, a dynamic, developing cosmopolitan city, reaches out to all its people and works towards creating a unified and harmonious environment in which everyone can enjoy all the benefits and amenities of a world-class city on an equal basis, in safety and freedom" (City of Cape

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30 The surprising strength of the New National Party, which is a reformed version of the old National Party, can be seen as being largely due to the vote of Cape Town's Coloured population, which makes up more than 50% of Cape Town's population and seems to feel sidelined by the ANC's political focus on the poorest of the poor, the Black population (Mail & Guardian, 8-14 December 2000).

31 In fact, the ANC won the provincial elections of 1999 by one seat; it was, however, overruled by a coalition that was formed between the New National Party (NNP), the Democratic Party (DP) and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP).

Town 1998a, p. 5). In order to give effect to the vision and mission of the IDP[32], the City of Cape Town has identified 7 strategic priorities that provide 3- to 5-year objectives to ensure the transformation of the city (City of Cape Town 1998, pp. 6). Space as a focus and agent of urban transformation remains an important pillar of the IDP, and is part of the IDP's first strategic development priority to integrate the city. The IDP recognises, however, the complex interrelationship between various aspects of development and identifies strategies, such as the implementation of equity and redistribution, targeting zones of poverty and/or social disintegration, housing, economic development and job creation, community safety as well as special, high impact projects as the equally important remaining six strategic priorities as fields of action for the City of Cape Town (ibid., p. 6)

In the following three chapters, I will illustrate three contemporary examples of urban intervention strategies in the City of Cape Town: The first of these, the Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF) (Chapter 5) is a typical instrument for spatial development and planning to ensure urban transformation. It can be understood as an example of the prevailing general approach to urban spatial transformation that expresses the apparent political consensus about the spatial form of the 'good city'. The second example, the One City Festival (Chapter 6), is a social strategy that intervenes in social relationships to enable reconciliation amongst Cape Town's emotionally divided population. The final example, the New Urban Management approach, which develops a new management approach for Cape Town's central business district (Chapter 7), is an example that illustrates the City's own ambivalence towards transformation in the context of attempts to create an internationally marketable identity, thereby creating the need to manage the new openness of society and space. All of these examples of urban transformation, however, fall into one or more of the IDP's strategic priorities of spatial and social integration, economic development and job creation, as well as community safety. These examples have been selected for their significance in illustrating the divergent new conceptual approaches to the city as a place of difference, as they emerged from 1998 onwards. They have furthermore

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32 The first Integrated Development Plan for the City of Cape Town has been drafted, but its legal and practical status had not been clarified before the introduction of the unicity. No community participation process had taken place, nor had the plan been legally approved. However, its strategic priorities build the basis for the approved budget for the financial years 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 (expert 16, personal communication).

been selected for their importance in indicating the complexity of challenges facing contemporary Cape Town. They will be assessed with regard to the challenges that I have identified in Chapter 4.4, in other words, their potential to transform fears amongst urban dwellers, their ability to negotiate social relationships in and through space, and the transformation of the city and urban spaces as socio-cultural construct. In Chapter 8, these different discourses and practices will be evaluated in terms of their respective effects on the overall aim of the City of Cape Town to transform the city that had been formed by the discourses and practices of colonialism and Apartheid.

5 The Municipal Spatial Development Framework: The New Spatial Vision for the City of Cape Town

The Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF)[33] explicitly seeks to re-interpret and restructure the concept of a city that was formed by the discourse of control and order of Apartheid and by a discourse of racial segregation, which led to the strategic spatial exclusion of and discrimination against the Black and Coloured population. The Muni-SDF is based on the principles of the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework for the Cape Metropolitan Area, which has been developed in a highly inclusive process with strong trade union and civic involvement and which was adopted by the newly formed Cape Metropolitan Council in 1996 (Cape Metropolitan Council 1996). The Muni-SDF is understood as the spatial component of the City's Integrated Development Plan and is seen as being central to the City's strategic priority "to integrate a city divided by Apartheid" focussing on the physical integration of Cape Town's fragmented urban landscape[34] (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 2). The Muni-SDF turns on its head the modernist planning approach in the Apartheid city which believed that architecture and planning could enforce particular social and economic relations: It calls for radical changes of the spatial structure to enable the transformation of social and economic relations, in other words, to enable real material changes, particularly with regard to the living conditions of hitherto disadvantaged communities.

5.1 The Aims of the Muni-SDF

The Muni-SDF develops a new rationality for the envisioned social and spatial order of the city that is based on fundamental norms and values of the new South African society as inscribed in its new Constitution: Equity, equality of rights and unity in diversity. From the vantage point of this new rationality the Muni-SDF formulates three fundamental aims for the new spatial order: Firstly, and this makes up the core concept of the Muni-SDF, it

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33 The Muni-SDF was published in August 1999 as a draft version, building the basis for community participation.

34 The development of the Muni-SDF has been declared as one of 11 business highlights for the Municipality's business year 1999/2000.

aims to ensure "equity of access" to urban resources and opportunities, that is to social, educational, commercial and recreational facilities, to natural assets and most importantly to job opportunities (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 20). Secondly, the Muni-SDF seeks to create a new spatial order, in which resources and urban opportunities are spread equally over the urban landscape instead of being monopolised and confined to certain areas (ibid., p. 43). And thirdly, the Muni-SDF aims to dissolve and overcome spatial fragmentation, by envisioning Cape Town's urban space as integrative and integrated, both in terms of integrating different areas that have been separated in the past, but also in terms of integrating urban activities and functions, such as living, working, shopping and recreating (ibid., p. 69).

5.2 The Strategies of the Muni-SDF

In order to achieve those aims, the Muni-SDF provides for both a physical and a social strategy.

The physical strategy comprises decentralisation and the redistribution of urban resources and people, the radical improvement of the public transport system and the (re-)construction of public urban space. Decentralisation and the redistribution of urban resources occur conceptually through the construction of a cohesive, hierarchical and three-tiered system of 'urban nodes' spread relatively evenly across the urban surface, accommodating transport interchange points and clustering various commercial, social and educational facilities (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 43; see Figure 8). In terms of geographical patterns, the Muni-SDF suggests the highest order place as the current location of Cape Town's international and domestic airport, and suggests, furthermore, two new level 2 centres at Wingfield on the northern spine halfway from the central city to the existing suburb of Bellville, as well as in Manenberg/Hanover Park on the southern spine along the planned Landsdowne Corridor (ibid., p. 68).

Through decentralisation and redistribution, the Muni-SDF seeks to establish a clear balance between the old centres and newly emerging ones, as well as within centres (which should integrate all urban functions) to ensure city-wide equity on the one hand and to create internally balanced communities on the other hand (ibid., p. 26). To guarantee equal access to these urban

CITY OF CAPE TOWN MUNICIPAL
SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

LEGEND

● Level 1 Interchange
● Level 2 Interchange
○ Level 3 Interchange(within City of Cape Town)
╲ Road-based public transport line haul
╱ Rail route serving interchange
○ Notional interchange

FIGURE 12:
EQUITY CONCEPT ADJUSTED AND WARPED TO EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORK

Fig. 8: The Equity Concept of Urban nodes of the Muni-SDF (Fig. taken from City of Cape Town 1999, p. 44)

nodes, specifically for the urban poor, the Muni-SDF promotes the radical improvement of the public transport system, which takes pedestrians as the conceptual starting point and which thus integrates pedestrian routes, bicycle lanes, roads and railways into a complex and decentralised movement pattern, in which urban nodes serve as transport interchange points, giving convenient access to different modes of transport, such as walking, buses, taxis[35] and trains (ibid., p. 43).

The (re-)construction of public urban space in Cape Town is central to the Muni-SDF's aim to redress the fragmentation of Cape Town's urban space and society. It describes the role of such spaces – parks, streets, but also urban centres at large – as "primary meeting places of people in urban settlements", acting as "urban living rooms" and as "seams of connectivity" (ibid., p. 51). This is particularly relevant in the face of persisting residential segregation, as the interviewed expert from the City's spatial planning department suggests (expert 1, personal communication). The Muni-SDF therefore makes clear provisions for interventions in public urban space, such as the general enhancement of the quality of public spaces, but also in particular the active use of greenbelts and roads that used to serve as barriers between different communities in the past by creating multifunctional urban parks as well economic activity corridors that encourage the shared use of these spaces by different and formerly separated communities (ibid., pp. 35, pp. 51).

Apart from this physical strategy to create the envisioned integrated city and thereby to provide equity and equal access to all its inhabitants, the Muni-SDF offers a social strategy integrating new urban economic, social, cultural and spiritual needs. Acknowledging the fact that the growth in the formal sector of the economy is insufficient to match the growing demand for jobs and that an increasing number of people will have no option but to generate their income outside the formal economy, the Muni-SDF argues in favour of the provision of spaces for urban agriculture (both large-scale and subsistence gardening at the single household level) as well as livestock grazing (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 27). It also promotes the accommodation of small businesses to enable them to manufacture and trade in viable locations, for example, in well located markets for informal sector activities, or small food centres (ibid., p. 61). The Muni-SDF, moreover, facilitates the accommodation

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35   In the South African context, the word 'taxi' refers to a 10-13 seater minibus operated by private Taxi associations and serving in particular the Townships where no other public transport is available.

of new social and cultural practices and needs, such as slaughtering, initiation or traditional healing by expanding the traditional components of the City's social facilities programme by, for example, making available facilities for traditional African initiation rituals, hygienic facilities for the accommodation and local slaughtering of livestock, communal bathhouses and laundries in places where there are households without water, support for single-headed households, homeless people and street children through emergency housing, shelters and others (ibid., p. 55).

5.3   Radical Change or Continuity?

With its spatial vision of a city of a socially just city and with its normative principles for the development of urban space, the Muni-SDF manifests strong elements of modern socialist thinking, which seeks to exercise redistributive power through the reconstruction of urban space. It clearly breaks with the segregative and discriminative character of past urban planning and urban form: equity is opposed to inequality and discrimination; integration and compactness are opposed to separation and fragmentation; openness and pervasiveness are opposed to barriers; unity in diversity and heterogeneity are opposed to exclusive homogeneity; redistribution of opportunities to all is opposed to the monopolisation of resources by a minority.

And still, reading the Muni-SDF against the challenges identified in Chapter 4.4, some shortcomings of the Muni-SDF's understanding of the production of urban space and of its approach to change and transformation become clear. In the following discussion, I will thus raise some critical points about the limits and possibilities of the Muni-SDF concerning, firstly, the Muni-SDF's core concept of 'accessibility' based on the assumption of rational choice, secondly, the inadequacy of underlying theoretical concepts of society and space that remain within the conceptual framework of the western and the capitalist city, and, thirdly, its practicability in a capitalist society.

The Assumption of Rational Choice

The first critical point concerns the Muni-SDF's understanding of the production and use of urban space, which underlie its core concept of accessibility: it is based on the central characteristic of modernist thinking on the city, namely, the assumption of rationally thinking urban dwellers, investors and other stakeholders, and the assumption that space and its use can be calcu-

lated, predicted and directed by the simple provision of spaces and infrastructure. The Muni-SDF defines accessibility in material or technical terms, in other words, in terms of the time, distance and convenience of transport. Accessibility is guaranteed, for example, if distances are not too great, and if there is available transport. As I have argued in Section 2 there are, however, other, equally powerful dynamics that shape urban space and prevent the equal accessibility of spaces, but these tend to be neglected in this conception of accessibility: there is the exclusive occupation of urban spaces through, on the one hand, symbolic appropriations of space and, on the other hand, through acts of violence, both of which operate through socio-psychic dynamics of power. The following two examples may illustrate this point, thereby questioning the appropriateness of the Muni-SDF as an instrument to enact change and transformation.

An example of the forms of symbolic exclusion that prevent equal accessibility is Cape Town's central city. According to the Muni-SDF, the city centre is currently the urban node of highest order, where governmental, educational and, most importantly, cultural institutions such as theatres, museums, galleries etc. are concentrated. As I have illustrated in Chapter 4.3, this area was originally constructed as a 'sacred' place for the generalised White population, in the sense of it being the place of representation and reproduction of White European culture and power, and as such it meant the eviction and deprivation of others. In terms of the Muni-SDF's definition of 'accessibility', however, the exclusive history and images of places, the specific desires and fears that are linked to the central city and with that the symbolic und emotional forms of accessibility and inaccessibility, are neglected. In its discussion of the role of green space, the Muni-SDF argues for the recognition of its psychological, social and cultural dimensions: Most importantly, it acknowledges that "human life is qualitatively affected by a sense of place" and that a "high-quality environment" contributes to "creating a sense of dignity and pride of ownership". Moreover, the Muni-SDF recognises "the inextricable linkage between the characteristics of a place, people's activities in that place, and the emergence of cultural expressions and forms" (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 7).

The Muni-SDF applies this argument to the development of new spaces, suggesting that public urban parks, where people can develop a sense of pride and ownership of that specific place, are crucial. It looks at space as an image in people's minds, as a space for social and emotional experience. Conse-

quently, the interview partner from the City's spatial planning department argued explicitly and vehemently for the development of new spaces for urban parks and the creation of new places, free of history and not already occupied by one particular culture, in order to allow a new, tolerant culture to emerge (expert 1, personal communication). Although this is a noble goal, this understanding of space is not, however, emphasised sufficiently in the overall approach of the Muni-SDF. It is not applied to existing urban places, such the central city, and it is, most significantly, missing in its definition of the core concept of "accessibility". It therefore has to be assumed that these issues remain largely untouched in the spatial restructuring of city spaces, thus calling into question not only the Muni-SDF's concept of accessibility as being central in achieving its vision of an equitable city, but also calling into question the integrative function of urban centres as the means and place for overcoming social fragmentation. If the described forms of symbolic and emotional exclusion are not addressed, it can be assumed that urban spaces, such as the central city, which are highly charged with symbolic meaning, will remain exclusive to a small minority.

An example concerning forms of violence as an important force in preventing the accessibility of urban spaces can be found in Manenberg, a densely popu-lated, low income, mainly Coloured residential area on the Cape Flats, which was first created in 1969 during the implementation of the Group Areas Act. Today, there are severe social and structural problems in this neighbourhood, such as a severe housing crisis, teenage pregnancy, rampant tuberculosis and high unemployment (City of Cape Town 1999b). In addition, and perhaps not surprisingly, Manenberg is particularly known for and troubled by gang activities and rivalries: There are about 45 gangs active in the area, the largest of which are the 'Americans', the 'Hard Livings', the 'Jesters' and the 'Clever Kids' (Pinnock 1984; 1997; Cape Times 30.4.1999). A study on social structures and dynamics in Manenberg – commissioned by the Com-munity Development Directorate of the City of Cape Town in 1999[36] – had revealed the enormous power of rivalling gangs in the area: Not only do their activities impede any municipal intervention in space, as gang leaders often put local organisations and local councillors involved in municipal planning processes under pressure to manipulate governmental decisions (expert 2,

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36   This study has not been published as yet and the results were related to me in an interview
     with a representative of the City's Community Development Directorate (expert 2, personal
     communication).

personal communication). But these gang activities also extend their influence over space by creating defensive formations, by defending turf and territory, and above all by turning public spaces into battlefields, in which uninvolved local residents have frequently been hurt or even killed (Robins 2001 and see e.g. Cape Argus, 14.4.2000; 2.2.2001; 28.5.2001). In April 2000, troops of the South African army were moved into Manenberg to patrol the area around the four primary schools of Silverstream, Sonderend, Red River, and Edendale, a so-called no-man's land between the 'Hard Livings' and 'Americans' gangs (Cape Argus, 14.4.2000). Gang activities fundamentally limit the use of public urban space and public infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, libraries and Community Centres by local residents (expert 2, personal communication).

According to the Muni-SDF's spatial concept, a new local centre, where a set of public facilities will be concentrated, is planned to be established in the middle of an area that is currently controlled by the 'Americans' gang. This means that these facilities are inaccessible to whole groups of others who either belong to other gangs or who simply fear getting involved or being hurt (expert 2, personal communication). This example shows that 'accessibility' in Cape Town has little to do with geographical factors, but more with social dynamics of power and control. It also illustrates the fact that the Muni-SDF has an insufficient understanding of 'real life' in the city, because it has thus far focussed above all on the consequences of Apartheid planning in its definition of the city's problems, thereby neglecting historic and contemporary forms of power and control that are at work in communities, such as the gangs in the case of Manenberg.

Instead, the Muni-SDF assumes that rationality and the intention to make urban society and space more efficient, is stronger than socio-psychological dynamics of power in the form of symbolic and violent exclusions. Although it can be argued that the Muni-SDF is a spatial embodiment of the imagined new social order and that it, as such, creates a new spatial vision, it can be argued that it is too simplistic in its understanding of the past and the present by underestimating the huge symbolic and real barriers produced by a spatial economy of desires and fears. The Muni-SDF as an instrument for restructuring Cape Town therefore remains extremely limited in its efficacy, because its vision is illusive and not sufficiently bound to the actual conditions of Cape Town society.

Limits of the Framework of the Western City

The second critical point illustrating the shortcomings of the Muni-SDF as a tool for transformation concerns its underlying theoretical concepts of society and space, which remain within the concept of the western, capitalist city.

The Muni-SDF can be understood as the spatial expression of the City's approach to urban transformation, which regards 'integration' as the main mechanism for the transformation of urban society and space, and which thus makes up the first strategic priority of the City's Integrated Development Plan. Integration, in the City's understanding, as the City's representative responsible for the implementation of this strategic priority suggests, refers to the administrative, economic, social and physical incorporation and inclusion of those who have previously been excluded. As a result, it involves the extension of privileges and rights of a small group to the majority of Capetonians (expert 3, personal communication). Integration, as it is sought to be implemented by the Muni-SDF, means, however, the incorporation of the previously excluded into an existing system. It does not mean the radical questioning and re-interpretation of underlying concepts of space or the underlying concept of a spatial order. Quite clearly, the Muni-SDF is arguing within the existing conceptual framework of the western city, which is revealed not only in its promotion of specific physical characteristics, but also in its concept of public urban space.

The spatial system promoting compactness, physical and functional integration, in conjunction with a system of urban nodes, is the classic form of western concepts of spatial organisation that dates back to German theorists John Heinrich von Thünen and Walter Christaller. Their works have substantially contributed to the development of spatial urban systems that are based on central places; moreover, like the Muni-SDF, they define centrality primarily in terms of geography (Von Thünen 1966; Christaller 1966).

This approach structures Cape Town's urban landscape in terms of a clear hierarchy of spaces and functions, integrating urban space into a coherent whole and also integrating the central functions of urban living, such as working, living and recreating. The conceptual separation of these dimensions of urban living is highly influenced by the thinking and working of a capitalist society, with people relying on paid labour. With decreasing job opportunities in the formal sector, however, it is important to ask whether informal economic activities allow or require a similar separation of the

spheres of urban life (Simone 1999, p. 176), and whether the central physical characteristics of being compact, physically and functionally integrated in this way can really create a city that works for all. Although the Muni-SDF does encourage the integration of new urban needs in the spatial system, such as incorporating grazing for cattle and facilities for slaughtering, conceptually these are merely 'added on' where they are believed to be needed (i.e. in the Townships), but it does not transform fundamental principles of the concept itself. The Muni-SDF does not ask, in other words, why these urban needs exist and what they mean for the social and cultural reproduction of urban society.

A conceptual focus on the actual connections between spaces and the actual use of urban space that has been developed by those who have been excluded from the urban system in the past, appear to be important in developing a new understanding of urban space. A case in point here is the Muni-SDF's concept of order that is informed both by a conceived hierarchical order of spaces and functions and by the order of the capitalist market system, which comes into conflict with the practice of informal trading, which cuts across this very order: In its discussion of the current problems of existing urban centres, the Muni-SDF states that "uncontrolled pavement hawking contributes to issues of crime and grime and undermines confidence" (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 9). Effectively, the Muni-SDF is defining informal trading as disorderly and linking it discursively to crime (see section on informal trading in Chapter 7). The Muni-SDF therefore suggests the creation of markets for informal traders, in an attempt to incorporate informal trading – in other words, the activities occurring outside the formal economy and its spatial order – into the existing concept, which aligns economic activities to specific designated spaces. This is a point to which I will return in Chapter 7.

A similar case in point is the Muni-SDF's concept of public urban space. It imagines this as a central space for collective action, and as an urban space, where integration of people from different social backgrounds takes place. This is a conception of public urban space that goes back to the European and western concept of the public sphere. Jürgen Habermas in 'The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere' that the idea of the public space and the public sphere is a particular configuration of commonness that emerged in the capitalist-democratic West in the course of the eighteenth century with its notion of commonness The public sphere was thus based on a secularist and universalist conception of universal access and '*Öffentlichkeit*' (1990). Cri-

tiques of this concept have pointed out that the notion of public space has been formed in distinction to private space; in other words, the public is conceived as the outside and opposed to the private or the inside (the family); public space is thus seen as a forum where public interests, the interests of the collective, are represented and negotiated, whereas private space, in contrast, is hidden and withdrawn, and represents the interests of the individual (Kaviraj 1997, p. 99; Weintraub 1995). Moreover, in modern western thought the public or the outside is the "tamed" and civilised space, governed by a civil order instead of the state of nature, and with control and discipline as an unmistakable constituent element of that order (Kaviraj 1997, p. 99).

If urban space can be understood as being socially produced by specific social and cultural systems of knowledge, then the definition of what is the 'public' or the 'private', but also of what constitutes 'public interest' and commonness becomes increasingly difficult. This is particularly the case in culturally diverse societies such as South Africa, as definitions of the respective concepts become more diverse and contest each other.

The notion of universal access or 'Öffentlichkeit', for example, might not exist universally in ideas of common space. Kaviraj, for example, in his analysis of concepts and practices about public space in Calcutta illustrates this point (1997, p. 86). In the Indian cultural context, the notion of universality of access, the idea of an activity that is open to all, irrespective of their social attributes is missing (ibid.). This has implications for the use and construction of public space, making it conceptually unavailable as a space of social integration. The cultural diversity of Cape Town suggests that there, too, might be diverging and conflicting notions of what may or may not happen in public urban space (see e.g. Da Costa 1994; Holt-Damant 1995). Hence, the Muni-SDF's postulation of public urban space as a culturally integrating space remains a loose vision as it omits to assess how Cape Town's culturally diverse communities actually construct the public and the private . I will return to this point in Chapter 7.

The conception of secularism as an urban way of life, i.e. the attitude that religion should have no place in civil affairs, might be similarly contested in South Africa. Lewis Wirth (1938) and others have valued secularism as a way of living that allowed for greater tolerance between groups. However, the view of secularism as lying at the heart of the modernist project seemed to have brought with it a new system of order and control, a new belief system, often based on western, modernist rationality and imposed on other non-

secular, religious or spiritual belief systems with their own constructs. Examples of this are manifold: in Europe, secularism was imposed upon the belief systems of the Middle Ages; in Australia, upon the spirituality of the Aboriginal peoples; in India on Hindu beliefs; and in South Africa upon the belief systems and spiritualities of the San, Hottentots, Xhosa, Zulu or Tswana (cf. Sandercock 1998, p. 212). In fact, the secularisation of education, politics, and also of everyday life practices and social spaces is critical to the modernist project and the western way of living, as Göle shows in her example of the secularisation and westernisation of Turkish society and state at the beginning of the 20th century (1997, p. 65): "The adoption of the metric system and the Gregorian calendar, the celebration of the New Year, the acceptance of Sunday as the official day of rest, and the civil marriage ceremony exemplify the imposition of Western secularism at the level of temporal organisation, daily life and social practices" (ibid.). In Turkish society, then, the public sphere described a space for the making of new republican elites, while excluding those who do not conform to this new life, the non-westernised Muslim population. Hence, the public sphere does not initially and solely appear as a manifestation of democracy by providing equal access of all citizens to critical debate on public issues, "but emerges as a model of modernist patterns of conduct and living" (Göle 1997, p. 65). Conduct and ways of living in the Western modern conception of the public sphere and hence public place were not only defined in temporal terms, but also in terms of order of appearance and the dress code, in terms of cleanliness, body and space hygiene, in terms of behaviour, which was expected to be civilised, quiet, not conducting private affairs (e.g. eating, urinating or hanging up one's washing), and in terms of use of certain spaces, e.g. pavements are to be used for walking and not for sitting (Göle 1997, p. 65; Kaviraj 1997).

Is secularism a prerequisite for a tolerant culture? Authors such as Sandercock (1998) and Watson (1996) suggest the opposite. Referring to the example of the Aborigines who were deprived of their sacred sites through colonisation and urbanisation in Australia, they point at the exclusive and oppressive character of secularism that has marginalised the spiritual appropriation of urban space by Aborigines. More recently, however, Aborigines have challenged secularism as a constituent element of the public sphere and have reclaimed their sacred sites in cities such as Perth and Sydney. The acknowledgement of Aboriginal claims by the Australian Labour governments in the early 1970s and recently between 1983 and 1995 can be understood as acts of reconciliation between White Australians and marginalised Aboriginal Aus-

tralians (Watson 1999, p. 229). Although the sacred sites were added to otherwise secularly conceived public spaces, and although the general thought about the public sphere and public space was not necessarily radically transformed, the acknowledgement of such sacred sites can at least be understood as a democratisation of the public sphere.

Sandercock in her discussion of new ways of understanding and recognising knowledge in the city in 'Towards Cosmopolis' suggests that "our modernist/progressive longing for freedom from the non-rational is inherently flawed; out of date and out of touch with the real needs of our time" (1998, p. 212). She argues for the repeal of the one-dimensional, rational thought of city space and urban culture by urban planning professions. In her view, there is a need to re-introduce the importance of the sacred and the spirit in our thinking about the city, not only by being more inclusive and allowing the manifestation of spiritualities of marginalised peoples, such as the Aborigines, but also more generally by recognising the need to nourish the soul and the spirit in daily space.

The question whether secularism is a condition and prerequisite for the creation of public space and what this might mean for the need to make provision for the non-rational, the spiritual and the sacred, is of particular relevance in Cape Town. As I have sought to show in Chapter 4.3, there is no secular space in Cape Town; its sacredness derives not only from the multiple religious productions, but also, more significantly, from colonial and Apartheid practices of setting things and people apart. The Muni-SDF does not discuss these issues, although it does make provision for the addition of spaces for spiritual practices, such as initiation sites. Nonetheless, it locates possible conflicts in the past: It sees the condition for the emergence of a tolerant culture in the provision of 'new' spaces that are historically not occupied by one or another group; as a result, it unfortunately underestimates the possibility of conflicts that might derive from different concepts of commonness in different cultures in Cape Town, where spiritualism, religious beliefs remain important aspects of urban life (Chidester 2000). In April 1999, when the five short-listed bidders for Cape Town's only casino licence presented their project proposals, members of Cape Town's Muslim community demonstrated strong opposition, in particular to the plan for the location of the casino on the Culemborg site adjacent to Cape Town's central city. Basing their protest on the belief that gambling is 'evil', 'corrupting' and 'addictive' and thus in conflict with the Muslim belief system, they argued that locating the Casino on this site would invade and violate the sacred spaces of Muslims who live

in the surrounding areas, such as the Bo-Kaap, Woodstock and Salt River, and who have their places of prayer in even closer proximity, such as in Long and Loop Street[37]. They announced fierce resistance to the plan, demonstrating clearly that public space in Cape Town is not secular, but over-layered with multiple sacred meanings, and above all, that it is extremely vulnerable and contested.

Contradictions in a Capitalist Society

A third and last critical point is to be made on the potential of the Muni-SDF to transform Cape Town's fragmented urban society and space concerns successfully, namely its approach to transformation within the concept of capitalism.

The need to stimulate economic development to allow social development is a central concern of the Muni-SDF. It argues that spatial development therefore has to be informed by those "preconditions necessary to optimise economic development" (City of Cape Town 1999, p. 16). Economic development has two "strongly interrelated dimensions", that is, firstly, the need to maximise comparative advantage, since in an increasingly global economy "cities of the world are in direct competition with each other to attract increasingly footloose investment capital". The quality of the environment, the quality of skills of the labour force and the efficiency of the urban environment, are all important factors. The Muni-SDF also argues that the other dimension of economic development is poverty alleviation, which is closely related to the first dimension, in that "steady progress in alleviating poverty is itself a precondition for social stability and investor confidence" and in that "the alleviation of poverty requires economic confidence" (ibid., p. 16).

Throughout the Muni-SDF, these two dimensions are followed through, on the one hand by arguing that the spatial structure of the city has to be "efficient" and that an investor- friendly environment has to be created, and on the

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37 The demonstration of opposition at the first public hearing held at the Civic Centre in Cape Town's central city was itself of highly symbolic character: A group of about 30 people entered the lecture theatre silently in the middle of the proceedings. But the silence was loud in another sense: With their clothes (the women were fully veiled), they expressed difference (see Peleikis 2001). They claimed that this 'other' space would be used for the spinning of 'unholy' plans; they walked up to the podium holding up posters saying e.g. 'gambling is evil', 'gambling is addictive', and then scattered across the lecture hall, taking remaining empty seats; no words were spoken until the session where questions from the public were invited, began.

other hand by calling for the spatial accommodation of small, medium- and micro-enterprises, since these provide greater rates of employment and income generation than larger enterprises. As Mabin has pointed out in his discussion of Gauteng's urban policy, "Vusani Amadolobha: Urban Regeneration and Integration Plan for City, Town and Township Centres", the urgent need of South African cities to generate employment is met by urban strategies to make urban areas "function well" (1999, p. 49). He puts it even more bluntly by arguing that "there is wide agreement that urban policy should make the cities safe for capitalism", and asks the important question whether this is compatible with the aspired integration of South African cities (in social, racial, economic and cultural terms). Capitalism, so he argues, generally goes along with a relatively small class of people who control the bulk of assets in the economy and who in the South African context are White and often sharing ideologies, consumption habits and social interactions (ibid.). Furthermore, as international examples show, rapid economic growth can readily be accompanied by deepening poverty for some and declining economic opportunities for large numbers (e.g. Soja 1995; Marcuse 1995). As Turok shows in the case of Cape Town, commercial pressures to maximise the value of land have militated against and limited the possibility of constructing low-income housing on well located sites as envisioned by new spatial development frameworks, as government agencies outside local authority control have been reluctant to sacrifice a lower price for a more strategic use of the land (2000, p. 24). The question whether a capitalist urban economy can be compatible with the redistribution of wealth remains largely unresolved and seems to remain a hidden albeit powerful issue.

In conclusion, the Muni-SDF can be understood as an important step towards reconciliation, which it seeks to achieve through restitution and redistribution, in other words, through material changes and social transformation in order to narrow the huge gaps in living standards that divide Capetonians. However, the critical points raised in the previous paragraphs point at a fundamental shortcoming of new spatial thinking and practice in the City of Cape Town: a lack of conceptual reconciliation. The Muni-SDF is based on too simplistic definitions of problems of the past, seeing them in physical disconnection, fragmentation and exclusion. As a result, it neglects not only other, more subtle forms of exclusion and socio-spatial dynamics of power, but it also fails to re-interpret fundamental concepts of the western and capitalist city. This shortcoming essentially makes it questionable whether the Muni-SDF can achieve its high aims to integrate, socially and physically, Cape Town's fragmented urban landscape.

6 The One City Festival: A Strategy for Social Intervention

The One City Festival (OCF), a three day arts and culture festival that took place in Cape Town for the first time around the national public holiday 'Heritage Day' in September 1999 is part of a strategy that explicitly seeks to ensure the social integration of Capetonians, by reinterpreting cultural difference and diversity as a dividing force in Cape Town society. Initially, the OCF was a private initiative by the Cape Times, one of Cape Town's major English daily newspapers, which, at the end of 1998, launched an editorial initiative called "One City, Many Cultures" to "help promote tolerance and understanding" amongst the people of Cape Town (Cape Times, 26.11.1998). In February 1999, the City of Cape Town agreed to enter into a joint venture between itself and the Cape Times to organise the One City Festival, with Mayor Nomaindia Mfeketo being the patron of the Festival. The Festival was to become part of the City's first strategic development priority to integrate the City.

6.1 The Aims and Strategy of the One City Festival

Based on the general aim of contributing to social and cultural integration in Cape Town the One City Festival set itself two primary objectives, and one secondary objective:

Firstly, the OCF sought to create a cultural context that encouraged both the celebration of difference and cultural diversity as well as the development of a shared culture, a new hybrid Capetonian identity: Recognising emotional divisions, fear, mistrust and ignorance as important forces dividing Capetonians, the OCF sought to create a non-threatening environment that would make transparent the full range of cultural expressions in Cape Town in order to encourage Capetonians to explore their differences and discover commonalities across and beyond racial lines. In so doing, the OCF sought to stimulate cultural change by transforming not only the prevailing fear of difference, but also dismantling the exclusive identity constructions fixed to race, previously imposed by Apartheid. The intention of this was to enable people to see themselves not primarily as Black, White, Coloured, Muslim, Jewish

or Christian, but as human beings living in Cape Town and having common interests and concerns (experts 4 and 25, personal communications).

Secondly, the Festival sought to strengthen and develop the arts and culture sector of Cape Town and to promote the acknowledgement of arts and culture as a stimulator of social development and economic growth by equipping and maintaining cultural infrastructures, by providing access to arts and entertainment for historically marginalized communities, by creating opportunities for the acquisition of skills and work for artists and event managers, and finally, by contributing to an attractive local and international image of Cape Town and thereby putting it on the map of international investors and tourists (experts 4 and 25, personal communications). The OCF therefore sought to "generate widespread support from the public, business community, arts and culture sector, tourism industry etc. for an annual festival", as well as to put in place the infrastructure, expertise, marketing, funding, organisational and support basis for future festivals. The ultimate aim was to place Cape Town on the international festival circuit, thus further attracting tourists and contributing to economic growth in Cape Town (OCF newsletter 1999).

Thirdly, and this aim arose out of more strategic considerations, the Festival sought to make a socio-spatial impact on the central city: On the one hand, it symbolically sought to encourage specifically Blacks and Coloureds who had been physically, socially and culturally alienated from the centre of the city by Apartheid politics to re-claim this area and to reinterpret its exclusive image. On the other hand, and more generally, it sought to re-attract people to the central city in order to contribute to inner urban regeneration (experts 4 and 25, personal communications).

By means of these aims, the One City Festival developed an approach to social and spatial transformation that uses arts and culture as a mediator to address negative constructions of difference negative and exclusive constructions and perceptions of public urban space, particularly with regard to Cape Town's central city. Reconciliation of emotional divisions and alienations between and from people and spaces lies at the heart of the One City Festival's approach to social and spatial integration.

6.2 "Teaching a Vegetarian to eat meat again": The Achievements of the One City Festival

"Teaching a vegetarian to eat meat again" – this quote of the City's representative who is responsible for the One City Festival puts the challenges of the Festival in a nutshell: to redress the huge psychological and symbolic barriers anchored in people's minds and dividing people and spaces in Cape Town.

What did the One City Festival achieve?

In terms of its first aim, to create room for expression and celebration of Cape Town's cultural diversity, the Festival can be valued as a success. As the Festival was designed as an arts and cultural festival, 226 events took place over the festival period, offering a wide range of activities, shows, performances and events, including dance and drama, visual arts, music, literature, film, video and television, lectures and panel discussions, craft and cuisine, gatherings, sports and recreation, cultural tourism, children's events as well as multidisciplinary events, such as a street carnival procession and a buskers' festival. Twenty-seven of these events were part of a core programme, mostly initiated by the Festival organisers and relating directly to the aims of the Festival to showcase different local cultural expressions and different genres of art as well as to reflect explicitly on the 'One City, Many Cultures' theme. The rest of the events were part of the fringe programme organised and funded independently of the Festival Office by cultural institutions and organisations within the city, as well as cultural events and arts projects from outside the city (Festival programme). The Festival programme thus offered a balanced mixture of elite' and 'popular' culture[38], with the majority of events of the core programme being free of charge.

The Festival in general was well attended by an estimated 50 000 people over the festival period, despite cold and rainy weather. It reached a broad spectrum of audiences, attracting not only those who regularly attended art events. As a result of the pro-active approach of the City Council, which advertised

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[38] According to Blau, a distinction between 'elite' and 'popular' culture can be made in the following way: art museums, galleries, opera, theatres, symphony orchestras, ballet and dance companies make up 'elite culture', whereas cultural events 'with broad popular appeal', such as live popular music concerts, general interest museums, cinemas, commercial bands, dance halls, variety entertainment establishments and craft fairs are 'popular' culture (Blau 1989, p. 433).

the Festival in Black Townships and staged community dance competitions and school competitions, it also attracted 'untypical' arts and culture audiences.

Fig. 9: The Grand Parade during the One City Festival

However, the Festival largely failed in terms of its aim to encourage the crossing of cultural boundaries, both by artists crossing the lines of different cultural expressions, genres and styles, and by audiences attending different types of events. Rather, what the Festival sought to address was reflected in how people made use of the programme: People were attracted by different types of activities happening in familiar places and, as a result, the audiences remained largely separated. Events on the Grand Parade (see Figure 9), the hub and major public space of the Festival, for example, were attended almost exclusively by Black and Coloured people, whereas the lecture series, dance and theatre shows as well as the Arts Night were predominantly visited by White people. The only exception where racial boundaries were indeed crossed, was at 'The Granary', a historic building, which has recently been leased by the City of Cape Town to the Manufacturing and Design Academy

(MADESA) of South Africa, whose aim it is to give development opportunities to young previously disadvantaged artists and artisans.[39] The official opening took place in the Granary, and throughout the Festival it was well visited by a racially and socially mixed audience. This is evident from the mixture of so – called high – and lowbrow culture, exhibiting long-term arts and culture projects that involved local arts, craftwork and cultural tourism projects, community groups working with youth, schools and the Cape Technikon.

In terms of the second aim of the Festival, viz. to contribute to social and economic development and to the development of the arts and culture sector in general, the achievements were more ambivalent. For the preparation of the Festival, 55 project co-ordinators and managers were appointed, of which 8 were specifically employed as part of the Festival's development programme (expert 25, personal communication). However, the aim of the Festival was to make events available free of charge and with very little funding from public sources (it received R 390 000 from the City of Cape Town, which also provided Municipal services, such as cleansing, ambulances, fire and rescue services, for about R 160 000) and private sponsors (R 4.74 million was received from the Cape Times, SABC Television and corporate businesses). This meant that only the operational costs of the Festival were covered; artists gained nothing except for exposure to the public. The Festival moreover achieved political support, and it was incorporated into the City of Cape Town's strategic priority "integration of the City"; it was also included in the Cape Metropolitan Council's 'Major Event Strategy' whose aim is the stimulation of economic development. The political buy-in can be attributed to the realisation that the One City Festival can become an internationally known event that enhances the image of Cape Town (experts 4, 13, 21 and 25, personal communications). However, the City did not commit itself to increase its funding, and only appointed a Festival co-ordinator for the following festival a couple of months before the Festival date, thereby fun-

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39 The Granary, built in 1809, is one of the most significant historical buildings in the country and has been put to many uses: At first it was a Customs House, before being converted into a Granary; thereafter, it became a prison for women, before being converted to Police offices; most recently, it had been unoccupied for seven years. The Manufacturing and Design Academy (MADESA) of South Africa, which supports young previously disadvantaged artists and artisans, is currently busy restructuring the building to achieve National Monument Status.

damentally undermining the long-term social development aims of the Festival.

Lastly, the third aim of the One City Festival, viz. to make a symbolic statement to encourage the people of Cape Town to reclaim the city centre and therefore to contribute to inner urban regeneration, could only be achieved partially, as was the case with the previous two aims. The good acceptance of core events on the Grand Parade, in the Castle (see Figure 10), in the Granary as well as the Arts Night, suggests that the Festival did encourage Capetonians, and particularly those who were historically marginalised, to reclaim the inner urban space. It also proved that the Festival generally can contribute to the revitalisation of the central city.

Fig. 10: The Castle Reclaimed

Nonetheless, the way in which audiences made use of the programme indicated the persistence of existing psychological and symbolic barriers that make public space exclusive. There was very little flow between the different venues within the central city, and spaces and people remained largely separated in terms of race. Whereas the events on the Grand Parade attracted

many Blacks and Coloureds, only few of them made use of other venues within the central city, and the streets in the central city remained largely empty. In the case of the Jazz Festival, an event that usually attracts large Black and Coloured crowds in Cape Town, the venue of the Nico Malan complex might have been the reason for the small audience that arrived. The Nico Malan complex had, after all, been built under the Apartheid government in the 1950s and served primarily the promotion of Afrikaans culture in Cape Town. Even though the management team of the Nico Malan had renamed itself "Artscape" in 1998 to actively promote a new and more inclusive image of the institution, it is possible that the history of the building still acts as a psychological barrier that turns it into a no-go place for Black and Coloured communities.

The connection of different spaces within the central city did, however, succeed in the case of the Arts Night, in which the 41 galleries and museums in the central city were open until 11 pm and shuttle busses provided transport between the different venues. That night, the streets of the central city were injected with life, with people moving between different spaces. However, as pointed out already when evaluating the Festival's aim of crossing cultural divisions, audiences and places remained largely racially segregated: For the duration of the Festival, the Grand Parade was an exclusively Black space, whereas, during the Arts Night, the streets of the central city were an exclusively White space.

Fig. 11:   Louis Botha Transformed

Where the Festival sought to reinterpret the exclusiveness of the meaning of space, it provoked angry protest: As part of the public sculptures project of the Festival, artists temporarily transformed public sculptures and monuments, questioning their symbolic meaning; this was the only

project of the Festival that provoked negative and controversial public opinions. For example, the make-over of the statue of South Africa's first president, Louis Botha, in front of the Houses of Parliament by Cape Town based artist Beezy Bailey, who turned Botha into an 'abakhwetha', Xhosa initiate, to symbolize South Africa's 'coming of age', was perceived by some as "offensive" and in "exceptional poor taste" (Cape Times, 23.9.1999; expert 25, personal communication): "I am not an Afrikaaner, but all members of the 'Rainbow Nation' should respect our collective heritage with tolerance and understanding," reads one letter to the editor, illustrating the sacredness of historic symbols in the city (Cape Times, 24.9.1999; see Figure 11).

6.3 Celebrating Difference: A Stimulator for Change and Transformation?

The strength of the conceptual approach to transformation of the One City Festival lies specifically in its recognition of the emotional divisions amongst Capetonians, which are understood as being caused by negative constructions of difference inherited from Apartheid. The Festival's strategy takes people's emotions, anxieties and fears related to difference as its conceptual starting point, with the aim of explicitly addressing them by creating a cultural and political context, which makes the reality of Cape Town's cultural diversity transparent and in which the negative constructions of difference can be transformed. Considering the illustrations in Chapter 4, where I have argued that fear of difference and exclusive constructions of culture and civilisation have been historically important divisive forces in the construction of society and space in Cape Town, the One City Festival with its conceptual approach a mechanism of reconciliation. It therefore is an important instrument for working towards the City's strategic priority of social, cultural and spatial integration. It translates the normative discourse of South Africa's new Constitution finds unity in diversity, into the urban context and turns it into a tangible experience.

However, the ambivalent results of the Festival illustrated above do raise questions about the limitations of the One City Festival, both on a conceptual and a practical level. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss three critical points: firstly, the Festival's conceptual approach of multiculturalism, which underlies its strategy of celebrating difference; secondly, its practical approach to pursuing social transformation independently from spatial transformation, and thirdly, the Festival as a strategy for change itself.

Multiculturalism, a Relevant Concept?

The Festival's conceptual approach to celebrate difference is based on the concept of a pluralist, multicultural society. In this instance, intercultural toleration is premised not on suspending but on celebrating difference. Difference is thus not viewed as a reason for fear, nor does it reinforce the construction of otherness that legitimised the conceptual and practical exclusion of certain population groups from society and from the notion of 'civilisation'. The state-imposed conceptualisation of difference in terms of 'race' that was inherited from the past is thereby re-conceptualised in terms of 'ethnicity', and social and cultural forms of identity (Hall 1992). This assertion of difference, as I have illustrated in Chapter 2.1, has been welcomed by international theorists writing on ethnicity and group identity, as an expression, not of social discord, but of a new form of democracy through which sections of society previously silenced have been given a voice, thus enabling a more democratic form of social dialogue (Hall 1992; Young 1990). Moreover, as Hall writes in the context of British society, "new ethnicities" posit a "non-coercive and more diverse conception of ethnicity, to set against the embattled, hegemonic conception of 'Englishness', which … stabilises so much of the dominant political and cultural discourses" (1992, p. 258). As a result, challenging such exclusive notions of political and cultural discourses shaped in the past by a White/European minority can be seen as an important role of the One City Festival in legitimising its approach to celebrate difference. However, opponents of this conceptual viewpoint argue that pluralism re-asserts the notion that ethnicity is a central part of people's identity, and thereby ironically re-confirms 'culture' as a defining and divisive force, leading inevitably to the questioning of equality as a social and political concept (Malik 1996, p. 16). This critique is particularly valid in South African society, as Apartheid did not aim to distinguish between ethnic differences, but to use them to legitimise an unequal society (experts 1 and 26, personal communications; see also Chapter 4.1).

The One City Festival sought to solve this ambivalence towards its pluralist approach by staging different cultural expressions on a single platform, symbolising that Cape Town as a city is constituted by differences within and not without: The theme of the 'One City' served as a conceptual reference point, symbolising a 'hybrid' culture, characterised by unity and equality (experts 2, 4 and 25, personal communications). However, the fact that audiences remained largely separated throughout the One City Festival suggests that

Capetonians did not celebrate the many cultures as part of the one city, but rather the many cultures reproducing the many cities. The theme of the One City, standing for intercultural and interracial harmony, was instead a theme in search of a reality rather than already a reality. Neither the theme nor the chosen strategies were strong enough to create a new reality of the integrated and equal city.

The One City Festival therefore requires a more coherent effort to create an awareness of commonalities and to make them tangible. A more coherent programming of events with the aim of consciously attracting different audiences and thus facilitating the crossing over of cultural lines (as occurred in the case of 'The Granary'), is very important. The proactive encouragement of cross-cultural projects, in which artists and/or members of different social and cultural backgrounds work on a common theme, creating not only a 'hybrid' product that fuses different cultural expressions, but more accurately creating a tangible space of a 'hybrid' experience, could be another important step. The One City Festival had such projects in mind, although they failed, however: This was partly because of a lack of interest from both artists and communities, because of a lack of time, as the preparation time for the Festival was limited to 4.5 months, and because of a lack of funds, which limited the possibility to pro-actively encourage such long term projects (expert 25, personal communication). A stronger commitment of the City Council to the strategy of the Festival is thus clearly needed, and this is a point to which I will return later.

Social Transformation without Spatial Transformation?

Related to the first point of concern discussed above is the Festival's strategy of transforming social relationships relatively independent from space. An important reason for the failure of the One City Festival to bridge and integrate the 'many cities' into 'One City' can be seen in its neglecting to make space central in redressing social and emotional divisions. To make a socio-spatial impact on the city was a secondary aim of the Festival, arising mainly out of strategic considerations and legitimising, too, the decision to locate the main festival district in the central city[40]. As I have sought to show in Chap-

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40 Prior to the Festival, a number of community and cultural organisations expressed their discontent about the plan to locate the Festival primarily in the central city (expert 4, personal communication). These groups argued that this would reinforce the existing spatial divisions by emphasising the privileged status of the central city and of those population groups

ter 4.3 the construction of identities (and with that, social divisions) has been inextricably bound to space in Cape Town; different population groups have developed alternative ways of mapping and using the city, thereby not living in the 'same' city and producing a fragmentary, divisive and exclusive sacredness of Cape Town's urban landscape. The outcome of the Festival has shown the persisting entanglement of identity and space reproducing the 'many cities' also in its spatial dimension: Whites avoided the spaces that were populated by Blacks and Coloureds and Blacks avoided historically exclusive spaces, such as the Nico Malan complex, but also more generally other venues in the central city.

The notion of the place-making values of festivals is well reflected in socio-logical, anthropological and geographical literature on festivals. Festivals transform landscape and place from everyday settings into temporary environments (albeit with permanent identities), created by and for specific groups of people: the everyday space of the familiar and mundane is temporarily transformed to one that is otherworldly and spiritually uplifting (e.g. Waterman 1998, p. 58; Cohen 1982; Jackson 1988; Soja et al 1993). Therefore, if the Festival wants to take advantage of the place-making values to contribute to the restructuring of exclusive spatialities, it must address space as it exists in its many symbolic meanings more explicitly, both in its strategic aims, chosen projects and choice of specific venues and places.

Central to such an approach would be, firstly, a more coherent approach to the programming of events. The example of the Grand Parade suggests that venues are well accepted when a positive identification with the particular space is possible or when it is bound to the practice of everyday life. The Grand Parade has a history of public (particularly Black) protest, and also lies in close proximity to Cape Town's central public transport interchange points, which are predominantly used by Blacks and Coloureds. The examples of the Granary and the Castle indicate that a mixture of events can attract mixed audiences even in a symbolically charged space that is rather unfamiliar and not bound into the everyday life of audiences. However, if the Festival wants to intervene substantially in the entanglement of identity and space, and if he wants to prevent the reproduction of the many cities, it needs to

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that have access to arts and culture events and activities anyway (ibid.). As a result, many organisations and community groups organised their own events in community centres or other venues in their areas, which then became part of the Festival's fringe programme (ibid.).

strategically create confusion about and stirr up the entanglement of space and identity: The strategy of the Festival to locate events mainly attractive to Black and Coloured population in traditionally White spaces of the city must, then, be extended to the traditional Black spaces of the city, to which Whites need to be attracted. Instead of having arts exhibitions, public lectures, dance and theatre shows that usually attract White population groups in the traditional White spaces of the city, those events should be staged in the traditional Black and Coloured areas of the city. Precisely because there are so few reasons for Whites to visit the Black and Coloured areas of the city during everyday life, a Festival could create a reason for doing so, at least for a limited time.

Secondly, developing a spatial strategy, then, would mean the incorporation of the Festival into long term social and spatial strategies, which also requires close co-operation with other line functions within the Municipality, such as the spatial planning and economic development departments, with the different functions supporting, incorporating and balancing each other's strategies. Even though the Festival did become part of the City's strategic priorities, this form of interdisciplinary planning failed in the case of the first One City Festival in 1999. While the Spatial Planning Department was not involved at all, the Economic Development Department was only involved, because it was responsible for the planning and co-ordination of the Millennium celebrations for New Year 1999/2000, which were to be launched during the Festival. There was, however, otherwise no co-operation to develop cross-functional strategies with regard to the One City Festival (experts 4 and 25, personal communications).

The need for long-term social and spatial strategies, within which the Festival is embedded, leads to the third and final critical point to be made with regard to the Festival as a strategy itself.

The Festival as a Strategy for Transformation

Festivals are ephemeral: They come and go. As anthropological literature suggests, festivals can be understood as a liminal ritual that removes people from their habitual daily lives (Falassi 1987a, p. 2). As such, they can create a time and space where exploration beyond predominant socially constructed boundaries can take place. In such celebratory spaces, fantasies about the self and the other can be embodied that extricate people from the limitations of their everyday lives. The potential of suspending the everyday rules that gov-

ern people's lives during festivals can open spaces for subversion of dominant ideas and identities. However, a festival can only be a starting point: it can initiate change, but it cannot transform what has been established and internalised over decades, even centuries. If, therefore, a three-day festival was to be more than a big party that glosses over rather than addresses social and emotional divisions in society, and if it was to have a long-term social and spatial impact, it must be incorporated into the day-to-day functioning and thinking of the Municipality, which needs to recognise arts and culture activities as a valid means of dismantling exclusive imaginations of urban space.

There is, however, another danger involved in the strategy of the festival. The One City Festival eventually gained political support as a result of its potential to become an internationally known event, such as the Edinburgh Festival in the U.K., for instance, and thereby contributing to a marketable identity of Cape Town that stimulates economic growth in the city through foreign investment and tourism (experts 13, 21 and 25, personal communications). In the contribution of the Festival and the arts sector in general to economic development, the Festival co-ordinator sees a chance for the arts to justify themselves in terms of the strategic aims of the city and therefore to receive greater support from the city (expert 25, personal communication). The symbiosis of the aims to stimulate economic development and to create an internationally acknowledged festival and to contribute to the social development and integration of communities is, however, a difficult one. It evokes the danger that the Festival has to compromise its content for one that is attractive and marketable to a wider, international audience, which might not be interested in community dance shows, school children's poster exhibitions, or the SABC celebrities and other events that seek to include those who are otherwise not necessarily interested in the arts by celebrating, the local, daily culture of Cape Town's diverse population. In fact, these were events that attracted large audiences that had never before gone to an arts gallery. The central focus on these events and therefore people, is essential, though, if the One City Festival wants to play an integrative and reconciling role for the city. The international marketing of the Festival might undermine this role by forcing future organisers to increase the proportion of high-brow arts and cultural events and by marginalising popular community events as well as people. In such a case, the Festival might become an exclusive space, taking away its very potential to be a liminal space for the subversion of dominant ideas and identities. The fact, however, that international tourism to South

Africa in general and Cape Town in particular has a strong element of cultural tourism, with tourists being particularly interested in South Africa's history and transformation from colonialism and Apartheid to liberation, which is documented in the great interest of international tourists in organised trips into Cape Town's Townships as well as in the great popularity of trips to Robben Island[41] (expert 21, personal communication), suggests, however, that a focus on the international marketability of the Festival does not necessarily require a shift away from local culture and local issues, but could instead be used as an argument for a strong local focus.

In conclusion, the social strategy of the One City Festival, which focuses on reconciling emotional divisions amongst Capetonians, should be understood as an important mechanism for contributing to the social and cultural integration of Cape Town. However, as it also indicates that the transformation of identities and social divisions cannot be addressed separately from space, it should be integrated in long-term social and spatial strategies in order to fully realise the positive potential of the Festival.

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41 Robben Island, lying about 10 km offshore in front of Cape Town, was a state prison for political prisoners under Apartheid, and it was here that Nelson Mandela served most of his 27 years imprisonment. Recently, Robben Island has become recognised as a World Heritage site, and, as the cell of Mandela became a virtual shrine, Robben Island became a 'sacred space' of local and international pilgrimage that celebrates the triumph of the human spirit over the forces of colonial oppression (Chidester 2000, p.16).

7 New Urban Management in Cape Town's Central City: The Reconstruction of a Sacred Place

Although there seems to be an overall consensus at local and national government levels about the need for urban integration and for the facilitation of a new openness of South African society and space, a discourse and practice of new urban management has emerged in Cape Town since 1996, focussing on the regulation of precisely this new openness, most importantly in Cape Town's central city, the historic centre of the Cape Metropolitan Area. The call for new urban management originates in a discourse on inner urban decay that was highly publicised in local newspaper articles soon after the first local government elections in 1996, when the ANC was elected into power in the Municipality of Cape Town. "Save our city! Creeping decay is eating it away" (Cape Times, 14.09.1998), "CBD: A wasteland of crime and grime?" (Saturday Argus, 14./15.11.1998), "Big city clean-up vital, say experts" (Cape Times, 28.10.1998), "Cape Town CBD on downhill slide" (Sunday Times, 11.04.1999) read some of the headlines. These articles call attention to the changing face of the central city by attributing it to the weakness of the new state and to the breakdown of cleansing and policing standards in the city. They furthermore bemoan the dramatic decline of the central city's public environment, presenting it as part of a general atmosphere of apocalypse by prophesying that a process of inner urban decay will take place in Cape Town, as had been experienced in Johannesburg's central city in the early 1990s.

Local institutions, such as the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA) and the Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) – both institutions that are representative of property owners and formal businesses located in the central city – have over recent years lobbied the City of Cape Town to address the perceived causes of inner urban decay: high crime rates, difficult vehicle access and parking congestion, litter and grime, homelessness and poverty and, most importantly, mismanaged informal traders selling fruits, vegetables, clothes, bags and other goods from makeshift stalls on pavements and markets, as well as informal parking attendants directing cars into their parking bays and 'guarding' them for a tip (experts 13 and 18, personal communications).

The City Council has taken up this discourse on inner urban decay and on the need for new forms of urban management with the argument that the central city, which generates the City's bulk income and provides for about 25 % of all employment in the Cape Metropolitan Area, excluding informal activities, is the most important economic generator of the Cape Metropolitan Area and thus needs to be protected (expert 13, personal communication). Moreover, the City Council argues that it has to create conditions for an economically viable city in a globalised world: The central city is regarded as the "shop window" of the Cape Metropolitan Area in that it that represents greater Cape Town and in that it creates Cape Town's local and international image. As such, it determines whether local and, most importantly, international investors and tourists have confidence and are therefore prepared to invest in the city (ibid.). The new urban management approach is thus an integral part of the City's strategic priorities to stimulate economic development and job creation on the one hand and to promote community safety on the other (City of Cape Town 1998; 1998a). Furthermore, with the development of a new urban management model for the central city, the City of Cape Town seeks to establish a role model that can be applied to the management of other central business districts throughout the City (expert 13, personal communication).

7.1 The Aims of New Urban Management: Creating the Clean and Safe City

Based on the aim to arrest inner urban decay and to ensure the local and global competitiveness of Cape Town's central city, thereby enabling economic growth in the Cape Metropolitan Area, it is the key objective of the new urban management approach to create "an orderly, clean and safe public environment" and to restore law and order. The aim is to develop the central city as a centre of 'first class standard' and as 'the heart of a leading world class city' (City of Cape Town 1999e; Cape Town Partnership 1999).

7.2 The Means and Strategies of the New Urban Management Approach

The new urban management approach seeks to achieve its aims and objectives by means of the 'efficient management' of inner urban space. In April 1999, the City of Cape Town established a new administrative branch called "Business Area Management" in the Directorate of Planning and Eco-

nomic Development as a co-ordinating body with the task of developing strategies for and monitoring efficient management of the central city and other business districts. The management strategy that was developed by the Business Area Management Branch for the central city, consists of the following central elements: Firstly, the establishment of new interventionist bodies that enable the deregulation of municipal decision-making structures and the privatisation of municipal functions; secondly, the control and surveillance of inner urban space to ensure law enforcement and the prevention of crime, and thirdly, the introduction of new policies and laws regulating the activities of informal traders and parking attendants.

Deregulation of Municipal Decision Making and Functions

Modelling its new urban management approach on international success stories of inner urban regeneration in cities such as Coventry (UK) and New York (USA), the City of Cape Town provided the legal and organisational framework for establishing public-private partnerships in the form of the Cape Town Partnership and the Central City Improvement District as the main mechanisms to enable inner urban revitalisation in Cape Town.

The Cape Town Partnership

In August 1999, the Cape Town Partnership was established as a public-private partnership between the City of Cape Town, the Cape Metropolitan Council and private businesses represented by the South African Property Owners Association and the Central City Improvement Districts Association in central Cape Town. It is a Section 21 company, which means that it is a non-profit organisation.

The Cape Town Partnership is a co-ordinating, lobbying and interventionist body that guides the decision-making of major stakeholders and policy-makers within the City Council, and develops "partnership based management solutions" to the problems in the central city[42] (Cape Town Partnership

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42 The geographical focus of the Cape Town Partnership is "Central Cape Town" as it is defined by the City Council, that is the area from the Foreshore to Orange/Mill/Buitensingel Street and from Tenant Street to Buitengracht Street (Cape Town Partnership 2000). This includes a small area of mainly residential use in the south-east of the area, east of the Company's (Botanical) Gardens, and south of Roeland Street, in which, however, an increasing number of businesses in the service sector (such as restaurants, coffee shops,

2000). The Cape Town Partnership has become an important vehicle for determining the future development of the central city. It is recognised by the City Council as its management agent and as the central mechanism to develop visions and strategies for the management of inner urban space, which will be translated and backed up by municipal urban policies for the central city (experts 13 and 19, personal communications).

In addition to the founding members of the Cape Town Partnership, the City of Cape Town identified the following institutions and individuals as key role players to ensure the development of a revitalisation strategy for the central city. They were appointed to the Board of Directors: the Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI), Cape Town Tourism (CTT), the Cape Community Patrol Board (CCPB), Business Against Crime (BAC) – Western Cape, the Cape Town Heritage Trust (CTHT) and the South African Black Technical and Allied Careers Organisation (SABTACO), which serve together with two co-opted individuals, a real estate agent for commercial property and a property manager. Neither the informal business sector, nor social welfare institutions nor local residents are members of the Board of Directors or directly represented on it, because, so the official argument, they are indirectly represented through the City Council, which also supposedly represents the interests of these constituencies. The City Council set up a mirror structure within Council, referred to as the above described Business Area Management Branch, which set up special task teams for the internal co-operation and co-ordination of different municipal functions concerning the management of the business districts. These task teams are, however, not decision-making bodies, but instead bodies for the communication of different levels of municipal functions (experts 6 and 13, personal communication).

In its first year of operations the Cape Town Partnership carried out a communications programme to garner support for its revitalisation strategy, and thus gave presentations to a range of interested parties, including those involved in tourism, investment promotion, hospitality, property management, local and provincial government, local residents associations and social welfare. A forum for the direct involvement of the public in decision making was, however, only formed for the private business sector. Private business

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backpackers' hostels, bed & breakfast accommodations and businesses in the film and print industries) have started operating in recent years.

can become a voting member of the Business Forum by making a capital contribution of R 10 000–25 000 per year – depending on the size of the business and on condition that they fully subscribe to the Partnership's mission and aims (Cape Town Partnership 2000, p. 10; expert 18, personal communication). During the year 2000 22 corporate businesses signed up to the Cape Town Partnership, contributing a total of R 395 000, about 13 % of the Partnership's total funding[43] (Cape Town Partnership 2000, p. 10). An equivalent forum for non-paying members was planned in the early beginnings of the Cape Town Partnership (expert 18, personal communication), but this has only met once and again, is a communication body rather than a decision-making body with no possibility to exert any direct influence on the policies of the Partnership – in other words, you pay to have influence.

The City Improvement District

The establishment of the Central City Improvement District (CID) is considered by the Cape Town Partnership as well as by the City Council to be the main interventionist and management tool to ensure the revitalisation of the central city, as it allows the stakeholders to emulate the controlled conditions and comprehensive management that exist in private shopping malls. The model is based on the strategy of Business Improvement Districts which proved so successful in fighting "crime and grime" in New York's Times Square (experts 13 and 19, personal communications). The required legislation in the form of a provincial by-law, enabling and regulating the establishment of City Improvement Districts in Cape Town as Section 21 companies, was passed in March 1999 (Provincial Gazette 5337, 26.3.99). In terms of this legislation, a City Improvement District (CID) can be established in any area on condition that it is supported by 50 % plus one of property owners (in terms of number of properties and rateable value) of a specific area. The main aim of such a CID is to ensure services such as cleansing and policing over and above what the Municipality can provide. A CID contracts the Municipality to provide a guaranteed level of services and compiles a business plan for the additional services and activities they wish to be imple-

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43 For the financial year 2000/2001, the Cape Town Partnership had a projected budget of R 2 million, of which 25 % was funded by the Cape Metropolitan Council, 25 % by the City of Cape Town and 50 % was expected to be funded by the private sector; ultimately, however, only 13 % rather than 50 % of private sector funding materialised (Cape Town Partnership 2000, p.10).

mented in their area. If the business plan is approved by the City Council, the Council collects an extra levy from the property owners within the CID (in the case of the Central City Improvement District this amounts to 9,5 % of normal rates), and redirects it to the CID, which contracts private companies for the delivery of additional services.


Fig. 12: The Central City and the First Phase Implementation Area of the CID

The demarcation of the area of the central city's CID has gone through several stages, during which the boundaries of the CID were defined and redefined. Initially, it was intended to establish 12 precinct-based City Improvement Districts within Central Cape Town, "to meet the specific needs of each different precinct and to allow greater diversity in the applied marketing strategies" (experts 13 and 18, personal communications). Several CIDs were close to becoming formal, viz. the East City, Central City, West City, Foreshore and Thibault Square. However, at the beginning of 2000, the Cape Town Partnership decided to establish one single "Central City Improvement District", which was to cover the whole central city in order to allow cross-subsidisation of different precincts, quicker implementation and greater effectiveness, thus preventing the shifting of 'crime and grime' from one street to another (expert 19, personal communication).

In November 2000, then, the Central City Improvement District was implemented. However, it lacked sufficient support in the southern part of the central city, where most of the corporate businesses are located. Nonetheless, its long-term plan is to expand it to the full area of the central city as soon as sufficient support is gained (Central City Improvement District Business Plan 2000; see Figure 12)[44]. In its first operating year, 49% of the overall budget of the Central City Improvement District (R 14.6 m) was spent on security, which pays for an additional 183 full-time security personnel, 22,5 % was spent on cleansing in order to double the current cleansing services in the area, 10,3 % was spent on marketing, and the remaining 13,4 % covered the operational costs of the CID (Central City Improvement District Business Plan 2000, see Figure 13).

The general buy-in of local property owners was gained by emphasising that they would be directly involved in determining the level of service provided and that they would be part of a fully constituted, legal entity, establishing a contract-bound relationship with the City Council. The City Council, too, supports the instrument of the City Improvement District and its emphasis on financial involvement from the private sector, particularly in previously advantaged areas, given the general financial constraints of local government

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44 The southern part of the central city has only a small proportion of corporate business and the area south of Roland Street between the Company (Botanical) Gardens and Buitenkant St is a predominantly residential area. The reason for insufficient support in this area can be seen in the additional high rates to be paid, however, and not in disagreement with the instrument as such (experts 13, 23 and 24, personal communications).

and the far more pressing demands of local government intervention and investment in previously disadvantaged areas (expert 13, personal communication).

Fig. 13: The Cleansing and Security Team of the Central City Improvement District

Control and Surveillance to Restore Law and Order

In addition to the new management tools of the Cape Town Partnership and the City Improvement District, which deregulate governmental decision making and functions, the control and surveillance of inner urban space that is necessary for achieving the 'clean and safe' inner city, has become an important component of the new urban management system. In the discourse on the deteriorating environment in the central city, the perceived prevalence of "crime and grime" plays a central role describing an atmosphere of "general lawlessness", even "anarchy"[45] after the abolition of Apartheid laws: Parking attendants are breaking the traffic by-law; car washers are breaking

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45   These words to circumscribe the condition of the central city have been used by all the experts – representing the City Council as well as private institutions, property owners and formal businesses – who were interviewed in the context of new urban management.

the health by-law; informal traders are breaking the informal trading by-law; motorists parking on pavements or in restricted zones and exceeding parking hours are breaking the traffic by-law; gangs of drug dealers and street children are roaming the streets and thus displacing the "law-abiding citizen".

This perceived atmosphere of 'general lawlessness' is reinforced by acts of violent crime in Cape Town as a whole, which (as I have shown in Chapter 4.4) are no doubt a crucial problem for Cape Town. Crime has had a strong impact on Cape Town's local and international image, clearly clouding Cape Town's image of being one of the most beautiful cities in the world and threatening the confidence of foreign and local investors as well as tourists in the city (expert 15, personal communication; City of Cape Town 1998c; Cape Times 7.5.1999; Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.7.1998; Le Monde Diplomatique, 10.3.1999). As a result, a number of police initiatives were introduced by national and provincial government to fight violent and, in particular, gang-related crime[46], and "Community Safety" became a strategic priority of the City of Cape Town's Integrated Development Plan (City of Cape Town 1998, p. 6f). In June 1998, the City implemented the Safer Cities Program (SCP) of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (City of Cape Town 1998c; Valley 1999). This is a multi-agency approach to crime prevention at a local government level, with the focus on social crime prevention aiming at the reduction of "socio-economic and environmental factors conducive to criminality" (expert 15, personal communication).

The strategy is informed by the 'zero tolerance strategy' and the 'broken windows philosophy' developed by Kelling and Wilson in the 1980s in the context of processes in US American cities. Kelling and Wilson argued that a failure to maintain public urban space, which is visible in general disorder, vandalism, graffiti, aggressive begging, littering, urinating in public, loud music, prostitution, junkies etc., would create a breeding ground for criminal activities, thereby stimulating a vicious circle of inner urban decay (in Feltes 1997, p. 21, experts 13 and 15, personal communications). Rob Walsh, president of the Charlotte Centre City Partners and acclaimed driving force behind the revitalisation of New York's Times Square, was invited to the City of

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46 In general, because of the reduction of personnel, the extension of policing to formerly disadvantaged areas, inefficient management, corruption and an increasingly bad morale, the South African Police Services (SAPS) has become weakened and is now seen as being largely ineffective in fighting crime (experts 7, 8 and 15, personal communication; Bussiek 1999).

Cape Town in September 1998. He pointed at the so-called 'broken windows' in Cape Town's central city, such as unpainted lampposts, wrecked street signs, garbage in the streets, homelessness, public defecation and broken phone booths in St. Georges Mall, which he interpreted as clear signs of the city degenerating.

He advised City officials to show 'zero tolerance' towards these forms of public disorder (Cape Times, 14.9.1998). Subsequently, the enforcement of municipal by-laws has become a priority in the City's approach to crime prevention, particularly in the central city. In August 1998 and in March 1999, the City Council launched 'Clean and Safe' and 'Reclaim' as two ad hoc 'blitz' law enforcement operations aiming at clearing inner urban streets of traffic violators, informal parking attendants and other petty criminals (Cape Argus, 27.8.1998; Dixon 2000, p. 42, see Figure 14). Although these operations, which lasted for one week and four months respectively, proved to be successful in

Fig. 14: No more Garbage in St. Georges Mall?

terms of cracking down on petty crimes, they were unsustainable over a longer period, given the lack of municipal financial and human resources (expert 15, personal communication).

Against this background, law enforcement has become a significant priority of the City of Cape Town since 1999 (expert 7, personal communication). In 1999, the Civic Patrol Branch[47] was established within the City's Protection Services Directorate, amalgamating all law enforcement functions of the city.

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47   The Civic Patrol Branch can be seen as the predecessor of a Municipal Policing system, which was promulgated by the unicity in October 2001.

Despite the City's general financial shortages and retrenchment policies, the Civic Patrol Branch's budget has been increased substantially since 1999, from R 35 million in the financial year 1999/2000 to R 47 million in the financial year 2000/2001, and the personnel has been extended by an additional 80 members of staff (expert 7, personal communication). In the central city, the City of Cape Town introduced two long-term initiatives in 1999: The patrolling of the City's streets with Peace Officers and Community Patrol Officers to increase the level of visible policing, and the establishment of a Closed Circuit Surveillance System.

Bobbies on the Beat: Peace Officers and Community Police Officers

To increase visible policing on the street and to ensure the enforcement of municipal by-laws, the City of Cape Town formed a special CBD unit within the Civic Patrol Branch and introduced the City Community Patrol Board (CCPB).

While the area of jurisdiction of the Civic Patrol unit, which is also responsible for the central city, comprises a large area (extending from Bakoven, Sea Point and Green Point in the west, Gardens and Tamboerskloof in the south, and Woodstock in the east of the central city), special attention is currently given to Cape Town's central city, even though it is not categorised as a "high" crime area but only a "medium" crime area by the SAPS (experts 7 and 8, personal communications). A special "CBD unit" has been formed in this area, allocating Peace Officers for patrols on a permanent basis. In the central city, this unit consists of 16 Peace Officers, which are complemented by 16 Community Patrol Officers who are part of the City's Community Patrol Board (CCPB), a private-public partnership between the SAPS, various businesses and local government.[48] The main function of both Peace Officers and Community Patrol Officers is to permanently patrol the streets

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48   It is the role of the CCPB to augment the manpower of the police service by involving local government and the community, in particular private businesses, who can rent Community Police Officers (CPO's) to patrol an area of their choice. The Community Police Officers are unemployed policemen or police reservists; they are trained and equipped by SAPS, they have full arrest powers and they are employed under control of the local station commissioner in the area where they are deployed. Community Patrol Officers receive a remuneration of R 2,200, per month from local businesses and local authorities. Currently, 360 Community Police Officers are deployed to 36 police stations throughout the Cape Metropolitan area, of which 101 are paid for by local Councils and the balance by private businesses. Another 180 were being trained in SAPS training colleges and it is planned to increase the total to 770 by the end of the year 2000 (expert 8, personal communication).

of the central city and to respond to complaints, and thus to make law enforcement visible. The formation of the CBD unit can be seen as being largely due to the great pressure of private businesses in the central city who 'bombard' city managers on a daily basis with complaints, demanding the materialisation of the ANC's election promise of 'community safety' (experts 7 and 8, personal communications).

Fig. 15: Mounted Patrol in St. Georges Mall

In addition to the security services provided by the City Council, the Central City Improvement District's budget for safety and security pays for another 145 Community Patrol Officers, which are intended to replace the private security guards paid for by businesses individually, as well as for 8 mounted patrols, which patrol the central city's pedestrian areas, specifically around St. Georges Mall and Greenmarket Square, and which are provided by the private security firm 'Grey Security' (Cape Town Partnership 2000a, p. 1, see Figure 15).

All Peace Officers, Community Patrol Officers and Mounted Patrols co-operate with and are assisted by the Closed Camera Surveillance System.

The Closed Circuit Surveillance System

In December 1998, a Closed Circuit Surveillance System (CCTV) has been introduced in the central city of Cape Town. It is an initiative of Business Against Crime (BAC) Western Cape, a Section 21 Company established in 1997. Business Against Crime was founded nationwide in 1995 in response to the appeal of the then South African President Nelson Mandela to the business community to help combat crime in South Africa (Business Against Crime 1998, p. 1). BAC Western Cape is a key role player in the provincial government's delivery mechanism for South Africa's National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), the provincial Multi-Agency Delivery And Mechanism (MADAM) and also serves on the Board of Directors of the Cape Town Partnership.

The CCTV system is meant to be the 'Big Brother' of law enforcement; it is a technology that assists law enforcement by providing sophisticated visual and auditory tools, which ensure the effective deployment of officers to incidents, but which can also be used as evidence in court (experts 7, 15 and 20, personal communications). The first footprint of the camera system was installed as a pilot project in Cape Town's central city 1998, with 12 cameras being distributed around Long Street, Strand Street, Greenmarket Square and Thibault Square, funded solely by private businesses in Cape Town (expert 20, personal communication). After the first footprint was found to be successful in substantially reducing crime (by 80 %, according to expert 20), the City of Cape Town allocated R 10,3 million to the project, and by November 1999 another 60 cameras had been installed, covering the whole central city and thereby becoming the biggest external surveillance system in South Africa (expert 20, personal communication). The cameras relay pictures to a central control room in Thibault Square on the Foreshore, which is staffed by 3 officers of SAPS and private security and are linked per radio to all private and public law enforcement officers on duty in the central city. The staff reacts to any suspicious behaviour, any crime and any socially unacceptable behaviour, such as "urinating in public, harassing people, or threatening behaviour", and law enforcement officers can be sent to the scene immediately (expert 20, personal communication).

The success of the Closed Circuit Surveillance System in cracking down on crime has been repeatedly communicated to the public by regular reports in daily newspapers (e. g. Cape Times 24.3.1999; 8.4.1999; Saturday Argus 23./24.9.2000).

Although the current focus of this project is on the central city, both BAC and the City Council argue that the central city is only a pilot project and that the camera system will also be extended to other areas, since it has proved to contribute efficiently to the fight against "grime and crime". The next footprints are currently planned for Heideveld/Manenberg and Athlone/Mitchells Plain (predominantly Coloured areas), and Khayelitsha (a Black area), with the long-term aim being to cover most of the metropolitan area eventually (experts 7, 13, 15 and 20, personal communications). After the city centre, however, the next footprint that was actually implemented, was around the Grand West Casino, which opened its doors in November 2000 (Cape Times, 6.12.2000).

The Regulation of Informal Activities

Central in the discourse on the deteriorating public environment of the central city is the increase in informal traders and informal parking attendants. In response to continuous lobbying from property owners and formal businesses, the City Council has developed a new approach to dealing with informal activities, which is informed both by the political and socio-economic need to create employment opportunities for the urban poor and by the perceived need to re-establish order in the city. Following the development of approaches to dealing with informal activities, it can be described as a move from strict regulation and control under Apartheid, through increasing relaxation and deregulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, towards a new wave of stricter regulation, albeit not with the intention to control, but rather to facilitate the growth and formalisation of the informal sector. The transformation and incorporation of the informal sector into the formal economy is understood by the City Council as being part of its strategic priority of socio-economic growth and development, and integration of the informal economy into the formal economy of the city (experts 3 and 13, personal communications).

Because of the centrality of informal activities in the discourse on inner urban decay and because of the City Council's ambivalent position towards their regulation, I will discuss the development of the City's approach to dealing with informal activities in some detail in the following two subchapters.

Informal Trading

During Apartheid, informal trading was regulated by way of the Cape Town Municipal Traffic By-Law, which was very prescriptive and prevented informal trading as far as possible by demarcating all central business districts of the City and suburbs as 'hawker prohibited areas' (City of Cape Town 1986). Informal trading was thus seen as a "nuisance" and was only allowed, when it contributed to the convenience of the (White) community (expert 14, personal communication). Only very few permits were given to hawkers to trade from a mobile stall, which had to be moved every hour (City of Cape Town 1986, p. 88). Traders were required to wear white coats to ensure an orderly appearance and were only permitted to trade fresh products, such as fruits and vegetables (ibid.). Due to an increasing influx of unskilled people to Cape Town, decreasing employment opportunities in the formal sector and growing unemployment rates, the City Council already from 1986 onwards pro-actively researched and promoted the contribution of the informal trading sector to job creation from an economic development perspective (expert 14, personal communication). During this time, the City Council tried to change the existing legislation to allow informal trading and to change the prevailing mindset (which involved dealing with informal trading from a law enforcement point of view only); it sought to understand it as a sector that can reduce unemployment and poverty by developing the business skills of the involved traders (ibid.). The City Council already at that time argued for a relaxation of restrictive laws and regulations in order to facilitate the growth of the informal sector (City of Cape Town 1986, p. 7).

In 1991, the National Government passed the Business Act to deregulate the business environment and to assist in addressing increasing unemployment rates in South Africa (Business Act No. 71 of 1991; Tisseker 1997, p. 1). The new legislation recognised informal trading as a vital part of any growing economy, in that it creates employment opportunities particularly among the urban poor (City of Cape Town 1999i, p. 1). Moreover, because of the new developmental role of local government, it is incumbent upon municipalities "to create an enabling environment for the informal trading sector to operate, expand and graduate into the mainstream economy" (ibid.). The Business Act went from one extreme of being very prescriptive and regulatory to the other extreme "of almost having no controls in place" and providing only very few regulations, such as the prohibition of setting up stalls where they obstructed shop entrances, display windows, fire hydrants, etc. (Business Act No. 71 of

1991; expert 14, personal communication). As the new Business Act did not make provisions to limit the number of traders in a certain area, a dramatic increase in the proliferation of informal trading activities occurred throughout the city, but particularly in the previously prohibited trading areas, such as Cape Town's central city (expert 14, personal communication).

Around 1999, trading in the central city occurred on six daily and weekly markets,on the edges of the central city.[49] The different informal markets with their offered goods attract different customers: Greenmarket Square, one of the main tourist attractions in the central city, sells mainly African curios, alternative clothes, jewellery and other items attractive to tourists; Trafalgar Square is Cape Town's well-known flower market; Thibault Square is a relatively new and small market, where mainly bargain clothes, bags, sunglasses and jewellery are sold, as well as prepared food during lunchtime hours; in Church Street, there is an antique market in a small pedestrian area near Greenmarket Square; on the Grand Parade, which had been a market place since the beginning of the 20th century until the 1960s, and which is now used as a parking lot during the week, there is a market with prepared food, bargain clothes, household ware, fabrics etc. on Saturday mornings, attracting mainly lower class local customers; lastly, the markets on the Lower and Upper Station Deck at the Cape Town Railway Station, which are situated at the major public transport interchange and arrival point in the central city, trade mainly bargain clothes, bags, fruit and vegetables as well as prepared food on the Upper Station Deck, as the main customers are daily commuters using minibuses and trains. All these markets operate during normal office hours. Most of them are managed privately, either by private companies (Greenmarket Square, Church Street Market), or informal traders' associations that are subcontracted by the City (Education Resources Network 2000). The Cape Town Partnership, however, regards these different markets as generally mismanaged, although those markets that seem to be attractive to tourists, such as Greenmarket Square and the flower market, are perceived as potentially contributing to an attractive image of the central city (experts 13, 18 and 21, personal communications; see Figure 16).

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49 On the edge of the central city, at the main traffic lights along Buitengracht Street leading out of the central city, as well on the corners of Hertzog and Oswald Pirow Boulevard and Adderley and Strand Streets, traders sell the major local newspapers, but also the homeless magazine (Big Issue) as well as refuse bags, hangers or sunshades. A few try to earn some change by cleaning motorcar windscreens while waiting at a red traffic light.

Fig. 16: Informal Trading on Greenmarket Square

The major point of conflict, however, evolved around the pavement trading that proliferated on pavements in Adderley Street, Heerengracht Street, Wale Street, Shortmarket, Longmarket, Castle and Long Streets as well as in St. Georges Mall, Cape Town's only pedestrian area (see Figures 17 and Figure 18). In 1998, the City Council counted about 685 pavement traders in the central city (City of Cape Town 1998b, p. 2).

The City Council's current position on informal trading is ambivalent. Although it views the current mismanaged situation as problematic because it obstructs the revitalisation of the central city,, the City Council, given the clear development role of local government, also seeks to stimulate and develop informal trading "as part of an overall local economic strategy" with social and economic benefits specifically for previously disadvantaged population groups (City of Cape Town 1999i, p. 3)[50]. In this instance, informal trading activities are not seen in isolation but as part of the management,

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50   Although there are no exact figures available for Cape Town in general and the central city in particular, a study of the University of South Africa's Bureau of Market Research revealed that informal trading is a 'big business' in the Cape Metropolitan area. About R 783,8 million are spent on hawkers' goods at street and flea markets. It is, however, mainly Black Africans who buy from informal business (18,5 % of their cash) compared to Coloureds (8,6%) and Whites (2,5%) (Sunday Times, 12.7.1998).

revitalisation and urban renewal strategy being developed for Cape Town's central city and other business areas throughout Cape Town (City of Cape Town 1999i, p. 2).

Fig. 17: Informal Trading in Adderley Street

After negotiations with national government, the Business Act was amended in 1993 (Business Amendment Act No 186 of 1993), authorising local government to pass by-laws to manage informal trading according to local needs in different parts of the city[51] (expert 13, personal communication). On the basis of the amended Business Act, the Cape Town Municipality developed a new by-law "for the supervision and control of the carrying on of business of

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51 In terms of the amended Business Act, informal trading in the city can be managed in three different ways: Firstly, it can be self-regulated, which is mainly applied in the Townships, because there, so argues expert 14, informal trading is traditionally part of community life. In this case, however, the City monitors whether informal trading occurs according to the provisions of the by-law. Secondly, it can occur by agreement between the different interests groups, which is presently the case in Mitchell's Plain Town Centre and Athlone. Here, too, informal trading is monitored by the City Council. In areas, where informal trading has caused conflicts between different interest groups because of an uncontrolled increase in informal traders, "hawker prohibited areas can be demarcated" (Business Amendment Act No 186 of 1993).

street vendor, pedlar or hawker" (Provincial Gazette 5099, 1996) and an Informal Trading Policy (City of Cape Town 1999i), both of which outline how regulations are to be applied in specific areas of the Municipality.

Fig. 18: Informal Trading in St. Georges Mall

Although the informal trading policy clearly emphasises the development and expansion of the informal sector, the new by-law for the management of informal trading in the central city is characterised by containment and restriction, in particular of street (pavement) trading. The by-law effectively declares Cape Town's central city[52] as a "hawker prohibited area", which means that trading is only allowed in 353 trading bays, as well as in the existing markets mentioned above. As a result of this regulation, the number of informal traders in this area has been substantially reduced by almost 300 trad-

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52   Claremont CBD, another major central business district of the city, where the upmarket shopping mall Cavendish Square is situated, has also been declared an area where hawkers are prohibited.

ers. In St. Georges Mall, the number of traders has been reduced from 200 to 60 (expert 14, personal communication). An informal trader needs written permission from the City Council, which is issued on a monthly basis. A stall in St. Georges Mall costs R 200,- per month, and all other street stalls R 125,- per month. Stalls on the existing markets are far more expensive, ranging from R 30,- to R 35,- per day (Education Resources Network 2000, p. 68; expert 14, personal communication).

To ensure the buy-in of all interest groups and to ensure a balanced solution that recognises the interests of both formal and informal businesses, the City set up a local task team in preparation of the new by-law, which consisted of representatives of the City Council, the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and Industry, SAPOA, the informal traders' associations, the Ward Council-lor, the Western Cape Small Business Council, the Western Cape Chamber of Commerce and the Economic Development Standing Committee of the City to negotiate the different interests and to develop overall guidelines and a uniform approach to managing informal trading (expert 14, personal communication). The local task team negotiated and agreed upon the limitation and designation of specific trading sites. The informal trader co-ordinator in the Business Area Management Branch argued during the interview that, because of the participative process in preparation of the new by-law, where the interests of the different groups have been thoroughly negotiated, it eventually became necessary for the informal traders themselves to place strict limits on the number of allowed traders, because this would decrease competition among them (expert 14, personal communication). The consensus among was reached particularly around the agreement to limit the proportion of foreign traders, since local traders saw the viability of their businesses threatened by increasing numbers of African immigrants who were venturing into informal trading (expert 31, personal communication). The new by-law only allows foreigners with a valid work permit or proof of their accepted refugee status in South Africa to do informal trading and furthermore limits the number of informal trading permits issued to foreigners to 30% of the total permits (City of Cape Town 1999i, p. 8).

However, despite the intensive negotiation and participation process, when the restriction of informal trading in the central city was enforced early in 2000, and the then illegal traders were evicted and their goods confiscated, a confrontation ensued between the so-called illegal traders and the City's law enforcement officers. The traders protested against the harsh style of the offi-

cers, who did not even allow the traders to count the confiscated goods; moreover, they blamed the Council for "preying on people who were trying to make an honest living" and who who depend on informal trading, since there are no other employment opportunities in South Africa" (Cape Times, 13.1.2000). My own spontaneous interviews with various street traders revealed that these were harassed and fined by law enforcement officers for petty issues, such as, for example, not sticking exactly to the demarcated bays. Other informal traders complained that the new permit system disadvantaged them, as their established trading spots were given to other traders (Cape Times, 28.1.2000) or that they were unable to access their confiscated goods (Cape Times, 24.4.2000). A similarly negative response came from Debbie Diamond, a spokesperson for the homeless magazine Big Issue. The City Council had clamped down on vendors of the homeless magazine as well as on newspaper sellers and other street vendors at traffic intersections; in response, Diamond argued that the City Council's policies were hitting on the least fortunate Capetonians who were trying to earn an honest living in this way, rather than resorting to crime as an alternative (Cape Times, 13.1.2000).

The City Council's position justifies its actions by saying that the need to regulate street trading is in the traders' own best interest. It does not seek to take employment opportunities away, but maintains that the reduced numbers of traders should improve the development opportunities for the remaining traders and that the permit system educates informal traders how to become formalised (expert 14, personal communication).

With regard to the future development of the informal trading sector, the City Council envisions the centralisation of informal trading into public and private "mini-markets", since this would "provide the opportunities to informal traders to conduct their businesses in an orderly and efficient manner" (City of Cape Town 1999i, p. 3). The City Council believes that trading within markets makes it "more economical and cost effective for the sector to provide a better quality product and service". It would provide informal traders with better facilities, such as stalls and storage rooms, which will attract better and more customers and therefore have a positive impact on the growth of small business (ibid.). This approach to the future management of informal trading is still under discussion, but it seems to be the desired form of informal trading management in the central city, as it allows a compromise between the interests of the formal business community and those of the infor-

mal traders. The market approach is furthermore in alignment with the Muni-SPF, which recommends the creation of a "people's market programme". In December 2000, the Business Area Management Branch organised the "Christmas Lights Night Market" in Adderley Street in the week preceding Christmas, during which about 50 informal traders sold goods, such as Father Christmas gear, snacks, ice cream, balloons and decorations. By means of this market, the city sought to provide extra opportunities for informal traders to conduct their business. At the same time, it sought to contribute to the revitalisation of the central city, particularly at night, by reviving the tradition of the lively Christmas market in Adderley Street that had taken place in the 1970s and 1980s (expert 13, personal communication). The City Council envisages that this Adderley Street Night Market will become a monthly event and that permanent night markets will be established in other parts of the city; these markets are intended to match "those in Singapore, New York and Paris" (Andre Jacobs of the Business Area Management Branch, quoted in Cape Times, 19.12.2000). None of these monthly, or permanent, night markets had, however, been established at the time of writing (i. e. at the beginning of 2002), although the Christmas Lights Night Market was indeed repeated in 2001.

Although such special night markets provide for extra room and extra time where informal trading can be conducted beyond normal trading hours, there are, however, several problems with the general market approach. Firstly, as the City Council itself argues, there are currently no spaces available in the central city that could be used for a market to accommodate the informal traders who have lost their trading spots through the demarcation of the "hawker prohibited area" (expert 14, personal communication). Secondly, as the current situation shows, trading from a market involves greater costs for the individual trader, making it even more difficult for the smallest trader to operate a business. This contradicts the general objective of the City Council, namely, to encourage specifically the smallest businesses (see above). And thirdly, as Barnes' study on informal trading in Cape Town has shown, informal traders rely on passers-by to buy their goods, whereas the market system is modelled on shopping centres where customers are destination shoppers. This puts into question the appropriateness of the market strategy for developing the informal trading sector (Barnes 1998).

Informal Parking Attendants

Since the early 1990s, informal parking attendants have become an increasingly common feature in South African cities, specifically in areas of curb side parking, and thus also in Cape Town's central city. Informal parking attendants indicate free parking bays to motorists, direct them into these and then promise to guard the car while the motorist is gone. Moreover, they often offer to wash the car in the motorist's absence and to feed the parking meter when a traffic officer arrives, thereby enabling parking for more than the allowed parking time. Initially, these parking attendants were mostly homeless people staying in the central city, who earned some money with their "parking activities" (see Figure 19).

However, this has changed over the years, with increasing numbers of unemployed adults between 18 and 35 coming from their homes into the central city, who regard the activity of parking vehicles as their permanent form of employment (expert 13, personal communication)[53].

At the time of writing there was still uncertainty on how to deal with the activities of informal parking attendants. It is a highly sensitive issue politically: On the one hand, it does provide informal employment opportunities for the urban poor, who are the main political constituency of the ANC; but on the other hand, it is recognized as one of the main factors contributing to

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53   A study on homelessness in the Cape Metropolitan Area carried out by the Cape Metropolitan Council estimates the number of homeless people in the central city at around 488, which is about a third of all homeless people in the Municipality of Cape Town and almost a tenth of the whole metropolitan area (Cape Metropolitan Council 2000, p. 50, 80). According to the study, homeless people survive mainly by begging (27,4%), recycling scrap (23, 4%), parking and washing of cars (19,2%), casual jobs (18,6%) and petty crime (3,7%) (ibid., p. 63). As homelessness is understood as a subject of welfare functions, it is only addressed at a metropolitan and provincial government level, and the City of Cape Town does not develop nor pursue its own approach. The homeless co-ordinator in the City of Cape Town, whose role is to co-ordinate different municipal, metropolitan and provincial functions concerning the homeless in the city has not been involved in the development of the new urban management strategy. While she argues that the general perception of the homeless issue has substantially improved since the end of Apartheid (expert 6, personal communication), non-governmental organisations working with homeless people in the central city still report regular harassment of homeless people (experts 29 and 30, personal communications). As the head of the law enforcement unit in the central city argues, this happens because of extreme pressure of the formal business community in the central city (expert 8, personal communication). The Cape Town Partnership argues strongly in favour of the establishment of a multipurpose centre outside the central city amalgamating the six homeless night shelters and outreach programmes currently located in and in immediate proximity to the central city (expert 19, personal communication).

the central city's de-
cline. Even more so
than informal traders,
parking attendants are
seen as contributing to
an atmosphere of
"crime and grime".
Many motorists make
use of the parking at-
tendant's service to
feed the parking
meters while they
work in one of the of-
fices or shops in the

Fig. 19: Informal Parking Attendant at Work

central city, thus causing a shortage of short-term parking facilities as well as
reducing the City's revenue on curb side parking to about 2% of the potential
income (expert 13, personal communication). At the same time, parking
attendants are regarded as a public threat, as they harass, intimidate and
threaten motorists, 'milking' them for money as reward for their services.
"Parking terrorists" is the common word used not only by people complain-
ing about parking attendants in the many letters to the editor of the local
newspaper Cape Times (e. g. Cape Times 20.12.1999; 3.2.2000; 19.5.2000),
but also and in particular by property owners, representatives of the various
institutions that I interviewed, City officials and the Cape Town Partnership
(e. g. Cape Argus, 26.01.2001, see Figure 20)[54]. Over recent years, the City
Council's approach to dealing with informal parking attendants has become
more restrictive, making it clear that it wants to stop these activities. This has
been promoted by the Cape Town Partnership in particular (expert 19,
personal communication, Saturday Argus 27./28.5.1999).

Initially, the City Council proposed the outright prohibition of the activities
of informal parking attendants. The legal basis for this proposal was the
Municipality's traffic by-law, which prohibits any person other than a traffic
officer to direct traffic. Directing motorists into parking bays was understood
as such (expert 14, personal communication). Because of its social responsi-

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54 A Cape Town based internet company even uses the negative perceptions of informal park-
    ing attendants in an advertising campaign for e-commerce in the weekly newspaper Mail &
    Guardian (see Figure 20).

bility, the City Council then funded the Broom Brigade, a project initiated by the St. George's Cathedral Foundation in 1999, which offers street people employment by cleaning the streets of the inner city. In a previous report, the City Council had suggested that informal parking attendants should be offered alternative employment in the Broom Brigade to comply with the

Fig. 20: Advertising e-commerce to avoid Informal Parking Attendants in

Council's social responsibility. However, this recommendation was withdrawn by the Council Report of the 24th of May in the same year, since the project was mismanaged in the eyes of the City; the funding of the Broom Brigade by the City Council has since ceased (City of Cape Town 1999j). The City Council argues that its "moral obligation to initiate alternative avenues of informal employment for those persons" has been reduced by the Council's proposed formalisation of parking attendants through a permit system (ibid.). In this instance, the Metropolitan by-law "For the Convenience of Persons Using Public Streets or Public Places" (PN 1103/1997) was revised in order to make it applicable to the specific problems of the City of Cape Town, and specifically its central city. This by-law allows the activities of informal parking attendants under the condition that they are issued with a permission of the Council and that they conduct the activities in an "orderly" and "presentable" manner (ibid.).

In parallel to this process of legally formalising the activities of informal parking attendants, the City Council promoted another strategy to restrict these informal activities: outsourcing the management of parking and introducing a new technology in the parking meter system for curb side parking. At the beginning of 1999, the City Council introduced new parking meters, which were to be activated by prepaid cards instead of coins, which – so argued the City Council – prevented the vandalisation of parking meters and discouraged the activities of informal parking attendants (City of Cape Town 1999j). Another strategy of the City Council was to outsource and privatise

the management of parking. In June 2000, the City approved a pilot project to outsource the management of curb side parking within the central city, starting with Hans Strydom Avenue, Long, Wale, Queen Victoria, Buitensingel and Buitengracht Streets (City of Cape Town 2000b). The model has been developed by the Cape Town Partnership: it recommends that the Council outsource the management of curb side parking to the Cape Town Partnership, who would appoint private companies as subcontractors to manage such parking. According to the model, uniformed "traffic wardens" would monitor parking bays, help customers with the required smart cards for the parking meter and ensure the rotation of bays. They would earn a commission on the smart cards, and an even higher commission on the fine that would be issued to parkers who block parking bays for more than the allowed parking time (Saturday Argus, 27./28.5.1999; expert 19, personal communication).

This new model has three aims: to increase the revenue of the City for curb side parking, to ensure rotation of the 3600 available bays in the central city by preventing motorists from using parking bays for long-term parking, and to create an environment, which is not attractive to the "parking terrorists" (experts 13 and 19, personal communications). The outsourcing of curb side parking is thus an answer to unsuccessful attempts to regulate informal parking attendants in a more moderate way, particularly by imposing a certain code of conduct on them by means of by-laws and law enforcement (experts 13 and 19, personal communications). Whereas the new approach to manage curb side parking will create employment opportunities and therefore formalise previously informal activities, it does, at the same time, take away an informal employment opportunity for homeless people in the central city. Effectively, this will create an environment that displaces the homeless and encourages so-called 'law-abiding' citizens to reclaim the streets of the central city.

The City's approach to dealing with the informal activities of traders and parking attendants seeks to control and regulate them by partly formalising such activities. In this way, new urban activities are to be incorporated, in order to find a balance between the interests of formal businesses and hitherto informal activities. The new approach is the result of political pressure from both sides and as an answer to two opposing political constituencies, a concern that was particularly important, given that there were two election years in a row.

Generally, the new urban management approach seeks to achieve its aims to revitalise the central city and to develop it into a centre 'of world class standard' through a complex set of organisational, judicial and technical means: New administrative and decision-making structures as well as new expensive technologies have been introduced, existing laws have been changed and new laws have been created. Large amounts of financial and human resources are being spent on the management and surveillance of the central city. What all of these have in common is that, instead of redressing the legacies of Apartheid redress the new openness of South African society and space, which is materialising in Cape Town's central city and fundamentally changing its public face: They are focusing, in particular, on the control and regulation if not in fact exclusion of informal activities to ensure the establishment of a 'clean and safe' city.

7.3 New Urban Management – A Fear of Loss and Change?

The discourse on inner urban decay and on the need for new forms of urban management has been initiated and driven primarily by property owners and the business community in Cape Town's central city, as well as by their representative organisations, such as SAPOA and CCCI and the newly created Cape Town Partnership. As the interviews with various stakeholders of the Cape Town Partnership, with representatives of the City Improvement District, with City officials, and also with representatives of informal traders and the homeless suggest, this could be interpreted as a reflection of a conflict over the transformation of Cape Town's central city. This conflict is between the previously powerful beneficiaries of the old social and spatial order and the new government that stands for new urban policies of redistribution in order to redress the legacies of the Apartheid system.

As I seek to show in the following paragraphs, what is central to the ambivalence of the business community and the property owners is that this is more than a conflict over material interests, such as property prices and rental returns. I contend that it is a more fundamental, psychological conflict, in which the fear of the 'other' and the fear of loss of White European culture and power are central. This materialises in a socio-cultural conflict about the concept of the city as a socio-cultural construct, in other words, a conflict about the image of Cape Town as either a 'first world' western city, or a feared 'third world' African City. The new urban management approach adopted by the City Council, as I will show in the following paragraphs,

expresses the City's own ambivalence towards the ongoing political, social and spatial transformation process of South African cities. Whereas it seeks to enable, implement and engage with the new openness, freedom and democratisation of South African society, interviews with various City officials in specific departments, such as the Economic Development Department and the Protection Services, which are directly involved in conceptualising and implementing this approach, suggest that the City – which seeks to develop Cape Town into a economically viable place by integrating it into the global economy – is bound into the same logic of the political economy of the city. It is my contention that the lack of agreement and conciliation with regard to Cape Town as a socio-cultural construct by both sides – the previously powerful versus the new City government – is leading to the continuity of urban politics as exclusive and discriminative identity politics with new means, which not only reinforce fear as a dividing force, but also reinforce old power relations, thereby critically jeopardising the project of urban integration.

There are without doubt material interests behind the discourse of inner urban decay and behind the indignation about informal traders and parking attendants. Formal businesses argue that informal traders pose an unfair competition, as they pay neither shop rentals nor taxes and are therefore able to offer their goods at much lower prices. Property owners are concerned about the value of their assets (expert 18, personal communication). However, studies on informal trading have shown that formal and informal businesses can co-exist, as the goods sold by informal traders tend to serve different market needs than those sold by formal businesses. Informal traders sell fresh fruits and vegetables that are rarely sold by formal business in the central city; they also started to sell souvenirs before formal business ventured into this market, and they sell bargain clothes, bags, sunglasses, cosmetics and jewellery that are offered at lower prices than by formal businesses (City of Cape Town 1986; Barnes 1998). Informal traders, therefore, do not compete with formal business but rather serve a different clientele, and in fact make the central city more attractive to low-income groups.

Moreover, the prophesised downfall of property prices has never occurred and the developments in Cape Town can by no means be likened to the proc-

esses taking place in Johannesburg's central city, where prime office space rentals had fallen to R 13/sqm[55] by 1999.

Fig. 21: New Investments in the Central City

At the same time, the expected increase in property values and rentals has not materialised in the central city[56] either, – in contrast to what has happened in decentralised urban nodes, such as Century City, Claremont, Victoria & Alfred Waterfront and Tygervalley, where, for example A-grade office rentals are up to 25% higher than in the central city (Rode Report 2000, pp. 59–61). Despite all this doom, there has been substantial formal capital investment in the central city and its immediate environment in recent years[57] (see

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55 Richard Tomlinson in his paper "From exclusion to inclusion: Rethinking Johannesburg's central city" (1999) questions the appropriateness of inner urban politics in Johannesburg by illustrating the differences between Johannesburg and US cities, on which current inner urban politics in Johannesburg are based. From his paper, it becomes evident that the processes in Johannesburg are shaped and influenced by different dynamics than in Cape Town, thus challenging the assumption that Cape Town's central city is bound to decline in the same way as Johannesburg if immediate action is not taken by the City Council.

56 In 1996, it was expected that rentals for A-grade offices in the central city would rise to R 60-70/sqm in 1999, instead of the R 50/sqm that could be realized then (SAPOA, personal communication).

57 Just to mention the most important: The redevelopment of The Pinnacle on the corner of Strand and Berg Street (R 80m), Investec´s new regional headquarters on the Foreshore (R 100m), Cape Town's international Convention Center (R 320m), the Roggebaai Canal Tourism Precinct (R 35m), the new headquarters of Mediterranean Shipping (R70m) and Clocktower Precinct near the Waterfront (R 850m), as well as the Waterfront Residential

Figure 21). The process of decentralisation to be observed in the central city, as the interviewed property analyst suggests, can be described more accurately as a transformation of user and customer profiles from A-grade towards B- and C- grade users, which might change again in the light of recent investments (expert 28, personal communication). The processes, therefore, can be interpreted as a general tendency towards deconcentration and differentiation, thus changing the internal structure as well as the network of different economic centres in the Cape Metropolitan Area (Turok 2000, pp. 12–19).

This tendency is envisioned by the Muni-SDF, which aims to redistribute economic activities across the Municipal Area (see Chapter 5). Moreover, these processes of decentralisation, deconcentration and differentiation have important structural causes that can be located both within the central city and outside it. With regard to the central city, the negative aspects are the unavailability of parking space, traffic congestion during rush hours and the lack of geographical centrality, making access to the central city by private transport extremely inconvenient. With regard to the areas outside the central city, there has been a significant boom in the construction of shopping malls and office parks in the 1990s; these offer semi-privatised spaces that are cleaner and safer, as well as offering better marketing, easier parking, and better accessibility specifically to the private car owner, as these malls are closer to the homes of the majority of Capetonians (expert 18, personal communication).

Other push and pull factors that encourage customers, businesses and investors to stay away from the central city are therefore important too, namely, the central focus of the public discourse on inner urban decay as well as the practice of new urban management. In terms of this, informal traders, informal parking attendants and the homeless are effectively being made responsible for a process that has different or other causes, too. The focus on informal activities can be interpreted and criticised as a short-sighted political approach that looks for quick solutions and instead avoids engaging in long-term challenges.

However, the discourse on inner urban decay does also represent the specific views of the formal business community and property owners (which are

Marina (R 1.3bn) and the Cullinan and Holiday Inn Hotels (Cape Times, 24.4.2001; Sunday Times, 8.3.1998).

95% White according to experts 18 and 28, personal communications) as well as the views of Cape Town's White population; this can be shown by a closer look at a study of perceptions that was commissioned by the Cape Town Partnership and that serves as a central source of legitimisation for the call for new urban management strategies.[58] The fury, the indignation and the aggression with which informal activities are represented, as well as the abundance of concern, or even obsession, with cleanliness and safety in calls for revitalising the central city by various stakeholders in the Cape Town Partnership and by City officials,[59] suggests that material interests or political ideologies cannot be the only explanation for the centrality of informal activities in the new urban management strategy. Instead, as I will suggest in the following paragraphs – it is an expression of a lack of reconciliation of a generalized White population with the political transformation of South Africa

For example, the interview partner of Cape Town Tourism argues:

> "While we feel sorry for them [the homeless], we cannot tolerate what is intolerable. When you want to open your shop in the morning you find a homeless person sleeping there, or you find human faeces. They [the homeless] use bins to make cooking fires. I take you up the road, I tell you, you won't believe what exists there. It's still there, weeks later! It's unhygienic!" (expert 21, personal communication).

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58 The survey included 295 public samples and 118 samples of property owners and formal business. When asked about informal trading and informal parking attendants, 50% of the public responded positively, whereas only 15% of property owners thought well of it. 75% of property owners, but only 43% of the general public expressed negative views on the issue of safety and security, and 61% of property owners and formal businesses compared to 32% of the general public gave negative responses on the issue of cleanliness. In general, the respondents were a well-educated group with half of them having received tertiary education and only 4% having had no formal schooling qualification. The racial distribution showed that White opinions were over-represented with 37%, Black opinions were well represented with 22%, and Coloured opinions with 40% were underrepresented (Cape Business News 2000).

59 Although interview partners usually used politically correct language, they reacted with outrage and abusive language, when they were confronted with opinions such as the one that informal traders and parking attendants are struggling for survival and are simply claiming their right to earn a living. While the interview partners would not deny that right, they were outraged about the disorderly and in their view 'anti-social' manner, in which informal activities were pursued (see in particular experts 7, 18. 19, 20, 21, 22 and 24, personal communications; see also Chapter 1.1 on this issue).

The representative of the Community Policing Forum in the central city argues:

> "They [the informal traders] do not only leave all their dirt behind, when they wrap up their stalls in the evenings, but they also think they can use every corner in the city as a public toilet! That cannot be tolerated! That's disgusting and everyone will tell you that, because who wants to live in a filthy city?" (expert 24, personal communication).

The representative of SAPOA, speaking about informal parking attendants, says:

> "It cannot be that you come to the central city and you want to park your car … that you have to pay money not only to the parking meter, but then also to your attendant that pretends to guard your car, while he is actually drunk. And not only that. If you don't give him any money he harasses you, he terrorizes you and if you don't give him any money then you find your car scratched when you come back from your shopping. How can you accept that?" (expert 18, personal communication).

And as a City official from the Protection Services puts it:

> "It is not only about cleansing. If the street is cleaned today, tomorrow the blacks are back there and they throw the packets, and the chewing gum and the biltong and the meallie bags and the faeces. It will be the same again." (expert 7, personal communication).

Cleansing services promoted by the Cape Town Partnership therefore need to do more than just clean the streets. The CEO of the Cape Town Partnership promises:

> "Cleansing and other services in the CBD will double ... If the City is hosing the streets, so are we – but with disinfectant" (Cape Town Partnership 2000b).

The loathing and disgust expressed in these quotes – according to a psychoanalytical reading (see Chapter 2.1) – can be interpreted as ways of solving internal fears of disintegration by a moral dissociation of the self from an other who is to be feared. The indignation and aggression about the dirtiness of informal traders, parking attendants and the homeless in Cape Town's central city can be interpreted as the continuity of a deeply internalised psy-

chological fear of otherness rooted in the historic struggle of the White minority to enforce and maintain political and cultural hegemony in a colonized country. In other words, this is as a mis-representation of unreconciled White fears of the other.

In Chapter 4, I have argued that White fears of Blacks and Coloureds, and specifically the fear of becoming 'like them', have been part and parcel of a spatial politics of emotion in Cape Town that consistently thought to solve these fears by dissociation and separation. The ongoing political transformation process, the new political and social discourse of a non-racial society, I suggest, has created a vacuum between the new conceptual social order of a non-racial society on the one hand and the practice of everyday life on the other. The outer world of the city as a social and spatial context is disintegrating after the abolition of Apartheid laws. In the central city of Cape Town, the place that has long stood for the reproduction of White, European culture and power, those who had previously been excluded from this space have recently appropriated the urban space and made it available for their own needs. The abolition of Apartheid laws has deprived Whites of the political, moral and spatial framework to negotiate their relationships with others, to solve fears of incompleteness and to something other. The abolition of Apartheid laws requires Whites to address their fears in a new way. In the discourse on inner urban decay, old racialised fears re-emerge and are legitimised by a sanitary discourse on pollution. The behaviour of informal traders and parking attendants is (again) represented as being uncivilised and disorderly: for example, traders pollute the inner urban space with the dirt they leave behind, when they pack up their stalls in the evening; the homeless contaminate the inner urban space by urinating and defecating in the street and in entrances of buildings; and parking 'terrorists' are 'dirty, 'smelly', often 'drunk', 'harassing' the 'law-abiding citizen'. All of these are represented as an eyesore, and as stains and blots on Cape Town's otherwise beautiful landscape. This time around, they are represented as threatening the post-Apartheid order, in terms of which the central city is conceived as the "heart" of a world class city, enabling the economic viability of Cape Town at large (Cape Town Partnership 2000).

Given the fact that many Capetonians quite voluntarily co-operate with informal parking attendants as it allows them to park longer than the officially allowed time, might suggest, again against the background of a psychoanalytical reading, that the aggression they express against parking attendants is

not only an expression of the fear of the other but the fear of becoming like the other, the fear that the law-abiding citizen may be seduced to break the law, to become the unmoral, anti-social other.

As expert 21 puts it:

> "You know, people start to take chances here, because they know that nobody is going to blink an eyelid. You can pass through this red robot or a red traffic light and a stop street. No sweat, I do it myself now. Because there is just a general feeling of lawlessness. You can do whatever you like, because there is no law enforcement" (personal communication).

And the CEO of the Cape Town Partnership promotes the new organisation of curb side parking by arguing:

> "If you are a good citizen you are really going to like the system" (Cape Town Partnership 2000c).

The outrage about informal traders, parking attendants and the homeless is further legitimised by means of the all-pervasive fear of crime. Considering the high crime rates in South Africa in general, but also increasingly in Cape Town, which have substantially damaged Cape Town's local and international reputation of being the most beautiful city in the world, the concern with security seems to be reasonable and understandable (see introduction to this section). But again, there is the fear of becoming the other, there is the fear that the central city may be invaded by and perceived as the 'other', and thus as that which has previously been dissociated and distanced.

The representative of the Community Policing Forum argues:

> "Because there is no law enforcement people think they can do whatever they want to do. This leads to the perception of the CBD as an increasingly dangerous place, where gang warfare and crime is coming closer and closer. In terms of perceptions from people out there, people start to think that the Cape Flats are really Cape Town" (expert 24, personal communication).

However, the discursive link of informal activities with criminal activities, and specifically with serious criminal activities, which is made by the Cape Town Partnership, has no empirical grounding. Neither informal traders, nor parking attendants, nor the homeless are involved in serious crime, they tend

to be engaged in petty crimes, such as the snatching of handbags or cell phones as a study of the Cape Metropolitan Council on homelessness suggests and as even the head of the law enforcement unit in the central city confirms (Cape Metropolitan Council 2000, p. 63; expert 8, personal communication).

Moreover, a crime victim survey, conducted by the Institute for Security Studies in 1998, suggests that the representation of Cape Town's central city as an increasingly dangerous place in the discourse of inner urban decay and the urgent call for stricter policing and law enforcement in the central city, effectively privileges the perceived fears of the general White population.[60] The dominating image of the central city as an unsafe place, as it is portrayed in the media and in the discourses of the stakeholders on the Cape Town Partnership who were interviewed for this research, can be partly explained by the fact that White people are coming from relatively crime-free areas, they have in the past been protected from crime by the state, and they protect themselves now with walls, fences, burglar alarms and private security firms. But it can also be interpreted as a projection and misrepresentation of the fears of a generalized White population, as it encounters the new South Africa in the central city.

The new urban management approach seeks to provide a legal and technical background, against which social relationships, the meeting of the other, and the confrontation between Cape Town's wealthiest and poorest populations can be regulated by means of new laws and controlled through law enforcement and cameras that focus particularly on the 'anti-social' behaviour of informal traders, parking attendants and the homeless. The laws regulating informal traders as well as those regulating informal parking attendants suggest, moreover, a 'civilizing mission' of the formalisation process: both sets of laws impose a strict code of conduct, which includes the need to be "clean" and "presentable", not to shout, and in the case of informal parking attendants not to consume or to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs during work, and "not to harass motorists for money and to swear and fight

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60 The survey indicates that the majority of Coloured and Black people in Cape Town perceive the inner city as a fairly safe place, and it is 27% of White people who perceive themselves as particularly vulnerable to crime in the central city (Camerer et al 1998, p. 74). The survey also indicates that is particularly Black and Coloured residents that are mostly affected by violent crime, while Whites are normally affected by property crimes (ibid.).

or in any way act in an anti-social manner" (City of Cape Town 1999h, see Figure 22).

Fig. 22: Codes of Conduct for Informal Traders (in: City of Cape Town 1999i)

The outrage about homelessness and its importance in discourses on inner urban decay is not unique to Cape Town. Similar arguments can be observed in inner urban renewal initiatives in many cities of the first world, such as Los Angeles (Davis 1990), New York (Reichl 1999; Daly 1998), Seattle (Ruddick 1990), Frankfurt (Keil et al 2000) or Berlin (Ronneberger et al 1999). In fact, the Cape Town Partnership and City officials argue that they are simply applying 'international best practice' to solving the central city's problems. However, the Cape Town Partnership as well as various stake-holders in the Cape Town Partnership, when recommending strict control of informal trading, warn against the proliferation of pavement trading, as this would contribute to the 'Africanisation' of the city and thereby threaten Cape Town's image of being of world class, that is western, standard (experts 18, 19, 20, 22 and 24, personal communications)[61].

The representative of the Cape Town Heritage Trust, talking about the need to make the central city more inclusive and to create a sense of ownership of previously excluded population groups, argues:

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61 In this regard, the Cape Town Partnership submitted a strong motivation to the unicity com-
    mission, which was deciding whether to rename 'Cape Town' 'Ikapa' (Isixhosa for Cape
    Town) (Cape Town Partnership 2000, p. 8). Moreover, the formal business community also
    argued strongly against the renaming of Adderley and Wale Streets in the central city into
    "Nelson Mandela" and "F.W de Klerk" Streets respectively (Cape Times, 7.5.2001)

"That creation of sense of ownership has to take place without changing the fundamental qualities of what is important. There are certain qualities that make Cape Town Cape Town. I don't think that we make Cape Town a better place if we turn it into something like Nairobi. It would not be better. I get tense with people who say that Cape Town does not look African enough. What the hell does that mean? Does it mean that there should be even more informal traders blocking the streets? Does it mean that it is not dirty enough? Does it mean that there are not Lions running down the street? Cape Town is the Gateway to Africa. Cape Town is an international city" (expert 22, personal communication).

In a similar vein, the representative of the City's Civic Patrol Branch links the proliferation of informal trading to a general trend towards the 'Africanisation' of the city:

"You find that everywhere in Cape Town now. You go along the N2 now, what do you find there? Cattle and sheep! They are supposed to be on a farm, they are not allowed to be here. Cape Town is the homelands converted or is becoming the homeland, the Transkei converted. That is quite sad" (expert 7, personal communication).

The CEO of the Cape Town Partnership, too, argues:

"If we want to turn Cape Town into a globally competitive city, then the benchmark for development strategies cannot be African standards, but must be first world, western standards. That's why informal traders and parking terrorists must be managed efficiently" (expert 19, personal communication).

It is the discourse on inner urban decay that turns informal activities into cultural phenomena, which suggests that it could be interpreted as a coded way of talking about the arrival and presence of Non-Whites and their activities in the central city, a place that was sacred to South Africa's White nation for many years. It is a coded way of expressing the fear of loss and change of a generalized White population, the fear of loss of a 'home', and of becoming 'homeless' in the new South Africa.

The discourse on inner urban decay crystallises a conflict over the city as a socio-cultural construct, over its image as a first world western or third world African city. As I have argued in Section 2, the central city of Cape Town can

be understood as a sacred place to its generalised White population. It can be understood as a spatialisation of specific desires to maintain and reproduce the cultural representation of a White minority and to create a space of social experience that anchors European identity in and through space in the face of the threatening African continent. One central characteristic of the European and modernist city is important in the context of the current inner urban politics in Cape Town: the distinction and separation of public and private spaces, with a clear assignment of functions to each of them. Public space serves primarily for recreation and representation, while the private sphere serves the reproduction of human life (see Chapter 3).

This distinction of functions and their assignment to one of the two spheres is part of the European civilization process itself, in which the satisfaction of reproduction needs, such as primary bodily needs (sleeping, washing, urinating, defecating and eating) have been assigned increasingly to the private sphere (Göle 1997; Goheen 1998; Kaviraj 1997; Sennett 1976). As the discourse on inner urban decay evolved primarily around pavement trading, parking attendants and the homeless, it is the violation of this clear-cut conceptual distinction between the public and the private, which is caused by how informal traders, parking attendants and the homeless make use of public urban space, that provokes the indignation and aggression of White property owners. Informal traders and parking attendants make economic use of public urban space; in other words, they work on pavements that are conceived for flaneuring, or otherwise for recreation, i.e. for drinking cappuccino and cocktails[62] but not the papsakkie[63]. Moreover, as their stalls cause congestion on the pavements, they are represented as disabling public life (expert 22, personal communication). In addition, the homeless absolve all their bodily needs, which any 'civilized' person would do at home. It is my contention, therefore, that it is not only the presence of the new arrivals but more significantly the redefinition or re-interpretation of the European/modernist concept of public urban space by such informal activities that causes anxiety: not only does it disable a positive identification that provides security, that provides a home, as a social medium and a space of experience, but also as a

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62 Although the lack of space is a central argument for the restriction of informal trading on pavements, restaurants and coffee shops are in fact encouraged to use the pavements for chairs and tables (experts 13, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24, personal communications). So the lack of space cannot be the issue, but rather the use of space.

63 Papsakkie is an Afrikaans word and slang for wine from the cardbox

conceptual reference point making valuations and providing certainty about what is 'good', what is 'civilized', what is 'orderly' etc..

New urban management thus represents the desires of a White population to re-possess and re-experience something untouched by the ravages of time. The desire for the 'first class city' is informed by nostalgia (Boyer 1992), which in Cape Town's central city can be interpreted as the nostalgia for the security that the Apartheid system used to provide for White South Africans.

In this regard, the representative of Cape Town Tourism expresses openly what has also emerged from all the interviews with the proponents of the new management approach:

> "I remember when I was younger … I used to come with my family, we used to go shopping at night, there were all kinds of nice shops open where you could look into their windows … Obviously at that time more resources were put into the city and politically we were the Pariah state of the world. Things were horrible here, but the city itself was safer, because I think obviously more resources were put into white areas. We want a new openness of society, but the paramount issue is safety" (expert 21, personal communication).

In a Council report that argues for the introduction of new urban management, a City official argues:

> "Informal parking attendants, uncontrolled street trading, the influx of street people and children, and increased levels of crime and grime have all contributed to the once beautiful city in architecture, environment and people, being changed into an environment that is unpleasant, dirty and unsafe" (Council Report, 10.6.99).

And a member on the Board of the Cape Town Partnership, whose family owns substantial property in the central city, made the following remark in his appeal to property owners to support this new instrument of urban governance, speaking at the public meeting about introducing the Central City Improvement Districts:

> "When I was a little boy my grandfather sent me across the city to collect the rent from our tenants. But the happier times are gone. Today high security cash in transit agencies are doing what I was doing as a little boy with just a bag in my hand. This CID is about saving our property that we and our families have worked for for so

> long. Let's put the pen to paper and let's get a city that we want to enable this city to work". (Statement at the Public meeting for the introduction of the Central City Improvement District, 17.7.2000).

In terms of this view, the new urban management approach seeks to mediate White desires and fears that structure social relationships in and through space after the abolition of Apartheid laws, and it seeks to address the new insecurities that have come with political freedom.

The City Council, as is evident from the above, is under enormous pressure. It is under pressure to enable social development and to serve its main political constituency, the urban poor, in the context of a new political economy of the city, in which the economically marketable identity of the city is gaining importance (see Chapter 3.1). The central argument for the City to promote City Improvement Districts as a new form of urban management is the financial involvement of the business community at a time when the Municipality is hampered by severe financial shortages and nonetheless needs to invest in the previously disadvantaged urban areas (expert 13, personal communication). With the new urban management approach, the City Council seeks to demonstrate that the strong state is capable of dealing with the shadows of the new openness of society, and that it seeks to ensure a globally competitive image of the city.

The City official in charge of introducing new urban management argues:

> "The City of Cape Town is in competition with different cities at the provincial level, also at an international level we compete with cities around the world. So we have to create a city that is of world standard. We don't need to copy anybody, but we need to employ best practice in our city. We have to ensure a business environment within different business areas and we need to look at opportunities for bigger and small business so that in the end we can attract more tourists and that we also can attract investment to our different business areas" … "But you can't expect your business areas just to manage itself. There has to be a focus on what actually makes this work. That's why you need to link up with other directorates, other branches within council and also outside council to actually ensure that there is a co-ordinated approach to dealing with problems but also to deal with being pro-active and turning the city in a world class city" (personal communication).

He says further:

> "It [the central city] provides massive income for the city of Cape Town and it is a sort of a Gateway for all the other Local Authorities within the area. And if this one dies, then all the others will be affected negatively. We cannot afford to allow anarchy to reign within the city" (expert 13, personal communication).

The City Council's informal trading policy effectively seeks to formalise and develop informal traders in the central city. However, the envisaged new approach of concentrating informal traders on markets instead of allowing pavement trading, which has been strongly lobbied for by the Cape Town Partnership, also means that informal activities will be integrated into a specific mono-functional spatial system that clearly identifies public spaces with certain functions, such as recreation and leisure, which I have argued above lies at the heart of the European, modernist city. As a compromise towards the established formal business community and for the imagination of the central city as the "heart of a world class city", the City Council rejects the re-interpretation of this very concept. It thus rejects the possibility of re-interpreting public urban space, previously used mainly for walking and promenading, into one, where economic activity takes place. This is particularly important for those who are otherwise economically excluded from conducting business in the central city, as the rentals of formal shops in this area are far too high for these forms of businesses. To sustain the view that public spaces are to be there for consumption, recreation and leisure is, however, questionable because of Cape Town's socio-economic structure, where only a minority actually have the time and the financial resources to use public space in that way.

This leads to another fundamental critique of the new urban management approach: it continues urban politics that are exclusive and segregative. It is a form of identity politics that make use of new means, however, reinforce both fear as a dividing force and old power relations, thereby critically jeopardising the project of urban integration.

Although the prioritisation of White fears illustrated above can be seen as a crucial problem of the new urban management approach itself, an equally important problem lies in the very means of solving them: Mechanisms such as the Central City Improvement District, law and order politics and the regulation of informal activities continue a segregating identity politics that

systematically dissociates and separates, controls and regulates what is perceived as threatening. Where an official politics of integration seeks to break down old borders and divisions, new urban management recreates them: It thus seeks to separate the central city in real and symbolic terms from its surroundings, by re-creating a clear distinction between an inside and an outside world, between the safe and the unsafe, the orderly and the chaotic, the clean and the dirty, the rule and respect of law and anarchy – and with that, again, between the 'civilised' and the 'barbarian'.

In these inner and outer worlds, different rules, norms and values are applied, and different activities are allowed to take place. Flags reading "you are now in the Central City Improvement District" have been put up along the borders of the current district, distinguishing between the inside and the outside and demarcating an invisible wall of separation that is patrolled and enforced. The rationality of new urban management re-establishes a way of thinking that revolves around 'us' and 'them', which defines the threatening other no longer in racial terms, but in social and cultural terms. New urban management addresses and seeks to reverse aspects or consequences of the new openness of the South African society and urban space. The irony is that, whilst the

Fig. 23: Fencing off Spaces within the Central City: No place to sit under a Tree

City of Cape Town envisions the creation of an "integrated, cosmopolitan city", those who have newly appropriated inner urban spaces, such as the informal traders, parking attendants and the homeless, are represented as illegal outsiders who threaten the ideal of an integrated Cape Town, the new social order of the post-Apartheid city (see Figure 23, p. 195). Moreover, in the practice of new urban management of deregulation and privatisation, the established community of property owners and formal businesses gains a powerful voice through structures such as the Cape Town Partnership and the Central City Improvement District, which empowers it to determine the future of the central city. In this way, old power relations are reinforced rather than dismantled.

New urban management, as international critiques of similar urban regeneration strategies suggest, is moreover likely to reinforce Cape Town's fragmented urban landscape and the extreme inequalities in living conditions. This is because it focuses on creating a marketable image of the city that derives not from the whole city as an entity, but from selective, often isolated archiples (Boyer 1992, 192), which are places such as the Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Killian et al 1996), shopping malls such as Cavendish Square in Claremont or the recently built shopping mall and office park Century City (Marks et al 2000). Spaces in between these, such as derelict industrial areas or residential areas of the poor population are systematically excluded by the image of Cape Town, but also from investment; inevitably, this results in an ever-widening gap between neglected land and revalued places (Turok 2000). Despite the financial involvement of property owners, the City Council is making an enormous effort in terms of the allocation of budgets but also in terms of the implementation of new policies and laws. New urban management in Cape Town's central city is seeking to blank out the grim reality of the Apartheid heritage and current urban social and spatial development. Its dynamics produce and (re-) enforce inequality and divisions rather than reducing them. City Improvement Districts, politics of law and order, restrictive policies on informal activities, etc. are implemented in the traditionally wealthy business districts, such as the central city, producing an increasingly disparate and separated city.[64]

Moreover, it is part of the very logic of new urban management that tourists and investors will not be attracted to the spaces in between the shopping malls, the office parks and City Improvement Districts,[65] as the standards are not first class, not western. This is exacerbated by the fact that those who are excluded from the "first class" spaces accumulate in the remaining spaces.

New urban management re-interprets the historic sacredness of the central city in a double-sided, yet ironic way: On the one hand, it prevents the transformation of the central city and thus facilitates its continuous sacredness to the generalised White population. At the same time, it discursively constructs the central city as a sacred space that is central to the survival and growth of Cape Town's economy. It is constructed and protected as the "goose that lays

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64 The informal trading policy allows different standards in different areas of the city, thereby effectively enforcing double standards.

65 Several City Improvement Districts are planned for other business districts, such as Wynberg, Claremont, and Sea Point.

the golden egg", and as such it has to be fed, polished and protected for the benefit of all Capetonians. New urban management combines the nostalgia for a lost European culture and space with the interest shared by all Capetonians for a prosperous future of the Cape Metropolitan area. Using the argument of global competitiveness, the level on which the concept and materiality of the good city is negotiated, has been shifted from a local level to a global one. The rationality of the new urban management approach is not primarily conceived by local urban planners who might be reproached for their resistance to change and transformation, but it is conceived by the standards and concepts of globally active capital. New urban management is thus subtly represented as a politically neutral instrument that can be, and in the City of Cape Town has been, adopted by a political party who stands for the will to radically redress the legacies of Apartheid, and yet, as I have sought to show, continues both segregative politics to resolve White fears, as well as old power relations.

Section 4

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"The major danger in the black community ... is … to be so conditioned by the system as to make even our most well-considered resistance to it fit within the system both in terms of the means and of the goals."

(Steve Biko 1978, p. 203)

8   Conclusion:
The Need for Spatial Politics of Reconciliation

This thesis set out to prove the hypothesis that reconciliation, the healing of emotional divisions and the mutual communication and comprehension of historical conflicts, is essential for realising an integrated urban society as envisioned both by new urban politics and by South Africa's new Constitution, which seek to enable and provide for unity in diversity. In Section 2 of this thesis, I have sought to develop a conceptual framework circumscribing what reconciliation can mean for the city. I have argued that, because of the historically negative constructions of difference in South Africa, as well as the long tradition of spatially segregative politics that had been informed by a racial discourse of power and that had led to a deep entanglement of identity and space, approaches to reconcile emotional divisions amongst urban dwellers have to recognise the importance of urban space for the process of reconciliation itself: As space is charged with emotional meaning, providing a space of safe social experience in which the identities of individuals and groups can be anchored, the reconciliation of emotional divisions amongst urban dwellers in Cape Town requires reconciliation about space. This must happen in two interrelated ways: On the one hand, the exclusive and discriminatory sacredness of urban space needs to be addressed; on the other hand, as the materiality of the Apartheid city has been based on a modern, western concept of the city that represents the value system of a White minority, which has been informed by a fear of diversity and heterogeneity, the concept of the city as a socio-cultural construct has to be transformed. In short, it is the political economy of fear that has shaped both the conceptual and cultural production as well as the actual materiality of urban space in Cape Town that needs to be transformed to allow or initiate a process of reconciling emotional divisions amongst urban dwellers and to enable the integration of Cape Town's urban society.

The analysis of three different contemporary projects of urban transformation in Cape Town in Section 3, was a first attempt to use soft, psychological categories, such as 'desire' and 'fear' in evaluating contemporary urban politics with regard to their way reinterpreting or continuing the conceptual approach to the city, and to deal with difference and ambivalence in the 'new' Cape Town.

The analysis has illustrated, above all, the complexities and difficulties of transformation in a deeply divided society and city, despite a new dispensation that clearly envisions an integrated and equal society.

Focusing on the way in which the different approaches redress negative constructions of difference and the White discourse of power in urban politics, which have resulted in a fragmented and discriminative urban landscape, there seem to be two competing discourses transforming urban space in Cape Town: A discourse of the 'Rainbow Nation' with a practice of integration, reconstruction and redistribution (represented in the Municipal Spatial Development Framework and the One City Festival) competes with a discourse of the city's global competitiveness and a practice of new urban management, which focuses on the recreation of security and order. These two discourses and practices seem to be competing for the new identity of Cape Town, in which questions about social constructs of the 'self' versus the 'other', and the 'familiar' versus the 'strange', are implicitly negotiated under the new democratic government: Who are we, and who are the others? What is the familiar, and what is the strange? What is South African and who is allowed to define that? These are very important political questions for the negotiation of Cape Town's future. However, they are not explicitly or openly debated but instead prevented by postulating the need for a global competitiveness that requires 'first class standard' for the public face of the central city.

Furthermore, the two discourses contradict each other in their approach to allow and enable social and cultural diversity and to transform old power relations. While the discourse of integration aims at the opening of society and urban spaces, the discourse of global competitiveness is directed exactly against this new openness and seeks to reverse it: The Municipal Spatial Development Framework thus seeks to overcome difference in terms of social inequalities: it seeks to intervene in the materiality of space and to break down physical walls and barriers in order to create the material conditions that will allow the huge social and economic gaps to be bridged and a new urban society to develop, in which the cultural diversity of Cape Town can be experienced on the basis of social equality. The One City Festival, similarly, sought to overcome negative constructions of difference by providing a cultural context that values and celebrates difference. The Festival also sought to break into the entanglement of identity and space, to heal emotional divisions, to break down symbolic barriers and to re-create a sense

of belonging and ownership for those who had been forcefully removed from the inner urban space by means of the Apartheid politics of segregation.

The new urban management approach, in contrast, is directed exactly against the new openness promoted by the discourse and practice of integration, and it seeks to reverse aspects and consequences of this new openness. Those who have recently appropriated inner urban spaces, such as the informal traders, parking attendants and the homeless, are thus represented as illegal outsiders who threaten the ideal of the new social order in post-Apartheid Cape Town. It aims to reverse the changing public face of the central city through politics of privatisation, regulation and control, in order to (re)-create the image of a world class city. The practice of this new urban management has been called for in particular by property owners and formal businesses in the central city. As I have shown in Chapter 7, this can be interpreted as continuing the 350-year long White phobia of being under siege: the fear of the other, the fear of Africa's wilderness, the fear of loss of control and of a loss of power of a White minority continues to be an important force in the construction and re-construction of urban space in Cape Town. The logic and technology of race as a legitimating instrument for dissociation and segregation has been replaced by the logic and technology of inner security and economic prosperity for the city. Crime becomes the new face of the hostile environment, but so do the informal activities of traders and parking attendants who are represented as threatening the global competitiveness of Cape Town. As global competitiveness requires 'world class standard', cities of the first world, i.e. not African cities or third world cities with similar socio-economic structures, become the benchmark for local urban politics. In this way, too, the argument of global competitiveness becomes a new protective shield for local property owners and formal businesses to prevent the transformation of inner urban space by feared Africanisation.

For the future development of local urban politics in Cape Town, the discourse and practice of new urban management represent a way of thinking about the city and society at large that increasingly seems to dominate (urban) transformation policies at both national and local government level. It is informed – as I have illustrated in the introduction of Section 3 – by South Africa's new macroeconomic strategy GEAR. The objective of GEAR is to integrate South Africa into global markets; in order to do so, it regards cities as strategic sites for South Africa to become globally competitive, and it favours public-private partnerships as major agents for urban transformation.

In terms of the application and extension of new urban management to other areas of the city, the proponents of this approach have argued that the mechanisms developed for the central city can serve as a role model for managing business districts throughout Cape Town to prevent the impression that the central city is unfairly prioritised. Indeed, central components have already been implemented or are being discussed and prepared for other business districts throughout Cape Town. In Sea Point, Green Point, Camps Bay, Wynberg, Claremont and Pinelands, the Community Patrol Officers are operating; in Claremont, Wynberg and Sea Point, the establishment of City Improvement Districts is currently being prepared; the Closed Camera Surveillance System has been installed around the Grand West Casino in Goodwood, which opened its doors in December 2000, and this is connected to the system in the central city. The emphasis on law enforcement as an important municipal function and as an expression of the City's commitment regulation and control has been reinforced by the introduction of the Municipal Police Force, which was introduced in December 2001.

Initiatives with a different approach to inner urban revitalisation, which proactively seek to re-interpret the exclusive image of the central city by working towards a stronger spirit of unity, reconciliation and commitment to a common future through urban space, do not receive similar political support. The renewal of the Grand Parade was initiated as one such project and as part of the mayoral initiative of City Mayor Nomaindia Mfeketo to promote democracy, tolerance and inclusive citizenship (The Mayor of the City of Cape Town 1998). The 'Grand Parade Renewal Initiative' was conceived to redevelop the Grand Parade as "a focal point of civic life and citizenship" and to serve as "a symbol and monument to democracy and citizenship" in Cape Town, where "people gather on issues of common concern" (ibid.).

This initiative included five components that were to link the themes of reconciliation to inner urban renewal: Firstly, it sought to revive the Parade's history as a gathering place for celebrations and events, and as a venue for the public to voice their opinions. Secondly, it sought to equip the Grand Parade with facilities to host local and international festivals, such as the One City Festival, developing it into the spatial link of arts and culture activities in its surroundings, such as the City Hall, the Drill Hall, the Castle, the District Six Museum and others. Thirdly, the initiative planned to turn the Grand Parade into a centrally located market square for informal traders. Fourthly, the initiative also included a food court that would offer a diversity of local cuisine.

And lastly, it planned to explore the question of what a more local and African design of space and street furniture might mean, and in this regard planned a public design competition (The Mayor of the City of Cape Town 1998, p. 3). A member of the consulting committee established by Mfeketo outside the City Council in 1998 argues that the Grand Parade Renewal Initiative was conceived to initiate the revitalisation of the central city by promoting reconciliation and inclusive citizenship and through social development of the previously disadvantaged such as informal traders rather than through growth of those sectors that have traditionally been strong (expert 32, personal communication). Its objective is to achieve revitalisation not through control and containment, as is done by new urban management, but by pro-actively re-attracting people to the area on a daily basis, by offering activities and opportunities (ibid.). "Security comes with people that take ownership of space", which in turn could be achieved by making transformation visible and tangible in symbolic terms to those who have been alienated from this space, argues the expert serving on the Mayoral consulting committee (personal communication). Nonetheless, the initiative, even though promoted by the Mayor of the City of Cape Town, did not find sufficient support, not even to fund a feasibility study. This alone would have cost R 250 000, an almost ridiculous amount of money compared to the huge capital investments allocated to the new urban management approach, which allocated R 11m to the installation of the camera system alone.

The discourse and practice of integration seems to be too weak to prevent the dominance of the new urban management approach and with that to prevent the new segregating forces in the city. One reason for the weakness of the integration practice might be located in its lack of institutionalisation: The Municipal Spatial Development Framework is a comprehensive spatial plan developed over several years. It is understood as the spatial component of the City's Integrated Development Plan and should guide all municipal line functions and decisions that are related to space. Any school or residential unit that is built and any commercial or industrial development taking place should comply with the concept and the principles of the Municipal Spatial Development Framework.

The ideas of the Municipal Spatial Development Framework have been workshopped with Council officials, executive directors and line managers; simpler versions, including a checklist for urban decision makers, such as council staff of the different line functions as well as private developers, have

also been distributed already (City of Cape Town 1999). However, the Municipal Spatial Development Framework does not have the authority of an approved statutory plan to regulate public and private investment, nor the resources or the influence over other organisations to actually instigate development. It thus relies mainly on the 'goodwill' of respective administrators and private developers for its actual implementation.

The One City Festival is even less institutionalised. The One City Festival is, after all, only one individual project, which is far less comprehensive in its approach towards transformation. It was originally initiated by the private sector, and thus, even though it has been included in the City's strategic priority of integrating the city, there was no co-operation with regard to its conceptualisation and organization between the City Council's Spatial Planning Branch, the Community Development Branch and/or the Festival office. Instead, the co-operation with the Economic Development Department was characterized rather by competition than co-operation (experts 4 and 25, personal communications). The Festival is far less comprehensive in its approach and far less institutionalised and more sensitive to political changes. The first Festival took place in 1999; it was repeated in the year 2000. Due to the political change after the local government elections in November 2000, there was no Festival in 2001, but it re-emerged as the Cape Town Festival in March 2002. While the major aims of this Festival are similar to those of the One City Festival, some changes have occurred. The name change was decided on by the new Unicity government, which was now dominated by the Democratic Alliance, as the 'One City Festival' was perceived as an ANC initiative (expert 27, personal communication). The major hub of the Festival was moved from the Grand Parade to the Company Gardens, since this was perceived to be a less threatening environment and more likely to attract the White population too (ibid.). More than the One City Festival, the Cape Town Festival made use of spaces that were used on a daily basis, such as the Cape Town Station, to lower the thresholds of psychological barriers to attend. Even though the new Unicity Council substantially increased its financial contribution to R 1,8m, it provided no other support, and no inter-disciplinary approaches involving different departments of the City for the planning of the Festival occurred. Moreover, the Festival co-ordinator was appointed only 2 months before the Festival was due to take place, making any long-term approaches to community and spatial development impossible (expert 27, personal communication).

In contrast, the new urban management approach has a sound foundation. Its far-reaching organisational, legal and technical institutionalisation enables change in a far more comprehensive and effective way. It is institutionalised on an organisational level, having introduced new administrational structures and mechanisms, such as the Business Area Management Branch within the Economic Development Branch, the Civic Patrol Branch within the City's Protection Services Directorate, public private partnerships such as the Cape Town Partnership and the City Improvement District, as well as the outsourcing and privatisation of 'non-core' municipal functions such as the management of curb side parking. New urban management is also institutionalised on a legal level with the introduction of new by-laws governing the establishment of City Improvement Districts and regulating informal trading and informal parking attendants. Finally, the institutionalisation of the new urban management approach also has a technical dimension by introducing the Camera Surveillance System as well as the smart card system for curb side parking.

The underlying reason for the dominance of the new urban management approach, and for the weakness of the discourse of integration, as I have suggested with this thesis, lies, however, not merely in the lack of institutionalisation of the integration discourse, but rather in a lack of reconciliation in, through and about space.

The Municipal Spatial Development Framework, with its focus on restitution and thus on material changes that can narrow the huge gaps in living standards across the city, can and should be understood as a central mechanism of reconciliation. However, its weakness results firstly from its failure to recognise the emotional dimension in the production and use of urban space and secondly from the fact that it continues to promote a rational approach to urban space, which regards space and its use as being calculable in terms of geographical and economic factors. Space is understood as an 'outer world', and it is thus treated as a platform, on which social identities are displayed, rather than as a medium through which the inner worlds of human beings connect with the outer world and through which identities and social relationships are formed. Both the separated audiences at the One City Festival and the discourse on inner urban decay illustrate that this approach to overcoming Cape Town's spatial divisiveness is not strong enough, as it assumes a condition, where there is no fear of the other and where the deep entanglement of identity and space is already broken open, and as it relies on a mentality,

which recognises that cultural diversity and heterogeneity are productive and desirable.

The weakness of the One City Festival, which, in contrast to the Municipal Spatial Development Framework takes negative constructions of difference and emotional divisions amongst urban dwellers as a conceptual starting point for its approach to integration, results from its failure to link its social strategy to a coherent spatial strategy, in other words, to take space as an instrument and medium for intervening in social relationships: Precisely because social divisions and social identities have been formed and maintained through the production of space, space or specific places could help to anchor the experience of reconciliation and to make it tangible. Reconciliation thus needs a place.

The most fundamental weakness of the integration discourse is, however, its failure to radically question the concept of the city as a socio-cultural construct. As I have argued in Chapter 5, it does break with the past in that it seeks to overcome the discriminative character of urban space, but its approach to integration means that it is unable to extend social and economic opportunities to the hitherto disadvantaged population groups, to 'add on' new social and cultural needs while it continues to operate within the framework of both the western and the capitalist city. New urban management, and thus the re-construction of Cape Town's central city as the economic heart of a globally competitive city, is a specific formation of the western and capitalist city in the context of processes of global economic restructurings, in which cities not only play an increasingly important role in national and international economies in the competition for footloose international capital and tourists, but they are also transformed from places of production into places of consumption (e.g. Boyer 1998; Castells 1989; Harvey 1989; Soja 1995; Ronneberger et al 1999; Zukin 1989 and 1995). The practice of new urban management, therefore, is not necessarily a contradiction of the Municipal Spatial Development Framework, but instead a logic consequence and interpretation of the new spatial framework for the city.

As I have sought to show, if cities are to be a crucible for an integrative society, as envisioned by local and national policy papers, there is a need for reconciliation, both of concepts and of emotional divisions. Reconciliation in a South African city, however, cannot mean to heal and to bring together what had once been 'one' or 'whole' and that had been divided at a later stage. This is because such oneness never existed in the first place, as local politics

have from the outset been divisive and always constructed in the face of a threatening other. In such an environment, reconciliation means to bring together and to make consistent with each other what has always been conceived of as separate and valued as unequal.

At the time of the negotiations leading up to the abolition of Apartheid, it was primarily the White politicians, who spoke of reconciliation; however, they did not use the term not in the classic sense as a process of healing and forgiving. Instead, they called for the recognition of the interests of their White constituencies, as a prerequisite for being willing to reconcile with the new Black government (Krog 2000). Reflecting on the discourse on inner urban decay and how this has been translated into new urban management strategies, the word reconciliation is defined primarily by property owners and formal businesses: Re-create inner urban space as an environment of 'first world' standard, otherwise we will leave the central city for the safer, 'first world spaces' of shopping malls and office parks in decentralised urban nodes.

Njabulo Ndebele, vice chancellor of the University of Cape Town, turned this view of reconciliation on its head. In a lecture in 2000, during which he spoke about the tasks of White and Black South Africans in the process of nation building, he argued that Whiteness in South Africa – that is, not the colour of one's skin but a specific way of thinking, speaking and acting – must declare that its own dignity and that of the Blacks are inseparable (Ndebele 2000). It must let go of the shield of the worldwide Whiteness that has protected its interests for so long; it has to change conceptions of itself and the other, and it must reconcile itself with the idea of being fully at home in South Africa. It is the argument of 'global competitiveness' that provides Cape Town's Whiteness that Njabulo Ndebele described as giving them a new shield of protection, and saving them from the task of reconciling with the fact that they live in Africa, in Cape Town, where the majority of people do in fact live in 'third world' standards and where there might be different needs, different interpretations, different imaginations of what a 'good' city looks like. Ndebele referred to Steve Biko who led the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa until his death in the 1976, and who saw the biggest danger in the Black community as one where they would become so conditioned by the system of Apartheid as to make even the most considered resistance to fit within the system, both in terms of the means and of the goals (Ndebele 2000, p. 48). The analysis of contemporary transformation projects

in the City of Cape Town suggests that the new government, which explicitly seeks to transform Cape Town as a city formed by a colonial and Apartheid system of segregation, control and order, is still in such danger.

With the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa set a courageous example for a constructive way of dealing with its violent and conflict-riddled past. The strength of its political leaders, but also the strength of its people to forgive, has enabled this internationally outstanding example of a negotiated revolution, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission became the role model for similar tasks in other post-conflict societies. The new freedom has, however, brought to the fore new uncertainties and new insecurities, which are played out in an intense way in its cities, which are the realms, where its contradictions and inequalities are most extreme. As I have sought to show in this thesis, reconciliation in the sense used by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has to be extended to the level of everyday life; it has to be sensed and lived in the everyday experience of the new South Africa in order to guarantee the sustainability of South Africa's integrative concept of unity in diversity enshrined in its Constitution.

A starting point for an urban politics of reconciliation that enables a radical transformation of urban space in order to promote reconciliation on the level of everyday life, I suggest that it is crucial is to understand the city as an imaginary space of projection, where individual and collective desires and fears are projected. In other words, the city must be understood as a space of experience, which, both in its materiality and in its imaginary construction, serves to create a place of safety for social identities. The reconciliation of the diversity of imaginations is needed, and this requires a new imagination of what the city as a socio-cultural construct can mean in a post-conflict and culturally diverse urban society such as Cape Town. Furthermore, what is needed is an urban politics of transformation, which takes 'experience' as a central point for its policies.

Yes, South Africa has greatly inspired the world! South Africa has set a unique example of International Best Practice by finding its own way of negotiating the end of Apartheid. In the past 15 years, South Africa has provided the nourishing ground for the emergence of new styles in music, fashion, furniture, visual arts as well as dance and theatre that are both perplexing and adorable because of the creativity which they use to merge the various cultural influences into a new South African style. It is precisely this creativity that is needed, too, in the sphere of urban planning to surprise the world

once again with unique and new approaches of dealing with 'difference' and 'otherness' in society and space. Such a new approach is not only needed in South Africa and in other post-conflict societies, but is needed, most importantly, in the increasingly multi-cultural, global cities across the world, where a multitude of possibly diverging desires and fears as well as concepts of what constitutes 'the good city' have to be consoled with each other.

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Expert 28: Economic Analyst, 21.09.2001

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Expert 31: Deputy Managing Director of ENCLODEK, Informal Traders Association, 17.7.2000

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