Rüdiger Meyenberg
Henk Dekker ;

Introduction

When in 1989 one eastern European country after another became involved in turmoil, no schemes or master plans had been prepared in the west. The most difficult question in our country was that of the German unification which meant not only the uniting of two separate parts but also the inclusion of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the European Community (EC) an quite difficult arrangements with respect to it links with the NATO.

The common slogan of a "new European architecture" has up to now mainly been reduced to collecting the rubble of a formerly existing organisation. The EC emerges as the only single regional economic organisation of considerable operational significance. As a result the EC became more and more the focus of a possible orientation. This is not only the case of those countries which had applied for association but also for the Baltic States and for regions like Slovenia and Croatia, which are in the midst of a sharp internal political conflict. As a consequence the EC is confronted with a two fold task: to consolidate over the next years its internal economic and political coherence and to be an active partner within this future wider structure within Europe which has get to be designed.

In those days in autumn 1989 a Round-Table-Conference was held at the University of Oldenburg in Germany on October, 26 and 27, 1989. This meeting, which was supported by the "Research Committee on Political Education (RCPE)" in the "International Political Science Association (IPSA)", the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (Netherlands) and the Ministry of European Affaires of the Federal State of Lower Saxony, wanted to gain insight into the following questions:

- What do the different countries mean by the term "Europe"?
- What conceptions of a European cooperation are there in the European countries (models of a "Federate Europe")?

- How can the one-sided view of the European thought as a West European integration be avoided?
- What does the population know of the political systems of West- and/or East-Europe?
- What are juveniles (pupils/students) taught about European facts?
- What kind research is being done in and outside the universities?

The organizers invited educationalists, sociologists and other experts from nine different European countries in East and West to give answers and their specific views on the political and sociologic development of Europe.

Of course, the focus of the contributors was not the actual political situation in Europe and the further development afterwards. So this book is a document of thoughts produced in those days of political change; it gives an overview of the considerations and results of research made at that time.

But Europe is not the EC; in the past people in the West sometimes forgot this fact. Europe covers the regions from the Northcape to the Mediterraining, from the Atlantic-Ocean to the Ural-Mountain. Europe is more than only the sum of several states from west to east. Whole Europe has its own identity which derives from the past and its own history.

It has to be noted that their is an increased awareness today of the need for European approaches to political problem-solving; but there is a lack of convincing strategies for the future. The initial question is: How can political problems be solved in a European manner? What is asked for here are proposals in exemplary areas such as environmental protection, security policy, technology development etc.

Perhaps this book might help to deal with these problems by producing an attitude of European thinking and behaviouring.

Oldenburg/Groningen 1992

Heinrich Jürgens

Minister of European affairs of Lower Saxony (1986-1990)

1   Preface

My best wishes to all participants who have come together for the international conference on "Perceptions of Europe in East and West".

In the history of Europe there have been events causing unspeakable suffering and grief to many people. It was less than 50 years ago that the Second World War came to an end. Europe was largely in ruins. An incredible number of lives had been lost and an enormous amount of material been wasted, there was deeply stirred hate and enimity that seemed almost irreconcilable between those European nations that had been at war with each other. However, like so often in history, there were aw few wise men and women who, by way of decisions and suggestions pointing the way ahead, contributed to bringing together again the people, the nations, the countries of Europe. Let me mention just one name, here, in place of the many: Robert Schuman.

Following the horrible devastating effects of the dreadful war one of the major tasks was to secure and strengthen peace and freedom. There is no doubt that this demand is still valid for us today. We declare our support for these objectives, trying to make them the basis of European unity. Many ways of living together are opening up.

The memory of the joint intellectual-cultural heritage of the nations of this continent should become a motive for uniting Europe. In this European House there is room for more than just the one or the other side, it is open to anybody wanting to strengthen and realize this concept of unity.

National egoism has always been a disturbing factor where communality is concerned.

I am very pleased indeed that this conference was made possible in cooperation between the Universities of Oldenburg and Groningen as well as the Research Committee on Political Education of the International Political Science Association. Cooperation in Europe, knowing and understanding why Europe exists, have been essential prerequisites of people living together peacefully.

I can hardly think of an event that would be more topical to the situation than discussing here with people from East and West about the concept of Europe. Talking to each other is an essential step towards understanding one another and thus also to creating a Europe based on partnership.

Thus I hope that the conference will be successful and will contribute to a fruitful cooperation in the future for the benefit of all fellow men.

Rüdiger Meyenberg

2   The political identity of Europe as a whole

2.1   Europe

In the last years an intensive discussion has been going on in Europe about Europe. This discussion was, moreover, intensified by the the "reunification of Germany".

The simple question is, what is Europe? Why should its states want to co-operate or even create supra-national institutions and give up their national sovereignty? Why do we regard Denmark as part of Europe; not, however, Norway, Sweden and Finland? And how about Switzerland and Austria? Is it not true that Vienna and Prague were once political and cultural centres of Europe?

In the Federal Republic of Germany in particular and in other West Europe-an states as well it has become the custom to limit the concept of Europe to West Europe. This is wrong, as far as the facts are concerned, and more-over problematic, because - as we have just seen - it makes the population regard the non-EC states as extra-European and foreign countries.

The European Community of the twelve, in fact, is nothing but a model for the organization of European politics. Europe itself is much older than the EC, and the efforts for a united Europe go back much further in time than the joining together of six European states, to begin with, after the Second World War.

From a geographical point of view it is certainly agreed today that Europe extends from the North Cape to the Mediterranean, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains. In this connection the situation of Russia is not an easy one - Russia as a whole certainly is not a part of Europe, rather a superpower extending far into Asia, which therefore plays a different role than the other European states.

Since the Second World War, Europe has organized itself in many different ways. Together with Switzerland and Austria the North European states united in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA); the West and South European countries set up the EC, while the above mentioned states plus Cyprus, Malta and Liechtenstein created the Council of Europe as early as 1949. In Helsinki in 1975, then, an all-European meeting took place which also included non-aligned states such as Jugoslavia, Monaco, Vatican City and others. The aim of this "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", which was attended by 33 European states, was to set up rules of conduct for inter-European relations and to promote cultural exchange in order to thus improve the freedom of speech and of movement between the countries. The conference was based on the following principles: equality, non-aggression, inviolability of existing borders, non-intervention, prior announcement of bigger military manoeuvres, exchange of manoeuvre observers, and readiness to take part in disarmament talks. Moreover measures and guidelines for a closer economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation were to be worked out; and each government was to be placed under the obligation to solve humanitarian questions (reuniting of families, easier travelling between East and West) in the spirit of human rights. It was the most important and comprehensive conference ever held in Europe for Europe. In this connection it should also be mentioned that this treaty was also signed by the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union.

In connection with the question "What is Europe?" a leading Social Democrat in the Federal Republic (Peter Glotz) has introduced the new "old" concept of "Central Europe" into the discussion. It was the Hungarian novelist György Konrad in particular who re-established the idea of Central Europe. Although the exposition by Peter Glotz did not pass unchallenged ("Words have specific connotations and cannot be filled

with new life in the way people like it" as the Jewish historian Dan Diner said), his attempt increasingly to overcome the sterile thinking in terms of

blocs is to be met with approval. I will return to Glotz's statement further down in a different context.

2.2   Europe - an area of shared history and culture

And yet it has to be emphasized that Europe is neither first of all a product of state politics nor a natural product of geography; nor is it as old as that figure from Greek mythology Europe borrowed its name from. Its joint identity rather is the result of a joint cultural development since the early middle ages: a creative mixing of ancient heritage and Christian innovation.

It would be beyond the scope of this contribution to describe how the values, which later European cultures shared, developed from the foundations of the Christian Occident. And yet modern Europe is based on these fundamental values, so that in agreement with Richard Löwenthal, an important German political scientist, the following five points may be cited as constitutive:

1. Early on western Christianity began to concentrate on the problems of a morality which was to prove itself in this world, not in the next.
2. Very soon the magical elements of faith were repressed in favour of reason as a key to understanding the world.
3. Early on the contrast between freemen and slaves, Jews and heathens were reduced in favour of a society to be formed voluntarily.
4. A state of awareness developed which brought about the central significance of a system of laws delimiting the spheres of the individual and of society.
5. Finally a value-oriented relationship towards work developed, which in the convents was expressed in terms of the two equally important demands made on the monks "ora et labora".

It is true that the biggest empire of the early days of the Occident - the Empire of Charlemagne - could not compete with Byzantium, neither as to size nor as to wealth, power or stage of development; nevertheless the constitutive dualism of secular and spiritual power which stamped the middle ages was the basis from which Europe's creative diversity developed.

Europe would not be Europe without its armed conflicts. There was for instance the German colonization of the East through the crusades, and there was the Thirty Years' war (1618 to 1648) caused by the reformation; later

the imperialistic claims of a Napoleon followed who wanted to submit all of Europe up to Moscow to his rule. In the twentieth century, then, Germany brought two World Wars to Europe, in the course of which millions of people died.

Europe would not be Europe without its successful and unsuccessful revolutions: in 1688 the English revolution; in 1789 the French revolution; in 1848 the (unsuccessful) German revolution; in 1917 the Russian revolution; and in 1918 the German revolution.

2.3 Cooperation and integration in Western Europe

Although the most intensive armed conflicts took place in the two World Wars in the twentieth century, it seems that people's readiness to concern themselves with Europe as a whole could be roused and strengthened against this background only. However, there had always been individuals - politicians, scientists, artists - who considered themselves Europeans rather than Germans, Frenchmen, Italians or whatever.

In 1922 a first appeal to found "Pan-Europe" was published in the German and Austrian press by Graf Richard Coudenhove - Calerghi.

In 1929 the French prime minister Aristide Briand delivered a speech in front of the Assembly of the League of Nations supporting a "federative Europe".

In 1942 political prisoners on the island of Ventotene published a magazine entitled "L'Onith Europea".

From this the European movement developed after 1945, supported by members of the resistance against National Socialism.

In 1948 the first "European Congress" met in The Hague which, thanks to preliminary work in the years between 1945 and 1947, was able to adopt a "Message to the Europeans". It was the activities of the European Movement at the Congress of The Hague and following it that led to the establishment of the Council of Europe.

In 1951 the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the three Benelux countries sign the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. It comes into force on 23rd July, 1952.

In 1957 these six signatory states sign the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). They come into force on 1st January, 1958.

In 1973 Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland join the European Community. The population of Norway, which wanted to join the EC as well, had voted against EC membership in a referendum. In 1981 Greece joins the EC as its tenth member state.

In 1986 Spain and Portugal join the EC.

Besides the hope for a better economic development and the protection of democracy and constitutionality, the desire to preserve peace played a central role in the development of the modern European movement and in the search for alternatives to the organization of the European nations in separate states. The main aim of the European policy of integration and alliances, which was begun after the Second World War (and which can only be understood against the background of the strong position of, as well as the contrast between, the USA on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other), was to end the German predominance over Europe and make the role Germany was to play in the future more transparent and above all more calculable. If, however, Europe did not (and does not) want to be at the mercy of the interests of the two superpowers, it finally had to reach an agreement on political questions besides the economic cooperation already practiced. Recently even more than before, now that the world is finally beginning to disarm, it has become obvious that Europe needs to change the way it sees itself by formulating its own interests so that it may become politically and, at least partially, economically independent of the world powers and play the role of a peacemaker in the world. Europe must not become a vicarious battle field for armed conflicts between the superpowers.

2.4   Cooperation between all European nations

Today, after more than 45 years of peace in Europe and the gradual collapse of a spirit of enimity, in particular due to the new policy of the Soviet Union, the motive of preserving the peace by armament has more and more receded into the background for the European process of integration. Disarmament, securing peace with less and less weapons is the essence of all government politics today. Only this will make peace more secure. There are other questions/problems, moreover, which cannot be solved on a national level. Let me mention in particular the protection of the natural envi-

ronment, which will be impossible without an all-European network. An early warning of industrial catastrophes, natural disasters and unintentional military attacks require an all-European cooperation.

This is the background against which Peter Glotz introduced the concept of Central Europe into the political debate, certainly not intending to encourage notions of German hegemony. Quite on the contrary! Glotz rather pleads against the principle of national states and supports an all-European commitment. He considers politics that encourage illusions about a possible reunification of Germany as reactionary and consequently rejects them. Focussing on the geographical area of Central Europe, therefore, does not mean giving priority to a discussion of German affairs and favour the possible neutrality of a reunified Germany, but rather reminds us of the fact that Prague, Budapest and Warsaw are European cities.

To him Central Europe means that the Hungarians, the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Bulgarians, the Romanians and the East Germans are more than satellites. Hungary is cautiously approaching a multi-party system, and Poland has legalized the opposition, while the GDR and Czechoslovakia are watching these hardly controllable processes with growing tension. What we need now is a new vision of Europe, an all-European design the aim of which is maintenance of the peace by disarmament, more freedom of political action for the people in Eastern and Central Europe, close cultural contacts across all borders, functioning economic relationships also on an all-European level. In this context the Federal Republic of Germany has to stay in the western region and the German Democratic Republic in the eastern. Nevertheless, the question would be asked whether the multinational state is not a better model of integration than the Europe of nations propagated by De Gaulle at that time.

In the 21st century we must not return to the Europe of national states as in the l9th century. Against this background it is indeed frightening that demands for autonomy expressed by individual ethnic groups and/or republics are increasing, for instance in Jugoslavia (under the populist Milosevic) and likewise in the Soviet Union. Will socialism know how to deal with their national minorities? But even in Western European countries this problem has not yet been solved. The conflict between the two languages in Belgium, the Basque separatist movement in Spain, the conflict between Catholic and Anglican groups in Northern Ireland may serve as examples here. And yet, will we understand in the West that we must not play with the na-

tionalism emerging in the East? We must become pioneers advocating guaranteed rights for ethnic groups and minorities without encouraging nationalism.

The oldest European alliance, the Council of Europe, with its 23 member states might perhaps take a leading role in this process. It might be predestined for this task, because, on the one hand, it tries to overcome any thinking in terms of East and West and, on the other, has started a policy of opening up to the East. This was done when the Parliamentary Assembly decided to grant the East European states a guest status. At the seat of the organization in Strasbourg it is being expected that Hungarian and Polish representatives will soon be able to make use of this special status with involves the right to a say, but no right of participation in decision-making. Even the Soviet Union might soon be granted this status, and the Council of Europe even thinks of gradually turning the guest status into full membership. Its founders wanted the Council of Europe to represent democratic Europe, not geographic Europe. And the democratic developments in Central and Eastern Europe are indeed very encouraging! I believe that the chances of realizing a democratic Europe including East and West based on pluralistic democracies, rule of law and such civil rights and liberties as laid down in the statutes of the Council of Europe, have never been better.

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Hans-Joachim Heintze

3   Internationalization of Human Rights The end of the principle of non-interference?

3.1   State sovereignty and non-intervention

The world is composed of sovereign states which more or less cooperate with one another. Under the constraint of the global problems affecting mankind's development, the pressure to cooperate more closely and to turn from a mere coexistence into active cooperation is objectively increasing. This compulsion in the sphere of international cooperation can also be felt in the field of human rights (Cf. Humanitäre Aspekte in der Systemausei-nandersetzung. In: IPW-Berichte, Berlin, 18, 7, 1989, pp. 1). The less international security can be maintained by armies and weapons (and in Europe, in view of the huge accumulation of mass annihilation potentials, this stage was reached long ago) the more it must be achieved by political, economic and humanitarian cooperation.

3.2   Human rights

Human rights in particular have a key position in this respect because they to an especially large degree act as confidence-building factors. The more people meet each other, speak with each other and get to know one another, the more reservations about and concepts of the enemy will be reduced.

However welcome such a development may be, it will not, for the time being, lead to an abolition of state sovereignty and frontiers. It would be pure illusion to proclaim a world state and, as expressed by Kelsen (1928, 320), to overcome the sovereignty "standing everywhere in the way". The time is not yet ripe for this, and states differ too widely from one another with regard to their socio-economic structure, their cultures and stages of development. More importantly, a civilised dispute must take place between, in particular, capitalist and socialist states about the optimum solution to current problems. In this dispute, the goal would be the strengthening of joint security, which the different states, while respecting each other's differences, would have to achieve - with the penalty of destruction in the event of non-compliance (SUP, 1987, 3). On the other hand, it becomes obvious that a great number of states - even those with the same socio-economic systems - are not ready to renounce their sovereign rights. There are considerable political and economic differences between the Warsaw Treaty states, and this has led to the fact that these states have, in the course of their work together, fallen back upon their sovereign rights in order to restrict humanitarian cooperation (for example, holiday traffic, import and export, tourism). Even in Western Europe, however, agreement is by no means a problemfree process; this is demonstrated by the jealous wrangling over butter mountains and overabundant wheat stocks. The growing conflicts arising between the states which will participate in the West European domestic market, the non-member states of the EEC, North America and Japan speak for themselves. Here too, both sides fall back upon sovereign rights whenever national interests are concerned. One should not forget the differences between the North and the South which have also contributed to the strengthening of sovereignty.

Of course, Sohn is right in saying that "since 1945 more treaties have been concluded than in the 2000 years before. Every treaty reduces, to a certain extent, the sovereignty of its signatories" (In: Ferencz, 1989, 32). Nevertheless, only very small slices of sovereignty were given away, and one could just as well argue that all the treaties concluded were merely instances of enforcement of the sovereign decisions of the states concerned. Despite these numerous conclusions of treaties, these same states repeatedly referred to the basic international legal principle of non-intervention and thus protected their rights to sovereignty (Damrosch, 1989, 1). There is no set of statistics which shows how often states have referred to the prohibition on intervention since the United Nations was established in 1945 (when the

present international legal catalogue of principles came into force) although at the same time the various states agreed upon a general legal duty to strive toward peaceful international cooperation. However, one of the demonstrations of the importance of the norms is the fact that they were repeatedly put into concrete terms through resolutions of the General Assembly. Especially worth mentioning is resolution 2131 (XX) of 1965 (which is the first interpretation of the UN as an organisation). Since it was adopted by 105 votes (with only Great Britain abstaining from the voting), it represents the "common concern of all states for the values in the principle of state sovereignty for which the principle of non-intervention requires respect" (Vincent, 1974, 314). In eight articles, activities are quoted as being incompatible with the principle of non-intervention: armed intervention; denial of the international legal subjectivity or the political, economic and cultural elements of the state; economic, political or other sanctions; organization, support or tolerance of subversive, terrorist or armed actions; interference in internal affairs; and deprivation of national identity.

These statements are repeated in the "Declaration of Principles" (Resolution A/2625) of 1970, which is of fundamental importance for international law, and thus they take on the character of an agreed interpretation of this norm.

Under these circumstances it is astonishing that the UN General Assembly again confirmed the principle of non-intervention by Resolution 36/103 of 1981, and at the same time regarded further cases as interventions. The destabilization of a state, the strengthening of military blocs, defamation campaigns, economic retaliatory measures and the distorted representation of human rights problems were quoted as examples. This specification, from the point of view of the theory of international law, raises a number of questions. Obviously this is a confrontative document from that time in the history of the UN when the majority of states from socialist and developing countries thought they could pursue policies opposing a group of states (the Western industrial states) through resolutions. They were not in search of a compromise, which contributed to a stagnation in the development of international law. In assessing developments in the 1970's and the 1980's against this background, one is forced to the conclusion that these states reacted to the challenge of a world coming ever closer together, and to massive global problems, with the demand for separation rather than for cooperation. As a consequence, the development of the principle of international cooperation and solidarity fell well short of what was required (Tomuschat, 1983, 730).

The sphere of human rights in particular became a battle-field for wars of belief waged with almost religious fervour (Müller, 1986, 27). The hopeful starts made in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 within the framework of the CSCE process were thus largely paralyzed. The follow-up meeting of Belgrade and Madrid were marked by this paralysis. Western human rights initiatives failed when opponents claimed that they were in conflict with the prohibition against intervention in a country's internal affairs; in addition, these initiatives were often put forward half-heartedly because those proposing them were unwilling to admit their own shortcomings in this sphere. Summarizing, confrontation was at the fore during long stretches of the CSCE process, and meaningful mechanisms of cooperation under international law failed to materialize (Egeland, 1985, 266).

3.3   International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights

In contrast, during the drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, three procedures were developed which, on the one hand, reflected a reasonable degree of internationalization with respect to the fostering of human rights, and on the other hand, embodied a respect for state sovereignty to the extent that inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of states are prohibited (Graefrath, 1989, 29).

The convention contains three different types of procedures. The first one is the procedure of reporting. One year after they have joined the Covenant and once every five years after that the participant states shall report to the executive body of the Covenant - a committee consisting of eighteen elected experts (and not representatives of states). These reports are then discussed in that committee. In practice, the following procedure has developed: "One or more representatives of the country concerned which has presented a written report shall appear to have their report examined by the committee. This will avoid the examination of the report taking place as a kind of abstraction or in a vacuum ... The individual members can then freely ask questions. They do not need to have their questions approved by either the chairman or the majority. The states' representatives then answer the questions, either in a tactful or even undiplomatic manner, sometimes very briefly, occasionally at great length and often in an unsatisfactory manner" (Tomuschat, 1984, 18). The disadvantages of this procedure are obvious - it is possible for states to present reports which are "glossed over" and which do not give answers to questions. The reports of the socialist

countries in particular have all too often presented too ideal a picture of the situation. This conduct was paradoxical; the committee would rather have accepted critical reports (Szawlowski, 1980, 9) in order to discuss collectively the problems presented. The discussion in the committee referred in any case to the deficiencies in implementing the convention, and thus brought them into the open (Tarnopolsky, 1987, 617). Self-critical reporting would perhaps have helped to limit adverse developments in the GDR, such as the lack of a travel and media law, and deficiencies in the rule of law (Buchholz, 1985, 117; Hofmann, 1988, 112). Despite these critical remarks one must not, on the other hand, overlook the fact that the procedure of reporting has affected numerous legislative processes in the member states and has led to a number of improvements in the human rights situation. Furthermore, the covenant can be expected to gain increasing importance as publicity increases and the rules of procedure of the committee are put into more concrete terms.

The second procedure is the procedure of state complaint. Whereas the procedure of reporting is made obligatory in the Covenant, the participating state is subject to Article 41 as far as the procedure of making a complaint is concerned. This was observed by twenty out of the the ninety or so member states of the Covenant who consequently subjected real or asserted non-fulfillment of convention provisions to a special arbitration mechanism in a special procedure. Unfortunately, this procedure has not been applied so far, primarily because states with serious human rights' problems have not agreed to it. Those states which respect the law should have all the more reason to agree to the procedure and increase, by their own example, the moral pressure on participant states such as Chili and El Salvador, to adhere to human rights. As a whole, one cannot help thinking that the states shy away from state complaints and act according to their motto: You don't touch me, I won't touch you. This has become obvious in connection with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In this convention, the procedure for state complaint is fixed as obligatory, but nevertheless it has been used just as little as that of the Human Rights Convention. This must come as a surprise because nearly 130 states are participants to the convention, among them those with serious problems of racial discrimination. One example in this respect is Israel which was repeatedly reproached for racial discrimination - even before the implementing body of the convention. Nevertheless, there have not been any state complaints (Ansbach & Heintze, 1987, 147). If international enhance-

ment of human rights is to gain credibility in the future, then there is no other way for the peaceful settling of disputes than using this procedure. Such a procedure would be free from the accusation of interference and would have considerable consequences for the internal legal order. The third procedure is the individual complaint. This procedure is based on the agreement of participant states to the Human Rights Convention to the Optional Protocol. These states provide individuals with the possibility of turning to the Human Rights Committee to report asserted or real violations of rights mentioned in the Convention. However, some preconditions must be taken into consideration here. For instance, the complaint must not be an anonymous one. Nor can it be a pending complaint in other authoritative bodies. The main precondition, however, is that the individual complaining must have first exhaused the internal legal possibilities of the state concerned. Herein lies the weak point of this procedure because the path through a given country's legal system is often an extremely complicated and lengthy one: "The long duration of the procedure doubtless affects its effectiveness. Hereby one must take into consideration that a complaint can only be approved after the internal legal processes have been exhausted. In many states, legal action is a slow process and has to go through many stages of appeal so that the subject of complaint may easily date back up to ten years before reaching the committee" (Graefrath, 1989, 163).

The second disadvantage of the procedure - repeatedly stressed in GDR literature - is its reference to a single and probably atypical case (Mohr, 1989, 344). Both disadvantages, however, are compensated for by the advantage that the possibility of individual complaint before an international body places extreme pressure upon states to observe the rights covered by the convention and to create legal avenues for their assertion. Therefore the agreement of as many states as possible to the Optional Protocol is desirable and Hungarian initiative has to be welcomed (Hannikainen, 1989, 23).

The three procedures regulated in the framework of the Human Rights Convention should be comprehensively applied. Their advantage lies in their exact formulation and the subsequent creation of international legal security. In many ways, all of them help to bring national legal procedures into line with the standards agreed upon in the Human Rights Convention. In this respect the problem of interference in internal affairs will not arise, the procedures mentioned above having been agreed upon.

3.4 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The hesitant conduct of many states (among them socialist ones) in accepting the procedures of state complaint and of individual complaint has led to Western states pursuing new ways of pushing through internationally agreed standards. This assessment applies to the CSCE process. In the Vienna document of 1988, in connection with the humanitarian dimension of the CSCE, the possibility exists of reporting violations (asserted or real) of the rules contained in the CSCE document through diplomatic channels. Thus in the CSCE framework, procedures have been agreed upon through political channels which are by no means juridicially regulated. This in turn gives rise to the threat of interference in internal affairs, which could well bring with it a disruption in intergovernmental relations. To render this impossible, states should reduce their stipulations on juridicially regulated procedures of state and individual complaints and should subject themselves to them.

At the same time, the possibilities for the peaceful settlement of disputes in connection with human rights should be given more intensive thought. The Soviet Union, with regard to six UN Human Rights agreements, has withdrawn its limiting conditions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes by the International Court in the Hague (Franck, 1989, 531). Thus another method regulated under international law has been opened up for the solution of human rights problems which can in turn be employed by other states as well.

When agreements such as these are made on the basis of cooperation, reproaches of interference are less likely to occur. At the same time, human rights can completely fulfil their confidence-building function. Consequently, effective cooperation in the sphere of human rights will not lead to the abolition of the principle of non-interference in international law, but will restrict the necessity and possibility of referring to this norm.

3.5 Addendum

In the late autumn of 1989, facts came to light in the GDR which showed that the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party, headed by Honecker, had lied to the people of the GDR for decades, and had deceived them with distorted and untrue facts about the real situation in the country. Since the SUP held the leading role in the country, according to the constitution it acted at the same time as the government for the state of the GDR. This ex-

perience shows that an international cooperation in the sphere of human rights which is exclusively based upon state mechanisms will be subject to certain dangers. Corrupt regimes, like that of the SUP in the GDR, may abuse this cooperation by false presentations of facts. Therefore, intergovernmental cooperation should be supplemented by measures in the non-governmental field. In this respect, public non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International are of great importance. History has shown that organizations such as these have made an essential contribution to the revelation of human rights' violations. Therefore, the community of states should do everything to promote the activities of these organizations. Their recognition in the Vienna Document on the CSCE meeting of 1989 is a welcome contribution in this direction.

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Karl-Otto Richter

4   Citizenship in different urban contexts - some problems of research

4.1   Europe

Perceptions of Europe in East and West, approached as a social-scientific problem, involve a number of questions and a multitude of facets of these questions demanding our attention. Let me formulate only three complexes of them. What is meant by "Europe"?

Evidently more than only a certain geographic region - but what else? Should Europe be seen as a cluster of nations, more or less interdependent and connected, more or less friendly, indifferent or even hostile to one another? Or should it be regarded as groups of nation-states with different systemic patterns, say capitalist or socialist, and, consequently, split up into blocs of allies, each block developing according to its own systemic logic? Is it a continent filled to bursting with an enormous potential of destruction - thousands of nuclear missiles located so close to one another that their warheads are almost touching.

What are we interested in if we speak about Europe? What conception of it should we make if we want to discuss how it is perceived?

I would plead for considering Europe as a particular social space with a long history of the formation, differentiation and transformation of different societies, constituted until now as nation-states which are independent and at the same time interdependent. I admit that this conception is somewhat lacking in specificity. Particularities of Europe as a certain social space would become more obvious, however, if we were to take a closer look at the individual items named above. Without going deeper into details I would summarize like this: particularities result from the long history of Europe as a history of modern industrial societies which are unevenly though generally well-developed. These modern societies have been relatively strongly conditioned by a long, long past - encompassing impressive transformations of the modes of production, the accumulation of wealth and power by an unmerciful exploitation of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and devastating wars, class-struggles and revolutions which changed Europe and the world.

A contribution on "perception of Europe" should not, therefore, be limited to considering Europe in its recent form but should also examine the perception of those historical conditions which shaped its present configuration.

4.2   Perceptions

Another complex of questions arises with respect to "perception".

In fact the question is not only that of how Europe is perceived; the problem is much more complex. Attempting to construct an aggregated formulation I propose the following: How do which social subjects perceive which aspects of Europe, by what is this perception mediated, and why is this so?

Even if I cannot offer a detailed answer I want to point out three methodological consequences resulting from this complex question.

The first is that we must begin by defining the social subject whose perception of Europe we plan to study. "The East", "the West", "countries in East and West" can hardly be treated as social subjects which perceive something. This seems to be true even for national populations as a whole. It is much more fruitful, in my opinion, to ask how governments, parties, other

organizations, and particular groups within socially structured populations perceive Europe.

The next questions are how homogenous or how disparate this perception is with respect to different social subjects, how this homogeneity or diversity can be explained and what impact it has on politics.

In the second place, there is no way an adequate explanation can be found without looking at the interests which govern the process of perception. This refers not only to the particular "European interests" of particular social subjects. It refers even more to the particular interests of those social subjects who are in the position to control - at least to a great extent - how Europe is perceived: that is, to control the resources necessary for forming or influencing public opinion relating to the history, the present and the future of Europe. This leads, thirdly, not only to the question about the means by which particular social subjects perceive Europe and the means by which they try to influence other social subjects' perception. Again, the problem is much more complex. The perception of social phenomena is in any case mediated by a multitude of conditions under which particular social subjects exist. If we consider individuals, for example, to be social subjects, it becomes evident that their perception of Europe is not exclusively dependent on the information they gather from the media, from travelling experiences, from school and so on. Before this information is transformed into "perception" it will be selected, evaluated and incorporated into an already-existing view of life which is itself influenced by the circumstances under which the individuals live.

My argument is now that urban conditions are an important set of these circumstances influencing perceptions, and that it makes sense to ask how and to what extent the political thinking and political behavior of citizens is mediated and influenced by the urban context. Some relevant problems will be delineated later.

4.3   Interest in perceptions

Finally there remains the question: What is at the core of our interest in the perception of Europe? Since there are so many obvious facts at hand which could contribute to an answer, this question seems to be redundant. It seems so but it is not.

To drive my point home: There are evidently a number of processes going on in Europe which deserve our attention - processes of integration within Western Europe, processes of greater differentiation within the community of socialist states accompanied by a transformation and even loosening of the mechanisms of integration between them. There are processes of detante and disarmament, as well as a revitalization of old Western visions, dating from the times of cold war and including the almost psychotic dream of a Germany united in the frontiers of 1937. There are grave economic problems crying for a new international division of labour and a new economic world order, there are dying forests and wasted natural resources, there are new technologies going together with remarkable social structural changes and - last but not least - there are new media whose coverage reaches across nearly all of Europe, not only promising European countries more information about one another, but also threatening to transform the standards of European mass culture to the level of the media highlights of a North American province.

Summarizing again, I would suggest that the processes of change have resulted in new forces of production and new dimensions and organizational forms of the use and exploitation of these forces, as well as new, extremely dangerous forces of destruction. As a result, the scope of contradictions has shifted from the national level to the supranational, or even global level. This, it seems to me, is at the core of those processes we are interested in when speaking about the perception of Europe.

If it is true that a characteristic feature of Europe is that its modern societies have been relatively strongly conditioned by their long history and significant social transformations, then the opposite has now become true as well: Much more than any other world region is Europe confronted with a present heavily conditioned by the future. This means that recent decisions to master European developmental processes, to master contradictions and situations of crisis are - far more than ever before - delimited by their future impact on Europe as a whole. Hence any major decisions and developmental steps of today must be considered as a partial answer to the question if there will be a Common European House, a Common European Ruin, or a Common European Poisoned Desert. Drawing upon the questions delineated above we may draw our first conclusion: The problem of the perception of Europe is a highly important, complex matter. Both its complexity and importance also have something to do with the fact that Europe had and has a particular influence on the emergence and development

of global problems, that Europe is - in a certain sense - a global problem itself. The question of how we perceive Europe is therefore related to the question of how we perceive a world which is in transition: from local to national, and from national to global.

This globalization of human existence, felt in Europe in a particular manner, has an impact on more than only national policies and on the role of international organizations.

Mediated by national conditions in general it filters down more and more into the everyday life of the people. From this follows a second conclusion: Though most of human activities are primarily local in nature, human thinking and human activities are interwoven with the "global world" much more deeply than ever before. In other words, the meaning of space and time is changing: the local, the national and the global sphere penetrate each other in a new, particular mode. Changing space and time imply, however, first of all changing human responsabilities - growing responsabilities in our case. This leads to a final conclusion: If we understand our science as being a contribution to a better understanding of the potentials, the necessities and the conditions of responsible human behaviour aimed at shaping an ever-more global future, we are challenged by new dimensions of complexity and change. To arrive at an understanding of these complex determinants of responsible human behaviour we will need broader, interdisciplinary approaches. These approaches should also include questions about the influence of social space on human behaviour in general and on political thinking and political activity in particular.

4.4   Citizenship and urban conditions

Human activity is, as stated before, spatially-speaking predominantly locally bound. It is influenced by the characteristics of a limited local social space patterned by the character of the society of which it is part. How then does the "global world", mediated by the national, penetrate into the "local"? How do characteristics of the local social space influence the perception of the world as a global social space? How does the global social space change when penetrated by the national and/or the local social space? What does this mean politically and what impact does it have on the pattern of human thinking and of human activity? In short: If it is true a) that we live in times of globalization, which makes growing demands upon the level of human responsability and b) that human activity is influenced by the spe-

cific characteristics of the local social space, than we may state as a problem of research (admittedly at a high level of abstraction):

- How do the interrelations between the local, the national and the global social space change in view of globalization and what are the driving forces behind these changes?
- What impact do these interrelations and their changes have on human thinking and on human activity in general?
- What are the political implications of (changing) interrelations between local, national and global social space as factors influencing human thinking and human activity?

Abstract as the questions formulated above may appear, there is historical and recent evidence of interrelations between a view of life and citizenship on the one hand and urban conditions on the other - if "urban conditions" are understood as being concrete expressions of the dominant social conditions in general.

This is certainly not the time or place to prove this statement in detail. So I want to support it by sketching very briefly some historical examples of relevant interrelations, examples which deserved a deeper analysis.

4.5   Polis

The interrelationship between the view of life, citizenship and urban conditions are obvious with respect to the city in ancient times. The polis, representing a particular unity between urban concentration of population, society and state, was also based on a new quality of the division of labour and, in view of the vocational specialization necessary for this division, on the fragmentation of man. This gave momentum not only to scientific considerations about the particularities of different professional activities, but even more to considerations of to how this social organism named polis could result from a multitude of individual "skilled workers" and specialists (Lübke, 1980, 704). These considerations may have led to democratic concepts of society or to aristocratic social utopias; in any case they had to be founded on a new premise: on the discovery of the individual, loosened from traditional bonds and no longer a weak, insignificant object of divine arbitrariness.

This extremely important discovery was evidently not simply a direct effect of the spatial concentration of population. Oriental cities, for instance,

did not stimulate any comparable reflections about man and society. It was instead the particular configuration of the polis as a locally concentrated, urban population of landlords and businessmen constituting both state and society, which gave rise to the political-cultural image of polis-citizens participating in governing the destiny of their community.

It is obvious that the polis-citizen was not just a direct result of characteristics of the local social space. It is just as obvious, however, that urban life with its relative independence from nature, its greater social differentiation (linked to the need to regulate a number of aspects of that urban life juridically, rather than according to convention, as in the past) had a significant effect upon the character of the local social space. In addition, this space, once patterned, influenced human thinking and activity in society and politics.

4.6   Medieval town

The medieval town can also be seen as an example of interrelations between view of world, citizenship and urban conditions. This is reflected, for instance, in changes in the perception of space and time. The anthropomorphic perception of space - reflecting the "specific intimate relation of man to nature" characteristic of pre-industrial civilizations - changed into a process of secularization of space. This secularization of space within a completely christianized feudal world meant that the social space lost its hierarchical order and its "moral colour".

The same changes occured with respect to the social time which was absolutely under clerical control and characterized by both linearity and cyclicity: Man and the world would return to the creator, time would return to eternity (Gurjewitsch, 1978).

Urban life, however, far more independent from nature than rural life, required and developed a new perception of time, and demanded that it be measured and conserved. Time was afforded value and changed into an easential factor of production.

Again it is evident that these changes, so fundamental for undermining the feudal mode of production, did not simply result from the fact of urban concentration. European mechanical watches, for instance, aroused the interest of medieval Chinese emporers - who regarded them as amusing toys (Gurjewitsch, 1978, 186). Changes in the perception of space and time as

indispensible premisses of economic, cultural and social progress were in-fluenced, however, by the urban conditions in that they were concrete ex-pressions of the social conditions within European feudalism. One aspect of these urban conditions was the formation of a new type of citizenship - that is, the emergence of the burgher as a member of a free, self-governed urban community. The urban burgher as a social type was unknown under the conditions of political despotism in the medieval East; it was this urban burgher whose whole existence led to fundamental changes in the percep-tion of space and time.

4.7   Early capitalism city

Looking at cities under early capitalism we again find examples of those interrelations discussed before. In a certain sense these cities look like pro-totypes of capitalist societies as reflected in early bourgeois thinking: there are isolated individuals, each of whom is pursuing private interests and to-gether constituting by division of labour, exchange, competition and - may-be - solidarity a basically atomized society.

So it is by no means due to chance that the dramatic urbanization processes at the eve of the 20th century forced sociologists to discover a new object of studies: the city. There were quite practical reasons for this interest. Park and Burgess (1924, 211), prominent representatives of the early Chicago school of social ecology, summed it up like this: It was the historian and the philosopher who led the sociologist to study society. But it was the re-former, the social worker and the businessman who forced him to study the community. What kind of practical reasons there were can be seen when looking at the contents of the first numbers of the American Journal of So-ciology. Between 1895 and 1915 this journal published a total of 847 arti-cles. One hundred and twelve of them were explicitly devoted to the city or to aspects of urban life. Almost fifty per cent of those "urban articles" presented expositions on local politics and administration, including pro-posals for and assessments of reform, and the study of European experi-ences in communal administration. About one fifth of the "urban articles" was dedicated to characteristics of urban life and another one fifth was oc-cupied with specific urban social groups, mainly with the living conditions of industrial workers, of immigrants and of underdogs.

The early capitalist city, promising as it was for profitable production and the accumulation of capital, revealed new dangers for the "upper classes" -

and particularly for the ruling class: There was not only the agglomeration of "lower classes" living under conditions which favoured myriad types of social pathologies. Much more important was the fact that an agglomerated working class in conjunction with urban conditions favoured and allowed for the formation of working class organizations threatening bourgeois political power. What else is at the core of Simmel's statement (1908, 1f) that the claims of the science of sociology were but a theoretical reflection of the practical power which the masses achieved in l9th century at the expense of the interests of the individual?

Urban sociology was, consequently, a theoretical answer to social problems which were basically political or, seen from a political point of view, a reformist answer to an emergent working class movement. Indeed, reading these early articles on the city and on urban life confirms impressively the reform-oriented attitude of urban sociologists and demonstrates convincingly how much they contributed to convincing the rulers that social-political interventions were necessary as instruments of political integration. In summary: Urban concentration under capitalism favoured on the one hand the formation of a working class intruding more and more into the political structures originally designed for exclusive use by the better off. Thus this class became a threat to bourgeois political power, but it did so because it was national and even international in character while acting primarily in a determinate local space and under its own particular conditions. The same conditions provided an impetus on the other hand for what was at that time "new political thinking" among the ruling bourgeoisie. This was a kind of thinking which was also able to discover the integrative power of urban conditions which allowed for a modest but generally decent life and for political participation (at least for a majority) - within the structures of bourgeois democracy - which was sufficient to integrate the whole population politically instead by by means of police force.

4.8   Telecity

A final, recent example illustrates the influence of new technologies on interrelations between view of life, citizenship and social space.

There is a growing number of publications devoted to "Silicon Valley", "technoville" or "telecity" to be found in sociological journals. Central to the discussions in these articles is the recurring argument that new technologies enlarge the possibilities of decentralization of population and eco-

nomic activities. There can be little doubt about the possibility of growing decentralization; however, most authors seem to ascribe to some kind of technological determinism and, by confusing the potential for ensured reality, arrive at a "decentralized future". An example is Teune (1987, 1) who takes for granted that the new technologies will determine how enterprises produce, how governments govern and how we are located in physical as well as in social space.

Let us follow Teune for a moment and, looking exclusively at Europe, let us ask ourselves what it would mean with respect to the questions outlined above? A decentralized future? Settlements all over Europe, connected not so much by streets or railway tracks but, more important, by telecommunication and computer nets? A population able to obtain - within seconds or minutes - any kind of information about any place and any topic under dicussion elsewhere, communicating with friends or colleagues whenever they feel like and without taking a step outdoors? A local space which is, eventually, local because of landscape and neighbourhood ties but which is essentially global because spatial limits have been annihilated by processes of change?

But would these people, finally made equal by overcoming at least mentally the limits of space and time, be interested in anything at all? Would they want to know about the world? Or would the elimination of spatial (and maybe national) borders end in a population who cares at best for local issues while forgetting about national, European, or global affairs? A population, in short, which is global in character but provincial in mind and activity - a state of affairs which it seems not too unfair to say already exists today with respect to great parts of the populations of large countries such as the United States.

All this is obviously exaggerated. But who could really answer the question how far the exaggeration goes and where the future reality lies?

Certainly it makes little sense to go deeper into the realm of scientific speculation. We should recognize, however, that the meaning of space and time is changing more and more, that these changes raise questions about interrelations between different dimensions of social space, and that a changing social space very probably has important political implications which are yet to be explored.

4.9 Global city

Cities, which are apparently local by definition and empirical evidence, have lost their local character since the capitalist mode of production destroyed feudal society. As parts of translocal social systems they have acquired a translocal character.

This is particularly true of so-called "global cities", huge metropolises with an enormous concentration of economic and political power in the face of which most national borders degenerate to mere strokes on a map. It is as just as true, however, for smaller urban concentrations which simply could not exist without a steady flow of energy, goods and money, of people and information crossing their spatial limits.

My thesis is now that not only metropolises but even smaller cities have become increasingly affected by the global context, and this has happened in two different ways. First there are interrelations between the global and the national sphere influencing the local space just because the national sphere has been affected. This was and is true in a variety of cases. Remember, for example, the dramatic changes of local space which occurred in wide parts of Europe during World War II. These changes refer not only to disastrous destruction, they refer as well to changes in the meaning of local space. Names like Leningrad, Stalingrad, Warsaw, Coventry and Dresden, Auschwitz and Dachau will stand for centuries to come as symbols characterizing not only Nazi Germany and its victims but a whole period of history. Even within cities, local space changed in structure and meaning. Former hotels were transformed into to Gestapo torture-hells, whole areas of cities became bases of resistance against the occupants, houses of childhood changed into ruins where parents had been killed. Less disastrous but at times just as dramatic are recent global events affecting local space: global influences on national economies or policies, for example. Consider, for instance, the effects of global economic processes - such as the international debt crisis - on streams of rural migrants enlarging the cities in underdeveloped and dependent capitalist countries to monstrous proportions. Or think of the role of state interventions in the structure of more advanced societies, reflected at local level, and mediated by state, global processes of economic restructuring. We could continue with examples, but this will be enough to demonstrate what is meant.

Secondly, there are more or less direct effects of global processes upon the local sphere, related to national conditions only insofar as national condi-

tions find concrete expressions at the local level. These phenomena in particular represent new effects of globalization. This refers for instance to ecological problems. Global ecological problems are of local relevance not simply because they were locally experienced due to local effects like pollution of air or water, by damages of forests and so on. Moreover they gave rise to a new quality of ecological consciousness and to ecological movements acting mostly within a particular local space and under specific conditions. While active ecological movements helped to limit further environmental damages, they achieved even more: Growing numbers of people began to understand that their - usually local - world is definitely part of a global world and that damaging their local world is part of damaging the natural conditions of human life on a global scale. Do not forget: If ecological movements were successful, it was because they acquired political influence mainly within the local political structures before they achieved (seldom enough up to now) political influence at the national level. Finally, look back at the powerful peace movements at the end of the seventies and at the beginning of the eighties. In the beginning, at least, they were predominantly direct local responses to the intensification of tensions between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization, of tensions which contained the the real threat of a global war.

It is certainly true that those movements in the West had much more of grassroots character than those in the East, and that both the local condition and the concrete aims and intentions were different. In both cases, however, the local sphere was affected - by demonstrations, by the appearance of new symbols among the urban public, by supportive or repressive responses of local authorities toward demonstrations, by local assemblies declaring their city to be free of nuclear weapons and so on.

4.10   Conclusion

To conclude: The globalization of human existence we are witnessing today implies numerous and highly divergent consequences for the interrelations between the global, national and local spheres. Global military, economic, political, ecological and cultural developments influence not only the national sphere and, consequently, national policies with respect to international or internal affairs, they also have an impact - evidently in different ways - on the local sphere.

This does not simply reduce the role of state but it undoubtedly affects the interrelations between the national and local sphere. Grassroots movements, reacting locally on global processes and influencing - at least potentially - national policies - were but one aspect of this changed relationship.

These observations give rise to some questions which should provice valuable topics for interdisciplinary and multilateral research.

The first question is how global problems influence national policies affecting the local sphere. This question relates to state interventions into the territorial structure, to related social structural changes, to the state-controlled distribution of financial and material resources to maintain or to further develop urban conditions, and so forth.

The second question is how different urban conditions stimulate or hamper, allow for or block local responses to global problems or, in other words, which potentially different urban conditions combine to contribute - in different ways - to the formation of global consciousness and activities of the population. This refers particularly to the question of how differences in the urban social structure, in local economies and urban political structures, in culture and so forth were linked to differences in global thinking and in political socialization and mobilization. In short: It refers to different urban potentials for stimulating local action as expression of global instead of provincial thinking.

Last not least there remains the question concerning the interrelations of both aspects sketched previously. This refers to the question of how and to what extent national conditions and policies influence urban conditions so that, intentionally or not, urban conditions favour or hamper global instead of provincial thinking and activities. It refers as much, however, to the question of whether and to what extent local action, inspired by global thinking, is reflected in national policies with respect to global problems and how much it contributes to developmental processes within the political system and to political culture in general.

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Barbara Fratczak-Rudnicka

5   Poland - back to Europe?

Before I refer to the title of my paper, I would like to draw your attention to some interesting changes in Polish society's national and ethnic attitudes, which took place in the nineteen eighties.

In the last thirty years, several studies have been conducted by Polish sociologists and antropologists devoted to the national and historical consciousness of Poles (as a whole or in different social groups - such as the students, workers etc.) Some examples are: Kloskowska (196), Sicinski (1967), Szacki (1969), Wilska-Duszynska. (1975), Jerschina (1978), Szacka (1981), Jasisska-Kania (1983, 1988). In 1966 the Center for Public Opinion Studies (OBOP Orodek Badania Opinii Publicznej) started a series of nationwide, representative surveys on the national identity of Poles, including their attitudes towards other nations and ethnic groups (1966, 1972, 1975, 1986, 1987).

The widespread interest in this topic is rooted, among other things, in a conviction widely shared among Poles that, due to historical reasons, national values play a specific role in the Polish society's attitudes and value system. These historical reasons include a struggle for a sovereign Polish state which lasted for more than a hundred years (1975-1918), and a five-year occupation (1939-1945) of Poland by the German army during the Second World War. Both of these historical periods involved a real threat of cultural and even physical extermination. Polish society succeeded, however, in preserving its culture and national identity (language, religion and historical tradition), mainly through a transmission of values through the channels of the family and of the Church.

The specific significance of national values has also been stressed as an important characteristic of contemporary Polish society. Studies from the sev-

enties showed that people felt related to mainly two groups - the family and the nation. Intermediating reference and identity groups (class, professional etc.) were to a large exten absent. On the basis of these findings the sociologists suggested the existence of a specific "social vacuum" in the social orientations of Poles Nowak 1984). This was one of the symptoms of an emerging political crisis, a growing alienation of the political authorities (and the institutions connected with them) from the society.

A comparison of research findings from the sixties and seventies and the nineteen eighties shows, however, that the strong emotional affiliation felt by the Poles towards their own nation has begun to change.

Although 95% of Poles reported feeling sympathetic towards their own nation in 1975 (and 5% said they were indifferent) and 88% still felt the same way in 1987 (with 10% feeling indifference), the national autostereotype (stereotype of one's own nation) consisted in 1964 for a majority of Poles of only positive characteristics, while 58% of the respondents mentioned only negative features in 1981 when describing Polish national character (Jasinska-Kania 1988).

Along similar lines, 78% of Warsaw students declared in 1979 that they wanted to live in Poland (if given a free choice), while in 1983 only 58% had the same desire (Lindenberg 1986). Similar data shows that in 1981 only 28 % of a representative group of Warsaw teenagers would choose to live in Poland, while in 1986 even less - only 22% - made the same choice (Fratczak Rudnicka 1989). At the same time the number of respondents from the same groups willing to sacrifice their lives "for the fatherland" (although still high) decreased by more than 10%.

Another phenomenon characteristic for the nineteen eighties was a general tendency to a decrease in positive feelings towards other nations as well (except Italy and Japan).

Opinion polls from the nineteen seventies show that over half of all respondents at that time declared positive feelings towards the citizens of several countries: first of all Frenchmen, then Hungarians and Russians. In 1986 and 1987 not one nation was positively evaluated by a majority of Poles (Jasinska-Kania 1988). The already mentioned study of Warsaw teenagers showed a decrease in sympathy towards different nations by 10-30% (of respondents declaring it) in the years 1981 to 1986 (Fratczak-Rudnicka 1989)

The decrease in positive feelings towards other nations was not followed by an increase of negative feelings. On the contrary - the percentage of respondents declaring antipathy, or hostility towards other nations also decreased significantly in the nineteen eighties. For example: 2/3 of all Poles declared having negative feelings towards the Germans in the 70s, while in 1987 only 1/3 did so. There was also a big decrease in anti-Semitic attitudes. In 1975 and 1977, 40% of the respondents felt that they "didn't like the Jews, while in 1987 only 16% said they felt that way (Jasiiska-Kania 1988). It is characteristic that this decrease in negative feelings was followed by only a small (by a few percent) increase in positive feelings towards those nations. So the general change in Poles attitudes towards their own and other nations is a decrease both in negative and in positive feelings, a growing indifference.

Several explanations may be referred to when trying to understand this change. For example, it has often beem suggested that there is a relationship between the economic situation and national stereotypes. Taking into account the long-lasting, severe economic crisis in Poland today this could be a possible explanation. However most authors (for example the social psychologist Aronson 1972) suggest the existence of a different kind of tendency - with the deepening of the economic crisis, negative stereotypes of other groups should increase, rather than decrease as in the Polish case.

It may be due to the concentration of the Polish people on dramatic internal political events during the last decade and at the same time to the growing difficulties in every-day life (shortages of basic goods, endless lines, steadly increasing inflation, a collapse of the social services and so forth), accompanied by several attempts to reform both the economic and the political system, which together may be responsible for the growing indifference to "the outside world." External political processes may also form part of the explanation (progress in détante and so forth).

Independently of which explanation we choose, the discussed phenomena can also be seen as a sign of another, much broader phenomenon. They can in fact be seen as a symptom of an identity crisis of contemporary Polish society - or putting it more precisely, of large groups within the society.

The deep long-lasting crisis in Poland involves not only the economic system, nor solely the political system; because it is also a social and moral crisis, it can also be seen as a crisis of social identity (Jasinska-Kania 1983). In the nineteen eighties (especially in their beginning and their end)

many old identifications were shaken and new ones were formed. The so - called "social vacuum" mentioned above was, at least partly, filled with new social institutions, providing new identifications and reference groups. Studies show that, simultaneously, national values decreased, and values and orientations connected with the family also declined. For example, 47% of respondents in a nation - wide, representative sample polled in 1977 chose life-goals connected with family life as being the most important for them; while in 1983, only 39% did so (Sawinski, Nasalska 1989). In the confused world of the nineteen eighties, words lost their old meanings, authorities ceased to be authorities, left ceased to be left and right to be right. National identity (including attitudes towards ones own and foreign nations) is an important element of social identity.

A social identity crisis has been characterized by Habermas (1976) as a state in which the society is no longer inclined to accept its own image, has ceased to recognize itself in the hitherto propagated tradition, which tradition then loses its ability to integrate the society. In such a situation an effort to overcome the crisis is followed by an attempt to redefine society's self-image, to interpret its history in new ways, looking to the past for new, previously neglected values and giving a new meaning to them see Jasinska-Kania 1983).

Approaching the problem from this perspective also enables us to better understand the present vivid discussion in Poland about Poland's affiliation to Europe, European values and standards.

Whenever one nowadays looks into a journal or newspaper, watches TV or listens to the radio there will almost certainly be a reference to "Europe". Let me give a few examples: "On the way to Europe" - title of an article about cultural contacts between Poles and ethnic miniorities; "... are not in Europe yet" - part of a sentence from a speech of one of our newly elected senators on a prospective reform of the legal system; "Catching up Europe" - the title of an article on the shortage of telephones and telephone lines in Poland; about a car owner: "... sitting in his car (...) with the feeling of unity with Europe" - from an article about the extremely high car accident rate in Poland.

In the recent election campaigne (June 1989) slogans such as: "With our candidate ... back to Europe" were used on both sides. (Although most often it was "Solidarity" which was supposed to "bring us back to Europe".)

It is interesting to note that the term "Europe" is used rather symbolically here. It is a condensed symbol of many things simultaneously: West European standards (the material standard of living, but also political, legal and other standards), democratic and liberal values, or simply a state which is refered to as being "normal" (in contrast to the "abnormal", "sick" condition of "crisis reality" in which the Polish state finds itself. In a broader context it can mean a shift from the communist system to a democratic political system, or a shift from a centralized so called planned economy to a market economy.

Of course geographically Poland is (as it always was) in the very center of the European continent. The notion of "Europe" refers here, however, to its cultural and historical implications. This is expressed, for example, in an article recently published in the political quarterly "KRYTYKA". The title "Poland lies on the coast of Mediteranean" obviously stresses here the Greek and Latin heritage of Polish culture (Parandowski 1989).

The notion of "going back" (to Europe) has two further implications. First, it means that we consider ourselves as once having been fully Europeans. Second, it also suggests that in the meantime we belonged somewhere else (or still belong there). Where then do we belong? The answer would be: to the East, to Asia. Asia symbolizes in this rhetoric Asiatic totalitarianism, social backwardnes or - with an obvious oversimplification - simply communism (Barcikowski 1983). Sometimes the answer would be: "we belong(ed) to the Forth World"; meaning here "not even to the Third World", dramaticly overexaggerating, suggesting that our situation is worse than that of the Third World.

A less superficial, and less "common sense" analysis of the Polish notion of "Europe" includes four main factors: Greek intellectual traditions, Roman civil law, Christian morality and Germanic sense of organization (Barcikowski 1983).

It is commonly held that - historically - Poland started its affiliation with European culture around the year 966. This is the symbolic date of the foundation of the Polish state: that year the leader of a powerful Slavic tribe (POLANIE) married a Czech princess, adopting at the same time the Christian faith (and turning down an alternative Byzantine Christianization). This action drew Poland into the sphere of West European culture.

Historians and publicists do not agree as to when this connection started to weaken. Some would say that Poland lost contact with Europe during the nineteenth century. Parandowski, for example, writes: This was for us not a century of steam and electricity, nor a century of industrialization and social movements - it was for us a time of mysticism and heroism." (Parandowski 1989)

The author refers to the fact that during the whole nineteenth century Poland was divided and occupied by its three neighbours Russia, Austria and Russia. This period was characterized by several unsuccessful uprisings and continous fights for the preservation of Polish language, culture and religion, leading to a development of mystic and romantic ideologies and attitudes instead of more pragmatic ones. Others consider the break to have started after the end of the Second World War, with the introduction of socialism in Poland. Still others would suggest that even this did not necessarily implicate a break with the European tradition, pointing to the - as they perceive it - European origins of socialism.

However, my aim here is not to analyze the historical facts in order to decide whether or when we ceased to be Europeans, nor to examine the alternative (Eastern) cultural influences.

My aim was to give a brief analysis of the contemporary notion of "Europen," as it is used in the public discours in today's Poland. The European myth is in Poland highly idealized and partly a-historical and anachronic. Stressing the high material standard, well organized social and public relations, democratic political life, the freedom and many rights of the citizens, it omits problems as such unemployment, terrorism, organized crime. It also omits such obviously European merits as thrift, industry, work-discipline and so forth. Neither does it take into account characteristics of the contemporary European culture (or should we say cultures), as it really looks today - often materialistic, pragmatic, more and more secular and so forth.

A good indicator of the attractiveness of Europe are results from an empirical study of the political attitudes of Warsaw youth conducted at the end of 1986. Over 50% of them chose an West European country as a place where they would like to live if given a free choice. 8% chose the United States. Less than 4% chose a socialist country (Poland not included; it was chosen by 22%). When other dimensions of attractiveness were measured (such as perceived material standard, degree of freedom) West European countries were chosen twice to ten times as often as East European (socialist) coun-

tries! (With Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany ranking highest on a combined index of attractiveness). (Fratczak-Rudnicka 1989)

The slogan "returning to Europe" is such a powerful one because of its exclusively positive and very broad and general associations. Connected with it are great hopes for a better, or only a "normal",life. However, in my opinion, if our renewed European identity is supposed to be a constructive element in the social identity of Poles, and not only an expression of our inferiority complex or - on the contrary - of national megalomania, the present notion of "Europe" has to be demistificated, less wishful thinking and more a realistic assessment of what Europe" has to offer.

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52

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Máté Szabó

6   *Contradictions and dilemmas of European and Hungarian identity*

6.1   Hungary's exclusion

We Hungarians are very far from having the type of "Europhoria" presently being experienced by the nations of the European Community in the years leading up to "1992". We feel ourselves excluded from Europe in the Western sense. Our country is not a member of the European Community, but we wish it could be.

Hungary was an indispensible part of Europe in the Western sense before the Second World War - but we were relegated to the Societ bloc by the Yalta treaty. In the ensuing period, our traditional ties to Europe have been destroyed but no new real political or economic community has been established to replace the old one.

The development of Hungary since the end of the war can be seen as a history of unsuccessful experiments aimed at breaking away from the monolithic communist system, and turning back to Europe.

6.2   Hungary after World War 2

After the second World War, there was a shortlived pluralistic phase between 1945-1948, during which a multiparty system and pluralism existed in Hungary. There was also some tolerance for an orientation toward Europe, though it was of course limited by the presence of the Soviet troops. This short democratic-pluralistic story was brought to an abrupt end by the crude and cruel Stalinist regime which ruled from 1948 until the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In the time of Hungarian Stalinism, all the contacts with Western Europe broke down; Hungary reoriented itself toward the Soviets and other COMECON countries, and even to the socialist countries of Asia, such as China and North Korea. The Hungarian revolution and struggle for freedom declared the national independence and the neutrality of Hungary, and expressed the intention of restoring Hungarian ties and contacts with Western Europe. But the intervention of the Soviet troops and of their Hungarian collaborators headed by Janos Kadar, the later political leader of the country between 1956 and 1958, restored the communist rule and the isolation from the Western part of Europe. Despite his devotion to the Soviets, there were important steps undertaken toward the opening up of the country in economic terms to the West under Kadar's rule. But politically monolithism remained unchallanged, and foreign policy never questioned COMECON membership and the Soviet orientation. Following the fall of Kadar in 1988, the country has entered into a new period, with a revival of political pluralism, and of a western orientation in foreign policy.

At present, Hungary is on the borders of two worlds; we are not yet members of the European Community.

We are removing ourselves from the Eastern bloc, but do not as yet have roots in the western one. Developments in other countries in this part of Europe similar to those occurring in our country may contribute to the breaking down of some of the barriers of the old "bloc confrontations" and to the emergence of systems of a "mixed" type. New phenomena may begin to be established - institutional innovations which may be valuable for the development of Europe as a whole, extending beyond the blocs. To understand Hungary's "avantgarde" role in this process, we must go back in history to the period before these two blocs existed.

6.3 Hungary's avantgarde role

Hungarians have considered themselves to be Europeans since Christianity was introduced and its statehood was established in the eighth and ninth centuries. This feeling of being a Christian, which at that time was identical to being a European, was very much strengthened by the participation in the expeditions to the Holy Land; and especially later by continuous fight for freedom carried out against the Turkish Empire.

The Habsburg rule established later was also an important tie to Europe. The Habsburg Empire, especially its Austrian line, was European-oriented, and not particularly involved in colonization, expeditions and so forth outside Europe. They were Catholics, but defended the whole of Christianity against the Turkish Empire. Hungary as a part of their Empire was closely embedded in Europe.

The first crisis of the European identity of Hungarians occurred, of course, following the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire after the first World War. Through the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary became an independent nation-state, which had been the aim of those who had fought for separation from the Habsburgs. At the same time, Hungary lost 75% of its former territories to its newly-established "neighbors".

Many millions of Hungarians have lived since then under foreign rule and sometimes under suppression. Hungary's first reaction, along the same lines as the Turkish war against Europe, was to take to arms in protest against the unjust peace treaty. This protest, however, was unlike that of the Turks short-lived; it took the form a proletarian dictatorship following the Soviet model which lasted just 133 days. The communists were only able to seize power because they were the only non-Western-oriented political party which could fight against the West, against Europe. This protest was, of course, unsuccessful, but we can interpret it as a counterpart of the Weimar complex in Germany - an expression of the deep discontent with the postwar European order, a questioning of the ties with the European community of states, and the choice of another, non-Western alternative.

The counter-revolution of Horthy succeeded against the Hungarian communists only with the intervention of the Western powers, and with the collaboration of foreign troops, such as the Czechs and the Rumanians. The communists were forced into exile and illegality, but the root of the problem remained: a type of uncertainty emerged with respect to the political and intellectual orientation of Hungarians toward Europe. Of course, there had al-

ways been proponents of opting for the "Asian", "pagan" roots of the Hungarians, especially on the extreme right. Following the establishment of the post-war order by the Western powers, experienced by Hungarians as being an unjust one, this "Asian option" became quite popular.

The idea of an orientation toward the East, toward Asia, or toward a type of "third way" as an utopia between the Eastern and Western types of social and political order, was influential in Hungary between the two World Wars, especially in the populist movement, and has even survived to the present day. The persistence of these Eastern orientations was due to support from the literature, and due to the fact that, as a non-specific political orientation, it overlived the changes of the system. The group propagating an Eastern orientation also organized themselves politically after Kadar in the "Hungarian Democratic Forum" (Magyar Demokratikus Forum), which is one of the most influential new political organizations in the Hungary of today.

From the beginning, between the two World Wars, the populists had had their antipode in the so-called "urbanists", who were exclusively oriented to the West - or as their enemies expressed it, they were "cosmopolitan" and unpatriotic. The attitudes of the two groups toward liberal values also differs: populists criticize them, and urbanists support them. The Western orientation is affiliated with the idea of the free market and parliamentarism. Populists stress the importance of the welfare of the populace, and they have a checkered relationship with parliamentarianism. This is because the East-West dichotomy was overshadowed for a time by the Jewish question and the emergence of fascism - with which the populists collaborated to a certain extent, or at least did not oppose with as much fervour as did the urbanists. The present-day urbanist political organization is the "Alliance of the Free Democrats" (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ), which has a great deal of political support from intellectuals, but very little from non-intellectuals.

The "Trianon-complex" brought Hungary into the second World War on the side of the Third Empire, fascist Germany, because the fascists gave some of Hungary's lost territories back.

Thus this war was again a war against Europe, and later against the Soviets. Hungarian troops were in fact engaged only on the Eastern front, but Americans and other Western air forces bombed Hungary too. Some ties with the West were broken. The "punishment" came in the form of the Yalta treaty,

which again appropriated all the lost Hungarian territories, justified the Trianon borders, and turned Hungary over to Eastern, or Asiatic-Stalinist rule. Following the second World War, during the Russian domination, a second, much deeper crisis of the European consciousness of Hungarians took hold. The copying of the Stalinist model in Hungary destroyed not only the Cristian roots of our tradition and culture, but also transformed the economic system, civil society and political culture, which had their roots in Europe.

The "liberal" reforms of Kadar in the sixties, and especially the new developments which took place following his rule have attempted to reestablish these European ties, but it will take long and hard work to achieve success after so many crises and conflicts.

6.4   Europeanism and nationalism

All these developments have led to a situation in which Hungarians' consciousness of belonging to Europe has become fragmented and troubled. A survey done in 1977 showed that 90% of the respondents identified him\herself as being a "Hungarian", 70% as a white man, and 53% as a European when asked the question "Who am I?" In 1984, the respondents were asked to place a number of categories in rank order. The result was: 1. Hungarian, 2. Human being, 3. regionality, 4. Soviet bloc, 5. European. According to this result, Hungarians tend to identify strongly with the nation, and Europeanism comes far down the line of categories of identity.

The role of the national consciousness as a category of identification is very important in Hungary. In 1975, 95% of the youngsters questioned in a survey said that to be Hungarian was something to be proud of.

This nationalism is partly connected to the special role of Hungary in Europe: Hungarians are excluded from the West, but they do not want to identify themselves with the East. That is why "to be European" has a type of normative, or utopian character for many of the Hungarians, while at the same time the majority compensate their relative deprivation to the Western system with an overemphasis of their own national identity. The consciousness of Hungarian "exceptionalism" is oriented both against the East and the West: Hungarians are "others", neither Slavs nor Germans, and they have to go their own way, with no regard for others. This type of nationalism opposes any broader framework of states or nations having any power over the own nation.

This type of crude nationalism is not often openly propagated in public discussion; it is, however rooted in the consciousness of a great many people.

6.5   New roles of Hungary in Europe

Public discussions which have taken place from the seventies to the present day have produced some interesting arguments and positions concerning the possible role of Hungary in a new, or reformed European order. We will summarize some of these arguments below, in a simplified and shortened typology, with no attempt to confront or criticize them. The first position is/was a critique of COMECON membership. This was originally a discussion among economists, but it has a more general impact on economic policy and on public opinion. According to this argumentation, COMECON membership destroys the Hungarian economy, hinders technological development, and makes it impossible to join the European Community. Hungary should try to change the system of COMECON so that the degree of integration is increased, or it should leave it. This proposal maintains the relationship with Europe, but does not criticize the Warsaw Treaty. This opinion was a critical and sometimes suppressed on under Kadar, but became politically acceptable after him. The second position is: "Reintegration" into the Western alliance. Of course, in the past Western countries were criticized as being capitalist in socialist Hungary, and it was maintained that capitalist countries are necessarily in a continuous crisis situation. Even the European Community is one of the signs of the crisis of "Western imperialism" according to the former official opinions. This ideological fiction has been abandoned only in recent years. The criticism of capitalism has been replaced by criticism of the defects in the own, socialist, system. Some of this criticism goes so far as to maintain that it is necessary for Hungary to join into the Western European political integration, but with a possible neutral status, similar to the arrangement that Austria is trying to make. This is an old idea in Hungary, which goes back to the revolution of 1956, when Austria was also taken as a model. Thus this argument goes further than the former one, proposing the positive goal of an economic orientation toward the West as well as a political one, and advocating leaving the Warsaw Pact. This strategy takes only Hungary into consideration, which distinguishes it from the next standpoint.

The third position focusses on Central-European horizons. Those ascribing to this viewpoint argue that Hungary is neither a Western nor an Eastern

country, but a Central-European one. It shares a number of common characteristics with other countries in the region, who would all profit from doing a number of things together and creating some degree of integration with one another, based on their common past and characteristics. This argument presents a scenario for the collective action of a special type of states or nations. As suggested, a mixed type of system could emerge in this area. The main political points of this Central-European scenario are: first, a new type of relationship with the Soviet Union, a concept of "finlandization," which means a type of neutrality with the cooperation of the Soviet Union. There would be freedom in the choice of political, economic and cultural options, and therefore a considerable degree of autonomy in the area of Western orientations. The second point is the "German question," the normalization of the relationship of the two German states embedded in conflicting blocs. There are different options for the type of cooperation and solidarity between the states of this imaginary "Central-European bloc":

- no federation, each state completely autonomous, but some new form of economic, social and cultural integration, with some political consequences;
- collective membership in the European Community, introducing these states as a bloc a Western integration, but maintaining their special relationship with respect to the Soviet Union;
- the reorganization of the present group of Central-European states, along the lines of a reformed model of the Hungarian-Austrian monarchy, a new type of "Empire".

It will be a hard, complicated and uncertain path to the realization of "back to Europe" in Hungary, considering the various dilemma's of national consciousness which will need to be resolved.

In the Eastern countries, which are presently having to deal with a number of serious crises, the "idea of Europe" is a synonym for the paradigm of systemic change and of an utopia of crisis-solving. On the one hand, there are heated public discussions about how the goal desired by all can be reached; on the other hand there are structural problems and dilemma's with respect to perceptions and consciousness with regard to Europe. The deep-rooted trauma's and schyzophrenia's of the national identity, the relative deprivation compared to the West, and utopian, wishful thinking are merged together into an image of "Western" and "Eastern" Europe. Following in

the wake of clear-cut and laudable political goals, old conflicts and new dilemma's emerge, shadowed by the subconsciousness of the nations. The exceptionalism of Hungary, a damaged national identity, conflict with the immediate neighbors - is the idea of Europe strong enough to cure all of the mental illnesses, or is it only a synonym for a new, better psychiatric clinic for the subconscious nation?

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Ivan Siber

7   Perceptions of economic standard, Democracy, social welfare and aspirations in Yugoslavia and orientation to Europe

7.1   Introduction

In Yugoslav society, problems of Europe, of the integration process occurring there, general thinking about the relationship of Yugoslavia to other European countries, and to the European Community in particular, have been relegated to the background for a long time, in official political circles as well as in the mind of the man in the street.

With the growing crisis of the past years, a comprehensive reexamination began of the entire groundwork of social, political, economic, as well as foreign policies. As a result "Europe" is today one of the notions most frequently invoked, encompassing, as is were the totality of civilizational progress, the twentyfirst century, advancement - in short, the aspirations of the common man as well as of official policy.

This assertion is difficult to substantiate at the moment by direct empirical evidence. The general lack of empirical research, insufficient social awareness of the need to verify certain political options, and concentration on the understanding and resolution of the ongoing acute problems and conflicts plaguing Yugoslavia today have not left much scope for the investigation of such problems.

The present paper will attempt to situate the question of "perception of Europe" within a broader historical and social context of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, making use of some findings from an extensive study of current conflicts in Yugoslavia, I will consider the significance of Europe in the aspirations of Yugoslavs with regard to economic standard, social equality, individual freedoms and democracy.

7.2   Historical background

In spite of the fact that a large part of Yugoslavia geographically belongs to the sphere of the ancient Greek civilization and the Roman Empire, for most of its history it has been in the centre of the confrontation between two civilizations - the Occidental and the Oriental, between two relogions - Christianity and Islam, figuring at the same time as the bridgehead and as the border between Europe and Asia. Interestingly enough, this ambivalent position has persisted in various forms up to the present day and represents a peculiar constant of the relations of Yugoslavia with the rest of the world, as well as of the relations within the country itself.

The complex pattern of relations, cultures and values in Yugoslav society today is also the result of historical circumstances and of the operation of various external cultural and other influences.

The western part of present-day Yugoslavia developed in strong interaction with two dominant cultures - the Central European culture of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Italian-Mediterranean influences emanating from the Venetian Republic.

For many years, the eastern part was under the political and cultural domination of the Ottoman Empire, fraught with latent, but often erupting, conflicts with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Identification with a religion - the Orthodox faith, but also with the common ethnic - Slavonic descent led to the growth of constantly stronger links with Imperial Russia.

Two world wars, of which the first resulted in the constitution of the common state of the southern Slavs - Yugoslavia - and the second brought about radical changes of the socio-political system, served in a way to bring Yugoslavia at the same time closer to and farther from Europe. Coming closer to Europe was the result of the establishment of a common state, which severed its links with the East, due to the revolutionary upheavals in Russia and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and turned to the West. The West, however, did not possess at the time the same economic and integrational attraction that it possesses today, and the links were mostly of a cultural character.

The Second World War signified, in effect, the disintegration of Europe - for its end brought about the establishment of "two Europes", in which Yugoslavia could not find an adequate place. "Eastern Europe", which represented an ideologically congenial community, demanded political uniformity and submission, to which Yugoslavia would not consent, while Western Europe figured as an ideological adversary, incompatible from the standpoint of the socio-economic system. Finding itself in this specific self-isolation, Yugoslavia turned to the world at large and to itself. The years between 1948 and until the late 1960s was the most creative period in Yugoslav development. In the domestic sphere self-management was introduced and "Yugoslavia discovered gold but ... it has not succeeded to mine it right" (I. Adizes, 1989, "How to solve the mismanagement crisis", Kako rijesiti krizu upravljanja, Globus, Zagreb, p. 12); self-management became the trademark of the specific line of development followed by Yugoslavia. In her foreign relations, Yugoslavia evolved the policy of active peaceful coexistence, which, situated in the midst of a world divided into blocs, raised hopes of different solutions to world conflicts and of the possibility that the "third world" might become an active, independent agent of its own and the world's development.

In this situation of high international recognition, of self-confidence instilled by excellent domestic performances (economic, social, cultural, relations between ethnic communities), deeply convinced that a system had been found which transcends the conflicts generated by private ownership as well as the conflicts deriving from the "all-powerful" state, the emerging ideas of "Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals" were viewed from a distance and with mistrust.

Due to her infinite trust in the viability of the idea of self-management, for whose full realization there were simply no elementary preconditions, above all no economic and general cultural basis, Yugoslavia was being gradually overcome by an increasingly severe crisis, at first of a developmental character, but growing into a crisis of the entire socio-political and economic postulates on the basis of which the society functions.

Substantive changes were also taking place at the same time in the non-aligned movement. The ideas of "détente" which were gaining ground in international affairs and the rifts between various non-aligned countries called for new forms of organization and action, which could no longer be expressed through direct confrontation with the existing blocs but which aimed above all at fostering processes of development and cooperation.

7.2   Current situation in Yugoslav society

Every critical situation inevitably leads to a reexamination of prevailing solutions, of their functionality, their efficiency and justification. So it may be said that Yugoslavia finds itself in precisely such a situation of reexamination of its socioeconomic relations in their entirety and that this reexamination is producing distinct internal confrontations, differences in approach - but also a shift towards Europe. Crisis situations give rise as a rule to two basic approaches. One implies a radical break with all misconceptions and illusions, with all the visions which failed to become reality; the other approach consists of a return to the very origins of beliefs, of an insistence on the dogma which has not been endorsed by practice. These two approaches are today very much at work in Yugoslavia, contributing greatly to the intensification of the conflict.

As regards the desired projections, they incorporate three substantive aspects of the desired changes in Yugoslavia, which are at the same time essential prerequisites for participation in the integration processes taking place in Europe. These are: market orientation, political pluralism and changes in the constitution of the Federation. However, here, too, a number of contradictions and conflicts arise. A market orientation inevitably leads to a clash with the entire ideological superstructure concerning basic issues such as private property, the character and modes of exploitation, the distribution and reallocation of surplus labour, the idea of self-management, which is in direct contradiction to the idea of the labour market, and the like.

Orientation to political pluralism places in jeopardy the position of the League of Communists as the "avantgarde", the organization which acts in accordance with the historic interests of the working class, and undermines the concept of integral self-management at all levels of social organization.

Changes in the structure of the Federation, due to the specific multinational composition of Yugoslavia, and especially in view of the huge differences in the degree of economic development, are a particularly delicate area. On the one hand, there are tendencies towards a stronger central government and a modification of the principles of decision-making in the direction of majority rule. On the other hand, however, there are trends towards increasing decentralization and insistence on decision-making by consensus as the principle which safeguards "national" interests, that is to say, the interests of the component parts.

7.3   Turning towards Europe

With the intensification of the crisis and of internal contradictions and conflicts, there is growing awareness of the need for involvement in the contemporary integration processes, devoid of any ideological prejudices, of the need to adjust to the criteria set by "Europe 1992". This will be aptly illustrated by the statement of the Youth Organization of Yugoslavia issued on Youth Day 1989 under the title "We are citizens of Europe", which says: "the citizens of Yugoslavia are citizens of Europe. Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is our home as well, and failure to take part in the European integration trends would drive us to the periphery of world events and advancement" (Vjesnik, 25 May 1989).

In Yugoslavia, the idea of Europe is increasingly becoming a synonym for the 21st century, for civilisational advancement, a humane society, prosperity; the idea of the European Community and participation in it is associated with expectations of possibilities for overcoming the current Yugoslav crisis. There is growing realization that "Europe will not have us such as we are", so that the perception of certain implicit "European" standards becomes the reference for broader social behaviour. All of this is helping to create a social climate aspiring to a "return to Europe", albeit with very vague notions as to what this really means and how it can be accomplished.

7.4   Internal confrontations and European orientation

A country's relations with the world are always complementary with its internal relations. Deeply submerged in a crisis of social relations in their entirety and of powerful national confrontations, the desire has spread in Yugoslavia for stronger integration and "entry" into Europe. However, this aspirations has assumed different meanings and contents in different parts of the country, and the ideas as to how this integration should be accomplished are equally at variance with each other. This is why the idea of Europe is increasingly becoming not only a symbol of progress but in a way also an element of internal strife, reflecting as it were the different lines of development in the various parts of the country. The statement that "we are an integral part of Central European civilization", heard in some parts, is often meant as an expression of superior civilisational achievement in relation to those who are "part of the Byzantine tradition and Asiatic mode of production". On the other side, claims are made that "we do not wish to enter Europe as lackeys but join it on our own terms".

7.5   Subject of research

All the ferment currently taking place on the soil of Yugoslavia lends special urgency to the need for empirical studies of attitudes, perceptions and aspirations of the population, as this can provide additional insights into the "state of mind" of the population with regard to Europe.

The present paper is based on the findings of a survey conducted in June 1989 on a sample of 4361 respondents over 18 years of age. The sample is structured so that it is representative of each of the eight constituent parts of Yugoslavia, and adjusted with regard to the national composition and age of the population.

The main subject of the survey was *public opinion on current problems in Yugoslavia*. The following three variables have been selected from the extensive study:

a) evaluation of economic standard, social equality, individual freedoms and democracy compared with certain groups of countries;
b) attitude towards economic groupings;
c) opinions concerning the prospects of reforms in various socialist countries.

The general premise underlying this study was that a critical attitude towards one's own social situation and a desire for closer links with the world, especially with Europe, increase with the degree of individual (education) and group (level of development of a given part of Yugoslavia) development. When operationalized, this assumption would imply that individuals with a higher educational status, together with those from the more highly developed parts of the country, would be more critical with respect to Yugoslavia's achievements, and also that they would adopt a more favourable attitude towards integration on a global scale.

7.6   Results
7.6.1   Evaluation of achievements in comparison with other countries

The problem of research into the critical views of individuals on various issues or achievements in their country is a complex task. We are, namely, always faced with a certain conformism, a kind of "perception of pressure" to answer in a definite way, but also with rather undefined standards of evaluation. What does it mean, for example, if a subject states that he is satisfied with the level of democratic relations in his country? This may reflect genuine democratic development, and yet, the question must be asked concurrently of what democracy is understood to heg and what the criteria are used for judging the level of its development? The answers obtained to such a question are also affected by the level of aspirations, the previous social situation, the relevant milieu, and a number of other variables.

In the survey under review, the respondent is placed in a situation where he or she does not have to assess the development of, let us say, democracy in Yugoslavia, but to indicate which country, or group of countries, including Yugoslavia, which he or she considers to be a model. In this manner we obtain two kinds of data - indirectly, on the critical attitude towards the achievements of their own country and, also, on their perception of other countries, that is, on the attraction these countries hold for them.

With the exception of special stress on Japan as a model of more rapid economic growth, the rest of the replies indicate that the basic dichotomy lies in the option for their own country (Yugoslavia) and the countries of Western Europe. Interestingly enough, in their evaluation of those areas of social achievement which are highly concrete and tangible (economic development and social equality) the subjects show a considerably higher degree of criticism than in areas denoting broader social relations, which "elude", so

to say, direct, concrete measurement and are much more subject to general social options and values (individual freedoms and democracy).

Table 1: Your opinion on whether there are any countries in the world which could serve as models to our country in the following areas:

area	our country is the best	countries of E. Europe	countries of W. Europe	USA	Japan	Don't know
More rapid economic growth	5	1	33	5	51	5
Greater social equality	23	14	31	4	6	23
More democracy	38	1	31	13	1	15
Greater individual freedoms	47	1	29	13	1	9

In these responses, which are also to a certain extent expressions of conformism, the answers concerning the Western European countries are extremely stable in all areas. If we take the answers relating to all countries except Yugoslavia as 100, then 35% of respondents single out the countries of Western Europe as their model in the area of economic growth, 40% in the area of social equality, 50% with regard to the level of democracy, and 55% in relation to individual freedoms. Although it is difficult to make direct evaluations of these data because of the lack of a reference basis, it still appears that, in general, they indicate that the countries of Western Europe represent the prevalent criterion of the aspirations of the Yugoslav population.

Table 2: Comparison 1986-1989 in model perception

	economic growth		social equality		democracy		individual freedoms	
	86	89	86	89	86	89	86	89
Yugoslavia	13	2	30	18	30	28	45	41
East Europe	7	1	21	20	5	1	1	0
West Europe	37	41	24	37	38	37	32	33
USA	14	5	3	4	11	14	13	14
Japan	18	46	1	5	1	1	1	1
don't know	11	5	21	26	15	19	7	11

It may also be of interest to examine a set of data on the same question, obtained in 1986 in one part of Yugoslavia (Croatia) and to see the differ-

ences between these two periods, in view of the dramatic progression of the crisis in Yugoslavia.

As seen from these findings, in the course of three years substantive changes are to be found in two out of the four areas - perceptions of economic development and social equality, whereas in the other two areas - development of democracy and individual freedoms, there are no great changes. If we attempted to generalize this finding, we might suggest that the social crisis has caused a high degree of dissatisfaction as regards the living conditions but that, at the same time, it has still not affected the overall value orientation relating to democracy and individual freedoms. The perception of Western European countries as referential has remained constant during the period under consideration, except that a larger proportion of respondents single out these countries as their model in the area of social equality.

It will also be of interest to note that this trend of changing perceptions of Yugoslavia as a model in the areas of economic development and social equality is attended by a similar trend in Eastern European countries, in which, on the whole, similar processes are occurring as in Yugoslavia.

In keeping with our initial premise regarding the relationship between the educational level of the subjects and their critical attitudes, it can be seen that individuals with lower education tend to manifest a higher degree of conformism with their own milieu, while individuals with higher education are more apt to turn to other settings, in this instance to the countries of Western Europe. A confirmation of this assumption will be found in Figure 1.

The second part of the general premise on which this study is based concerns the group level and the expectation that the degree of the critical attitude and openness to the word, that's to Europe, of an individual is in direct proportion to the level of development of the community, or constituent republic, in which he lives (Figure 2).

In this case the premise has been only partly substantiated. Subjects from Slovenia and Croatia, which are the most highly developed parts of Yugoslavia, opt much more rarely for their own country as successful, but are more often than the others inclined to indicate the countries of Western Europe as their model. The other parts of Yugoslavia, with the exception of subjects from Kosovo, tend to choose Yugoslavia somewhat more frequently than West European countries. Kosovo is definitely a specific case. It is

by far the least developed part of Yugoslavia, but, as the results reveal, it is also markedly oriented to the countries of Western Europe. The reasons for this orientation, however, should not be sought in the development variable but rather in the specific political processes in Kosovo, the marked intolerance between the members of different ethnic groups, the temporary introduction of a state of emergency, the feeling of being threatened, and the like. In a situation like this, Western Europe figures as a criterion of the development of democracy and individual freedoms, which have been suspended in Kosovo for a time as a result of the state of emergency.

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Figure 1: Educational level and perception of Yugoslavia or of Western European countries as models

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
Note: For easier reference, only averages are shown instead of four areas.

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Figure 2: Level of development by region and perception of Yugoslavia and of Western European countries as models

_____

7.6.2 Yugoslavia and economic integration groupings

As mentioned in the introduction, the social crisis in Yugoslavia has urgently posed the question of turning towards neighbours, and towards Europe in general. Of course, it is undoubtedly a great pity that this shift has been more or less "extorted" by the critical state of affairs and by the fear of isolation and backwardness rather than being the result of the logic inherent in our development. In the operationalization of this problem, I have proceeded from the assumption that there exist only two real economic groupings in Europe - the European Community (EC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and, further, that the attitude can range from the belief in cooperation with both of them to resistance against integration in either of the two economic communities.

Table 3: Attitude towards integration of Yugoslavia into one of the economic communities

attitude on integration	level of development								
	KOS	MAK	MN	B&H	SERB	VOI	CRO	SLO	average
against all integration	5	9	9	7	7	8	5	-	7
EC	<u>65</u>	44	37	40	38	37	<u>53</u>	<u>56</u>	43
Comecon	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
supports all integration	25	38	45	43	48	47	35	40	42
don't know	3	7	8	9	4	7	6	3	7

C = 0.239

These data reveal the dichotomy existing in the answers between the option in favour of economic integration with the European Community and the attitude that all economic integrations are desirable. What is particularly interesting in these results is the fact that integration with the European Community is desired by respondents from the same milieux in which a more critical attitude was found with respect to the achievements of Yugoslavia compared with other countries, that is to say, in those parts which expressed a stronger orientation in general to the countries of Western Europe, parts which are at the same time at a higher level of economic development. It is, nevertheless, difficult to offer an unambiguous interpretation of this finding because it was probably brought about not only by economic but also by social and cultural differences, as described in the introductory part. We shall, therefore, only make a number of suggestions at this point. The reply "I support all forms of economic integration" can serve as asocially acceptable response, without being explicitly against the European Community but also not in favour of it. This may also be a reflection of the attitude which is rather typical of the internal relations in Yugoslavia, something like: "Leave me alone with your Europe. We are open towards everyone!" On the other hand, in those parts where greater stress is placed on the desirability of joining the European Community, this attitude, that is the European option, may imply a certain emphasis on the differences inrelation to the other parts of the country, which are still the "Balkans". As regards Kosovo, similarly to the previously mentioned findings, an orientation to Western Europe is prevalent, which is a striking example how, at times of crisis, even the most backward milieux generate aspirations towards opposite extremes. In the specific case in hand, this is probably not the result of a lasting option but rather a direct reaction to the current political situation.

7.6.3 Prospects of reform in individual socialist countries

It might appear strange at first glance that issues of this kind have been included in this paper. It is a fact, however, that more or less all socialist countries are today in crisis and that they are looking for different ways of overcoming it. One of the important distinctions between them is their orientation and attitude towards Europe, or, more precisely, towards the countries of Western Europe. At one extreme end there is Hungary with its markedly pro-European orientation and at the other Romania, with its complete entrenchment. It might therefore be of interest to see how Yugoslav respondents assess the chances of reforms in individual countries.

Table 4: Replies to the question: "Reforms of the social system are currently being undertaken by a number of socialist countries. Which road to reform seems to you to have the best chance of success?"

				level of development					
country	KOS	MAK	MN	B&H	SERB	VOI	CRO	SLO	average
USSR	18	37	40	36	40	40	32	19	35
Hungary	42	18	27	26	27	27	38	69	32
Poland	17	5	4	5	3	2	6	7	5
Romania	3	3	2	3	3	2	1	-	2
China	1	3	1	2	1	2	1	1	1
don't know	19	33	26	28	26	27	22	4	25

C = 0.384

Here, too, the answers reveal a dichotomy in opting for the soviet Union or for Hungary. What is particularly interesting, however, is that the respondents from the same parts of Yugoslavia tend to support integration with the European Community and to identify the countries of Western Europe as their model and also to consider that the reform in Hungary has the greatest chance of success. Those subjects however, who are more turned inwardly, to their own country and its achievements, or who support all forms of economic integration, state their belief that reform in the Soviet Union has the best chance. The question is, of course, how to interpret these findings. The stress on better prospects of the Hungarian reform found in Slovenia and Croatia could be viewed through the prism of the links which tied these parts with Hungary for centuries as parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the other hand, the province of Voivodina had a similar history, but the composition of its population had been considerably changed after the Second World War due to the settlement of people

from other parts of Yugoslavia. It would be probably better to look for an explanation in the dominant characteristics of the overall political orientations, both in Yugoslavia and in Hungary and the Soviet Union.

It is, namely, considered in Yugoslavia that Hungary is more radical than the other countries of Eastern Europe in its renunciation of the existing political orientation, that it is turning towards Western Europe, that it is increasingly adopting political pluralism in the form of independent and competing programmes and organzations, and obeying the logic of the market economy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is believed to be embarking upon reform only gradually, with a powerful and monolithic Communist Party, with decentralization which is forced upon them rather than voluntarily attempted, and with considerable skepticism as regards the introduction of a market economy.

Process of reform are at work also inside Yugoslavia, attended by forceful confrontations and differences of approach. Putting it in simplest terms, the basic dichotomy is between the centralistic orientation, with a monolithic Communist Party, and a decentralistic-pluralistic orientation. Since the survey covered a series of variables referring to these two orientations, we shall show in Table 5 the relationships between the endorsement of one of these two orientations and opinions on prospects of reform in individual socialist countries.

Table 5: Political orientation in relation to Yugoslavia and opinion on prospects of reform in socialist countries

political orientation regarding Yugoslavia	reform in USSR	reform in Hungary	reform in other countries
centralistic-monolithic	44	23	24
decentralistic-pluralistic	19	53	28

C = 0.370

The results seem to support the hypothesis of the projection of internal political orientation on the external milieu. Subjects who accept a centralistic-monolithic orientation within Yugoslavia are considerably more inclined to believe that the Soviet Union has the best chances of reform, while those who uphold a decentralistic-pluralistic orientation see the reform in Hungary as the most likely to succeed.

7.7   Conclusion

In the empirical study of the attitude of respondents to integration tendencies in Europe three indicators were used:

1. models of achievement; 2. attitude towards economic integration; and 3. evaluation of prospects of reforms in socialist countries. The analysis of the results has shown that all three indicators support the conclusion that the option in favour of the external milieu, Europe in this case, and of all this implies for Yugoslavia, greatly depends on internal relations and basic political orientations within the Yugoslav society. This implies, furthermore, that in examining and interpreting the findings it is necessary to take into account the internal economic, cultural and social differences and, related to this, the actual processes which are taking place in various parts of the country.

With regard to the dimension of economic development, with the exception of Kosovo (for which there are specific reasons), there is a marked "European" orientation in the more highly developed parts. A similar conclusion can also be made with regard to the educational level.

Suna Kili

8   *Turkey and Europe*
An Assessment of past conflicts and present commitments

8.1   Introduction

Situated at the meeting point of Europe, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean region, Turkey sits strategically between East and West. The city of Istanbul is divided into two main areas by the Strait of Bosphorus. One shore of Bosphorus is Asia and the other is Europe. Because of its position on the fringe of Europe, its different cultural heritage and its economic divergence from the EC countries, Turkey's application for full membership in the EC poses one of the most dramatic challenges facing the Community. The complexity of this challenge is not necessarily or exclusivley prompted by the present realities of Turkish society, but gets its intensity also from history.

8.2   Turkey and Europe - fast conflicts

After the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, the Ottoman Empire expendet across the Balkan penisula and into South-Eastern Europe. Thus, the Turks established themselves as the common enemy of most European nations. In the following years the Turks conquered most of the Middle East and all of North Africa. The Turks besieged Vienna in 1529 and then in 1683. Confronted by the rising strength of the Ottoman Empire, the European nations

cooperated in order to stop first the Ottoman Turks. The decline of the Ottoman Empire started in the seventeenth century and beginning with the first half of the nineteenth century relations between the Ottoman Empire and several European nations began to improve. An example of this improvement was the alliance between France, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, against the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia. Moreover, the Paris Treaty of 1856 acknowledged that the Ottoman Empire was a European power by initiating her as a member of the Concert of Europe.

In the nineteenth century closer relations developed between the European states and the declining Ottoman Empire. During the Tanzimat period of 1839-1876, the Ottomans were preoccupied with closer cultural ties with the West. The Empire was increasingly integrated into European institutions after being accepted into the Concert of Europe in 1856. And at the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was referred to as the "sick man" of Europe and not of Asia.

In spite of certain shortcomings of the Ottoman Empire, it had certain positive cultural and administrative traits. We shall state and briefly analyze some of these fundamental traits:

Aristocratic classes similar to those of Western Europe were absent in the Empire. Everyone was considered equal before the Sultan. The Sultan enjoyed predominance as a temporal and spiritual ruler. The termination of the Sultanate in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924, and the exile of the Ottoman dynasty rid Turkey of its only family which had enjoyed hereditary titles and superior status. Equality of the people has been one of the dominant traits of the Ottoman Empire, and modern Turkey has profited much from the absence of hereditary classes in the social structure of the country.

Another characteristic of the Ottoman Empire was its use of Christians for high administrative posts. The tolerance of the Empire toward other religions was pointed out by several authors of the West; in particular, John Locke can be mentioned who, in his long ESSAYS ON RELIGIOUS TOLERATION, remarked that the Ottoman Empire should be an example to the Christians, who bred intolerance toward one another. He wrote that in the Ottoman Empire not only the Christians but Moslems and Christians and Jews were living together peacefully.

Religious differences did not prevent men of ability from serving the Empire and rising to high positions. Christian boys of very humble origin

could in the long run become governors, prime ministers, and generals. The Ottoman system was not concerned with the origin, tongue, or religion of its recruits. The Ottoman system selected the boys when they were very young and trained them to be scholars, administrators, and military man.[1] If they showed ability, they could hold highest positions in the land. An example of this was Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. He was a Christian and a peasant from Serbia.[2] Although the minority troubles in the Empire during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century may have a religious appearance, a careful analysis of the situation and the facts would reveal that those troubles were predominantly political and nationalistic in character. The minorities under the impact of the spirit of nationalism, and many times under the tacit or open encouragement of foreign governments and organizations, were not interested so much in religious matters as in secession from the Empire and separate existence.

Apart from the compact group of high administrative officials and the fighting class, the rest of the Ottoman Empire was divided into organizations called *millets*. The word *millet* has no direct equivalent in Western terminology. The term *millet* can neither be equated with nationality nor with church since the same *millet* could be speaking different languages in different areas. Althought the head of each *millet* was a religious dignitary, a millet could not still be called a church since *millets* were subordinate political parts of the Ottoman system. The *millets* registeres births,deaths, wills and marriages, and even maintained law-courts for trying cases involving the people belonging to the same *millet*. They also raised taxes to pay for these functions. These functions, which were delegated to the *millets*, were at the time among the privileges exclusively enjoyed by the central governmental bodies of Western states.[3]

To give such autonomy was the policy of the Ottoman government. Infact the Ottoman system of government was predominantly interested in exacting taxes and using the manpower in times of war. Forced conversion to Islam or forced cultural amalgamation and assimilation were not goals of Ot-

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[1] Albert Howe Lybyer, "The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiyman the Magnificent". Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1913. p. 45.

[2] The life of Sokollu Mehmad Pasha was made into a novel by the Nobel Award winner Yugoslavian author Ivo Andric. The title of this particular novel was "Bridge On the River Drina".

[3] Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, "Turkey". New York: Scribners, 1927. p. 28.

toman administration. The *raison d'être* of the Ottoman Empire was not one of attaining religious and cultural uniformity, but was one of preserving the Empire in view of her geographical, religious and cultural diversities.

The above analysis gives us ample evidence of the fact that culturally and historically Turkey is used to think in larger units. Turkey's past and present have prepared her for integration with Europe. Some further cultural and historical analysis would help shed more light on this matter.

The Ottoman Empire opened her doors to the West much earlier than Japan did. In fact since the Empire extended far into Central Europe, she was always in contact with Europe. Western European culture, particularly as it developed since the sixteenth century, did not commence to exert any significant influence on the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century.

Western civilization has been profoundly influenced by the works of early Greek civilization. A.J. Toynbee maintains in *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A study in the contact of civilizations* that the influence of early Greek civilization has been much greater on Western Europe than its influence on the later Greeks themselves. Although the impact, in the later centuries, of Hellenic civilization as incompatible and often as having nothing in common. Yet the differences of the two civilizations are not one of sources but are due to the later historical, political and economic developments. The difference of relogion is an important factor which cuases Western man to regard Western and the Near and Middle Eastern civilizations as being completely different.

Western man tends to view Islam as fundamentaly alien to the nature of Western civilization. Islam is not enteraly alien to Western Christianity. There is similarity between the relationship of Monophysitism and Islam to Christianity since both being monotheistic were, in different degrees, opposed to trinitarianism. They were both revolts of the Middle East against Hellenism, but this repudiation has not rid them entirely of the influence of Hellenism. The influence of Hellenism upon Islamic institutions and ideas is a subject which is increasingly attracting the attention of many shcolars.[4] The Ottoman system, the Ottoman civilization were, thus, under the influence of her nomadic past, Islam, and to a limited extent Hellenic civilization.

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[4]   Arnold J. Toynbee. "The Western Question In Greece and Turkey: A Study In the Contact of Civilizations". New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922. p. 329.

The westernization of the Ottoman Empire can be defined as the attempt of the Empire to adopt those institutions of the West which developed after the Renaissance. The Ottoman Empire remained outside the influence of the Industrial Revolution. The forces which gave rise to scientific, economic, social, and political developments in Western Europe were absent in the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of the Empire in several wars, increasing economic and political exploitation by the West and the inability of the Empire to forestall effectivelythose threats to her security produced the desire on the part of some progressive Sultans and leading Ottoman officials to reform the country along Western lines. The Ottoman movement toward reform and westernization commenced in the eighteenth century an continued up until the end of World War I.

Cooperation between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire were not always continuous. During the course of the nineteenth century, the European nations supported the efforts of the Ottoman colonies to achieve independence; thus, precitating the separatist activities of the subject nationalities, and thereby hastening the break up of the Ottoman Empire. During World War I the Ottoman Empire was in alliance with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following the First World War, the victorious allies concluded the Traty of Sévres which brought about the final dismemberment of the Empire. The Treay of Sévres attempted to divide Anatolia, the homeland of the Turks, into several non-Turkish states.

In 1919 the Turkish nationalist forces, under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk repudiated the Treay of Sévres. During the period of national struggle (1919-1922), the issue was not the maintenance of the Empire, but the retention of the very Turkish homeland. The drive was to solidify national independence and assure survial. As one observer of Middle Eastern affairs, Felix Valyi stated: "During the national struggle in Asia Minor, between 1919 and 1923 the fundamental question was whether the Turkish nation was to be made the advance guard of Islamic revolution, or whether she was to be allotted the role she aspired to play in the happiest moments of her dramatic historical career - that of the rearguard to the West on the confines of the two continents of Europe and Asia. Were the Turks to be for or against Europe?"[5] This question was ably answered by another astute observer of Turkish history. As A.J. Toynbee noted: "Russia was ... at least as

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[5]   Felix Valyi, "Spiritual and Political Revolutions in Islam". London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925. p. 24.

alien in the guise of a Socialist Soviet Republic as when she hat been an Orthodox Christian Czardom. Not Petersburg an not Moscow, but Paris, was the spiritual home in quest of which they had cast loose from their ancient Islamic moorings, and they were not willing to be diverted to another port. Even while they were fighting the Western powers tooth-and-nail for their political and economic independence, they were reconstructing their national institutions from top to bottom on Western lines."[6]

Kemal Atatürk cast aside all imperial goals whether of the Pan-Turkic, Pan-Islamic or Ottoman variety. Military and foreign policy considerations of survival propelled the Kemalists to strengthen the internal cohesion and civilian organization of the Turkish polity. The 1920 revolutionaries limited Turkish political aims, accepted the new national frontiers and decided to establish an enduring political structure. Although supreme national crisis had brought military defence and military affairs to the forefront, the Kemalist movement, in time established the civilian institutions to which the military were increasingly subordinated.

The successful termination of the nationalist movement made patent the political and legal boundaries of the Turkish homeland, the establishment of the Republic and the reforms of Atatürk followed. All these events were instrumental in the defining of the national identity of Turkey. Turkey's efforts to establish closer relations with the European nations were accelerated after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923.

8.3   Turkey and Europe - present commitments

The major source of the present commitments of Turkey to Europe lies in the Kemalist reform movement. Kemal Atatürk employed a strong parliamentary government and expanding secularist system of education to turn Turkish national identity from its Ottoman history toward close indentification with Europe. He commissioned a French linguist to convert Turkish alphabet to Latin characters from the traditional Arabic script. Atatürk's westernizing movement involved a cultural break from its Ottoman heritage. While the Atatürk reforms were being put into practice, the following remarks were made by some Western scholars on the nature of these reforms: "The outstanding conclusion of a study of special conditions in Tur-

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[6]   Toynbee and Kirkwood, "Turkey. op. cit." pp. 288-289._

key at the present time is that an oriental people is passing from the inherited social customs of the East to the rapidly changing social values of the West; from the social and religious ideas of Islam to secular ideas; from autocracy to democracy; from loose allegiance to Khalif and Sultan to a vigorous nationalism; from women's isolation and inferiority to equality of sexes; from primitive agriculture to European transportation, trade, manufacture and modern agriculture - and it is all being attempted at the same time."[7]

As David Barchard notes: "Those who advocated like Mehmet Akif Ersoy in the 1920's that Turkey should adopt the technology but not the values of the West were relegated to the sidelines."[8] Kemalist educational system aimed at inculcating in the minds of the students and the people at large an allegiance to the new frontiers of Turkey, to the Republican regime, to secular and national values, and to the need for international cooperation.

Atatürk's legacy of Europeanism flourished through the continuing rise and expansion of Turkey's westernized middle class, the bureaucracy and the military.

Commenting on the two significant paradigms of purposeful change, namely Japan's industrialization after the Meiji Restoration and the reforms of Atatürk in Turkey after World War I, Ali Mazrui makes the following succinct observation: "In at least earlier phases of modernization in Japan the ambition was to hold a substantial part of Japanese culture constant while the Japanese economy and military were modernized ... Hence the old Japanese slogan: 'Western technique, Japanese spirit'. The Atatürk reform in Turkey, on the other hand, started from the premise that neither the state, nor the economy could effectively be modernized unless Turkish culture itself was modernized. The soul of the nation had to be converted to a new allegiance before the limbs of the national could perform their tasks effectively. In theory, the Atatürk approach seemed the more coherent. Society was an integrated phenomenon, and no easy distinction could be made between culture and economy, between the state and the collective soul. In

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7   Frank A. Rose, Luther C. Fry, and Elbridge Sibley, "The East and American Philanthropy". New York: Columbia University Press, 1929. p. 176.

8   David Barchard, "Turkey and the West". London: Roybal Institute of International Affairs, 1985. p. 12.

practice the Japanese effort was ultimately a greater transformation and a higher level of performance than anything attained by Turkey since Atatürk. However, the reasons for the difference in performance are complex and cannot be attributed solely to the distinction between modernizing without westernizing (the Meiji wasy) and modernizing through westernizing (the Atatürk way)."[9]

Despite this western orientation on her part, turkey was interested in achieving good and peaceful relations with all the nations of the world. The Kemalist government demonstrated through word and deed that peace on earth could only be realized through mutual cooperation and understanding between all nations. The most important watchwords of Kemalist foreign policy were "peace at home and peace abroad". Kemalist foreign policy was dedicated to the idea of peaceful co-existence between all nations. In short, Kemalist foreign policy was pacific. As August Ritter von Kral stated: "Eager to break with every connection even moral ones with the old Ottoman Empire, with which the new Turkey did not wish to be confounded, the Ankara government insisted on establishing an new system of agreements with the foreign powers, and diplomatic or other relations only with the governments inclined to do so."[10]

In a speech he gave in the Grand National Assembly in June 1930, Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüsdü Aras elaborated upon Turkey's pursuit of peace in the following words: "The very necessities of our great national revolution and of the special geographic positon of our country have always obliged us to maintain an extreme interest in the cause of pease, as much for ourselves as for the entire world. Every time that we have been invited to a meeting in any country whatever for the purpose of peace, each time that a formula of peace had to be found for participation in the meeting, to subscribe to the formula we have laid down two conditions: equal treatment for all, and exclusion of every hostile intention against anyone. We were not ignorant of the fact that every peace based on an equilibrium of forces set up by groupings of powers working together by a special agreement has never

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[9]   Ali Mazrui, "Africa Between the Meiji Restoration and the Legacy of Atatürk: Comparative Delemmas of Modernization", in Papers and Discussions: International Symposium on Atatürk, May 17-22, 1981. Türkiye Is Bankasi Cultural Publications. Ankara: Tisa Matbaacilik Sanayi Limited Sti., 1984. pp. 407-408.

[10]   August Ritter von Kral, "Kemal Atatürk's Land: The Evolution of Modern Turkey". (Translated by Kenneth Benton). Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1938. p. 233.

been absolute and permanent peace ... We knew further that means of violence and compulsion do not constitute a foundation for peace, but definitely lead to war ... Believing that every separate alliance brings about others, Turkey has abstained from participation in such initiatives. But she hastened to subscribe to the Kellogg Pact which required a universal entente among all nations."[11]

While engaging in a vigorous program of westernizing, the Kemalist foreign policy did not limit Turkey's relations to the European states. Kemalist foreign policy was characterized by its rationalism an humanitarianism. Its humanitarianism could be observed by its insistence on the right to independence, to equal opportunities, and to prosperity of all nations and peoples everywhere in the world. According to Atatürk the Turkish struggle for independence had meaning not only for the Turkish, but for all the oppressed nations of the world. He stated that: "Colonialism and imperialism shall be annihilated form the face of this earth, and in their place a new era of harmony and cooperation between nations shall prevail regardless of differences of color, race and creed."[12]

Atatürk and the 1920 revolutionaries were not interested in imperialist adventures. They did their utmost to inculcate in the minds of the Turkish people a rational as well as an emotional loyalty to the new frontiers of Turkey. This has proven to be one of the most noticeable accomplishments of the Kemalist era. Kemalist foreign policy was anti-irredentist and anti-imperialist. As Yalman states: "Mustafa Kemal's regime cured Turkey of the terrible disease which had proved to be the unmaking of many national organisms: it eradicated all germs of irredentism, imperialism and aggressive militarism."[13]

In his attempts at modernization Atatürk used often the terms "Contemporary civilization", "the common civilization", "the civilized world". Hence, Atatürk's intellectual frame of reference encompassed the whole world, while focusing in the main on Europe. The Kemalist heritage, be it in the

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[11] Henry Elisha Allen, "The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development". Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935. pp. 66-67.

[12] Enver Ziya Karal, "Atatürk'ten Düsünceler (Thoughts From Atatürk)". Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1956. p. 17.

[13] Ahmed Emin Yalman, "Struggle For Multi-party Government in Turkey", The Middle East Journal. Jan., 1947. p. 48.

main tenets of Turkish foreign policy or the principles guiding the restructuring of Turkish society, has brought turkey closer to Europe than any other area of the world. However Atatürk did not hesitate to take his stand on the behavior of such states which he believed to be disruptive of international peace. Atatürk was particularly bothered about the rising tension in Europe in the 'thirties. As Ernest Jäckh states: "Kemal ... in the last years of his life, anticipated the world issue of today and set the definite course of tomorrow: 'Once we so-called pagan and infidel Turks, though believers in the Mohammedan version of Judaeo-Christianity, seemed to threaten civilization in Central Europe; now however world civilization will be defended by us against the menace of modern barbarism and paganism which is spreading from Central Europe to the four corners of a world of neighbours.'"[14]

Hans Kohn sees much similarity, asdo other thinkers such as S.N. Eisenstadt and A.J. Toynbee, between the Kemalist revolution and the processes of change in thought, life, and production in Western countries which took place since the seventeenth century. Kohn summarizes these changes in turkey as the adoption of rationalism, individualism, and industrialism.[15] However the famous Turkish novelist Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu comments on the special role of Turkey in bridgeing the gap between the East and West in these words: "for nearly four hundred years the Europeans have tried to introduce European civilization into the heart of Asia. But from the first Venetian voyager to the latest convoys of colonization, all attempts made in this vein by Europeans have served only to lead the nations, Oriental and Asiatic, to hate that civilization. One may say that it was after these contacts that the abyss opened between the Orient and the Occident. Thus it is that today we others constitute a bridge of steel over this abyss."[16]

Following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey increasingly asserted its western identity under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk. Following World War II Turkey entered a variety of western institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Interna-

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[14] Ernest Jackh, "The Rising Crescent: Turkey Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow". New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944. p. 260.

[15] Hans Kohn, "Revolutions and Dictatorhips". Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. p. 249.

[16] As given in Allen, "The Turkish Transformation, op. cit.", pp. 61-62.

tional Monetary Fund, Council of Europe and NATO. On July 31st, 1959. Turkey first applied to become an associate of the European Community. According to the Ankara Agreement signed by Turkey in 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the EC the following year. Although the stages outlined by the Ankara Agreement hat not yet been completed, Turkey applied for full membership in April 1987. There are a number of reasons which contributed to Turkey's decion to apply for full membership. The Turks asserted that membership in the EC had been thoroughly established as a national goal. Turkey noted that already the EC had expanded with its decision to integrate Greece, Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, the Turkish government asserted that membership in the EC represented a logical step in Turkey's progression toward the West.

Since the holding of general elections in 1983, Turkey has made significant progress toward the establishment of a democratic government which is becoming increasingly compatible with the nations of the Community. As the economy develops, a more secure government would be more willing to permit the expansion of pluralist institutions in Turkey. Prime Minister Özal recently declared that "Turkey will enter the 21st century as a European power".[17] Speaking to the Bavaria Turkish-German Friendship Society in September 1989. Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz pointed out that "the EC has certain internal problems that it needs to solve by 1993. Moreover Turkey needs this time also to overcome its certain shortcomings in the economic sphere which will facilitate the processes leading to full membership".[18] While the statement of Yilmaz indicates the reality of some economic problems, there is no mention of certain cultural difficulties. In the official Turkish statements or in the writings of those concerned with the EC, one does not encounter much apprehension on the part of Turks whether Turkey can assimilate culturally with the Community. In this context the pluralistic cultural heritage of Turkey is mentioned, and further it is emphasized that Turkey's association would enrich European cultural heritage. But the reactions of the EC countries are varied regarding Turkey's full membership.

The Belgians and the British have not actively opposed Turkish membership. The French have stated publicly that they will not veto the Turkish

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[17] "Cumhuriyet", September 19, 1989.

[18] "Cumhuriyet", September 19, 1989.

application. Greece remains apprehensive of its traditional enemy to the east. The German governmend too is apprehensive and in fact has reacted with horror at the possibility of free movement of labor from Turkey. Denmark, Holland and Luxembourg have expressed concern over some human rights abuses in Turkey. On the other hand, Spain, Portugal and Italy, while acknowledging some solidarity with anothern southern nation, remain anxious about competition from Turkish agricultural products.

In the talk he gave in the meeting of the European Council in September 1989, Prime Minister Özal summarized the reasons why turkey wants to become a full member of EC in these words: the term West has little to do with geographic limits. In reality the term West connotes a way of life based on freedom and human rights. This is where we all meet and unite. The different cultural background of turkey not only enriches Western culture, but it also provides a door that opens to the East for the West, and a door that opens to the West for the East. We believe we have aright to wand and expect to be admitted to EC from our allies and partners with whom we share the same values, the same goals and in fact a mutual destiny especially since the past fifty years. Moreover, Turkey has undertaken great responsibilities for the defence of Europe. We believe it is Turkey's right to be a full member ... the democratic system which Turkey is practicising is not a copy of the West, but the natural culmination of those processes which were in the making in Turkish society over many decades. But one has to remember the special difficulties the West itself experienced in terms of the practice of democracy when it itself was industrializing. The Western understanding of human rights then and today show some differences. For this reason the West has to understand the difficulties that a country confronts when it is attempting to industrialize within a democratic system. The Atatürk reforms constitute the very essence of the pluralistic political life that Turkey has embarked on for sometime.[19]

The statement made by Jacques Delors, Chairman of the European Community Commission, in Strasbourg in September 1989 that talks over Turkey's admission to EC could not commence prior to 1993 and further that European cultural entity is Christian was received with adverse reactions from various circles in and outside of Turkey. Mr. Özal's reaction to Delors statement was meaningful: "A point of view that limits Christianity with

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[19]   "Cumhuriyet", September 28, 1989.

Europe is primitive. In fact there is no room for this point of view in the 21st century. However, I know that such a point of view exists ... Turkey is not going to concert to Christianity just to be admitted. If this point of view prevails we shall naturally not be admitted to EC. We are not going to beg."[20]

In an editorial in the Turkish newspaper "Cumhuriyet", Hasan Cemal voiced Turkey's rising impatience with EC's reluctance to grant full membership to Turkey in these words: "There are two sides to the question of our membership in the EC. On the one hand, it is quite true that we still have to overcome several difficulties, several obstacles which are in the way of democracy in turkey. But on the other hand, we are not striving for a more democratic way of life just to please the Europeans. Turkey has made great efforts towards modernity over the past one hundred and fifty years. It it up to the EC to accept or reject our application. Turkey is important enough of a country not to be seriously bothered by this. Turkey has made efforts towards modernity before EC and these efforts shall continue after EC."[21]

It is important to note that the above-mentioned editorial appeared in turkey's leading liberal paper "Cumhuriyet". This situation prompts the Islamists to point out that Europe, the West shall never be tolerant of Islam. If the Community cannot tolerate Turkey, the only secular Moslem state in the world, then the Community is a closed, limited club. Religion should not be a criteria for admission into the Community. Intolerance is not a fitting attribute to a Community which declares as its basis the protection of human rights and freedoms. It is also important to note that the writer included democracy as an indispensable component of modernity, as most Turks do. In Turkey, the regime has always been considered as an indispensable component of modernity ever since the nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, the Young Turk movement of the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was an attempt at the democratization of the Ottoman system of government. The Young Turks believed that the establishment of constitutional monarchy would be a panacea for all ills of the Empire.

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[20]   "Cumhuriyet", September 28, 1989.

[21]   "Cumhuriyet", September 29, 1989.

8.4   Conclusion

This concern with the democratization of the regime has been one of the primary items on the political agenda of Turkey ever since the nineteenth century. In spite of some occasional setbacks, commitment to constitutional democracy constitutes an important element of Turkish political culture.

Several Turkish universities have set up Institutes or programs exclusively devoted to the study of the cultural, economic, political, and social problems related to Turkey's full membership in the Community. The same questions are constantly being discussed and debated in panels, newspapers and journals. The question for most Turks is not if Turkey shall become a full member, but it is when it will become a full member. The wish to integrate with Europe, European consciousness are of growing interest in Turkey.

The Turkish government has argued that it must be admitted to the Community before the realization of the internal market in 1992. Ankara asserts that accession will grow progressively more difficult as the nations of the Community become increasingly integrated. Turkey has also argued that it must be admitted as early as possible in order for its priorities to have an influence on the development of European integration.

Turkey's national indentity has become increasingly linked with Europe during the past century. Moreover, the Turkish application presents the Community with the opportunity to establish a wedge of influence into the Middle East. Turkey would act as a force for stability in the fairly unstable Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions. The Community's growing interest in influencing the regions surrounding it will act as a catalyst for granting full membership to Turkey.

Turkey offers the Community vast opportunities for enrichment through the incorporation of a large and dynamic society. In spite of some setbacks, the drive toward Europe remains as the most consistent and persistent element of Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

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Olof Johansson

9   Sweden and European cooperation

9.1   Europe and Sweden

Today Europe is in the centre of the Swedish debate in a way that is completely different from ten years ago. One reason for the intensive debate and spread of information on Europe in Sweden is obviously related to what is happening within the Common Market (EEC) countries. However, possibly equally important are the positive developments in the direction of greater democratic processes and the increase in freedom of expression which can now be observed in a number of Eastern European nations. These social changes have received much attention in the Swedish press. Radio and television along with daily and weekly newspapers report from different European countries much more often today than they did a few years ago.

Another explanation for the increased public interest in European issues possibly arises from the fact that Swedes travel much more today than before - above all young people visit different countries by train - and the cultural distances between countries have thus decreased. Furthermore there is an ever-increasing proportion of immigrants in Sweden today.

In official publications, internationalization is often discussed in sweeping terms along with the value for a small country such as Sweden of having contact with other countries. Discussions tend to become more focused and

to include the economy of Sweden, since economic concerns are of decisive importance.

Two-thirds of Swedish industrial exports are destined for Western Europe. A large proportion of Swedish industrial workers are directly or indirectly dependent on Western Europe, and primarily the Common Market countries. It is therefore of significance for the Swedish welfare system that Swedish industry can maintain these markets even after 1992. At a conference in January 1988 Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt formulated the objective for cooperation with the EEC in the following way: "We want to achieve the closest possible cooperation with this organization (EEC) within, more or less, all areas". The reservation "more or less" concerns the EEC and foreign policy. The Swedish neutrality policy sets the boundary for how far Sweden can go with the EEC. Sweden's neutral position places strict demands on foreign policy cooperation in peacetime so that neutrality will be credible in war situations and crises. Sweden cannot participate in a binding alliance with the intention that member countries will implement common foreign policy in all or certain issues. The type of foreign and security policy arrangement that would result from membership in the Common Market is not in accordance with Swedish neutrality policy. The Swedish foreign and defence policy can briefly be described as alliance-free in peacetime and neutral during wars.

As an introduction it can, in other words, be stated that the goal for Sweden is to reach a situation that leads to the same advantages and commitments for all citizens, institutions and companies in Sweden as in the EEC countries. This was declared by the parliament and government in 1988. It was, however, further declared that Swedish membership in the EEC is not a goal of the discussions and negotiations that are now being undertaken.

9.2   Europe in Sweden

It is clear for all Swedish citizens that Sweden is a part of Europe. It is also clear that what most of these citizens think of as being Europe is Western Europe even though the connections to certain parts of Eastern Europe are very strong. Countries such as Poland and the Baltic states can also be thought of as Sweden's European neighbors. They have always been the focus of much interest among the Swedish people. An example of this is the spontaneous donation of clothing, agricultural products, and so on, which have been organized by different Swedish interest groups.

On the other hand the concept of Europe in relation to the Nordic countries or Scandinavia is less certain. The Nordic countries and Scandinavia have long had objectives for developing cooperation. This inter-nordic cooperation operates within the framework of the Nordic Committee and the Nordic Ministers Committee. Integration is well developed within many areas including implementation of similar laws, absence of passport requirements, a common labour market, cooperation on social policy, and an active exchange in the areas of research, education, and culture.

The Swedish Foreign Trade Minister, Anita Gradin (1989), expresses the hope that "Western Europe will become like the Nordic countries; a region where people live and work as they wish, and know that social security is the same in other countries regardless of where one lives; an area where parliaments and governments work for full employment, free trade and closer association in a series of different areas. The Nordic reality and vision is also the vision that we have for Western Europe."

In conclusion, Sweden is a country that is active in promoting wide cooperation between European countries and increasing exchange between East and West. Sweden participates, for example, in the European Security Conference (ESC) and in the UN's Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Sweden was also one of the initiators of the European Parliament.

Sweden's strong support for Western European cooperation within the bounds of the Nordic countries, EFTA, and the free trade agreement within the EEC, has partially originated from an economic interest. However, it also reflects an association of common values such as democracy and human rights.

9.3   The official school-curriculum policy is internationalization

Internationalization is an operative and, in itself, a relatively useless term. To internationalize means to make international. International in this context means contacts between people, between states; something that involves many countries. To internationalize, Swedish schools must strive to enhance the schools' opportunities for contributing to our country's relations with other countries in different areas, to develop and strengthen these relationships or, briefly stated, to open Sweden to the world. The concept of school internationalization is also characterized by a large variation. The dimension and content of this depends on who uses the term. The term includes issues of international cooperation with respect to global problems,

human rights and peace. But it also relates to our very real economic dependence on other countries and thus the interest of industries to promote Sweden in international competition. There is no reason to concentrate on conflicts between the aspect of international solidarity and industrial concerns. The school has taken both into consideration. It requires, to a large degree, the same insights and proficiency. For the most part that means, for example, some type of required learning on Islamic culture, traditions and thought, whether it involves humanitarian work in a refugee camp or business deals in Damascus. The official assertion is, in any case, characterized by a certain dominance of the international solidarity aspect. In this way it also has a definite normative character.

Concerning the motive for an internationalized education, a distinction is made between a general and a labour market motive. The general motive concerns the state of an evershrinking world, that the relations and dependency between countries and people has increased. It emphasizes that many of the decisive questions have become global and can only be solved through international cooperation. It is further emphasized that the need for international solidarity and the sense of world citizenship are the most important motives for internationalizing education. The labour market motive is based on providing, to various degrees, an international element to education for different types of skills. Preparation and capacity to meet the changes underway in the internationalization process are needed. It is further documented that the general motive is primarily the labour force aspect.

It is interesting with respect to the concept of the connection between internationalization and the school and education to present examples of displacements that have taken place over the years. As early as 1962 the annual teaching plan for elementary schools contained different proposals for the inclusion of major international issues and recommended that international knowledge and understanding should be included in the students attitude development. Behind this was an investigation by the Swedish UNESCO Committee dealing with education on international understanding and cooperation (Undervisning om internationellt samförstand och samarbete). This investigation was of great importance for the annual teaching plan in 1962, which contained different statements and thoughts from that report.

Since the reality of underdeveloped countries seriously began to force its way into the public consciousness at that time, the internationalization of

schools became, for many, equivalent to greater knowledge and commitment to the poorer parts of the world. That was intensified by the rapid development of Swedish foreign aid and the dispersion of information on underdeveloped countries into the schools, which developed as an important activity within the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). Internationalization began to be linked to the north-south allignment.

The second half of the 1970's, with its more strident political climate, brought the east-west dimension more into the limelight. The increases in military arsenals, both in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons, gave rise to a resistance movement and peace activism at a level never before experienced in both the USA and Europe. In its tracks - as an outflow from the peace movement - also came, for example, the demand from the UN for more attention in the schools on issues concerning war and peace, and relations between East and West. Issues of disarmament and peace, as well as security policy - our own and foreign, with emphasis on Europe - began to be seen as equal in importance to the issues of underdeveloped countries. Peace education became a concept that school boards supported. In more recent times a further aspect of internationalization has become topical. This concerns a new north-south dimension, that is, as related to the increased interest for Europe.

To a certain extent this interest concerns the old undivided Europe; the geographical, historical, and cultural solidarity between people. Is there a European identity? Is there room for a European union between both superpowers and despite their dominance? In that case, can this be promoted in schools? But, above all, does this European interest apply to that part of Europe within the Common Market (EEC), where, in contrast to the previous concept, merely the Western part of Europe is considered. Swedens relationship to the EEC and the direction that policy should follow will become a dominant issue in the coming years. This is not only of concern to the economy, but also to education. Swedens "European internationalization" is being dealt with here. The increased insight into major global environment threats of recent years have - beyond the threat from weapons of mass destruction - provided an educational base for the internationalization concept in schools. The future of humanity and its possibility for survival are no longer unusual subjects for consideration and debate within research, literature, and the mass media. The large interest in environmental issues is obviously of importance in daily schoolwork.

Finally, the concept of internationalization obviously also involves immigrant and refugee issues. For an internationalized school it is not only the world outside the country that is of interest. It is not only a matter of Sweden in the world, but also the world within Sweden. Sweden has become a multicultural society and the world is part of the everyday reality of Swedish schools. There is thus already a good opportunity to begin building up an international perspective within the immediate environment.

The parliament decided in 1985 that inter-cultural education applies to all students. This does not refer to a single subject, but rather a way of functioning that could be applied in all subjects, characterize all activities in the school, create conditions for mutual respect and understanding in the classroom, school, and immediate society, and start a process leading to coexistance among groups within Swedish society and outwards towards international solidarity.

9.4   Research on Europe

Many extensive research programmes have been carried out in Sweden handeling the theme of Sweden and the EEC. Naturally, a large part of this research concentrates on economics. How will Sweden be influenced by the EEC? What do different agreements mean for the Swedish economy? How are Swedish environmental investments, for example, affected by EEC regulations? Do the EEC's often less restrictive environmental regulations threaten the ability of Swedish industry to compete? These and many other questions are dealt with in the economic research on Sweden and the EEC.

Another problem, which mainly concerns reports from union organizations, relates to the conditions in the labour market. Sweden has a relatively regulated labour market, where unions have a proportionally large influence through cooperative decision-making and negotiations. Norms for these processes are established by law. What happens to the labour market regulations when companies become multinational and, in addition, sometimes have powerful ownership interests in two or more countries? Current Swedish examples of this problem are ABB along with discussions on a joint operation between Volvo and Renault of France.

Another research angle that should be named in this context is that which is occurring under the theme "European Networks of the Future". Issues dealing with how the networks will arise and be maintained, along with how Sweden will be connected to the European network, are continuing inten-

sive topics for research. Many Swedish university institutions are involved and the research can be described as interdisciplinary. Some of the projects can also said to be future studies in the sense that they try to focus on Sweden in a future European scenario.

9.5   Research on European political cultures

"Swedish Political Culture in a Comparative Perspective" is the title of a new research project that commenced in January 1989. According to the research design the project is divided into three different stages and will be completed by 1995. The project has started with a follow-up of the study the research group carried out in 1986 of Swedish childrens' and adults' reactions to the assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme. The focus of the study is on changes in Swedish political culture linked to the dramatic event. Stage 2 commenced in the spring 1991. The researchers plan to investigate two different groups. One group will consist of members of the public not holding offices within organizations or political parties and the other group will be elites holding offices within Greenpeace and/or the Green Party of Sweden. The aim of stage 2 is to be able to present an in-depth analysis of Swedish political culture in a European perspective, using secondary data about Europe, by the end of 1992. Stage 3 is scheduled to begin Autumn 1992 and is preliminarily intended to embrace empirical surveys of the political culture in England and West Germany.

In the study, the term political culture is used to describe basic ways of relating to politics: knowledge, values, attitudes and behaviour. These concern the forms for political decision making - or politics - as well as the material content of politics - or policies.

Sweden can, like the majority of modern democratic welfare states, be characterized as a "participant culture".

In this group are found countries which are characterized by a sense of national identity, citizen participation in the shaping of politics and interest in the constitution and not just in the material results of politics.

The researchers intend to shed light empirically on such elements of popular and elite political culture that are of relevance for the way in which the democratic constitution operates in modern welfare society. They identify a number of external and internal threats and point out that these have not infrequently led to organization responses in the form popular movements

such as the environmental movement and the women's liberation movement and various kinds of organizations such as Amnesty, Greenpeace and "green" political parties such as the Green Party of Sweden.

The main aim of the project is to describe and analyze Swedish political culture in such a way that distinctive features are brought out, thereby making a contribution to the elucidation of the problems facing the democratic constitution in modern welfare societies. Another aim is to analyze and classify the changes which have taken place in Swedish political culture in the post-industrial period - that is, from about 1970 and onwards. The main hypothesis is that Swedish political culture has, in some respects, become more like that of other European countries.

9.6   Conclusion - the current debate

The goal that the parliament has established for Swedish Europolitics is to give the Swedish citizen and company the same rights and opportunities as citizens and companies in the rest of Western Europe. The goal is ambitious and it certainly reaches into more than just a customs union with the EEC. Such a customs agreement is necessary but insufficient. The goal demands further Swedish participation in the economic, political, and social problems in the new emerging Europe of the l990's. From the Swedish position there cannot be any barriers other than consideration of the strictly interpreted neutrality policy. The support for the parliament's decision is strong and extends across all party lines. There are, however, differences in the interpretations of this decision. The Social Democrats and, to a certain extent, the Communist and Green parties, want take the route of encouraging negotiations between the EEC and the EFTA, of which Sweden is a member. The goal of these negotiations should firstly be to develop cooperation between the EFTA and the EEC, and also obtain a customs union between these two trading blocks. The Conservative party sees a more direct association with the EEC. They consider the EEC to be a crucial issue for Sweden's future and hope to use it as an election platform. The Social Democrats, however, would prefer to avoid this during the election campaign.

For an export-dependent nation such as Sweden an adjustment to the EEC is entirely necessary in this time of internationalization, regardless of how negotiations go between the EFTA and EEC. It is also difficult to imagine a situation where Sweden could accept a customs union without participating

in the extensive international cooperation occurring within the EEC. Participation without the ability to influence seems, in a certain way, to be a rather humiliating situation.

In summary, Sweden will probably continue to follow developments within the EEC very carefully, and unilaterally adjust to relevant EEC decisions as far as possible. The purpose of this adjustment is not to become submissive to the EEC, but rather should be seen as a way of easing the coming discussions and negotiations on a closer association between the EEC and Sweden.

Louk Hagendoorn

10   Determinants and dynamics of national stereotypes

10.1   National stereotype research since World War Il

Research into national stereotypes since World War II has passed through three phases. Up to the l950's there was an increasing interest in different stereotypes of different countries. In the 1960's and 1970's, research was concentrated on the images of the two superpowers. In the 1980's the interest in diverse national stereotypes reemerged. In other words, these phases clearly reflect the ebb and flow of international politics.

A second trend parallels these phases. The first years after World War II were years of optimism. National stereotype research was based on the hope that hostile and shortsighted ideas about other nations could be corrected through education and dissemination of information. The cold war destroyed this optimism and started a second phase in national stereotype research. During this phase, scholars were preoccupied with detached studies of the factors behind the mutually distorted images the world superpowers had of each other. Not until the 1980's and the emergence of a number of new political powers in the world did a renaissance in the study of national stereotypes occur.

Two other things characterize the decade after the second world war. First, the main aim of national stereotype research in that period was a description of the content of national stereotypes. Second, this research was focussed primarily on young respondents still being educated (Gilbert, 1951; Prothro, 1954; Zeligs, 1950,1952,1953,1954). Although young respondents would remain an important target in later national ste__reotype research (for example, Becker, 1970; Kippax and Brigden, 1977; Lambert and Klineberg, 1967; Sinha and Sinha, 1966), the assumption that national stereotypes are a result of socialization processes is characteristic of the 1940's and 1950's (Gilbert, 1951; Gundlach, 1944; Seago, 1949).

After the l950's the so-called socialization hypothesis gradually evolved into the more general information-processing hypothesis. Where family socialisation is seen as just one of many factors contributing to the development of national stereotypes (Tajfel, Jahoda, Nemeth and Campbell, 1970). That is, the family is one form of information transmission relevant to the development of national stereotypes, along with school and the mass media, for example (Wolf, 1963, 1966; Suleiman, 1974).

During the cold war the so called mirror-image hypothesis dominated national stereotype research. The main idea was that, despite fundamentally different ideologies, the distorted stereotypes of the two ideological blocks were structurally identical in their division of the world into good and bad hemispheres (Berrien, 1969; Conover, Mingst and Sigelman, 1980; Holsti, 1962; Salazar and Marin, 1977). Although the mirror-image hypothesis was also a child of its time, it also contained the kernel of an important and more general insight. This insight is that national stereotypes reflect features of the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived. That is, the economic and political positions of the nations in question relative to each other play a critical role in national stereotypes. This relational hypothesis, however, never dominated national stereotype research even though it is repeatedly formulated (Buchanan and Cantril, 1953; Prothro, 1954; Sinha and Sinha, 1966), it encompasses the mirror-image hypothesis, and is related to the socialization hypothesis. The mirror-image hypothesis is simply a special case of the relational hypothesis. Socialization often concerns the relations between and relative positions of different nations (for example, information about trade, wars, alliances, colonization).

Characteristic of the 1980's was a renewed interest in cross-national research on national stereotypes. The new surveys by Eagly and Steffen

(1984), Eagly and Kite (1987), Peabody (1985) and Stapf, Stroebe and Jonas (1986) followed the older traditions of Buchanan and Cantril (1953), or Reigotski and Anderson (1959). Eagly's and Stapf's research elaborates on the older structural features hypothesis. Which states that underlying structural features such as level of industrialisation and level of modernization will be reflected in the stereotypes of the perceiver (Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Campbell, 1967; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). The new version is the so-called social role hypothesis, in which it is assumed that national stereotypes are deduced from the observation of foreign public figures (Eagly and Steffen, 1984; Eagly and Kite, 1987). Only a subset of a society's roles are visible through the media and other sources of information and therefore national stereotypes will be distorted along these lines. That is, the behavior of prominent and high status figures in public roles will be generalized to the general population.

Peabody (1985) also draws on the structural features hypothesis, but assumes that cultural features contribute to national stereotypes instead. Peabody compared the stereotypes of several European and Asian countries and found a high degree of international consensus on the national stereotypes. Moreover, real differences in the work ethos, role of the individual, and so forth, in these cultures showed up in the national stereotypes, leading Peabody to conclude that actual cultural differences are reflected in national stereotypes. We will call this the cultural differences hypothesis.

This brief overview shows that numerous different viewpoints and hypotheses have been guiding national stereotype research since World War II. In general, however, there has been a shift away from the socialization hypothesis towards a model in which processes of social perception are assumed to play a central role.

10.2   Determinants of national stereotypes

The one variable common to all of the hypotheses mentioned above is the role of the information available relating to the perceived nation and its population. This information can vary in its source, availability and type and function for the perceiver.

Among the many different sources of information are socialization, the media, and direct contact. Socialization refers to education in the family and at school and to daily conversation with peers and significant others (cf Zeligs, 1950; Wolf, 1963). As a rule, this information only vaguely reflects

the effects of hostilities, wars, calamities, poverty and so forth (Holsti, 1962). The media can be divided into newspapers, television, films, and eventually literature.

Little is known about the differential effects of the media on national stereotypes. The effects of direct contact are more clear, but appear to depend on the the type of contact investigated. Bjersted (1962), McGrady and McGrady (1976), and Reigotski and Anderson (1959), who operationalized contact in terms of visits abroad. Speaking foreign languages, or having family and friends living in other countries, found contact to lead to more positive attitudes towards the contacted populations. Triandis and Vassiliou (1967) and Vassiliou, Triandis, Vassiliou and McGuire (1972) used living abroad as an index of contact and found that the positive effects of direct contact were contingent on having a clear picture of the foreign country beforehand and that such positive effects were nevertheless hampered by marked cultural differences. The amount of information available to the perceiver also appears to influence national stereotypes, as indicated by the finding that a higher level of education correlates with more differentiated and positive stereotypes (Reigotski and Anderson, 1959). The relevance of the type of information has been shown in studies testing the social role hypothesis (Eagly and Kite, rg 87). The main predictive variable in this research is what the perceiver can and cannot perceive about a foreign population. According to Eagly and Kite, this clearly depends on the type of contact the perceiver has with the observed population. Three types can be distinguished: direct face-to-face contact, indirect contact through cultural exports, and information based on newsworthy events. Direct contact will lead to a rather differentiated picture about the foreign population, although the contact will often be one-sidedly confined to trade, science, or tourism and thus biased when generalized to the national population. Information transmitted through the media, films or magazines will be even more selective and biased than direct contact because it is largely actors in public roles who attract the attention of these forms of communication. The news is often only concerned with the behavior of prime ministers, soldiers, hijackers, and so forth. According to Eagly and Kite, national stereotypes may be based on real observed behavior, but they quickly get biased by selective reporting based on only the highly visible section of the role structure of the perceived society.

There are several reasons why the function of the information for the perceiver affects national stereotypes. First, certain subgroups within the na-

tional population can differ in values and political outlook and, as a result, develop different national stereotypes. This has been shown for political elites and for different religious groups compared to the population at large (Mingst, 1984; Dials, 1962). In contrast, differences in age, sex, marital status, and personality traits do not appear to significantly affect national stereotypes (Reigotski and Anderson, 1959).

Second, in the "social identity theory" of Tajfel (1981, 1982) and Turner (1987), it is assumed that the general need for a positive social identity induces people to accentuate the differences between their own groups and outgroups, particularly when the real differences are minor. One of the means for maintaining a positive social identity and fulfilling the need for intergroup differentiation is to generate negative stereotypes about the other groups. Finally, the actual and perceived relation between the country of the perceiver and the target country will determine the meaning of the information received. More specifically, the identical information may have a different function in hostile than in friendly relationships. Although this is an important effect, it has not received much attention. One exception is Eagly and Kite (1987), who report that stereotypes about hostile nations contain more "agentic" (dominant, male) attributions and those of allied nations more "communal" (friendly, female) attributions. The political/economic relation between two countries might even form a basis for inferring traits characterizing the target population in the same way as structural features are conceived as doing in the concomitant structural features hypothesis. Moreover, relational elements in the "social representation" (Moscovici, 1982, 1984, 1988) of a certain state may affect the perceiver's evaluation of structural features.

10.3   Factors affecting application of national stereotypese

The above distinction between the population and the political/economic structure of a foreign country is also relevant to the application of national stereotypes. Our main contention is that the consequences of national stereotypes for actual contact with foreigners will depend on the type of knowledge and the information at the disposal of the perceiver. We should distinguish in this respect between knowledge of the foreign country, its institutional structure, and population characteristics on the one hand, and knowledge of foreign individuals on the other hand.

One effect of some degree of insight into the institutional structure and demographic composition of a foreign country is that the perceiver can distinguish subtypes within the larger population. That is, the homogenous national stereotype actually gets broken down into subtype stereotypes with different attributes ascribed to these subtypes. For instance, different stereotypes may evolve for Caucasian and Asian Russians, for Hindu and Muslim Indians, and for French-speaking versus Dutch-speaking Belgians. Such subtype effects have been reported for both ethnic and gender stereotypes (Ashmore, 1981; Deaux and Lewis, 1984; Hamilton and Trolier, 1986; Hagendoorn and Kleinpenning, 1990). A special case of subtype differentiation is that the traits attributed to the governing elite and to the population at large differ. In general it appears that the ability to differentiate between subtypes increases with greater outgroup familiarity (Linville, Salovey and Fisher, 1986). Observation of foreigners in a wide variety of contexts blocks the generalization of overly selective social role information. This subtype effect was not foreseen in the original social role hypothesis, however.

A second finding revealed by research on ethnic and gender stereotypes is that stereotypes may not be called upon when specific information about individuals is available (Locksly et al., 1982; Koomen, 1989). This is what may happen with national stereotypes when direct contact occurs. Continued direct contact, of course, will single out the idiosyncracies of the contacted individuals.

A third point relates to the question of what exactly a stereotype is. According to McCauley and Stitt (1978), the attribution of traits to outgroups per se is not a stereotype and need not necessarily affect behavior. For instance, if we believe that most Germans are efficient, but also that most Chinese and French are efficient, then this attribution has little special significance for how we behave towards Germans. Stereotypes should be studied comparatively, where "people in general" or in the ingroup are used as yardsticks for the measurement of trait attributions towards the outgroup (McCauley, Stitt and Segal, 1980). Unfortunately, the thesis that stereotypes are relative phenomena has not yet been well tested.

There are also situational conditions and perceiver characteristics affecting the use of stereotypes. Extending Koomen's (1989) general inventory to national stereotypes, it appears that stereotypes will be used more often when they are strongly held, causally relevant in a given situation, recently and

frequently activated in memory, or salient. The use of stereotypes increases when the perceiver acts in a group instead of individually, does not have to account for his judgement, acts under pressure, and is not dependent on the target for some outcome. In other words, social factors generally reinforce the use of stereotypes. In addition, stereotypes are used more often when the target's behavior is complex or ambiguous. Only two perceiver characteristics seem to make people rely more on stereotypes: lack of cognitive complexity and lack of interest. The possible interactions between the different situational factors and perceiver characteristics have not yet been investigated, however (Koomen, 1989).

10.4   A model of national stereotypes

Our next step is to bring the various hypotheses and determinants discussed above into a descriptive model of national stereotypes. The two main entries in the model are (a) the perceiver's prior knowledge of the nation in question, particularly its relative international position and relation to other countries including that of the perceiver, and (b) the perceiver's ability and opportunity to gather information about the behavior of the foreign population. The first entry, relative position and relations of the target nation, will be divided into equal versus unequal positions and cooperation versus conflict. The second entry, availability of information, can be divided into minimal or no information about the foreign population, versus indirect observation and direct contact.

By integrating the structural features hypothesis and the social role hypothesis with insights from research on intergroup relations, we should be able to deduce more general hypotheses about the formation of national stereotypes. First we will mention what appear to be facilitating conditions for the emergence of national stereotypes, namely nationalism and early schematic knowledge. Next we will demonstrate how perceived structural features and political or economic relations of nations are used to construct national stereotypes when minimal or no information about the behavior of the foreign population is available. Finally the effects of the availability of indirect and direct information are discussed.

10.5 Facilitating conditions for the formation of national stereotypes

It is not necessary to be a nationalist to have national stereotypes, but it helps. Identification with the national ingroup will activate national stereotypes and nationalism will magnify national differences - usually making outgroup stereotypes more negative.

People will almost always have some prior knowledge of other nations: their history, geography, and other information learned in primary and secondary school. New information about foreign nations will be processed in terms of this prior knowledge. Moreover, prior knowledge provides a basis for generating expectations about the traits and behavior of foreign nationals even when more concrete ideas about or experiences with the other nationals are absent.

10.6 Minimal or no information about the population

Transposition of relational features. Our first thesis is that if minimal specific information about the behavior of the foreign population is available to the perceiver, the known relational features of that nation will be used to infer population attributes. For instance, an Italian perceiver will know that Bulgaria belongs to the Warsaw Pact, an alliance hostile to Nato, and might therefore perceive Bulgarians as hostile to Italy. In the same way, Pakistani can recall their many wars with India. And most Dutch people know that the Federal Republic of Germany is The Netherlands' most important trade partner. Thus, the perceiver can typically locate the target nation in terms of political and economic cooperation or conflict with his own country. In addition, the perceiver is often aware of power asymmetries. Most people know the superpowers and economic giants and are able to rank order nations in terms of their political and economic power relative to their own country. When other information is absent, relations of dominance and dependence and cooperation or conflict may be translated into traits such as arrogance, superiority, cooperativeness or aggressiveness. Therefore our first hypothesis is:

1. When specific information about the behavior of a target population is absent and sufficient knowledge of the relative position of the target nation and its relation to the nation of the perceiver is available, inferences about the target population will be deduced from this relational information.

Transposition of structural features. Often perceivers have some ideas not only about the relations and alliances of national states, but also about their structural features. For example, the perceiver might infer from the fact that China is a communist country that the Chinese people are not a very individualistic people; from the fact that Peru is poor that Peruvians are inefficient; or from apartheid in South Africa that South-Africans are racists. Thus, conclusions about the population in question can be drawn from the social forces and systems known to characterize the country.

2. When specific information about the behavior of a target population is absent and sufficient knowledge of the structural features of a target nation is available, inferences about the target population will be deduced from this structural information.
   We assume that relational features often determine the specific meaning of structural features (that is, have specific consequences for the perceiver):

3. Which traits are inferred from structural features of a target nation depends on the relation between the target nation and the country of the perceiver.
   We assume that inferences from structural and relational features of nations occur only when more specific information is absent. If more information is available, population attributes will be inferred on the basis of observed behavior, as predicted by the social role hypothesis. Thus, in our view the structural (and relational) features hypothesis and the social role hypothesis complement each other:

4. If the perceiver possesses some knowledge about a foreign country, but less or none about the specific behavior of its population, then the (relational and) structural features of this nation will be used to infer population attributes.

5. When the perceiver is able to directly or indirectly observe the behavior of a foreign population, these observations rather than the known features of the nation will be used to infer population attributes.

The effect of equal positions. The above hypotheses do not specify how the structural and relational aspects of target countries lead to national stereotypes. Research on intergroup relations suggests two different trends. First, the most negative stereotypes will be developed for nations with lower status positions and for nations in conflict with the perceiver's country. Sec-

ond, high similarity between nations may also lead to negative national stereotypes. The first hypothesis is plausible, while the second sounds paradoxical. The idea behind the latter is that the need for a positive social (that is, national) identity will encourage people to accentuate intergroup differences (Tajfel, 1981; Tumer, 1987). This accentuation of the differences between similar nations typically takes the form of a negative stereotype. It must be admitted, however, that research in the field of national stereotypes also shows the opposite effect: political and cultural similarity leads to more positive stereotypes (Seligman, 1982). In the theoretical framework of social identity theory, however, similarity specifically refers to power and status and not to cultural similarity. In the framework of social identity theory, positive stereotypes between equally powerful groups are expected only when the relevant nations are both members of a higher level category, such as the participation of both Belgium and The Netherlands in NATO. In other words, in the framework of social identity theory the formation of a positive stereotype on the basis of group equality is context dependent and therefore seen as an exception to the general rule.

6. Stereotypes of the populations of nations that are politically and economically similar to the nation of the perceiver will be more negative than those regarding dissimilar nations.

7. The negative effects of the need for a posible intergroup difference will be less intense for similar nations belonging with the country of the perceiver to a common alliance, than for similar non-allied nations.

8. Cultural similarity between nations may lead to positive national stereotypes.
   The effect of unequal positions. When the country of the perceiver and the stereotyped nation are unequal in military, political, or economic status, a mixed set of results may follow. Intergroup experiments suggest that low-status groups often acknowledge the superiority of high-status groups, at least under conditions of cooperation (Van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1989). Acknowledgement of outgroup superiority is often compensated for, however, by claiming ingroup superiority on a secondary dimension (Van Knippenberg and Ellemers, 1989). A Dutch observer may acknowledge the efficiency of Germans in running industries while emphasizing the superiority of Dutch hydraulic engineering. The French might admit that Americans are more efficient, but not that they are more cultured. In many cases, even the high-status group may

come to agree on the minor strong point of the low-status group, producing complementary stereotypes. Nevertheless, in this case each group overevaluates the dimension on which it excels. Applied to national stereotypes:

9. Under conditions of cooperation between nations of unequal status, perceivers from the low-status nation will acknowledge the superiority of the high-status nation in their stereotype of the high-status nation's population, but simultaneously underline their own minor strong points. The effect of inconsistent positions. Often nations cooperate in one respect and compete in another. A political conflict, which leads to military hostilities, will almost always abort any economic cooperation. That is, the combination of political conflict and economic cooperation is extremely unstable. In contrast, the combination of political cooperation and economic competition can be maintained under many different conditions of stress. Examples of this combination are the relations between the USA, FRG, and Japan. Of course, conflict is not the same as competition. Moreover, competition can easily accompany neutral political relations. We will neglect these gradations for the time being, however. One effect of the combination political cooperation and economic competition may be ambivalent stereotypes. Another possible effect is that stereotype of the politically-allied-but-economically-competitive nation is more negative than that for politically antagonistic nations as long as there is no direct conflict. This effect is a little paradoxical, of course, but we find clear examples in the often negative relations between capitalist states competing for foreign markets. Thus, for example, Germans seem to have more negative stereotypes nowadays about Japan than about the USSR.

11. Economic competition between politically allied nations can make the population stereotypes more negative than those for nations that are members of politically antagonistic alliances but which are not economic competitors.

10.7   Direct or indirect observation of a national group

The interaction between features of a nation and the observed behavior of its population. The social role hypothesis assumes that direct or indirect information about the behavior of a national group will be reflected in national stereotypes. Newsworthy events, the media, or direct contact form the

basis for generalizations about the larger group. In many cases, moreover, this leads to bias. For example, Eagly and Kite (1987) found the national stereotypes of nations in which women are underrepresented in high-status positions to be more "male"; that is, the stereotypes of these countries contained more "agentic" than "communal" attributions (that is, more male than female attributions), particularly when compared to the national stereotypes of nations known to be more egalitarian. As we saw before, the explanation is that the most visible roles in a nation determine the image of that nation abroad.

It is questionable whether inferences based on direct observation will overrule the transposition of the structural and relational characteristics of a nation in the formation of a national stereotype. On the one hand, the direct observation of behavior would seem to provide concrete and overwhelming cues to the national character. On the other hand, it is unlikely that structural and relational information will have no effect whatsoever. Most plausible is that the relevant relational information will not be transposed directly but, rather, structure the meaning of the observed behavior. For instance, a news item concerning repressive actions by the Israelian army in the occupied territories will be seen as an example of Israelian aggressiveness by enemies of Israel and as a sign of deciveness by friends of Israel. That is, the relations between the country of the perceiver and the perceived nation will determine the meaning of the behavior of foreign nationals. Relational information will not give rise to a completely different interpretation of the observed behavior, but the polarity of the particular attribution may change, as emphasized by Peabody (1985). For instance, the same behavior may be called "easy going" rather than "lazy" or, at the other pole, "industrious" rather than "workaholism". The effect of relational information on the interpretation of observed behavior is overlooked in the social role hypothesis, however.

12. Information about the behavior of representatives of foreign nations will be more important determinants of the content of national stereotypes than inferences deduced from structural and relational features of the nations. However, the meaning (evaluation) attached to the observed behavior will nevertheless depend on perceived national attributes, particularly the relation of the perceived nation to the country of the perceiver.

Face-to-face contact. Information gathered through face-to-face contact is no doubt very important to the formation of national stereotypes. The effects may be rather complex, however. In general, direct contact may lead to more differentiated and therefore positive images of the contacted populations, particularly when apriori ideas about the nation in question were not too well defined or not too negative. In cases of a strong negative bias, observations of positive behavior may be dismissed as exceptions or attributed to exceptional situational factors (Pettigrew, 1979). However, Amir and Ben-Ari also report the opposite effect. They found contact to lead to particularly less positive stereotypes when prior ideas about the target country were too positive. The effect of direct contact on the national stereotypes is complicated by the fact that structural and relational features may distort the perception of behavior of foreign nationals and that face-to-face contact will often activate subtype differentiation and thus limit the generalization of both positive and negative traits to the larger population. Even when the perceiver is well informed and completely open to new information, the risk of biased perception is not absent. It is a well-known fact of social life that, ultimately, each perceiver is dependent on the standards of his own culture in evaluating the behavior of foreigners. Cultural misunderstanding is hard to avoid when the norms in two nations differ (Hagendoorn, 1986). For instance, conversational interruptions may be tokens of involvement in one nation, and signs of impoliteness in the other; as a result of interaction, therefore, positively intended behavior will be coded as negative in the outgroup stereotype of the perceiver.

13. Direct contact will lead to more positive national stereotypes if apriori ideas about the country were not too well defined, too negative, or too positive.

14. Strongly negative ideas about a country will make national stereotypes resistant to direct observation of positive behavior by the foreigners. Moreover, observations of negative behavior will confirm the existing negative stereotype.

15. The observed behavior of foreigners will be interpreted against the background of the structural and relational features of the nations concerned.

16. The evaluation of the observed behavior of foreigners will ultimately depend on the cultural standards of the perceiver and therefore often deviate from its intended meaning.

10.8 Limitations of the model

The hypotheses outlined above are of a rather general nature. The specific way(s) in which perceivers infer population attributes from the structural and relational features of nations is not yet spelled out. Our next step in the future, therefore, is to specify what kind of population attributions may be inferred from knowing that a country is rich, communist, agricultural, fighting a Maoist guerrilla, or receiving American military assistance. A factor not yet specified in this model is the personal influence of the national leader. The names of Kennedy, Reagan or Bush, just have to be mentioned to illustrate this point. Think of Gorbatsjov's popularity in Western Europe. Does the national stereotype of a nation change when a new president comes into power? Or is it actually his policy that alters the images abroad? Is a new president seen as the expression of larger political forces in the population, or is the person of the leader seen as the directing force? The type of regime may be a critical factor in this process of attribution.

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Henk Dekker

11   *Perceptions of the European Community*

11.1   Abstract

Perceptions of the European Community held by young Europeans have been studied recently in four research projects. Data from these four studies are presented here in a systematic way. First are presented the findings relating to the knowledge/beliefs, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviour. Secondly, relationships between these orientations and individual and social variables. Thirdly, relationships with socialization processes and structures. Finally, the relationship between European political socialization and European cooperation and integration is examined.

11.2   Amazement

Amazement about the low percentage of voters in the elections for the European Parliament in the Netherlands in 1984 (50.5%) has activated our curiosity about how people acquire knowledge/beliefs, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to the European Community. In 1985, we started the research project "European Political Competence".

In this project answers are sought to the following questions: What knowledge/beliefs, insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to the European Community do Europeans have at a given point in time? What are the relationships between these cognitions, behavioral intentions, behavioral patterns and individual and social characteristics of these individuals? How do people acquire these orientations? Due to the influences of what agencies do people acquire these orientations? The goal is to find an answer to the question: When, how, and as a result of who and/or what do people with which individual and social characteristics acquire what knowledge/beliefs, insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to the European Community?

The interactive theory of political socialization (Dekker, 1988) has helped us impose order on the results of our research and steers our actual research as well. The central component in this theory is the individual being socialized. The second component consists of the agencies of socialization and within these agencies the various socializers. The third component is the

dominant sub-system of the society, divided into a dominant sub-system which is in power and a dominant sub-system which is in the opposition. The final component comprises the peripheral sub-systems of the society. The relationships among and inside these four components are influence relationships.

In our study, we focus on youngsters who can vote for the first time in elections for the European Parliament.

In this contribution, we will present some of the data acquired up till now by means of literature analysis and five empirical studies from our team (Dekker, 1986; Meulema, 1988; Meinardi, 1988; Meinardi, 1989; Redmeyer, 1989).

11.3   European political socialization

First we would like to clarify the following concepts: socialization, European political socialization, direct and indirect socialization, and intentional and non-intentional socialization.

Socialization is seen as the whole of structures and processes through which individuals acquire certain knowledge beliefs, insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to social systems. Elements are amongst others gender socialization, professional socialization, language socialization and political socialization. Political socialization is the whole of structures and processes through which individuals acquire certain knowledgebeliefs, insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to political systems. Elements are amongst others local political socialization, regional political socialization, national political socialization, political socialization with respect to particular foreign countries, political socialization with respect to international political institutions and political socialization with respect to international political relations. European political socialization is the whole of structures and processes through which individuals acquire certain knowledge and so forth, with respect to European political systems. In this study we focus on one of these systems, the European Community.

We expect to find differences between national and European political socialization because of the following reasons: the political system of the European Community differs from national political systems; decision-making processes in the EC political system are (even) more complicated and un-

scrutable than those in the national political systems are; the EC political system offers (even) less opportunities for personalizing politics, for emotional involvement, and for exerting influence, than the National political systems do; and more people lack direct contact with European policy outputs (or are not aware of them). Direct European political socialization includes the acquisition of specific European political cognitions, attitudes and behavioral patterns. Indirect European political socialization encompasses the acquisition of cognitions and so forth, which are not in themselves European political, but which exert an influence upon the subsequent acquisition of specific European political orientations. These orientations can be categorized as National political orientations and nonpolitical orientations which are later targeted on European political objects. Examples of the first kind are: interest in domestic political issues is transferred to interest in European political issues, and the feeling of national political efficacy is extended to European political efficacy. An example of the second kind is: trust in other social groups is transferred to trust in other nationalities. This contribution deals only with direct European political socialization and the first kind of indirect European political socialization.

The distinction can also be made between intentional and unintentional European political socialization. Examples of intentional European political socialization are education about the European Community in schools and information or propaganda campaigns by the Commission of the European Community.

Unintentional European political socialization takes place where, for example, a child of a farmer hears his or her parents complain about "Brussels". This contribution deals with intentional as well as unintentional European political socialization.

11.4   Studies

The perceptions of Europe, the European cooperation and integration and/or the European Community have been studied by Stoetzel (1957), Inglehart (1967), Holt (1972), Hedges (1976), Spence (1976), Saarlrik et al. (1976), Noelle-Neumann (1980), Bacot-Decriaud, Plantin (1982), Letterie (1989) and Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis in the European Voter Study (1989). There are four recent studies into the perceptions of youngsters.

The first study is called "The Young Europeans" (abbreviation: TYE82; Commission, 1982). The research was carried out in all ten countries of the

European Community. It concerned a nationally representative sample of those aged 15 or more. The findings, published in the report, relate to 3.867 young people of all ten member states of the EC.

The second report is published by Hewstone (1986), focussing on university students in the FRG, Italy, France and the UK.

The third report, "Young Europeans in 1987" (1989) (abbreviation: YE87) is a follow-up of the first-named study (all twelve member states; 7.000 respondents). "The Young Europeans" and " Young Europeans in 1987" are two publications out of a series, the so- called "Eurobarometers". In some of the other "Eurobarometer" reports, other data relating to young people are presented as well (for example, "Eurobarometer Europe 2000", 1987).

The fourth report has been published by one of our team members, Meulema (1988). The research method is a written questionnaire, consisting of closed-ended questions. The population consists of secondary school pupils who could/did vote for the first time in elections for the European Parliament in 1989 (16-18 years olds). In all, 143 students from one grade ("Havo-4") representing six schools in the Northern part of the Netherlands, filled out the questionnaire.

Data from these four studies are presented here in a systematic way. First, findings with respect to the effects of European political socialization: knowledgebeliefs, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviour. Secondly, findings with respect to relationships between these cognitions, attitudes and so forth and individual and social variables. Thirdly, relationships with socialization processes and structures.

11.5   Knowledge

In the "The Young Europeans" research in 1982, an indication of a great knowledge gap is given by the answers to the following question: "All things considered, would you say that people like yourself are sufficiently or are not sufficiently well informed about the problems dealt with by the European Community?" 71% of the 15-19-years old Europeans say that they are not sufficiently well informed. "Their feeling of being not sufficiently well informed seems to be directed against the information itself and is not derived from any intellectual laziness on their part" (TYE, 1982, 129). This conclusion is based on the fact that about half of the sample say that newspapers, radio, and television do not deal enough with European

questions; only 39% agree with "I have no time for this and cannot be interested in everything at once".

In the "Young Europeans in 1987" study, the question is asked "How much would you say you know about the European Community (the Common Market)?" "Nothing at all" says 18% of the 15-19-year old Europeans, "not much" 58%, "a certain amount" 21% and "a great deal" 2%. Only one young European in four feels he/she has a good grasp of the EC. Another indication of a knowledge gap is the lack of answers to the question about respondents' impression of the Commission; 70% didn't give an answer (probably because of ignorance).

One of the open-ended questions in Hewstone's study is: "What are the basic principles and goals of the EEC?" The categories which receive most answers are "promote trade", "cooperation/shared identity", "greater world role of Europe", and "benefit/protect interests of members". 10.5% of the respondents do not give an answer. "Overall, few respondents mentioned the more specific ideas behind the Community. Very general ideas predominated and are found in nearly half the respondents, but more exact information is held only by a minority of respondents and its content varies across countries" (Hewstone, 1986, 104).

Another open-ended question in Hewstone's study is: "Why was the Community founded?" The four objectives, entrenched in the Treaty of Rome are mentioned by only a few. Common politics for agriculture is mentioned by 30%; the establishment of a customs union by 14%; and the freedom of exchange of goods and persons by 8%. Nobody mentions the common policies for transport and the creation of a European Social Fund.

Another open-ended question in Hewstone's study is: "About which common policy of the EEC have you heard or read the most? What have you heard and read, and what is your attitude to that policy? Please try to give reasons for your answers". The Common Agricultural Policy is the only common policy which is mentioned by more than a handful of respondents. About the C.A.P., more than one person in four, considering all respondents, mention the problem of "surpluses", "excesses", "stock-piles" and "over-production".

Another finding in the study of Hewstone (1986) is the fact that only 12.3 % of all respondents could name exactly all ten member states of the EC.

Meulema (1988) measures knowledge of politics in the EC (and in the Netherlands) of Dutch secondary school pupils by means of three questions: a question about the political structure, a question about a political topic, and a question about a politician. Only 4.2% of the respondents have knowledge about politics in the EC (and 39.9% have knowledge about politics in the Netherlands). More boys than girls have knowledge of politics in the EC. Eighteen year olds have more knowledge than sixteen year olds.

Table 1: Knowledge of politics in the EC, and of politics in the Netherlands, of Dutch secondary school pupils.

Index of answers to questions on knowledge of a politician, political topic, political structure.

Age: 16 - 18 / Year: 1988

	Politics in EC		Politics in the NL	
Value	N	%	N	%
0	108	75.5	9	6.3
2	25	17.5	55	38.5
4	4	2.8	22	15.4
6	4	2.8	48	33.6
8	1	.7	6	4.2
10	1	.7	3	2.1
Total	143	100.0	143	100.0

Source: Meulema, 1988.

Hewstone (1986) tests the knowledge of the EC by means of ten items (Questions: "Which common policy accounts for the largest percentage of the EEC budget?", "How many member states are there in the EEC?", "How many countries were there in the original "Common Market", "Which treaties form the basis of the EEC?", "Name the member states of the EEC", "Name three of the major decision-making institutions of the EEC", "What is the position held by M. Gaston Thorn?", "What is the name of the convention which covers the EEC's economic relationship with African, Caribbean and Pacific states?", "When were the EEC treaties ratified?", and "What office is held by Mr Piet Dankert?"). Mean scores reveal a "remarkable lack of knowledge" in the four countries involved in this research (FRG, Italy, France, UK). Only about two out of ten questions are answered correctly. Striking is the low level of knowledge of personalities, major figures in the Community bureaucracy. Results of the "knowledge test" provides "striking evidence of a lack of knowledge, which certainly justifies borrowing the term "dark area of ignorance" (Kriesberg, 1949) to

describe the average respondent's cognitive map of the Community" (Hewstone, 1986, 159).

An important question is, why knowledge is so low. Some speculations are the following. First: knowledge of politics in general is low. Without fundamental political knowledge it is difficult to learn about the politics in the European Community. Second: citizens are starved of direct participation in Community decision-making. Third: opinions and attitudes with respect to the EC are not in favour of being interested in learning more. Fourth: there are not enough opportunities for becoming better informed on the EC (in school and/or through mass media). People can hardly be expected to be correctly informed about such a complex topic as the EC if they have had no intentional direct political socialization (formal education) about it. Empirical data about these speculations will be presented in the following paragraphs.

11.6   Opinions

Hewstone (1986) test the opinion on the EC in general through the following open-ended question: "What do you think of the EEC?

What are its advantages and disadvantages, successes and failures? Please try to give reasons for your answers". Content-analysis of the answers shows that the majority response in every country, except the UK, is positive. Enjoyed are economic cooperation (17% of all respondents), cultural, technological and scientific cooperation (14.5%), dismantling quotas and tariffs for trade (14%), European unity/identity (11%), freedom of travel (10.5%), and expansion of free exchanges (10%). The most perceived disadvantages and failures are competition between members (17%), too much nationalism/protectionism (16.5%), "we pay too much" (14%), bureaucracy and centralisation (13%), loss of national sovereignity, identity and independence (13%) and imbalance between rich and poor countries (11%). Nearly a quarter of the total sample is "conditional positive". The negative minority are sometimes highly critical.

"Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, neither a good nor a bad thing, or a bad thing?". The answers to this question of the 15-24 year olds in Europe in the TYE82 and YE87 studies are the following. "Good thing": 52% and 65% respectively (+ 13%). "Bad thing": 11% and 6% respectively (-5%). "Neither good, nor bad thing": 27% and 21%.

No reply: 10% and 8%. The data show a renewal of approval and support for the EC.

There are, however, strong disparities between member states. The most favorable opinions are observed in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The least, in Denmark and the United Kingdom. It should be noted that the formulation of this question tends to prime positive responses (Dalton, 1980).

Now the opinions on the costs and benefits of EC membership. "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that your country has on balance benefited or not benifited from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?" (YE87). "Benefited" is the answer given by 58% of the 15-24 year olds. "Not benefited" says 22%. "Don't know" or no reply, 20%. The figures of the individual states show great differences. Most benefits are seen by the young people in Luxembourg (81%), Portugal (78%), Italy (77%), Ireland (77%) and the Netherlands (72%). The least, by the young Spaniards (30%).

In Hewstone's study (1986), the respondents are asked: "In your opinion, which member state benefits most from the EEC? ... which member state benefits least from the EEC? ... which member state contributes most to the EEC? ... which member state contributes least to the EEC?" Very few respondents think that their country has benefited most from the Community. A large majority of the respondents in the FRG, Italy, and the UK all give their own country as the member state which is believed to benefit least. The French split their replies fairly evenly between their own country, Italy and the FRG. With respect to the contribution to the EC, it is found that a massive majority of the West Germans feel that their country contributes most, while a large number of Italians, French and British agree with them. The British are split equally into two groups, with a large number also asserting that the UK contributes most. Very few respondents think that their own country contributed least. The perceived ratio of outcomes and inputs is, in all four sets of respondents, lower for one's own country. Respondents from all four member states think that their country is worse off than the average other state.

"If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?" (TYE82 and YE87). Most young people in the EC, aged 15-24, would be indifferent about it, 44% and 45% respectively. "Very sorry about it" would be 36% and 39%, and "relieved", 7% and 4%. No reply: 13% and

12%. Conclusion: "Young people currently show considerable acceptance of their country's membership in the Common Market, but a majority of them are indifferent to its scrapping" (TYE82, 120).

"Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel that these problems are very important, important, not very important or unimportant for the future of (your country) and the people (of your country)?" was asked in order to find out the opinions on EC policies (TYE82). 27% of the youngsters, aged 15-19 years, think the problems of the EC are very important for the future of their country and the people of their country. 51% think they are important, 12% think they are not very important and 3% think they are unimportant and 7% do not give a reply.

Hewstone (1986) invites the respondents (university students in the FRG, Italy, France, the UK) to assess the achievements of five policy areas of the EC and ten more specific political and economic effects. Judgement of the five policy areas (agriculture, transport, energy, environment protection, defence) are not enthusiastic. Significant differences exist between all four countries. The French perceived most successes, followed by the Belgians, the British and the West-Germans. The highest mean rating is 3.93 and the lowest is 3.42 (1= extremely unsuccessful; 7= extremely successful). The total scores on the ten more specific political and economic effects are much less than the maximum. The highest mean ratings receive "increasing trade between member states" (4.52), "freedom of movement for EEC citizens to work elsewhere in the EEC" (4.44) and "reducing travel restrictions in the EEC" (4.38). The lowest mean ratings receive "speaking with a single voice when the EC acts on the world stage" (3.31), "reasonably priced agricultural produce for the consumer" (3.52), and "reducing inequalities between regions of the Community" (3.65). In between: "increased agricultural productivity" (4.25), "increased efficiency of industries" (3.86), "providing social security benefits for EEC citizens who work in other member states" (3.79), and "harmonisation of national transport costs within each of the member states" (3.6) Once again, considerable variation can be observed among the four countries. The differentiation of responses to the individual items of both sets of opinion questions show that respondents "would appear to have definite views about the nature and effects of common policy, rather than simply global evaluations of the Community" (Hewstone, 1986, 143).

A majority (58%) of the young Europeans (aged 15-24) thinks that the coming into being of the Single Common Market in the EC in 1992 will be a good thing (YE87). A country-by-country analysis reveals very marked differences. In Italy, the support is the greatest, in Denmark the weakest. In 1989, the figures are about the same (Eurobarometer, 31, 1989, A13).

Greater than this general support for the Single European Market is the support for various measures which will be brought about by that Market (TYE87). Eight in ten young Europeans, aged 15-24, think that the following measures will be an advantage: the opportunity to go and live without limitation in any other country (80%); to go and work in any other country (80%); to buy any product lawfully sold in other countries (79%); and the ability to make payments without complication within the whole EC (77%). A majority also has positive opinions about being able to take any amount of money with them when travelling to other countries (77); about the possibility of acquiring land or property throughout the EC (73%); about the possibility of opening a bank account in any country of the EC (71%); and about bringing together the rates of value-added tax (67%). Only two aspects receive a moderately positive response: elimination of custom controls (58%) and the opening of public procurement (50%).

On the unification of Europe, the following question is asked: "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?" (TYE82, YE87). "Very much for" receives 23% and 28% respectively (+ 5%) and "to some extent for" receives 49% and 46% respectively (- 3%) of the support of the 15-24-year-old Europeans. "To some extent against" is answered by 10% and 7% and "very much against" is answered by 3% and 2% respectively. No reply: 15% and 17%. The level of support for European unity has risen since 1982, both in young people and people aged 25 or older. These opinions in all member states are very similar, with two exceptions. In Portugal, the support is the greatest. In Denmark, the opinion is least favorable.

In the YE87 study, the question is asked, "Are you in favour of going even further than the Single Common European Market towards the unification of Europe? If yes, in which direction mainly?" "Yes" receives 48% of the 15-24 year old Europeans. "No" is answered by 26% (and don't know or no reply by 26%). Nearly one young European in two supports further steps towards the unification of Europe. Support for this idea varies, however, greatly from country to country. It is strongest in Italy and Portugal and

weakest in Denmark and the UK. Between the young (aged 15-24) and the older respondents (aged 25 or more) no great differences can be observed. For those in agreement with going further than the Single Common European Market, "a true cooperation in science and technology", receives support from the majority in each member state (in the average 62%). "A single common currency" has the support of a majority of the young people in Belgium (60%), Luxembourg (56%) and France (52%). The average is, however, less than the half of the group of young Europeans (43%). None of the other possible policies are favoured by a majority in any country. "A political union among the member states" receives 39%; "a strong common defense" 32% (and "other" 3%, "don't know" or no reply 2%).

Next are the opinions about possible changes in the political system of the EC. In the TYE82 study, the respondents are asked to say which of the following two ways of looking at the more distant future of the European Community comes nearest to their way of thinking. The first one was: "Some people think the Community should not only have a directly elected Parliament, but should also have an actual Government which would have the final say in decisions in some important areas". The second one was: "Others think that the individual governments of member countries should have the final say". In favour of an actual European Government is 40% of the 15- 24 year olds. In favour of the second option is 44%. No reply: 16%.

Finally, the rate of European unification. In the YE87 study, it is asked which rate of European unification is desired by the young in the EC. On the whole, young Europeans, aged 15-24, wish to see the process of unification speeded up.

11.7   Attitudes

First: the interest in politics in Europe in general.

Meulema (1988) measures this interest of secondary school pupils in the Netherlands. The index measuring interest in politics in Europe (and in politics in the Netherlands) is shown in Table 3. Interested in politics in Europe is 47.8% of the youngsters (and interested in politics in the Netherlands is 49%). Boys are more interested in politics in Europe (and in the Netherlands) than girls. Older youngsters have more interest in politics in Europe than the youngest ones.

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Table 2: Interest in politics in Europe and politics in the Netherlands of Dutch secondary school pupils

Index of reading newspaper articles dealing with politics in Europe, talking with other people about politics in Europe, and interest in particular political topics in Europe.

Age: 16-18 / Year: 1988

Value	Politics in Europe		Politics in the NL	
	N	%	N	%
00-01	7	5.0	12	8.4
02-03	21	15.0	29	20.5
04-05	45	32.1	29	20.3
06-07	30	21.4	35	24.5
08-09	35	25.0	34	23.8
10	2	1.4	1	0.7
Total	140	100.0	140	100.0

Source: Meulema, 1988.

Second: the interest in problems of the EC.

The TYE study in 1982 shows that 16% of the 15-19 years old Europeans are very interested, 56% are a little interested, and 25% are not at all interested in the problems of the EC. Those in higher education aged 20-24 are actually the most inclined to display interest in European problems. A key source of their level of interest in European problems is, according to the TYE82 study, the young people's great dissatisfaction with the information about these problems (71% say that they are not sufficiently well informed).

In Meulema's study (1988), Dutch secondary school pupils are asked to indicate whether they are interested in certain problems or not. Lists of political problems in the EC, the Netherlands and in countries outside Europe are presented to the respondents. The findings show that topics which are specific to the European level attract less interest (Table 3). Typical European political topics, like milk and farm surplusses, and customs formalities for truck drivers, are interesting for only a small number of secondary school pupils in the Netherlands.

Table 3: Interest in political problems in Europe, the Netherlands and in countries outside Europe of Dutch secondary school pupils.

Question: "Some people keep close track of precisely what is happening in Europe as far as political problems are concerned, other people are not at all interested in these political questions. Below are listed a number of political problems ... Will you indi-

cate for each of the problems whether you are highly interested in the problem, mildly interested, not very interested, or totally uninterested?"

Age: 16-18 Year: 1988	Interested			Uninterested
	highly %	mild %	not very %	totally %
Europe:				
- Milk surplusses in Europe	4.2	14.0	69.2	11.9
- Struggle against acid rain in Europe	10.5	67.1	21.7	0.7
- Inferior wages of women in E.	0.7	28.0	60.8	9.8
- The fishing industry in E.	0.7	20.3	66.4	12.6
- Information technology in E.	4.9	14.0	65.0	15.4
- Coordinated aid to Third countries by the Europ.ones	4.2	38.5	52.4	4.9
- Customs formalities for European truck drivers	2.1	13.3	71.3	13.3
- Farm surplusses in Europe	4.2	19.6	65.7	10.5
- Unemployment in Europe	2.8	55.2	37.1	3.5
- Minorities in E. countries	4.2	36.4	49.7	8.4
Netherlands:				
- Energy in the Netherlands	2.1	33.6	48.3	13.3
- Alcohol and drugs problems	11.2	66.4	19.6	2.1
- Environmental pollution	14.0	63.6	21.0	0.7
- Unemployment in the Netherl.	4.9	58.7	32.9	0.7
- Housing shortages in the NL	1.4	17.5	62.9	13.3
- Criminality in the Netherl.	10.5	64.3	23.1	0.7
- Minorities in the Netherl.	7.7	13.4	38.5	8.4
- Abortion in the Netherlands	6.3	44.1	36.4	12.6
- Inflation in the Netherlands	4.2	14.0	53.1	27.3

Age: 16-18 Year: 1988	Interested			Uninterested
	highly %	mild %	not very %	totally %
- Educational policy in the NL	7.0	46.9	40.6	4.9
Outside Europe:				
- Iran-Iraq war	5.0	41.3	44.8	6.3
- Trade war US - Japan	4.9	23.8	58.0	12.6
- Struggle in Nicaragua	2.8	21.7	66.4	7.7
- Israel-Libanon war	4.9	37.1	50.3	6.3
- Developments in USSR	8.4	46.2	39.9	2.1
- Relations US-USSR	20.3	60.8	16.8	0.7
- South Africa	12.6	64.3	20.3	1.4
- Activities of Greenpeace	18.2	55.2	22.4	2.8
- Famine in Africa	7.7	68.5	19.6	3.5
- Northern Ireland conflict	4.2	18.2	64.3	10.5

Source: Meulema (1988).

Third: the demand for information on the European Community.

In the YE87 study, the question is asked: "Would you like to be better informed than you are about the European Community?" 68% of the 15-19-year-old Europeans says "Yes"; 24% says "No"; 8% "Don't know" or no reply. The strongest desire for information on the EC is expressed in Portugal (90%), Greece (83%) and Italy (82%). The weakest, in Belgium (49%), the FRG (54%) and the Netherlands (57%).

Fourth: the interest in people in other countries of Europe. In 1982 and 1987, 20% and 21% respectively of the 15-24-year-old Europeans say being really interested in "how people live in other parts of Europe" (TYE82, YE87). This interest increases with age.

Fifth: having a party preference. Meulema (1988) reports that 35.1% of Dutch secondary school pupils do not know for which party they should vote for in the elections of the European Parliament or have no opinion. (With respect to politics in the Netherlands 18.2% do not know, or have no opinion about, which party to vote for).

Sixth: political efficacy. Meulema (1988) defines political efficacy as follows: "the feeling one has of being able to exert influence on the way things run in politics and the feeling that it is useful to involve oneself for or against certain states of affairs in politics". Only 7.1% of the Dutch secondary school pupils who filled in the questionnaire has a feeling of political efficacy with respect to politics in the EC (while 30.1% has that feeling with respect to politics in the Netherlands).

Seventh: the attitude towards the EC. An indication of the attitudes towards the European Community of 15-19 year olds has been obtained, in the TYE82 and YE87 studies, through an index of values assigned to the answers to two opinion questions on membership of the EC (membership is a good or bad thing, very sorry or relieved about scrapping of the EC). The distribution of values shows a strong support for the European Community by 30% and 35% respectively of the youngsters (15-24 year olds), a moderate support by 27% and 33%, a neutral position by 30% and 26%, a moderate opposition by 8% and 4% and a strong opposition by 5% and 2% respectively in the years 1982 and 1987. "The distribution of values in the indicator represents evidence of young peoples' relative lack of involvement in the EC" (TYE82, 121). Hewstone (1986) developed a set of eight state-

ments measuring "utilitarian" support (gains and losses associated with EC membership) and eight affective support statements. There was evidence of broad utilitarian support and affective support. The levels of both support are almost exactly the same.

Eigth: the value attached to the unification of Europe. In both years of the YE-studies (1982 and 1987), "the unification of Europe" receives the support of 8% of the 15-24 year olds in the EC countries. Together with "my religious faith" and "the revolution", "the unification of Europe is ranked at the bottom of a list of ideas or causes. The best educated young people are more in favour of the unification than the other respondents. In several research reports (TYE, 1982; Armitage, 1988; and others) it is suggested that most youngsters are not thinking of Europe primarily as an idea, but in terms of concrete every-day experiences (for example: meeting people from other countries). The political idea of Europe is negatively evaluated while the concrete experiences are positively valued. The progress which has been made towards European integration since World War II is now taken for granted by most of the youngsters. "As the past recedes so present generations can no longer imagine France and Germany at war" (Armitage, 1988, 91).

Nineth: the fear for one's own country's loss of influence in Europe. "Here are some kinds of fears which are expressed about the future, say in the next 10 or 15 years, of the world we live in. I would like you to tell me which of the following really concern you or worry you" (TYE82). The loss of influence in Europe of one's own country is at the bottom of the list (10%; together with reduction in influence of Western Europe in the world).

Finally: Europeanism. In the TYE82 study, it is asked: "Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe?". Only 15% of the 15-24 years old Europeans "often" think of themselves as a citizen of Europe. 38% and 44% think "sometimes" and "never" of themselves as a citizen of Europe.

Europeanism is measured by Meulema (1988) by using two questions. The first one asks whether the respondent is proud to be European or not. The second asks what emotions the European flag evokes.

The scores on Europeanism (and nationalism) are shown in Table 4. Twenty-nine percent of the studied Dutch secondary school pupils have a feeling of Europeanism. More boys than girls have a feeling of Europeanism.

Youngsters who have a feeling of Europeanism also have a feeling of nationalism.

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Table 4: Europeanism and nationalism of Dutch secondary school pupils.
Index of answers to questions on being proud to be a European and emotions European flag
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Age: 16-18 / Year: 1988

Value	Europeanism		Nationalism	
	N	%	N	%
00-01	21	43.8	38	28.6
02-03	4	8.3	29	21.8
04-05	9	18.8	22	16.5
06-07	-	-	-	-
08-09	12	25.0	17	12.8
10	2	4.2	27	20.3
Total	48	100.0	133	100.0

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Note: Only a small number of students answered the questions about Europeanism.
Source: Meulema, 1988

Also Hewstone (1986) finds that being pro-European does not rule out national chauvinism. Being pro-European can be combined with national chauvinism. Explanation could be, that the EC may be seen positively if judged to be good for one's own nation.

11.8 Behavioral intention and behaviour

The behavioral intention, which is studied in the research reports cited, is the willingness to vote for the European Parliament. Meulema (1988) asks Dutch secondary school pupils: "If there were elections for the European Parliament right now, and if you were allowed to vote, would you do so?" 33.1% is willing to vote, 33.1% is not willing to vote, 14.1% has no opinion and 19.7% does not know if they would vote. "One out of three pupils is willing to vote for the European Parliament, a very low percentage" (Meulema, 1988, 47). The willingness to vote for the European Parliament is studied in the Eurobarometers too. The data are presented in Table 5. It is interesting to see that in 1989, the declared intention was higher than the turnout in France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal, and lower in Italy, Greece, Ireland, and Spain. Declared intention and turnout were about the same in the FRG and the UK. Explanations could be differences between the political cultures in the involved countries: degree of inclination

to give socially acceptable answers and differences in what the socially acceptable answer is.

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Table 5: Willingness to vote in the elections for the European Parliament and the Second Chamber in the Netherlands of Dutch secondary school pupils.

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Age: 16-18 / Year: 1988

	European Parliament		Second Chamber	
	N	%	N	%
Would vote	47	33.1	116	81.1
Would not vote	47	33.1	15	10.5
No opinion	20	14.1	5	3.5
Do not know	28	19.7	7	4.9
Total	142	100	143	100

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Source: Meulema, 1988

The following political activities are studied in the research reports cited: to go and vote for the European Parliament; being a member of the European Parliament; being a member of a political party or group; reading on politics in the EC; talking about politics in the EC; hanging up placards on an EC problem; distributing handouts on an EC problem; signing own name to a petition on EC; taking part in demonstration or protest; seeking to involve a political party or organisation in EC matters; and participating in a boycott on an EC problem.

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Table 6: Turnout in elections to the European Parliament and declared intention to vote, by year and country.

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	1979 Turnout *	1984 Turnout *	Intention ** a	1987 Turnout **	1989 Turnout **	Intention ** a
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Belgium (b)	91.4	92.2	-		91	52
Luxembourg (b)	88.9	88.8	-		88	51
Italy	84.9	83.4	76		82	70
Greece	78.6	77.2	81		80	75
FRG	65.7	56.8	67		62	64
France	60.7	56.7	73		49	66
Denmark	47.8	52.4	55		46	56
Netherlands	58.1	50.6	64		47	54
Ireland	63.6	47.6	55		68	47
UK	32.3	32.6	36		36	35

Spain			69	55	41
Portugal			72	51	60
Total	62.5	59.1			

Notes: a: N = 11.678
b: In Belgium and Luxembourg, non-participation constitutes an in-fringement.
Sources: * Europees Parlement, 1984.
** Eurobarometer, 31, 1989, 53.

Popular involvement in the elections for the European Parliament in 1979, 1984 (1987), and 1989 have turned out to be low in all EC member states. In countries without a compulsary voting system, only an extremely low percentage of citizens used their right to vote. In countries with a compulsary voting system, the percentage of voters was lower than at national elections.

Meulema (1988) measures European (and domestic) political participation of Dutch secondary school pupils by asking whether they are a(n active) member of a European political organisation, and whether they have taken part in activities which are related to political problems. No one participates with respect to politics in Europe (while 1.4% participates with respect to politics in the Netherlands).

11.9 Cognitions, attitudes and behaviour

An important question is what the relationships are between knowledge, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavior.

Interest in European problems seems to be strongly and positively linked to the feeling of being sufficiently well informed, or not, about these problems (TYE, 1982, 128), and with the feeling of political efficacy (Meulema, 1988).

By far the most powerful predictor of Community attitudes, in Hewstone's study, is the "support index" (a collapse of the original utilitarian and affective support items). Correlations were highest in general for the five items measuring "solidarity", "trust" and "confidence", "personal gain", and "own country has benefited". The second powerful predictor is the expectancy-value measure; this measure yielded strong direct paths to overall attitude for both West-Germans and Britons and was marginally significant in France. Active interest is the third powerful predictor. The liking for own nationality, national image, and time spent in other European countries tended to relate to the main variables (support, expectancy-value, active in-

terest). Knowledge had negligible impact on attitudes, except in the UK (due probably to special political circumstances). The variables with the strongest correlation with being willing to vote for the EP election are: knowledge of politics in the EC and interest in politics in the EC (Meulema, 1988).

In order to obtain a more complete picture, other independent variables should be included as well. Some of them will be introduced in the following paragraphs.

11.10   Individual and social characteristics
11.10.1   Age

According to the TYE-Research (1982) European youngsters and adults differ from each other in many European socialization effects. Young Europeans, compared to adults, have more interest in international politics, have more interest in how people live in other parts of Europe, are less interested in the problems of the European Community, are less prepared to support the unification of Europe, are less proud of their nationality, are more in favour of the creation of an actual European government, are more often indifferent to the prospect of the Common Market being scrapped, have less involvement in the European Community, and say more that they are not sufficiently well informed about problems dealt with by the European Community.

Meulema also found a relationship between age and effects of political socialization. One of the conclusions of her study is: "The older one (youngster - hd) gets, the more knowledge, the more interest and the more willing to vote one is with respect to politics in Europe" (1988, 55). There is no relationship between age and the feeling of political efficacy, party identification and Europeanism.

When a significant difference in attitude by age is apparent, the question can be asked whether this is a lifecycle effect or the start of a historical effect, which could be a generation or a period effect. In case of a lifecycle effect, young people reproduce the attitudes that the adults expressed when they were young and will later express the attitudes the adults have today. In case of a generation effect, all individuals born in the same period, marked by certain social, political, and other circumstances and developments, express other opinions and attitudes than individuals born in other periods. In case of a period effect there is a change in attitudes among the

population which emerge first in the attitude of young people (Rabier, 1982; named in Tchernia, 1982). These three effects are generally intermingled. Longitudinal studies are needed to discover which of them is dominant (Rabier, 1982).

11.10.2 Gender

A large number of research projects in many countries have established that relationships exist between national political socialization effects and gender. Girls are clearly less interested in national politics than boys. Fewer girls than boys would like to have the right to vote. Fewer girls say they would vote if made eligible than boys. Girls have fewer racial prejudices than boys (Hagendoorn, et al, 1983).

Since the research studies cited above, we know that boys and girls also differ with respect to European politics.

Meulema (1988) found that Dutch girls have significantly less knowledge of politics in Europe and are significantly less interested than boys. Girls have also a less developed feeling of Europeanism, and are less willing to vote for the European Parliament than boys. These differences between boys and girls with respect to European politics are even greater than those with respect to domestic politics.

Attempts to explain these differences between girls and boys are sought in psycho-analytical theory (for example, Chodorow, 1978) and role theory (for example, Oakley, 1972). There is evidence that the differences in political knowledge and so forth between boys/men and girls/women are the result of the different gender-specific socialization since early childhood. In this process of psychological sex-typing male children learn to orient themselves to aspects of out-of-doors activities and female children to domestic concerns. Because politics is an out-of-doors activity, female children are inclined to ignore politics. Although there is not much research done in this field, the military service can be a factor as well. Girls/women miss the experience of living in such a total, "greedy" political institution during a certain period of time. Decrease in difference in political knowledge, attitudes and behavior between boys/men and girls/women is expected to be illusive if the general gender-specific socialization combined with the sex-gender system, with the social institution of "mothering" instead of the institution of "parenting", continues to exist (Boddendijk, 1988).

11.10.3   Level of education

Education is another factor in political socialization.

In the TYE-Research (1982) a difference is shown between students and working (and unemployed) youth as well. Students are more interested in the problems of the European Community. One of the conclusions is: "... it is the best educated young people, with the level of knowledge required to understand European problems, who are best suited to being interested in them" (1982, 123).

11.10.4   Living in urbanized areas

Pupils from the countryside in the Netherlands have a significantly greater feeling of Europeanism and are more willing to vote for the European Parliament than pupils from cities (Meulema, 1988).

11.10.5   National political competency

Meulema (1988) found, that Dutch pupils have considerably less knowledge of politics in the EC than of politics in the Netherlands, nearly the same level of interest in politics in the EC and in politics in the Netherlands, considerably less feeling of political efficacy with respect to politics in the EC than with respect to politics in the Netherlands, a less highly-developed feeling of Europeanism than of nationalism, and are considerably less willing to vote for the European Parliament than for the national parliament.

Is there a hierarchical cumulative political development of individuals from national to European political orientations? Is knowledge of national politics necessary for knowledge of European politics? On the basis of the research reports cited, we can not give an answer to this question. Meulema's study (1988) points in the direction of a positive answer. She found that Dutch pupils who have knowledge of European politics also have knowledge of national politics. Pupils who are interested in European politics are also interested in national politics. The same is the case with respect to the feeling of political efficacy and the willingness to vote. Finally, pupils with a feeling of Europeanism also have a feeling of nationalism.

11.11   Processes of European political socialization
11.11.1   When

At which age do individuals acquire the first and the greatest amount of political knowledge and the most important political attitudes and behavioral intentions? The answer on this question will give an indication of the best age for parents and teachers to start with political education in order to prevent incorrect beliefs (for example, the EC deals only with economic issues) and undesirable attitudes (for example, ethnic prejudices).

Results of investigations into this topic of age and political socialization in general are not identical. Four tendencies can be distinguished: the primary principle, structuring principle, intermediate-period-model, and the recency-model (Dawson et al, 1977). Each of these is useful for the investigation of a certain type of political socialization.

Agreement can be assumed about the following conclusions. The more fundamental and broader the political orientations are, the earlier in life they are acquired; the more specific they are, the more they are influenced by recent experiences. Examples of fundamental and broad political orientations are: feeling oneself to be a Dutchman, Frenchman, and so forth, loyalty to democracy, identification with political symbols, such as flags, identification with political authorities like the queen or president.

Nowadays most approaches are based on the idea that political socialization which takes place at an early age does not determine every socialization which follows, nor does this early socialization prepare the individual completely for everything which confronts him/her when he/she is older. Political socialization is taking place in the course of an individual's whole life. The political knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral intentions and patterns of people are not determined by the preceding stages of political socialization but they are influenced by it. Political learning is, like each learning, cumulative in essence. "This means that what youngsters learn at an early age builds upon and is influenced by what they have previously learned. ... Through a continuing, lifelong process of cumulative learning a political self is forged" (Nathan, Remy, 1977, 23).

According to Torney (1977) there is some evidence that middle childhood may be a critical age period for international socialization. The following two studies are mentioned by her. Lambert and Klineberg (1967) conclude after interviewing 3.300 children (of 6, 10 and 14 years old) from eleven different parts of the world that children of about 10 years old were particu-

larly receptive to approaches to foreign people but that this openness to international understanding then declined so that by 14 years of age there was an unfortunate tendency to stereotype people of other countries. Also Jahoda (1964) found a considerable difference in attitudes of young and older children from Scotland with the shift beginning at about 10 or 12 years of age. Other research has, according to Torney (1977, 4) frequently found the period from ages 7 to 12 to be a time of plasticity of attitudes and behaviors. By 13 or 14 children are more likely to have a fixed perspective about themselves, their culture and country. So the years between the ages 7 and 12 are especially important. "They come before too many stereotypical attitudes dominate the child's view of the world and are concurrent with the period in which the child's cognitive

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Table 7: Age when youngsters first received information about politics in Europe and the Netherlands according to the respondents themselves

age	Boys		Girls		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
03 - 05 years	1	0.7	1	1.2	2	1.4
06 - 11 years	6	10.2	5	6.2	11	7.9
12 - 15 years	4	6.8	14	17.3	18	12.9
16 and older	6	10.2	6	7.4	12	8.6
I can't remember	42	71.1	55	67.9	97	69.3
Total	59	100	81	100	140	100

Source: Meulema, 1988

development is sufficiently advanced to understand a diversity of viewpoints".

Meulema (1988) asked 16-18 year old pupils in the Netherlands at what age they first received information about politics in Europe. Nearly 70% cannot remember that age. Of respondents who do remember, the greater part (12.9%) received their information about politics in Europe between 12 and 15 years of age. Girls receive information about politics in Europe at a later age than boys.

11.11.2   How

To explain the "how" of political socialization in general, several approaches can be distinguished: psycho-analytical theory, personality theory, development theory, learning theory, role theory and political resources

availability theory (Pawelka, 1977; Dekker, 1988). The results of research obtained until now provide very few arguments for preferring one approach above another. Different approaches (from psychology, sociology, antropology and political science) will be deemed suitable at different times, depending upon the problem to be addressed. In many cases, an interdisciplinary approach will be the preferred one.

For teachers and public information officers the learning theories are most interesting. Five schools of thought can be distinguised. The first is the reinforcement theory which says that learning takes place following reinforcement by means of reward and/or punishment. The second theory is that of imitation learning. According to this theory, learning takes place as a result of identification and imitation. A third tradition directs attention to intrinsically motivated learning. People learn because the activity itself provides its own reward. The fourth theory is called the theory of social representation. Social representations are generated through two processes. "Anchoring" is the process through which a person anchors new information to that which he/she already knows and believes. "Objectifying" is the process through which something abstract turns into something almost concrete. The fifth theory focusses on learning through experiences (real ones or simulated ones). With respect to attitude and/or behaviour change, there is strong empirical evidence supporting the theory of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, 1980).

11.11.3   Channels, agencies

In The Young Europeans research (1982) it appears that the majority of the fifteen to nineteen year-old respondents get their information about the European Community, according to their own perception, from the television (74%), daily newspapers (49%), radio (32%), talking with other people (28%), magazines and periodicals (16%), professional publications (4%), (other ways, 6%, and 6% does not answer).

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Table 8:   Sources of knowledge about politics in Europe, according to the respondents (Dutch youngsters) themselves.
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	Knowledge		First info		Most knowledge	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
- radio	103	72.0	2	1.5	25	24.5
- television	142	99.3	35	25.5	133	93.0
- national newspaper	69	48.3	2	1.5	46	32.2

- local newspaper	65	45.5	-	-	26	18.2
- magazine(s)	32	22.4	-	-	3	2.1
- weekly magazine(s)	15	10.5	-	-	-	-
- friends	29	20.3	-	-	1	0.7
- parents	70	49.0	12	8.6	23	16.1
- brothers, sisters	24	16.8	1	0.7	1	0.7
- grandparents	12	8.4	-	-	-	-
- teacher	33	23.1	-	-	8	5.6
- political young people's organization	-	-	-	-	-	-
- interest groups	1	0.7	-	-	-	-
- church	2	1.4	-	-	-	-
- church affiliated young people's organization	4	2.8	-	-	-	-
- jobs in weekend	2	1.4	-	-	-	-
- trips, travelling	10	7.0	-	-	-	-
- other	1	0.7	-	-	-	-
- I cannot remember	-	-	85	62.0	-	-
Total	-	-	137	100	-	-

Source: Meulema, 1988

Meulema (1988) asked sixteen to eighteen year-old pupils in the Netherlands from what source they have acquired knowledge about politics in Europe (and politics in the Netherlands), from what source they first received information and from what source they have acquired the most knowledge.

According to the youngsters themselves, they receive the most information about the EC from the television, national newspaper, radio, and local newspaper. Teachers were assigned to the sixth position, named by only 5.6%.

Meulema (1988) also asked pupils by means of which people and/or events they became interested in politics in Europe. The answers to this open question were the following: television (28%), parents (22.7%) and school (10.7%).

Let us have a look at four socialization-agencies in particular: school, mass media, international experiences, and the political structures and processes of the EC.

11.11.3.1 School

Intentional direct European political socialization is expected to take place in the subjects such as history, economics, geography, and in particular (social and) political education.

Some research findings, with respect to this intentional direct European political socialization in the Netherlands are the following.

Dekker (1986) found that, contrary to the expectations of many people and contrary to the formal curriculum, only half of the experienced "social and political education" teachers in the Netherlands, interviewed by him in 1984, wanted their students to learn something about (local, regional, national, European) politics in their classes. Yet, even in this category of teachers, a large number of additional topics were mentioned as being important for the students to learn. The other half of the teachers interviewed had no desire whatsoever to devote classroom time to politics. Reasons or motives mentioned by the respondents are: the teacher had a lack of political science education; most pupils don't like classes about politics; the danger of indoctrination, and parents don't want political education in schools.

Meulema (1988) found some years later that 42.7% of sixteen to eighteen year-olds in the Netherlands (from 6 schools), report having had classes in that year about politics in Europe (53.8% told that they had no classes about politics in Europe). Politics in Europe are taught the most during "social and political education" classes, with economics and history classes following in second and third place.

De Winter and Berghorst analysed 89 Dutch textbooks in 1984. Europe is a topic in only 34% of the textbooks for history, in 27% of the geography textbooks, 25% of the government textbooks, 14% of the economics textbooks and in 11% of the "social and political education" textbooks. The average number of pages about Europe in these textbooks are 6, 6, 11, 3 and 7 respectively (while the average total numbers of pages are 245, 132, 136, 163 and 228 respectively). The conclusion is that European integration and cooperation is treated in a quantatively marginal and qualititatively poor way. Often the subject is only mentioned without any real depth of treatment and these isolated remarks are spread over a number of different chapters. Finally the research showed that the theme of European integration and cooperation is afforded more attention in textbooks for schools for pre-university education than in those for schools for general secondary education. Some years later the same kind of research was carried out by one

of our team members, Meinardi (1988). The average percentages of pages about European integration and cooperation are: economics: 1.3%, history: 1.5%, geography: 18.5% (1 book), government: 5%, and "social and political education": 1.2%. The total scores on the content-evaluation varies from 7.6 to 59.7 (the maximum that could be attained is 100). The total scores on the evaluation of the didactic approach vary from 0 to 48 (on a scale of 0 to 100). "Using our standards, the treatment of the European integration and cooperation in most textbooks is poor with respect to content and didactic approach" (1988, 45). Similar conclusions have been reached in other countries. Böttcher, for example, says about textbooks in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Die Europäische Integrationspolitik stellt quantitativ und qualitativ nur ein Randproblem in den Schulbüchern dar ... Eine Sensibilisierung der Schuljugend für Europa findet nicht statt. Das politische Bewußtsein oder gar ein europäisches Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein wird gegenüber ökonomischen Nutzdenken nicht gefordert" (1976, 454).

Meulema (1988) discovered that Dutch youngsters who have had classes on politics in Europe have significantly a greater feeling of Europeanism, but are significantly less willing to vote for the European Parliament elections. Other relationships, for example with the level of knowledge, could not be found.

A study into the effects of a European Studies Course in 1982 in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany (Armitage, Ed., 1988), showed a relatively modest increase in knowledge, a greater tolerance of foreigners, a marked decrease in nationalistic views and an increase in pro-European attitudes in 14 to 16-year olds.

11.11.3.2 Mass communication media

We now turn to the mass communication media as political socializers.

Many authors expect mass media to exert the greatest influence on the knowledge, opinions, attitudes and behavioral intentions with respect to national and European politics. Television is the socializer cited most often by young people in the Netherlands as a source of information about politics in Europe (Meulema, 1988).

Intentional direct European political socialization is considered to take place by means of television and radio programs providing European political information and propaganda, the European political sections of newspa-

pers, European political books and European politically-involved popular music.

A preliminary question is how much time the mass media devotes to ("European") political messages. There are no research data available. One indication of the importance which is attached to "European" questions is the fact that the quality newspaper NRC/Handelsblad has twelve correspondents based in the Hague to report on national politics, and has one correspondent based in Brussels to report on Belgium, Benelux questions, NATO and all the EC bodies (Source: Namens, 4, 4, 1991, 10).

A second preliminary question is how much time the public spend watching television programmes and reading newspaper articles and so forth about "Europe". Meulema (1988) asked Dutch youngsters about their tv-watching habits. The news show at 8.00 p.m. was the most popular, along with some popularly presented news commentary programs. The percentages of viewers are small (about 10%).

Empirical research has not succeeded in uncovering very much about the effects of the various mass media socializers on (national and international) political socialization. These effects are extremely difficult to measure because of the necessity of including other potential socializers in the analysis. Researchers usually limit themselves to a content analysis of the message, and thus only to the potential effects. One characteristic of television and radio programs providing political information and political sections of newspapers is the dominance of unexpected, unusual, mostly negative events or incidents. Information is provided about unsolved problems, failures, differences of opinions and conflicts. Well-functioning, successful elements are seldom included. In general, those receiving this media message are not expected to identify with or support the negatively-presented institutions involved. The European Community is such an institution (Dalton et al., 1986). When the flow of negative information continues, providing one disappointment after the other, it is probable that people will not want to be informed about this institution anymore; they are likely to turn their backs upon the institution and address themselves to other institutions, groups and persons, especially those associated with leisure-time activities (Neubauer, 1981).

Another characteristic of many political messages of mass media is the complexity of the language. Prick (1976) found that the language used in radio current events programs in general in the Netherlands was too diffi-

cult for a large number of listeners, so that they failed to understand the message of the programs.

An indication of the messages about the EC in newspapers is provided by the content analyses carried out by Dalton and Duval (1986). From July 1972 until November 1979, a sample of daily editions of the Guardian was examined for all articles dealing with European integration. Each article was coded on several dimensions such as subject matter, length and the actors involved. In addition, the coders made a summary judgement on the overall positive/negative implications of the events described in the article, based on a judgement of how "the average citizen" would expect the event to affect British national interest or the specific groups involved in the event. The individual articles were aggregated by month to trace the history of British-European relations over the seven-year timespan. The Guardian series was validated for a thirty-two-month period against one of the most different media sources that was available: the popular Sun.

Despite their varied news formats and readership, these two media sources reflected the same overall longitudinal trends. The conclusion is: "After more than six years of British membership, European integration was still being presented in generally negative terms to the British public" (Dalton, et al, 1986, 126).

In the The Young Europeans research, the 15-19-year olds were asked to evaluate the media as sources of knowledge. The question was: "Considering your personal knowledge of the questions which the EC is concerned with, can you tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?" The first statement is: "The newspapers, radio and television do not say enough about European questions". The answers are: agree: 47%, disagree: 38% (and no reply: 15%). The second statement is: "The newspapers, radio and television do not deal seriously enough with European questions". The answers are: agree: 52%, disagree: 29% (and no reply: 19%).

11.11.3.3 International experiencese

International experiences are the next political socializers to be considered. A distinction can be made between international experiences on vacations and those during (organized, joint) study abroad programs.

Travelling abroad (both on vacations and in study programs) is expected to be effective in diminishing stereotypes and prejudices with respect to for-

eign countries and the people living in these countries and in diminishing strong nationalism. Research has showed, however, that this is not always or not even usually the case. Due to selective observations stemming from a negative attitude, quite the opposite can be the result. Observations in another country can be emotionally unpleasant, because the traveller is confronted with the unknown, with information that fails to tally with knowledge acquired earlier. The reaction can be a defense against this threat to identity, resulting in a strengthening of one's own beliefs (Neubauer, 1981). Making observations and having contacts with people of another country, is not in itself enough to change existing stereotypes and prejudices. (Koch, 1973; Schäfer, Six, 1978). Variables are: which stereotypes, prejudices and other attitudes does a person leaving his/her own country, have; which kind of concrete experiences does the person have abroad; and which persons does the individual meet abroad (Allport, 1971; Sorembe, Westhoff, 1975,1979). The most positive effects are expected to result from cooperative contacts to reach common goals. "Die dauerhafte Veränderung von Einstellungen und der Abbau gegenseitiger Vorurteile gelingt nachweislich am besten durch die gemeinsame Bewältigung von Aufgaben und Problemen" (Neubauer, 1981,175). As a result of such forms of cooperation, the participants are forced to discuss different points of view. A possible outcome of such discussion is mutual understanding, mutual sympathy and a new, international group awareness. Examples are a common project of pupils from different countries, and frontier-crossing forms of political and/or economic cooperation (for example 'Euregio'). Armitage (1988) found no verification of the hypothesis "the more often a student has been to foreign countries, the weaker his nationalism will be". This is explained by the fact that the majority of the 14-16-year-old respondents (in the UK and the FRG) made frequent visits to foreign countries. "Because tourism is now more or less institutionalized in Europe, foreign travel does not constitute a differentiating element for explaining the strength of an individual's nationalism vis-a-vis inter-nationalism" (1988, 95). Meulema (1988) found that Dutch students who have had more contacts abroad have more knowledge about politics in Europe and are more willing to vote for the European Parliament. Their feelings of political efficacy and Europeanism are not greater than students with fewer contacts. In the Eurobarometer-research in June 1985, no statistically significant relationship could be found between travelling abroad and the opinion about doing away with impediments at border crossings. Organized study abroad programs have been demonstrated to be effective in bringing about knowledge and attitude change.

McCrady et al. (1976) discovered changes in descriptive stereotypes held by American students through classroom study supplemented by direct exposure to national groups in their own national environment. Dekker and Oostindie (1987, 1988) found an increase for Dutch students in knowledge of and interest in politics of the USA after an organised study abroad program in the USA.

11.11.3.4 Political structures and processes

Examples of political structures and processes which are expected to exert influence on those being socialized are among others, the frequent hearing of the national anthem and seeing people react dramatically to it; the frequent seeing of the national flag and taking part in ceremonies and rituals around this flag; the frequent hearing and seeing via mass media of the head of state; meetings with and having meaningful exchanges with politicians; political participation experiences; serving in the military; frequently being exposed to political propaganda and election campaigns.

According to Dalton and Duval (1986), political elite actions have a relatively strong potential impact on public opinion about foreign policy compared to the potential impact on public opinion about domestic policy. This is due to two characteristics of foreign policy. First, foreign policy opinions are less firmly held than domestic and are therefore more susceptible to change. Second, the public events that comprise the foreign policy environment are relatively easily manipulated by political elites. "Thus, public events may influence foreign policy opinions more than opinions on domestic policy issues such as inflation or taxes" (1986, 133). At the same time the findings from the research carried out by Dalton and Duval indicate that the impact of public events is of short duration, and opinions rapidly regress to their long-term equilibrium point. Dalton and Duval asked themselves if there is a linkage between foreign policy opinion, for example the British attitudes toward European integration, and events occurring in the international arena. They found that political events do indeed systematically alter support for EC membership. Events have an initial sharp impact on opinions and a lingering influence that lasts for several months. The impact of events apparently declines as opinions are formed and become rooted in individual belief systems.

Continued exposure to Community institutions and policies is said to develop support for the European integration. The findings of Dalton and Duval

(1986) in the United Kingdom argue against this expectation on several grounds. The first reason is that stable opinions have not developed. The second reason is that the long-term baseline for British opinions of the EC is predominantly negative.

With respect to the European Community we can observe the following. First, the European flag (twelve stars in gold with a blue background) and anthem (not a special song but the introduction of the ninth symphony of Ludwig von Beethoven) are rarely used in ceremonies or rituals and are as a result of this unknown to most Europeans. Secondly, there is no European "head of state", no European King/Queen or President; people in Europe do not have a personal symbol of "Europe" with which they can identify. Thirdly, opportunities for meeting European politicians are scarce. Fourthly, opportunities for European political participation are scarce as well. In only some countries has a referendum about Europe been held (Ireland, 1972; Denmark, 1972; Norway, 1972; France, 1972; United Kingdom, 1975). Only once in the five years is there an election (campaign) for the European Parliament. In the fifth place there is no European military. All these socializers are not present. There is, however, a huge flow of pro-EC propaganda. No empirical data are available about the use and effects of these materials. I expect that these pamflets have a limited number of readers and if there is any effect, it is probably a strenghtening of the feeling of being mislead, resulting in anything but a pro-EC attitude. It is probable that this propaganda has a "boomerang effect"; the "negative" attitude will be strenghtened or become more extreme through the confrontation with undesired counter-information and/or information not deserving belief.

11.12   European political socialization and European cooperation and integration

A very important question is what the relationship is between developments in political socialization and developments of the political system (for example, the European Community)? This question can be specified in three subsidiary questions. Are political socialization effects (for example, attitudes towards European integration) the result or the cause of developments of the political system of the European Community? Are developments in political systems dependent upon political opinions and attitudes of the public? Which political cognitions, affections and behaviour support which developments in political systems? There are different points of view con-

cerning the question of whether there is first a deply-felt desire within the populace for cooperation and integration which is then adopted by the political (and economic) elites, or whether the process takes place in the opposite direction.

A number of theories have also been developed about the relationship between the knowledgebeliefs, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns of the "avarage citizen" on the one hand, and the process of European cooperation and integration on the other. Hewstone (1986) subsumes these theories under four categories: federalists, pluralists, functionalists and neo-functionalists. In the federalists' approach, the views of the public are only important insofar as the success of integration is seen to depend on the elite's persuasion of the wider public. In the pluralists approach, the development of a popular consensus is a prerequisite for cooperation and integration. Key words are "sense of community", "we-feeling", "mutual understanding and sympathy". In the functionalists' approach, the development of a social-psychological community is emphasised and ties of mutual affection, identity and loyalty are seen as the building-blocks of integration. Cooperative solutions to social and economic problems are expected to promote social interaction across national boundaries. In the neo-functionalists' approach, shifts in political loyalties are seen as the ultimate measure of integration. The key principle is that the survival of a political community depends on the existence of some support. "The new neo-functionalists (perspectives) do appear to be the most useful, although ... one should be wary of gauging the success of European integration in terms of shifts in citizens' loyalty" (Hewstone, 1986, 13). Several functional analysts had the expectation that continued exposure to Community institutions and policies would cause a diffuse support for European integration to develop. The study carried out by Dalton and Duval (1986) argues against this expectation.

In most of these theories the assumption is that every political system needs some popular legitimacy. In democracies this legitimacy is essential. The decisions of political elites should be acceptable for the majority of the constituents. According to this line of thought, the long term survival of the present European Community and the development of a yet more integrated "Europe" will only be possible if the majority of the citizens possess knowledge about "European" matters, are convinced of the intrinsic importance and value of an integrated Europe, are prepared to identify themselves with such a Europe and to contribute to its realization.

Research data with respect to the knowledge, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to the European Community, presented above, show that these requirements have not yet been met. If this line of thought is carried further, a legitimacy crisis can be predicted some time in the future for the European Community. This will be even the more likely if the process of integration is intensified.

Further, longitudinal research has uncovered a number of developments which can be expected in the future to increase the probability of such a legitimacy crisis taking place. The following expected developments are involved here (See: Kaase, Newton, 1988; Inglehart, 1978; Halman et al., 1987). In the first place, there is the trend towards the strengthening of the feeling that citizens have the right to have an impact on the political processes and political outcomes, and to have a larger say in political matters, than simply to exercise the vote. In the second place, there is a trend towards less traditional linkages with political parties and more political behaviour which is more individual or which takes place in new political groupings. In the third place, there is a trend towards a change in emphasis from issues of personal well-being (main policies of the EC) to issues of a global societal nature ("post-materialism").

11.13   Conclusions

The knowledgebeliefs, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviour of young Europeans with respect to the European Community, were studied recently in four research projects: "The Young Europeans" (1982); Hewstone (1986); "Young Europeans in 1987" (1989); and finally a project carried out by Meulema (1988), who is one of our team members.

According to the TYE82 and YE87 studies, most young Europeans do not feel themselves to be sufficiently well informed about the problems dealt with by the European Community. "European institutions seem distant and unknown to young people ..." (YE, 1989, VIII). A degree of complexity is inherent in approaching European problems and may reduce interest in Europe among younger and less educated groups (TYE, 1982, 117). Most young Europeans "are drawn to the major European ideas and recognize the importance to their country of membership of the Community but ... do not involve themselves in European affairs: they have little interest in European problems and, more often than not, view the prospect of the Community being scrapped with indifference" (TYE, 1982, 138). "All in all, the attitude

of young people towards Europe seems to be characterized by a certain discordance" (TYE, 1989, VIII). "It must be understood that young peoples' greater dissatisfaction with information seems, in fact, to be a key source of their low level of involvement in European problems" (TYE, 1982, 128). If young people "are informed and feel themselves capable of adopting a position, then they become involved in the problems. If, on the other hand, they regard their knowledge as insufficiently reliable, they remain neutral...Young people cannot really involve themselves in European problems unless they feel sufficiently well informed about them" (TYE, 1982, 132).

Hewstone's analysis also shows "the picture...of low interest and low knowledge, indicating the Community's lack of saliency in the minds of its citizens" (Hewstone, 1986, 146).

Meulema's study (1988) shows that secondary school pupils, aged 16-18 in the Netherlands have no knowledge about politics in the European Community. Their interest in topics which are specific to the European level is low. They have no feeling of political efficacy with respect to politics in the EC. Two third has no feeling of Europeanism. Only one third is willing to vote for the European Parliament. One third does not know for which party they should vote in that election. No one participates in politics in Europe.

The most important political orientation variable for interest in politics in the EC is the feeling of political efficacy (Meulema, 1988). The variables with the strongest relationship with being willing to vote for the EP elections are knowledge of politics in the EC and interest in politics in the EC. Other important independent variables are age, gender, living in urbanised areas, level of education, having had classes on the EC, media "consumption", and (educational) experiences abroad.

The stability and long term survival of the present European Community and the development of a yet more integrated "Europe" will only be possible if the majority of the citizens possess knowledge about "European" matters, are convinced of the intrinsic importance and value of an integrated Europe, are prepared to identify themselves with such a Europe and to contribute to its realization. Research data with respect to the knowledge, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns with respect to the European Community, presented above, show that these requirements have not yet been met. A legitimacy crisis can be predicted some time in the future for the European Community. This will be even the more likely

if the process of integration is intensified. Unless appropriate actions are undertaken among others, in the fields of information and education.

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160

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