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*Introduction*

What do young people know about politics? What opinions do they have? How extensive or how limited is their interest in politics? Do young people feel as though they can exert influence within the political arena? Do boys and girls differ with respect to these points? Are young people in general more left-wing or more right-wing than the older generation? Does religion still play a significant role in the determination of political preferences? At what age do people become more or less politically conscious?

These are some of the questions which are considered in this book. The answers are applicable to ten European countries.

This book is the result of an initiative taken by the two of us in 1988. We had observed that as far as we could ascertain, no book had been written describing the political socialization of young people in the various European countries.

We decided to invite experts in the field to write a paper on the political socialization of young people in their own country, and to present it at an international conference. This conference was held at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands on November 17 and 18, 1988. All the authors were requested to provide answers to a number of identical questions. After the papers had been presented, a discussion about them was held in which all the authors, as well as other interested parties, took part. The authors were then asked to make any adjustments in their contributions which they might feel were warranted in light of comments made during that discussion. You are now looking at the resultant finished products.

The questions put to the authors were the following ones. What has been ascertained through research studies about political knowledge, opinions, attitudes and behavior of young people in your country? Through which channels do young people acquire their political knowledge, and which

channels exert the most influence upon their opinions, attitudes and behavior? Do youngsters receive an education in politics - in schools, for example; if they do, what are the goals of this educational endeavor? What is the state of the art of political socialization research and theory development in your country? Who is carrying out research, which concepts are employed, which initial steps in theory formation have been taken?

We discovered at the conference that research into political socialization is once again enjoying considerable popularity. One reason for this may be that in recent years we have witnessed far-reaching changes in the political arena. The expanding cooperation and increasing integration of the countries in Western Europe is one example; the democratization of politics in several of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is another. A second possible reason for this upsurge in interest in this topic is that research into political socialization has itself been transformed as a result of the introduction of new research questions and methods.

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## *1 Political socialization theory and research*

### **1.1 Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with information about the "state of the art" in research and theory developments in political socialization.

The following aspects will be discussed:

- goals, areas and methods of political socialization research
- results of political socialization research
- a theory of political socialization.

### **1.2 Political socialization research**

#### **1.2.1 Goals**

Political socialization research generally aims at reaching two types of knowledge-related goals. In the first place, greater insight is sought into how political systems function and develop. In the second place, researchers want to obtain a deeper understanding of how individuals develop a political identity.

One group of political socialization researchers takes the political system as its point of departure. The most important goal of their research is to track down differences in the ways in which political systems function and develop. From this viewpoint, political socialization is seen as a means of developing support for existing political systems, and is also seen as a function of these systems. It is assumed that the way in which political systems function is influenced by the political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns of the citizens. The way in which a country is governed, the degree of harmony and cooperation, the stability of a country's political system, is considered to be linked to the political socialization of the population. Seen from this "system" perspective, political socialization can be defined as "The process through which citizens acquire political views that become aggregated in ways that have consequences for the political life of the nation." (Dawson, et al, 1977:14).

For other investigators, the individual is the focus of research into political socialization. At this level, political socialization is described as being "The process through which an individual acquires his particular political

orientations, his knowledge, feelings and evaluations regarding his political world" (Dawson, et al, 1977:33). The goal of political socialization research at the micro level is to find an answer to the question: When, how and as a result of what do individuals acquire what political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns. What usually inspires political socialization research at this level is concern about the effects of the political socialization of a large number of individuals. Many researchers are alarmed when statistics show them clearly the low level of political knowledge and interest of the "average" citizen, because they assume that there is a relationship between the amount of political knowledge and interest and the level of democratic commitment. One pair of Dutch researchers has warned, for example, "There is a danger that a generation of virtually a-political youth is growing to adulthood, a large part of which - primarily those who are the most economically and socially vulnerable - are now, and will be as adults, susceptible to fascist and racist pressures. Educators, do something about it" (Roeders, Van der Linden, 1983:47). The aim of this type of research, as the quote above indicates, is to provide information which can be used to supplement or correct the political socialization which has already taken place.

Both approaches - the one at the macro (and meso) level and the one at the micro level - are represented in the social science community. The first level is encountered primarily in political science circles, the second among psychologists, specialists in education, and social studies teacher educators. Although the two broad approaches differ in the knowledge goal being strived toward, their societal goal is identical - a more successful socialization process. Their interpretation of what comprises a successful socialization process differs as well, however.

Different views are held of what exactly a "better" political socialization consists of, views which correspond to different theoretical social science positions. Pawelka (1977) distinguishes an empirical-analytical and a critical-dialectical position. The aim being served by empirical-analytical studies is the discovery of how the legitimacy of a political system is generated and/or how it can be enhanced. Critical-dialectical researchers are interested in the opposite process: the surmounting of a socialization process which demands that legitimacy be accorded to the existing "capitalistic" society in which the "true" needs of the subordinate

members of the system are suppressed. Power and alienation are the central issues here.

What political socialization researchers do and what others can do with the outcomes of their investigations, can be summarized as follows: providing recommendations for how the political socialization of citizens can be improved. These recommendations are presented to political advertisers, public information offices, dispensers of political information on television and radio, and in movies and newspapers, to political youth workers, and to social studies teachers. In recent years, social studies teachers have been made more and more aware of the significance which the effects of prior political socialization have upon their school subject. The initial situation in which social studies teachers encounter their pupils, in contrast to the zero level of other subjects, is often "minus ten" with respect to their knowledge, attitudes and skills. A large number of pupils have no, faulty, or completely false conceptions of political matters.

### **1.2.2 Areas of study**

Stated succinctly, the aim of those doing political socialization research is to find an answer to the question: when, how, and as a result of what do which people acquire what political knowledge and which political opinions, attitudes, skills, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns and what is the relationship of these cognitions, opinions, attitudes, skills, behavioral intentions and patterns with what political system?

The following subsidiary areas of study can be derived from these goals:

- relationship between political socialization and political systems;
- effects of political socialization: political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns;
- correlations between political socialization and characteristics of the individual being socialized (gender, social environment, age, cognitive and moral development, social-economic status);
- political socialization processes;
- political socialization agents and, within them, political socializers.

In each of these research areas, attention can be focused on the political system of one's own country, the political system of other countries, the political system of the European Community, and the systems of other organizations of international cooperation (national political socialization, European political socialization, international political socialization).

Comparative political socialization research compares one country's political socialization with that of one or more other countries, and/or that of the European community, and/or that of other international political bodies.

Later on we will present some recent research findings for each of these subsidiary research areas; we will turn our attention first, however, to the research methods employed.

### **1.2.3 Methods**

Use is made in political socialization research of those methods most commonly employed in social science research involving data acquisition: written (mailed) questionnaire, interview, and systematic content analysis.

The validity and reliability of research is dependent upon the methods employed. Recently, these methods have been criticized (in the Netherlands: Foeken-Rubinstein, 1985; Charmant, 1986 among others).

The following comments can be made concerning various different research studies of the effects of political socialization. In the first place, the question can be asked whether the knowledge which has been measured (knowledge of names of politicians, for example), as well as the opinions and attitudes, are the most relevant ones for discovering what we actually want to know (for example, from the perspective of the competencies which are necessary to be able to vote). In the second place, political behaviour is measured by asking the respondents about it in retrospect, with all the concomitant dangers of distortion. Measures are not always taken to avoid obtaining socially acceptable answers to the questions asked by researchers. (In the Netherlands more people systematically report being a member of a political party than there are registered members of political parties.)

The approach used most often in investigations of the influence of various political socializers is the tracking down of conformity of political viewpoint of the socializer with those being socialized. It is perfectly possible, however that influence has been exerted without it having led to any conformity of insight, opinion, attitude, behavioral intention and/or behaviour; the person being socialized may have formed totally different opinions. Influence may well have been exerted, however, in spite of the absence of a conformity of opinion: the person being socialized does or fails

to do something, thinks or doesn't think about something that he/she would otherwise not have thought about or done, as a result of his/her interaction with the socializer. Another reason why influence may have been exerted while no conformity of opinion or action has been reached, is that a number of socializers may have been working simultaneously. Even if there is conformity, it can be due to the influence of other socializers than that particular one. Both the socializer and the person being socialized may both, for example, have derived their points of view from a third party. It might have been a coincidence. Still another possibility is that even more influence was exerted on the person being socialized by another socializer. In addition, the fact that there is agreement does not make it possible to specify in what direction the influence is being exerted. Statements are sometimes made about the influence of a socializer without involving other potential socializers in the analysis. Some other dubious research practices are the following: in interviews with "parents", questions are sometimes directed exclusively toward the father; sometimes the children are asked to disclose information about the political knowledge, and so forth possessed by their parents; and researchers also sometimes use aggregated data instead of data which is obtained from "real" parents.

It is my impression that the written questionnaire (sent to respondents and returned by them by mail) is the method used most often for obtaining data in political socialization research. This method is relatively cheap, and the data obtained using it can be processed relatively quickly. A serious disadvantage of the method is the relatively high percentage of non-response.

Another aspect of the methods which can be criticized is that the sample is often small.

The criticism directed toward the political socialization research which has been carried out has led a number of writers to advocate introducing changes in the commonly-used research design. Suggestions have been made that the following (additional) methods be used: questionnaire with open-ended questions, in-depth interview, systematic observation, experimental research and/or autobiographical storytelling.



### 1.3 Political socialization and political systems

In investigations of the relationship between political socialization and political systems, an answer is sought to the question: which political knowledge, opinions, attitudes, skills, behavioral intentions, and behavioral patterns are the outcome of or contribute to the functioning of which political systems?

In most publications, researchers concentrate on the relationship of political knowledge, and so forth, and democracy.

The following cultural prerequisites for a stable democracy are often named: a felt need to participate politically, feelings of (national) solidarity and of connectedness with fellow citizens, attachment to and belief in the legitimacy of the democratic system, political efficacy, democratic attitude (willingness to settle differences according to certain rules, by eschewing violence for example), openness for other opinions, tolerance, acceptance of human equality. It seems probable that the degree of political democracy in a given society will be greater to the extent that the fundamental principles of democracy are more frequently and more intensively supported. The problem of the chicken and the egg is applicable in this area: is political culture the cause or the effect of a stable democracy? No convincing research data is available, and therefore lines of reasoning in the direction of interdependence are considered to be more realistic than argumentation propagating a causal relationship. The political system is based upon the existing political culture, and at the same time influences that culture. The political system can make available a great deal or very little information. The processes in the political system can be seen to be more or less interesting by the population, which can influence their interest in politics as a whole. The political system can be more or less open to demands issuing from the citizenry, which in turn has an effect upon political efficacy. Further research is urgently needed. A central focus of such research could be: what political knowledge, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns are the minimum needed for which type of democracy?

### 1.4 Political socialization effects

In research into the effects of political socialization an answer is sought to the question: what political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, be-

havioral intentions and behavioral patterns do individuals have at a given point in time?

A relatively small number of researchers have charted the political knowledge, and so forth of youngsters. (In the Netherlands: De Hond, 1981; Flohr, 1982; Hagendoorn en Janssen, 1983; Van der Linden and Roeders, 1983; De Hond, 1983; Wurtz and Buning, 1985; Bosma, 1986; Raaymakers, Meeus, Vollebergh, 1986; Van IJzendoorn, 1986; Almer, Matznetter, Vlug, 1986; Sikkema, 1988; and others).

The following picture has emerged with respect to young people in the Netherlands. They have very limited knowledge of political structures and processes at the national level. Their knowledge of provincial and local politics is even more limited. Knowledge of international political structures fares somewhat better (with the exception of European Community political structures). Many of them display a tendency to personalize politics and to rely exclusively on psychological explanations to explain political phenomena. There is very little interest within this group for national parliamentary politics. The interest in international politics is somewhat greater. There is yet more interest in the content of certain political problems (disarmament for example). A large number of young people are critical of the society as it is now; they think more progressively than adults about many problems. When asked which party they would vote for if there were elections, one-third of the youthful citizens questioned said that they did not yet know, or did not want to say. The confessional parties are not particularly popular among young people. One-third of this group of young people has a mediocre or poor level of political efficacy. About half of them are politically cynical. Two-thirds are suspicious of politics. Information about political topics reaches very few young people via radio and television. Young people likewise learn very little about political topics from newspapers. Although they do usually read a newspaper (generally only one, and a local one at that), they usually begin with local news; the list of preferred reading then proceeds from a rough scanning of the newspaper as a whole, to current events, then the 'human interest' or 'show' page and the advertisements, then the sports page, the sensational items like disasters, accidents and crime, and only then the political news. The financial and cultural news are at the end of the list. Young people read virtually no weekly news magazines. In general, young people do not take advantage of their right to vote. When they are asked why not, they say most often: "I don't know

enough about it". Extremely few young people are active in political processes (such as political campaigns and activities of political youth organizations).

It should be noted that investigations among young people (in the Netherlands) of political knowledge, skills and so forth have until now been considerably fragmented (different researchers, different formulation of central research problems, different research instruments, different populations being studied). An important step would be for the investigations themselves to be investigated with respect to validity, reliability and relevance. It should be sought out whether the knowledge and so forth being investigated is as relevant as possible within the context of the competencies required for voting in elections and taking part in other important political processes.

### **1.5 Political socialization and characteristics of those being Socialized**

Research into the correlations between political socialization and characteristics of those being socialized attempts to find an answer to the question: which political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns are acquired by people of which gender, what age, with what level of education, in what social and economic position, in a state of what physical and mental health, what level of cognitive and moral development, what philosophy of life, and so forth. The characteristics: gender, age, level of education and state of health are considered in the following section.

A number of research projects have established that connections exist between political socialization and gender. In the Netherlands, boys are clearly more interested in politics than girls. More boys than girls say that they would like to have the right to vote. More boys than girls say they would vote if made eligible. A notable fact is that, beginning at age twenty-two, the difference between boys and girls on this point disappears in the Netherlands. Girls have fewer racial prejudices than boys. In future political socialization research it would be interesting to investigate how, when, and as a result of what, these differences between boys and girls originate.

Age and political socialization is a topic which is particularly popular among those who would like to use the results of their research for ma-

king concrete recommendations for political education. Occupying a particularly central position are the questions of at which age individuals acquire the first and the greatest amount of political knowledge, and the most important political attitudes and behavioral intentions. If it becomes known at what point incorrect insights (for example, "The King makes all the final decisions") and undesirable attitudes (for example, ethnic prejudices) are acquired, then more will also be known about the best age for parents and teachers to begin with political education. Prevention is better and easier than cure. Results of investigations are not identical. Some say that the years between zero and five are the most important ones. Others believe the five to nine-year old age span to be the most important. Yet others consider the years between nine and thirteen to be the most crucial. Finally, another group of researchers maintain that the adolescent years, between about thirteen and eighteen years old, are the most important. The varying results of these research projects can be traced to the differences in exactly what was being investigated (knowledge, or opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions or behavioral patterns). These results have led to the formulation of four different ways of approaching political socialization (Dawson et al., 1977). These four models complement one another in a certain sense. The "primacy principle" and the "structuring principle", in which experiences in early youth are considered the most important, appear to be applicable to the generation of fundamental political loyalties (for example, loyalty toward democracy), identifications (with political symbols and authorities, for example) and fundamental political insights (for example - the Netherlands is a small country, but it is located in the center of the world). The intermediate-period model seems to be applicable to the acquisition of knowledge of political structures and processes and of more specific political attitudes (party preference, for example). The recency model would seem to apply best to the explanation of concrete political choices with respect to current political problems and political candidates. Each of the four models is therefore useful for the investigation of a certain type of political learning. The more fundamental and more amorphous the political orientations, the earlier in life they seem to be acquired. The more specific they are, the more they seem to be influenced by recent experiences - more of which, of course, have been gone through when an individual is older. Thus the political socialization which takes place at an early age does not determine everything which follows, nor does this early socialization prepare the individual completely for everything which confronts him/her when he/she is older. Political

socialization is taking place in the course of an individual's entire life. The political knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral patterns of adolescents and adults are not determined by the preceding stage of political socialization but they are influenced by it. There are also periods in the lives of adults when they suddenly change their opinions and attitudes. Such periods are ones in which significant alterations take place in personal circumstances (marriage, divorce, having children, children leaving home, serious illness, becoming unemployed, retirement, death of immediate family, and so forth). During these periods of upheaval, insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns which have been acquired previously can alter because they become inadequate or of marginal importance for dealing with the new situation. Important changes in the social and political spheres (occupation of one country by another, threat of a new world war, revolution, for example) can be the immediate cause for alterations in political orientations as well. Age does not in itself tell us much about political socialization. The important element is the other variables which are so often linked to age such as personal characteristics, social position, and social and political experiences. It is important that those providing political information and social studies teachers realize that the group they want to reach - no matter how young - is not composed of individuals who are, politically-speaking, "virgin soil".

We thus arrive at the third personal variable: education.

Various investigations have shown that there is a correlation between the level of education and political competence. The higher the level of education which has been achieved, the more individuals feel compelled to participate in politics, the more interested they are in political affairs, and the more they do in fact take part in political activities, such as working for political campaigns. Level of education does, therefore, in itself have an influence on political involvement. It is difficult, however, to find an explanation for why this is the case. The level of education is, of course, narrowly linked to a number of other variables (such as income), which are in turn highly correlated with the level of political knowledge, skills, and so forth. Dawson et al. (1977) proposed four hypotheses as a first effort toward finding an explanation. The first is: people with a higher level of education receive more political information (because of their reading habits, travel experience, friendship patterns and leisure activities). Secondly, people with a higher level of education are accustomed as a re-

sult of their social activities to take part in collective decision-making; this experience helps them to acquire knowledge and skills which can easily be adapted for use in political activities. In the third place, people with more education acquire certain attitudes (self-confidence, for example) which can be utilized in the sphere of politics (political efficacy). In the fourth place, finally, more highly educated people feel that they have more to lose, that there is more at stake, because of their higher social and economic position.

The fourth characteristic of individuals being socialized which is thought to be an important variable in the process of political socialization is the state of health. American research (Schwartz et al., 1975) has shown that people whose health is dubious are more interested in politics, yet less active in politics, than healthy people. The health factor is at least as strong as the variables age, gender and social economic background, according to Pawelka (1977).

## **1.6 Political socialization processes**

Research into processes of political socialization attempts to find an answer to the question: how do people acquire political knowledge, skills and so forth?

The following attempts to explain the "how" of political socialization can be listed: psychoanalytical theory, personality theory, development theory, learning theory, role theory, and resource availability theory (see Pawelka, 1977).

In the first place, psychoanalysts emphasize the importance of the affective processes, and in the second place, the dependance of socialization on the way in which drives are accommodated in the process of interaction between the individual and his/her environment. In the third place, psychoanalysts focus on how experiences in early childhood influence, or even determine, the course of the socialization process. For quite a long time, psychoanalytical approaches dominated the mainstream of socialization research.

Proceeding from the assumptions of "the" personality theory, investigators have made attempts to test what influence is exerted upon political socialization by personal characteristics (health, for example) and psychological traits (feelings of (in)dependence, positive or negative fear of failure).

Developmental psychologists base their analyses on an assumed process of interaction between an active organism and his or her surroundings. In the course of this interaction, children observe an increasingly complex psychological and social environment. A number of different, consecutive stages are distinguished in the individual acquisition of proficiency in thinking and making conscious moral judgements. These different stages of cognitive and moral development are related to different stages of political development in individuals. Both this approach and the previous one have been criticized for their neglect of social-economic and cultural variables.

While psychoanalysts, personality theoreticians and developmental psychologists accentuate the development of intra-personal structures, stimuli issuing from the environment are the center of attention in "the" learning theory. Four schools of thought can be distinguished. The first is the reinforcement theory which says that learning takes place when behaviour is strengthened by means of reward and/or punishment. The second is the theory of imitative learning. According to this theory, learning takes place primarily as a result of identification and imitation. A third line of thought points to the intrinsically-motivated character of learning: individuals learn because the reward for learning is contained within the activity of learning itself. These three ways of looking at the learning process run parallel to three types of relationships between socializer and individuals being socialized: one with potential control in the form of punishment, one with the desire to conform on the basis of attraction, and one based on equality. In addition to these three modes of learning, learning by experience should also be considered. The assumption in this case is that people learn the most (about politics as well) from experience, from living through something. Finally, the theory of behavioral modification of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) should be mentioned. The relationship between attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviour are in the center of this theory. The reverse of "learning" - failure to learn or distorted learning - is also relevant for political socialization research. Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance - or expressed in broader terms, the theory of the pursuit of equilibrium - can prove helpful here. People strive toward consonance (or equilibrium) in their attitudes, and behaviour. Cognitive consistency theories in general focus on inconsistency among cognitive elements, or cognitive-affective consistency. People try to avoid dissonance by shutting themselves off from

certain informations by receiving information selectively, by rejecting information (by refusing to recognize the validity of a source, for example), or by absorbing information selectively.

After having considered these psychological theories, let us turn to a sociological one, "the" role theory. The central factor here is the process by which children are introduced to a repertoire of roles which they will have to be able fulfill (later) as a(n) (adult) member of a group. Two approaches can be distinguished: that of the structural-functionalists, and that of the interactionists. The dominant idea in the structural-functionalist approach is a passive conception of socialization. People assume the roles which are expected of them and behave accordingly. The personality, seen as a collection of roles, is determined by the culture of the society. The personality system becomes a "mirror-image" of the social system. The objection to such a perspective is that roles in our society are not determined by norms which are as unequivocal as is assumed in this model. The interactionist approach involves the individual him/herself. The individual is actively involved in trying to maintain an identity equilibrium, balancing expectations from the environment against the desire not to adapt completely to its demands. This approach also recognizes that the individual is confronted with a number of divergent and conflicting role expectations which must be balanced against one another. It takes into consideration the fact that an individual is forced to interpret roles due to their lack of clarity, and that he/she must learn to live with this lack of certainty about how roles should be fulfilled. In some cases, an individual may dissociate him/herself from certain role expectations. In the interactionist approach, the rigid thesis of reproduction by means of socialization is relativized. Adults have more opportunities than young people to determine for themselves with which role expectations they will be confronted, and to dissociate themselves from certain role expectations. The same is true for people with a more education as compared to those with less education.

Political scientists have drawn attention to "resource availability": people from different social status levels have unequal opportunities for access to the means for acquiring political knowledge, and so forth, and for participating in politics.

This concludes the exposition of the attempts which have been made to gain an insight into the "how" of political socialization. The results of re-



search obtained until now provide very few arguments for preferring one approach above another. Different approaches will be deemed suitable at different times, depending upon the problem to be addressed. In many cases, an interdisciplinary approach will be the preferred one.

Contained in the attempts sketched above to explain the "how" of political socialization is the hidden distinction between direct and indirect, and between intentional and non-intentional political socialization.

Direct political socialization involves the acquisition of knowledge, and so forth which are specifically political in nature. General orientations do not play an intermediate role. Types of processes of direct political socialization have been cited in our earlier exposition of learning theories and role theories.

Indirect political socialization involves the acquisition of knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns which are not in themselves political, but which exert an influence on the subsequent acquisition of specific political knowledge, and so forth. Non-political attitudes are acquired first, for example, and are later targeted on political objects, then becoming political attitudes. It is a process consisting of two steps. The first step is the acquisition of a general attitude or skill. The second is the application of that general attitude or skill to certain specific political objects. Dawson et al. (1977) cite three conceptions of the processes of indirect political socialization: interpersonal transference, apprenticeship and generalization. The concept of interpersonal transference is thought to be applicable to the explanation of the development of attitudes toward authority. According to certain investigators, young children have extremely positive feelings with respect to political authority figures (a president or a king, for example). This is explained by linking these feelings to those acquired at an earlier stage of development with respect to non-political authorities - primarily the parents. Apprenticeship encompasses the "learning" which takes place when the individual acquires non-political skills and attitudes which are later used in a specific political context. In scouting, for example, children - operating within the constrictions of the scouting "rules of the game" - learn how to compete with one another, how to want to win, how to accept defeat and how to choose leaders by voting. Finally, with respect to generalization, acquired social values are only later applied to specific political objects. "The fact that innercity black children have less political

trust of political leaders or lower political efficacy may be part of the generalization from their social values to political objects." (Dawson et al., 1977; 104).

The final distinction to be made here is that between intentional and non-intentional political socialization. We speak of intentional political socialization when one actor attempts to influence the political knowledge, opinions, attitudes, skills, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns of another actor. Non-intentional political socialization takes place when influence has been exerted by an actor who was not deliberately aiming to do so. An example of intentional political socialization is a social studies class in which a teacher tries to persuade students to vote in the coming elections. An example of non-intentional political socialization is a situation in which a young person inadvertently hears a conversation between two people in which it is clear that they feel that members of Parliament fail to take serious notice of what the voters want.

It is as yet unclear which form of political socialization - intentional or non-intentional, direct or indirect - exerts the most influence in general. "Some types of political orientations are more likely to be acquired through direct political learning and others through indirect forms of socialization. For example, identification with a particular political party is most often transmitted directly to an individual by his family, his close associates, or groups to which he belongs. Political predispositions such as political trust, political competence, and political assertiveness may result from indirect forms of political learning. More general self-concepts may be acquired first and only later transferred to political objects" (Dawson et al, 1977:97).

### **1.7 Political socialization agencies**

Research with regard to political socialization agents - and the political socializers contained within them - attempt to find an answer to the question: due to the influence of what agent do people acquire political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns?

The most important agents of political socialization named in literature are: primary groups, educational systems, church, mass communication media, peer groups, employment structures and processes, and political structures and processes.

It is impossible to make statements on the basis of research concerning which socialization agent or agents exert the most significant influence in general. Nor is it possible to say which agent has been the most influential in the case of specific political problems.

Methodological problems are likely to stand in the way of finding answers to these questions for a long time to come. The first problem is that it is impossible to isolate socialization agents in a research design. Agents function concurrently, are linked to one another, influence one another, and function within different political and social-economic structures, cultures and processes. The second problem is that influence of any type is as yet extremely difficult to measure using existing social-science research methods and techniques (see 1.3).

Some investigators have asked young people themselves who they think has exerted the most influence on their political knowledge and attitudes (for example, with respect to a given specific political issue). In the Netherlands, De Hond (1981) asked eighteen and nineteen-year-olds by means of what channels they had come into contact with politics, and which channels had influenced them the most. Programs on radio and television were named most often. Articles in newspapers and news magazines dealing with politics came in second place, followed by "discussions of politics in certain school subjects", discussions about politics at home/with parents. Indicated as being the most influential were: programs on radio and television about politics. The school came in second place, followed by the three other channels. What those being socialized say has happened and what has in fact happened are not necessarily identical. More research continues to be needed into which socialization agents, and which socializers have (had) the most influence on knowledge, on opinions, and so forth, with regard to various political problems.

In such research it is important to recognize that we can only speak of "influence" when there is a message, when that message reaches the individual being socialized by means of some form of communication, and when the person being socialized is receptive to the message. Matthijssen (1972) has made a good start in tracking down (within the framework of role theory) the most important messengers: a referential category (socialization agent, HD) exerts more influence to the extent that it is the first to exert influence on the subject, it functions as a role definer for the subject for a longer period of time, it has more power over the subject, and the

subject believes this power to be legitimate. Factors in socialization processes in socialization-agents are: personal and social characteristics of the person being socialized, personal and social characteristics of the socializers, similarities and differences in orientations and behaviour of the socializers, and the kind of relationship between the person being socialized and the socializers.

This concludes our discussion of political socialization agents and socializers in general. We will now turn to a consideration of each of the agents separately.

### **1.7.1 Primary group**

As far as socializers within primary groups are concerned, hypotheses have been formulated and research has been done into the effects on the political socialization carried out by fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, grandparents and neighbors.

About the effects on political socialization carried out by parents Kent Jennings and Niemi (1974) write that almost without exception the child is more likely to reflect one parent's orientation when that orientation is also shared by the other parent. If one parent's orientation is not shared by the other parent the child is more likely to reflect the mother's orientation. About the effects of the kind of relationship between child and parents Dawson et al (1977:31) say the following. "Several studies have found that parent-offspring correspondence is affected by the amount and type of control that parents exert over their children. Parent-offspring correspondence seems to be highest in cases where the offspring report medium amounts of parental control or what they judge to be the right amount of control."

In many countries, there is virtually no trace of intentional direct political socialization at the primary group level.

Indirect political socialization effects can be expected to flow from the development in children of a sense of self, and from their cognitive and moral development in general. There is, however, very little convincing evidence in the form of research data to support this supposition.

Direct political socialization effects are thought to apply primarily to fundamental political attitudes. The influence of primary groups upon political knowledge, opinions about political problems and upon political beha-

viour is quite limited, according to most research done until now. One of the reasons for this may be that parents are not particularly concerned about the political education of their children.

The most important influence which primary groups have upon the political socialization of children and young adults possibly consists of the fact that they determine to a large extent to what other influences children will be exposed. It is primarily the parents who decide what school children will attend (in the Netherlands: public, protestant or catholic and lower middle or higher level), which television programs their children are allowed to watch (in the Netherlands: protestant, catholic and so forth), with which friends they are allowed to associate, and so forth.

### **1.7.2 Educational system**

The second socialization agent is the school, or put more broadly, the educational system.

As far as socializers within the educational system are concerned, hypotheses have been formulated and research has been done into the effects on the political socialization carried out by the school (type of school, composition of student population, the grouping of that population, decision-making structures), the courses of study (formal curriculum, hidden curriculum, teachers, rituals, textbooks) and the extracurricular activities.

Intentional direct political socialization is considered as taking place in the subjects history, economics, and in particular, social studies. There has been, however, little or no research into what goals are reported as being desired, what goals are in fact being strived toward, and what goals have been achieved in each of the three subject areas. Dekker (1986) found that only half of the experienced social studies teachers in the Netherlands interviewed by him wanted their students to learn something about politics in their classes. Yet even in this category of teachers, a large number of additional topics were named as being important for students to learn. The other half of the teachers interviewed had no desire whatsoever to devote classroom time to politics. Quite a bit of research has been done in the form of content analysis of (social studies) textbooks. The conclusions reached have been mostly critical of textbook content. Anyon, for example, says of the social studies textbooks in the United States: "...they provide conceptual legitimacy to U.S. social

arrangements by omitting social conflict, misrepresenting the realities of economic participation, disguising or rationalizing political and economic power and privilege, de-legitimizing potential economic alternatives, and constraining approved methods of dissent and social change" (1981:204).

The "hidden curriculum" is one source of non-intentional indirect political socialization. Students learn more in school than what is contained in the formal curriculum. Much more takes place during each classroom hour than the simple dispersal of information. In addition, students acquire insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns casually by becoming accustomed to the culture prevailing in the classroom and in the school as a whole. Such a learning culture involves a large number of cultural values which can have political consequences. A few of them are: the acceptance of standardization as a means of exerting control; the acceptance of sex-role determined behaviour; the idea that there is a positive honoring of passive behaviour, conformity, showing respect, providing the answer which the questioner is likely to appreciate, and pretending to feel involved; and finally, the acceptance of the unequal distribution of power as something which is "ordinary", "logical", or "natural". Yet students also learn how to withdraw temporarily and individually from the system by playing hooky and by developing anti-school attitudes. "The basic point here is that attitudes toward achievement, toward change, toward fair play, toward manipulability of the environment, toward cooperation, as well as toward obedience and competitiveness, can be shaped by the cultures of the classroom. Such components of one's world have important 'spillover' effects and shape political outlooks" (Dawson et al, 1977:155).

A general conclusion, cited in many publications, is the following. In the words of Robins (1976:316): "Education in general, and political education in particular, contribute to the survival and stability of the political system."

### **1.7.3 Mass media**

We now turn to the third political socialization agent: the mass communication media.

As far as mass media political socializers are concerned, hypotheses have been formulated and research has been done into the messages and effects carried out by television (programmes), radio (programmes), newspapers,

(news) magazines, popular fiction, comic strips, popular music, art, computer programs and commercials.

Intentional direct political socialization is considered to take place by means of television and radio programs providing political information and propaganda, the political sections of newspapers, political books, politically-involved popular music, and so forth.

Other media messages are responsible for non-intentional direct and indirect political socialization.

Empirical research has not succeeded in uncovering very much about the effects of the various socializers on political socialization. Researchers usually limit themselves to a content analysis of the message, and thus only to the potential effects. The actual effects are, of course, extremely difficult to measure.

Some interesting research data in this area should be noted. Wember (1976) discovered that a large number of people in the Federal Republic of Germany, who had watched politically informative television programs reported having learned something from them, but when asked could in fact tell very little about what they had seen. Prick (1976) ascertained that the language used in radio current events programs in the Netherlands was too difficult for a large number of listeners, so that they failed to understand the "message" of these programs.

#### **1.7.4 Peers**

Peer groups are the fourth socialization agent to be considered.

Political information, opinions and attitudes are passed on in various types of youth groups. In some of these groups, political action is an important goal (Pax Christi, Third World Stores, youth divisions of political parties).

Indirect political socialization falling into this category would be when certain opinions and attitudes are stimulated in the scouting movement, sports clubs or disco groups, for example.

The following are research data bearing upon this area of political socialization. Koprince-Sebert et al. (1974) found some similarity of political attitudes among high school friends. It remains uncertain, whether these friendships are based on this conformity of political attitudes or

upon other qualities. These investigators are convinced, however, that political attitudes can never be the reason behind intimate friendships. It is more likely that people become friends with people who appeal to them for a number of reasons, and that a few -most probably implicit- points of political agreement are only one element among many in that appeal. Another possibility is that the political values of those involved have drawn closer to one another as the friendship has deepened. A combination of both processes may have been taking place. It is interesting to note that girls in the same age group exhibit a higher degree of political conformity with one another than do boys in the same age group. The explanation given for this is that girls are more sensitive to the values of the other people in their social vicinity. In the Netherlands, Van der Linden and Stoop "surmise" on the basis of research outcomes "... that factors such as being able to lean on a group of peers, using a peer group as a reference point, being influenced by one's peers, or being oriented toward the youth culture in a more general sense, all contribute to the desire to have one's own group exert direct influence and to become politically involved" (1977:95).

#### **1.7.5 Employment system**

The fifth socialization agent is comprised of employment structures and employment processes. Socializers are among others: the company (type, composition of population, decision making structure), job training and labor union.

Two problem areas can be distinguished in the literature on the influence of employment structures and employment processes on political socialization. The first area of concern concentrates on the question of how the generation and alteration of political insights, and so forth of individuals are affected by the work that they do. In the second area, the effects of unemployment are investigated.

We turn first to the question of whether the type of occupation has an influence on political insights, and so forth. Intentional direct and indirect political socialization take place within the framework of on-the-job training, day-time education for young employees, and in educational programs run by the labor unions. We can assume that non-intentional direct political socialization takes place due to of the pressure which is brought to bear on employees to acquiesce in existing decision-making structures



and processes, and therefore in the distributions of power on which they are based. This acquiescence is also fostered by the desire not only to keep one's job but to advance upward along the career ladder. Non-intentional indirect political socialization takes place in this area by means of pressure to conform to existing production structures and processes. Work in factories, for example, is expected to reinforce attitudes such as respect for effectiveness, willingness to innovate, standing open for systematic change and planning, and awareness of time. Like the school, the factory is regarded as being a source of political and psychological alienation. "The noise of the assembly line, the monotony of the task, the insecurity of the job, and the impersonality of the organizational structure are related to political apathy or alienation and radicalism" (Sigel and Brookes Hoskin, 1977: 273). Pawelka (1977) reports that various research studies appear to support the contention that occupational "reality" succeeds very rapidly in curtailing the ideologically-tinted conceptions instilled in employees by the political socialization during their educational and training stages. Trainees are markedly less alienated from the political system and its underlying values than are young workers. Investigations demonstrated that people who had succeeded in advancing to higher career levels during their working lives did, in fact, exhibit the tendency to vote more conservatively. But, is political conservatism the cause or an effect of a rise in social status? Some studies demonstrated that ambitious individuals who are motivated to seek promotions in their work already had a positive attitude toward the social status quo at the outset, and already had conservative attitudes which only became more outspoken following their social advancement. It is also striking that a number of researchers have established the fact that a certain degree of uniformity exists among those in a given profession with respect to political opinions, attitudes and behavioral patterns. Too little research has been done to be able to say whether this uniformity of outlook is an effect of being in the profession, or are people with certain political opinions, attitudes and behavioral patterns more likely to choose one profession than another. There is likewise little that can be said about which characteristics of professions increase the chances of agreement with respect to political opinions, attitudes and behaviour, and which do not.

At present, the question of what it means for someone to be unemployed, and what the effects of being unemployed are on political knowledge, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns, is an ex-

tremely important one. Becoming unemployed is assumed to occur in conjunction with a personal crisis, and can as a result lead to a change in fundamental political orientations. An increase in political apathy in particular is expected.

**1.7.6 Political system** Political structures and processes is the last socialization agent to be considered here.

Examples of structures and processes which are expected to exert influence on those being socialized are: the frequent hearing of a national anthem, and seeing other people react dramatically to it; taking part in ceremonies revolving around the national flag; celebrations of the birthdays of national heroes; appreciation of national cultural monuments; meeting and having meaningful exchanges with politicians, policemen, military figures; political participation experiences; political propaganda, and serving in the military.

Political participation can be expected in general to have a positive influence on political knowledge and political action skills. There are differing views of what the effects of political participation are upon political attitudes. One view is that political participation is likely to result in feelings of political powerlessness, political apathy, and distrust of politics, because political participation does not as a rule yield positive results for the participants. Another view is that political participation can be expected to have positive results for the participants, and will therefore lead to a strengthening of political efficacy.

Many persons expect military service to exert considerable influence on political knowledge and attitudes, especially in the case of young people who enlist voluntarily and at a very young age. Conscripts, of course, are also thought to undergo intentional and non-intentional political socialization during their term of military service. Intentional political socialization takes place by means of courses which they are given, and non-intentional political socialization by means of the structures and processes within the military hierarchy.

### **1.7.7 Overview**

This concludes our review of a number of insights and data from research into various separate socialization agents.

Below is presented a diagram of researched and potential political socialization agents and political socializers which can serve as a summary of this section.

**Diagram 1:** Political socializers/political social agents

political socializers political socialization agents	persons groups	institutions organizations events objects
1. Primary group; family	grandparents father mother brothers, sisters neighbors	social environment
2. Educational systems; school	teachers fellow students	education as such school, training institute: - type - composition of population - social stratification, groupformation - internal decision making structure classes: - formal curriculum - hidden curriculum - classroom rituals - textbooks extra curricular activities
3. Church	clergymen	services
4. Mass communication media	presentors actors popular musicians authors	television movies radio newspapers (news) magazines youth-orientated magazines popular fiction comic strips popular music jokes art computer programs commercials, advertisements

political socializers political socialization agents	persons groups	institutions organizations events objects
5. Peers;  friends	friends  companions	(youth, women, men) organizations sub-cultures anti-cultures vacation experiences
6. Employment systems	boss, foreman teachers of job training courses teachers of courses given by the labour union	work in itself unemployment in itself position, job company: - type - composition of population - internal decision making structure job training labour union economic events
7. Political systems	members of the royal family,  president politicians  civil servants police officials judges prison officials	political parties political (youth, women, and so forth) organizations political information services election campaigns military service action groups interest groups political events

### 1.8 Interactive theory of political socialization

In order to impose some kind of order on the results of the research carried out I have tried to find an adequate model or theory of political socialization.

One of the most complete models which I have found is that of Pawelka (1977). Pawelka names four interlocking conditional factors comprising political socialization: the individual being socialized, the agents of socialization and the socializers contained in them, the dominant sub-systems of the society and the peripheral sub-systems of the society.


With the help of this model, findings of political socialization research can be integrated into an interactive theory of political socialization. The central component in the theory is the individual being socialized. Objects of investigation with respect to this individual being socialized are: the political knowledge, insights, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns of this individual, and the relationship between that knowledge and so forth, and personal characteristics such as gender, age, health, level of education, cognitive and moral development, motivation for learning and achieving, anxiety for failure, and self confidence and social characteristics. The second component in the theory are the agencies of socialization; structures and processes within the society which are of importance to the socialization. Falling under these different agents of socialization are various socializers - that is, persons, groups, categories, institutions, organizations, objects, and events which contribute to the individual's socialization. The third component consists of the dominant sub-system of the society. This can be divided into a dominant sub-system which is in power, and a dominant sub-system which is in the opposition. A decision will need to be made on the basis of empirical data as to which sub-system is which at any given time and place. The final component comprises the peripheral sub-systems of the society, which have some significance for the individual being socialized. Like the dominant sub-systems, these peripheral ones must be determined on the basis of empirical data. Part of the systems are the political cultures.

The relationships among these four components are influence relationships. The first influence relationship (A) which is examined is the one between the individual being socialized and the agent of socialization, and the active socializers contained within it. The next influence relationship (B) is the one among the different agents of socialization themselves, as well as among their respective socializers. The third influence relationship (C, D) is the one between the dominant sub-systems and the socialization agents. The anticipated influence exerted by the part of the dominant sub-system which is in power is a stabilizing one, the anticipated influence of the oppositional part of the dominant sub-system is one of the breaking down existing structures. The fourth influence relationship (E, F) is between peripheral sub-systems and the agents of socialization. In addition to these influence relationships, some thought might be directed toward the interdependence between the dominant sub-systems and the peripheral sub-systems. It may be supposed that the

dominant sub-systems are capable of directly influencing the structure of a society, and thus also directly influencing the peripheral sub-systems; it can also be assumed that there is also an influence relationship, though a much weaker one, in the opposite direction.

A visual presentation of the theory is provided in the diagram 2 which follows below.

**Diagram 2:** Interactive theory of political socialization



- O = individual being socialized
- PDS = the part of the dominant sub-system which is in power
- ODS = that part of the dominant sub-system which is in the opposition
- PSS = peripheral sub-system
- = socialization agent
- O = socializers
- > = influence relationship

## 1.9 Summary

Two broad types of approach can be distinguished in political socialization research. The aim of researchers using the macro approach is to obtain insight into the functioning and development of political systems and the role played by political socialization in them. Researchers using the

micro approach are interested in the political identity of individuals. Political socialization researchers using both approaches usually want their investigations to make a contribution to the realization of a "better" political socialization. What comprises a "better" political socialization is, of course, open to lively debate and these ideas of what is "better" correlate in turn with different positions with respect to scientific theory. At the one extreme are those who think that the aim should be to increase the level of support for the existing political system. At the other extreme are those who believe that the aim should be to make people aware of how they are being manipulated by the existing system, to the detriment of their own interests.

The goal of political socialization research in its broadest sense is to find an answer to the following question: when, how and by means of what do people with which personal and social characteristics acquire what political knowledge, opinions, skills, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns, and how are these cognitions, skills, attitudes, and behaviors related to which given political systems?

Five distinctive areas of research can be distinguished: the relationship between the political system and political socialization, effects of political socialization, correlations between political socialization and the characteristics of those being socialized, processes of political socialization and finally, political socialization agents and socializers.

In an effort to improve political socialization research, some authors have recently pleaded for the use of other methods in addition to the traditional method, the written (mailed) questionnaire. Some of the suggestions have included: in-depth interview, systematic observation, experimental research, and autobiographical storytelling.

Models of political socialization have also been developed for the purpose of upgrading research practice. One of the most extensive models is that of Pawelka (1977).

Findings of political socialization research can be integrated into an interactive theory of political socialization.

Political socialization research is a relatively new research area. Interest in this area has, however, been growing rapidly in recent years. It is understandable that so many researchers are intrigued by political socialization. It is, after all, an enigma why one person is interested in politics

and the other not, why one person looks forward eagerly to being able to cast his/her vote, while another throws away his/her voting card the same day he/she receives it. Why can one person sing all the verses of a national anthem with tears in his/her eyes, while another abhors any expression of nationalism, in whatever form. What is the source of these differences? When do they first become apparent? How do they occur? By means of what? Research done up to now has only succeed in making a small beginning at finding answers to these questions.

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## 2 *Political socialization in Hungary*

### 2.1 **Research on political socialization**

#### 2.1.1 **Political socialization in the context of social sciences**

The position of research on political socialization in Hungary is connected to the development of Hungarian political science and sociology. Thus, we must place our theme into this context. Both disciplines had independent beginnings at the turn of the century and the years which followed. After the long intermission of the Stalinist period following World War II, there was a revival of sociology in the sixties and of political science in the eighties.



Although political psychology and political socialization have begun to develop independently within Hungarian social science, it is better to examine research to political socialization together with Hungarian sociology and political science.

Research into political socialization started within the distinctive social-political context of the late seventies. Although the objective of this developing socialist social-political system was the political re-education of society, the results of political socialization research were not taken into consideration in development plans. The Stalinist period had been characterized by the disregard of the individual and by the glorification of the community.

The concept of political socialization, oriented toward social psychology, or in other words towards the individual, was an alien one. Social science was oppressed by an approach which reduced marxism to propaganda and ideological dogmatism. Individual and social consciousness was taken to be a "tabula rasa" which could be filled in freely by political ideology. The renaissance of psychology, sociology and political science in Hungary was connected to the transformation of the principles underlying the social system, to the concern for social and individual autonomy, and to reduction of state interference. Research into political socialization developed within this context, which meant that there was a break with dogmatism oriented toward propaganda. There was another important political-social condition. While in the Stalinist period no distinction was made between the intended and real effects of political education, research into political socialization was rooted in surveys demonstrating the significant difference between intended and real effects of political education. In other words, doubt arose concerning the efficiency of a quantitatively intensive, expansive political-educational system. The present research into political socialization is consciously connected to the increase of individuals' social-political autonomy, to a critical attitude toward existing institutions and to political education.

So far, political socialization research has not produced independent and specific theoretical models. It is characterized more a dependence upon previous work on the theoretical level, and by the application of American, Western-European models to Hungarian and East-European problems (Kéri, 1987/a). Of course, special Hungarian and East-European traditions also play a role. Hungarian researchers are not using Western theories only.

For example István Bibó (1911-1979) (publication from 1986), authors of classic works reporting on political psychology and political culture research, have greatly affected research in this area. Of the Western theories it has been primarily European (French, German, English) concepts which have influenced our researchers. The search for a theory is aimed at forming concepts about relationships existing among the political institution-system, political culture, political participation and socialization at the level of mid-range theories. The following disciplines have influenced Hungarian researchers: the Frankfurt School's theory on the authoritarian personality, the concept derived from the survey of political generations, research on political identity, the theory of value change, research concepts relating to social movements and the analysis of legitimation and institutions.

### **2.1.2 Approaches**

From a theoretical-methodological point of view two main approaches can be differentiated, which were in part institutionalized differently.

One of them evolved in the mid-seventies, and focused on political psychology, public opinion research backed by sociology; more specifically, political identity, political opinion, values, attitudes and political knowledge were the targets of research. Its major representatives are: György Csepeli, Tamás Pál, Anikó Soltész, Péter Schiffer, Ildikó Szabó, Mária Zsiros and Miklós Tomka. These researchers were primarily educated in sociology and social-psychology; some of them are public opinion and mass communication researchers. Their institutional bases are: Institute of Sociology at the Budapest University Eötvös Lóránd, the Mass Communication Research Center of Hungarian Radio and Television and the Youth Research Group of Hungarian Youth Organization. This latter research center, which had been functioning efficiently since the 1970's was terminated and reorganized in 1988. (Their collective publication is Schiffer, 1986.) The work of these researchers served partly as an underpinning for decision-making, providing preparation and information for decision makers of the Hungarian Radio and Television and the Youth Organization.

The other approach is more institution-oriented and has its roots in political science. Its rise is connected to the circle of young teachers working on political theory and political education at the Faculty of Law of the Eötvös

Lóránd University. In 1980 they joined the youth research program of the Institute of Social Science (which belongs to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) where they established a research group called "Political Socialization Group". The head of this group is Zoltán Békés, members are: László Boros, Ilona Dögei, Ildikó Csatári, Agnes Gyulavári, László Kéri, István Stumpf, Máté Szabó and Eva Tóth. Collective publications are Csatári (1985); Kéri, (1987/b). This group can be considered the first and only existing research basis of political socialization in Hungary. The group's work is part of broader social science research programs on youth, which are coordinated by Zoltán Békés (1985, 1988). A comprehensive publication is Gázsó (1987). The main lines of research in the Institute of Social Science are the following: the theoretical-methodological foundation of political socialization's research, the system of education, the institutional system of youth policy, political socialization, the youth organization and political socialization, the sub-cultures of youth movements, the role of reference groups and generations in the process of political socialization. Compared to the first approach, in this one researchers assign a more significant role to the survey of normative and institutional aspects, there is less empirical quantified research, and there is less interest in political psychology and in mass communication. The group's activity is in the service of the scientific foundation of youth policy within the frame-work of youth-sociology research. Researchers are in contact with the Communist Youth Organization; youth movements and organization, political education and the process of becoming a political leader are thus their central research themes.

Naturally it would be a simplification to speak only two approaches existing in the field of political socialization research. There are, for example, analysts operating outside institutional and scientific frameworks. There are also researchers from other sciences who have published important and interesting works on the political socialization of youth, such as: writers and sociographers like János Köbányai or Vilmos Csaplár. There are youth sociology research studies being done with ties to political socialization in several research bases, which are supplementary to the two approaches mentioned above, for example at the Sociology and Political Science Department of the Party's Political College (Jenő Andics, Vilmos Szabó), or at the Institute of psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Science (János Rácz, Katalin Templom, Ibolya Szilágyi).

### 2.1.3 Forum

Researchers in the area of political socialization do not have an institutional, unified forum in Hungary. They only have a common publicational forum, the journal "Ifjusági Szemle", published six times a year. Professional editor was Tamás Fritz, who regularly publishes studies on this theme. The "Ifjusági Szemle Club" functioned for a while; it tried to gather together researchers interested in current issues relating to the political socialization of youth. The Hungarian Association of Political Science, which is a member of the International Political Science Association, has a Political Sociology Section. There were some debates organized on political socialization, but this forum cannot take over the function of regularly organizing professional debates. In this "political science" forum there were no real debates between the representatives of different approaches and institutions. Exceptions, are the national youth policy and youth research meetings where researchers act together. This relatively new scientific area, with a small number of researchers, is only slightly integrated, and as a result the chances for critical communication and debates are limited.

There is very narrow communication with teachers and researchers of pedagogy.

On the other hand there are very good relations with the representatives of political science and educational sociology.

### 2.1.4 Political socialization and political education

Concerning science and politics, the relations of researchers to youth-politicians and to the youth organization are relatively good. Youth policy is willing to use research results including empirical surveys and conceptual proposals. Functionaries of the Communist Youth Organization, partly because of the decreasing membership, feel the demand for changes with respect to the organization and the style of operation. Thus, for example, the University and College Council of CYO declared that it is willing to give up its monopolistic position in the political representation of youth and is supporting the organization of different informal groups, and is transforming the system of political education. Political socialization researchers of the Institute of Social Science played an active role in the transformation of political education's contents and style. There are other positive examples concerning the experiment on the involvement of high

school students in school affairs (Pál, 1987). A part of youth politicians are serious in their requests for research results and their implementation. The favourable reformsituation in Hungary since the spring of 1988 offered positive scope for the political implementation of research results relating to political socialization.

### **2.1.5 Comparative studies**

Certain results of political socialization research in Hungary may probably be extrapolated to other socialist countries (in East-Europe) since similar institutions and processes influence the political socialization of youth there. Of course this is only hypothetical as long as no empirically founded comparative research studies exist. Unfortunately there are no such research programs, although there are possibilities for such comparative analyses.

Because of the lack of East-European points of comparison, the reference points in the case of many investigations - even if it is not made explicit in all cases - are Western processes, because Western models are being used. This on one hand has a heuristic force, but on the other hand it makes comparison difficult because of the differences in the two social-political systems and political cultures. This is why comparative research using Eastern European countries is necessary. Integrated and coordinated youth-sociology research (Gospodinov, 1986), has been done, but the issues of political socialization have not received proper attention so far. Areas of research cooperation exist between Polish, West-German, Austrian and Hungarian research bases primarily with respect to themes of youth sociology (values of youth, their position within the social structure), though not in the specific area of socialization. There are several proposals for the development of international comparative research projects. In my opinion, comparative research is made difficult by the differing evaluations of political systems and cultures, which leads to divergent categories and problem-sensitivity.

The "Research Committee on Political Education" (RCPE) of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) has an important influence on Hungarian political socialization research. (Its head is Bernhard Claussen.) This relationship with the international research forum has proved fruitful for Hungarian researchers and it has also established links of communication among Hungarian researchers themselves.

## 2.2 Effects of political socialization

In this relation I would like to introduce some major theses of Hungarian literature concerning the problems of political socialization in Hungary. These problems are summarized with the following key words: lost youth, negative identity and distracted socialization.

"Lost Youth". The extremely centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian character of the socialist political system is keeping youth away from official, formal socialization institutions. Thus the disinterest in politics, passivity and the inclination towards anarchism is spreading among them (Agh, 1988).

"Negative Identity". A crisis in and scarcity of social and political communities can be observed in Hungary. Thus, the same young people who reject formal institutions systems are unable to rely on communities like family, nation or local communities. This is accompanied by a tendency toward secularization, so that religion and church cannot provide them with an identificational background, especially not from the point of politics, since Hungarian churches support the existing social-political system. Thus an irrational-utopistic, fundamentalist identification demand evolves for communities (Csepeli, 1988/a).

"Distracted Socialization". Since formal organizations and social institutions and communities do not supply youth with a proper identification basis, the process of political socialization is rather contradictory. Youth is building an existence among inconsistent, contradictory effects which neutralize one another and which are unable to promote their growth toward becoming adults with critical and participating capabilities. The conserving, manipulative tasks of political education cannot be achieved either (Kéri, 1986).

Research results (Gazsó, 1987) show that the political view of youth is primarily dominated by foreign policy. Thus politics for them is defined something which is and global, and which is very far away from them. They do not consider school and local community matters as being "politics" (in local matters they have no opportunity for participation and receive no relevant information). The news being presented to them by mass communication becomes a special "politics-substitute" for them, and they identify "real" politics with their superficial knowledge of foreign policy.

### **2.3 Agents of political socialization**

Which are the major agents and factors of political socialization in Hungary? What kind of results are obtained from their description and analyses? We will pay attention to the family, school, church, youth organizations, local community, nation and informal agents.

#### **2.3.1 Family**

The family's role as the primary socialization agent significantly depends upon the problems originating in its structural position. Hungary is characterized by the monogamous, small family. Its educational and socializational functions display a tendency towards decreasing in significance of the growing employment of married women. The family is primarily an economic unit and recession is placing increasing burdens in this social institution which has already been in crisis for some time. At the same time, the family's function of stimulating individual autonomy and privatism is becoming more significant, since the only counterforce to bureaucratic institutions' demand for total political education has been the family where different types of individual identification was possible. This situation which characterized the nineteen forties and fifties had begun to change by the nineteen sixties, when the spread of private autonomy stimulated the transformation of the family into an economic, productive and consuming unit. The consistently similar results of political socialization research (Dögei, 1986; Kéri 1987/b; Szabó Ildikó, 1986, and 1987/b) show that communication is decreasing within Hungarian families. A privatist-economic, anti-political value system, which instills young people with a "defensive" attitude towards politics, has become dominant. The family often produces a contraproductive effect to those strived towards by political and educational institutions and political education. A major source of the "anti-politics" attitude of youth is ongoing political socialization of families which prepares them for political passivity.

#### **2.3.2 School**

The sociologic, pedagogic and psychologic literature devoted to school system is very broad in Hungary. I cannot introduce literature here, but must refer to a widespread thesis stating that the social "side effects" of the crisis apparent in the centrally-guided socialist political and economic system primarily manifest themselves in the family, in school and in the

institutional system of social policy. This decreasing efficiency is probably the most pronounced in the case of school, since it is a centrally-guided, hierarchic, homogeneous organizational system which is directly affected by legitimization crises of the political system. The family as a primary group is not affected by this problem of legitimization.

According to Hungarian research (Kéri, 1987; Szabó Ildikó, 1986; Tóth, 1986), the school system had a significant role in political education until 1956 which has been taken over by the social-political youth organizations (Hungarian Pioneer Organization and the Communist Youth organization) that are partly entwined with school. School is playing an indirect role in political education in Hungary today. This role is important because the school is transmitting the authoritarian and conformistic expectations of the bureaucratic-centralized-hierarchic organization to students.

Students have no self-governing bodies in primary and secondary schools and they have no right of participation in school matters. Students self-government exists in universities and colleges, and there are efforts to realize self-governing bodies in certain high schools (Pál, 1987). The direct functions of school in political education are not significant. In primary school there is a short and primitive subject called "Citizenship". No such subject exists in high school. Students get a certain picture of the present social-political system through social-philosophy and history. Political education in universities and colleges is provided in the subject "Scientific Socialism" which handles the political theory of Marxism and which will be changed to political science in the future.

Altogether we get a contradictory picture of the role of the school in political education. Directly, as first organizational experience, it is a determining factor in the political socialization of youth and promotes the development of a conformist, anti-political authoritarian personality. Direct political education has been handed over by schools to youth organizations, and it carries out this function in a contradictory manner. Thus, it contributes to the underdevelopment of political knowledge and abilities, since efficient citizen education is totally lacking.

### **2.3.3 Youth organizations**

The youth movement had a pluralist structure in Hungary before 1945. Churches, political organizations, and so forth had their own youth organizations. The youth movement was unified, centralized and homogenized



after the 1948 takeover of the communist party. Communist organizations were in a monopolistic position and since 1957 there has been only one organization, the Communist Youth Organization (for those between the ages 14 - 30) in existence. The only organization for children has a similar monopolistic character (Hungarian Pioneer Association for age groups 6 - 14). These two organizations were deeply intertwined with the school. Their leaders or functionaries were teachers, their organizational structure was tied to that of the school.

This situation results in a contradictory role being played by young people's political organizations in the process of political socialization, which has been analyzed by researchers (Gazsó, 1987; Kéri, 1987; Stumpf, 1985/a, 1985/b, 1986; Szabó Ildikó, 1986). Anyone may become a member of these organizations. There is no special selection. At present, membership is neither obligatory nor officially sanctioned (as it was in the 50's), but members may be afforded certain limited advantages. The ratio of membership has significantly decreased in universities and colleges; in certain institutions the ratio of members is around 10%. The members' activities are largely formal and ritualistic with the exception of an active minority who wish to exploit their function within the organization to gain political or economic advantages. The decrease in membership and the formality of activity is connected to the fact that both organizations are functioning as monopolistic bureaucracies; their entwinement with school is inorganic; they have no independent function or are not carrying out their functions efficiently. From the point of view of political socialization the most important role played by young people's political organizations is political education. The only significant effect is upon the education of functionaries of these organizations. For the majority of young people, neither the school, nor the youth organization supplies the basic building blocks of citizen education which are necessary for becoming a well-rounded political personality (Szabó Máté 1988/a).

Summarizing: according to Hungarian political socialization research, family, school and youth organizations all play a dysfunctional and counterproductive role in the socialization of citizen eligible for autonomous political activity (Kéri, 1987; Szabó Ildikó, 1986). None of these institution types are carrying out their elementary socializational functions. They do not supply the frame-work of political communities with which the individual can identify. They are not fulfilling the functions of political education. The dysfunctional functioning of these institutions in the process of

political socialization leads to a situation in which individuals keep politics at a distance, fail to identify with any given political value system, possess little or no political knowledge, and are incapable of (in the case of young people) processing new information.

#### **2.3.4 Army**

In addition to the family, school and youth organization we must consider the army in its role as socialization agent; it acts as a force in the reproduction of political system and it influences the development of a collective conformist political personality. There are no published research results concerning the socialization role of the army in Hungary. As a result of the general compulsory military service (18 months) and of the compulsory political education in the army, the army as a factor of political socialization cannot be omitted.

Family, school, youth organization and army function dysfunctionally from the point of democracy and critical participation; they do successfully promote the attitudes of conformity, political passivity and of obedience to the dictates of existing institutions. For the majority of youth and for the society as a whole this is in fact a preparation for a life-long anti-politicism, political passivity and a vacuum with respect to identification. The existence of politically passive "silent majority" contradicts the declared aims of political education, but it really is securing the stability of the political system. Alongside the "silent majority" there are two politically active minority groups within Hungarian youth. One group takes advantage of the opportunities provided by political education and youth organization for individual career purposes, for getting into the political elite, for gaining leadership. The other minority takes part in nonformalized, spontaneous alternative forms of policy-making in the area of civil society (Szabó Máté, 1988/b).

#### **2.3.5 Church, local community and nation**

Social community forms, political institutions, the family, school and the youth organizations legitimized by the political system are dysfunctional from the point of view of a socialization process which is acting to form critical, politically participating personalities. This gap is not filled by those community forms which are "dissenters" or which occupy at least an

ambivalent position within the socialist political system: the church, the local community and factors relating to "the nation".

The church is a non-marxist social organization acknowledged and tolerated by state. The role of church has been strongly suppressed since 1945 with respect to political socialization, and it has not played as important a role in this process as it has in Poland or East Germany.

Local communities were virtually destroyed by extreme centralization and industrialization in Hungary. The crisis in and lack of communities in Hungarian society is a widespread thesis in Hungarian sociology. As a result of the extremely centralized, bureaucratic state administrative organization, the pauperism of local societies and communities prevents local political activity. Thus, local community is either not functioning as a direct political socialization factor, or similarly to family it stimulates anti-political attitudes and passive resistance to macro political concerns, although it carries within itself a potential for autonomy (Garami, 1987, A. Gergely, 1988).

The nation was degraded in the socialist value system for a long time by referring to an abstract internationalism. Of the Hungarian researchers it is primarily Csepeli, György (1982/a, 1985, 1987, 1988/b, 1988/c) who is concerned with the role of nation and national consciousness. He analyzed the complex, multifaceted disturbances of national identity, the intolerance against minorities, the schizophrenia of national self evaluation, and so forth.

These community forms cannot be seen as factors of democratic political socialization which are acting in opposition to the official institutions in Hungary. Church, local communities and nation are not seeking to prepare individuals for democratic political activity, nor are they contributing directly to the development of conformity with official politics. All three political community-types are receptacles of values and attitudes of Hungarian political culture which contain within them the seeds of non-conformity with the aims of official political education; this potential non-conformity may become actualized from time to time.

Since the spring of 1988, the new Hungarian political leadership has been trying to exploit the existing social mobility potential of these community-types in the service of official politics and political education. They are accorded a greater political role, which increases their importance in political socialization. Hopefully, this process will not push the political socializati-

on role of these communities exclusively in the direction of conformity with the system, but it will also increase or liberate their potential political socialization effects in the direction of the formation of democratic political personality.

### **2.3.6 Informal agents**

Under informal agents I shall include the "fluid" and "flexible" factors of political socialization which cannot be connected to organizations or institutions: mass-communication, youth culture and subculture, age groups and social movements. These political communities do not endure from generation to generation like the nation, the family, church and local communities; their origin and effects are largely linked to one generation, or their life-span is even shorter, and is transitory in character.

Youth as a specific social group is handled separately by the sociology of mass-communication and by public opinion research, because the political socialization effects of communication have a special manifestation for this group (Szabó, Ildikó, 1986). As a result of mass-communication's state monopoly, the intended political effects of mass-communication were to support official politics and political education in Hungary. Since the spring of 1988, as a result of the new political style, a certain degree of pluralization and openness can be observed with respect to information policy. While earlier mass-communication, similarly to family, school and youth organization and the army, promoted conformity and political passivity from the point of view of political socialization, its new effects will be manifested only in the long range. According to surveys, young people display very little interest in political programs on television; they prefer light entertainment. Political news as it is presently presented on television produces a special, foreign policy oriented semi-culture which organically complements political illiteracy.

A very important factor in the political socialization of youth in Hungary is "alternative publicity". As a result of the official mass-communication monopoly, the themes neglected in political information and education receive unofficial publicity. The main consumers are young intellectuals. Young intellectuals' political socialization is greatly influenced by channels of alternative publicity. Alternative publicity developed in several ways in Hungary. The so called "dissenters" have existed in Hungary ever since the "Budapest School" founded by Gyögy Lukács in the mid-nineteen seventies

was forced by administrative and political measures into the opposition. It was this group of highly qualified "differently thinking" intellectuals interested in politics which gave rise to alternative publicity. They established a "samizdat" press and book publishing, and the so-called "flying universities" held in private apartments, where youth was informed on the "real" history of Soviet Union, the problems of human rights, and so forth. These forms of alternative political education had significant influence on students and young intellectuals primarily in Budapest. Alternative publicity increased in the early eighties, as a result of the effects of the Polish crisis and that of our own leadership. Its new forms appeared: circles organized within or outside universities, clubs, associations, which fleshed out the network of alternative publicity (Diczházi, 1987; Kéri, 1987; Stumpf, 1988). In these debate-forums, built primarily on verbal communication, youth received political information which differed from that provided in official political education. They learned new skills and abilities: free debate, self-administration and self-organization. The themes of the debates were: the crises of the Hungarian social-political system, its reform, national identity, minorities, environment protection and peace policy. All of these issues were approached differently than in official information.

The third wave, in the early and mid-eighties is going beyond alternative publicity and is leading to political activity. By the middle of the nineteen eighties, a special network of alternative organizations have developed which are run by young people themselves which include clubs, movements and groups where people think differently and make different political decisions (Agh, 1987; Bilecz, 1987; Szabó Máté, 1988/a, 1988/c). The main elements in this process are the alternative peace movement, ecology movement, the club-movement, the student movement, the collegiate self-administration movement and the new wave of association's establishment. By 1988 the situation has ripened to the extent that alternative youth organizations have organized the "Association of Young Democrats" (FIDESZ) which is trying to organize politically the youth that is taking part in alternative politics.

Alternative publicity and alternative movements are factors of political socialization aimed at transforming the authoritarian political personality in Hungary. Self administration, self organizational system has produced a group of non-conformiste youth dealing with politics. Of course this is only a minority within Hungarian youth, but it deserves attention for several

reasons. On one hand, it is primarily recruited from university students who are the intellectual elite of the future, which has the potential for carrying out "silent revolution" by means of the change of elites (Szabó Máté, 1988/e). On the other hand, the new leadership, following the close-down of the Kádár-period, is consciously intending to build on social self-organizational experiments, to break away from the previous policy of administrative control and sanctioning. Thus, for example a decision has been made to issue a new act on associations which would contain the right to demonstration. The party's Institute of Social Science (Group of political socialization) is attempting to set up research into alternative policy-making within the research program "The Role of Spontaneous Youth within Hungarian Youth" (from 1986 to 1990). They are trying to survey this new area through case studies and interviews, making use of Alain Touraine's "sociologic intervention" method. Similar research is going on in Poland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which reflects the interest and attention paid to this phenomenon by the youth sociology of socialist countries. The analysis of youth culture, subcultures and age groups has been accorded an important place in Hungarian socialization research (Kéri, 1987; Szabó Ildikó, 1986). Deviant youth subcultures and cultural trends (or those which were considered deviant by politics and public opinion) have existed in Hungary since the 1960's. Some of these cultural entities such as gangs, drug addicts, homeless hobos, aggressive punks and skinheads have been made the focus of deviancy and subculture researches (Csörsz, 1986; Gyulavári, 1986; Köbányai, 1986/a, 1986/b; Rácz, 1986, 1988). From the point of view of political socialization these groups can be described in terms of their attempts to break out of formalized, bureaucratized institutions, and to reject them. Against the glass-house of political passivity, which hinder all types of conformist and non-conformist activity including alternative political activity.

The different trends of youth culture are not unanimously aggressive, deviant and anti-political in Hungary. There is, for example, the "folk" youth culture, the dance-house movement, or the "folk" trends of young music which have an indirect political nature and promote the commitment to national and local community values (Szász, 1983, 1987). There is another, directly political trend within youth culture, which is more urban and European. It deals with global issues, and is committed to liberalism and democracy instead of national values. The contradiction between "folk" and

"urban" is a part of twentieth century Hungarian political thinking as well as the debates of the youth movements (Bozóki, 1987).

## 2.4 Summary

How could we summarize the picture resulting from the research done to examine the processes and contradictions of political socialization in Hungary? Literature globally agrees that official socializing institutions and organizations are in crisis; their transformation and the establishment of new ones is necessary. According to some researchers, alternative policy-making forms are just such innovative factors, which are challenging the existing institutional system and thus promoting its transformation. Others call for change through the transformation of existing institutions from above. Hopefully the professional and political debate which has been lacking until now will take place between the researchers of political socialization, which could yield useful results for the transformation of Hungarian society's institutional system, primarily in social, educational and youth policy.

From the perspective of development the influence of the present social-economic crisis on youth is of essential significance, as are its effects on political socialization. In my opinion, the crisis will decrease the efficiency of institutional socialization mechanisms among young people. One answer to the crisis will be increasing deviant processes together with the rejection of politics, although the crisis may produce other reactions among youth. Different forms of collective activity may appear in addition to a lessening of social-political restrictions from above and these activities may increase in strength. With the cooperation of movements and institutions, mechanisms of political learning and innovation may be put in motion which can promote the formation of a democratic personality with the capability of criticism, debate and participation. The options of political apathy and collective activity are open to Hungarian youth, today. The transforming style of political leadership and the promise of a more open and democratic society may contribute to the removal of political socialization's serious disturbances and contradictions. Political socialization research may become an actor in this process with its criticism concerning the existing structure and with proposals for transformation.

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### 3 *Political socialization in .i.poland*

#### 3.1 Introduction

While there was a great deal of interest in political socialization among western social scientists through the nineteen sixties and seventies, with the interest waning after this period, in Poland the subject only began to be popular from the beginning of the nineteen eighties, and has continued to be so up to the present. The social unrest of the years 1980-1981 and the great number of young people taking part in an awakening political activity, followed by an ongoing deep economic and political crisis and its consequences in the sphere of social consciousness and behaviour, all gave

rise to problems which provided an impulse for a number of empirical studies and theoretical discussions in the field of political socialization.

### **3.2 .i. Research on political socialization**

#### **3.2.1 Start**

Before the end of the nineteen seventies the term "poli-tical socialization" was hardly ever used in Polish sociology and the theories and research findings developed under this notion in the West were not very well known. Although the situation has changed considerably, even now it is not very often that the Polish social scientists use the term "political socialization", nor do they use intentionally the theoretical frameworks produced by it. But the problems they consider are very much problems incorporating the crucial issues of political socialization.

Moreover, problems connected with political socialization have been present in Polish social sciences for a long time. First they were discussed within the framework of the sociology of education. The development of this subdiscipline in Poland is closely connected with the name of Znaniecki<sup>1</sup>. Although he did not directly involve himself with the problems of political socialization, he formulated several findings about the socialization processes in general. His "Sociology of Education" (1928-1930) uncovered new possibilities regarding the educational process from a sociological perspective, until then treated as an exclusively pedagogical problem.

Chalasinski (1958), a pupil of Znaniecki, modified his theory of education by introducing a class perspective to the theory.

Another pupil of Znaniecki, Szczepanski, came most close to the very specific problems of political socialization (Szczepanski, 1964, 1972). In his works he directly considered the problems of political socialization in socialist societies. He stressed the impact of political and economic institutions on personality development. He also considered the possible social and psychological effects derived from a domination by the political sphere over other spheres of human activity (economy, culture).

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<sup>1</sup> Florian Znanieckis; most known in the West for his work together with William Thomas; "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America", 1918-1920. He had a great impact on Polish sociology. Some works printed in USA are: F. Znaniecke "Cultural Rality" (1919), "Social Actions" (1936), "Social Relations and Social Roles" (1965), "The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge" (1968).

This, however, was quite exceptional for that period, when most authors concerned with political education in Poland contented themselves with a purely theoretical and postulative approach. We could give a long list of these educationists and social philosophers (for example Kozyr-Kowalski, Ladosz, 1972; Muszynski, 1972) who produced longer or shorter descriptions of desired charter features of "the Socialist Man"; they made no clear distinction between what was desired and what was the reality. They were mostly occupied with the function of the ideological value system, ignoring the real functioning of political and social systems.

This does not mean that no empirical research on the topic was conducted. As early as by the end of the nineteen fifties, Polish sociologists started with empirical opinion and attitude studies, producing both voluminous and sophisticated works on topics such as: the value-system of Polish society, generational differences in social attitudes, the effects of mass education and mass upward mobility on the social consciousness and so forth. I will mention only a few, dealing with our topic. The first one to put an open question about the acceptance of socialism and "socialistic values" in a question-naire was Nowak in 1958. That was in a study on the political attitudes of students and the impact of social class on them (Nowak, 1962). In the nineteen seventies, Nowak and his cooperatives conducted a large empirical study on the transmission of attitudes and values from parents to children (Nowak, et al., 1976), finding a great amount of continuity between the two generations.

Jasinska and Siemienska (1978) summed up a large amount of empirical data and findings from attitude and value studies in a book called *Personality Patterns in Socialism*<sup>2</sup>. The book also contains an analysis of changing personality patterns (ideals) in Poland since 1945. These changes are connected with different stages of the socio-economic development. It is in fact a content analysis of intentional socializational stimuli, as they are reshaped according to the changing needs of the political system (the "sender" of those stimuli).

Several studies were devoted to national, religious and historical consciousness of Polish youth (Wilska-Duszynska, 1975; Jerschina 1978, 1980; Szacka 1981).

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<sup>2</sup> See also A. Jasinska, R. Siemienska; "The Socialist Personality: a Case Study of Poland" (1983).

A broader comparative perspective was presented in a book by Adamski (1980a), where the patterns of Youth socialization in Poland and the United States were compared.

One of the first to introduce the idea of political socialization, as it was developed in the West, was Wiatr (1977), who in a widely-used academic handbook on sociology of politics devoted one chapter to the topic. In the following years several articles (Pospiszyl 1979; Opalek-Orzechowska, 1982; Fraczak-Rudnicka, 1983; Opalek-Westholm, 1986) and one book were published, where western theories and research findings were treated more profoundly. In the book *Political Socialization in the Society* (Opalek-Orzechowska et al., 1981) were presented not only western authors, but also authors from the socialist countries who discussed the problems of political socialization as seen by marxist theory. It was argued that political socialization processes are always class-related and not homogeneous in one society. They are looked upon as processes of integration and disintegration of large social groups (classes), and their function is to reproduce political practice. However, no empiric application of this perspective was presented. The above mentioned book was published by the Center for Political Studies at Warsaw University<sup>3</sup>. The Center also started in 1982 to edit a scientific journal dedicated to the problems of political education, "Edukacja Polityczna"<sup>4</sup>. In it are published articles on political education and socialization, on political culture and ideology. But the stress on education is quite clear. This is not a coincidence. Political education, meaning here intentional political socialization, is seen as a tool for transformation of the social consciousness. Taking its main goal for granted, a socialist transformation, the editors present problems concerned with "the state of art", the broader context of political education in Poland, its "quality" and its effectiveness or ineffectiveness (Bodnar 1983, 1984; Szczepanski, Wasniewski, 1982; Stefanowicz, 1983; Jablonski, 1984).

### 3.2.2 Extensive empirical studies

In the early nineteen eighties, two extensive empirical studies were carried out on child and youth political socialization in Poland. One of them, conducted by the author of this chapter in 1981 (Fraczak-Rudnicka 1984a),

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<sup>3</sup> Centralny Ośrodek Metodyczny Studiów Nauk Politycznych /COM SNP/, directed by Prof. A. Bodnar.

<sup>4</sup> Until now, 11 volumes have been edited.

was aimed at researching the process of political socialization in Polish families. To be more exact, it aimed to verify hypothesis, formulated primarily on the basis of western research findings, on conditions of the "inheritance" of parents' political attitudes by their teenage children. The study, carried out by Szacka in 1983, was a partial replication of a Swiss study, and it was aimed at researching national and social identity of Polish twelve year old children (Szacka et al, 1987). Some findings concerning children's political attitudes were the following. The children's interest in political problems was very limited. No authority-idealization was found. On the contrary, children's opinions on political authority in Poland were rather cynical. The children's' perception of the social structure was relatively the most politicized. Least politicized and most supportive towards the political authority were children from rural families. Most politicized and least supportive were children coming from urban, white-collar families. Working class children were more similar to white-collar, than to rural children (Fratczak-Rudnicka 1987).

Political socialization theory was also used as a frame-work for several content analyses of school books and children's journals (Fratczak, 1981; Szacka, 1987; Gesicka, 1987; Janowski, 1987). These are some of their conclusions.

The political socialization which takes place in the school books and journals for children is seldom overt and explicit. It is not so much aimed at shaping positive attitudes towards the political authority, but rather at the promotions of a model of social organization, of social relations. This "hidden curriculum" presents a picture of a society which is harmonious and consensual (in the terms of social values, interests, life-styles and so forth) and at the same time atomized (no group identity except family and nation exists). The whole world outside the family is dominated by benevolent and effective institutions providing for the citizens. Of course this is not a full picture of the schools' curriculum. Especially in higher grades we also find open, intentional political education aimed at shaping explicit political attitudes and transmitting political information. The role of teachers and the classroom-environment should also be considered. We will come back to some of this problems later on.



### 3.2.3 Motives

As I mentioned in the very beginning of this chapter there was a real explosion of youth research in Poland in the nineteen eighties. Let us now try to find out where all this interest came from.

During the nineteen seventies many extensive, representative studies were carried out investigating the values and life-goals of Polish society, including among its young members. All those studies showed one thing: a clear domination of so called "private-stabilization" values. This meant that the life-goals of a large majority of the society were limited to individual well-being and the well-being of one's family (and sometimes one's "closest friends"). At the same time a stabilization of one's position was preferred over a concerted attempt to improve it. The values which were most highly esteemed were "love and family happiness", "a life among friends" and an interesting job. Only a few wanted to strive for "the well-being of others" and "the respect of others". Very few were attracted by a political career. More wanted to be successful within their professions, to be "rich" and "famous". Most showed no interest in political and ideological questions, did not express any desire to take part in a "rebuilding of society". Studies carried out at various periods and among several social groups, including among young people, showed that these "private-stabilization" values were stable and widely spread (Sutek, 1985). The young generation was depicted by sociologists as homogeneous, moderately ambitious and realistic in its life aspirations (Adamski, 1980b), as apathetic, conformistic and passive (Nowak, 1976).

When one now thinks of what happened in Poland during the years 1980-1981, one can not avoid asking the question:

- How could such a generation take so active a part in the dramatic attempt of social and political change which took place in Poland at that time? How can this gap between values and behaviour be explained? These questions are one of the inspirations for youth research in the nineteen eighties. Other important questions posed by social scientists, also important for the authorities<sup>5</sup>, were:
- What are the changes in the political consciousness of youth caused by the rapid political mobilization process in the early nineteen eighties? Or

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<sup>5</sup> For example, in 1986 the Polish parliament, "Sejm", obligated the state-authorities to carry out systematic research on the problems of youth.

putting it another way: How was the process of political socialization influenced by the experiences of the "Solidarity revolution", later the introduction of the martial law and later an ongoing so-called "normalization"?

- What are the consequences of the deep, long-lasting economic crisis? And of the moral and political crisis?
- What can be expected in the future?
- Can the political orientation of the youth be influenced by means of intentional political education?

This is the background to the considerable interest in youth research displayed in contemporary Poland. Conferences<sup>6</sup> were held on the subject, theoretical discussions took place, surveys were carried out, books and articles were published.

I will mention a few of these articles, just to give an impression of the range of topics which have been investigated: "Youth as a generation" (Gesicki, 1983), "National awareness of the young generation in the light of sociological research" (Marczuk, 1983), "Religious attitudes of the young Pole" (Ciupak, 1984), "The directions of changes in Polish religious attitudes" (Jerschina, Ulasinski, 1985), "Political and legal consciousness of the youth" (Gerula, 1985), "Changes in the life values of Polish youth: study results, observations, speculations" (Sulek, 1985), "School children's attitudes towards the socio-political problems of the country" (Antosik, 1986), "Social change and the political consciousness: the dynamics of political attitudes of Warsaw students 1979-1983" (Lindenberg, 1986), "The political culture of students" (Garlicki, 1987) and "Some elements of the political consciousness of young workers in the beginning of the eighties" (Nowacki, 1988).

To this list can be added annual reports in "Polish Youth" (1984, 1985, 1986; edited by the Institute of Youth Research)<sup>1</sup>, reports published in the Bulletin of the Public Opinion Study Center and, last but not least, reports from large, representative national surveys carried out by the Polish Academy of Sciences on the political consciousness of Polish society

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<sup>6</sup> "The Young Intelligentsia in a Socialist Society", Warsaw, 1984; "Youth and Generational Changes", Warsaw, 1985; "Youth in the light of Sociological Studies", Zaborow, 1986.

<sup>1</sup> This is an institute affiliated to the State Council. Director is Prof. J. Bogusz. Since 1986 it edits a journal "Polska Młodzież" (Polish Youth).

("Poles 81"; "Poles 84"; "Poles 87"<sup>2</sup>), where youth is just one of the social categories studied.

All these studies were carried out in an atmosphere of growing criticism toward the political system itself, a call for a greater pluralization and democratization of that system; the public discussion was becoming more and more free and open.

### **3.3 .i. Political socialization processes in contemporary Poland**

Now, taking all this data into consideration, what can be said about political socialization processes in Poland?

First one general remark. I will limit my attempt to answer this question to a study of youth socialization in contemporary Poland only. This means I will discuss the process of political socialization of one generation only.

Political socialization is a process that goes on during one's whole life. There are, of course, periods when the process is more intensive, but generally we can not say that there comes a moment in one's life when that process "is over". So we can discuss the political socialization of children, adolescents, adults, old people (whatever age limits we choose). The process of political socialization within each of these groups is to some extent unique, although these processes may be taking place simultaneously. It is not only the problem of a different stage of life-cycle experience and a different responsiveness to change in the social environment. Different generations enter political life at different moments. This means that "the history" of political socialization of each generation is different. At the same time, however, the history of the political socialization of the previous generations has an influence on the coming generations. This influence is mediated through parents and a sort of generalized "social memory". For example, the present young generation in Poland was brought up by parents who experienced several political crisis and the "renewals" and so forth which followed. This means that when discussing the political socialization of, let us say, Polish youth, we can not totally omit the history of political socialization of previous generations, but at the same time we have to be careful not to treat it as parts of the same, continuous process.

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<sup>2</sup> Carried out by a team led by Prof. W. Adamski, Institut of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN).

Before we continue, one important feature of Polish youth must be mentioned. Compared to most of the western countries, young Poles achieve economic and social independence relatively late. A limited scholarship system and very low salaries at the beginning of professional careers force many parents to provide for their already-grown-up children. The housing crisis, resulting in an tremendous shortage of apartments<sup>3</sup>, means that a large number of young families do not have a flat of their own, and they are forced to stay with their parents often long after they have children of their own. All this results in an "extended youth", which, although it is imposed, is sometimes readily accepted (Adamski, 1987).

Furthermore, due to the economic crisis, most young people have to content themselves with a lower living standard than they experienced during their childhood.

The present young generation in Poland is a large one. Using the official (from official statistics) age limit for youth of 15 to 34 years, the group makes up almost 1/3 of the whole Polish population<sup>4</sup>. In this generation we can find two important sub-categories:

- the younger one, 15 to about 23 years, which did not take an active part in the "Solidarity"-movement of the early nineteen eighties (they were too young for that, but the political events of those years definitely had an important influence on their political socialization);
- the older one, from about 24 to 34 years, which was an active and perhaps dominant participant of "Solidarity"-movement and had to experience "the bitter taste of defeat".

This last group also experienced the relative economic prosperity of the nineteen seventies. The younger generation, on the other hand, has been brought up largely during a deep economic crisis (a clear decline in living standard started around 1978, getting worse in the early eighties.)

Taken as a whole, the young generation is very pessimistic about their future and about the future of Poland. This pessimism is connected with a widespread criticism toward the Polish political and economic system. But

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<sup>3</sup> The waiting time for an apartment is in many Polish cities more than 20 years; the shortage causes prices of flats rented on the open market to be far beyond the means of people earning an average salary.

<sup>4</sup> 11,808.1 thousand in 1988; it is exactly 31.62% of the total population ("Polska Młodzi. 1986").

the last strikes (in May and September 1988) and waves of social unrest in Poland showed that there seems to be some important differences between the two subgroups cited above, which may enable us to treat them in the future as two different generations. For example, the younger workers tended to be more radical, less ready to compromise and they questioned the authority of the "old" Solidarity leaders.

Although youth is generally very critical of the political regime and distrustful of the authorities, it is not totally homogeneous. The differentiating effect of age has already been mentioned. Social status also has such an effect. The most critical are pupils, students and young people with higher education. In this group the support for the "illegal" political opposition is most pronounced. They identify their interests with a program of democratization of political system and a western-style pluralistic party system. Relatively most supportive towards the government, and at the same time expressing the least interests in political questions, are the young farmers. The young workers are somewhere in between (but closer to the young "intelligentsia" than to the young farmers). They are distrustful of the government and the party which claims to be "their own". They also distrust the new, state-controlled unions. But they also display little trust of the political opposition. What they find most important are the demands for an economic improvement (Czyżewska, 1985).

Political socialization processes in Poland are characterized by a general incoherency<sup>5</sup>. This incoherency is both "internal" and "external". By "internal" incoherency I mean the contradictions stemming from the repeated reconstructions of the political education system (each time on a partly new base) and a lack of coordination between state-controlled agencies of political education, such as schools, youth-organizations, the army, and mass-media (Milanowski 1987)<sup>6</sup>. By "external" incoherency I mean that formal political education is confronted by phenomenon beyond outside the education system itself. Those phenomenon are: "old" ideological influences (originating in the political culture of the previous political systems), persistent, deeply-rooted stereotypes, alternative, informal socialization in the families, the Church, foreign radio broadcasting

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<sup>5</sup> On this subject see also my article: B. Fratzak-Rudnickae; (1989).

<sup>6</sup> While the main goals of education are homogeneous, they are often very differently interpreted by the respective agencies (Milanowski, 1987).

and so forth and finally, the contradictions between the propagated norms and values and the social practice, "the real life".

### 3.4 .i. Effects of political socialization

As it was mentioned above, the youth is generally critical and distrustful. A study carried out in 1985 showed that 50% of young people thought that the effects of the ongoing economic reform were only negative ones. Seventy percent said that there was chaos in the economy and the same number believed that the introduction of the martial law (1981) stopped an ongoing process of democratization and led to the concentration of power in the hands of a small elite. Sixty percent believed that the young people who were members of the official organizations only had a decorative function to fulfil (Czyżewska, 1985). The political efficacy of the young people is very low; only a few percent believe that they have some influence on what is going on in their country (Garlicki, 1987).

The only institution which is supported by a majority is the Church. The young people tend to distrust almost all other public institutions. A study from 1986 ("Polska Młodzież 1986") showed that 15% of the young respondents said that they did not trust any institution (Table 1).

In the same year, a study on a representative sample of Polish students showed that the only group trusted by the majority were "the scientists". The Church was trusted by 38% of the students; other institutions much less (Garlicki, 1987).

Table 1: Trust in institutions.	
Institution (%)	Trust
church	58
parliament	25
army	24
oppositional organizations	14

[illegible]

When asked if they wanted the World to develop into some form of socialism, a majority of young people says "yes" (55%, "Polska Młodzież 1986"). Among the students there were only 30% "yes"-answers (Garlicki, 1987). In 1983 among Warsaw students, 21% said "yes" to this question (Lindenberg, 1986). In 1958 68% of Warsaw students gave the same answer! (Nowak, 1962).

When the question is asked: "would you like the World to develop into a form of socialism such as that which exists in Poland?", the positive answers vary from 4% to a maximum of 20% (in different studies; Marody, 1986).

Despite the criticism and distrust, a clear majority of youth reject the idea of using force as a way of changing the political situation (Czyzewska, 1985).

We can conclude that while the support for the abstract ideals of socialism is still quite extensive, its real-life manifestation is definitely rejected. It can still be said, however, that the formal political education has proved to be effective to some extent. Some very general regime-norms are accepted, such as: the nationalization of the big industry, the protective role of the state (its responsibility for social security), the principle of social justice and so forth. Our international alliances are also accepted. Rejected are principles such as the leading role of the party and the preferred status of the interests of blue-collar workers in state's policy (Garlicki, 1987).

Generally, the effectiveness of intentional political socialization conducted by the agencies of the political system seems to be rather limited. Taking

all three levels of support for the political system, the nation, the regime and government (as suggested by Easton, 1957) only the support for the nation is really high.

It should be remembered, however, that in this case the structure of loyalties is not cumulative. In the Polish political culture, where patriotism has always been very highly evaluated, "the state" has almost always been seen (and still is) as parallel and often antagonistic towards "the nation" (Adamus-Matuszynska, 1986).

In this sphere we can find some new trends as well. A study comparing the political attitudes of Warsaw students in 1979 and 1983 revealed that there was a moderate decline of "patriotic declarations". For example in 1973, 83% of the students said that it is worthwhile to sacrifice one's life for the fatherland, while in 1983, 72% held such an opinion. In 1979, 78% chose Poland as a country where they would live if they had a free choice; in 1983, 58% of the students did so. The author of this study argues that this decline in patriotism is an effect of a fusion of the notions of "the state" and "the nation" in the consciousness of some respondents (Lindenberg, 1986). What is interesting is that there are negative emotions which are transmitted from "the state" to "the nation" and not vice versa (which would be desirable from the point of view of the political educators).

As has been said, only some very general and abstract regime-norms are accepted by the majority. Its practical manifestation (of "the regime") is clearly rejected by most of young Poles. The government is not trusted; youth is very skeptical towards its activities both with respect to politics and with respect to the economy. The low effectiveness of the intentional political socialization conducted by the political system (political education) depends in my opinion on three major factors: the political education process itself (and its quality), the existence of different, often contradicting agencies of political socialization and also, and very much so, on the objective economic situation.

### **3.5 .i. Agencies of political socialization**

The different agencies of political socialization in Poland contradict one another in several spheres. The most important are: the family, the school, and the Church. However a closer investigation obscures this seemingly clear picture.



### 3.5.1 .i. Family

The family is an important agency, exerting both direct and indirect influences, but its influence is not homogeneous. Different families not only transmit different contents (which seem to be at least to some extent class- and status-related) but they are also not equally effective in the transmission of parental values and attitudes to the children. Most effective in this transmission seem to be parents from the intelligentsia, white-collar strata (Fratczak-Rudnicka, 1984a; Garlicki, 1987).

The author of this contribution (Fratczak-Rudnicka, 1984a) found in her study of political socialization in Polish families the following: Generally there was a great similarity between the political attitudes of the child- and parent generations. But on the level of individual families, comparing children to parents one by one, the similarities were much less pronounced (correlations not exceeding 0.2)<sup>7</sup>. Only one major difference existed between the views of children and their parents. It consisted of greater politicization of criteria of social divisions perceived by the children and a better 'up-dating' of this criteria to the current socio-political situation<sup>8</sup>. Several contradicting socializational influences operating in the society clearly weaken parents' influence on children's attitude formation. No clear effects of different parental behaviour patterns were found. No effects of the child's gender were found, but there was a positive relation between the child's intellectual abilities and the similarity of children's and parents political attitudes. The parents' social position (education, profession and so forth) had both direct and indirect influences on children's political socialization.

### 3.5.2 .i. Schools

The schools, totally controlled by the state, represent here the political education system. The programs and textbooks (obligatory for all schools) are intended to promote both an overt and a more hidden political socialization. Textbooks, however, are only one element in the education process.

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<sup>7</sup> This situation is not unique. It has been commented on by: R.W. Connell; (1972) and M.K. Jennings; R.G. Niemi; (1974), S. Nowak; (1976).

<sup>8</sup> On this subject see also my article: B. Fratzak-Rudnicka; (1984b).

In a survey from 1986 ("Polska Młodzież 1986") over 2.5 thousand teachers were asked "who has an influence on the young people's political attitudes?" Ninety-two percent chose "the family", 50% chose "the Church" and 24% chose "the school". What is more interesting is that only 2.5% of the teachers believed that the teachers should try to influence the pupils' political opinions. Another study from the same year showed that the teachers (again a representative sample) were on average even a little more critical towards the political system than the rest of the society (Kosciesza-Jaworska, Lenczewska-Gryma, 1988).

### 3.5.3 .i. Church

The Catholic Church in Poland is known for its activity on the behalf of political freedom and pluralism. During the social conflicts of the nineteen eighties it acted not only as a mediator but clearly supported the political opposition. As has already been mentioned, the Church is the only institution trusted by a majority of young Poles. And over 50% of them believed that the Church defended the interests of workers against the state (Czyzewska, 1985).

The most religious groups in Poland are the youngest and the oldest ones, the school pupils and the pensioners. In 1986 only 3.4% of these young people said they were non-believers (while 4.7% of adults did so) and 66% said they were practicing regularly (46% of adults did so) (Kwiatkowski, 1988). Sociological studies show not only an increase of religious interests but also a development of a new kind of religious life-style among the young population (Jerschina, Ulasinski, 1985).

However, the influence of the Church on political attitudes of Polish youth is difficult to determine. Statistical analysis of data from five big, representative national opinion studies from years 1984-1985 showed that the religious identification and the intensity of religious practices are not good indicators of a person's political attitudes. For example, 55% of the party members declared themselves to be "believers". At the same time, 60% of the respondents in a national opinion survey from 1985 said that "the Church should not interfere in political matters" (Kwiatkowski, 1988).

The Church seems to be more a moral authority than a political one. This does not mean that it does not exert any influence on political socialization processes, although this happens in a more indirect way. Seemingly a-

political moral values such as: human dignity, truth, justice and so forth are definitely not politically neutral.

As can be seen, this brief but complex picture of socializational agencies operating in Polish society offers no easy answers. And it suggests a number of difficult problems for future studies on political socialization and its agencies.

#### **3.5.4 .i. Economic situation**

The objective economic situation in Poland is in my opinion perhaps the most decisive factor explaining the state of the political consciousness of Polish youth.

The deep, long-lasting economic crisis has turned Poland into one of the poorest countries in Europe. The foreign debt is enormous. The economic system is no longer effective in the organization of the process of production. The processes of distribution have become more egalitarian than ever. The most visible consequences of the ongoing economic reforms, although these reforms have been relatively progressive and radical, are high inflation and price increases. The results are that many of the basic needs of the citizens cannot be fulfilled, or cannot be fulfilled on a satisfactory level. And, quite realistically, it is the political system which is blamed for this.

#### **3.5.5 .i. Political system**

Of course the development in the political sphere should not be underestimated. A rapid, spontaneous political mobilization and democratization process in the early nineteen eighties was abruptly stopped and followed by an imposed demobilization. When the Polish young generation is called "the generation of disappointed hopes" (Gesicki, 1983) disappointed political aspirations are referred to and not mere consumer aspirations. But politics and economy are very closely interrelated with one another. The economic progress, relative prosperity, social justice and bright perspectives for the future, have been a major factor for the legitimization of the Polish political system. Thus the negative evolution in the economy has led to a severe legitimization crisis of the political system.

What political education can be effective under such circumstances? To make it effective the first thing to change is not the political education sys-

tem but the political and economic system itself. Such changes seem to be on the way.

### 3.6 Instead of conclusions

Let us at the close of this paper go back to one of the questions raised previously in the text. How can we explain the gap between the political apathy and conformism of Polish youth of the nineteen seventies and its later revolutionary behaviour in the early nineteen eighties?

Several explanations have been formulated by Polish sociologist (for example Sulek, 1985; Lindenberg, 1986; K. Nowak, 1986).

First it has been pointed out that by the end of the seventies the decline in the economy started to threaten "the private-stabilization" values which were so highly valued. Consumer aspirations which were raised during the seventies could not be fulfilled and even the already-achieved living standard was being threatened. This may have acted as a mobilizing factor.

Another explanation was based on the assumption that certain values may be latent or suppressed and become overt only under favourable circumstances. Characteristic for the end of the seventies were new ideological influences, such as the organization and activity of the political opposition and renewed religious interests<sup>9</sup>. Those new influences could return to the social consciousness such latent values as national pride and dignity or democratic values mediated by the Polish historical tradition. They also broadened the range of the public discourse.

At the same time two catalytic events (the strikes and worker-demonstrations of 1976, which forced the authorities to withdraw a planned price increase, and the Pope's first visit to Poland in 1978) not only gave the society a new feeling of strength, but also provided experiences which mediated new patterns of effective mass behaviour.

Finally, it has also been pointed out that the escape to "the world of private values" in the seventies may only have been a sort of defensive reaction against a world of highly-formalized social relations, hostile bureaucratic institutions and incomprehensible power relations.

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<sup>9</sup> Connected among other things with the fact that a Pole was chosen to be the Pope and later made his first visit to Poland (1978).

Looking at the problem from a more general perspective of the political socialization theory, three remarks can be made:

- Important social events, not necessarily of a political character, may be agents for political socialization, catalyzing changes in social consciousness.
- The existence of latent, suppressed values should be taken under consideration in explaining political behaviour. These latent values could be the results of indirect political socialization.
- It should be remembered that social behaviour cannot be explained only on the basis of values and attitudes. The whole context, the whole structure of the situation has to be considered. An important element of this consideration must be whether or not patterns of effective behaviour exist in the given situation.

Political socialization researchers often fail when they want to show the connection between attitudes formed during earlier socialization processes and later political behaviour. But this failure does not mean that these attitudes are of no importance for later behaviour. The problem is that they are only one element of several others which have to be taken into account when explaining social behaviour.

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## 4 *Political socialization in .i.Yugoslavia*

### 4.1 Introduction

Problems of political socialization are particularly relevant to the Yugoslav society for a number of reasons. First Yugoslav society has a very complex structure, with an extremely heterogeneous population, traditions and level of economic development. Secondly, Yugoslavia has existed as an autonomous state only since the beginning of the 20th century. Thirdly, during the brief period since its inception, it has experienced a series of dramatic events and changes of political system, and, fourthly, the ideological system and the value system in general, occupies a highly prominent

position in Yugoslav society. The importance of these issues has not been reflected in an equivalent scientific scrutiny.

The present study attempts to review the socio-political background against which the process of political socialization takes place and to identify the main agents and effects of this process on the basis of a secondary analysis of the available research material, which was primarily directed at other subjects.

## **4.2 The socio-political context**

To understand the problems of political socialization in a country, its character, aims and protagonists, requires a knowledge of the specific historical conditions in the development of that country which helped to shape the substance of its politics and thereby also its political socialization.

In the case of Yugoslavia, there are two crucial points in its history which have had an exceptionally strong impact on the processes of political socialization: (a) the end of World War I, and (b) the events of World War 2.

### **4.2.1 World War 1**

The end of the First World War was marked by the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and of the Ottoman Empire and by the constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which encompassed all Southern Slav nations, with the exception of the Bulgarians. This meant that a single state was being established consisting of peoples with extremely diverse historical-cultural and economic backgrounds and traditions of statehood. This diversity is best exemplified by the existence within its framework of three religious communities (Catholics, Orthodox and Moslems), three languages (Croato-Serbian, Slovene and Macedonian) and two alphabets (Latin and Cyrilic). Furthermore, it should be stressed that these national entities each had a different level of development of their own national identity, and that there was a strong tendency to deny the existence of certain national groups (the Macedonians and the Montenegrins, together with the undefined status of Moslems). It should be also borne in mind that a considerable number of non-Slavic nations lived on the territory of Yugoslavia, first of all Albanians and Hungarians, and before World War II Germans as well.

Viewed from a historical perspective, in the course of the political and social processes which have enfolded political socialization in Yugoslavia has gone through the stage of the introduction of new values and of the emergence of a sense of common identity, followed by the stage of transformation of the earlier value systems, and by the present stage, which can be seen as a period of integration of the individual into the prevailing value system.

In the brief interval between the two world wars, Yugoslavia had only just begun to evolve an independent political life, and the task of political socialization was to assert new values and a sense of common identity.

#### **4.2.2 World War 2**

The host of unresolved social problems, and especially problems of relations among the nationalities, culminated in the turbulent events of World War II. Capitulation, which followed a brief war interlude in April 1941, resulted in the fragmentation of Yugoslavia's territory among the Italians, Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians, as well as in the establishment of two national states, Croatian and Serbian, both of them quisling formations. This led to a tragic escalation of conflict among nationalities and mutual massacres, with the result that in the course of four years Yugoslavia lost 10% of her population.

The only organized political force which rose in defence of the Yugoslav community, with a programme of social and national equality and resistance against the aggressor, was the Communist Party. It rallied around this programme the nationals of all ethnic groups and members of all social strata. In other words, Yugoslav identification, in the sense of the desire for common life in a single state and equality, was the product of a traumatic experience. It constituted, at the same time, a basis for completely new contents of political socialization.

#### **4.2.3 After World War 2**

The reputation that the Communist Party had won in the struggle against foreign invaders and strong internal enemies, the disrepute into which a large part of the bourgeois parties had fallen because of direct collaboration with the enemy, the general poverty of the people and the wish for social justice and existential security served as the common ground on which to build a completely new type of political community under the direct

leadership of the Communist Party, as the only legal and organized political force in the society. The profound change of the political system and relations, of the entire value system and norms of behaviour, imposed on political socialization the task of effecting, at individual as well as group level, a transition from the old to a new value system, in keeping with the newly emerging socio-political relations. It was a case of a specific kind of political resocialization.

In the postwar period, particularly since the 1950s, political socialization performed the function of political reproduction, that is the function of consolidating the society and ensuring its continuity and of integrating the individual into the prevailing value system. This period brought about additional momentous changes in the contents of political socialization, such as the introduction of self-management in 1950, or a series of constitutional changes (1946, 1950, 1963, 1974, 1988), which made it considerably more difficult to achieve unambiguous political socialization. Nevertheless, some fundamental principles, such as federal relations in the state, the leading role of the League of Communists, social ownership of the means of production, self-management and foreign policy based on non-alignment, remained constant elements of the value system.

In analyzing political socialization, it should be borne in mind that all the changes mentioned, from the inception of the common state to political resocialization and political reproduction, had taken place in a period considerably shorter than a century, indeed, within a time shorter than the life span of a generation.

The specific features and problems of political socialization were the products of another crucial aspect of economic development. Yugoslavia is a country without a strong tradition of civil society and with a very low level of economic development, whereas the ideological concept of development rested on other assumptions - a high level of economic development and democracy founded on self-management.

The objective incongruity between the ideological project and actual possibilities for its realization in the given situation inevitably led to the formation of two sources of contents of political socialization - on the one hand, political socialization at the level of ideas, which occupies a position as the goal of the socialization process in society, above all of its institutionalized components such as the educational process, and, on the other hand, political socialization at the level of practical everyday experience.



It should be pointed out, however, that these discrepancies and conflicting elements are manifested differently at these two levels and that they have exerted different influences on behaviour and individual values, just like ideology itself, which has had different connotations for the process of socialization in the past. Thus, for example, in the first stage of social development (from 1945 and up to the mid 1960s), the post-revolutionary fervour of the masses was still strong enough to prevent any serious questioning of the values themselves despite the gap between the straitened living conditions and visions of the future. This tendency was further reinforced by the fact that this was the period of the constitution of the new political system and of relaxation after the horrors and tragedies of war, the time of a powerful sense of identification in resisting the pressures of Stalin and of the USSR. It was a period in which there was a strong sense that a new society, the society of self-management, was being created.

In a situation like this, the importance of ideology is clearly very great, and thus also the importance of systematic political socialization. Consequently, political socialization primarily aimed at engendering an appropriate relationship with respect to the political system, since the political system, and above all the Communist Party, attained legitimacy on the strength of its role in the past and of its ideological projection of the future.

### **4.3 .i. Agents of political socialization**

#### **4.3.1 Agents**

Processes of political socialization naturally occur in definite social settings, which provide the basis and motivation for the adoption of a certain orientation. The position of the individual in the social structure determines to a high degree the type of political experience and knowledge that individual will adopt. The social group to which the individual belongs serves as the frame of reference, a conceptual filter, for the comprehension of the world of politics. Social antagonisms, values and orientations are imparted to the individual by political socialization within the frame of some smaller groups and institutional forms of socialization.

Whereas in the section dealing with the results of studies of political socialization in the context of regular education the analyses are largely based on the analysis of contents of curricula, in the present section we must focus on survey studies of perception, attitudes and opinions. Studies of this kind are unfortunately few, and we shall have to refer to the findings of just

two surveys - one on a sample of young people (15-29 years, Siber, 1977) and the other on a sample of adult population (over 18 years of age, Siber, 1987).

The studies under consideration concentrated on three main issues:

- What are the dominant agents of political socialization;
- What is the relationship between certain features of the individual, his status in the social setting and the characteristics of that setting, on the one hand, and the influence of the individual agents of socialization;
- What is the relationship between individual agents of political socialization and certain ideological orientations?

The findings concerning the first issue are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1:** Level of influence of political socialization agents

agents	Who had the greatest influence in the process of political socialization? (in %)			
	a g e			
	15-19	20-24	25-29	over 29*
school	29	15	10	4
mass media	28	28	26	23
parents	23	22	23	15
friends	7	10	7	3
personal experience	6	14	22	43
books, lectures	4	3	4	5
political organizations	2	7	7	6
church	1	1	1	1

Source: Siber, 1977; Siber, 1987.\*

Sample and population: 1588 persons at the age of 15-29 in Socialistic Republic of Croatia.


\* 1305 persons over 29 years old in the city of Zagreb.

The interpretation of these findings calls for a great deal of caution. The subjects of analysis, namely, were not the actual agents of these influences, or rather, which of them was instrumental in forming the "political personality" of the individual, but the opinions of individuals about these agents. These opinions, however, could be the results of desired rather than real situations. In other words, the replies are partly indications of the

desirability of the various agents of influence, which is another important factor.

Regardless of whether these were real or desired influences, the fact remains that various age-groups reveal significant differences. The most important ones are with regard to the influence of the school as agent of political socialization and to personal experience. With increasing age, the impact of the school diminishes, and the individual is more and more politically formed on the basis of his own experience. It could be, therefore, said that, from a specific "object" on which society systematically exerts influence through the educational system, the individual increasingly becomes a "subject" with respect to political relations and processes.

Figure 1: Groups of agents of socialization and age



Source: Siber, 1977, 1987.

If the agents of socialization which we have singled out are divided into three customary groups - primary, secondary and personal experience and activity, the following trends are obtained:

The relationship of primary and secondary agents is especially interesting. Although the impact of both of them decreases with the advancing age of the respondents, their ratio remains relatively constant and is an indication of the dominance of secondary influences. It is a sign of the disintegration of traditional bonds and of interdependence, and at the same time also of the tendency for the individual to become more and more a "lonely person in a crowd", typical of modern society.

#### **4.3.2 .i. Education: indirect political socialization**

Education occupies a special place in the process of political socialization. It is particularly important in the so-called post-revolutionary societies which strive to attain political legitimacy within a relatively short historical time-span. The educational process is important also in that it provides a basis for a longitudinal analysis of the form and substance of political socialization in a society and for the identification of its specific features.

Education is a process that occurs in every society, in the course of which various contents are systematically imparted for the purpose of accelerated political socialization. That is, for the introjection of the dominant value system.

The beginnings of political socialization by means of education relevant to the current value contents can already be observed in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. As early as 1942 instruction was organized for children of school age in the free territories (Ogrizovic, 1962). The mother tongue was taught making use of contents with strikingly political overtones. Thus, for example, letters of the alphabet were taught with the aid of material which emphasized the role of the Partisans in the struggle against the enemy - Germans and Italians as well as the domestic traitors, the Ustashi and the Tchethniks.

Examples:

"F"	The Fighter Fights with Firearms. The Fight is Fair We are Free.
"P"	We are little Partisans. All Proper People Support our cause.

After the war and the separation of the Church from the State, religious instruction ceased to be a part of the educational process. Education became materialistically oriented, irreligious, and educational contents, above all in social sciences and the humanities, was adapted in presentation and interpretation to the dominant ideological orientation.

One of the popular methods of evaluating the process of political socialization in education is the method of content analysis of textbooks in current use. The findings of a number of analyses of this kind are shown for illustration. The analysis of history textbooks, for example, reveals different interpretations of the same events in school curricula in the time between the two world wars, during the brief period of dominant Soviet influence (1945-1948) and in the subsequent period (Ceko, 1981).

The general abundance of political subject matter in school curricula and material reflecting the prevailing value orientation were the subject of several studies.

**Table 2:** Presentation of various attitudes in primary school textbooks (in %)

social relationships:	democratic	40
	autocratic	41
character of personalities:	realistic	57
	idealized	29
attitude toward	realistic	5
social institutions:	idealized	19
attitude toward	active	60
the social setting:	passive	35
level of social	family	12,5
identification:	region	21
	nation	1,5
	Yugoslavia	25
	mankind	40
proportion of contents about socialism		11

Note: if the sum total is not equal to 100, the analyzed attitude is not treated in the content under review.

Source: Vujevic, 1972.

A similar study was conducted by O. Samardzic (1987), though he analyzed the various contents for separate subjects (also in primary schools).

**Table 3:** Attitude towards socialism in textbooks for primary schools (in %)

subject	a t t i t u d e		
	realistic	idealized	none
Readers (maternal language)	1,7	1,5	96,8
Nature and society	7,5	5,7	86,6
Social science	35,1	27,0	37,9
History	25,2	5,9	68,9
Geography	17,3	3,3	77,4
Technical education	4,2	4,2	91,6
total:	9,2	4,4	86,4

Source: Samardzic, 1987.

Kundacina (1980) analyzed secondary school textbooks. He tried to determine the extent of content with ideological or political features in various subjects.

**Table 4:** Ideological or political features in textbooks for secondary schools (in %)

subject	% of content
history	86,6
geography	69,6
readers	33,5
foreign languages	14,3

Source: Kundacina, 1980.

It is difficult to be certain, on the basis of these data, whether this content really reflect an organized effort to guide the young people in a given political direction. For a well-founded conclusion we would have to possess data from other countries. What is evident, however, is that the educational process is to a high degree also the process of political socialization, both at primary and at secondary school level.

#### 4.3.3 .i.Education: direct political socialization

In addition to political socialization pursued through general subjects, special courses have been introduced into the educational process, particularly in secondary but also in higher education, with the specific aim of

achieving political socialization, imparting both definite ideas and discussions of the functioning of the political system. I am referring here to two subjects - Fundamentals of Marxism and the Theory and Practice of Self-Management Socialism. Unfortunately, no comprehensive studies have been carried out on the educational effects of these courses. The survey by Pantic (1978) is a partial exception. He found that in the course of five months the politically relevant knowledge of secondary-school students had been augmented by only 11%. Practical experience, the students' responses and the opinions of teachers all point to a marked lack of effectiveness of such political education. The widespread saying among students "as boring as Marxism" is an expression of resistance to subject matter which has a doctrinaire rather than instructional character. These subjects appear to be experienced by students as being a new "secular religious instruction".

There are two opposing schools of thought on the role of these subjects in the political socialization of young people. According to one of them, Marxism should be insisted upon, since it represents a firm, inherently consistent, and the only "orthodox" world outlook. The other school maintains that efforts should be primarily directed at the cultivation of an independent, critical stance towards society among the students, as this conforms with the fundamental postulates of Marxism. A survey conducted among university students (Culig et al., 1988) showed that familiarity with Marxism did not depend on the students' political orientation. This finding can be taken as indirect evidence that the introduction of these subjects has failed to attain the desired objectives.

In analyzing political socialization and the educational process the question arises as to what is the appropriate age for young people to be exposed to contents relevant to the concrete social relations in which they are growing up, and to achieve the desired effects. A study done some time ago (Siber, 1968) showed that it is only in the last year of secondary school that young people begin to take real interest in general social issues. An analysis of school essays on the preoccupations and attitudes of young people showed that a majority of secondary school students fit into the following pattern: (Diagram 1)

Evidently, the young begin to take serious interest in their social and political setting only towards the end of secondary schooling - and this means that they are then more susceptible to certain political contents.


**Diagram 1:** Preoccupation of youngsters in Yugoslavia

Year of the secondary school	age	main preoccupation
first	15	leisure activities
second	16	relationships in the family relationships at school
third	17	personal characteristics
fourth	18	ideological issues relationships in society

Source: Siber, 1968.

Political schools are a special form of political education. Their aim is to provide education and value guidance to certain segments of the social structure - the young, members of the League of Communists or of some other organizations or self-management bodies. These schools address themselves directly to the needs that arise from practical social phenomena and have been conceived as special educational establishments offering the supplementary general knowledge necessary for active involvement in current social processes.

The role of knowledge as a crucial link in this type of political socialization could be graphically represented as follows:

**Diagram 2:** The role of knowledge in social activity

As seen from the foregoing diagram, because the institutional forms of social processes are highly complex, knowledge is an essential prerequisite of social activity. It should be also borne in mind that without knowledge there can be no responsible social activity; at the same time, however,



knowledge alone does not automatically ensure that a given type of activity will take place.

The findings of a number of studies (Miric, Siber, 1979; Pantic, 1978; Siber, 1984) indicated that such educational forms (political schools) had only marginal effects on the increase of knowledge and the forming of political attitudes. The increase of knowledge was on the average between 4% and 11%, with substantial differences being observed among the courses on various topics. As could be expected, the smallest increment in knowledge was found in the "Fundamentals of Marxism" (2.3%) and the greatest in the course entitled "The activity of the League of Communists" (15.7%). The educational process had led to no changes whatsoever in the area of political attitudes.

#### 4.3.4 .i. Mass media

As seen from Table 1, in the opinion of the respondents, mass communication media play a significant role in the process of political socialization. Unfortunately, no intensive effort has been made so far to study the interest young people take in various types of mass media, or the effects of these media on them. An exception to this rule is the survey by a group of authors (Vrcan et al. 1986), who conducted an extensive study of the status, social consciousness and behaviour of the young generation in Yugoslavia. This study marginally touches upon the reading of daily newspapers.

**Table 5:** Age and perusal of news and commentaries in daily papers

age	often reads news and commentaries (%)
up to 17	19
18-19	25
20-23	34
24-27	42

Source: Vrcan et al. 1986

Sample and population: 6215 young persons between 14 and 27 from all over Yugoslavia

As could be expected, interest in social developments increases with age, as reflected in a higher rate of reading of specific contents in daily newspapers.

The composition of newspaper columns which the young favour was also analyzed in this study.

The above findings reveal a relatively small proportion of largely "political" contents and the predominance of general features on leisure and entertainment.

The application of a factor analysis to the findings showed the existence of two main groups of contents: the first, which the authors named "interest in marginal social affairs" (crime reports, film and music, love and sex, sports, entertainment), and the second, "interest in politics and the society" (political affairs in the country and abroad, economic problems, armed conflicts, science and technology). It was also found that the contents classified under the heading "marginal social affairs" are favoured by younger subjects and those at a lower educational level, while those under the heading "politics and the society" are more frequently read by older respondents and those with higher education.

**Table 6:** Newspaper contents favoured by the young

content	reading (%)
entertainment	64
film, music	65
problems of young people	55
crime section	52
sports	50
love and sex	46
classified ads	32
home affairs	30
foreign affairs	30
armed conflicts and military matters	28
science and technology	26
economic affairs	20
religion, religious affairs	16

Source: Vrcan et al. 1986

#### 4.4 .i.Effects of political socialization

The function of political socialization is, ultimately, to form the individual as a member of the body politic, to inculcate in him the appropriate ideological orientation, value system and patterns of behaviour which are needed for the operation of the society within the framework of a given political system. In other words, political socialization is the process of

establishing a political culture in keeping with the demands of the political system.

The effects of political socialization in Yugoslavia will be presented in the form of three standard components of political culture - the cognitive component, politically relevant knowledge; the value component, ideological orientations and values; and the behavioral component, politically relevant behaviour.

#### 4.4.1 .i. Knowledge

The political man is above all an educated man. Regrettably, the results of a series of studies have shown that the level of knowledge is not commensurate to the demands of political activity.

In view of the fact that political communication is one of the key factors of a system's functioning, we ought to be seriously concerned over the findings of Vujevic (1976) in a study of familiarity with socio-political terminology. He had learned that most citizens simply do not know the meanings of terms that are in daily use in political communication.

**Table 7:** Understanding of socio-political terms

term	understands (%)
expanded reproduction	50
amortization	37
sovereignty	21
opportunism	13

Source: Vujevic, 1976.

Sample and population: 760 young persons between 16-27 in the city of Zagreb.

In addition to general knowledge, familiarity with the operation of mechanisms of political activity and of the political system as a whole is a relevant form of knowledge. The level of that knowledge may be assessed by examining familiarity with the electoral system, which has been the most frequent object of systematic studies. Some examinations of electoral behaviour have revealed inadequate familiarity both with electoral procedures and with the concrete candidates or delegations to be elected. No significant differences in this respect have been found between younger and older respondents.

Only about 60% of all citizens possess over an elementary knowledge of electoral processes (Zvonarevic et al., 1986; Grdesic et al., 1986). It is also interesting to note that the subjects have manifested a large dose of self-criticism with regard to their knowledge, so that only 25% of them feel that they possess an adequate knowledge of election matters, while an additional 50% of them consider that these matters are clear to them "in general outline".

There are three main reasons for this lack of understanding of electoral issues, which are, at least in theory, essential to the legitimacy of a political system:

- the great complexity of electoral processes, which comprise a combination of direct and indirect elections, various types of delegations and organization on the basis of interests, all of this relating to either the place of residence of or work, or to socio-political organizations;
- markedly numerous changes in the forms of representative bodies, modes of election, and composition of constituencies;
- the relatively marginal significance of elections within the overall operation of the political system in Yugoslavia.

#### **4.4.2    .i. Opinions and attitudes**

It has been found that concepts such as the self-management society, social ownership, the role of the League of Communists and of the working class meet a high degree of acceptance (Siber, 1974, 1987; Pantic, 1977; Jerbic, Lukic, 1979; etc.). All of these are fundamental values of the self-management society contained in the ideological concept, and are nurtured through the process of socialization. Some authors (Jambrek, 1988) interpret these findings as a specific acceptance of the "civil religion", that is to say, of the dominant value system, the adoption of which constitutes the basis for membership in a community.

The overall pattern of political attitudes, obtained by means of factor analysis, (Siber, 1987) may be interpreted from the vantage point of three crucial political orientations.

The first among them is the self-management orientation. Proceeding from the assumption that each political system comprises a certain value system which represents, psychologically speaking, the dominant content of social awareness and which facilitates the functioning of that system; and, furthermore, assuming that this value system is the main content of

political socialization at the macro level, in all systematic and all-embracing processes, but primarily first of all in education, then it may be said that this self-management orientation is the main ideological factor which reflects the acceptance of that value system. The great importance of that orientation for political relations in their entirety is evidenced also by the extremely high degree of its acceptance and by the non-existence of any differences in this respect between various groups of respondents (with respect to social status, for example).

The second orientation is the egalitarian-statist orientation, or the demand for an equitable distribution of the national wealth and for a strong state to ensure it; this orientation directly reflects the respondents' socio-economic status. Individuals with lower incomes, a deprived status, probably see social equality in distribution as a way of improving their personal standing. For this they need the intervention and guarantee of the state. This suggests that the egalitarian-statist orientation in individual evaluation directly reflects social deprivation relating to social status.

The third orientation is national-religious and is a reflection of contents of informal socialization in smaller social groupings. The individual adopts certain national and religious evaluations as part of his social heritage, so that this orientation might be also regarded as a part of the national identity.


As can be seen, the self-management orientation is strikingly predominant among these global orientations and is accepted by nearly all respondents. The egalitarian-statist orientation is also well represented; it is independent (there is neither positive nor negative correlation to other orientations) and exists parallel to other orientations. The national-religious orientation, which stands in a negative correlation to the self-management orientation (Pearson's  $r = -0.29$ ), is found in a strikingly small percentage of respondents.

The relationship between the individual chief agents of the process of political socialization and the content, or acceptance, of various ideological orientations is not completely unambiguous. Nevertheless, it points to three relevant influences which are at the root of the different acceptance of these orientations.

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**Figure 2:** Distribution of the acceptance of ideological orientations

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——— self-management;  
 ----- egalitarian-statist;  
 ..... national-religious

Source: Siber, 1987

Sample and population: 1959 persons over 18 years in the city of Zagreb

The strong influence of socio-political organizations results in an emphatic acceptance of the self-management orientation which is far above the rating for the egalitarian - statist orientation and in the rejection of the national - religious orientation.

The decisive influence of "reading" on the individual implies an active attitude towards one's own political personality, and leads to an average degree of acceptance of the self-management orientation (average in relation to the other respondents, which actually signifies acceptance, in view of the overall distribution of results on this dimension). At the same time, it signifies a clear-cut rejection of both the egalitarian-statist and the national-religious orientation.

The influence of the church causes a markedly negative attitude towards the self-management and the egalitarian-statist orientations and, logically, also a markedly positive attitude towards the national-religious orientation.

Even though it does not refer directly to political behaviour, another variable might be of interest in this context. It concerns the experiential aspect of politics, the feelings that politics produces in individuals (The delegation system, 1986).

As seen from Figure 3, positive feelings concerning politics in relation to age follow the trend of political interest - the oldest age-group only shows the greatest interest in politics but for them politics is also an object of rapture and enthusiasm.

**Table 8:** Age and feelings concerning politics (%)

feeling	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-39	40-49	60 -	total
rapture	4	3	4	2	3	7	3
enthusiasm	3	4	4	4	6	11	5
interestedness	30	29	30	30	34	44	31
mistrust	10	18	16	18	17	8	17
anger	8	16	15	19	18	15	17
discomfort	1	1	3	4	4	5	3
indifference	13	9	9	7	9	6	8
boredom	10	7	7	6	1	2	6
don't know	21	13	12	10	8	2	10

Source: Unpublished data, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Project: The Delegate System 1986.

Sample and population: 2547 persons over 18 years in the Socialist Republic of Croatia.


Exactly the opposite trend, with a much more regular course, can be observed with regard to distancing from politics. A full 44% of the youngest age group simply do not "live politically"; politics is not for them a source of interest, or gratification, but neither is it a source of discomfort. With increasing age, this distance is diminished.

Negative feelings in connection with politics are the most prevalent among those age groups which are, formally speaking, the most involved in political processes. This suggests that perhaps the very fact of involvement and direct experience, with all that politics entails, and sometimes the impotence to act, may be the sources of such responses.

For easier reference, we shall classify the data into three groups - feelings indicating a positive attitude towards politics (rapture, enthusiasm, interest); feelings that are negatively associated with politics (mistrust, anger,

discomfort); and feelings indicative of a certain indifference, a distancing from politics.

**Figure 3:** Age and feelings concerning politics



Source: The Delegate System, 1986


#### 4.4.3 i. Interest and behaviour

Self-management-based social relations, as institutionalized in Yugoslavia, demand a high degree of commitment of all individuals, on the one hand, while, on the other, its great institutional ramification offers the opportunity for a large proportion of people to take direct part in the numerous bodies of self-management and other bodies. Clearly, mere formal participation does not signify real activity, but it is nevertheless a certain indicator of the individual's involvement in political processes.

However, the demands of the system are often in contradiction to the willingness of people to become politically involved.

**Figure 4:** Formal participation in different self-management bodies, political interest and electoral activity in 1986 for delegate assemblies





— interest;  
 - - - personal activity;  
 ..... electoral activity

Source: Kasapovi, 1986.

Sample and population: 2547 respondents over 18 years in Socialist Republic of Croatia

Figure 4 shows the distribution of results with regard to total formal activity (earlier and present), the distribution of interest in political issues, and actual activity in electoral processes.


As could be expected, these distributions are significantly disparate, with the overall trend that the more concrete the political behaviour which is examined the smaller the activity revealed by the data.

The political interest is relatively extensive; in a dichotomous division, 68% of the subjects manifested a considerable interest in political happenings, with 32% of them relatively uninterested.

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**Figure 5:** Political interest and formal activity in relation to age
 

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—— interest;  
 - - - - - formal activity

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Source: Kasapovic, 1986.

In the case of formal political activity, bearing in mind the huge number of bodies of self-management and delegations, 35% of respondents reported a considerable activity, while 65% remain relatively outside the formal forms of activity.

As for electoral processes, which represent an actual political act, this area reveals the least amount of real activity; only 27% of the respondents can be regarded as active participants in the complex nomination process for the election of delegates.

Some data on the age of the respondents will help to shed some light on the variables of political interest and formal activity.

Regardless of the fact that the differences are relatively slight, two tendencies can be observed. The first indicates that political interest grows

with the age of the subjects, with two groups particularly standing out. Those are the youngest subjects (up to 21), who manifest the least political interest, and the oldest ones (over 60), whose political interest is the most intensive. The differences between the other age groups are minimal.

When we come to the variable "formal political activity", the relationships are quite different. Those who are coming (the youth) and those who are going (the oldest) manifest the smallest degree of activity, while formal political involvement in political processes is the greatest among individuals between 30 and 60 years of age, a finding that does not require special explanation.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

In this survey of political socialization in Yugoslavia the author presents the results of a number of studies of political socialization and its effects. The introductory part outlines the general political context necessary for the understanding of the contents and processes of political activity.

It will be evident to the reader that some of the studies under review are unrelated to one another and insufficiently elaborated. The reason for this is simple: the problem of political socialization has yet to be made the object of scrutiny of a comprehensive, theoretically-founded longitudinal study.

One of the causes of this lack of systematic investigation of the phenomena of political socialization is probably the non-existence of a specialized research centre, but it is also due to insufficient interest in the role of the political factors in society. True, there have been some attempts, albeit short-lived, to carry out systematic research into the problems of youth, conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade and by the Institute of Social Research in Zagreb, but these have not resulted in any comprehensive studies or analyses.

The data used in the present analysis relating to political socialization were mainly obtained and used in studies conducted for different purposes, for example, to examine the functioning of the political system, to analyze political processes, or as public opinion research. This is the reason of their evident lack of theoretical background in their approach, and hence also the reason why it is so difficult to subsume the data within a set of coherent theoretical concepts. As a result, the author fears that his survey of the problems of political socialization in Yugoslavia may be somewhat one-

sided. There is a lack of studies dealing with the informal aspects of political socialization, primarily in the family setting and in small groups, that is to say, research into early political socialization.

The unsystematic character of research into these phenomena does not permit a survey of contents and processes of political socialization over a longer time-span, although this would be extremely interesting, in view of the rapid changes in Yugoslav society. In spite of all this, some findings of a general nature may be suggested.

Extensive and systematic efforts are being made in Yugoslavia to socialize young people with a certain set of values and principles of the political system. At the level of fundamental ideological orientation, these efforts have been successful. The most powerful agents of this process are mass communication media and the school. The mode of presenting political contents in the course of education is frequently unsuited to the interests of the young, and they experience it as a kind of "political Sunday school".

The great gap between the ideological projection of social development and the actual possibilities and concrete political processes hinders a consistent political socialization.

The political system of socialist self-management, founded on various forms of direct democracy, imposes considerable demands with regard to political activity. The inconsistency, complexity and frequent changes of the political system, on the one hand, and the insufficient political interest on the part of the individuals and their unwillingness to participate in it, on the other, constitute another major obstacle to the attainment of the goals of the system.

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## 5 *Political socialization in Finland*

### 5.1 Introduction

Politicians and the general public in Finland have for many years been troubled by the negative attitudes young people have shown toward politics and politicians. Voter turnout in national elections among young people has also declined. Political scientists in Finland disagree whether this development is a sign of a widespread alienation in society and of a "legitimation crisis" confronting the Finnish political system, or whether it simply means that people are now better educated, and thus have acquired a capacity for criticizing politicians and their actions. In the absence of empirical investigation, however, the public discussion has been reduced to



the level of pure speculation; anyone expressing an opinion is considered to be an expert.

An inability to specify the causes, conditions and outcomes of the negative attitudes of Finnish young people toward politics reflects on the one hand the narrow focus of Finnish political scientists upon elections, political parties and other institutional aspects of politics. On the other hand, the current intense preoccupation with the micro level analysis of language and political texts also contributes to the failure to make advances in this area. Perhaps on a larger scale, it illustrates the failure to study individual preferences and their collective articulation.

For the purpose of this review, it is necessary to use the term "political socialization" rather loosely. The presentation in the following chapters of the type of political socialization research done in Finland, along with its central findings follows a certain reverse logic. Finnish political science and political sociology is reviewed mainly according to what has been left unsaid about political socialization. The review is supplemented by a look at some electoral studies and youth studies in addition to the studies explicitly defined as political socialization research.

## **5.2 Social and cultural change in post-war Finland**

The focus, scope and findings of Finnish political socialization research are incomprehensible without a general overview of the rapid structural change Finnish society has gone through since the 1960's. During this period the traditional structure of everyday life eroded and was transformed. Basically, three processes contributed to this transformation: urbanization, changes in the occupation structure, and a shift in what was seen to be the central goals in life (Heiskanen, 1980).

Finland's structural change took place much later than in the neighbouring Nordic countries, but the change was among the most rapid in Europe. Until the 1960's and 1970's Finland was hardly an industrial society. As late as 1960, 32 % of the Finnish population still earned their income from agriculture, forestry and fishing. Between the years 1950 and 1975 the number of jobs in the agricultural sector declined by 65 %, whereas the number of people employed in industry increased by 37 % and by around 100 % in the service branches. Parallel to the shift from farming to other occupations, a great migration movement took place toward the towns of southern Finland and Sweden. During this time the southern province of

Uusimaa, where also the capital Helsinki is located, gained a total of a 315,000 new inhabitants (Heiskanen, 1980; Allardt, 1985).

Politically, the 1960s and 1970s were marked by the central role played by the so-called Popular Front government coalitions consisting of the Social Democratic Party, The Centre Party, and the People's Democratic League. The creation of a welfare state was begun by launching a policy based on the idea of social equalization which was to be achieved with extensive social planning. During this period, reforms were made in health care and the social security system. Comprehensive schooling was introduced in the 1970s replacing the former discriminatory school system. Finland also entered an era of large-scale, well-functioning income agreements, which had an equalizing impact on income and wages. This, however, gave rise to new problems such as increasing corporatism, more and more centralized planning, and powerful labour market organizations (Allardt, 1985).

In 1980, the agricultural sector accounted for only 9 % of Finland's population. The geographical mobility has continued directed toward the metropolitan area of Helsinki and its neighbouring cities. Though many of the problems caused by the breakdown of traditions in the 1960's have disappeared, in the 1980's Finnish society has retained one central characteristic: late, but rapid transition. The main moving force in this newest wave of transition has been the growing information sector: it has been estimated that as early as 1984, 36% of wageearners were employed in different fields of information handling (Kortteinen, 1985). Industry in its turn has faced a recession, and as in other industrialized countries, unemployment has become a permanent feature. The basis of social classifications has altered very quickly: the emergence of a "new middle classes" is usually seen as a product of the second phase of this great structural change in Finnish society (Roos, Rahkonen, 1985).

Culturally, the transition from a society dependent on farming into an industrial society brought a change that was two-fold in character. It was natural that people started to seek new models of behaviour and social relations: models for their new urbanized life, models for adjusting to social change, models for relationships at the new work-place, and models for changed personal relationships in the family. On the other hand, social change is often connected with nostalgia, a desire to preserve old values and retrieve at least a portion of the life that is left behind (Heiskanen, 1980). The difficulty of sustaining old agrarian and patriarchal values in

modern urbanized, rationalized and commercialized settings has been documented by several studies on the changing way of life of Finns (for example, Kortteinen, 1982) and Finnish generations (Roos, 1987).

An evaluation has yet to be carried out of the cultural change accompanying the transition wave of the 1980's, which has been characterized by the growth of information technology and of handling occupations manned by the "new middle class". However, a few important changes altering the structuring of ways of life and affecting socialization processes may be mentioned: a further increase in the number of women working outside the home, a decrease in family size, an increasing demand for child care subsidised by the state and local authorities, an increase in the living standard and the level of consumption, and an increase in the level of education and the time spent in educational institutions in the course of an individual's life.

Structural and cultural changes paved the way for the modernization of Finnish society, and this led in turn to a new series of changes. These processes were also reflected in the ideology of social administration and guidance of production and distribution. The development of the ideology of "social steering" has been described as being comprised of the following four phases: 1) the reconstruction of the society after defeat in the war, 2) the modernization of Finnish society in the 1950's and early 60's, 3) a stress on economic growth by the end of the 1960's, and 4) in the second half of the 1970's, a focus on an inevitable international economic and political catastrophe and its avoidance (Heiskanen, Mitchell, 1985, 69). These ideologies have been generated (or adopted from influences coming from the outside) at the level of political-administrative and economic institutions and organizational elites, and they have been incorporated into the level of public discussion, social groups, and voluntary associations via different channels (Heiskanen, Mitchell, 1985).

### **5.3 Phases in Finnish .i. political socialization research**

It is possible to outline Finnish political socialization research by dividing it into four different periods: 1) an interest in the background of voting behaviour, examined from the perspective of political socialization, 2) a growing interest in political socialization, its institutional framework and its products, 3) the decline of political socialization research, and 4) a renewed interest in political socialization and its processes. The phases in

Finnish political socialization research have interestingly mirrored the phases of the ideology of social steering (Table 1).

**Figure 1:** Political socialization research in Finland 1956-1989

study		year	data
<i>I Electoral behaviour and political activity 1956</i>			
Allardt:	Social struktur och politisk aktivitet (Social structure and political activity)	1956	ecological data from parliamentary elections 1945, 1948, 1951, 1954
Pesonen:	Student voters in the Election of the College of Presidential Electors	1958	panel survey of university students (N=430), 21 and older in 1955
Pesonen:	An Election in Finland	1968	panel survey of adult population (N=583), comparison of town and rural community in 1958
Martikainen:	Ikä ja sitoutuminen politiikkaan. (Age and political involvement)	1978	ecological data from 185 electoral districts in 1975
Pesonen, Sänkiäho:	Kansalaiset ja kansanvalta (Citizens and democracy)	1979	survey of population aged 16 - 74 (N=1109) in 1975
Martikainen, Yrjönen:	Nuoret ja politiikka (Youth and Politics)	1980	ecological data from 170 electoral districts in 1975 and 1979
Martikainen, Yrjönen:	Nuorten poliittinen suuntautuminen (Political Orientation of Youth)	1984	survey of 326 20- to 30-year-olds in 1982
<i>II Growing interest in political socialization 1965 - 1973</i>			
Heiskanen, Stolte-Heiskanen:	Political Orientations of Youth. Effects Education system	1971 (1970)	survey of secondary and vocational school students age 16-19 (N=1048) in 1969
Stolte-Heiskanen::	Sex Roles, Social Class and Political Consciousness	1971	as above
Martikainen:	Political Activity: Structure, Determinants and Dynamics	1973	survey of 478 young people aged 15 to 25 in 1965

### III Decline of political socialization research 1973 - 1984

Aalto:	Nuorten sosiaalistuminen ja nuorisotyö (Youth Socialization and youth work)	1975	Various surveys and interview material of 10 to 24-year-olds gathered between 1964 and 1974
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### IV Renewed interest in political socialization 1984

Heiskanen, Mitchell:	Lättähatuista punkkareihin. (From Rockers to Punks. Three decades of confrontation between youth subcultures and the Finnish dominant culture	1985	a case-study based on interviews of 233 comprehensive school students aged 15-16 in 1981 and 1982, analysis of articles on youth 1950-1980
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Although the first phase was not strictly speaking a phase of explicit political socialization research, the study of electoral behaviour produced the background for the rising interest in political socialization in the 1950's and the early 1960's. The study of voting behaviour was connected to the first wave of behavioral research, which initially introduced empirical research into Finnish political science.

Internationally, the development of the behavioral study of voters fell into three main categories. It was started off by pre-survey studies on political ecology and turnout. The People's Choice (1948) by the Columbia University research team Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet paved way for an accumulation of voting studies also in Europe. The third stage re-emphasizing election statistics was influenced by The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) from the Michigan Survey Research Center. These influential studies had an important impact on Finnish electoral studies: Erik Allardt's Social Structure and Political Activity (1956, in Swedish) and Pertti Pesonen's Student-Voters in the Election of the College of Presidential Electors (1958, in Finnish) relied heavily on The People's Choice, whereas Pesonen's later work was modelled after The American Voter.

Using sociological theories of "cross-pressure" as a framework, Allardt (1956) sought explanations for the fluctuation of voting activity in Finland since the Second World War. The cross-pressure hypothesis of a relation between conflicting norms and participation, according to which political passivity becomes more likely when a group is confronted with political pressure, was the basis of Allardt's study. Allardt's central finding was that

relative social isolation promoted activity, whereas social mobility and extensive social contacts (that is, more cross-pressure) had a dampening effect. However, Allardt paid very little attention to cross-pressure and activity in, for instance, different age-groups. Neither were the formation processes of political behaviour discussed in this first extensive sociological study of political activity, nor in the voting studies later carried out by Pesonen.

In these early electoral surveys, a great deal of attention was focused on whether the results were consistent with international findings, which actually meant characteristics of the American voter. To the relief of many behaviorist political scientists, it was noted for instance that "(a)n electoral survey of university students, published in 1958, showed reassuring similarity with what was known about the Anglo-Saxon countries." (Pesonen, 1968, preface ix). The interest in election studies, new research techniques, and the behavioral approach meant an internationalization and particularly an "Americanization" of Finnish political science, which had its connection to the wider political interest in establishing Finland as a modern Western Democracy.

Electoral studies was quite an influential and internationally well-known field of inquiry in Finnish political science until the late 1970's. The development of political socialization studies in Finland is, however, perhaps best characterized as sporadic. In contrast to electoral studies, political socialization studies have never been in the center of focus in Finnish political science. In an evaluation of Finnish political science since the 1960, Anckar (1983, 270) has pointed out that research into socialization processes has been inadequate.

There are, of course, some practical reasons for this. In a small country political scientists are rather scarce. The number of political science professors, associate professors, lecturers and assistants in Finnish universities increased from a total of 11 in 1960-1962 to 45 in 1978-1980 (Nousiainen, Anckar, 1983, 339), but this hardly justifies expectations of large scale extensive study in a specialized sub-field as political socialization research. The research interests of the political scientist community as a whole has rather straightforwardly reflected the individual research interests of prominent researchers.

The expansion of political sociology in Finnish political science gave rise to an interest in political socialization during 1965-1973. However, this

interest could not hold its own in the 1970's for several reasons. The expansion of the activities of the state and the new interest in continental and even marxist philosophy pushed political socialization research into the background. The study of socialization in general concentrated in sociological, educational and psychological research, which in turn did not focus on political socialization. Only in the beginning of the 1980s, when new European theoretical developments spread into the Finnish social sciences, did the problem of political socialization again become topical. Although the process of political socialization received new attention in theoretical discussions inspired by British cultural studies and the writings of, for instance, Foucault, Aries and Giddens, no empirical research was carried out.

Although political socialization studies are no longer popular, in the past decades Finnish political scientists have clearly adopted some of the basic assumptions of socialization research. In the 1950's, when Parsons, Bales and others thought they "had ironed outmost of the difficulties arising from the traditional problem of the tension between individual and society" (Brittain, 1978), in Finnish political science attention was accordingly devoted to the functions of "pattern maintenance", the transfer of prevailing political preferences through the socializing performances of the nuclear family and the school. The study of political culture was another attempt to combine macro- and micro-level analysis in resolving the problem of individual and society. In their classic study, *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba defined political culture as a "psychological orientation toward social objects" (Almond, Verba, 1965, 23). Although Almond and Verba's framework was never explicitly used in Finnish studies on political socialization, it gained popularity in comparative research. Political socialization was long understood as the process of internalization of "political culture".

The following definition of socialization probably describes a widely-shared understanding of what socialization was thought to be in Finnish social science as late as the 1970's. "Socialization is the process between generations, which results in the preparation of the new generation to perform different functions in society and develop them and a reception of the culture of the community and the ability to develop it. The function of the older generation is to socialize, and the function of the younger generation is to be socialized" (Takala, 1974, 17).

Today it is basically recognized that socialization is never merely a passive imprinting by "society" upon each "individual". Nor does socialization stop at some particular point in the life of the individual, such as when s/he is recognized as a mature member of the society, but it should be understood as referring to the whole life-cycle of the individual (Giddens, 1979, 129). Nevertheless, socialization studies have until lately mainly concentrated in mapping the attitudes of children and adolescents toward politics, the main interest of empirical studies being the prediction the future of politics. In this sense, however, empirical socialization studies of young people in Finland and elsewhere seem to have sadly failed: "(R)arely has a sociological discipline exposed itself to such ridicule through the development of its subject matter as empirical youth research." (Baethge, 1985, 442). Martin Baethge describes, for example, the numerous youth studies in Germany which failed to predict the student rebellions of the 1960's. Again in the 1970's, just when apathy and withdrawal was diagnosed as a new type of socialization, shortly afterwards large numbers of young people became involved in the peace movement and the environmental movement. When this was again interpreted as a new ideological radicalism and a new social movement, only a short time later "it was noted with surprise that young people were adopting an unexpectedly reserved political stance and detaching themselves from alternative life-styles" (Baethge, 1985, 442).

## **5.4 Central .i. socialization agents**

### **5.4.1 .i. Family**

Finnish electoral studies contain perhaps the most information about the politically socializing effect of family background. In fact, political socialization in the nuclear family has been studied only with respect to election studies and general political activity studies (for example, Pesonen, 1958, 1968; Pesonen, Sänkiahö, 1979). The main interest in these studies was not political socialization in itself, but the determination of to what extent political views were inherited from parents. Pesonen (1968) assumed that children often inherit their parents' party preference as a result of the political socialization that takes place in the parents' home during youth. Another hypothesis was that the party identification of citizens who share the party preference of their family tends to be stronger than that of those who disagree with their parents and spouse. Inheritance of party preference was not found to be as common as the similarity between married couples, but people agreed with their fathers considerably more often than would



have happened at random in a multi party system. The general rule was to learn the party affiliation in the parents' home and then to hold on to it without change.

This type of political socialization indicated that changes in the adopted party preference were exceptional and slow. This was also evidenced by the relative consistency of the aggregate distribution of votes cast in different parliamentary elections.

The youngest respondents had the greatest tendency to agree with their father. Pesonen assumed that upon acquiring independence, citizens became subject to new factors that influence their party choice. A change of social environment separated persons from their father's party affiliation. The likelihood of inheriting the father's party was greatest if a person had remained in the father's occupational class. In Pesonen's earlier study of Finnish university students (1958), the influence of the parents on party affiliation decreased with increasing age, although it was not discontinued entirely. In the Tampere election study, Pesonen noted that the father's party was least known by two groups, those born before 1893 and between 1921 and 1923. Suffrage had not been extended to the parents of many of the former group, while the special character of the latter may have been a product of the disturbance which military service caused in the normal political socialization of that age group.

Tuomo Martikainen's study *Political Activity: Structure, Determinants and Dynamics* (1973) is the only extensive Finnish publication dealing with political activity that explicitly refers to the study of political socialization. The central question of the research was how political activity was distributed. The study also examined the intensities and the distributions of political orientation. Martikainen's research resulted in roughly similar findings to those which had been reported in international political socialization studies. The association between parental and adolescent levels of political interest was found to be positive but low. The study of the family as a socialization structure also yielded the finding that the effect of a "politicized" family was the provision of a source of stimuli for political activity, which also evened the unequalizing effect of class. Ecological variations in background did not prove to have any special effect on socialization into political activity.

#### 5.4.2 .i. Educational institutions

The increasing interest in political sociology expanded political scientists' narrow focus on electoral behaviour to other phenomena bordering on the social and political, which also broadened the framework of political socialization. School children and university students were a source for samples that could be easily reached, classified, and interviewed without great costs. Students were also often interviewed when the initial interest was in other institutions. One of the first extensive studies of political socialization was Veronica Stolte-Heiskanen's and Ilkka Heiskanen's *The Political Orientations of Youth, Effects of the Educational System* (1971). Although the Heiskanens never completed a report summarizing their central findings, this article was published in connection with a larger research project. Starting with a general theoretical concept of opportunity structures that determine at the societal level the range and intensity of individual and group activities, the authors maintained that certain social institutions (for example, family, school, workplace) alone or in combination differentiate individuals and groups as to the amount of resources they can obtain for social activities. On the other hand, the same institutions make demands upon individuals and groups to develop their potential for adopting and utilizing these resources. The authors suggested a typology of high versus low resources and high versus low potentials that divide individuals and groups into four types according to their ability to participate in social activities. The social activities were in turn from the perspective of the opportunity structure divided into central and peripheric, and actively and passively involving activities. The authors tested a set of suggested general hypotheses using questionnaire data obtained from Finnish secondary and vocational school students.

Political awareness and involvement in politics was found to be highest among secondary school students from higher social background, next highest among secondary school students of lower social background, followed by vocational school students from higher social background, and lowest among vocational school students of lower social background. In secondary schools, there was a trend for all the students to change their political affiliations to correspond to that of the existing group of influentials - that is, students from higher social background. When the latter rather unanimously supported the traditional bourgeois parties, there was increased support from other groups as well. In vocational schools, where no salient group of influentials were to be found, the shift in party affilia-

tion was from the center to the socialists and traditional bourgeois parties - the ideologically more articulate groups.

A study rather similar to that of the Heiskanens' was Pertti Toukomaa's (1970) article on patriotism among schoolboys. A sample of urban twelve-year-old boys was divided on the basis of social class (higher and lower) and type of school (elementary and secondary). Comparisons indicated that patriotism in the elementary school/lower class group was "submissive", and in the elementary school/higher class group "right-wing authoritarian"; in the secondary school/lower social class group patriotism was "democratic" and in the secondary school/higher class group again "submissive". Congruency and incongruency, and upward mobility and downward mobility determined the structure of patriotic attitudes.

A few years later Martikainen (1973) returned to the relationship between education and political activity. The assumed inequality originating from the different resources of different individuals ("class" factor), with a concomitant imbalance in benefits accrued from education structures, could not be proved on the basis of Martikainen's data. In fact, quite the contrary situation seemed to emerge: education equalized class differences very efficiently. However, the inequality aspect emerged from another angle: the different accessibility of higher education for various different groups. Differential education functioned as a structural source of individual inequalities (Martikainen, 1973, 77).

The Heiskanens' research in particular illustrates the role which secondary schools had in maintaining the bourgeois character of the higher social classes and in contributing to the embourgeoisment the upwardly mobile, which until the 1960's was usually finished off in the universities (see Pesonen, 1958). Pesonen (1960) studied male students of the University of Helsinki on their attitudes toward national defense. A majority not only wanted an increased defense budget but, were also prepared to take part in student pressure-group activity to help realize this goal.

The situation changed somewhat in the 1960's in certain fields of higher education. Lammi and Sänkiäho (1970) studied the party affiliation of male law and social science students at the University of Helsinki in spring 1969. The students were asked whether they had changed their party affiliation during their student years and if so, in what direction. Social science students had changed their party affiliation more often (33%) than law students and the direction was most often from bourgeois parties to socialist

parties. Law students had changed less often (22%) and the direction was most often from conservative bourgeois parties to center parties; however, a countertrend from the socialist and center parties to the conservative party could also be detected. The social science students majoring in economics had switched more often to bourgeois parties.

Since the studies reviewed above, the Finnish school system has gone through a reform with the introduction of comprehensive schools in the 1970's. The aim of the reform was to modernize the school system and equalize educational opportunities. However, it seems that the division of the adolescent population into the "vocational" and "academic" tracks has only been postponed. In addition, entrance examinations have been introduced by the 1980's to all branches of university education. Although both secondary and higher education are provided by the government and are free of charge, the educational systems at both levels do help to enhance the cumulative advantage of students with a higher social background (cf. Kuusinen, 1985).

#### **5.4.3 .i. Peer groups and youth culture**

In the 1970's, youth cultures and student radicalization raised the question of whether there was a "generation gap" dividing the society. The central finding in a pioneering Finnish youth study *Youth Socialization and Youth Work* by Ritva Aalto (1975) was that the majority of Finnish youth seemed to regard the smooth transition into the adult society as the most central thing in life. For young people, finding a job and maturing in regard to personal relationships was most important. The researcher concluded that no "generation gap" nor "counterculture" existed in the world of Finnish youth. "Counterculture" was in Aalto's opinion a totally foreign concept connected to the affluence of American society and artificially brought into Finnish discussion. The absence of a counterculture was explained by the lower standard of living in Finland compared to the USA (Aalto, 1975, 83).

Aalto's data relating mainly to fifteen to twenty-four-year-olds were gathered from 1968 to 1974. Only a few years after her results were published young people were chaining themselves to tractors trying to prevent the drying out and utilizing for agriculture of ecologically rich lakes and swamplands; they were occupying deserted old buildings, forming punk bands and printing counter-culture magazines. It was true, however, that these subcultures were not USA-based, but inspired mainly by similar

trends in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. A more sound assumption about conflict and inequality between generations, was that an oscillating process had been taking place: decision-makers become over-aged when young people become politically passive (Martikainen, 1978). Whether a conflict will take place, however, depends on complex social and political processes.

While seeking to predict the future, youth sociologists and political scientists interested in the political socialization of children and adolescents more often than not contributed in legitimizing the existing political system and social order. As a result, empirical youth research acquired a certain conservative label in Finland. Much of the criticism of the field has been aimed at its uncritical use of surveys as its main source of evidence.

In several European countries, the repeated failures of empirical youth research encouraged youth researchers (particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom) to turn to qualitative methods. The main aim, however, was not to predict more accurately the behaviour of young people in the near future, but to understand social change. In regard to "politics", the theoretical foundations of the resulting research abandoned the focus of traditional youth research to adopt a more critical examination of the politics of class, culture and ideological domination. In Finland a similar change in the framework of youth studies took place. "Socialization" gave way to "youth culture". Heiskanen's and Mitchell's (1985) "case-study" interestingly duplicates to some extent the earlier study from 1971 by Stolte-Heiskanen and Heiskanen. The data was collected from comprehensive school students, but the analysis did not focus on the effects of the reformed education system, but on the class-based "habitus" of the respondents in terms of youth cultures. Though not a study of political socialization, Heiskanen's and Mitchell's research illustrates the connections between class, educational-orientation and subculture in preparing the young people for their future orientation and success in adult society. The study documented with accuracy the confrontation between youth subcultures and the dominant culture, although today the Punks and Teds of the study already seem to be things of the past. In general youth culture-research focusing on controversial and highly visible subcultures has not provided clues to the development of political orientations.

## **5.5 Class, sex and generation as orienting concepts**

### **5.5.1 .i. Class**

In Finnish political socialization the nuclear family has been treated in many ways as a dominant factor. However, the central focus has not been the family in itself, but the "family" represented by the occupation, status and political affiliation of the father as an operationalization of "class". Class has been treated as a background-variable without giving any attention to the fact that belonging to a class in itself involves an ongoing process of political socialization.

Socialization into different social classes has not received much attention, with the exception of a study on the ideology and political action of the Finnish working class (Matheson, 1979), and a study of young trade union members (Nieminen, Jyrkämä, 1987). In both studies the significance of the established working-class movement was discussed. Experiences, especially those with later on in working life, provided opportunities for political learning for working class youth, most obviously in the activities of the trade-union, and in the socialist parties which dominated in the unions. The impact of the findings are, however, limited for understanding the political socialization of the working class. Both studies are based on extensive survey data and comparisons between age-groups, but instead of examining socialization processes more thoroughly, the researchers were content to find support for earlier findings, such as that a working-class and socialist party family background are powerful determinants of socialist party support and protest behaviour (Matheson, 1979; Nieminen, Jyrkämä, 1986).

### **5.5.2 .i. Sex vs. gender**

In political socialization studies, gender has mainly been treated as a pattern of differences, not as a pattern of relationships (Connell, 1987). The orienting concept of Finnish political socialization studies in explaining the differences between the political orientations of men and women in the 1960's and 1970's has even more clearly been (biological) "sex": no mentions of "gender" are to be found.

One of the most consistent findings in Finnish research on voting behaviour is that the voting percentages for men have been higher than the percentage for women. However, the differences have decreased from year to year in this area, until in the parliamentary election of 1987 women's voting

activity for the first time surpassed the voting activity of men. This was mainly a result of the higher turn-out among women in the younger age groups (see: Martikainen, 1988).

In the 1950s the voting activity of younger well-educated women was nearly as high as men's. This was a finding which was unexpected in early Finnish voting studies and which also was inconsistent with international voting studies. Pesonen (1958) explained that the high voting percentage of the female university students of his sample was not comparable to the voting percentage of male students, because women more often postponed their vote to the second day of the election (in Finland all elections are held for two days). As a result even though virtually no difference in voting activity between the men and women could be found, Pesonen maintained that women "in the end cannot be considered politically as active as men" (Pesonen, 1958, 144).

Another bias in Finnish male/mainstream political science has been that it has often been seen sufficient to study schoolboys and male students for a representative view of the attitudes of the whole youth population (e.g. Toukoma, 1970; Lammi, Sankiah, 1970). This changed somewhat towards the end of the 1960's when gender was politicized by the rise of the women's movement. Only then did the process of female political socialization become a focus of study in its own right.

The only Finnish study dealing explicitly with women's political socialization has been Veronica Stolte-Heiskanen's (1971) comparison of male and female secondary and vocational school youths. Stolte-Heiskanen's analysis proceeded out from the assumption that "sex role ideology" to a great extent functions to maintain the prevailing economic relations of society and as such, is an important aspect of the norms concerning female role expectations. Sex role ideology functions to discourage women from participation in politics or from developing a political consciousness, and thereby actively attempting to change the status quo. A further assumption was that because accessibility to different 'opportunity structures' of society in class societies is determined by social class, lower class females are subject to a "cumulative disadvantage". It had already been found that there were no significant differences between adolescent boys and girls in level of political interest. The Finnish evidence from the late 1960's showed a decrease in both political interest and activity during the late teens and early twenties among women in the strata of society with manual oc-

cupations (Haavio-Mannila, 1970; Martikainen, 1973). In study dating in the 1950's, it was established that differences in sex roles were in general much more sharply delineated and rigid in the working class (Allardt et al., 1958).

Stolte-Heiskanen's study supported these earlier findings. She explained the decrease in the political interest of young women as the outcome of the differentiation of sex roles produced by the traditional norms regulating the behaviour of the sexes. This is in turn a consequence of historical changes which have led to women becoming both a cheap labour reserve and a vast consumer outlet in the market economy. Although the empirical data in support of these assumptions were not systematic, the importance of the more elitistic and bourgeois educational environment of the secondary school in raising the political consciousness of females was obvious. Stolte-Heiskanen suggested that this also has implications for the nature of the ideology of "women's emancipation movements" and it may also have been at the core of the basically elitistic character of the movement in Scandinavia (Stolte-Heiskanen, 1971, 94).

### 5.5.3 .i. Generations

Shifts in political behaviour are often described in generational terms, although this is problematic in several ways. Generational socialization is often discussed in terms of parent-child relations with a reference to generational conflict that often dubiously links individual childhood and adolescent experiences and adult behaviour. In the comparison of the political attitudes of "generations", Pesonen and Sänkiäho (1979) were content to compare the attitudes of sixteen-year-olds and their parents. It was hardly unexpected that the attitudes of the adolescents often closely resembled those of their parents. Among the few deviations from the priorities stated by the parents was found a shift from an emphasis of the importance of satisfying material needs towards a stress on social needs. Although evidence was scarce, the adoption of political affiliation "in the mother's milk" also seemed to be declining. Pesonen's and Sänkiäho's study was a part of the large comparative research project Political Action, which reached similar conclusions (cf. Barnes and Kaase (eds.), 1979). However, the term political generation implies that political attitudes and preferences permanently label the age group under study. Neither age group comparisons alone, nor a cross-sectional study of parents and their teenage children, of course, can guarantee that this is actually the case.



Previous sketches of political generations in Finland carried out further back in time (for example, Pesonen, Sänkiäho, 1979, 18-19, although they do use the term "age-groups") have totally ignored social and cultural influences and narrowly pointed to the "first voting experience" and the historical events that occurred at the same time in the institutional sphere of the political system. At present, however, it is extremely difficult to acquire an understanding of Finland's cultural and political development without making use of the concept of generations. A general framework for studying Finnish generations has been constructed by Roos (1987). Evidence came from comparing life histories of Finns belonging to different generations. In the younger generations born after World War II, experiences gathered in the course of life seem to be replaced by "non-experiences": absence of war, poverty, famine and serious illness (Roos 1987). The same life history material was used by Jääsaari (1986) in a study of the political attitudes of Finns born between 1920 and 1950.

The younger age groups have hardly been studied as generations, with the exception of Heiskanen's and Mitchell's (1985) study on generations of Finnish youth cultures. With respect to politics, the group born between 1958 and 1970 has been much discussed but scarcely studied. The few major studies have concentrated mainly on voting behaviour (Martikainen, 1987; Martikainen, Yrjönen, 1980, 1984). Due to a lack of concentrated research, the discussion of the political socialization of a whole generation of young people has been trivialized. Recent psychologically oriented youth studies (e.g. Helve, 1987, Pulkkinen, 1988) have reinforced the discussion of a politically passive youth population as a social problem. However, at least those belonging to the older part of the group in question have been among the agents and main supporters of the subcultures and new social movements (for example the Greens) in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

## **5.6 Neglected aspects of Finnish .i. political socialization research**

The merit of Finnish political socialization research has been to show how political behaviour in Finland has transformed its stiff, ritualistic and class-based character to a more reflexive, diffused orientation. The patterns of political behaviour are no longer as evident and easily predictable as in the 1950's. The inability of political socialization research to produce extensive explanations of these changes has not always been understood. In reality

interpretations have often lagged behind because of the very mere rapidity of these social changes.

However, the commonly accepted notions of political socialization have often demonstrated their limitations when confronted with political change. For instance, it has been suggested that the concept of "cultural reproduction" has a better ability to encompass all the relevant phenomena in political change than "political socialization" or "political culture". The idea of a separate political sphere is very limited, when the whole process of cultural reproduction in everyday life is political and has political consequences.

Referring to the works of Bourdieu, Passeron and Offe, Tom Bottomore (1983) argues that the theory of cultural reproduction has the great merit of emphasizing that the ideas and values shaping political action are not necessarily even expressed in political form. It relates such ideas to the whole social structure. Moreover, what the theory of cultural reproduction brings to light, is "the dense network of economic, political and cultural ideas and practices in everyday life - especially in modern industrial societies - which constitutes a formidable obstacle to any large scale radical political change" (Bottomore, 1983, 83-85).

The linking of economic, political and cultural influences is obviously not a task easily accomplished in social research. Overlooking cultural reproduction is only one shortcoming in Finnish political socialization research, although perhaps an important one. It could be argued, however, that Finnish political scientists have too often chosen their field of inquiry on the basis of easily obtainable survey data; those studies that have claimed to reach deeper than mere description have often resorted to a sociologism that has neglected the process of political socialization. Although the effects of different socialization agents and institutions have been mapped, there seems to be a lack of understanding of how these agents and institutions really operate in the political socialization of the individual. The relatively small number of political scientists interested in political socialization has also made longitudinal analysis and examination of the permanence of changes in political socialization processes very difficult.

The sporadic nature of the research has clearly left some crucial "white spaces" in the study of socialization. For instance, no research on political socialization using the framework of gender has yet been published in Finland. Up to this day, there have been hardly any women at all in the

field of Finnish political science; the research on women and politics has been mainly carried out by sociologists.

A few other areas have also been neglected. In the study of the effects of the educational system a great deal of attention has rightly been focused on the class-based differentiation of education that was particularly evident before the school reform. On the other hand, the role of the school curriculum, for instance, in attempting directly socialize pupils into the existing political system and in promoting patriotism and national identity, has not been taken into account. However, history, ceremonies, celebrations of the birthdays of national heroes, and the appreciation of national cultural monuments have been emphasized heavily in Finnish education since the second half of the 19th century (Smeds, 1987).

From the point of view of the enormous structural changes in Finnish society described earlier, there have been remarkably few studies devoted to socialization in urban society. Lately the symbolic aspects of politics have attracted the interest of many Finnish political scientists and sociologists, and the relations between economic interests and political power do not seem to be central for this school of research. Yet economics command an increasing space in everyday life in modern industrial societies; urban ways of life in particular are shaped to a surprising extent by economic interests (Kortteinen, 1983).

The theoretical interest in youth culture starting in the early 1980's promised a change in the direction of political socialization studies. The study of youth culture has indeed gained a trendy popularity in the past few years, but ironically this has occurred years after the fading away of spectacular subcultures. However, the "new" youth culture research has not advanced from the stage of reviewing foreign theoretical literature, nor has it avoided treating its subject in a stereotypical fashion. The widening of the concept of politics, mainly due to the influence of cultural studies and women's studies, may prove to have a stimulating effect on the study of political socialization processes. Experimenting with unusual empirical data might also yield some interesting information. On the other hand, the loose usage of the concept of politics is threatening to empty it of all content: anything ranging from knitting socks in womens' clubs to jumping up and down to the rhythm of rock music seem to be seriously regarded as evidence of a new political culture.

### 5.7 Implementation of *i.* political socialization research

Political socialization research in Finland has already been characterized as sporadic. As a result, the implementation of this research into intentional direct political socialization has been rather difficult. It seems that the demand for research oriented towards practical application has its roots in - and has lately been intensified by - changes in the voting behaviour of young people.

The student rebellions of the late 1960's put the question of youth and politics in the center of public political discussion in many countries. Empirically oriented researchers sought to explain the rapid radicalization of youth which had spread regardless of national and cultural boundaries. In Finland, the emergence of a group of young radicals and the counter-reaction it produced, the lowering of the minimum age of voting, the attention given to young voters, and the success of many young MP candidates were characteristics so typical of the Parliamentary election in 1970, that the election was nicknamed "The Youth Election" (Pesonen 1972, 7). The assumption that "immature" young people were easy targets for political manipulation and indoctrination caused a good deal of worry among the political, economic and social elites who held themselves responsible for the future of democracy. A group of Finnish political scientists even published a booklet containing information on politics, parties and election procedure designed to help young people decide for which party they should vote (Borg et al., 1970).

In 1968, the minimum age for voting was first lowered from twenty-one to twenty in municipal elections, and in 1970 it was extended to parliamentary elections. The minimum age for voting and eligibility was lowered to eighteen in 1975. One of the effects of lowering the minimum age was the arising of the theme of the political activity of youth, and it was consequently included in the 1968 research program of the Civic Education Centre at the initiative of the Ministry of Education (Martikainen, 1984). The Ministry of Education has sponsored all the major studies of the electoral behavior and political activity of youth (Martikainen, Sänkiaho, 1969; Martikainen, 1978; Martikainen, Yrjönen, 1980, 1983, 1984), and it has also been responsible for the publication of all but one study (Munck, 1988).

The low turnout among the young voters has been seen, however, as being "disappointing": the young have "not responded to their new powers as ex-

pected" (Liljeström, 1983). The Civic Education Center sponsored massive campaigns in the late 1970's and early 1980's directed towards the young to attract attention to the importance of voting. The 1979 campaign in particular was thought to be successful in raising the voting percentage among the young (Martikainen, Yrjönen, 1980), but the effect of these campaigns has been limited and short-term. These campaigns can also be accused of demonstrating patronizing attitudes.

The inadequacy of political information and civic education in the schools is thought to be among the major causes of the alleged political passivity of young voters. Today civic education is taught as a part of history courses, but it is limited to encyclopedic information about Finnish parties, government institutions and elections. In the attempts to encourage young people in political participation, the lack of sophistication in political socialization research has undoubtedly partly contributed to the prevalence of the "hypodermic needle theory" among civil servants, politicians and teachers in handing out political education and information. Several demands to increase the amount of civic education in schools have recently been made.

The first systematic youth policy in Finland was developed in the mid-1960's (Liljeström, 1983). The implementation of youth research in directing youth policy has been studied by Munck (1988). According to her study, the utilization of academic youth research carried out in particular by government committees has mainly been conceptual. Youth research in the 1980's has become more dependent on government sponsorship; in addition, a great deal of youth research has begun to be done in and directly under the control of the administrative institutions which are directly involved. In practical decision-making, results have often been interpreted and manipulated according to their political desirability (Munck, 1988).

Substantial attention in youth policy and policy oriented research has been given to the relationship between general social activity, participation and political activity (cf. Liljeström, 1983; Vesikansa, 1986). This has been connected to the priority Finnish youth policy has given to political youth organizations and voluntary-youth associations in the socialization of the individual (the targetgroup of Finnish youth policy is young people between the ages of ten and twenty-four) into collective participation in society and in promoting competence in interest articulation regardless of social background. One of the most consistent findings in Finnish youth

research has been that social "activity" and "passivity" are cumulative (Allardt et al., 1958; Aalto, 1975). Surveys done in the 1970's, which indicated the number of Finnish youth belonging to at least one organization to be as high as 65 %, are often cited in youth policy publications and committee reports (cf. Liljeström, 1983, 70). However, not much attention has been paid to the intensity of this "widespread participation" nor on its effects in increasing actual competency in political participation. The single organization adolescents actually most often belonged to was a sports club.

Lately there have been some adjustments made in Finnish youth policy. Attempts have been made to implement the use of youth research in political and administrative planning employing a wider and less repressive conception of youth. Youth culture research and the growing interest in theoretical definitions of youth have partly been incorporated into the decision-making process of youth policy at least on a symbolic level. It also appears that the gap between administrative data-gathering and academic youth research is narrowing (Munck, 1988).

Nevertheless, in the implementation of socialization research the capability of the political system and its administrative outlets to bring about social equality basically remains unquestioned. The most frequently presented frame of reference in Finnish youth research-produced for the needs of youth policy planning and administration, is the division of Finnish youth into active and passive groups, the latter of which are regarded as problem youth whose political socialization has not succeeded, and who need support in the form of education, information and additional socialization (Munck, 1988,95). Social isolation and mass-culture are seen as interfering in the attempt to bring about the desired socialization effects and these factors have been rather one-sidedly deemed to be harmful. In fact, a very influential field of study utilized in administrative planning of youth policy and media policy has been research into the effects of mass media violence on children. In this sense psychological, educational and sociological socialization research in Finland has probably had a far greater political influence than political socialization research which has more carefully sought to avoid moralistic overtones.

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## 6 *Political socialization in .i.Sweden*

### 6.1 Introduction

This contribution reviews findings from surveys carried out in Sweden on political socialization. These focused on the process by which young people's political identity and political culture is formed. According to political socialization researchers, the process of political socialization which leads to a young individual's political culture i.e. knowledge, values and behaviour in political issues, is explained, with the exception of individual characteristics, by a number of relationships which can be personal as well as contextual in nature. The mutual relationships between the different independent variables can give rise to conflicting interpretations of the situation in the dependent variable 'political culture'. The discussion below

will focus its attention on the use of different independent variables in political socialization research in Sweden.

Except for one early political socialization study (Husén, 1944), most of the socialization research done in Sweden has been carried out from the middle of the 1960s. This contribution gives a brief sketch of political participation patterns among youngsters in Sweden today. It also discusses developments in socialization research concerning the independent variables and gives a summary of the main research findings from studies in Sweden. Finally it presents a new research project on political culture.

## **6.2 .i. Political participation in Sweden**

The level of interest in and knowledge about politics, political participation and political activity among the citizens of a country are of great importance for the vigour of the political life in every democracy. In Sweden, 52 per cent of the electorate said in a survey dealing with the 1985 election that they were "interested or very interested" in politics. Men were more interested than women; older voters were more interested than younger voters; and highly educated were more interested than those with minimum education (Holmberg, 1987). The level of political interest is known to be strongly related to the political temperature in the debates during the election period.

If there are important political debates between the left and the right-wing parties, the political interest among the electorate will be higher than if there are no major political issues. This was, for instance, the case in Sweden when the Social Democratic Party lost power in Sweden in 1976 after a period of 44 years in government. The question which the bourgeois parties, especially the Agrarian (Center) Party, managed to handle better than the Social Democrats was the reduction of nuclear power plants. One interesting aspect of this question, from a political socialization point of view, is that the opinions that led to a vote for the Center Party (which meant voting no to nuclear power plants) were generally not based on actual knowledge about the danger with nuclear power plants but on attitudes and beliefs formed by unanswered questions about the safety of nuclear energy production.

The political knowledge concerning actual politics, i.e. different policy areas, is considerably higher among those of the electorate who have been in contact with politicians, participated in political meetings or read cam-

paign material. This difference in the electorate is valid regardless of their level of education. It can also be stated from research that young voters possess less knowledge than older voters. The electorate know much more about different politicians' party background than about actual politics.

Despite the fact that the level of political interest and political knowledge can not be characterized as high, it does not seem to effect the willingness of citizens to participate in the elections. Compared with most other countries, Sweden has a very high participation rate in the elections. The turn-out in the three latest elections has been just above or just below 90 per cent. This is probably the highest level of participation that is possible to reach without a compulsory system.

Participation in action groups and political parties is not that common among Swedish youngsters of today. The various old established political parties have had great problems during the last decade to attract young people to their activities. There is one exception - in Sweden as well as in many other countries - the green movement. The different environmental organizations have managed to get young people involved in the struggle for the protection of the environment. In the 1988 election the question of environmental protection was the most important political issue debated. There was a clear belief among the electorate that the old political parties were not able to deal effectively with the question of environmental protection. Evidence supporting this statement is that the Green Party of Sweden received 5.6 per cent of the votes in the 1988 election which gave the party representation in the Swedish Riksdag - the first new party in the Swedish Riksdag since 1936.

### **6.3 Political socialization factors**

Some of the studies carried out in Sweden have focused on new aspects of the independent variables in relation to the political culture. The overview below will, from a bird's eye view, discuss the importance of stability and change in political sub-systems, social ambition and dramatic events as socialization factors.

#### **6.3.1 Environmental influences**

The first major political socialization study that was carried out in Sweden focused on environmental influence on political learning. The basic thought was that one explanation of the apparently contradictory evidence

regarding the relative influence parents, schools, peers and other socialization agents had on children's political culture, was that macro-level factors in the political and social system surrounding the learner also had an effect on their political identity and political culture. In this study, Gustafsson (1972; 1974) argues that macro-level influences are frequently acknowledged in comparisons between societies but very seldom used for explaining interaction between the socialization agents and the learner. (In fact there is only one known example (Litt, 1963) prior to her study.) Gustafsson hypothesized that the nature of a sub-national political system i.e. a municipality would have a considerable impact on the socialization of its young people. In Sweden, as in most countries, some local and regional areas are characterized by rapid change and economic expansion while others have declining populations, unemployment and poor economic forecasts. In the study, sampling was conducted in three different types of municipalities. These were picked to represent the two extremes and the "in-between" of expansion and decline in relation to growth. The analysis of the empirical data shows that it is fruitful to relate socialization theory to macro-level features of the political system and to the characteristics of young people's sub-national environment. It is clearly demonstrated that youngsters' political interest and willingness to participate in politics are effected by the existence of a expanding or declining sub-political environment. In both expanding and declining communities the willingness to enter into discussions is greater than in a stable or static municipality. The municipal situation does not have an uniform effect on the youngsters' political opinions. It is clear from the research that, when the municipal environment influences young peoples' political opinions, the direction of the change is important. Youngsters from static or declining communities tend more often to have the more homogeneous values and to be more in agreement about different political issues than young people from expanding areas. This may be partly explained by the large number of new inhabitants in expanding areas leading to less homogeneity in opinions in general.

From the above study it can be stated that macro-level features of the sub-national political system play an important role in the understanding of the transmission of political values from one generation to an other. If situational factors are used to interpret the process of socialization of children and adults, the connection between childhood and adult political values can be better understood.

In the same study Gustafsson found that viewpoints on issues were established earlier, and considered more important, than party identification, which was formed comparatively late. This result contradicts the findings of the first socialization study undertaken in Sweden by Husén in 1944, which showed that children began to support a particular political party early in life. Husén also found that the parents were the most influential agents in the children's formation of a political culture. In this respect, Gustafsson's results demonstrate a change in the political culture in Sweden.

### **6.3.2 .i. Social ambition**

In a later study, Gustafsson (1981) looks closer at the importance of personality factors, including life-cycle and life crisis variables, in the political socialization process. She focuses her interest on the concept of social ambition measured as the youngster's social goals in terms of social mobility. Each of the dependent variables selected for the research comprises many items measuring the same kind of questions. The dependent variables are political knowledge, political interest, political efficacy and political activity.

The findings show that social ambition is as good a predictor of political knowledge as social background. It is also demonstrated that the higher the level of social ambition, the greater the degree of political knowledge. In consequence, those with an upper-class background and high ambitions were the ones most interested in politics. When it comes to political activity, it is clear that, if activity is measured as membership in political organizations, there is no relationship between ambition and activity. One explanation is that, in general, a greater percentage of the Swedish working class is organized than the higher social strata. If the operationalization of activity is 'the percentage of young people who can think of situations in which they would be willing to join a political organization', the pattern changes. The higher the level of social ambition, the greater the willingness to join a political movement in the future. Finally, in the case of the political efficacy index, Gustafsson's data clearly shows that it is the upper-class and ambitious youngsters who have the strongest belief in political efficacy.

In conclusion, social ambition stands out as an important independent variable. There is no evidence in this study that social ambition can be explained in terms of the degree of influence exerted by parents, schools or



the mass media. The crucial question remains: Why are some youngsters socially ambitious and others not and what are the explanatory factors?

A recently completed study (Öhlund, 1988) focuses on social ambition and identity processes among young men. Öhlund collected his empirical data through very extended individual and group interviews with the members of the hard-rock band "Styrke". The study clearly shows that being a member of the hard-rock group gives the youngsters many new dimensions through which they can explain and understand the surrounding society. Their social ambition in combination with the common group goal provides protection for the individual but, at the same time, acts as a strong influence on their views in political and societal matters. Membership of the group leads to the youngsters' originally differing views becoming more uniform and thus influences the formation process a great deal. In a more theoretical perspective, it can be concluded from the study that strong peer-groups, such as a pop-band, with a common social ambition have a great influence on the members of the group. Öhlund argues that group identity must be considered as an important independent variable in socialization research in the future.

### **6.3.3 .i.Dramatic events**

Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963, a now classic socialization study was undertaken (Sigel,1970). In connection with the tragic murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in February 1986, a similar study was carried out in Sweden (Gustafsson et.al, 1987). The parallel organization provided the researchers with the opportunity to make comparisons between Swedish and American political cultures.

The Swedish survey was undertaken in Umeå, Luleå, and Södertälje and encompassed 1,166 children aged between 11-16 years. A survey of 1,509 adults was also carried out. Both questionnaire surveys were undertaken within three weeks of the assassination. The following cultural elements were measured:

- emotional reactions related to people (leaders) or to institutions;
- fears, questions concerning what or who caused the assassination;
- attitudes towards control and openness;
- political engagement.

Two of these aspects, namely fears and attitudes towards control and openness, are considered in more detail below.

An event such as the assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme gave rise to a host of questions among the general public as to how it could happen. Speculations about who did it and why can be understood as more general indicators of who or what forces constitute a threat not only against the Prime Minister but also Swedish society as a whole, especially when no assassin was caught. When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, the situation was that a man, Oswald, who was probably guilty, had been identified and also murdered. Accordingly, the criteria used to measure fears in the American study must, of necessity, be different from those used in the Swedish study. The questions put in the Swedish survey showed that an overwhelming majority of children and adults considered that the shot was intended for the Prime Minister i.e. that the threat was real and not a mistake. The proportion who believed that a madman performed the assassination was large in the Swedish study compared with the American. Although the question was not framed in exactly the same words, it should be noted that only about 15 per cent of the Americans considered that Oswald murdered President Kennedy because he was mad, whereas more than 33 per cent of the Swedes thought that the assassin was a madman. It is interesting that more than a third of the Swedes place the assassin outside society and the political culture. A madman has, per definition, no place in normal day to day life. Naturally enough, both children and adults took, according to the Swedish survey, a "wait and see" attitude to the statement that an international terrorist organization had hired the assassin. Only 18 per cent of the adults and 28 per cent of the children expressly considered that international terrorism constituted the threat. Older children had, like adults, a higher percentage of 'perhaps' answers than younger, which feasibly ought to be regarded as an expression of maturity in the older children. Swedes have not construed the reason why the Prime Minister was shot in any uniform way. The assertion which gains most adherents is that the Prime Minister was shot because someone disliked his domestic policies. The next most frequently supported view is that he was shot because somebody disliked his international work. Naturally there is uncertainty (a high "perhaps" percentage), with regard to speculations on why Olof Palme was assassinated. Despite this, the response is characterized by a relatively high agreement with general political explanations of the type named above. It is much more unusual that the

probable explanation is given as that someone disliked the Prime Minister personally or that someone disliked specific policies e.g. on immigration or co-operation with one of the super powers, USA or Soviet Union. In a similar way the American fears are characterized by few references to the murder being planned by Communists, to Russia lying behind it or that radical policy was significant in this context. The conclusion that can be drawn is that fears in both countries are diffuse but have a clear political undertone.

The attitudes to control and openness are now considered; Prime Minister Olof Palme was a strong advocate of an open society. From time to time he declined the protection of the security police which was the case on the night he was murdered. His argument for refusing body guards was that even politicians and other highly placed persons must have a private life. In order to illuminate the attitude to control and openness, three blocks of assertions were formulated to which the participants in the survey were asked to take a stance. The first dealt with the need for security surveillance, the second with the role of the police in a democratic society and the third with certain law and order aspects in particular the treatment of suspected murders in the courts. No information is available on opinions on the balance between control and openness prior to the murder of the Prime Minister. In Gustafsson et al's survey the following question was posed: "Do you think that there will be more police surveillance in Sweden in the future?" To which not less than 53 per cent of the adults and 64 per cent of the children replied "yes". On the other hand, most were uncertain whether more police surveillance should be a good thing. As a rule surveillance was seen as unavoidable given the developments in society, whereas the situation which leads to the need for surveillance was regarded as unfortunate. The assassination has probably given Swedes a greater awareness of political violence and consequently a greater willingness to accept security surveillance compared with the time before February 1986. As is also evident from the assertions concerning the courts, the government of law is well anchored in the adult population. Children consider to a lesser extent than adults that murderers must also be given fair and just treatment in court and that no one should be convicted if they deny the charge and the evidence against them is weak. The older the children the closer they are to the adult generation's values in this issue. In the American study the awareness of legal rights was more firmly anchored amongst adults than children, amongst highly educated than poorly

educated, and amongst whites than blacks. In the same way, in the Swedish study, the awareness of legal rights is greatest amongst well-educated and other groups belonging to the privileged sectors of society. The fact that Prime Minister Olof Palme could be shot to death on a Stockholm street shows that Swedish society is by no means as peaceful as many of us would have predicted up to that fateful night 28 February 1986. However, despite what happened, the belief in an open society without very extensive police surveillance is firmly anchored amongst Swedes. Even after such an event, it is still not self-evident, according to those interviewed, that a minister should surround himself with body guards in the future. The idea that democracy has a price which, of necessity, leads to politicians facing a certain amount of risk in order for society to continue to be open and free, appears to be widely accepted amongst Swedes.

#### **6.4 .i. Agencies of political socialization**

Two different studies will be discussed in relation to agents of political socialization. The first study analyzes parental influence on children using a technique in which children are matched both against their own parents and against some other child's parent. The second study makes an effort to focus on the massmedia as an agent. In this study, political socialization theories are combined with mass-communication theories.

##### **6.4.1 .i. Parents**

The focus of research for Jacobsson (1989) is the parents' influence on their own children's political values and attitudes. One theoretical starting point is that there are both unidentified differences and similarities between the attitudes of parents and children caused mainly by the approaches used in earlier research. Very different results can often emerge depending upon whether the starting point is at the individual or system level.

The widespread belief that the child's early learning is of great importance in the process of forming its adult attitudes has led to theoretical models that focus on the importance of the parents. The models are often grounded on two basic principles called the "primacy and structuring principles" (Searing, Schwartz & Lind, 1973). According to these principles, the child's early learning, which is mostly based on emotional contacts with the parents, is of great importance for what is learnt later in life. What is learnt in childhood remains as basic knowledge, beliefs and attitudes which

structure what is picked up later. This type of theory has often been transferred into political socialization research. The problem, as described by Jacobsson (1989), is that the difference between the parents' emotional role and their importance for the child's political learning is often accepted without any theoretical argument. Jacobsson hypothesizes that the emotional relationship between parents and children is not necessarily important in the formation of the children's political values.

Jacobsson also argues in his thesis that the two separate concepts of 'parents' and 'the adult generation' have been misused in earlier research. They have been used as synonymous despite the fact that they describe two different levels - individual and group or system level. One of the aims of his thesis is to show that different interpretations are possible depending on how the researcher uses the concepts of parents and older generation. Jacobsson hypothesizes that a young person's parents have very little importance for the development of his/her political identity and political culture.

The empirical focus of the study is on parents' and children's political culture i.e. basic democratic values and attitudes in some concrete societal problems. Differences in the value systems between the child and parent generations and between children and real parents are related in the analysis to gender, school achievements, the political home environment and the parents' belief in authority.

In the study there is a methodological innovation in the analysis of the political influence from parent to child. Jacobsson starts with an analysis of real parent-child pairs. In this part of the analysis he describes the differences in political influence passed on from, on the one hand, the father and, on the other, from the mother to the child. From the empirical data, it can be said that the influence passed on from the parents to the child is weak and that there are no clear patterns showing differences in the influence on the child from the father and/or the mother. In the next stage of the analysis, Jacobsson uses the same data set but he rearranges the data. Every child is allocated new parents by a computer programme. The great advantage with this technique is that both children and parents are the same but "paired" in a new way so all family relationships are removed producing a warped pair. If the correlation between basic democratic values and/or attitudes in concrete societal problems declines for the warped pairs compared with the real pair, it can be stated that the parents have an

influence on the political values and attitudes of their child. The argument behind this is that neither the occurrence of the same views at group level nor at individual level between parent and child provides evidence of parental influence on the child's political culture. Jacobsson argues that, by using his technique, it is possible to analyse the parental influence on children's attitudes.

His empirical analysis provides no evidence of parental influence on the children's political values. The decline in the likelihood of parents and child having the same attitudes is small. The result clearly shows that the chances of demonstrating parental influence are as great with warped pairs as with real pairs of parents and children. Jacobsson concludes that the role of the parents in the political socialization process must be reviewed. It appears to be more likely that other factors are of greater importance than the parents in the formation of political attitudes and basic democratic values among young people.

#### **6.4.2 .i. Mass media**

The work presented here (Johansson, 1985) deals with the connection between use of the mass media and young people's political culture. Different degrees of exposure to the mass media as well as the type of media contact, direct or indirect, are assumed to be of significance for the resulting influence on youngsters' political culture. The analysis builds on the assumption that it is possible to distinguish young people with high exposure to different types of mass media and those with low exposure. The contacts with the media which are mapped out concern partly direct transference through exposure to the message and partly indirect exposure via a mediator.

The indirect exposure is assumed to take place through certain socialization agents, e.g. parents, acquainting themselves with the mass media's message and transmitting it further through discussions or by sharing the item of news with the youngsters. This form of influence has frequently been treated entirely as influence by the agent without any consideration being taken to the fact that it is a matter of indirect mass media exposure.

The study's intention was to analyze how such indirect exposure via agents was combined with direct exposure to the mass media. A basic assumption was that the two forms of mass media exposure combined and thereby reinforced the impression made by the mass media's message. The analysis


model used put into focus the mass media's ability to influence young people's political culture. Youngsters subject to high direct and/or indirect exposure were assumed to be influenced into developing a different political culture than youngsters with low direct and/or indirect exposure to the mass media. Obviously factors other than the consumption of the mass media contribute in shaping their political culture. In this study, however, the importance of the mass media was the focus of the research. By utilizing the knowledge available within the field of socialization research with regard to the different forms of influence through personal agents and combining this with mass media research's focus on the consumption of and direct exposure to the mass media, Johansson sought to obtain a more differentiated starting point for the study of the effects of the mass media.

The aim of the research was to analyze the correlations between different degrees of exposure to the mass media and young people's political knowledge and democratic values. The hypothesis was that direct and indirect exposure to the media in different combinations affect young people's political identity and political culture. An analysis model was created to test the hypothesis (See Figure 1 below). The basic idea was that direct and indirect mass media exposure combine and reinforce the possible mass media effects on young people's political culture arising as a result of solely direct or solely indirect exposure to the mass media (Johansson, 1980).

Johansson (1980) argues that all the four cells in the matrix are of interest when attempts are to be made to establish the media's relative importance as an agent for the development of an individual's political culture i.e. political knowledge, values and behaviour of relevance for society. He suggests that obviously the same amount of exposure to the mass media can lead to different reactions in different individuals.

Figure 1 illustrates four different political cultures (P1, P2, P3 and P4). These are assumed to have arisen through different forms of direct and indirect mass media influence. In the case of P1, the political culture has been shaped by strong direct impressions of the mass media.

**Figure 1:** Reinforcement Model - a starting point for the study of the mass media effects on political culture.



N.B. Naturally the variable, mass media exposure, is not a dichotomy but can vary along a scale ranging from extremely strong to infinitesimal. The simplification has been made for pedagogical reasons. P1 to P4 represent political culture subject to different degrees of mass media exposure.

The impressions have been strengthened through indirect mass media influence e.g. via parents and friends, which in their turn are influenced by the mass media. In P4 the mass media effects are small or non-existent. The basic hypothesis is that group P1 differs from group P4 with regard to political culture and that the different forms of exposure explain some of the differences in knowledge, values and behaviour.

The empirical part of the report is based on a nationally representative sample of Swedish school children in class 8 (14 year olds) for the academic year 1974/75. Material was collected using a questionnaire survey. Two questionnaires were sent out during the academic year 1974/75 and one during 1975/76. At a later date a questionnaire was also sent out to the pupils' parents. This was intended to be filled in by one of them. It was possible to follow 911 pupils from when they were 14 to 16 years of age.

The analysis carried out by Johansson verifies his basic hypothesis. Young people with both strong direct and indirect exposure tend to have more



mature political values than young people with both weak direct and indirect exposure to the mass media.

The analysis showed that there was a connection between the young people's political values and their degree of exposure to the mass media. With regard to the young people's attitudes to democracy, there were no unambiguous connections between high and low consumers of different media. Only in those cases where the attitude in some opinion or question varied considerably within the group of youngsters did the mass media play a certain role for their standpoint, the more media exposure the more mature attitudes. However, this did not provide a clear answer to the question, whether or not differences in levels of consumption of mass media covary in relation to a conception of democracy.

When, in the next stage of the analysis, the measures of direct and indirect mass media exposure were combined according to the 'reinforcement model', the basic hypothesis that youngsters with both strong direct and indirect exposure to mass media have different political values than youngsters with both weak direct and indirect exposure, was verified for five of the six items on democracy. When the attitude in the group of young people varied in a particular question, the connection between degree of mass media exposure and political values emerged more strongly than otherwise. The attempts made to more strictly control, the dependent variable, by dividing the youngsters into two groups, one with democratic and one with non-democratic values, showed that strong direct and strong indirect exposure to the mass media in combination, co-vary with democratic values. This applied irrespective of gender and school achievements.

The conclusion which can be drawn from the study on the connection between exposure to mass media and young people's political values is that different degrees of media exposure lead to different political values. It shows that young persons with high level of exposure to the media tend to have more democratic attitudes than youngsters with low exposure. The problem is to isolate media exposure in such a way that the conclusion can be scientifically verified. The study illustrates clearly that the independent variable media exposure, must be very strictly controlled if it is to be possible to identify media effects.

## 6.5 .i. Political resocialization

When a person moves from one country to another or when a political revolution takes place in a country, it is likely that "new" political values and attitudes as well as new patterns of behaviour, i.e. a new political culture, are inacted. In the research project 'Political Resocialization of Immigrants' (PRI), led by Hammar (1973), more than 2,500 interviews were conducted in 1975 and 1976 with random samples of immigrants born in Finland, Yugoslavia, Poland and Turkey. There was also a Swedish control group. The theoretical point of departure, i.e. the research group's view of the concept of resocialization can briefly be described as the process through which immigrants learn or acquire political values, attitudes and patterns of behaviour acceptable to the receiving society. The political resocialization is supposed to be affected by the common socialization variables, such as gender, education, age prior to immigration etc. One hypothesis is that the better educated the immigrant, the easier it will be for him/her to learn about the new political culture.

The findings show that one important factor for the success of the resocialization process is the immigrants' reason for moving. Whether migration is for political or economic reasons and the intention is to stay for a long time, or whether the purpose of the stay is of a more temporary nature, is of great importance for the adoption of the new political culture. How much of the sending society's culture is transferred to the new environment is also of considerable importance for the immigrants' ability to accept the new society. In, for example, the Turkish sub-sample (Alpay, 1980) as many as about 60 per cent of the Turks interviewed spoke little or no Swedish, according to their own assessment. This inability to speak Swedish prevented most of the immigrants from being able to communicate with the surrounding society. The survey results also indicate that when an immigrant loses his/her attitude of temporariness, he/she also has a tendency to change his/her frame-of-reference. Instead of comparing his/her own situation prior to and after migration, comparisons are made with other people living in Sweden. The comparison does not come out in the immigrant's favour. Instead, the immigrants find that, despite their relatively high degree of general satisfaction with living conditions, they have a lower standard of living than most other people living in Sweden. Alpay (1980) hypothesizes that the discovery may, in some cases, lead to a greater interest in learning about Swedish society and to their becoming more involved in politics.

## 6.6 .i. New research on political culture

Swedish Political Culture in a Comparative Perspective is the title of a new research project that commenced in January 1989. According to the research design (Gustafsson & Johansson, 1989) the project is divided into three different stages and will be completed by 1995.

The project has started with a follow up of the study the research group carried out in 1986 of Swedish children's and adults' reactions to the assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme. The focus of the study is on changes in Swedish political culture linked to the dramatic event. Stage II commences spring 1991. The researchers plan to investigate two different groups. One group will consist of members of the public not holding offices within organizations or political parties and the other group will be elites holding offices within Greenpeace and/or the Green Party of Sweden. The aim of stage II is to present an indepth analysis of Swedish political culture in a European perspective, using secondary data about Europe, by the end of 1992. Stage III is scheduled to begin Autumn 1992 and is preliminarily intended to embrace empirical surveys of the political culture in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the study, the term political culture is used to describe basic ways of relating to politics: knowledge, values, attitudes and behaviour. These concern the forms for political decision making, i.e. politics, as well as the material content of politics i.e. policies. Sweden can, like the majority of modern democratic welfare states, be characterized as a "participant culture". In this group are found countries which are characterized by a sense of national identity, citizen participation in the shaping of politics and interest in the constitution and not just in the material results of politics. The researchers intend to shed light empirically on such elements of popular and elite political culture that are of relevance for the way in which the democratic constitution operates in modern welfare society. They identify a number of external and internal threats and point out that these have not infrequently led to organization responses in the form popular movements such as the environmental movement and the women's liberation movement and various kinds of organizations such as Amnesty, Greenpeace and 'green' political parties e.g. the Green Party of Sweden. In the same way as in Almond and Verba (1963), four dimensions of political culture are identified: system as general object (1), input objects (2), output objects (3) and self as active participant (4). Almond and Verba also used an important

distinction between cognitive, emotional and evaluative political orientations. In this study an attempt is made to measure each of these dimensions. The intention is, thus, to pose questions which illustrate, for example, how and to what extent Swedes participate in politics, how they experience this participation and how they value the importance of their own contributions. In a similar way, cognitive, emotional and evaluative dimensions are distinguished from each other with regard to other aspects of political culture such as political leadership, preferences for collective or individual solutions to current problems and so forth.

The main aim of the project is to describe and analyze Swedish political culture in such a way that distinctive features are brought out, thereby making a contribution to the elucidation of the problems facing the democratic constitution in modern welfare societies. Another aim is to analyze and classify the changes which have taken place in Swedish political culture in the post-industrial period i.e. from about 1970 and onwards. The main hypothesis is that Swedish political culture has, in some respects, become more like that of other European countries.

## **6.7 Summary**

The studies presented here focus on the question of explaining why and how the political culture changes. The use of different independent variables have, in many cases, shed new light over traditional political socialization results. For instance, Gustafsson's analysis of the importance of sub-national differences and Jacobsson's analysis of the influence passed from parents to child using the technique with real and warped pairs have both been able to produce new knowledge about the process of political socialization. Despite all the new knowledge available in the field, the dilemma for all political socialization researchers is that our models will be a reduction of the real world and there will probably always remain an unexplained residual. That is why this research area is so fascinating.

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## Suna Kili

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7	<i>Political Socialization in Turkey</i> <i>A general appraisal</i>
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### 7.1 Introduction

The processes of political socialization in Turkey are in a state of crisis. This crisis is prompted, in the main, by certain persistent elements in Turkish political life in general, and by an identity crisis in particular.

In the Kemalist era, the identity crisis in Turkey was largely twofold in nature: the strong sense of national identity pursued by the Kemalists and the stubborn allegiance of the religious-conservatives to traditional values and *ümmetçilik* (the principle of living within a religious community). Since political power was in the hands of the Kemalists from the beginning of the Republican era in 1923 until about 1950, the processes of political socialization were channelled in the direction of enhancing secular, national, and Western values. Kemalism (Atatürkism) was in a sense an antidote to the hold of religion and religious establishment on Turkish society. However, even the Kemalists era could not bring about a spirit of co-



existence, a reconciliation between the old and the new, that is between the protagonists of modernity and the upholders of tradition. The roots of this state of affairs lay largely in the nature of Ottoman reforms.

## **7.2 The nature of Ottoman and Kemalist socialization processes**

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in several wars and increasing encroachments on her independence by European powers gave rise to the decision on the part of some eighteenth and nineteenth century sultans to initiate reforms. The earlier reforms were made to stop aggression by making those changes that would maintain the viability of traditional Ottoman society. Later reforms, however, could be described as efforts to keep the Empire intact by partial transformation of that traditional society. Hence, new institutions were established and new ideas were introduced. With the retaining of old institutions and values, however, a dualism was created in Ottoman society. This situation complicated the political scene and blurred the processes of political socialization. Moreover, all the plans for reform were confused by crosscurrents of Ottomanism and Islamism. Furthermore, the Young Turks were emphasizing nationalism as the dominant element in political life. As a result, Ottomanism, Islamism, and nationalism became the principal elements in the political socialization of the people. The inherent contradictions of these elements, the deep cleavages instigated by these contradictions confused the processes of political socialization. Moreover, they led to the fragmentization of the political culture.

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the successful termination of the War of Independence, 1919-1922, Turkey went through a series of fundamental, radical reforms which included the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate; establishment of the Republic; depolitization of Islam through removal of Islamic functionaries from politics, law and education; substitution of Western for Islamic legal codes; expansion, and secularization of the educational system; construction of a modern political organization and above all a vigorous fostering of Turkish nationalism. All these basic reforms instigated a political, social, economic, and cultural transformation which turned Turkey's face toward the West.

The new republican regime was based on popular sovereignty. This brought to an end the Ottoman type of state which was based on the sovereignty of

the sultan. The Kemalist revolution, therefore, changed the identity of the Turkish state and its basis. The nation-state of Turkey was established which required new allegiances.

The clear decision to bring the nation-state of Turkey to the level of the advanced states of the world explains the essence of the Kemalist reforms. According to the Kemalists, the only way to achieve the creation of a new generation devoted to a new set of moral values was the unification of all educational institutions. This was achieved through the passage of the law of unification of education in 1924. Reform in the educational system was considered basic to the achievement of national unity. Education was a central factor of the radical transformation of Turkish society. And this education was to be controlled by the state and was to be both national and secular in character. Kemalists ascribed overriding importance to education in the process of nation-building.

The processes of political socialization as instigated by the Kemalist education involved the abandonment of Islamic-Ottoman values and the embracing of national, secular values. Educational institutions were the most important agencies of political socialization. The Atatürk reform movement put an end to the dualism of institutions and goals which characterized the Ottoman reform periods. The Kemalists believed that through a rational, national, modern and progressive educational system the whole fabric of Turkish society could be changed. Kemalist nationalism called for ultimate allegiance to the nation-state of Turkey. It aimed at realizing a modern political system that superseded religious and regional identities. Thus, the Ottoman-Islamic legacy was rejected by the Kemalists. With the passage of the law on the unification of education in 1924, nationalization and secularization of education was made possible. The curriculum of all schools was changed with the introduction of the so-called cultural courses which emphasized national history, culture and politics. Education was also used for the inculcation of a secularist, positivist attitude toward life, which, according to the Kemalists, had been one of the primary reasons for the advancement of the West. The ideology of Kemalism was a major instrument in creating the new political culture of the nation state of Turkey, and political socialization of the citizens involved the processes of induction into this national political culture. The chief agencies in the processes of induction were the formal educational system, the massmedia, the Republican People's Party (RPP), the People's Houses and Rooms, the Turkish Historical Society, and the Turkish Language Society. The

Kemalists did not look upon education as a means of preserving traditional culture, but as a means of its total transformation. The Kemalists believed that the inherent characteristics of Ottoman culture had blocked the processes of nation-building, and had constituted impediments to the assertion of Turkish culture.

### **7.3 Crisis of political socialization since the transition to the multi-party system**

After the transition to the multi-party system in 1946, some political parties began to make concessions to the detriment of secularism in order to get the votes of the more traditional segments of the Turkish population. Since the 1960's these concessions have finally led to the establishment of political parties upholding religious and sectarian views and convictions. These tendencies have sought to violate the secular, national basis of the Turkish educational system. Moreover, they are in contradiction with the commitment of Turkish legal system and political life to secularism, thus giving rise to great political conflict in the country.

Especially since the 1970's the increase in the number of official Koran courses and imam-hatip (prayer leader and preacher) schools and the increase of public funds allocated to the building of mosques in cities and villages are examples of the continuation of traditionalist elements in Turkish political life which affect educational policy and thus, the processes of political socialization.

The democratization of Turkish political life was greatly accelerated with the acceptance of the Constitution of 1961, a document based on a welfare understanding of state, which further liberalized the regime. This situation helped to bring about a dramatic change in Turkish political life: a shift in the source of demands began to take place. This shift was from the elite to the people. Unfortunately widespread anarchy of the 1970's prevented the sound establishment of this shift. By 1980 Turkey had reached the point of chaos and dissolution. The viability of the state was at stake, precipitating the military intervention of September 12, 1980.

Since the Turkish state had come to the brink of dissolution prior to the 1980's, the framers of the Constitution of 1982 aimed fundamentally at the preservation of the state. Among other things, the new Constitution, as stated in the preamble, is imbued with the determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts and opinions contrary to Turkish historical

and moral values. Furthermore, there was a reaction in particular to extreme leftist activities of the last two decades. Hence, emphasis was placed on national and moral values as an antidote to these activities. To this end, Article 24 of the Constitution of 1982 provided that: "...teaching and education in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools." Thus, Islam was given a legitimacy which it had been deprived of during the Kemalist period. The nature and goal of the Turkish educational system, and thereby the socialization processes were profoundly affected by this constitutional provision.

In the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention, some interesting developments took place which shed further light on the problems relating to the processes of political socialization. Atatürkism (Kemalism) was re-emphasized, but was given a conservative interpretation. However, this emphasis was paralleled by compulsory religious instruction and revival of traditional values. Nothing could be more contradictory to the secularist Kemalist ethos. Moreover, this contradiction was over-looked by those in power. The state also endorsed a so-called Kemalist attitude along with the revival of the Ottoman-Islamic legacy. To this end, courses on the history of the Turkish revolution increased in number. Both these courses and courses in religion were made compulsory in the schools. Those who are in political power seem inclined toward a political culture and political education in the direction of traditionalism. In view of the historical and political background of Turkey, however, it is unlikely that traditionalism will take over. It is quite likely that once the political structure is free from interferences and normalization of political life is achieved fully, questions relating to political education and socialization will be on the political agenda and will receive a more serious and scientific attention. However, in the meantime, the Özal government is still resorting to the manipulation of traditionalist sentiments as one of the means of maintaining their power. Nonetheless, the use of such means are now backfiring as the results of the March 26, 1989, local elections have amply demonstrated. In these elections the candidates of the Motherland Party, the party of Mr. Özal, received only 21,75% of the total electorate vote.

Integration of the community, any community, on the basis of minimum value consensus is necessary to maintain a social order. At present, however, there are some serious bulwarks blocking the realization of this in Turkey. The state which has taken on the responsibilities of public edu-

cation at times invokes the sentiment of Islamic solidarity rather than the sentiment of national solidarity, thus precipitating problems of integration mainly between those who are secularly inclined and those who still cling to traditionalism and Islam. The most common integration problems relate to national identity and to the organization of individuals for the achievement of common purposes. Political socialization processes in Turkey are such that a sizeable portion of the Turkish citizenry still does not give the answer, "I am a Turk", to a question of identity, and may answer it by saying he or she is a Moslem. Obviously the reforms of Atatürk have not completely reached the countryside. An important aspect of the Kemalist modernization, or for that matter any modernization attempt, involves basically the role of the citizenry and new standards of loyalty and involvement, it enhances a form of political awakening whereby subjects become active and committed citizens. However, the still-prevalent limitations on organizational involvement and the revival of Islamic values are impediments to the reality of active citizenry.

In contemporary Turkey there is a noteworthy crisis centering on the theme of what constitutes the main elements of Turkish political culture. The difference in the contentions about what constitutes the essential elements of Turkish culture in general, and political culture in particular, become even more serious when several, if not all of these contentions find their organizational support from certain political parties. In fact, different contentions have their supporters within the same party, giving rise to acute conflicts within the ranks of the same party. We could cite the following as the most essential groups in their claims to "really" represent Turkish culture: those who are Westernists, those who are Easternists, those who are Islamists, those who are Anatolianists, those who are ultra-Nationalists, and the Atatürkists. Some of these groups share certain common convictions such as the Westernists and Atatürkists, but the element of Turkish nationalism weighs heavier in the Atatürkist group. Perhaps all of these groups in themselves are important and constitute in varying degrees the elements of Turkish political culture. In a sense, a pluralistic outlook is essential for understanding the unifying elements in this cultural diversity. At present, one cannot as yet observe the presence of a serious pluralistic cultural outlook, with perhaps the exception of the Turkish literary world which has long been preoccupied with this question.

During the Kemalist era, the Ottoman-Islamic legacy was replaced by a national, secular political culture and Islamists were drawn into political

inactivism. Since 1946 and particularly since the 1970's and 1980's, Islam has made a comeback. It is still not interested in a reconciliation with the forces of modernity, however. The Islamic idea of legitimacy negates both secular legitimacy and secular authority. As is widely noted and accepted, political modernization involves rationalization of authority, the replacement of a great many traditional, religious and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, and national political authority. Above all, this change implies that government is the product of man, not of nature or God (Huntington, 1968, 34). In this context it is important to note why the traditionalist and modernist forces have not been able to reach a point of reconciliation in Turkey. A historical comparative analysis may help shed further light on this matter.

In the case of Japan, elements of traditional society could be used in support of the process of political modernization. The Turkish case was less favorable in this respect. In contrast to the Japanese ruler, the Sultan was an actual ruler. He could not be manipulated as a convenient and adaptable symbol because the Sultan actually wielded power. In this capacity he was bound to be involved directly in the modernization process. In general, the Islamic establishment opposed the modernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire and took an adverse stand toward the national liberation movement. The legal and cultural reforms of the Kemalist period, and the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928 went counter to the Islamic way of life. Finally, the Kemalists made a frontal attack on the remnants of dualism, a legacy of the latter years of the Ottoman Empire (Ward et al, 1964, 445-447).

Turkey seems to have survived the crisis of the 1970's and early 1980's. The holding of parliamentary elections in 1983 and 1987 helped the normalization of political life. Presently, it is the conservative elements of the Turkish political elite who are in power. Hence, in its policy implementation particularly in regard to educational and cultural affairs the Özal government prefers the revival/and or maintenance of old values, mores, and traditions. To this end, textbooks have been reviewed and rewritten. The mass media, and in particular the T.V. are widely used, primarily in inculcating the values of the East, providing a marked contrast with economic individualism and Turkey's efforts at economic integration with Europe.

Turkey has direct and important associations with the West through such organizations as the Council of Europe and NATO. Joining the Common

Market is one of the primary items on the agenda of Turkey. These associations in themselves constitute factors pressuring Turkey not to pursue policies which would altogether antagonize its association with Western Europe. Nonetheless, it would be too-far-fetched to say that foreign pressure constitutes the single decisive factor shaping the nature of political socialization processes. The most important factor in this regard lies largely in Turkey's own political life.

In Turkey, particularly since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, attitudes and values supportive of a competitive political system have considerably increased in strength and are shared by civilians as well as military groups. However, certain carry-over values from the past, and important economic problems still awaiting solution do occasionally cause the swinging of the political scene toward authoritarianism. This situation is usually accompanied by the weakening of political institutions which make it possible for and/or necessitates military intervention. These military regimes do not last long and there is always effective pressure which makes a return to civilian life possible in a short period of time.

Civil society has not as yet come of age in Turkey. But a strong indication, a hallmark of its existence and strength was dramatically demonstrated in the May, 1950, elections, whereby the RPP, the party of the 1920 Revolution, lost the elections after having been in power for twenty-seven years. A new party, the Democrat Party, came to power. By the end of the 1950's, although the Democrat Party became increasingly authoritarian in its policies, the fact that political power can be changed through elections began to be widely accepted in the country. In this regard, one of the aims of the military intervention of 1960 was the establishing and strengthening of the new legal procedures for the realization of this change, since the Democrat Party was reluctant to do so. The National Unity Committee of 1960 sent into exile, for a few years, those members of the Committee who were interested in the continuation of the military regime. In the twenty years since 1960 the content of Turkish political culture, in spite of the political and economic problems of the country, grew in the direction of embracing democratic values. In these twenty years, political participation, political liberties, political organizations, and political alternatives were strengthened. A pluralistic political culture began to emerge. Unfortunately, increase in anarchy and the inability of the civilian governments to cope with it brought about the military intervention of 1980.

#### **7.4 The persistent negative factor in Turkish political life and political socialization**

One of the most important negative aspects of Turkish political life which influences both Turkish political culture and political socialization processes is the following: almost all political parties cling to the notion that once elected they have to continue to be in power in order to survive. For this reason, most resort and have resorted to authoritarian measures in order to stay in power. The reluctance of the Democrat Party to step down in the 1950's and the measures it took to stay in power was largely responsible for the military intervention of 1960. In addition to this, the awakening of the Turkish masses to their needs and the inability of a succession of governments to meet these basically social and economic needs constitute yet another reason for the setbacks in democracy in Turkey.

It would not be too far-fetched to say that the setbacks in democracy which Turkey has faced were not necessarily prompted by the negative elements in Turkish political culture, but more so by the policies of political parties to do everything in their power, to pursue every possible policy including the manipulation of the processes of political socialization, and to resort to every conceivable measure to stay in power. This is because defeat in an election is viewed as tantamount to the dissolution of a political party. It is generally claimed that the present Social Democrat Party, the inheritor of the RPP tradition, is less likely to resort to measures which are not compatible with democracy in order to stay in power.

The analysis of the recent Turkish elections gives us hope for the future of democracy in Turkey. Obviously the roots of Turkey's problems are not essentially prompted by certain negative elements of Turkish political culture as much as they are by certain attitudes and behavioral patterns of political parties. In short, the situation is largely structural and not basically cultural. Hence, more experience, more elections, the strengthening of civil society would help teach political parties that winning and losing elections is part of the democratic process. This would further enhance the democratic elements in Turkish political culture and help solve the crisis in the political socialization processes.

Needless to say, the revival of Islamic values account for some of the crisis in the socialization processes in the country. This fact causes Turkey to face a difficult situation in its socialization efforts. Nonetheless, this difficulty can be overcome. The more vital issue, the real factor behind the



crisis is the life and death struggle between political parties; and the policies of the party in power aimed at using all the socialization agencies in support of its own policies is the real generator of the crisis.

### **7.5 Conclusion**

Since the advent of the multi-party system, Turkey has become an ideologically and socially diversified country. This diversity has now reached the level of fragmentation of political culture and the ensuing crisis in political socialization processes. In line with the policies of the present Özal government, political socialization is continuing along the lines of reviving traditions and Islam.

Turkey has long faced the controversies stemming from the reality of a centre-periphery cleavage, between the strong state tradition and the anti-strong state political forces. After the military intervention of 1980, which in a sense resurrected the state that had come to the brink of dissolution due to the anarchic movements, a new cleavage occurred in Turkey which could be described as a state-civil society cleavage. However, following the end of the military regime, the holding of parliamentary elections, the ongoing normalization of political life, this cleavage is losing some of its intensity if not its validity.

Each time it has been the weakness of civilian institutions which has caused the military to intervene. To the extent that civil society is strengthened in Turkey, to the extent political parties act responsibly as indispensable elements of democratic life, the enhancement of Turkish democracy will take place. All this will ultimately have a vital and positive impact on the processes of political socialization in the country.

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## 8 *Political socialization in .i.Spain*

### 8.1 The political reference framework

All studies on political socialization in Spain from their origin to the present day have been carried out under two different political regimes whose boundary has been set by a biological fact: the demise of Spain's previous head of state, which took place on November 20, 1975, and which brought

about a transition from an authoritarian regime to a pluralistic democratic regime.

### **8.1.1 The .i. authoritarian regime**

In my opinion, in order to grasp political socialization as a process during the previous regime, attention must be centered upon the analysis of State activity in this field. This activity was carried out by means of: a) the educational system; b) the general framework for political participation which was the Movimiento Nacional under Franco; c) the official trade unions; d) the mass media which were directly linked to the State Administration (television in particular).

Studies examining the socialization processes of this period could be expected to uncover a high degree of formalization within the structure of these processes which is in contrast, at least apparently, with levels of efficiency. There is however evidence for maintaining that the political transition was made possible thanks to the socialization processes which facilitated the acceptance of King Juan Carlos or, at least, that the Franco Regime was able to create a diffuse feeling of respect and obedience towards Government as the representation of authority.

The predominating role of the State as a socializing agent and the high level of institutionalization within the processes being considered were the main characteristic features of that period, along with the low profile maintained by other educational agents.

### **8.1.2 The democratic period**

The political transition in Spain involved the replacement of values and principles contained within the fundamental laws of the previous regime with new values and principles of a very different nature which were affirmed in the Spanish Constitution of 1978.

However, the social change which had already begun more or less spontaneously under the previous regime, was much greater in range and scope. This social change was fostered by the State organization even before the new constitution was promulgated, and it was clearly proposed as an objective by the Spanish Socialists when they came into power in 1982. So

that, according to some, even the enduring elements within the social attitudes of Spaniards were affected<sup>1</sup>.

- a) Two public socializing agents, the central administration which, for example, continues to have basic aspects of the educational system within its jurisdiction and the governing organs of the regional autonomous communities were brought together. The authorities in the regions which were more highly differentiated due to historical vicissitudes and the existence of non-Spanish linguistic elements (Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia primarily, but also the Valencian Community) have converted language the main socializing instrument into a factor of conflict and of non-integration which at times borders on the very limits imposed by the Constitution<sup>2</sup>.
- b) The true pluralism of Spanish society, elevated to the rank of a superior value within the juridical order of Spain by the 1978 constitution, is made manifest by the existence of a wide range of different political parties which carry out a socializing function which at times transmits a body of opinion that questions some fundamental values of the Constitution itself.
- c) The ample acknowledgement of civil and political liberties should favor the existence of a varied range of socializing agents but this is not always the case due to inhibitions regarding participation. Tables 1 and 2 are good indicators of this affirmation.
- d) Within a generalized context of diffuse support for the political situation that has been created, the socializing force of certain political facts, the functioning of the parliament, decisions of the constitutional court, widespread unemployment, could provoke a crisis with regard to this support, or at best a certain degree of skepticism concerning the value of democracy as a form of government in spite of the intentional socializing function of any agent.

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<sup>1</sup> See PINILLOS, José Luis, "La evolución en las costumbres" in *La España de los Años 70*, Vol. III, tome I, Editorial Moneda y Crédito, Madrid 1974, pp. 341-381; LOPEZ PINTOR, R., and WERT, J., "La otra España", *Insolidaridad e intolerancia en la tradición político-cultural española* in "Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas", Number 19, July-September 1982.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. GUAITA-MARTORELL, Aurelio, *Sobre el art. 3 de la constitución: la enseñanza en las demás lenguas de España*, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, 1987. Vid. also J.J. LINZ, "Los jóvenes en una España multilingüe y de nacionalidades", in *Juventud Española*, 1984, Fundación Santa María, Madrid, 1985.

**Table 1: Youth participation in Associations of different types (1984)**

Types of associations	Membership	Volunteer Work(%)
Sports	17	9
Educational, Artistic and Cultural Groups	7	6
Church and Religious Organizations	6	4
Juvenile Group Work	5	4
Ecologist, Conservationist and Protection of Nature or of Animals	2	2
Charity Organization	1	2
Trade Unions	1	
Political Parties	1	1
Human Rights Organizations	1	1
None	67	75
No Answer	1	3

Source: *Juvenud Española* 1984. The survey was carried out on a sample of youth aged 15 to 24 years old (p. 77)

**TABLE 2: Proportion of interviewed individuals who belong to different types of associations according to the individual's characteristics**

Age	Football Club	Cultural	Trade Unions	Scout	Gymnasium	Trade Unions	Political Party	Religious	Religious	Religious	Religious	Religious	Religious
Total	8.7	6.2	3.7	1.1	7.4	1.8	4.6	3.5	4.1	0.6	0.7	5.5	
SEX													
Male	13	8	5	2	11	3	6	6	3	1		6	
Female	1	4	3	1	4	1	4	1	6		1	5	
AGE													
30 years old	11	10	6	2	12	2	3	4	3		2	2	
30 to 49	6	7	5	1	10	2	6	5	4	1		6	
50 to 64	5	3	1	2	1		3	2	5			4	
65 and over	3	2				2	4	2	4			11	
IDEOLOGY													
Left	13	9	5	2	9	5	8	10	2	1	1	6	
Center-Left	4	6	4	1	10		5	1	2	1	1	4	
Center-Right	4	5	8	2	8		4	3	5	1		7	
Center	11	7	5	1	12		4	1	10		1	7	
Right	3	4			4	2	1		5			8	
SOCIAL CLASS													
Upper	8	8	8	2	15	4	2	3	4			3	
Middle	7	7	4	1	8	2	3	3	4	1	1	6	
Lower	4	5	2	3	4	1	3	6	4		1	6	

Source: *Estructura Social de España. Comentario. Op. Cit.*, N° 59-50; July 1987. Survey carried out in 1987

**TABLE 3: Degree of Interest in Politics among Youth Different Ages (Percentages of National Surveys) (Youth Survey)**

Interest in Politics (males)	1960	1968	1975	1977	1982
Very interested	6	4	8	11	2
Quite interested	15	15	22	34	9
Not very interested	27	30	40	34	27
Not at all interested	49	48	30	20	60
No answer	2	3		1	2
(N)	(1.414)	(1.980)	(3.392)	(3.252)	(3.564)

Source: *Juvenud Española*, 1960/82, page 222

This in in total agreement to what Montesquieu writes in his *Esprit des Lois*: "We now receive three different or contrary educations: that of our parents, that of our teachers, that of the world. What we learn from the last upsets all the ideas received from the other two"<sup>3</sup>.

It is revealing to verify how youth's interest in politics has declined since 1977, as can be seen in Table 3.

## 8.2 Origin and evolution of studies on political socialization

The topic of political socialization was introduced in Spain by way of the book written by Murillo Ferrol, *Estudios de Sociología Política*, published in 1963, in which the author dedicates a brief chapter to political behavior and to socialization<sup>4</sup>.

However, prior to this work, in 1960, the Delegación Nacional de Juventudes carried out a survey on Spanish youth under the auspices of the General Secretariat of the Movimiento Nacional. The results of this survey were analysed by A. De Miguel in 1965 and 1966, in what was the first empirical study on the political culture of Spanish youth<sup>5</sup>.

From that moment onwards, the carrying out of public opinion surveys on current political affairs, especially after the death of General Franco, has produced a great wealth of empirical material which has yet to be synthesized in any study which has adequate consistent theoretical support and which is capable of establishing a global portrait of the political culture of

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<sup>3</sup> Book V., Chapter IV.

<sup>4</sup> cfr. MURILLO FERROL, Francisco, *Estudios de Sociología Política*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1963, 214 pages.

<sup>5</sup> See, in *Revista del Instituto de la Juventud*, Amando DE MIGUEL, "Estructura social y juventud española: normas institucionales" (No. 1, October 1965; pp. 111-114); "Estructura social y juventud española: el modelo de cultura política" (No. 5, February 1966); "Estructura social y juventud española: impacto político e interés por la política" (No. 6, August 1966); "Estructura social y juventud española: participación política" (No. 6, August 1966).

today's Spanish citizens, although such a study has been made possible by the abundance of material at our disposal<sup>6</sup>.

### 8.2.1 Political socialization as .i. political culture (empirical studies)

In spite of everything, two broad studies do exist. The first, covering the period of the authoritarian regime, was written by A. Lopez Pina and L. Aranguren: *La cultura política de la España de Franco*, and was published in 1976. The second, published in 1980, is by Maravall, *La política de la transición. 1975-1980*, and is a consideration of the transition period<sup>7</sup>.

Apart from these studies, some valuable research works have been published on the topic of the political culture of Spanish youth. Torregrosa published a book in 1972 entitled *La juventud española. Conciencia generacional y política*, based upon two national surveys carried out by the Pub-

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<sup>6</sup> The Instituto de Opinión Pública, now the Center for Sociological Research, had a regular publication, *Revista Española de Opinión Pública*, which put out fifty issues between 1965 and 1977, in which the Public Opinion Institute's findings from surveys were made available. In the "General Index" (1965-1977) put out by the Center for Sociological Research in 1978, we can find a chronological listing of the surveys which reflect an ample thematic interest, at times related to the area of study being treated in this paper.

The Center for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) now publishes its own journal, *Revista española de investigaciones Sociológicas*, as of 1978, and has put out forty-one issues from that year until January-March of 1988. The journal has a section called *Datos de opinión* in which survey results at times reflect the political culture of Spaniards. An example is issue number 39 (July- September 1987) whose partial results corresponding to several surveys are reproduced in this article.

As well, the Savings Bank Association in Spain, Confederation Española de Cajas de Ahorro, put out, between 1973 (nos. 1, 2 and 3) and 1987 (nos. 59 and 60), the journal *Estructura social de España. Comentario sociológico*, with abundant information on many topics gathered from different sources, including data on the political culture of the Spanish nation. A special mention has to be given to the Fourth FOESSA Report (*Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España : 1975 - 1981* and *Informe sociológico sobre el cambio social en España : 1975 - 1983*), sponsored by the FOESSA Foundation and published by Euramérica in 1981 and 1983 respectively. These reports provide a global view of Spanish society and its political culture.

<sup>7</sup> Cfr. LOPEZ PINA, A. and L. ARAGUREN, E., *La cultura política de la España de Franco*, Taurus, Madrid, 1976; MARAVALL, José María, *La política de la transición. 1975-1980*, Taurus, Madrid, 1981. This same author, MARAVALL, has also published the book *Dic-tadura y disenso bajo el franquismo*, Alfaguara, Madrid, 1978.



lic Opinion Institute in 1968 (May-June and Autumn, respectively), in which empirical data is treated in an analytical and conceptual framework<sup>8</sup>.

In 1981, Lorente published *La cultura política de la juventud. Actitudes y comportamientos de la juventud española ante el hecho político*, on the basis of two surveys carried out in 1977 and of another undertaken in 1979<sup>9</sup>.

The basic values held by Spanish youth, with a special reference to juridical and political values, were studied by Toharia in an empirical work which appeared in 1982<sup>10</sup>.

More recently, in 1985, Prieto Lacaci published *La participación social y política de los jóvenes*, based upon the analysis of five national surveys and fifteen regional or local samples<sup>11</sup>.

The Instituto de la Juventud has, since its foundation, put out its *Revista del Instituto de la Juventud*, subsequently called *Revista de Estudios de*

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<sup>8</sup> See TORREGROSA, J. R., *La juventud española. (Conciencia generacional y política)*. Ariel, Barcelona, 1972.

<sup>9</sup> Cfr. LORENTE, Santiago, *La cultura política de la juventud (Actitudes y comportamientos de la juventud española ante el hecho político)*, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid, 1981.

<sup>10</sup> Cfr. TOHARIA, José J., *Valores básicos de los adolescentes españoles*, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid, 1982.

<sup>11</sup> Cfr. PRIETO LACACI, Rafael, *La participación social y política de los jóvenes*, Instituto de la Juventud, Madrid, 1985.

Juventud, including many articles on partial aspects which clarify the reality of political culture among Spanish youth<sup>12</sup>.

The Santa María Foundation promoted an informational bulletin, *Informe Sociológico sobre la Juventud Española, 1960/82*, based upon the analysis of five Youth Surveys carried out in 1960, 1968, 1975, 1977 and 1982, which had already served as the base for other studies. With regard to political socialization, it is of great interest to refer to Chapter VIII of the book by Lopez Pintor, *Actitudes políticas y comportamiento político de la juventud*. The same foundation carried out another survey, *Juventud española, 1984*, already quoted in Footnote 2, on the basis of a national survey in which we find information of interest regarding this topic in the chapters written by Linz, already quoted, and by Gonzalez Blasco and Gomez-Reino<sup>13</sup>.

### 8.2.2 Political socialization as a process (empirical studies)

Notwithstanding the above, empirical studies of socialization as a process are hard to find: there are few works on partial aspects and none which can give a panoramic view of the structure of the socialization processes in Spain, that is, of active and passive subjects of socializing relationship whenever it exists, of their content (knowledge, appraisals and attitudes that

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<sup>12</sup> The *Revista del Instituto de la juventud*, first published in 1965, was put out by the Instituto de la Juventud until 1978; a total of 73 issues in that time period. In December 1980 the *Revista de Estudios de Juventud* began to be published; 30 issues have been put out to date. A "Summary of Summaries" has been put out also (Nos. I to 24) giving us an idea of the contents of the journal which often refer to socialization in general and to political socialization in particular. The Spanish Youth Institute (Instituto de Juventud), which operates within the framework of the Ministry of Culture and which published the journal *De Juventud*, is in charge of a National Information and Documentation Center on Youth (Centro Nacional de Información y Documentación de Juventud) which provides an abundance of varied information from its data bank on any topic relating to youth and therefore also to the topic of political socialization. The Institute promotes the undertaking of public opinion polls in the entire country as well as different studies on youth.

For example, upon the occasion of the International Year for Youth, the Institute prepared a report on Spanish Youth (*Informe sobre la Juventud de España*), based upon ten questionnaires and two qualitative studies. Seven volumes were published between 1985 and 1986 on a limited basis. These can be consulted at the Institute's headquarters in Madrid. The Institute's address is: Calle Marqués de Riscal 16, 28010 MADRID.

<sup>13</sup> See Various Authors, *Informe sociológico sobre la Juventud Española, 1960/1982 y Juventud Española. 1984*. Fundación Santamaría, Madrid, 1984 y 1985, respectively.

are transmitted), and of procedures whereby the socializing influence is made effective.

In spite of this, there are some excellent partial contributions. Martinez has analysed, in his doctoral dissertation called "La educación cívico-social en el bachillerato español (alumnos) entre 1940 y 1977", subjects, content, teaching materials, procedures and results of educational activities revolving around a specific course on the topic of the previous political regime which was taught in Spanish schools during that time period. Although this dissertation has not been published in its entirety, the author published a summary in *De Juventud* which gives a clear idea of its contents<sup>14</sup>.

Another doctoral dissertation which will shortly be published and to which I have had access thanks to the kindness of the author, is the one by Saez Marin, *El Frente de Juventudes (1937-1960). Política de juventud en la España de la Postguerra*. The author studies institutional aspects but also touches upon the socializing activity of an institution making use of high-quality sources<sup>15</sup>.

### 8.2.3 Political socialization (non-empirical studies)

Non-empirical approaches are also scarce, although we would have to mention the works of Zafra Valverde and of Ramirez Jimenez, as well as of other authors quoted in our bibliography. Some indication of the lack of interest concerning this topic in Spain, is the fact that at the National Congress of the Spanish Political Science Association held in Saragossa in

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<sup>14</sup> Cfr. MARTINEZ MARTINEZ, Enrique, *La educación Cívico-Social en el bachillerato español (alumnos) entre 1940 y 1977*, Doctoral Dissertation in two volumes defended at the University of Barcelona. The summary published is entitled "La Educación Cívico-Social en el Bachillerato (1940-1977)" in *De Juventud*, No. 12, October-December 1983, pp. 35-67.

<sup>15</sup> Cfr. SAEZ MARIN, Juan, *El Frente de Juventudes (1937-1960). Política de juventud en la España de la postguerra*, Siglo XXI, Madrid (Forthcoming).

March of 1983, only two papers were presented in the Section "Political Socialization within Democracy"<sup>16</sup>.

### **8.3 Political socialization as a social reality Relevant aspects of political culture**

The social atmosphere in which the processes of socialization operate is one in which the democratic system is appraised positively along with the main political and social institutions (parliament, government, regional autonomous communities, city corporations, political parties, trade unions, and so on), although there is a notable difference between the appraisal of the system as a whole and that of the mentioned institutions. This is the difference between what the common citizen perceives as a possibility of what he or she experiences and the reality of how these institutions function. At least this is what can be inferred from the analysis of Tables 4 to 10, which reflect the results of a survey of a youth aged 18 and over, carried out in 1987.

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<sup>16</sup> Cfr. ZAFRA VALVERDE, José, "Les difficultés pour une éducation politique en Espagne", paper presented at the Table Ronde du RCPE (IPSA), Katowice (Poland), October 1980; RAMIREZ JIMENEZ, Manuel, "La socialización política en España: una empresa para la democracia", in *Sistema*, No. 34, January 1980, pp. 91-115. The two papers presented were by CAMARA, Gregorio, *Educación política y enseñanza en España: problemas y posibilidades*, and by ROJO, A., *Educación para la autonomía y consolidación democrática*. III Congreso Nacional de la Asociación Española de Ciencia Política, Zaragoza, 24-26 March 1983.

Table 4: Appraisal of the democratic system

QUESTION: Could you please say with which of the following statements you are most in agreement?  
 1. Democracy is to be preferred over any other type of government.  
 2. In some circumstances an authoritarian regime or a dictatorship can be ferred over a democratic system  
 3. Ordinary people like myself don't care what type of regime is in power.

July, 2-6, 1984

	N° Interviews	Sentence 1	Sentence 2	Sentence 3	Don't know	No answer
<b>NATIONAL</b>	2.493	75	9	9	6	1
<b>SEX</b>						
Male	1.180	78	9	8	3	1
Female	1.313	71	9	11	9	1
<b>AGE</b>						
18 to 25 years old	484	79	8	9	2	1
26 to 40 years old	651	82	8	6	3	1
41 to 60 years old	819	72	10	11	5	1
Over 60	538	65	9	12	13	1
No answer	1	—	—	100	—	—
<b>SIZE OF MUNICIPALITY</b>						
Under 10.000 inhabitants	639	69	9	12	8	1
10.001 to 100.000 inhabitants	580	73	8	11	7	1
100.001 to 1.000.000 inhabitants	655	76	9	7	4	2
Over 1.000.000 inhabitants	619	79	9	8	4	1
<b>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</b>						
Less than Primary	725	62	8	16	13	1
Primary	954	76	10	9	5	1
Secondary	535	83	9	5	1	1
University	255	85	8	3	1	3
No Answer	24	92	4	4	—	—
<b>LABOR SITUATION</b>						
Employed	966	80	9	7	2	1
Unemployed	211	75	6	12	3	3
Retired	303	70	9	10	10	3
Student	179	82	9	6	1	23
Housewife	785	67	9	13	10	1
No Answer	49	80	12	2	6	—
<b>ACTIVE OCCUPATIONS</b>						
Business Executives	157	73	15	6	3	3
Professional Cadres	195	84	10	2	2	3
Agricultural Workers	137	69	7	12	10	2
Industrial Workers	765	80	7	9	3	1
Undetermined	1.239	70	10	11	8	1
<b>INCOME</b>						
Less than 30.000 Ptas./month	208	62	7	19	12	1
30.000 to 50.000 Ptas.	416	68	9	13	9	0
50.000 to 75.000 Ptas.	467	79	7	9	4	0
Over 75.000	638	82	9	5	2	2
No Answer	764	73	10	9	7	1

	N° Interviews	Sentence 1	Sentence 2	Sentence 3	Don't know	No answer
<b>RELIGIOUS PRACTICE</b>						
Non-practicing	760	83	5	7	3	1
Several times yearly	619	79	8	9	4	0
Off and on monthly	372	74	9	10	8	0
Almost every Sunday	327	65	12	13	9	1
Fully practicing	352	58	16	13	10	3
No Answer	63	78	10	3	2	8
<b>LEFT TO RIGHT SCALE</b>						
Left 1-2	196	85	4	9	1	2
3-4	815	90	4	4	2	0
5-6	544	81	9	7	3	0
7-8	253	57	22	13	6	2
Right 9-10	64	33	34	19	2	13
Do not know	353	50	8	22	20	1
No Answer	268	63	10	10	11	3
<b>VOTE IN 1986 ELECTION</b>						
A.P.	294	54	26	12	5	4
C.D.S.	128	84	9	5	2	1
I.U.	106	92	3	3	1	1
M.U.C.	3	67	33	-	-	-
P.R.D.	4	75	-	25	-	-
P.S.O.E.	945	84	4	7	4	0
Others	187	82	5	6	3	2
Did not vote	370	67	10	15	7	1
Blank vote	20	55	20	10	10	5
Do not know	156	59	8	17	14	1
No Answer	280	69	10	9	10	2

Table 5: The importance of the parliament

QUESTION: I will not list a set of institutions. Could you please tell me which of them you consider to be very important, not very important or not important at all with regard to the functioning of democracy in Spain?

The Parliament

2-6 July 1987

	N° Interviews	Very Important	Quite Important	Not very Important	Not impor- tant at all	Do not know	No answer
NATIONAL	2.493	40	41	4	2	11	1

Table 6: The importance of the government

QUESTION: I will not list a set of institutions. Could you please tell me which of them you consider to be very important, not very important or not important at all with regard to the functioning of democracy in Spain?

The Government  
2-6 July 1987

	N <sup>a</sup> Interviews	Very Important	Quite Important	Not very Important	Not impor- tant at all	Do not know	No answer
NATIONAL	2.493	44	40	4	2	9	1

Table 7: The importance of the regional autonomies

QUESTION: I will not list a set of institutions. Could you please tell me which of them you consider to be very important, not very important or not important at all with regard to the functioning of democracy in Spain?

The Autonomies  
2-6 July 1987

	N <sup>a</sup> Interviews	Very Important	Quite Important	Not very Important	Not impor- tant at all	Do not know	No answer
NATIONAL	2.493	29	38	14	7	11	1

Table 8: The importance of the city corporations

QUESTION: I will not list a set of institutions. Could you please tell me which of them you consider to be very important, not very important or not important at all with regard to the functioning of democracy in Spain?

The City Corporations  
2-6 July 1987

	N <sup>a</sup> Interviews	Very Important	Quite Important	Not very Important	Not impor- tant at all	Do not know	No answer
NATIONAL	2.493	38	45	6	1	9	1

Table 9: The importance of the political parties						
QUESTION: I will not list a set of institutions. Could you please tell me which of them you consider to be very important, not very important or not important at all with regard to the functioning of democracy in Spain?						
<p style="text-align: center;">_____The Political Parties_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2-6 July 1987</p>						
	Nº Interviews	Very Important	Quite Important	Not very Important	Not impor- tant at all	Do not know
NATIONAL	2.493	32	42	11	3	10
						No answer

Table 10: The importance of the Trade Unions						
QUESTION: I will not list a set of institutions. Could you please tell me which of them you consider to be very important, not very important or not important at all with regard to the functioning of democracy in Spain?						
<p style="text-align: center;">_____The Trade Unions_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2-6 July 1987</p>						
	Nº Interviews	Very Important	Quite Important	Not very Important	Not impor- tant at all	Do not know
NATIONAL	2.493	28	39	14	6	12
						No answer
The source for tables 4-10 is <i>Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas</i> , Nº 39, July-Sept 1987. For the sake of brevity I have included all the different variables in Table 4 only.						

The appraisal of democracy as the most ideal political system for the country was less positive in 1981 among school-age adolescents of 14 and 16 years old. Even less positive was their appraisal of the legal system, as can be perceived in the answers offered in Tables 11 to 14.



**Table 11: Perception of the aptness of democracy for Spain according to the general attitude towards democracy among fourteen year-old students**

Degree of agreement with the following sentence: "Democracy is the best political system for a country such as ours".

		Complete agreement	High degree of agreement	Partial Agreement	Little agreement	Disagreement	Do not know
TOTAL	(1.743) (1.743)	16 (276)	19 (325)	30 (527)	12 (206)	15 (256)	7 (128)

**Table 12: Perception of the aptness of democracy for Spain according to the general attitude towards democracy among sixteen year-old student**

Degree of agreement with the following sentence: "Democracy is the best political system for a country such as ours".

		Complete agreement	High degree of agreement	Partial Agreement	Little agreement	Disagreement	Do not know
TOTAL	(1.550) (1.550)	15 (230)	20 (316)	32 (502)	12 (186)	11 (168)	8 (128)

**Table 13: Perception of the degree to which laws are observed according to basic attitudes towards laws among fourteen year-old students**

If a foreing friend of yours were to ask you whether or not Spaniards by and large obey the laws of your country, what would you respond?

		A lot	Quite a bit	Very little	Not at all	Do not know
TOTAL	(1.743) (1.743)	7 (8)	17 (301)	51 (882)	25 (443)	5 (94)

**Table 14: Perception of the degree to which laws are observed according to basic attitudes towards laws among sixteen year-old students**

If a foreing friend of yours were to ask you whether or not Spaniards by and large obey the laws of your country, what would you respond?

		A lot	Quite a bit	Very little	Not at all	Do not know
TOTAL	(1.550) (1.550)	7 (7)	21 (333)	50 (771)	18 (286)	8 (127)

The source for tables 11-14: Toharia, op. cit. Survey carried out in 1981.

Nevertheless, results with regard to Spain as the ideal country in the minds of its citizens were more positive. See Table 15.

Table 15: Ideal preference concerning one's own country among different age groups (percentages)				
If you could choose your own country, which would you choose?				
	1980	1981	1982	
	Spanish Population	14 year-olds	16 year-olds	Young Population
Spain, without a doubt	66	40	37	57
Probably Spain	19	21	20	21
Probably some other country	5	15	13	8
Definitely another country	1	10	8	6
Do not know/ Do not answer	9	14	22	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Source: *Juventud Española 1960/82*, page 219. Data for 1980 is from the Data Bank of the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*. Data for 1981 is from the study by Toharia for the Ministry of Culture. 1982 data is from the Youth Survey *Encuesta de la Juventud*.

## 8.4 The socialization process

### 8.4.1 .i. State

Within the framework of the atmosphere described in the previous section, different agents exercise a socializing influence. Their relative influence vis-à-vis the acquisition of knowledge, appraisals and behavior regarding political matters is difficult to determine.

In this work I will limit myself to the study of the socializing activity of the State with regard to political matters and which is carried out through educational institutions which due to their level of formalization are more susceptible of analysis. In addition, such institutions reflect more accurately than other institutions the model of society and the political behavior which is sought from the citizens of the future.

Nonetheless, the educational task of the State has to be set within a framework in which other educational agents operate. I will therefore also refer to these agents.

#### 8.4.2 .i. Mass media

To the extent that the mass media provide information about political realities, carry out appraisals of such realities and propose behavioral models, they have to be taken into account. It is impossible to analyse the variety of content, appraisals and behavioral models thus transmitted. They are as plentiful as is to be expected within the ample regime of freedom and of real pluralism in which they operate, although the medium having the greatest influence, television, is State-operated, and the ruling party is indirectly present in the governing bodies and front offices of other mass media in the country.

It is interesting to note here how Spaniards consume mass media and the political efficiency which they attribute to them regardless of the direction of their influence.

Studies carried out show that television is the most widely used medium and the one which most influences voting. Radio attains similar consumer levels and the printed press, which permits a greater level of reflection among its users, lags far behind. Among youth, those who declare themselves to be to the far left or to the far right of the political spectrum are those who watch less television and who read newspapers the most. Differences are not so pronounced when it comes to radio. The most widely read newspaper is left-of-center. Television is, for adults, the medium having the lowest credibility index when it comes to news programs. See Table 16 to 18.

Table 16: Exposure to the mass media

AGE	% Who regularly read a newspaper (at least 4 out of every 6 issues)	Television viewing	Average hours, Monday to Friday, of Radio listening
15-17 ('84)	32	2.40	2.25
18-20 ('81)	44	1.89	
18-20 ('84)	46	2.24	2.42
21-24 ('81)	50	1.71	
21-24 ('84)	55	1.88	2.22
TOTAL			
15-24 ('84)	45	2.15	2.25
TOTAL POPULATION ('81) 47	2.09		

Source: For 1981: *Encuesta de Valores*, in F. Andrés ORIZO, *Entre la apatía y el cambio social* (Ed. Mapfre, 1984). For 1984: *Encuesta Nacional de la Juventud 1984*, in *Juventud Española*, op. cit., p. 51

Table 17: Medium having the greatest impact on the election campaign

Television	44.0%
Radio	2.1%
Newspaper	2.6%
Magazines	1.1%
Posters, Leaflets	9.8%
Meetings	23.3%
Peer Group	5.7%
Family	0.4%
No impact	8.3%
No response	2.4%
	(2,181)

Source: Lorente, Op. cit., p. 37. Survey carried out during the 1979 election campaign.

Table 18: Credibility of the mass media according to the medium

QUESTION: What credibility do you assign to news which you see, hear or read in the different media indicated?

Medium	Ocasional reader-listener (<25 years old)	Frequent reader-listener (<25 years old)	Panel Opinion Leader	Businessmen and Executives
Television News Programs	Medium	Low	Low	Low
Daily Press	Normal	High	High	High
General Interest Magazine	Normal	High	Very High	High
Technical and Economic Journals	Normal	Very High	Normal	High
Radio News Programs	High	High	High	Normal

Source: Comentario, Loc. cit., No. 53-54, January-June 1986, p. 155.

### 8.4.3 .i. Peer groups (friends)

Table I reflects the low level of participation in associations on the part of youth. Informal conversations on political matters are also infrequent among youth, as can be seen in Table 19. Twenty percent of the youth surveyed claim never to agree with their friends on these topics, whereas 37,4% are not always in agreement. The 1979 data supplied by Lorente relating to fellow workers indicate that the fact of spending time at the same place of work does not alter the percentage significantly, as can be in Table 20.

Table 19: Frequency of conversations on politics among friends	
Never any conversation	41,3%
Little frequency	26,0%
Frequent conversations	31,5%
Source: I <i>Encuesta Omnibus de Jóvenes</i> , June 1984. The survey included 3.000 young people of both sexes aged 15 to 21 years old. In <i>Informe Juventud en España</i> , Ministerio de Cultura, 1986	

Table 20: Discussion of political topics with fellow workers	
Very frequently	15%
Quite frequently	23%
Not very frequently	25%
Never or almost never	37%
	100 (1.203)
Source: Lorente, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 62. Survey of 1979	

### 8.4.4 The .i. Family

Table 21 shows that conversations within the home bearing on political topics are not very frequent, and that opinions are not generally shared by parents and offspring. In the Table 22, which expresses the appraisal of the usefulness of political education as it is received from parents, it can be seen that the influence is minimal. Nonetheless, these results must be accepted with a note of caution, since the responses concerning the use-

fulness of the education received from parents when it comes to facing problems are clearly positive.

Table 21: Frequency of conversations and agreement on politics within the home	
No conversations at all	
With the father	51.5%
With the mother	64.3%
Little frequency of conversations	
With the father	20.9%
With the mother	20.7%
Frequent conversations	
With the father	17.6%
With the mother	10.4%
Fair degree of agreement	
With the father	31.9
With the mother	33.4
High degree of agreement	
With the father	25.0%
With the mother	26.4%
Source: I <i>Encuesta Omnibus de Jóvenes</i> , June 1984, in <i>Informe Juventud en España</i> , op. cit., p. 341. The survey was applied to 3.000 young persons aged 15 to 21 years old.	

However, in a survey applied in the University of Navarra between 14-19 November 1988 and published in *Contraste*, nº1, the students affirmed that the family was the most influential factor when it came to voting, far ahead of education, friends, social position, and so on.

Table 22: Appraisal, as to its degree of utility, of the education received from parents														
QUESTION: How would you qualify, from the standpoint of its utility, the education which you have received from your parents?														
	Total	Sex		Age			Occupation					Do you live with your parents?		
		Male	Female	14-18 years old	19-24 years old	25-30 years old	Full-time job	Part-time job	Unem. played	Housewife	Student	Yes	No	
<b>RELIGIOUS EDUCATION</b>														
Very useful	10.7	8.0	13.3	10.5	9.1	12.7	8.0	7.0	9.2	22.3	11.6	10.9	10.1	
Useful	29.6	26.8	32.4	26.0	34.1	28.7	32.5	28.7	27.0	31.4	29.1	29.2	30.7	
Not very Useful	28.6	28.7	28.6	29.6	24.9	31.6	26.5	40.5	27.8	19.1	27.8	28.6	28.7	
Not useful at all	29.9	36.7	24.2	32.3	30.2	27.0	32.9	22.1	36.2	27.3	29.7	29.7	30.5	
Do not know/														
Do not answer	1.2	0.8	1.5	1.6	1.8	-	-	1.9	0.8	-	1.8	1.6	-	
<b>SEXUAL EDUCATION</b>														
Very useful	6.7	7.4	6.0	7.4	7.6	5.0	4.5	4.9	7.2	4.1	8.5	6.9	6.2	
Useful	27.8	26.9	28.6	26.5	30.9	23.4	23.5	27.3	30.1	21.8	30.1	30.4	20.5	
Not very Useful	26.6	28.0	25.3	28.9	21.2	30.1	27.3	31.9	17.5	23.3	28.2	27.2	25.0	
Not useful at all	37.0	36.3	37.7	32.4	38.3	40.8	43.2	36.0	43.3	50.8	30.4	33.5	46.9	
Do not know/														
Do not answer	1.9	1.4	2.4	2.8	2.1	0.6	1.5	1.0	1.8	-	2.7	2.0	1.5	
<b>POLITICAL EDUCATION</b>														
Very useful	7.0	8.4	5.3	4.6	6.1	10.4	8.2	6.0	5.3	5.9	7.4	6.4	8.4	
Useful	21.1	18.9	23.2	17.0	21.6	24.9	25.3	19.3	19.5	18.1	20.7	20.5	22.7	
Not very Useful	27.4	27.5	26.6	29.0	28.5	23.4	23.6	35.3	22.7	24.6	27.9	26.9	27.6	
Not useful at all	42.9	43.6	42.2	46.9	41.1	40.6	42.3	38.4	52.5	49.8	40.3	43.8	40.4	
Do not know/														
Do not answer	2.0	1.3	2.7	2.4	2.8	0.6	0.6	1.0	-	1.6	3.7	2.4	0.9	
<b>SOCIAL RELATIONS</b>														
Very useful	26.9	29.3	24.4	26.7	28.9	22.7	25.2	19.0	32.0	21.3	29.4	27.9	24.1	
Useful	44.5	42.4	46.7	37.7	44.3	52.2	51.6	36.0	34.5	43.1	41.5	42.6	50.1	
Not very Useful	16.6	16.1	17.0	16.1	17.0	14.5	11.9	16.2	19.9	17.9	17.6	17.4	14.3	
Not useful at all	10.4	10.3	10.4	12.2	9.5	9.3	10.3	7.4	13.5	17.7	9.1	10.2	10.9	
Do not know/														
Do not answer	1.6	1.8	1.5	3.3	0.4	1.2	1.0	2.4	-	-	2.5	1.9	0.7	
<b>IN THE FACE OF PROBLEMS</b>														
Very useful	29.9	28.4	31.3	30.8	32.0	26.4	28.0	25.3	29.1	29.0	32.5	31.0	26.5	
Useful	43.4	44.4	42.4	43.4	38.6	48.6	47.1	56.4	39.9	42.4	38.9	42.4	46.2	
Not very Useful	16.1	16.2	16.0	15.8	16.3	16.3	15.0	12.2	15.5	13.5	18.4	16.4	15.2	
Not useful at all	9.9	10.2	9.6	8.8	12.1	8.7	9.9	6.0	15.5	15.1	8.4	9.1	12.0	
Do not know/														
Do not answer	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	1.1	-	

Source: *Comentario*, op. cit., No. 59-66, July-December 1987, p. 217. Survey carried out in 1987.

Source: Comentario, op. cit., No. 59 (4), July-December 1987, p. 217. Survey carried out in 1987.

#### 8.4.5 .i.Army

It would be most difficult to list all the means at the disposal of the State for the transmission of political values, knowledge and attitudes. The State influences with an efficiency which is difficult to control by means of very varied activities related to leisure and the area of culture in general. It also exerts influence through the Armed Forces since almost all young Spanish males have to do their Military Service which, along with the legal age for voting, is a requirement for the attainment of full citizenship. However, the opinion held by young Spaniards concerning the Military Service as a creative element in the fostering of civic education is rather negative (See Table 23).

Table 23: Opinion on the formative effects of the military service on civic education	
Positive	32.7%
Negative	38.9%
Indifferent	28.2%
Source: Encuesta Omnibus de Jóvenes, May 1985, in <i>Informe Juventud en España, op. cit.</i> , p. 452. The Survey was carried out among 1.500 Spanish males aged 15-29 years old.	

#### 8.4.6 .i.School

As for the educational system, it is true that private centers do exist. The State, however, trains the teachers, sets the curricula, approves questionnaires and elaborates teaching guidelines. It can carry out a task of political socialization without even including any course specifically devoted to this function. It can exert such influence through courses in literature, history, biology and so forth. In spite of all these limitations I will focus upon the examination of the disciplines which more or less directly try to teach youngsters something about political matters.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes in Article 27.2 that "Education will have as its object the full development of human personality within the framework of the respect for the democratic principles of social life and for fundamental rights and liberties". Therefore, education, whose task is the fostering of "the full development of personality" of Spanish youngsters, must develop itself within the framework of "respect for the democratic principles of social life". Since the "fundamental rights and liberties" of Spaniards have to be interpreted as being "in conformity with



the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international treaties and agreements on these matters ratified by Spain" (Article 10.2), it is clear that the bases upon which political education in Spain rests are fully meddled to Western democratic culture<sup>17</sup>.

I will here refer to the political education offered at the elementary levels of learning, Educación General Básica (E.G.B.), which involves students aged 6 to 13 (8 years) and Bachillerato Unificado y Polivalente (B.U.P.), which involves students aged 14 to 16 (3 years).

There is yet another limitation that has to be pointed out: I have focussed solely on the part of the educational program bearing on the area of Social Sciences within E.G.B., ethical education and civics, and on the course on Knowledge of the Constitution which is offered in the Social and Anthropological Area of B.U.P. I mean to say by this that I have not carried out a complete study of all the subject matters which make up the E.G.B. and B.U.P. programs and which also have content related to Political Education, as is the case with Geography, History, Literature or Religion.

#### **8.4.7 .i. Political education**

On pre-school and in the first cycle of E.G.B. (students aged 4 to 7), we already come across objectives related to social education at an elementary and basic level in the areas of Social and Natural Experience and Social Affective Behavior, which try to create basic social habits (group integration, communication, respect, appreciation of the social value of work, and so on), by means of what are called "thematic block"<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Article 27 of the Spaniards Constitution is basic to the topic being discussed here. But so are Articles 10, 20, 39, 43, 44, 103, 148 and 149, among others, which refer to different aspects of educational activity and organization. The Constitutional Court, through its decisions concerning different anti constitutional cases, competence conflicts and protection of individual rights, has interpreted the contents of the right of education in its different aspects. Antonio EMBID IRUJO has edited a useful *Legislacion sobre enseñanza* (legislation on Education) -with international documents ratified by Spain, constitutional norms and legal rules- which offers a complete panorama of education in Spain from the point of view of the law. See *Legislación sobre la enseñanza. Normativa general*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1987.

<sup>18</sup> Social and Natural Experience: 1. Knowledge of oneself. 2. Knowledge of the milieu. 3. Coping with the milieu. Social Affective Behavior: 1. Affirmation of oneself. 2. Integration within the physical and social milieu. 3. Preparation for sexual education. 4. Values and behaviors.

In the middle cycle of E.G.B. (students aged 8 to 10), in the course designated as Area of Social Sciences, which integrates knowledge bearing on geography, history, economics, anthropology and civics, objectives are very diversified and revolve around the local community, the region and the nation. Stress is placed upon basic social habits, but knowledge of political institutions, democracy as a way of life, and so forth is also introduced. Nonetheless, the most important thing is the creation of positive habits and appraisals in relation with these realities<sup>19</sup>.

In the higher cycle of E.G.B. (students aged 11 to 13), Civics and Social Behavior is integrated within the Area of Social Sciences. Objectives seem to be centered upon a more profound delving into the meaning of the democratic way of life, its specific values, the role of human rights, the consideration of the constitution as a guarantee of the safeguarding of fundamental liberties, and so on<sup>20</sup>.

In B.U.P. (students aged 14 to 17), political education takes place in the last year (3º B.U.P.) in the course Knowledge of the Constitution which is given in the Social and Antropological Area (history, geography and philosophy). The connection with this last course can be explained through the need for cementing support for human rights. The objectives revolve around cognitive knowledge and are centered upon the systematic study of the Constitution<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> At this educational level the Bloques Tematicos for the three years are: 1. The local area. 2. The country. 3. The region or nationality. 4. Introduction to the study of Spain. 5. General geography.

Obviously out-of-place, there is also the inclusion of a Block called Work Techniques, which in fact applies to all the Blocks, and finally another Block called Civic and Social Behavior. In all this we can observe a clear progression of content culminating at the level of attitudes in "the appraisal and respect of the Constitution as the supreme norm of social life... The elementary knowledge of the functioning of a democratic system of government..."

<sup>20</sup> See, for Notes 17, 18 and 19, Programas renovados de la Educación General Básica, three volumes, Editorial Magisterio Español, Madrid 1981. See also, in Legislación sobre enseñanza, op. cit., the Ministerial Orders dated 17 January 1981 and 6 May 1982, as well as the Royal Decrees 69/1981 of 9 January 1981, 710/1982 of 12 February 1982, and 3087/1982 of 12 November 1982.

<sup>21</sup> See Resolución de la Dirección General de Enseñanzas Medias sobre Regulación de las Enseñanzas del Ordenamiento Constitucional en Bachillerato y Formación Profesional para el año académico 1981/1982.

One of the difficulties standing in the way of efficiency vis-à-vis political education is the fact that in both E.G.B. and B.U.P. there is no specific course properly dedicated to this type of education. The contents of Civic Education are diluted within Geography, History or Philosophy. In the third year of B.U.P., it should be dedicated to teaching the constitution, but this is rarely accomplished. Teachers mainly stick to explaining their own programs.

The methodology proposed for all educational levels (E.G.B. and B.U.P.) is active. More than the transmission of knowledge, what is aimed at is to have the student incorporate habits, appraisals and the capacity for judging experiences within real life. For this reason, direct knowledge of institutions is stimulated by means of visits, talks, the press, debates, social tasks, and so on.

Textbooks are approved by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and are edited by private publishers. Nonetheless, the Ministry elaborates programs and questionnaires, although this does not prevent diversity within the different approaches to be found in the textbooks.

No specific corps of teachers exists for the first type of education. In pre-school and the first cycle of E.G.B. there is one sole teacher. From the middle cycle of E.G.B. onwards there is specialization according to areas but still there is no specialized teacher for civic education. This subject is taught by a teacher from the Social Area who does not have specific training in the subject matter. Indeed, the curricula of the E.G.B. Teacher Training School do not include any discipline related to Political Science or to Constitutional Law. Neither do teachers of B.U.P., who are trained in University Schools of Humanities, have this type of study in their curricula at least not as a mandatory subject. This explains their resistance when it comes to having to teach this type of course, and all this leads to neglect in the teaching of civic education in educational centers.

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## 9 *Political socialization in the .i. United Kingdom*

### 9.1 Introduction

Research on political socialization in Britain developed in the 1960s, has been heavily influenced by similar research in the United States. A number of empirical studies were undertaken and the topic became a standard part of university courses in Politics and Sociology. In the early 1970s, however, there was a change of mood and political socialization theory came under strong and effective attack. Partly as a consequence of this, research in the area declined and the claims of socialization theory were re-considered. In the last few years, however, there have been some signs of renewed interest in political socialization, and a number of large-scale research projects have been started, although the theoretical claims being made by researchers are now a good deal more modest. In this chapter we

outline the rise, fall and re-emergence of the study of political socialization in Britain and report some results of recent research.

Interest in socialization was originally an offshoot of functionalist theories of society. These theories suggested that in order for a stable society to persist there have to be mechanisms by which individuals come to learn and accept the shared values, attitudes and beliefs of the society - its culture. More specifically, political culture was seen to be the product of processes of political socialization.

This approach gave rise to two main themes in political socialization research. The first was principally concerned with what might be called "cultural transmission". The focus here is on the societal or 'macro' level and the concern is to examine the ways in which political socialization processes contribute to the maintenance of stable regimes. The second concentrated on political learning at the individual or "micro level; - the processes by which individuals acquire specific patterns of political beliefs and learn various *.i.*political roles;. Both approaches involved an emphasis upon childhood socialization experiences and stressed the importance of the *.i.*family;, *.i.*school; and, to a lesser extent, *.i.*peer groups; and the *.i.*mass media; as socializing agencies.

## **9.2 *.i.*Political socialization research in the 1960s and 1970s**

A brief examination of empirical work in Britain in the 1960s and early 1970s shows that it reflected these concerns. For example, the work of Greenstein et al. (1974) and Dennis et al. (1971) on the attitudes of English schoolchildren was principally concerned with the way in which the development of political attitudes among children contributed to the maintenance of the British political system. Dennis et al. suggested that the unexpectedly high levels of anti-democratic beliefs which they found among their young respondents signalled a possible crisis of legitimacy for the political system, although their work provoked a number of critical responses (see, for example, Birch, 1972; Kavanagh, 1972). In contrast, Dowse and Hughes (1971a, 1971b) were more concerned with political learning at the individual level - exploring the differential socialization of boys and girls and of children in different types of school. Political learning in an even more direct sense was the subject of a study of Scottish schoolchildren by Mercer (1973) who investigated the commitment of young people to democratic values. Political socialization at the micro level

was also used by Denver and Bochel (1973) to explain why people became active members of the British Communist Party.

During this period there was no large-scale study of political socialization in Britain, but the theory informed two major works on British politics. Almond and Verba's study of political culture in five nations (Almond and Verba, 1963) concluded that Britain was the clearest example of a "civic culture" and argued that this was maintained and transmitted from generation to generation by mechanisms of political socialization. In Butler and Stokes's pioneering study of electoral behaviour, *Political Change in Britain* (1969), the implicit model used placed considerable emphasis upon family socialization - party choice in the 1960s was conceived of as being to a large extent transmitted from parent to child. Surprisingly, perhaps, the only other major contribution to the political socialization literature came from a very different tradition. Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969) offered a Marxist account of the capitalist state, taking Britain as a prime example. A key element in his analysis was the contention that capitalist states maintain their power by means of a dominant ideology which is transmitted by the agencies of socialization. He concluded that the process of political socialization in capitalist societies like Britain is "very largely a process of massive indoctrination" (p. 182).

What we described above as 'a change of mood' set in in the early 1970s. This was partly a result of a growing dissatisfaction with general theories like functionalism, but more particularly it resulted from a number of articles which offered cogent criticisms of socialization theory itself (Marsh, 1971; Tapper, 1976; Dowse, 1977, 1978; Dowse and Hughes, 1977). Among the most important points raised, four in particular are worth mentioning. First, the emphasis on studying children in empirical socialization research led to criticism. The assumption that in political matters "the child is the father of the man" was, it was argued, without foundation. Second, it was similarly argued that the links claimed or assumed to exist between attitudes and behaviour at whatever age were nothing like as strong as had been suggested. Third, critics pointed out that the concept of socialization had been expanded to include all learning and all possible influences upon attitudes. It had come, in effect, to mean everything that had happened or might happen to a person that might influence his or her political values, attitudes or beliefs - and that is not very helpful. Finally, critics mocked attempts to explain the stability of democratic regimes by reference to the political attitudes of 10-year old children. They pointed out

that nowhere in the theory was there any detailed account of the connection between the micro-level process of childhood learning and the macro-level maintenance of the system.

In addition to these theoretical difficulties with the socialization model, events in Britain in the 1970s cast doubt on the validity of a theory originally designed to account for regime stability. On the one hand, evidence about changing patterns of voting behaviour suggested a decline in the influence of such long-term forces as family socialization upon party choice; on the other, the British political system was subject to a series of strains and challenges - the miners' strike of 1973/4 with its attendant violence, the rise of significant nationalist political movements in Scotland and Wales, growing racial tension in inner-city areas and an apparent increase in support for extremist parties like the National Front. The "ungovernability of Britain" became a central theme of political debate and a major work of interpretation, Samuel Beer's *Britain Against Itself* (1982), argued that there had been a collapse of the civic culture, which in turn implied a failure of effective socialization.

By the middle of the 1970s, then, political socialization theory was under substantial attack and little empirical research in this area was being carried out. Indeed, one writer entitled an extended critique, "An Obituary to Political Socialization" (Tapper, 1976).

### **9.3 Political socialization .i. research in the 1980s**

In the 1980s, however, there has been a renewed interest in political socialization, but the focus of research has shifted. The notion that the attitudes of adults are, almost by definition, the products of the sum total of previous socialization experiences has been discarded. Similarly, the "bad press" received by studies of the opinions of young children has discouraged further serious research along those lines. Rather, attention has been focussed upon adolescents or, more precisely, young adults. Moreover, the main concern of this research is less with political socialization as a process ensuring the maintenance (or not) of the regime and more with exploring the political knowledge, interest and attitudes of young people and analyzing the extent to which these can be explained as consequences of socialization.

This switch in focus at a theoretical level among political scientists and sociologists coincided with increased concern among politicians and policy

makers about some aspects of youth behaviour - rising crime, hooliganism, rowdyism and so on. There were also worries about the long-term effects of high levels of youth unemployment. Partly in response to these sorts of concerns, the Social Science Research Council in the early 1980s set up a major research programme, the Young People in Society Initiative, which involved a series of studies covering, among other things, delinquency, alcohol consumption, unemployment and political attitudes, knowledge and opinions. A follow-up study, the 16-19 Initiative, - a five year integrated programme of research into economic and political socialization - is currently in progress.

As part of the Young People in Society Initiative, Billig and Cochrane studied the political attitudes of a group of mainly working-class young people in the West Midlands, using sample surveys (in 1979 and 1981/2) supplemented by small group discussions. The results published so far have concentrated on a small number of themes, two of which are of particular interest here (see Billig and Cochrane, 1987). First, they confirm earlier research findings that there is a low level of political literacy among the young. Although they have not reported detailed results, Billig and Cochrane tell us that their respondents knew little about and had little interest in politics, and they showed high levels of political alienation and disillusion. Furthermore, their political attitudes were inconsistent and bore no clear relationship to the parties they supported. Second, Billig and Cochrane report surprising levels of support for extreme right-wing parties (such as the National Front) with, in particular, a substantial rise in support between their two surveys. In 1979, 7% of their respondents gave the National Front or the British Movement as their first choice party. By 1982, 14% reported a first choice and 16% a second choice for one of these parties. They suggest that this support for right-wing parties may be explained as a consequence of young people's fear of unemployment and of their general political ignorance. "Most respondents expected to face unemployment when they left school ... Many were unable to identify the policies of any party except the National Front's commitment to the enforced expulsion of non-whites. Thus, on a poorly articulated political spectrum the fascist parties presented a clearly articulated symbol. ... Feeling that something must be done in the face of economic decline, they were drawn to the conclusion that the repatriation of non-whites was the only possible policy." (1987, pp.49-50).

The 16-19 Initiative is a complex longitudinal study of a cross-section of 6,400 young people in four areas of the United Kingdom (Liverpool, Kirkcaldy, Sheffield and Swindon). It involves a series of annual surveys between 1987 and 1991. As yet no published results are available, but a working paper by Roberts and Parsell (1988) has reported some preliminary findings. These include the following:

- a) Only about a third of the total sample claimed to be 'very' or 'quite' interested in politics. Interest was greater among boys (35%) than girls (25%), and it was also higher among young people with non-manual as opposed to manual backgrounds, and among those who remained in full-time education beyond the minimum school-leaving age (16 years).
- b) There are also significant differences between boys and girls in terms of party support. Support for the Conservative party was lower among girls (17%) than among boys (24%) and support for Labour was higher (55% to 47%).
- c) The family plays an important role in transmitting loyalties to party, a sense of class identity and attitudes towards trade unions, but not in transmitting attitudes on wider social and political issues. Rather, these attitudes are more clearly related to levels of educational attainment.
- d) Analysis of data for Liverpool respondents only shows that they exhibit a fair degree of support for extremist groups of both the right and the left - 9% "felt close to" or "belonged to" the National Front and 10% to Militant Tendency (a Trotskyist grouping which in the early 1980s attempted to gain a foothold in the Labour party). National Front support was higher among those who were unemployed and had a low level of interest in politics; by contrast support for the Militant Tendency was higher among those without jobs who were interested in politics.

As the 16-19 Initiative proceeds, we may expect it to produce much useful material on the political development of young people. At this stage, however, it is worth sounding a note of caution about the interpretation of the levels of support for extreme right-wing parties found both by Billig and Cochrane and by Roberts and Parsell. Whatever the explanation for this apparent extremism among young people, there has been no increase in support for the extreme right in either general or local elections in Britain during the 1980s. Indeed, in electoral terms their support has been smaller than it was at times during the 1970s and remains tiny. It may be that some

young people flirt with the extreme right in particular localities but this is not reflected in adult voting behaviour.

On the basis of their findings, the contributors to the Young People in Society Initiative have added their voices to those calling for more widespread formal political education. They argue that "The policy implications are clear. The current reluctance to introduce political studies into the school curriculum needs to be re-evaluated. The dangers to a democracy of ignoring political education are likely to outweigh the controversies which might attend its introduction." (Billig and Cochrane, 1987, p.51). A movement promoting political education in schools had been in existence since the late 1960s, centred mainly on the Politics Association (an organisation for teachers of Politics in schools and colleges). Backed by the evidence already available of widespread political ignorance among school pupils (Stradling, 1977) the group developed in the mid-1970s a Programme for Political Education in schools (see Crick and Porter, 1978) which led to considerable public debate. Although, as Billig and Cochrane imply, the issue of political education arouses controversy (and the present government remains basically hostile to political education in schools) the movement has made some progress. In particular, all English examination boards have scrapped the old A-level courses (advanced courses for school pupils aged 16+) on "British Constitution" and replaced them with more topical courses in British Government and Politics, and the number of pupils studying Politics at this level has been steadily increasing. Nonetheless, some proponents of improved political education remain pessimistic about the provision made, especially for pupils who leave school at the minimum age (see Robins, 1988).

#### **9.4 Research on the .i.impact of formal political education**

A third current study of young people, carried out by the present authors, takes as one of its main focusses the impact of formal political education upon political knowledge and attitudes. This study, which has been financed by the ESRC and the Nuffield Foundation, provides a basis on which the effects of various agencies of socialization can be investigated. In the remainder of this chapter we report some of the results of this research in detail. The study involved a series of surveys of a panel of 6,250 students taking A-levels in school sixth-forms and colleges between 1986 and 1988. Their ages ranged from 16 to 19, so that all respondents were in full-time

education beyond the minimum school-leaving age and, as might be expected, they were disproportionately middle-class. Roughly half of the sample were studying Politics at A-level, and we take as the focus of our discussion here the impact of formal political education in this sense, as well as exploring the significance of sex differences. We start by setting out evidence about how these factors affect political knowledge, participation and attitudes and then use more complex multivariate analysis to assess the relative impact on these variables of a range of socializing agencies.

#### 9.4.1 *i.* Political knowledge

We tested the knowledge of our respondents by asking a series of simple factual questions about political personalities and office-holders and about current affairs. In addition we sought information about their level of conceptual knowledge. From these data we constructed an index of political knowledge on which the score ranged from 0 to 31. Mean scores on this index for respondents as a whole and for groups categorised by sex and political education are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1:** Mean scores on political knowledge index

All Respondents	Males		Females	
	Pol.	Non-Pol.	Pol.	Non-Pol.
21.0	25.2	19.7	21.9	15.5
(6,250)	(1,970)	(1,662)	(1,265)	(1,301)

Note: Unless otherwise indicated the 'N's in all subsequent tables are as shown here.

Not unexpectedly given the nature of our sample, our respondents are relatively knowledgeable. The complaints about widespread political ignorance among young people, which we referred to above, are not borne out among this intelligent and well-educated group. What the table also suggests, however, is that there is a clear relationship between levels of political knowledge and formal education in politics. This may appear a truism, but previous research both in Britain and the United States has been unable to demonstrate such a link (see, for example, Langton and Jennings, 1968; Stradling, 1977). Elsewhere we have shown that the impact of formal political education upon knowledge is sustained even when a range of other variables is taken into account (Denver and Hands, 1989).



The table also shows clear differences between the sexes. Overall, boys know more about politics than girls, but it is worth noting that girls who study Politics are more knowledgeable than boys who do not, and that the gap between girls and boys is narrower among Politics students than otherwise.

#### 9.4.2 *.i. Political opinions and attitudes*

##### 9.4.2.1 *.i. Party choice*

One indicator of a person's general political outlook is the party he or she supports. We therefore asked our respondents which party they would vote for in a general election (if they were eligible to vote). The results are given in Table 2 and there is much to comment on here.

**Table 2:** Party support

	All	Males	Females		
		Pol.	Non-Pol.	Pol.	Non-Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%
Conservative	39	45	46	31	31
Labour	31	31	25	40	33
Alliance	19	18	19	22	21
Other/None/Don't know	10	7	11	7	15

First, the overall distribution of support for the parties among these young people is not very different from that of the electorate as a whole, even though in terms of both class and educational attainment the sample is untypical. Excluding "Don't Knows", our young respondents divided 42% Conservative, 33% Labour and 21% Alliance (the remainder supporting other parties) while at the 1987 general election the distribution of votes in England and Wales was 45% Conservative, 30% Labour and 23% Alliance (with the rest "Other"). It used to be that young people tended to be more left-wing than their elders, but this difference has been steadily disappearing (see Denver, 1989, pp.65-66). Our respondents are slightly more left wing than the electorate as a whole, although it may be that a left-wing bias due to age is being cancelled out by a right-wing bias due to class. It is worth adding here that there is no evidence of significant support for extremist parties among our respondents. In two of our survey waves we asked respondents to indicate their order of preference among seven different parties. Fewer than 1% placed the National Front first and

only 3.6% placed it first or second; 1% placed the Communist party first and 4.0% placed it first or second. More than half of respondents were unwilling to indicate any preference for these parties.

Secondly, Politics students tend to support Labour more than Non-Politics students. This is not, however, accompanied by a diminution of Conservative support but by a smaller number of "Don't Knows".

Thirdly, the fact that girls are a good deal weaker in their support for the Conservatives than boys is striking. Whereas the Conservatives are the party with most support among boys, it is Labour which comes first among girls. It used to be the case that in Britain men were more left-wing than women, although this 'gender gap' has been disappearing in recent years (see Denver, 1989, p. 66). But our data show a clear gender gap in the opposite direction. Interestingly, recent opinion polls have also found reduced Conservative support among young women (see *The Guardian* April 10, 1989) and similar findings have been reported by Roberts and Parsell, as we noted above. We have checked our finding by controlling for the type of school attended by respondents (whether state or private) and for family partisanship, but the differences between the sexes persist. It is far from clear, however, how this is to be explained. Some commentators have suggested that it may be due to the fact that Labour has captured a range of "women's issues". We suggest, however, that it is more likely to relate to the Conservative government's image as being more generally uncaring in matters of health, welfare, education and so on. It is also possible that it may indicate a differential response by boys and girls to Margaret Thatcher.

#### **9.4.2.2 .i. Policy opinions**

Our first task here is to consider the extent to which our respondents do actually have policy opinions. We presented them with 27 statements relating to current issues and to more general political principles and asked in each case whether they agreed or disagreed with them or had no opinion. If we take agreement or disagreement to indicate the holding of an opinion, then there is no doubt that our respondents do have opinions - they had a view, on average, on 19.7 of the statements. Deviations from this figure among our sub-groups were relatively slight. Male Politics students scored highest with 21.5 and female Politics students next with 19.7; male Non-Politics scored 19.4 and female Non-Politics 17.4.

To consider the content of political opinions we look in detail at five issues. These are unilateral nuclear disarmament, the renationalization of large corporations, government spending on the National Health Service, the redistribution of wealth and the role of the welfare state. On each of these there are fairly clear left-wing and right-wing positions. Figure 1 shows how our respondents are distributed on each issue (those who were "not sure" or "don't know" are classed as "middle").


**Table 3:** Balance of opinion on issues

	All	Males Pol.	Females Non-Pol.	Pol.	Non-Pol.
Unilateralism	+29	+34	+42	+14	+20
Renationalization	+29	+37	+40	+19	+14
National Health Service	-40	-37	-33	-50	-43
Redistribution	-17	-12	-5	-27	-27
Welfare state	-43	-40	-29	-58	-52

Note: The figures are reached by deducting the percentage taking the left-wing position on each issue from the percentage taking the right-wing position. Thus a positive figure indicates that the balance is to the right and a negative figure a balance to the left.

The distribution in left-right terms varies considerably from issue to issue. On unilateralism and renationalization right-wing opinions predominate; but on the Health Service, redistribution and the welfare state left-wing opinions are more common. On the evidence of these histograms alone, it is clear that our respondents are not, in general, very consistent ideologically across the five issues. Indeed, only 16% took the left-wing position on four or more of the issues, and only 8% consistently took the right-wing position on four or more. These are rather small figures given the clearly ideological nature of the statements on which they are based.

Further analysis (see Table 3) shows that in every case girls are further to the left than boys, confirming our results with respect to party choice. However these figures show that it is not just on matters of health and welfare that girls are more left-wing, but also on economic issues such as renationalization and redistribution. There is also a slight tendency for Politics students of both sexes to be to the left of their Non-Politics colleagues.

**Figure 1:** Distribution of opinion on five issues

Note : 'L' = Left, 'M' = Middle and 'R' = Right

How do respondents' opinions on these issues relate to their choice of party? To answer this question we computed a simple index of issue position by scoring rightwing answers +1, left-wing answers -1 and other answers 0 on each issue, and then summing the scores for each respondent. Table 4 shows how scores on this index relate to party support.

**Table 4:** Party choice by scores on overall issue index

	Scores				
	Left -5/-4	-3/-2	-1/0/+1	+2/+3	Right +4/+5
	%	%	%	%	%
Conservative	2	10	43	74	92
Labour	83	53	18	4	1
Alliance	8	24	27	15	4
Other/Don't know	7	13	12	7	3
	(1,000)	(1,217)	(2,411)	(1,128)	(494)

It can be seen that there is a strong relationship. The overwhelming majority of those who have right-wing views support the Conservatives and a substantial majority of those on the left support Labour. By contrast, Alliance support is strongest among those whose scores on the index place them in the middle of the spectrum. Thus, although these young people show some inconsistency across the issues we have considered, their overall position on the left-right scale is a good guide to their party choice.

#### 9.4.3 *i.* Political participation

It is well established that the young are less likely to vote than are other groups (see Crewe et al., 1977) and by extension one might expect that they would also be less likely to participate in politics in other ways.

Our respondents were mostly below voting age, but we asked them how certain they would be to vote in a general election if they were eligible. In addition, to measure more informal political participation, we asked them how often they discussed politics (outside the classroom) with their friends. The results are shown in Table 5.

In both respects, political education and sex appear to make a substantial difference. Politics students are much more likely to be certain to vote and to discuss politics than are Non-Politics students, while girls are less likely

to discuss politics than boys. As far as voting is concerned, however, political education once again sharply reduces the sex difference.

**Table 5:** Political Participation

	All	Males Pol.	Non-Pol.	Females Pol.	Non-Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%
% Certain to vote	62	75	56	70	44
% Discuss politics often	24	36	16	30	10

In one of the later waves of our survey we explored political participation further by asking respondents what they would do if what they believed to be a "really unjust" law was being considered by Parliament. We divided responses into three categories - those who would do nothing, those who would simply sign a petition, and those who would take other actions such as contacting an MP, raising the issue in an organization or going on a demonstration. Table 6 shows what actions our respondents would take.

**Table 6:** Level of Protest Activity

	All	Males Pol.	Non-Pol.	Females Pol.	Non-Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%
Do nothing	14	15	23	8	7
Sign a petition only	19	16	22	17	22
Further activity	67	70	55	75	71
	(1,710)	(573)	(450)	(347)	(340)

The willingness of these young people to engage in political activity is high. Fully two-thirds said that they would undertake some personal protest action. Politics students are somewhat more inclined to higher levels of activity, but interestingly, and contrary to what might have been expected, girls are less likely to say they would do nothing and more likely to take further action than boys.

In assessing our analysis thus far it is important to remember, as we have indicated, that the young people in our sample were part of the minority (about one third of the age group) who continue at school beyond the minimum leaving age. On the other hand, our respondents are drawn from all parts of England and Wales, rather than from particular localities as is the

case with the two other major studies we have discussed. Our results suggest that the conclusions drawn by Billig and Cochrane and by Roberts and Parsell need qualification. Among the young people we have studied we do not find widespread ignorance, apathy, disillusion and confusion. While this may partly be due to the composition of our sample, it seems likely that extended education in general, and formal political education in particular, help to produce young people who are better prepared for democratic citizenship. They are knowledgeable, keen to participate in politics and have opinions about issues which are clearly related to their choice of party.

## 9.5 *i. Political Socialization Agencies*

Education is, of course, only one among several agencies of socialization and in the final section of this chapter we attempt to assess the relative importance of a variety of socialization influences upon the knowledge, participation and attitudes of our respondents. We consider formal political education alongside the family, the mass media, type of school and peer groups, using regression analysis as the basis of our comparison.

To analyse levels of political knowledge, we use score on the knowledge index outlined above as the dependent variable and for participation we use the three indicators of aspects of participation presented in Tables 5 and 6. The predictor variables are an index of media exposure, reported interest of respondents' parents in politics, type of school attended, father's occupational class and political education. In addition, we include respondents' sex to check the sex differences noted above. Table 7 shows the beta-weights and the  $r^2$ s for regression equations involving these variables.

The table shows that the best prediction is obtained in the case of political knowledge and, gratifyingly perhaps for teachers of politics, political education is the best single predictor, closely followed by media exposure. Sex remains a significant variable. The equations predicting the various types of political participation are less successful, the  $r^2$  figures being substantially lower. The most important explanatory variable in these cases is media exposure, followed by parental interest and political education. Sex, type of school and father's class make little or no difference.

**Table 7:** Influence of socialization variables on knowledge and participation

	High media expo- sure	Poli- tics student	Male	High Parental Interest	Inde- pen- dent school	Father middle class	r <sup>2</sup>
Level of knowledge	.29	.33	.28	.06	-.04	.02	.389
Certainty of voting	.19	.12	.08	.14	-.04	-	.111
Discussion of Politics	.29	.17	.06	.19	-	-	.221
Participa- tion level	.19	.13	-	.17	-.06	-	.119

Note: The figures are beta-weights in regression equations. These show the relative impact of the variable concerned. Where no figure is given the variable was not significant.

To analyse socialization effects upon party choice we constructed three separate 'dummy' dependent variables - Conservative/not Conservative, Labour/not Labour and Alliance /not Alliance - and used them in three separate equations. The predictor variables in this case are family partisanship (an index based on respondents' reports of their parents' party support), friends' party, the party bias of the newspaper read, political education, type of school, father's occupational class and sex. Class was not significant in any of the equations and is omitted from the results shown in Table 8.

It can be seen that the equations for Conservative and Labour party support produce fairly good  $r^2$ s. The partisanship of respondents' families and friends and of the newspapers they read are the most powerful explanatory variables, confirming the continuing importance of well-established agencies of socialization in influencing party support. Whether students are studying politics and the type of school they attend make virtually no difference. However the sex difference found in our cross-tabulation analysis is confirmed - males are more Conservative than females even when a range of other variables is taken into account, although the difference is less marked. The equation for Alliance support produces a less good prediction and the beta-weights are smaller. This is, no doubt, due to the relative newness of the Alliance - there will be relatively few Alliance sup-



porting parents to pass on to children a predisposition towards the Alliance, for example.

**Table 8:** Influence of socialization variables on party choice

	Family sociali- zation	Friends' Party	Con. Paper	Pol. Stu- dent	Inde- pendent school	Male	r <sup>2</sup>
Conservative	.43	.23	.14	-	.03	.07	.403
Labour	.44	.24	-.14	.02-	.03	-.04	.435
Alliance	.28	.21	-	-	-	-.04	.151

Note: See Table 7.

Previous research on socialization has suggested that while agencies such as the family may be effective in transmitting partisanship, they are less successful in passing on attitudes on specific issues and principles (see Jennings and Niemi, 1974). Our data do not allow us to make a very satisfactory test of this point - we have no direct evidence of the attitudes of respondents' parents and friends, for example, on the issues we have looked at, nor of the particular positions taken by the various newspapers which they read. Nonetheless, to test the influence of socialization upon specific attitudes, we present in Table 9 the results of a series of regression analyses with position on the five issues discussed above as dependent variables and the same predictor variables that we used in the party choice equations. This involves making the admittedly crude assumption that pro-Conservative families, friends and newspapers will, on the whole, have Conservative attitudes on the issues. Although the results presented in Table 9 must be treated with caution they are of some interest.

**Table 9:** Influence of Socialization Variables on Specific Political Attitudes

	Con. fam. soc.	Con. pa- per	Con. friend	Indep. school	Male	Pol. stu- dent	Father middle class	r <sup>2</sup>
Unilateralism	.27	.17	.16	.03	.07	-.03	-.225	
Renationaliz.	.27	.15	.12	.03	.10	-	-.197	
Health Service	.16	.12	.09	-	.05	-	-.084	
Redistribution	.26	.13	.13	.06	.06	-	.05.196	
Welfare state	.15	.09	.11	.05	.09	-.04	-.096	
Attitude Index	.33	.19	.18	.05	.11	-.03	-.325	

Note: See Table 7.

It can be seen that none of the equations yields a prediction which is as good as those obtained in the case of Conservative or Labour party choice, although the more "ideological" issues - unilateralism, renationalization and redistribution - show the highest  $r^2$  figures. In all cases family partisanship is the best predictor variable, followed by newspapers and friends. Sex differences, although small, are in the direction which our earlier discussion would lead us to expect - being male is consistently associated with holding more right-wing views. The effects of type of school, formal political education and class are slight.

We would not wish to claim that our analysis provides a thorough test of the relative importance of the various socializing agencies in shaping political knowledge, participation and attitudes. Nonetheless, our results suggest that the family, the mass media, peer groups and education remain important influences upon young people. Socialization by these agencies is, of course, not the whole story - even given the crude nature of some of our indicators much variation in knowledge and opinions remains unexplained. But it is certainly an important element in the story.

## 9.6 Summary

We argued at the beginning of this chapter that research on political socialization in Britain, having been in the doldrums during the 1970s, has re-emerged in the 1980s with more modest aims. The examples of recent and current research which we have discussed suggest that the concept continues to be a fruitful one in explaining and understanding the political development of young people. Although we must be wary about drawing conclusions about regime stability, it is clear that the ways in which political attitudes, values and beliefs are acquired by young people today - and their content - are highly significant for the nature of British politics tomorrow.

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## 10 *Political socialization in the .i.Netherlands*

### 10.1 Introduction

Political socialization comprises the learning process by means of which an individual comes into possession of political orientations and skills. The study of political socialization processes seeks answers to questions about

the timing, configuration and content of numerous types of political learning processes. When, how and as a result of what do people acquire political orientations such as political knowledge, interest and views? Political socialization is a mixture of consciously organized political learning processes and unorganized political learning processes. In an advanced industrial society like the Netherlands, both types of political learning processes occur. Examples of consciously organized political learning processes in the Netherlands are political education (in school subjects such as history, government and social studies, and educational television programs) and political dissemination and propaganda (by political parties and interest groups). Examples of unorganized political learning processes are the adopting of examples from an individual's environment (parents who talk about politics, the presentation of politicians by the media and the transmission of norms and values via the media) and generalization from non-political areas to political ones. Unorganized political learning can take place in various different locations and situations: in the school canteen, in sport clubs, when hanging around with friends, with the family around the breakfast or dinner table or while watching a light entertainment program on television. This learning often takes place casually and unwittingly.<sup>1</sup>

It is difficult to determine the relative influence of consciously organized and unorganized political learning processes. How can the influence of deliberately planned political learning processes be separated from the influence of unplanned ones? Can the influence of political education in the school counterbalance the influence of mass media or parents? Is the influence of the family greater than that of the school? Which elements of the situation in the family and/or in the school are for weighing this relative influence? Do contacts with peers and/or friends play a more important role in political socialization processes than parents and teachers?

Political socialization is related to the political culture of a country. Political culture is considered here as being the aggregate of the orientations of citizens towards the political process and the political system. The political orientations of citizens are determined by the political culture of a society; at the same time, the profile of the political culture is determined by the political orientations of citizens. In other words: political socialization, political culture and political systems are related to one another.

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<sup>1</sup> Charmant; (1986a), pp. 20-40.



Political socialization involves a complex subject matter to which a number of different social sciences - pedagogics, political science, psychology and sociology - make a contribution.

Five socializing institutions are usually accorded an important place within the field of study of political socialization: family, school, mass media, peer groups/circles of friends, and youth organizations. School subjects such as world orientation, social studies, history and government are central to political education in school. The encouragement of political involvement is often named as an important general aim of political education in school and of social-cultural training outside the school. In this chapter I will examine more closely the relationship between political socialization and political education in school. That relationship has a special character, because political education in school can be regarded as a specific form of political socialization. That is to say: it is a direct, planned and intentional attempt to exert influence on the political orientations of pupils and high school students.

Boys and girls do not, however, enter school in a state of *tabula rasa* as far as politics is concerned. Learning processes which have taken place prior to formal schooling, or outside the school, often impose restrictions on political education in schools. The Dutch political scientist Charmant emphasises that, in a number of respects, processes of political socialization occurring outside the school constitute a serious impediment for political education inside the school. Many students have already acquired disinterested or negative attitudes towards politics long before they have their first class in government or social studies.<sup>2</sup> Political cynicism and political distrust of the politicians in 'The Hague' can be found among high school students in the lower grades.<sup>3</sup> Politicians are opportunists and do not have 'clean hands' in the eyes of a large proportion of eighteen-year-old boys.<sup>4</sup>

The results of research in the area of political socialization can be of vital importance for political education in schools. If a clear answer could be found to the question of when young people acquire political orientations, and what influence is exerted in the course of this process by family, mass media, friends/peers, politicians, dramatic events and so forth, then the

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<sup>2</sup> Charmant (1988).

<sup>3</sup> Meerdink; (1986), pp. 8-12.

<sup>4</sup> Breuer; (1985), pp. 69-85.

content and design of political education could be adapted to take these findings into account. The professional knowledge of teachers and the content of textbooks, for instance, gain in relevance and depth by relating political education to the findings of political socialization research.

Three questions are essential for the analysis of the relationship between political socialization and political education in Dutch schools:

1. What level and intensity of political involvement (political knowledge, interest, views, participation...) do high school students already possess? [Outcomes of research studies of political socialization processes.];
2. What kind of political orientations should students have when they leave secondary school, taking into account normative conceptions of the role of the citizen in a pluralist democratic country like the Netherlands? [Desire for adjustment based on ideas about the democratic citizen.];
3. What possibilities are there for political education in schools to effectuate changes, thus diminishing the gap between existing orientations and desired orientations? [What political education can or cannot possibly do.].

A consideration of these questions helps us to gain a clear idea of the field of tension existing between organized political learning processes in schools and unorganized political learning. I will begin by presenting some data relating to the degree of political involvement of young people in the Netherlands. I will then consider two models of the democratic citizen. Finally, attention will be turned to the role of the school and of political education within the political socialization process as a whole.

## **10.2 .i. Political involvement of young people**

### **10.2.1 Introduction**

Although the term 'political involvement of the citizen' is used very often in the literature relating to intentional political socialization, it is difficult to define precisely what is meant by it. Different suggestions have been made about how political involvement should be defined. This is not the place for an exposition of the problems which have been encountered in the course of attempts to define it. Political involvement is defined here as being the degree to which (young) individuals are interested in politics, have

knowledge of politics and consider it to be important, and take part in political activities.

The American political scientist Dahl has distinguished four ways in which individuals may be psychologically involved in political decisions. These different forms of involvement are:

1. Interest - how curious someone is to know what is happening;
2. Concern - how important someone feels the decision is; (Do individuals think that it makes any difference which parties make up a government, for example?);
3. Information - how much knowledge an individual has about the decision; (Do individuals watch/listen to programs about politics on television and radio; do they read political items in the newspapers and/or weekly news magazines?);
4. Activity - how much someone overtly participates in the decision;

(Are individuals a member of a political party; are they active within a party, a social organization, an action group, and so forth?).<sup>5</sup>

These forms of involvement usually appear together, but they need not. Someone who is not very interested in national elections, who has little concern about their outcome, will be less likely to cast his vote than someone who is very interested and has a great deal of concern. People who take an active part in election campaign activities will be better informed about the issues of the different political parties than those who are not active. Political interest is especially significant here. The first election research, done in the 1940's, showed that people with a relatively high level of political interest expose themselves more often to political information, are more active in election campaigns and party activity, and have an opinion about more political issues than people who are not interested in politics.<sup>6</sup>

This type of findings has been confirmed in a large number of research studies carried out since then in other western democratic countries<sup>7</sup> and in the Netherlands as well.<sup>8</sup> Many investigations have brought to light a link

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<sup>5</sup> Dahl; (1964), pp. 56-57.

<sup>6</sup> Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944).

<sup>7</sup> See for a survey of the literature on this field Milbrath; and Goel; (1977).

<sup>8</sup> Elsinga (1985).

between the level of education and political involvement.<sup>9</sup> People with a high level of education have a greater degree of political interest and are politically more active than those with a low level of education. In an article about the effects of education, the American sociologist Meyer provides two explanatory interpretations of this finding: socialization and allocation.<sup>10</sup> In the socialization approach an emphasis is placed on the effects of education and personal development in an individual's formative years. Young people acquire knowledge and skills at home and in school which are significant in determining the way they are to function in the political process. The more politics is discussed at home and in school, the greater the probability that an individual will have political knowledge, interests and skills at his/her disposal. It is also true in general that the more political knowledge someone has, the more likely he is to be interested in politics and to be politically active. In the allocation approach, the explanation for the link between level of education and political involvement is posited as lying in differences in status and social position of individuals. Those with a high level of education usually occupy positions with a higher status than those with lower education levels. People with a high status want to distinguish themselves in other areas, such as politics for example.

Data reported here relating to the level of political involvement of young people in the Netherlands has been obtained from several recent research and review studies.<sup>11</sup> Although the categories used to reflect dimensions of political involvement, as well as the social and demographic categories, are not identical in the various different investigations, the data obtained do provide a reasonably accurate image of the political orientations of young people in the Netherlands.

### 10.2.2 .i. Political interest

Official politics occupies a very minor position in the lives of high school students. Politics is not a regular topic of conversation in their world.

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<sup>9</sup> Milbrath and Goel (1977), pp. 98-102.

<sup>10</sup> I follow here the version of Elsinga; (1985), pp. 134-135.

<sup>11</sup> Castenmiller; (1988); Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1983); Dijkman; (1987); Van Deth; (1983), pp. 469-483; Van Gemert (1986); Sikkema; (1988); Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985); Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1986); Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1988).

Young people between twelve and eighteen years old exhibit a very low level of interest in political matters reported in daily newspapers, while television programs airing political information and opinions are definitely not popular.<sup>12</sup>

Various different research outcomes have provided a clear picture of the gaps existing in the political knowledge of young people. Most high school students aged twelve to sixteen know very little about politics and democracy.<sup>13</sup> A clear majority of young people between thirteen and eighteen years old say that they have little or no interest in politics. A difference has been noted between boys and girls with respect to political interest: boys report more often than girls that they are interested in politics. The political interest and political knowledge of adolescents is clearly less than that of (young) adults.

The political self-confidence (that is: the feeling that you as an individual can exert influence on political institutions and political processes) of young people is, however, greater than that of adults.<sup>14</sup>

The interest in politics is greater when political matters are discussed in the high school classroom. More planned discussions of this nature will in all likelihood be held in high schools with college preparatory courses than those with commercial and technical training courses.

Young people who are still in school report being more interested in politics than their peers who are already working. The political interest and knowledge of young people who fend for themselves (live separately from their parents) is greater than that of peers who still live at home.

Political interest and knowledge are unequally distributed among different categories of young people (as they are, of course, among adults as well). Age, gender, level of education, parental background and whether or not the individual is living independently are important factors determining these differences.

Four different explanations can be given for why young people consistently report being less interested in politics than their elders:

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<sup>12</sup> Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985).

<sup>13</sup> Dijkman; (1987).

<sup>14</sup> Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985); Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1988).

1. Young people are primarily concerned with getting their high school diploma and have not come into contact personally with political problems;
2. Young people have a number of other pleasurable ways of spending their time;
3. Young people fail to realize how important politics is; the older people are, the more weight they attach to politics, and the more they feel the need to conform to social norms - such as voting, for example;
4. Young people have not yet been able to draw upon a fund of practical living experience in order to assess political information, and have less experience (or none at all) than adults with a society in which social conflicts transform themselves into political conflicts.<sup>15</sup>

The following interpretations are given for explaining the fact that girls report being less interested in politics than boys:

1. Girls fail to have or to develop an interest in politics, because politics has traditionally been a male domain; why, after all, should girls be interested in an area from which social pressures decree that they should stay out?
2. Girls are primarily interested in personal relationships and in their own and others' well-being, while politics appears to be concerned primarily with impersonal issues: economics (growth, budget deficits) and defense (arms policy);
3. The way in which political issues are often contended
  - in a conflict-laden atmosphere, violent outburst from both sides, making a big fuss about minor matters
  - appeals less to girls than it does to boys.<sup>16</sup>

The following interpretations are possible explanations for why high school students (and/or young people whose level of education is higher than average) report being more politically interested than their peers who are no longer in school:

1. Education which lasts longer and which advances to a higher level not only expands knowledge and cognitive skills - it also broadens the outlook and stimulates interest in politics;

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<sup>15</sup> Van Deth; (1983); Van Deth (1987), pp. 23-32; Van der Eijk; (1977), pp. 23-32.


<sup>16</sup> Van Deth (1983); Meerdink; (1986).

2. Even when teachers do not succeed in broadening students' outlook and stimulating their interest, they do manage to convince students that politics is an important matter. According to the proposition of the American sociologist W. I. Thomas, this state of mind must necessarily bear fruit: "If man defines situations as real, they are real in their consequences".<sup>17</sup>
3. Young people who stay in school when it is no longer compulsory, come relatively often from families where political interest is present. In addition, it appears that the school succeeds better in arousing the political interest of students whose home influence have already made them familiar with political topics.<sup>18</sup>

In Figure 1 is presented the distribution according to age and gender of the political interest of the Dutch population in 1981. Table 1 presents the difference between young people and adults with respect to particular expressions of political interest.

**Figure 1:** Level of political interest (1981)

Percentage respondents who have a strong interest in politics



<sup>17</sup> Van Deth (1983).

<sup>18</sup> Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985).

16-26	27-37	38-48	49-59	60-70	71-..
years	years	years	years	years	years

Men: N = 4478; Women: N = 3981

Source: Deth, J.W. . *U.* van, 1983, 477.

The figure shows clearly that young people are less politically interested than young adults and adults. A clear difference in the level of political interest can also be observed between boys and girls (men and women).

**Table 1:** Difference between young people and adults with respect to expressions of political interest, 1983 (in percents).

	16-24 years old	25-34 years old	35-.. years old
Have you ever watched a television broadcast of a debate in the parliament?			
- yes	41.0	56.9	70.6
- no	59.0	43.1	29.4
	(332)	(459)	(1101)
Have you ever watched a television program about politics?			
- yes	52.2	65.9	66.3
- no	47.8	34.1	33.7
	(337)	(455)	(1106)

Source: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1985, p.79.

It is difficult to determine exactly which factor (level of education, gender, living independently) is most significant in setting the level of political interest of young people. As a result, it is also difficult to determine which interpretation or combination of interpretations is the most plausible. Political interest appears to be a function of home environment, education, gender, getting older and changes in the intellectual and political climate (*Zeitgeist*).

### 10.2.3 .i. Political views

Young people between sixteen and twenty-four years old believe more often than adults that differences in income should be reduced. The former group is also more likely than the latter to be in favour of refusing military service, and to accept tactics of conflict such as strikes and occupying



buildings. With respect to topics in the area of peace and security, young people are committed less strongly than older ones to NATO and to a military balance of power. On the other hand, this younger group - along with the thirty-five year and older age group - is less strongly opposed to nuclear weapons than young adults (25-34 years old). Young people are not particularly different from older ones in their orientation towards social and political problems. Young people (18-24 years old) show a similar trend to that of the rest of the population. The points of emphasis are somewhat different for the two groups, however. Young people are less concerned than older ones, for example, about crime and social disturbances.<sup>19</sup>

There is a consistent picture of considerable dissatisfaction among young people about the role of political parties. A considerable portion of the high school students cannot name a single party for which they would like to vote. A large proportion (40% to 45%) can see little or no difference between the various political parties.<sup>20</sup>

Are these respondents equally "dissatisfied" with the Dutch system of parliamentary democracy? Does a (large) part of the group of young people have a negative attitude toward politics? An investigation carried out among fifteen and sixteen-year-old high school students revealed that 6% of the young people interviewed, believed that politics is powerless when it comes to the shaping of society, while 22% of the respondents credited politics with a great deal of power in this area. Views of the Dutch political system which are clearly negative are encountered in about 10 % of the students. On the other hand, 13% is clearly positive in its assessment.<sup>21</sup>

Data show no clear distinction between young people and adults with respect to the degree of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the Netherlands.<sup>22</sup>

The conclusion reached is that present-day Dutch youth is neither noticeably radical and rebellious, nor extremely conservative.

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<sup>19</sup> Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985).

<sup>20</sup> Van der Linden; en Stoop; (1977); Dijkman; (1987); Inter/View (1981). The research of Inter/View was carried out in March/April 1981 under 436 18- and 19-year old people.

<sup>21</sup> Van der Linden; en Roeders; (1983), pp. 100-118.

<sup>22</sup> Van Deth (1985).

#### 10.2.4 .i. Political participation

Just as is the case with political interest, three variables are significant in shaping the distribution among respondents of political participation: age, gender and level of education. The level of education in particular, is significant for political participation, especially when political activities requiring knowledge and skills are involved. Those with a higher level of education participate more than those with a lower level of education. Boys (men) with a higher level of education participate more than other categories. Young people are more likely to be actively involved in incidental and more violent activities, while those who are older manifest themselves more often in less spectacular activities within the framework of organizations.<sup>23</sup>

The explanations for differences in participation are analogous to the explanations for differences in political interest.

A distinction is normally made among three types of political participation: electoral participation, conventional participation and non-conventional or protest participation. Electoral participation finds its expression in voting in elections and election campaign activities. The minimum age for being allowed to vote in the Netherlands (active and passive franchise) is eighteen. Examples of conventional political participation are writing a letter to a political party or politician, membership in a political party, participation in a public meeting, and party activities not connected to election campaigns. Protest participation encompasses new or less current activities. Examples are taking part in demonstrations, boycotts, blocking traffic, occupying buildings and refusing to pay rent or taxes. In the further presentation of data relating to young people, I will continue to use this tripartite division into types of political participation.

##### **First: voting behaviour and party preference**

Young voters make less use of their right to vote in elections than any other group. The youngest group of those who are enfranchised stays home from the polls more often than older groups. The failure to vote is more likely to be grounded in a lack of commitment to a specific political party than in a

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<sup>23</sup> Castenmiller; (1988).

lack of commitment to the political system as a whole.<sup>24</sup> Young people are less likely than older ones to be supporters of a specific political party. An analysis of elections held in high schools shows that high school students are less attracted than older people to large, moderate and middle-of-the-road parties (such as the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Social Democrats (PvdA), for example). PvdA and CDA, as well as the small right-wing parties are continually under-represented. This under-representation is, however, not the result of an aversion to "established parties", nor is it the result of an abhorrence of parties of the right. Both small left-wing parties (PPR and PSP) and the right-wing liberal party (VVD) are over-represented in every election. The Dutch researcher Van Deth puts forward as an explanation for this deviant party preference of sixteen to eighteen year olds that they are answering a need to distinguish themselves from adults. Another relevant finding is that the outcomes of elections among high school students exhibit the same tendencies as those in which people older than eighteen participate. When the VVD makes gains among the high school students, for example, it also makes gains among adult voters. Shifts in political preference of high school students correspond to shifts in the preference of adults. Apparently the same factors lead to similar reactions in high school students and adults. The reactions of high school students, however, are somewhat more pronounced than those of adults.<sup>25</sup> The political preference of high school students has shifted toward the middle of the political spectrum between 1982 and 1986. The parties on the extremes of left and right have diminished in popularity.

It is not possible to determine on the basis of available research data whether or not boys and girls differ with respect to party preference.<sup>26</sup>

### **Secondly: conventional participation**

Young people are less often members of a political party, a trade-union or professional organization, a neighborhood association or a woman's organization than older people.<sup>27</sup> About 15,000 young people are members

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<sup>24</sup> Niemöller; (1977), pp. 131-137; Schmidt; (1981), pp. 42-62; Schmidt (1983), pp. 139-155; Dijkman; (1987).

<sup>25</sup> Van Deth; (1986), pp. 4-7.

<sup>26</sup> In the election of 1984 42% of the girls didn't give any preference ('none' or 'doesn't know'), while 29% of the boys didn't have any preference.

<sup>27</sup> Castenmiller; (1988); Heunks; (1981), pp. 88-110.

of a youth branch of a political party, and while there is a total of 1.25 million young people between the ages of fifteen and nineteen (as of 1986) in the Netherlands - which means that the number of actual members corresponds to somewhat more than 1%.

In the Youth '87 research study (a questionnaire administered to young people between the ages of twelve and twenty-four), 1% of the respondents said that they were active members of a political party, while 2% said that they were members, but were inactive.<sup>28</sup>

### **Finally: protest participation**

Young people believe more strongly than older ones in the effectiveness of the political activities they take part in. The youngest generations show more political expressions of protest (demonstrations, petitions, and action groups) than older generations. The former are also quicker than the latter to accept forms of non-parliamentary political action and protest behaviour. The acceptance of protest behaviour, as well as actually taking part in it, is relatively the most widespread among young people living in large cities, who live independently, who (no longer) have religious beliefs, who have a higher level of education, or who are still working towards achieving a higher level of education and consider themselves to belong to the upper (middle) class.<sup>29</sup> An explanation of the greater amount of protest participation among young people may be that they generally have a weaker commitment than older ones to the political system. In the words of the political scientists Marsh & Kaase: "Young people enjoy the physical vigor, the freedom from day-to-day responsibilities of career and family, and have the time to participate in the pursuit of the energetic kinds of political activity implied by a high protest potential. Protest behaviour is therefore held to be primarily an outcome of the *joie de vivre* of youth itself."<sup>30</sup>

### **10.2.5 Conclusion**

It seems somewhat premature for political observers to become worried or anxious about these outcomes; there is certainly not enough evidence to

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<sup>28</sup> Sikkema; (1988).

<sup>29</sup> Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985); Milbrath; and Goel; (1977).

<sup>30</sup> Marsh; & Kaase; (1979), as quoted in: Elsinga; (1985), p. 147.

warrant suppositions that an 'apolitical' generation has been created. After all, the development of political orientations of youngsters is an ongoing process. Political involvement is growing in the age group older than eighteen years of age, and particularly so in the case of those older than twenty or twenty-one. This growth in involvement is attributed to the fact that young people older than twenty predominantly live on their own.<sup>31</sup> Political involvement is apparently developing relatively late in the course of the individual's growth toward autonomy. It would be a cause for concern if young adults (21 to 24 years) were as politically uninterested or opposed to politics as adolescents. This is not the case, however. The group of twenty-two to twenty-four year olds shows more political interest and is more familiar with politicians than the eighteen to nineteen and the twenty to twenty-one year old groups. It is not clear whether this should be ascribed to life cycle effect or to generation effect.<sup>32</sup> According to the authors of the study *Jongeren in de jaren tachtig* (Young people in the eighties) there are no indications that the present Dutch youth is moving from a political viewpoint in a direction that deviates significantly from the political tendencies of young adults. In those cases where young people do distinguish themselves from the rest of the population, they attract attention because of the way in which they express more pronounced changes in the political climate.

### **10.3 Political socialization, .i. political involvement and democracy**

#### **10.3.1 Introduction**

Political issues and problems usually involve matters of considerable complexity. It is not very easy to gain an insight into the political process. When the political process is experienced as being obscure, citizens will not try to learn more about it, and will not feel themselves to be involved in it. One factor which plays a role here is the language used in the media. Words like emancipation, consensus, electorate, dissident, mandate and euthanasia are unfamiliar words for young people - and older ones - who have had little formal education. In other words: they do not use these kinds of words themselves and probably fail to understand what is being said. As

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<sup>31</sup> Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1985).

<sup>32</sup> Andeweg; (1983), pp. 156-158.

a result, regular reports on political matters in newspapers and on radio and television pass them by.

There are a few authors who see possibilities in pop music for interesting young people who have very little schooling and who are distrustful of "official" politics. They maintain that a political message can be conveyed to these young people using pop music. They point to the popularity of pop festivals in which political ideas are being propagated ('Rock against Racism') and pop concerts, also shown on television, which are sponsoring a worthy aim ('Live Aid' and 'Nelson Mandela -70 years old').<sup>33</sup>

High school students between the ages of fifteen and eighteen are going through a stage in their life in which drastic personality, biological and social changes are taking place. In growing towards adulthood they are trying to establish their own place in society. At this point in their lives they are learning to formulate their own opinions. It is not at all surprising that the very youngest high school students (twelve to fifteen years old) are less involved in something as abstract and detached as political matters - or in other words: that they display so little interest in politics, and have so little knowledge of it. These pupils are just starting their higher level schooling and beginning to have classes in social subjects in order to become familiar with important aspects of Dutch society.

Normally students in the Netherlands are not introduced systematically to political topics until they are sixteen or seventeen, in the school subject social studies. At this age, students already have a number of their own (political) ideas and views. The question therefore presents itself as to whether, and to degree, political orientations which have already been adapted and learned from parents and media and which have been internalized can be either strengthened or changed by the school and by political education in school.

### **10.3.2 Education of .i.democratic citizens**

Generally speaking, the stimulation of political interest and political participation is justified by pointing to the benefits afforded for the individual and for the political system as a whole. An expression of this desirability for the individual of political knowledge and political participation can be found in the standpoint of the 'Scientific Council for Governmental Policy'

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<sup>33</sup> Sikkema; (1988).

(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), an advice organ for the Dutch government), which has since been adapted by Dutch government as policy. According to this point of view, formal education should make a contribution to educating for citizenship. According to the WRR: "... every citizen should possess knowledge concerning the structure and functioning of our national institutions, in order to understand and exercise the personal and democratic rights deriving from them."<sup>34</sup>

Political apathy, political ignorance, and lack of political interest among high school students is considered to have undesirable consequences for the stability of the political system. When even the most elementary knowledge is lacking among high school students, and when political interest is superficial at best, the prognosis for later, when they take part in politics, must almost certainly be poor. When a 1982 research study reported findings pointing to a 'move to the right' among high school students, and said that an alarming number of students have 'extreme right wing views', the newspapers were bursting with expressions of concern for the future of Dutch democracy.

Political education and social-cultural training must therefore furnish contributions to the formation of a democratic citizen. The quality and the survival of Dutch democracy are considered to be closely connected with the political interest, involvement and participation of citizens. Citizens who are interested and active in politics are said to form an essential link to democratic decision making.<sup>35</sup>

There is a Dutch saying: 'Who has the youth, has also the future.' This statement of a piece of proverbial wisdom implies that the standpoints of young people do not change when they grow older. Evidently the underlying supposition here is that of a "socializing *avant la lettre*" in which people maintain the same patterns of values acquired in their youth throughout the rest of their lives. Proceeding from this one-sided and

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<sup>34</sup> Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (1986), p. 132.

<sup>35</sup> See for instance the speeches of L.C. Brinkman, minister of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs; M. Sint, chairwoman of the PvdA [Partij van de Arbeid -social democrats]; E. Tuijnman [Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) - right wing liberals], burgomaster; J.J. Vis [Democraten 66 (D66) - left wing liberals], MP (First Chamber); and J.G. Kraaijeveld-Wouters [Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA)- christian democrats], MP (Second Chamber) on the symposium *politieke vorming* (political education) of the Thorbecke Association in The Hague on 6th June 1988, as published in: Namens (1988).

simplistic approach toward socialization, commentators air pessimistic views about the future of Dutch democracy.

A recent illustration of the concern felt by politicians about young people's aversion to politics, and the consequences this may have for Dutch democracy, is expressed by Marjanne Sint in her maiden speech as chairwoman of the Social Democrats (PvdA): "It is the young people in particular who are turning their backs to politics. Sometimes this is due to indifference, but increasingly it is a considered, conscious decision. They see politics as a decayed institution, where people talk too much, listen too little, and do even less. If this were to become the dominant view of politics held by young people, it would be a direct threat for democracy."<sup>36</sup>

The essential point here is not the question of whether or not there is enough evidence to support a contention that political interest and political participation have diminished among young people or that there is a process of political deterioration, as a result of individualization, for example. The relevant point is that citizenship is propagated both because of its importance for the individual himself and because of its significance for the country as a whole.

The question of what the content of political education should be, is more political-normative than pedagogical in nature. A consequence of the presence in the Netherlands of a plurality of political parties and social groups all competing with one another, is that the content of political education is a constant topic of discussion. Which political views should be instilled; what forms of participation should be put into practice, and which political values and ideals should be chosen above others, are all normative questions.

What model of the democratic citizen is being propagated? In the political science literature two models of democratic citizens can be distinguished: the model of the politically active citizen, and the model of a citizen who - while carrying out one or more activities - displays a certain degree of detachment from politics, and is not involved with politics on a regular basis. There has been a body of support for both of these models of democratic citizens up to and including the present day by political educators.

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<sup>36</sup> Speech of M. Sint at the congress of the PvdA on 2nd April 1987, as quoted in: Zonneveld (1988), p. 305.



### 10.3.3 Normative approach toward the *.i.* democratic citizen

The normative approach toward the democratic citizen is linked primarily to the political philosophers Aristoteles, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill.<sup>37</sup> The assumption underlying this approach is that the citizen is interested in political matters, is informed about political issues and problems, and is active at various different levels of political decision making. Political disinterest, apathy, and the adoption of an attitude of political aloofness are frowned upon. It is the responsibility of each and every citizen - who is, after all, affected by political decisions and regulations - to take part in the shaping of public opinion and decision making. Political participation is seen as making a contribution to the self-realization of the individual. Politics is such an essential part of society that individuals would not develop themselves to the full if they failed to be active in politics. Taking part in politics (in political debates, for example, and in participating in making a political decision) has an educational or developmental function. Rousseau in particular stressed the educational function of political participation. As a result of these activities, citizens acquire more political knowledge and (more) political self-confidence. In other words, political education is said to be effective because it helps individuals acquire positive attitudes and orientations toward politics and society. A human being is only truly a human being when he is developing his political talents, irrespective of the outcome for the political system.

This approach was 'rediscovered' in the 1960s. It is assumed that participation will diminish the gap between the individual citizen and government, and that it will guard against the alienation of citizens. Furthermore, political participation also makes the citizen feel as if he/she is his/her own boss. Classical liberal political thinkers like James Mill and Jeremy Bentham consider political participation important, because it is the citizens themselves who are best able to promote their own interests. Through participation, citizens learn how to recognize where their own interests lie and to promote these interests (when necessary) in opposition to the 'general interest'. When citizens put forward their own ideas and involve themselves in the political struggle, they acquire social and political skills and gain an awareness of social responsibility. Political participation of individuals which is as extensive as possible would also lead, it is

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<sup>37</sup> See political thought of Aristotle, Rousseau and Mill. See also for that matter Verba; (1965), pp. 130-171.

maintained to an improvement of the quality of political decision making. This improvement would be due to the fact that a greater allowance is made in political decisions for the clearly presented standpoints of citizens than would have been the case if they had not participated actively.

These normative approaches toward participation concentrate primarily on its positive effects. There is some controversy, however, about whether or not participation does, in fact, always lead to positive outcomes. Political participation can also lead to frustration, disillusionment, disappointment and aversion.

Being well informed about politics, for example, is not a sufficient condition for political interest and/or political activity. Someone who knows a great deal about the political process, but who sees him/herself thwarted in attempts to influence that process in the direction he/she desires, is likely to 'drop out'. Moreover, political participation does not always lead to an increase in political interest and political activities. Someone who has worked hard to realize a political goal, but who has not succeeded in realizing it, or who feels as though someone has been playing a game with him/her, will turn his/her back to politics. Apart from that, limited political interest and relative passivity in the political arena do not always merit a negative assessment. If someone thinks that political affairs in the Netherlands are being handled in the best possible way, and that his/her contribution is not needed, he/she will not take part in activities.

There is a certain amount of feedback between political participation and certain individual political attitudes and conceptions. Participation does not in itself lead to the development of (more) positive attitudes and increased knowledge. Success in participation activities can stimulate individuals to acquire positive attitudes. On the other hand, lack of success in the outcome of participation activities does not lead automatically to political distrust and cynicism. Failure can result in negative attitudes.<sup>38</sup>

#### **10.3.4 Empirical approach toward the .i. democratic citizen**

Empirical studies in the 1940's and 1950's have made clear that there is a discrepancy between the democratic ideal of the classical political thinkers and the actual situation in the western democracies. The major part of the population is not well informed about politics, has only a limited interest in

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<sup>38</sup> Irwin; (1979).

politics and is not particularly active in the process of decision making (that is to say: does not vote in elections, is not a member of a political party and/or trade-union, does not participate in protest activities, and so forth).

The conception of the role of the citizen in a democracy had already come under heavy criticism from the Austrian-American economist and political thinker J.A. Schumpeter in the early 1940's. The influence of his ideas is present to this very day. Schumpeter turns against the ideas of Rousseau and Mill on democracy and gives a different definition of the democratic method: "...the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote".<sup>39</sup> In this approach, where democracy is regarded as a method of decision-making, participation of all citizens is no longer a condition for the existence of democracy. Citizen participation is not seen here as a goal in itself, as it was in the previous model, but as a means of choosing political leaders.

The citizen's participation is directed primarily toward taking part in elections and elections campaigns. Citizens choose their representatives, who then make all the political decisions during a certain period of time. As long as there is free competition among political groups, and leaders of parties must make appeals to the voters, then a democracy can be said to exist.<sup>40</sup> Affiliating themselves with this approach, the American political scientists Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee maintain that limited participation and a certain degree of apathy have, in fact, a positive function for democracies. A democracy is in danger of falling apart when all the citizens are deeply involved in politics and when they are not sufficiently prepared to make compromises. Citizens who take part in the political process and who are involved in political affairs, should not make too many commitments within the political arena, and should not hold on too doggedly to specific political positions. One thing is clear, according to this line of thought of Berelson c.s.: people who are politically interested are less likely than those who are uninterested to change their political opinions and attitudes; people with pronounced political views are less likely to reach compromises than people whose views are less clearly defined. Powerful political commitments run parallel to a rigid adherence to party

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<sup>39</sup> Schumpeter; (1942), p. 269.

<sup>40</sup> Dahl; (1956) and Dahl (1982).

political lines. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee plead, therefore, for a balance between action motivated by deeply-felt political sentiments and actions for which political passion is not the driving force. A balance must be sought between involvement and indifference, stability and flexibility, progressiveness and conservatism, consensus and cleavage, and individualism and collectivism.<sup>41</sup>

This empirically-orientated reformulation of the role of the democratic citizen by Schumpeter, Dahl and Berelson has come under heavy criticism. In the view of the critics (Lukes, Bachrach, Walker, Wolin and others) the emphasis placed on the possible problems and dangers of a high rate of political participation should not lead to the conclusion that it is a good thing for democracy to have a low rate of political participation of citizens. Furthermore, the possibility is ignored that a small group of (professional) politicians fixes what kind of alternatives are to be presented to the voters.

### **10.3.5 .i. Political involvement and democracy**

When the actual political functioning of the Dutch citizen is contrasted to the model of the politically active citizen, then it quickly becomes clear that practice has not yet caught up to theory. People do differ in their level of political involvement. Some are very active in politics, while others remain indifferent to even the most pressing political problems. Only a few of those who are active are truly interested in wielding political power. In the Netherlands, even the "critical, active consumer" appears to be in the minority.

Figures are presented in section two showing the levels of political interest and political participation among young people/high school students, and explanations of these levels are proposed.<sup>42</sup> Dutch adults also regard politics as being abstract. The way in which political decisions make themselves felt in their lives usually eludes them. A great many Dutch men and women need guidance if they are to find their way in areas where politics determines what happens.

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<sup>41</sup> Berelson, Lazarsfeld; and McPhee; (1954).

<sup>42</sup> See the figures about the spread of political interest and political participation on the Dutch population in: Van Deth; (1987); Elsinga; (1985); Castenmiller; (1988); Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1988).

These people are affected daily by political and social regulations and decisions, whose significance they cannot even grasp - which means, of course, that they are very far removed from being able to exert an influence on these regulations and decisions through political channels. In the words of the Dutch sociologists D'Ancona and Tromp: "All the research studies reveal the tragic fact that a large portion of the Dutch population (20% to 25%) is incapable of introducing his/her own problems in an adequate way into the public and political arena - due to the lack of sufficient education, income, leadership capabilities, organizational capacity and so on and so forth."<sup>43</sup>

The paradox of participation seems to be an important factor here: education/training is both a necessary condition and a result of participation in politics.<sup>44</sup> Apparently, neither the school in general nor political education in school in particular, succeeds satisfactorily in instilling in all its students the enduring knowledge, insights, attitudes and skills which they will need to use when they leave school in their roles of consumer, tenant, employee, person entitled to social support, and citizen.

It is undesirable from a democratic point of view when, due to a lack of education, knowledge, insights and skills, the political equality of citizens remains - owing to circumstances beyond their own control - a hollow phrase, empty of material content. Only the high school is in a position to ensure that everyone - irrespective of gender, level of education and parental background - acquires knowledge about politics and democracy, and becomes familiar with the political decision-making process. Outside the school, it is primarily the political involvement of an individual's parents (for example parents who talk with one another and with the children about politics), as well as his/her social environment, which determine political interest and political participation.

## **10.4 .i. Influence of various socializing factors**

### **10.4.1 Introduction**

The continuing process of political socialization encompasses the conservation of political culture by means of the transfer of orientations as well as

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<sup>43</sup> d'Ancona en Tromp (1980), p. 273.

<sup>44</sup> Rosenthal (1975), pp. 7-8.

the possibility for changes of that same culture. Such changes can be the result of various events and processes which are not meant in the first place to influence the process of socialization (for instance Dutch affairs and scandals like the financing of the costs of study or the introduction of a new passport). To what degree do important an/or dramatic events (such as the murder of president Kennedy and of Martin Luther King or a political scandal like Watergate) influence the political learning process? Specific socializing agencies such as family, school, church, mass media, peer groups/circles of friends, clubs, army, and political and social organizations all exert a certain specific influence. Although research in the field of political socialization is taking place, there are still many white spots on the map of this field. Different causes can be given for these gaps in our knowledge.

In the complex process of socialization, so many factors play a role that it is nearly impossible to determine the relative influence of one single factor. The present state of research does not (yet) make it possible for us to determine a hierarchy of socializing agencies (socializing agents), because the effects of each of these specific agencies (agents) cannot be isolated sufficiently from one another to be able to investigate them separately. The relative influence of parents, school, media and peer groups can differ according to the situation.

Designating the relative influence of one specific political socializing agent is an extremely complex task. This is certainly true with respect to the influence of the school and of political education in the school.<sup>45</sup>

In the second place, the analysis of dynamic processes produces serious technical research complications. How is a possible effect of specific experiences to be registered when those effects appear after many years? And: does a change of attitude always lead to a change in behaviour?

In the third place, shifts in the political orientations of (young) individuals can also be the result of the generation effects, life cycle effects and/or effects related to the spirit of the times.

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<sup>45</sup> Charmant (1986b), pp. 257-286.

#### 10.4.2 Political .i. generations and life cycle

Since the middle of the 1960's, political culture in the Netherlands seems to have changed drastically. Secularization, de-pillarization, desire for greater democratization and for involvement in decision-making by citizens have changed the political scene. There was an extension of the political demands of a large number of political groups, and direct political actions replaced the former passivity of citizens. Forms of political participation which had been previously unknown began to gain popularity: occupation of buildings, demonstrations, traffic blockades and creation of political action groups. It is interesting to note that this wave of political activities and general increase in politicization reached its peak during an economic boom. The emphasis with respect to political wants and long-term demands was on issues such as well-being, democratization and emancipation, rather than the issues which had been in the forefront during the post-war reconstruction: economic growth, prosperity and social security. The political orientations of the citizens had changed; there was a shift in the standards which citizens employ in their assessments of governmental policy.

The manifestation of political protest in the 1960's and 1970's in the Netherlands - and in other western European countries as well - marks a change in thought about the relation between political socialization and the political system. "The waves of political protest that swept the advanced industrial democracies in the late 1960's startled scholars as well as politicians", say Barnes and Kaase.<sup>46</sup> A well known explanation of the 'democratization wave' and protests of students in western Europe in those years is the 'basic value priorities shift' of the American political scientist Inglehart.<sup>47</sup> His theory of a "silent revolution" comes down to being an observation that there has been a striking change in the value orientations of young people. This change is seen as being a result of an increased level of prosperity in the western countries. This prosperity has assured a constant, high standard of living, so that almost no one runs a great risk of missing the basic necessities of life. Inglehart assumes that people who have been born after the Second World War in particular are likely to give priority to "post-materialistic values" - such as self-realization, more

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<sup>46</sup> Barnes and Kaase (1979), p. 13.

<sup>47</sup> Inglehart (1977).

democracy, more equality, more openness and conservation of environment and nature - because they are not familiar from their own experience with war, poverty or grave social conflicts. Older people have had such experiences and are therefore inclined to afford priority to "materialistic values" such as social security, economic growth and standard of living. Inglehart assumes on the basis of the orientation toward "post materialistic values" of young people that there will be an increase in protest participation. Studies held in the Netherlands under voters in the years 1982-1986 showed only a small rise in protest participation, however. It is argued that the economic crisis could have resulted in materialistic values becoming more important.

#### **10.4.3 Socializing .i. influence of school**

Social studies teachers and teachers of history and government observe an aversion to 'politics' among their students. Their experience shows that students are more likely to express negative sentiments about politics than positive ones. With the assumption of this observed opposition of students to politics in the back of our minds, it becomes relevant to ask how a positive image of politics can be stimulated in political education courses in high school.

It is difficult to determine precisely what is the socializing influence of school and of the school subjects devoted primarily to political education (social studies and government). Political topics and (certain aspects of) political themes are also considered in subjects such as geography, economy and Dutch. Other relevant factors are the social climate in the school, the organizational structure of the school, the hidden curriculum and the personalities of the teachers. Research done in the Federal Republic of Germany has shown that "an open political climate" in school exerts a positive influence on the political interest and tolerance of students. Some characteristics of such a climate are: discussions about current events, discussions with politicians and political commitment on the part of the teacher.<sup>48</sup>

The socializing influence of classes (curricula) in the various relevant subjects, of teachers, the structure of interaction in the school, the 'hidden curriculum', and the size of the school, is extremely difficult, if not impos-

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<sup>48</sup> Ackermann (1981).



sible, to isolate from one another for the purposes of research. As a result, it is also very difficult to determine the net socializing effect of classes devoted to politics on political involvement. In the Federal Republic of Germany, research studies indicate that the school subject political education is more successful at passing on knowledge and concepts than it is at changing political attitudes, or helping students acquire the skills necessary for participating in politics.<sup>49</sup>

The American specialist in education Ehman provided an answer to the question of what the effects of going to school were for the political socialization of American students in a contribution he made some years ago to an international conference of educational specialists and social scientists in the German city Tutzing. In his contribution he inventorized the results of a number of empirical investigations. He formulated the following generalizations:

1. Compared to other factors such as family and mass media, the school is an important agent for transmitting political information to young people. The school is somewhat less central an influence in shaping political attitudes and behaviour, although for ethnic minorities and low status groups it may be more important than for high school groups.
2. The teacher has a modest impact on youth's political attitudes, probably having more influence for lower than for higher status groups.
3. Systematic and carefully aimed curriculum treatments can result in the transmission of considerable political information, both at the elementary and secondary level.
4. The regular secondary school civics and government curriculum has no noticeable impact on political attitudes of students except for ethnic minorities. .... The manifest curriculum itself appears not to be an impressive vehicle for shaping political attitudes or participation orientations.
5. Classroom climate (in combination with a certain type of teacher) has a powerful influence on student attitudes. This factor has been linked consistently and strongly to positive political attitudes.
6. Participation in school governance and extracurricular activities is related positively to political attitudes of students.

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<sup>49</sup> Ackermann (1987), pp. 415-420.

7. School and governance climate is related to political attitude of students. More participant and less authoritarian climate are linked to more positive political attitudes and behaviour of students.<sup>50</sup>

In order to assess the effects of school and of political education in school in the Netherlands, longitudinal studies are needed which can follow socialization processes among representative groups of high school students over a long period. Also needed are studies in which the aim is to discover the relative influence of different socialization agencies and of different aspects of school life. No such studies are being done at present in the Netherlands.<sup>51</sup> As long as this situation in the Netherlands prevails, the contribution of political socialization research to political education in school has to be limited to the passing on of insights which are based on fragmentary theories and speculations due to a lack of empirical data.

### 10.5 Concluding remarks

Theories and research findings in the area of political socialization can be very useful for the didactics of political education. In this chapter I have looked at the relationship between political socialization and political education in the light of the instrumental significance of political socialization for intentional political learning processes in school. It is assumed that it is possible to indicate more precisely on the basis of outcomes of political socialization research what can be achieved with political education in schools.

According to the American researchers M.K. Jennings and R.G. Niemi, unorganized political learning in the sense of an autonomous assimilation by each individual of his/her own impressions and experiences, plays a role which should not be underestimated.<sup>52</sup>

Results of empirical research in the field of political socialization indicate that to a great extent prudence is called for in making general statements about the effects of intentional political socialization. The origin of politi-

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<sup>50</sup> Ehman (1979), pp. 268-269.

<sup>51</sup> Systematically undertaken research from the angle of political socialization is almost missing. In various studies are scattered findings present about political orientations of young people/high school students. See for instance Dekker, Rozemond; en IJzerman; (1986).

<sup>52</sup> Jennings; and Niemi; (1974).

cal orientations is still unclear and the changeability of views and attitudes sometimes appears to be more dependent on actual problems, issues and events and the way in which mass media presents those problems, issues and events than on planned attempts to steer people in a specific direction. Research done in countries outside the Netherlands does not justify making either explicitly pessimistic or explicitly optimistic assessments of what it is possible to achieve with political education in Dutch schools. Political education in the Netherlands is one factor among many which influences the development of individuals' political orientations.

The question remains open whether intentional political education is more effective than the political learning which takes place outside the school. It is likewise unclear what lasting influence political education in an individual's youth will have on future behaviour. Is the political learning acquired as an adult more important than the political learning acquired in childhood or in high school? As the political scientist Charmant observes: "There are plenty of questions. There is only one way to find the answers: continue doing research." <sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Charmant (1986a), p. 38.

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## Gea Meulema

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Translation: Nancy J. Boeije-Kelley

## 11 *.i. Political socialization in the Netherlands with respect to the European Community*

### 11.1 Introduction

"The European Parliament? The European Parliament is bureaucratic, is boring, meetings go on for hours and hours and you don't know what they

are talking about. When I read the newspaper I sometimes force myself to read about the European Parliament, but it is not at all interesting, and I don't understand it. It is different from the Netherlands. The European Parliament exists, but I have no idea what they are actually doing; for example the member countries should be cooperating on environmental pollution, it's clearly necessary, but I never hear anything about it. Maybe they do talk about it, but they never seem to reach an agreement on it. And I also associate it with wasting a lot of money: upper-class men at banquets with luxurious drinks".

A friend of mine answers my question when I ask her what she thinks of the European Parliament. Her knowledge, attitudes and opinions about European politics are clear. It would be interesting to find out when and how she acquired this knowledge and these attitudes and opinions about European politics.

The mutual dependence of each of the countries of the European Community is increasing. European cooperation is growing in a number of different spheres: economic, agricultural, technological, educational, environmental, and so forth. In January 1993 the open internal market should be realised. A free exchange of goods, services, persons and capital will be able to take place. European cooperation on different levels is increasing.

On the other hand, there is a crisis in certain aspects of European cooperation. Decision-making about the most important topics fails to take place or takes much too long. Support for

the process of European integration is low among the inhabitants of the European Community. In the Netherlands, the participation in the elections for the European Parliament in 1979 was 57.8%,

in 1984 50.5% and in 1989 47.2%. Less than half of the population voted. The total participation in the elections in Europe in 1979 was 62.5%, in 1984 59.1% and in 1989 58.5%. The European Community is criticized for being an allegedly undemocratic institution. The European Parliament does not have enough powers to have a significant impact on European politics, and the citizens of the twelve member countries have no direct influence on policy making in Europe. Other reasons mentioned for the crisis in European cooperation is that the populations of the member countries do not feel themselves to be "Europeans"; they are still too nationalistic. In schools, virtually no attention is paid to the process of European cooperation. Textbooks ignore politics in "Europe", and teachers and pupils

have insufficient knowledge of and are not interested in "European" politics.

For young people in particular it is important to have knowledge about politics in "Europe". To an increasing degree they will be confronted with decisions taken at the European level. At school or at work, European politics will exert an influence on their lives. It is interesting therefore to study the political knowledge, attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns of young people with respect to politics of the European Community.

In this paper are presented the findings of an empirical research study into political socialization with respect to the European Community carried out in the Netherlands.

## **11.2 Research design**

The research problem in this comparative study is:

What are the knowledge, attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns of young people with respect to politics in the European Community, when and by means of which channels do they acquire this knowledge, and these attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns with respect to politics in the European Community, and what are the relationships between these effects, processes and agencies of political socialization with respect to the European Community with political socialization with respect to the Netherlands?

This research problem was further specified in the following questions:

1. Which knowledge, attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns do young people have with respect to politics in the European Community?
2. Is there a relationship between knowledge, attitudes and behavioral patterns with respect to politics in the European Community and gender, age, social economic status, religion, urbanisation, contacts abroad and having had schoolclasses on the topic of politics in the European Community?
3. Which variables exert the most influence on having knowledge of and being interested in politics in the European Community?
4. Which variables exert the most influence on being willing to vote for the elections for the European Parliament?

5. Is there a relationship between having knowledge of politics in the European Community and having knowledge of politics in the Netherlands?
6. Is there a relationship between attitudes and participation with respect to politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands?
7. By means of which agents do young people acquire knowledge and interest with respect to politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands?
8. When, at which age, do young people acquire knowledge with respect to politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands?

My aim was to investigate the group of those who would vote for the first time in elections for the European Parliament in 1989. This would mean the sixteen to twenty-year old age group. Because it could be expected that nineteen and twenty-year olds had already left high school and therefore differed too much from the younger group, I decided to confine the sample to sixteen to eighteen year olds. To increase the representativeness, I selected schools from both the city and the countryside, and included a public, a catholic and a protestant school.

A questionnaire seemed to be the method best suited to this pilot study.

A condition for collecting data from pupils was that it should be possible to fill out the questionnaire in about forty minutes. (A classroom period is fifty minutes long). That left about ten minutes for the researcher to instruct the pupils about filling out the questionnaire. I decided to have the pupils fill out the questionnaire during the classroom period devoted to the subject Dutch. All pupils have Dutch and they are not separated according to their choice of certain (exam) subjects. The chance that we would be selecting only "alpha" or "beta"-classes was avoided in this way. I did not choose a social studies class, because it was uncertain whether or not all the schools offered social studies in the fourth year of high school (sometimes they have two hours a week in the fifth year), and because social studies has a different status and position within the schools. I did not want this to influence how the questions were answered. Filling out the questionnaire during social studies might also have a greater tendency to yield socially expected answers ("during a social studies class you must be interested in politics").

All questionnaires were filled out by the pupils in the week of June 15-19, 1987. A total of 143 questionnaires were filled out.

Following data collection, data were put into the computer for calculations in SPSSX (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). A simple form of index construction was used. Because the sample was a small one, Pearson's  $r$  was used for the correlations and tests of significance. We can speak of a significant correlation when Pearson's  $r$  is .16, or more, in both a positive and negative direction.

When a certain value is not scored, the value is left out in the tables.

### **11.3 .i. Political socialization effects**

#### **11.3.1 General information**

The questionnaire was filled out by 143 pupils (6 schools); 81 girls (56.6%) and 62 boys (43.4%). Most pupils are 16, 17 and 18 years old (86.1% of the population); 31.5% come from the city, 39.2% from a small city and 28.7% come from the countryside. Thirty-five percent of the sample is affiliated with a religious denomination, and 65% is non affiliated.

The class composition of the sample was as follows: 14.7% from the lower social economic class, 31.5% from the middle class, and 50.4% from the higher social economic class. 38.9% has had contacts abroad.

About half of the total group of pupils reads a newspaper (almost) every day; 28.7% hardly ever reads a newspaper. There is a considerable difference, however, in the frequency with which boys and girls read a newspaper. Of the boys, 87% reads a newspaper (almost) every day or four times a week and the figure is 59% for the girls.

The percentage of pupils that had classes in 1986/1987 about politics in the European Community is 42.7%; 53.8% had no classes about politics in the European Community. 68.5% of the pupils had classes about politics in the Netherlands, 28.7% had no such classes. Politics in the European Community and in the Netherlands are taught the most during social studies classes, with economics and history classes following in second and third place.

Pupils of the public-countryside school had the most classroom time devoted to politics in the Netherlands. This is also the case with respect to politics in the European Community.

Let us now proceed to the findings with respect to knowledge, attitudes, opinions and the agents and processes of socialization.

### 11.3.2 Knowledge

Knowledge of politics is measured by means of three questions: a question about a political structure, a question about a political topic and a question about a politician.

**Table 1:** Knowledge about politics in the Netherlands and the European Community

Value	Netherlands		European Community	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
0	9	6.3	108	75.5
2	55	38.5	25	17.5
4	22	15.4	4	2.8
6	48	33.6	4	2.8
8	6	4.2	1	.7
10	3	2.1	1	.7
Total	143	100%	143	100%

Pupils who have a score six or higher than six are considered to have a knowledge of politics. Only 4.2% of the respondents have knowledge about politics in the European Community; for politics in the Netherlands this is 39.9%. If we look at which pupils have knowledge of politics in the European Community, we see that they are the same pupils who have knowledge of politics in the Netherlands (.24).

There is a difference in gender with respect to knowledge. With respect to politics in the European Community, 8.1% of the boys and 1.2% of the girls have knowledge (a significant relation; -.25). With respect to politics in the Netherlands, 45% of the boys and 36% of the girls has knowledge. There is also a significant relation between age and having knowledge of politics in the European Community. The older one gets, the more knowledge one has (.25). There is no such significant relation with respect to politics in the Netherlands. Pupils who have knowledge of politics in the European Community have had significantly more contacts abroad (.17).

To see which variables have the most influence on knowledge of politics in the European Community, we look at the variables: gender, age, social economic status, religion and at the variables with respect to the European Community: willingness to vote, political efficacy and interest. Gender has the most influence (-.32), then follow willingness to vote for the elections of the European Parliament (.19) and age (.16).

### **11.3.3 Attitudes**

#### **11.3.3.1 .i. Political interest**

Interest in politics is measured by means of questions about interest in political topics, reading articles in a newspaper dealing with politics, and talking with other people about politics.

Let us first see in which European political topics pupils are interested.

The political topic pupils are highly interested in is: struggle against acid rain. Pupils are mildly interested in the struggle against acid rain and in unemployment, coordinated aid to third world countries and minorities.

It is striking that pupils tend to choose "general" political topics. Popular are topics which are also national in scope, and for which the national government is also trying to develop a policy. "Typical" European topics, like milk and farm surpluses, inferior wages of women, the fishing industry and customs formalities for truck drivers are only mentioned by a relatively small number of pupils.

When we combine the categories highly and mildly interested for "typical" European affairs, we see that most pupils are interested in inferior wages of women, farm surpluses and information technology and milk surpluses in Europe. For all of these topics however, it remains the case that more pupils are not interested in these topics.

In which political topics with respect to politics in the Netherlands are pupils interested?

The political problems pupils are interested in are: environmental pollution, alcohol and drug problems and criminality. Educational policy and unemployment also have a reasonably high score.

**Table 2:** Interested in political topics, European Community

	highly inte- rested	mildly inte- rested	not very inte- rested	totally uninte- rested
milk surpluses	4.2	14.0	69.2	11.9
struggle against acid rain	10.5	67.1	21.7	.7
inferior wages of women	.7	28.0	60.8	9.8
the fishing industry	.7	20.3	66.4	12.6
information technology	4.9	14.0	65.0	15.4
coordinated aid to third world countries	4.2	38.5	52.4	4.9
customs formalities for truck drivers	2.1	13.3	71.3	13.3
farm surpluses	4.2	19.6	65.7	10.5
unemployment	2.8	55.2	37.1	3.5
minorities	4.2	36.4	49.7	8.4

76.6% of the respondents regularly reads articles in newspapers dealing with politics in the European Community. Of the total group 52.5% regularly reads the newspapers about politics in the Netherlands.

**Table 3:** Interest in political topics, the Netherlands

	highly inte- rested	mildly inte- rested	not very inte- rested	totally uninte- rested
energy	2.1	33.6	48.3	13.3
alcohol and drug problems	11.2	66.4	19.6	2.1
environmental pollution	14.0	63.6	21.0	.7
unemployment	4.9	58.7	32.9	.7
housing shortages	1.4	17.5	62.9	13.3
criminality	10.5	64.3	23.1	.7
minorities	7.7	13.4	38.5	8.4
abortion	6.3	44.1	36.4	12.6
inflation	4.2	14.0	53.1	27.3
educational policy	7.0	46.9	40.6	4.9

Let us have a look at the pupils who read the newspaper and those who read the articles dealing with political topics.

51.4% (almost) never talks about politics in the European Community, 27.5% once a month, 14.8% once a week and 6.3% four times a week or (almost) every day. When we ask whether or not pupils talk about politics in



the Netherlands, 5.7% does so four times a week or (almost) every day. 27.9% reply that they do so once a week, 20.7% once a month and 45.7% of the pupils (almost) never talks about politics.

If we look at the total index measuring interest in politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands, we see the following (Table 4).

If we look at respondents with a score of 6 or more, 47.8% are interested in politics with respect to the European Community, and 49% of the pupils is interested in politics in the Netherlands.

**Table 4:** Interest in politics in the Netherlands and the European Community

Value	Netherlands		European Community	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
0	5	3.5	3	2.1
1	7	4.9	4	2.9
2	13	9.3	11	7.9
3	16	11.2	10	7.1
4	14	9.8	30	21.4
5	15	10.5	15	10.7
6	15	10.5	10	7.1
7	20	14.0	20	14.3
8	21	14.7	19	13.6
9	13	9.1	16	1.4
10	1	.7	2	1.4
Total	143	100%	140	100%

There is a significant relationship between being interested in politics in the European Community and being interested in politics in the Netherlands (.61). When we compare boys with girls: boys are more interested in politics. Of the boys 56% is interested in politics in the European Community and 63% is interested in politics in the Netherlands. Of the girls, 41% is interested in politics in the European Community and 40% is interested in politics in the Netherlands. The relationship between gender and being interested in politics is significant. This significant relation exists in both areas (Netherlands  $-.23$ ; European Community  $-.20$ ). Interest in politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands increases significantly as the respondents become older (.25 and .24

respectively). Pupils who are interested in politics in the European Community have had more contacts abroad (.18).

Of the influencing variables (gender, social economic status, age, religion, willingness to vote, political efficacy and knowledge with respect to politics in the European Community), those which are most influential are: age (.28), willingness to vote for the European Parliament (.21) and political efficacy with respect to politics in the European Community (.19).

### 11.3.3.2 .i. Political efficacy

**Table 5:** Political efficacy with respect to politics in the Netherlands and the European Community

Value	Netherlands		European community	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
0	12	8.4	57	40.4
1	21	14.9	34	24.1
3	34	23.8	22	15.6
4	32	22.4	18	12.8
6	32	22.4	9	6.4
7	-	-	-	-
10	11	7.7	1	.7
Total	143	100%	141	100%

Political efficacy is the feeling one has of being able to exert influence on the way things happen in politics, and the feeling that it is useful to involve oneself for or against certain states of affairs in politics.

From the above we see that only 7.1% of the pupils has a feeling of political efficacy with respect to politics in the European Community. Almost one third of the pupils, or 30.1% has a feeling of political efficacy with respect to politics in the Netherlands.

Because political efficacy is limited, there is little we can say about the difference in political efficacy between boys and girls, and about relationships with other independent variables.

### 11.3.3.3 .i. Party identification

Party identification is the feeling one has of being aligned to a particular political party.

Do pupils consider themselves aligned to a political party?

**Table 6:** Identification with a political party

	N	Percent
strongly aligned	3	2.1
somewhat aligned	43	30.1
not aligned	82	57.3
no opinion	8	5.6
do not know	7	4.9
Total	143	100%

67.8% does not feel aligned to a political party, has no opinion or does not know. 32.2% of the pupils feel themselves (strongly) aligned to a political party.

More boys (41.8%) than girls (25%) feel themselves (strongly) aligned to a political party. This is a significant relation (-.21). Pupils who identify more with a political party, are significantly more religious (.31)

### 11.3.3.4 .i. Willingness to vote

Respondents were asked: if they were allowed to vote, and if there were elections right now, would they vote?

**Table 7:** Willingness to vote

	Netherlands		"Europe"	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
would vote	116	81.1	47	33.1
would not vote	15	10.5	47	33.1
no opinion	5	3.5	20	14.1
donot know	7	4.9	28	19.7
Total	143	100%	142	100%

33.1% of the pupils is willing to vote for the elections of the European Parliament, and the same percentage is not willing to vote. One out of five pupils does not yet know if they are going to vote.

81.1% of the pupils is willing to vote for the elections of the Second Chamber in the Netherlands and 10.5% is not willing to vote.

Pupils who are willing to vote for the Second Chamber are also more willing to vote for the European Parliament (.34).

The split between boys and girls on the willingness to vote in elections for the European Parliament is 42% and 26% respectively. 89% of the boys is willing to vote for the Second Chamber and 75% of the girls. Boys are significantly more willing to vote than girls (-.17). Of the pupils who are willing to vote in the elections for the European Parliament (n=47), 44.3% feel themselves strongly aligned and 45% do not feel themselves strongly aligned to a political party. Of the respondents who are willing to vote in the elections of the Second Chamber (n=116), 38.6% feel themselves (strongly) aligned to a political party and 49% does not feel themselves (strongly) aligned to a political party. There is a significant relationship between both willingness to vote in the Second Chamber and in elections for the European Parliament, and party identification. This means that pupils who feel themselves more aligned to a political party, are more willing to vote for the Second Chamber (.29) and the European Parliament (.20). When one gets older one is significantly more willing to vote for the elections of the Second Chamber (.17) and in the elections for the European Parliament (.18). Pupils who are willing to vote for the European Parliament have had significantly more contacts abroad (.16) and come more often from the countryside (.17).

The variables (gender, age, social economic status, religion, interest, knowledge and political efficacy with respect to politics in Europe) which have the most influence on being willing to vote for the European Parliament are: interest in politics in the European Community (.23), knowledge about politics in the European Community (.21) and religion (-.15).

#### **11.3.3.5 .i. Nation identification**

Nation identification with respect to "Europe" (Europeanism) and with respect to the Netherlands (nationalism) is measured using the question of whether the respondent is proud to be European/Dutch or not, and by asking what emotions the Dutch and "European" flags evoke.

34.5% of the pupils is proud of being European, 44.1% of the pupils is proud of being Dutch.

45% of the boys and 27% of the girls are proud of being European. Of the boys, 52% is proud of being Dutch, and 38% of the girls.

When we construct a score of Europeanism and nationalism we obtain the following findings.

29.2% of the pupils has a feeling of Europeanism and 33.1% has a feeling of nationalism.

Pupils who have a feeling of Europeanism also have a feeling of nationalism (.49). 43.5% of the boys has a feeling of Europeanism as opposed to 16% of the girls.

**Table 8:** Nation Identification

Value	Nationalism		Europeanism	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
0	38	28.6	21	43.8
1	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-
3	29	1.8	4	8.3
4	-	-	-	-
5	22	16.5	9	18.8
6	-	-	-	-
8	17	12.8	12	25.0
10	27	20.3	2	4.2
Total	133	100%	48	100%

45.6% of the boys has a feeling of nationalism and 23.7% of the girls. There is a significant relationship between gender and nation identification in both areas. Boys identify more with a nation than do girls. Pupils who have a feeling of nationalism are significantly more religious (.35). Pupils with a feeling of Europeanism come significantly more often from the countryside (.24).

#### 11.3.4 Opinions party preference

With respect to politics in the European Community, 35.1% does not know for which party they should vote or has no opinion. 21.7% of the boys has

no opinion or does not know which party to vote for and 47.9% of the girls has no opinion or does not know which party to vote for in the elections of the European Parliament.

If pupils were entitled to vote, which party would they vote for?

**Table 9:** Party preference\*

	Netherlands		European Community		
	N	Percent	N	Percent	
PvdA	28	22.8	20	21.3	Labour Party
VVD	11	8.9	5	5.3	Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy
CDA	28	22.8	20	21.3	Christian Democratic Alliance
D'66	17	13.8	8	8.5	Democrats 1966
CPN	1	.8	-	-	Communist Party
PPR	7	5.7	2	2.1	Radical Party
PSP	4	3.2	5	5.3	Pacifist Socialist Party
SP	1	.8	1	1.1	Socialist Party
no opinion	8	6.5	10	10.6	
don't know	18	14.6	23	24.5	
Total	123	100%	94	100%	

\* parties which are not mentioned, are left out.

With respect to politics in the Netherlands, 18.2% has no opinion or does not know which party to vote for. The difference in gender is smaller: 13.8% of the boys has no opinion or does not yet know which party to vote for. 27.7% of the girls has no opinion or does not know which party to vote for.

### 11.3.5 Behaviour .i. political participation

Political participation is measured by asking whether one is a member of a political organization, whether one is an active member of a political organization and whether one has taken part in activities which are related to political problems, or not. With respect to political participation we get the following index.

A very low percentage of pupils participates in political activities.

Because participation in politics is very limited, there is little we can say about the difference in participation between boys and girls and about relationships with independent variables.

**Table 10:** Political participation

Value	Netherlands		European Community	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
0	123	86.0	139	97.2
2	12	8.5	4	2.8
4	6	4.2	-	-
6	2	1.4	-	-
Total	143	100%	143	100%

## 11.4 .i. Political socialization agents and processes

### 11.4.1 Agents of socialization

By means of which channels do pupils obtain knowledge of and interest in politics?

If we ask pupils from what source they first received information about politics in the Netherlands, most of them can't remember. More girls (55%) than boys (43.9%) report not being able to remember by means of which source they first received information about politics in the Netherlands.

**Table 11:** Source of first information\*

	Netherlands		European Community	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
I can not remember	69	48.9	85	62.0
radio	3	2.1	2	1.5
television	25	17.7	35	25.5
national newspaper	-	-	2	1.5
local newspaper	2	1.4	-	-
parents	34	24.1	12	8.6
brothers, sisters	-	-	1	.7
teacher	4	2.8	-	-
other	4	2.8	-	-
Total	141	100%	137	100%

\* agents of socialization named in the question and not mentioned by the respondents, are left out in this table

With respect to politics in the European Community, first television and then parents are the first source of information. With respect to politics in



the Netherlands this is the other way round: parents and then television is the source of the first information. There is no difference between boys and girls in the source from which they received the first information in their lives about politics.

The agents by means of which pupils acquire knowledge and the most knowledge about politics in the European Community, are the following.

From what sources do respondents report acquiring knowledge about politics in the European Community? Television is also the winner here. Next in line are: radio, parents, national newspaper and the local newspaper. The teacher is in sixth place with 23.1%.

**Table 12:** Sources by means of which one has acquired knowledge, and the most knowledge about politics in the European Community

	sources of knowledge*		sources of most knowledge**	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
radio	103	72.0	25	24.5
television	142	99.3	133	93.0
national newspaper	69	48.3	46	32.2
local newspaper	65	45.5	26	18.2
magazine	32	22.4	3	2.1
weekly magazine	15	10.5	-	-
friends	29	20.3	1	.7
parents	70	49.0	23	16.1
brothers, sisters	24	16.8	1	.7
grandparents	12	8.4	-	-
teacher	33	23.1	8	5.6
pol. young people's org.	-	-	-	-
interest group	1	.7	-	-
church	2	1.4	-	-
church-affiliated young people's organization	4	2.8	-	-
jobs, weekend or vacation	2	1.4	-	-
trips	10	7.0	-	-
other	1	.7	-	-

\* several answers possible

\*\* two answers possible

The source from which pupils acquire the most knowledge is also television. Following television at a considerable distance are the sources: national newspaper, radio, local newspaper and parents. For 5.6% of the

pupils the teacher is the source from which they acquire the most knowledge about politics in the European Community. There is no difference between boys and girls with respect to sources by means of which they acquired most knowledge about politics in the European Community. Both boys and girls name television, national newspaper and radio. Although boys name the national newspaper more often than do girls (boys 39% and girls 27%).

The agents of socialization which most pupils cite as being their source for the acquisition of knowledge about politics in the Netherlands are: television, radio and parents. Both girls and boys think television, radio and parents are equally important sources for acquiring this knowledge.

**Table 13:** Sources by means of which one has acquired knowledge, and the most knowledge about the politics in the Netherlands

	sources of knowledge *		sources of most knowledge **	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
radio	114	79.7	27	18.9
television	141	98.6	125	87.4
national newspaper	74	51.7	38	26.6
local newspaper	95	66.4	29	20.3
magazine	40	28.0	2	1.4
weekly magazine	19	13.3	-	-
friends	48	33.6	4	2.8
parents	105	73.4	37	25.9
brothers, sisters	38	26.6	4	2.8
grandparents	16	11.2	-	-
teacher	83	58.0	29	20.3
pol. young people's org.	1	.7	-	-
interestgroup	-	-	-	-
church	5	3.5	-	-
church affiliated young people's organisation	5	3.5	-	-
jobs, weekend or vacation	3	2.1	-	-
trips	10	7.0	-	-
other	5	3.5	2	1.4

\* several answers possible

\*\* two answers possible

When we ask by means of which agents of socialization they acquire the most knowledge, then television is cited most often, but the national news-

paper and parents are also cited. The local newspaper and the teacher are not far behind in importance. There is a difference, however, with respect to sources by means of which boys and girls have acquired the most knowledge. Boys name television (90%), the national newspaper (34%) and the local newspaper (19%) as sources. Girls name television (85%), parents (31%) and teacher (26%).

When we ask pupils by means of which people and/or events they became interested in politics in the European Community they cite: television (28%), parents (22.7%) and school (10.7%).

When we ask pupils by means of which people and/or events they became interested in politics in the Netherlands, 33.6% names their parents as the agent of socialization. The agent of socialization named second most often is school (14.3%) and political phenomena (10.1%).

Difference in gender has not been analysed here.

**Table 14:** Agents of socialization which provide most knowledge of politics

Total EC		Boys EC		Girls EC	
1. television	93.0%	1. television	94%	1. television	93%
2. national newspaper;	32.2%	2. national newspaper	39%	2. national newspaper	27%
3. radio	24.5%	3. radio	23%	3. radio	26%

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Total NL		Boys NL		Girls NL	
1. television	87.4%	1. television	90%	1. television	85%
2. national newspaper	26.6%	2. national newspaper	34%	2. parents	31%
3. parents	25.9%	3. local newspaper;	19%	3. .i. teachers	26%

#### 11.4.2 Processes of socialization .i. age

When we ask about the age at which pupils first received information about politics, half or more of the population can not remember.

Of the respondents who do remember at which age they first received information about politics in the European Community, 12.9% received their first information between 12 and 15 years of age; 8.6% did so when they were 16 years and older.

**Table 15:** Age of first socialization

Age	Netherlands		European Community	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
3-5 years	6	4.2	2	1.4
6-11 years	21	14.7	11	7.9
12-15 years	33	23.1	18	12.9
16 and older	11	7.7	12	8.6
I can't remember	72	50.3	97	69.3
Total	143	100%	140	100%

With respect to politics in the Netherlands, 23.1% received then first information between the ages of 12 and 15; 14.7% first received information when they were between 6 and 11 of age.

There is some difference between boys and girls. With respect to both areas girls receive information about politics at a later age than boys. With respect to politics in the Netherlands, 5.8% more girls had received information about politics when they were twelve years or older. With respect to politics in the European Community this difference between boys and girls is 7.7%.

### 11.5 Summary

The research problem of the comparative study reported here, was: What knowledge, attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns do young people have with respect to politics in the European Community?, when and by means of which channels do they acquire this knowledge and these attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns?, and what are the relationships between these effects, processes and agencies of political socialization with respect to the European Community with political socialization with respect to the Netherlands?

This research problem was specified using eight questions. The answers to these eight questions are presented below.

1. Which knowledge, attitudes, opinions and behavioral patterns do young people have with respect to politics in the European Community?  
Young people in the Netherlands have virtually no knowledge about politics in the European Community. Their interest, however, is rea-

sonably high (47.8%), although it must be said that respondents are more likely to be interested in political topics which are also topics at the national level. Topics which are specific to the "European" level attract less interest. The young have virtually no feeling of political efficacy with respect to the European Community. A third of the young people identify with a political party. Only one third is willing to vote for the European Parliament. One third does not know for which party it should vote in the elections. Almost a third has a feeling of Europeanism. No one participates with respect to politics in the European Community.

2. Is there a relationship between knowledge, attitudes and behavioral patterns with respect to politics in the European Community and gender, age, social economic status, religion, urbanisation, contacts abroad and having had school classes devoted to the topic?

Boys have significantly more knowledge of politics in the European Community than girls; they have significantly more interest, have a more highly developed feeling of Europeanism and are more willing to vote than girls. They also feel themselves more aligned to a political party than girls. They do not have a greater feeling of political efficacy with respect to politics in the European Community than girls.

Age is also of importance: the older one gets, the more knowledge and the more interest one has and the more willing to vote one is with respect to politics in the European Community. There is no relationship between age and a feeling of political efficacy, Europeanism and party identification.

Social economic status does not play a significant role.

With respect to religion and politics in the European Community: there exists a significant relationship between the feeling of political efficacy and religion. Pupils who have a feeling of political efficacy with respect to the European Community are less religious.

Pupils from the countryside have a significantly greater feeling of Europeanism and they are more willing to vote for the European Parliament.

Pupils who have had more contacts abroad have more knowledge about politics in the European Community, and are more willing to vote for the European Parliament; their feeling of political efficacy is not greater, however, and they do not have a significantly more enhanced feeling of Europeanism.

Having had school classes on the topic does not play an important role. There are two significant relationships: pupils who have had classes are significantly less willing to vote and have a greater feeling of Europeanism.

3. Which variables exert the most influence on having knowledge of and being interested in politics in the European Community?

The research has shown us that it is boys in particular who have knowledge of politics in the European Community. Respondents who are more willing to vote and older respondents have more knowledge of politics in the European Community. Thus gender, willingness to vote and age are the variables having the most influence on possessing knowledge of politics in the European Community.

The variables with the most influence on interest in politics in the European Community are: gender, willingness to vote and political efficacy. Boys, young people willing to vote and respondents with a feeling of political efficacy are more interested in politics in the European Community.

4. Which variables exert the most influence on being willing to vote for the elections for the European Parliament?

We have seen that respondents who are willing to vote, are those who are particularly interested in politics in the European Community, who have knowledge of politics in the European Community and who are not religious. The variable interest in politics in the European Community exerts the most influence.

5. Is there a relationship between having knowledge of politics in the European Community and having knowledge of politics in the Netherlands?

There seems to be a general state of "being knowledgeable" about politics, irrespective of whether it is politics in the Netherlands or politics in the European Community. Pupils who have knowledge of politics in the European Community, also have knowledge of politics in the Netherlands.

6. Is there a relationship between attitudes and participation with respect to politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands?

Pupils who are interested in politics in the European Community are also interested in politics in the Netherlands.

Pupils who are willing to vote for the elections for the Second Chamber are also willing to vote for the elections for the European Parliament. Pupils who have a feeling of Europeanism, also have a feeling of nationalism.

Because virtually no one participates in politics and because virtually no one has a feeling of political efficacy we can draw no conclusions on this matter.

7. By means of which agents do young people acquire knowledge and interest with respect to politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands?

Television was the agent cited most often by the respondents as a source of information about politics in the European Community; the source cited the second most often was radio. Mass-media is also by far the most important source from which pupils acquire the most knowledge (television, national newspaper, radio) about politics in the European Community. Pupils first received information about politics in the European Community from television, and from their parents, in that order.

When we ask pupils themselves to name agents of socialization by means of which they became interested in politics in the European Community, they cite television, parents and school.

When we ask pupils by means of which people and or events they became interested in politics in the Netherlands, they mention their parents, school and political phenomena.

Referring to school classes we see that 42.7% has had school classes about politics in the European Community. Most of the pupils have had these classes during the subject social studies.

8. When, at what age, do young people acquire knowledge with respect to politics in the European Community and politics in the Netherlands?

Most pupils received first information about politics in the European Community when they were between 12 and 15 years old. This is at a later age than when they received information about politics in the Netherlands. Girls received information about politics somewhat later than boys.

## 11.6 References

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## Rüdiger Meyenberg

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## 12 *.u. Political socialization in the Federal Republic of Germany; with respect to the European community*

### 12.1 Introduction

There have always been individuals, politicians, scientists, artists, who considered themselves Europeans rather than Germans, Frenchmen, Italians or whatever. However, it is in our century that this is beginning to find expression as political will.

The present political system of the European Community raises the problem of its democratic legitimation. The European Community wants to establish the economic and political union of Europe, however, without

having set up an effective parliament vested with the necessary authority. The European Parliament, elected in direct universal suffrage since 1979, has rudimentary competencies only, so that it is not in a position to give important impulses for a progressive process of unification and an effective control. Decisive questions, such as whether to introduce a European currency, whether to establish a European Bank of issue, whether Europe is to become a federal state or a confederation of states in the future, as well as further rights for the European Parliament are decided by the governments of the Member States instead of the legislative body. Moreover there is the risk that progressive positions, for instance in social legislation or in ecological policy making, are revoked by uneasy compromises. From this point of view an increase in authority is urgently needed for the European Parliament. Europe's democratic legitimization must find expression in a directly elected representative body (cf. Mickel et al., 1983).

With respect to political participation in Europe two fields of study are extremely important: European political socialization and European political education.

## **12.2 Political socialization**

### **12.2.1 Research**

Political socialization of young people mainly deals with the question as to when, how and by what means juveniles acquire political knowledge, form opinions and learn certain behaviours. Moreover it intends to throw light upon the process of integrating the individual into the political groups and institutions of the society, and on the adopting of valid political norms and values.

Despite the flood of publications in this field we still do not know too much, in particular about the process of how young people take in whatever they are taught. Moreover it is still unclear, what interdependencies there are between knowledge, opinion and behaviours. The research into political socialization should, of course, not be confronted with too high expectations. Similar to empirical social science as a whole, this discipline as well must be aware of its possibilities and its methodological limits in particular. Every study will simplify and reduce the social reality, as it is impossible to consider all those variables forming political consciousness. Moreover the results are not always interpreted carefully enough. Thus it can be observed for instance that positive behaviour is interpreted as in-

tentional, while negative behaviour is seen in a causal connection (Allerbeck/Rosenmayr, 1976, 6, 155).

### 12.2.2 .i. Political knowledge and attitudes

Today we know about young people that

- the better they are educated, the better their knowledge of political events and the greater their interest in politics;
- pupils and students, compared to working young people, express a greater interest in politics and thus are more willing to join one of the existing parties;
- on an average, boys are more interested in politics than girls;
- in the case of political alternatives decisions are only seemingly based on rational reasons, while in fact they are often emotional (Baacke, 1983, 133).

The political behaviour of young people, their attitude to political institutions, their actual and planned political commitment is always of particular interest to social scientists.

Whether the political socialization of young people is regarded as "successful" by the political system seems to depend on the extent to which they share the prevailing norms and values. Desire for change causes fear in politicians and often leads to counter-measures on their part.

A problem in this connection is the question of what is meant by politics: does it only refer to the system of activities kept going by political representatives, or also to any activity of smaller or larger groups settling their common affairs? In my opinion political activity must not be limited to a small number of politicians; it rather is a decisive dimension of human behaviour. Unfortunately this cannot be dealt with here, in any further detail.

The Shell Study "Young People and Adults '85" interviewed more than 1000 young people in the Federal Republic of Germany about their interest in politics. According to this study 55% were interested in politics (63% boys, 47% girls), while 45% were completely uninterested in political questions. The 18 to 20 year-olds are particularly attentive (54%), while 38% of the 15 to 17 year-olds express their interest in politics (cf. Table 1 and 2).

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**Table 1:** Interest in politics according to sex - in percentage -

interest in politics	Youth '84			Adults '84		
	boys =725	girls n=747	total n=1472	men n=358	women n=371	total n=729
Yes	63	47	55	73	43	58
No	37	53	45	27	57	42

Source: Jugendwerk, 1985.

**Table 2:** Interest in politics and age, Youth '84 - in percentage -

interest in politics	Age		
	15-17 yrs. n=422	18-20 yrs. n=473	21-24 yrs. n=577
Yes	38	54	68
No	62	46	32

Source: Jugendwerk, 1985.

## 12.3 .i. European political socialization

### 12.3.1 Research

As already mentioned we know hardly anything about how political attitudes develop, that is to say about the factors influencing the political socialization of young people. Is this process caused by discussions with the parents, by the local newspaper read at home? What connection is there between official policy making and the political ideas and wishes of juveniles?

Is it even possible to speak of a Europe-consciousness of juveniles running parallel to political socialization in their own country? Or is it not possible at all to speak of a European political socialization, because formative factors are lacking altogether? Does this mean that questions of European policy making are discussed and judged differently - maybe much more rationally - than national problems?

Science will provide few answers only, because there are hardly any profound studies.

In the field of European socialization research in particular studies as well as results are rare. On the one hand this is due to the fact that the European research into political socialization is fairly new in science, and on the other hand that it still does not play a very important part in the mind of the scientists. Moreover the concept of attitude is so complex that statements about the political behavior of young people can be made to a limited extent only. And yet it was possible for the Shell Study about "Young People and Europe" to ascertain "that among the European youth there are even detailed European values" (Jugendwerk, 1977, 25).

### **12.3.2 .i. European political knowledge and attitudes**

In 1984 Noelle-Neumann and Herdegen made the first research into Europe-consciousness in the Federal Republic of Germany, comparing it with their investigations of national pride. When they did so, it became apparent that "those who were proud of being German, at the same time tended to state with more self-confidence that they were Europeans" (Noelle-Neumann/Herdegen, 1984, 313). 15% of the young generation between 16 and 29 years of age are "absolutely proud" of being Europeans; 48% are "predominantly proud", 11% are "not really proud", while 7% are "not at all proud". For a comparison see the figures on national pride: 20% are "absolutely proud to be Germans", 36% 'predominantly, 13% not really and 10% not at all. And yet it remains unclear what factors are decisively stamping the .i. Europe-consciousness of young people. Therefore it will be necessary to intensify the research done in this area (see Table 3).

Only 21% of the young generation state that they have sufficient information about the European Community. This fact is rather alarming, since it shows that the process of European integration is not very much part of young people's experience. This already indicates that an important task is waiting for the educational institutions in the future.

The most important source of information for young people is, according to themselves, the television (75% of the 15 to 24 year-old Europeans), followed by the newspapers (53%), radio (26%) and conversations with other people (26%). (Source: Kommission, 1982, 129).

<b>Table 3:</b>	proud to be German				proud to be European			
	abso- lutely %	pre- dom. %	not really %	not at all %	abso- lutely %	pre- dom. %	not really %	not at al %
total population	34	39	8	5	21	46	8	7
men	37	40	8	4	22	47	8	6
women	33	36	9	6	21	45	7	7
age groups								
16-29 yrs. old	20	36	13	10	15	48	1	7
30-44 yrs. old	27	45	9	4	19	47	6	8
45-59 yrs. old	38	45	6	4	27	45	6	8
60 yrs. and above	53	39	5	2	26	45	7	6

Source: Noelle-Neumann/Herdegen, 1985, 314

What picture do young people have of Europe? Are they actually in favour of a united Europe? And does this Europe include the Soviet Union and the East European states?

**Table 4:** Feeling sufficiently informed about the EC

	15-24 year-olds %	adults above 25 %	all Europeans %
sufficiently informed	21	28	27
insufficiently informed	71	61	64
no answer	8	11	9
	100	100	100

Source: Kommission, 1982, 128

The question whether only the West European countries should be part of a united Europe was answered with Yes by 40% of the 16 to 29 year-olds. On the other hand, a nearly equal number of young people said that they advocated also to include the East European countries. Table 5 shows that young people are more willing to consider the East European Community as part of a united Europe.

Besides their interest in politics the geographical mobility of young people is of importance in the context of their political attitude. 23% of all the juveniles interviewed in 1985 are "by all means" interested in a one or two-

years' stay abroad, 41% are "fairly interested", while 26% are "less interested". See Table 6.

**Table 5:** Opinions about inclusion of East-European countries (May: 1984)

	age groups			
	16-29 yrs. %	30-44 yrs. %	45-49 yrs %	69 and above %
only West-European countries	40	49	50	57
Russia and East Europe, too	42	33	34	24
don't know	18	18	16	19
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IFD-Umfrage 3066, 4040. Federal Republic including West-Berlin, population from 16 years of age, 1983, 315.

**Table 6:** Interest in a one or two-years' stay abroad

	1985 %	1983* %	1978 %
by all means	23	17	19
fairly interested	41	37	39
less interested	26	26	23
certainly not	11	16	16
no answer	0	2	3
answer	100	100	100

\* 18 to 24 year young adults

Source: Bundesministerium, 1985, 44

The conclusion is the following. Empirical studies, which, however, are partly outdated, prove that half of the young people are interested in politics, but only to a very limited extent in European policy making. Their mobility decreases with advancing years, whilst their own level of education and that of their parents tends to have a mobility-promoting effect. Young people have hardly any knowledge about the European Community, and no clear picture of the Europe of the future.



#### 12.4 Political socialization and .i. political education

For political education to be effective at school, it has to include the conditions and accompanying circumstances of the process of political studies into its considerations; it depends on certain results of the research into political socialization, as political education is preceded by political socialization. At the moment empirical researches giving insights into the inner processes of political socialization in juveniles (pupils) are still lacking. What is required moreover is to transfer the observations from the macro to the micro-level. In the long run the research into political socialization will not be able to do without the results of developmental psychology.

Sociologists are in discussion about the consequences of the research into political socialization for political instruction.

"The research into political socialization cannot give any practical advice for education and teaching. It is unable to formulate aims and give explanations; it rather tries to clarify the interrelationship existing between individual variables of a comprehensive process, if possible formulated as a law. Its results can never be generalized, because they are bound to the question chosen; and they will be relative, because they are dependent on the method which simplifies reality" (Sutor, 1984d, 32). According to Sutor socialization research can at most make suggestions and raise questions for one's personal observations and point to general conditions. This opinion is supported by Behrmann, who thinks that the research into socialization is in a crisis, rather than being able to give reasonable answers to justified questions. In particular the uncritical transfer of American research results of political socialization to pupils in Europe proved to be wrong (Behrmann, 1977, 23).

Wallraven, on the other hand, acknowledges research into political socialization as an "advisory and correcting function" of political didactics. It is the "prerequisite for correcting decisions made, the basis for curricular revisions, clarifications of unknown and neglected or known and unexplored phenomena" (Wallraven, 1977, 235).

Claussen too assigns a central function to research into political socialization: "Where the research interests of a system-oriented political science and a biography-oriented science of socialization intersect, it therefore is a matter of ascertaining interrelationships of political communications as to form and contents, which will at the same time increase the scope for political activity and political learning" (Claussen, 1982, 463).

## **12.5 .i. European political education**

### **12.5.1 .i. Objectives of political education**

Political education, in school in particular, is still in a state of crisis. The subject is more and more drifting into isolation, it is under increasing pressure to be absorbed by the subject history. The sociologists and educationalists dealing with political education are partly to be blamed for this. Not least because in the past they were more concerned about the question as to which political teaching aims should best be postulated by the school instead of being concerned about the addressee, the pupils themselves. Questions of legitimation, problems concerning the logic of science, and socio-political definitions of aims were dominating the discussions.

And yet today the experts on didactics, with certain restrictions, largely agree about the responsibilities of political education in school. Three important quotations are the following. "The aim of political education is to create critical awareness and the ability to form independent opinions. Both should result in political engagement" (Drechsler, 1979, V). "A crucial point of political education remains the imparting of democratic attitudes and competencies, which will enable every student to participate in political processes" (Wallraven, 1979, 228). This means that political education is to contribute to "making people's general opinions, statements and judgments about politics more rational, i.e. to make the reasons the former are based on more comprehensible both for the person giving their opinions and for their fellow men. This objective implies that the increase in rationality of political judgement will increase both the ability for and the quality of political participation" (Sutor, 1984b, II, 46).

In this context indoctrination is rejected just as much as a one-sided defence of certain social pressure groups. What is controversial in science or society must be treated controversially in political education as well. "Disclosure of premisses of value and a maxim for the selection and evaluation of educational contents" (Claussen, 1984, 203F) remain a common teaching objective. Despite great similarities with regard to the objectives, controversial positions are retained. Still unanswered is the question whether political education sees as its ideal the "law-abiding citizen", who uses the "follow-the rule democracy to his advantage, or whether, on the contrary, "emancipation" is regarded as the central task of political education (Günter, 1986, 12). While Günter calls for more willingness for dissent in political education, the professionals rather concentrate on mutual

central problems of this subject, in particular against the background of the specific situation of political education in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Much notice is taken at the moment of a controversy in the didactical literature about the question of whether political didactics today keeps at a distance from practice (Janssen, 1988), or whether, on the other hand, some didactical experts and some teachers with them, are setting extremely high objectives which in everyday life prove to be illusionary and thus unrealistic (Grammes, 1988). Grammes in particular has criticized the "technocratic structure of thinking in both conservative and progressive teachers", which in his opinion is neither educational nor political. He rather thinks that political education should be based on a conception of learning in the sense of "making it possible". According to him many didactical experts give a wrong picture of society already in their teaching, thus encouraging pupils to form an unrealistic idea of policy making. Janssen (1968), on the other hand, pleads for political didactics oriented to practice which can serve as a guideline for everyday teaching. He criticizes in this connection that political didactics has omitted to make practice the object of its reflections.

Whatever one's personal theoretical position in this question may be, it is to be emphasized that, despite the intensive didactical discussions in the 70s, theoretical discussions in political education are still very topical.

#### **12.5.2 .i. Objectives of European political education**

In 1978 the Ministers of Culture, Education and Church Affairs of the states of the Federal Republic of Germany agreed that the subject "Europe" should be taught more intensively in the schools. In this connection the task of the school is "to make the pupils aware of the process of rapprochement among the European nations and states, and of the reorganization of their relations by way of setting up a community..." (Resolution made at the Conference of the Ministers of Culture, Education and Church Affairs on 8 June 1987).

This leading teaching objective is to enable young people to recognize their own position and that of their nations in Europe, and to fulfil their tasks as citizens of the European Community. In this connection teachers and pupils are not only to acquire knowledge - so the resolution continues - "but they should also gain personal practical experience, if possible. Special

activities, such as teacher and pupils exchange, visits to the European institutions, participations in European competitions within the framework of the European Schooldays, are to be meaningful additions to the classes, thus helping pupils to form well-founded opinions". Questions concerning the European integration are to be treated in more than just one subject; all sociological disciplines as well as the languages are particularly suited for these questions.

In this connection teachers are confronted with a number of difficulties. Although there is no doubt about the objective significance of the European integration for the political, economic and social life of the citizens in the Federal Republic, people hardly ever feel directly concerned or, at least, the pupils are not aware of where they are affected. Negative impulses, such as anger at the agricultural prices or at the waste of agricultural goods, lack of understanding for stubborn national positions in negotiations, poverty in the marginal regions of the Community, financial burdens for the Federal Republic due to high payments are the first to be noticed. Knowledge about the high interdependence of the political, economic and social living conditions due to the facts created by the European integration, is rare. Apart from this the European integration is an often confusing and not easily understandable maze of facts, problems and questions. Therefore a didactical reduction is indispensable.

For this reason the following central guidelines should be considered when treating this subject in the classroom:

- "the motives of integration;
- the aims of the treaties;
- decision-making processes and competencies of the bodies;
- democratic involvement of the citizens;
- perspectives for the future" (Bundeszentrale, 1986, 39).

The objective of any instruction with regard to the European integration is to make available to the pupils instruments and criteria for analysis and opinion-making.

### **12.5.3 Guidelines**

The efforts at unification in Europe are reflected in the state guidelines (in the Federal State of Lower Saxony) in many ways. Particularly in social studies on the secondary school level ("Sekundarstufe I", classes 7 to 10) and in the upper classes of the grammar school (classes 11 to 13) the

subject "Europe" is a compulsory part of the curriculum. It is only in the first classes of the grammar school that teachers are not obliged to treat Europe in their classes. Under the heading of "Efforts at unification - people are meeting" as well as "Europe joins together" and "The West-European integration" 5 to 8 lessons are laid down for this subject in the whole secondary school ("Sekundarstufe I" and "Sekundarstufe II"). This may seem to be little at first sight. Considering, however, that Europe is also treated in geography, in those subjects imparting technical skills (in Germany: "Arbeitslehre") and in the foreign languages (in Germany: English and French) considerable knowledge is imparted to the pupils. The objective here is for the pupils to become aware of the fact that the European states are politically and economically interdependent, have common historical lines of development and that a reunification of Germany will only be possible within the framework of a European solution. It is not clear, however, to what extent teachers will be able to reach these objectives together with their pupils. Here, too, further investigations will be necessary.

#### **12.5.4 .i. Textbooks**

The subject of Europe has more and more found its way into the corresponding textbooks as well. Here, a large variety of working material is made available. And yet it is obvious that national questions, the international relations to the West and East clearly have priority over European questions. This deficit as well would have to be balanced more and more. A further shortcoming is the fact that, due to the long time of production, textbooks as a rule cannot reflect the current state of the process of integration. Therefore it will be necessary for teachers to inform themselves about the latest developments in this area by way of further education courses and current publications.

It is the Federal State of Saarland only that has formulated affective motives besides the usual cognitive learning objectives. Thus the pupils are to be provided with "the readiness to commit themselves to overcoming national prejudices and securing peace by way of integration". They are to understand that they are themselves affected by the process of integration.

## 12.6 Europe in research

At the universities of the Federal Republic of Germany the political system of Europe and the European integration are rarely an object of scientific investigation. Hardly any of the numerous professorial Chairs/institutes of political science is known to focus on "Europe" as a subject. It is the non-university institutions rather (such as foundations, institutes of adult education) that engage in these neglected but necessary reflections. In this area, too, there is a demand to catch up.

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### 13 *Political socialization in Europe*

#### 13.1 Introduction

In this final chapter are highlighted several striking similarities and differences in results of political socialization research in divergent countries which have been presented in this book. In addition several especially significant details selected from that research will be accorded a more focussed treatment in an attempt to flesh out the theoretical framework set out in the first chapter.

The goal of this chapter is therefore also to make contribution to future international comparative political socialization studies. To this end, fascinating phenomena crying out for explanation are brought to the fore, and socially and scientifically relevant questions are formulated.

The information in this chapter is primarily based on information provided by the authors of the preceeding chapters. Their names are not reiterated in the text which follows, although the country from which they come is always mentioned. The reader then knows that the information comes from the author of the chapter about the country in question (unless specifically indicated otherwise). The successive topics considered are: effects of

political socialization, explanations of differences in these effects, the role of intentional political socialization (political education) and developments in political socialization research.

### **13.2 .u. Political knowledge, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviour**

#### **13.2.1 .u. Effects of political socialization**

The effects of political socialization can be subsumed under a number of different categories.

One basic distinction is that between cognitions, attitudes and behaviour.

Fishbeine and Ajzen (1975) are largely responsible for the insertion of the category "behavioral intentions" between that of attitudes and behaviour.

An analysis of the cognitive domain led to the introduction of the category "opinions", which is placed between cognitions and attitudes.

How can cognitions be categorized further. One distinction made is that between knowledge and insight. Another distinction is made between a "pure", "objective" or "specialized" form of knowledge on the one hand, and "social knowledge", "common-sense understanding", "social representation" and "subjective image" on the other hand (Hewstone, 1986, 54). Finally, a distinction can be made on the basis of the area of politics involved: local, regional, national, uropean and other international politics.

A question of vital significance is which aspect is the most important for a (democratic) political system: that people have a great deal of knowledge about such a system; or that they have a large number of opinions at their disposal; or that they are in possession of adequate attitudes; or that they have desireable behavioral intentions; or in the final analysis, is behavior the only thing which is important?

#### **13.2.2 .u. National political socialization effects**

The conclusion reached in most of the contributions in this book is that young people have extremely limited knowledge of politics in their own country - or in other words, their national political literacy is low. This is true of young people in countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Western Europe. Political ignorance is widespread. The word "politics" seems to have totally different meanings for youngsters in Eastern and

Central and Western Europe. In Hungary, "politics" is defined as something which is international and which is very far removed from their own experiences. "Real" politics is identified with (superficial) knowledge of foreign policy. In Western Europe - the Netherlands for example - politics seems to be identified primarily with decision-making structures and processes rather than with the content of policies.

The following observations have been cited concerning the political opinions of young people in Europe in the 1980's. The young people of Eastern and Central Europe have the following strongly-felt opinions: rejection of formal political institutions (Hungary), acceptance of the nationalization of the big industry (Poland), acceptance of the protective role of the state (Poland), acceptance of the international alliances (Poland), rejection of the leading role of the party (Poland), and the belief that demands for economic improvement have priority (Poland). In Western Europe: many youngsters believe that differences in income should be reduced (Netherlands) and have not yet made a choice of political party (Netherlands).

The following has been observed with respect to political attitudes. Most young people in Eastern, Central and Western Europe (for example, in Hungary, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) report having little or no interest in politics. Other attitudes which have been encountered in a large number of young people in several Western European countries are: low political efficacy, political alienation, political disillusionment, political distrust, and political cynicism. In Eastern and Central European countries, some attitudes of a large number of young people are: very critical about the political and economic system (Poland), very critical about the political regime (Poland), distrustful or rather cynical of the authorities (Poland), low political efficacy (Poland), very pessimistic about their future and about the future of their own country (Poland), are wanting the world to develop into some form of socialism (Poland), reject the ideas of using force as a way of changing the political situation (Poland), and in an increasing number an inclination to anarchism (Hungary).

A very interesting question is what the feelings of young people are toward politics. In Yugoslavia (Siber, in this book), these feelings have been classified into three groups. The first group consists of positive feelings: rapture, enthusiasm, interest. The second group are feelings that are negatively associated with politics: mistrust, anger, discomfort. The third group are feelings indicative of a certain indifference, a distancing from

politics. Almost the half of the eighteen to twenty-one year-olds in Yugoslavia in 1986 fits in the third group. With increasing age this distance from politics is diminished.

In the United Kingdom an interesting question has been posed concerning the degree of consistency in attitudes. Research has shown that political attitudes are ideologically inconsistent and bear no clear relationship to party preference.

The following observations have been made with respect to the political activities of young people. In the first place, very little information about politics is read in newspapers (United Kingdom, the Netherlands). In the second place, a very low proportion of young people watch television programs offering political information (Hungary, the Netherlands). In the third place, politics is not a regular topic of conversation (United Kingdom, the Netherlands). In the fourth place, there is a low level of participation in formal politics (Yugoslavia, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands). In short, passivity (Hungary) is the main "activity".

Based in part at least on the research studies presented in this book, the following list can be compiled of the effects of national political socialization. These may be suitable for use in future research as dependent variables.

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**Diagram 1:** Some dependent variables in local, regional and national political socialization research

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*Knowledge of and insight into:*

the term "politics"

terms that are in daily use in political communication and/or fundamental concepts from political science. For example, power, influence, interest, policy, decision making, system, democracy, participation

electoral procedures on national, regional and local level

electoral candidates

decision making structures and processes on national, regional and local level

budget (incomes, expenses)

aims and instruments of particular policies

differences and/or similarities between different political systems

*Opinions about:*

role of the state

political system on national, regional and local level

relative relevance of issues

particular policies

political parties

electoral candidates

*Attitudes*

feelings concerning politics

political interest

political efficacy

political alienation

political (dis)trust

political cynicism

political confidence

belief in equal political rights for women

belief in freedom of expression

*Behavioral intentions:*

willingness to acquire information about politics

willingness to vote

willingness to election campaign activities

willingness to participate in other conventional political activities

willingness to participate in non-conventional political activities

willingness to be a member of a political body (for example, city council)

*Behavior*

acquiring political information

reading political section in newspaper, weekly magazines, political books

watching political television programmes

talking about politics

electoral participation:

- voting in elections
- casting a preferential vote

conventional political participation:

- election campaign activities
- writing a letter to a political party or politician
- membership of a political party
- participation in a public meeting
- and so forth

protest political participation:

- taking part in demonstrations
- taking part in boycotts
- blocking traffic
- and so forth

professional political participation:

- member of local parliament
- member of regional parliament
- member of national parliament
- and so forth

### 13.2.3 .u. International political socialization effects

Nothing is said in the contributions to this book about knowledge, opinions and attitudes relating to international politics (naturally enough - the editors did not ask the authors to do so).

The topic of international political socialization has been introduced, however, in the two contributions which consider political socialization with respect to the European Community.

This European political socialization is only one of the elements of international political socialization. Other elements of this latter political socialization are those relating to separate countries (for example, what do Dutchmen know and think about the political structures and the political culture of the Federal Republic of Germany), to groups of countries (for example, what do Poles know and think about the Western European countries, how have they acquired this knowledge and these opinions and attitudes), and to international political institutions (for example, what do Spaniards, Hungarians and so forth know and think about the EFTA and the European Community).

Very little research has been carried out in Europe into international political socialization. This is also true with respect to research into European political socialization.

The Eurobarometer studies, which have been carried out twice a year since 1973 and which have been commissioned by the European Community, have provided valuable information. A special emphasis was placed on young respondents in two of these studies ("The Young Europeans", Commission of the European Community, 1982, 1987).

In addition to these comparative European Community studies, some research has been done in separate European countries - in the Netherlands (Meulema, in this book) and the Federal Republic of Germany (Noelle-Neumann and Herdegen, 1985, a.i.), for example.

In the Netherlands it was found that young people (16-18 year-olds in upper high school grades in the north of the country) seem to have virtually no knowledge of politics in the EC and no feeling of political efficacy with respect to the EC. Almost a third of the (non-representative) group of 16-18 year-olds, questioned in 1987, has a feeling of Europeanism. One third is willing to vote for the European Parliament. The youngest group of eligible voters makes the least use of their right to vote in European Parliament



elections. Although youngsters have a general lack of knowledge about the EC, it is still possible for them to have a clear subjective image of it. Hewstone (1986) has confirmed that such a subjective image does exist in students in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The main element in this image is the common agricultural policy, often described in terms such as butter mountains and wine and milk lakes.

The following dependent variables can be recommended for use in future research into socialization relating to the politics of the European Community.

---

**Diagram 2:** Some dependent variables in political socialization research with respect to the European Community

---

*Knowledge of and insight into:*

decision making structures and processes of the EC  
 electoral procedures of the EC  
 electoral candidates  
 aims and instruments of particular policies of the EC  
 budget (incomes, expenses) of the EC

*Opinions about:*

the political system of the EC  
 aims and instruments of particular policies of the EC  
 political "parties" in the European Parliament  
 electoral candidates

*Attitudes*

interest in politics in the EC  
 interest in policies of the EC  
 attitude towards cooperation and integration of Europe an states  
 national identity; nationalism; patriotism  
 national stereotypes, prejudices  
 Europeanism  
 political efficacy with respect to the EC  
 political alienation with respect to the EC  
 political (dis)trust with respect to the EC  
 political cynicism with respect to the EC  
 political confidence wih respect to the EC

*Behavioral intentions*

willingness to acquire information about politics in the EC  
 willingness to vote for the European Parliament  
 willingness to participate in EP election campaign activities  
 willingness to participate in other political activities with respect to the EC

*Behavior:*

acquiring information about politics and policies in the EC

talking about politics in the EC

electoral political participation

- voting for the European Parliament

- casting a preferential vote

conventional EC political participation

non-conventional EC political participation

professional EC political participation

#### **13.2.4 .u.Relationships**

Relationships between political knowledge and insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviour have been the object of quite a number of research studies. Divergent research findings make it difficult to arrive at broadly valid statements. Political participation is often taken as a point of departure because researchers think that it is probably the most important category. With respect to this participation we know that certain attitudes exert a great deal of influence on the degree of political participation, for example political interest, political efficacy, strong identification with a particular political party. Other relationships which are or could be an object of study are those between knowledge, opinions, attitudes and behavior with respect to politics in the respondents' own country and the knowledge and so forth with respect to politics in the EC.

In the Netherlands (Meulema, in this book), youngsters who are interested in EC politics are also interested in politics in the Netherlands. Youngsters who are willing to vote for the Second Chamber of Parliament are also willing to vote for the European Parliament. Youngsters who have a feeling of Europeanism also have a feeling of nationalism. The latter was also found to be true in the Federal Republic of Germany (see Meyenberg, in this book). Those who were proud of being German, at the same time tended to state with more self-confidence that they were "Europeans".

#### **13.2.5 .u.Political competence**

In some studies, overall terms are used to indicate the whole of political knowledge and insights, having political opinions, having particular political attitudes, having political behavioral intentions and political behavior. Examples are "political man", "political personality", "political identity of the individual", "political culture of the individual", "political conscious-

ness", "political awareness", "political competence", "political involvement of the individual", and the "political self".

When all the subscales are considered to be equally important, however, such an overall scale can only be constructed if the separate sub-scales show a normal distribution. It is also possible, of course, to assign a different weight to the separate sub-scales (considering participation to be more important than having opinions, for example).

The next step taken in some studies is the distinguishing of different political identities, personalities, selfs and so forth, on the basis of the overall scale. For example, Almond and Powell (1988) identify "parochials", "subjects", and "participants". With respect to the European political involvement, Weidenfelt and Piepenschneider (1987) distinguish four basic "Grunddispositionen"; the European, the Community citizen, the unsatisfied Community citizen, and the national-state-oriented individual.

A last step taken in some studies is the distinguishing of certain stages in the development of political competence (for example, Connell, 1971).

### **13.3 .u.Explanatory system variables**

#### **13.3.1 Introduction**

Differences in political socialization effects between individuals and between categories or groups of individuals demand an explanation.

Four categories of independent variables can be distinguished: (political and economic) system variables, social variables, individual variables and political socialization structures variables.

#### **13.3.2 .u.Political system**

In this book several authors stress the point that to obtain an understanding of the problems of political socialization in a country, its character, aims and protagonists, knowledge is required of the specific historical conditions in the development of that country which helped to shape the substance of its politics and thereby also to shape political socialization.

In Yugoslavia in a timespan shorter than the lifespan of a generation, political socialization passed through the stages of introduction of new values (inception of the common state), transformation of earlier value systems (political re-socialization) and integration into the prevailing value system

(political reproduction). Some fundamental principles remained the same, however, despite changes in the political system.

In Poland the Solidarity movement is a decisive factor. Having taken an active part in this movement or not is a criterium for distinguishing two subgroups in the late eighties. The younger workers, 15-23 years, who did not take an active part in the Solidarity-movement because of their age, tended, compared to the older workers who did take an active part on the Solidarity-movement, to be more radical, to be less ready to compromise and to question the authority of the "old" Solidarity leaders.

Changes in the political system may be the most influential variable when changes in the political opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviour of the population take place.

### **13.3.3 .u.Economic system**

Szabó expresses the opinion in this book that the present social-economic crisis in Hungary influences the political socialization in a significant way. The crisis will decrease the efficiency of institutional socialization mechanisms among young people, increase deviant processes together with the rejection of politics, and will increase different forms of new collective activity. Fratzak-Rudnicka expresses the opinion in this book that in Poland the objective economic situation is the most decisive factor explaining the state of the political consciousness of Polish youth. The political system is blamed for the deep economic crisis (enormous foreign debt, high inflation, many of the basic needs cannot be fulfilled). In Western European countries, relationships are assumed and more or less empirically proven between economic prosperity and increased post-materialistic values (Inglehart, 1977) and between economic crisis and political apathy and an increase in extreme right-wing opinions and attitudes.

## **13.4 .u.Explanatory social variables**

### **13.4.1 .u.Social-economic position**

The social-economic position of the individual being socialized is seen as one of the most important variables in texts dealing with political socialization. In general, the higher the social-economic position, the greater the political knowledge, the more highly-developed the political interest, and the more extensive the political participation.

Explanations presented in some studies are the following. Individuals with a higher social economic position have in general enjoyed more and a higher level of education (with the effects to be mentioned below), receive more political information (because of their reading habits, travel experiences, friendship patterns and leisure activities), are more accustomed to take part in decision-making processes (as a result of their social activities) which helps them to acquire politically relevant knowledge and skills, acquire more politically relevant attitudes (for example, self-confidence) and finally feel that they have more to lose because of this higher social economic position.

#### **13.4.2 .u.Living in urbanised areas**

Some studies show a correlation between political attitudes and behaviour and the level of urbanisation of the environment of the respondents.

In Poland, in 1985, youngsters from rural families were the least politicized and the most supportive of political authority. Youngsters from urban, white-collar families were the most politicized and the least supportive of political authority. Working class youngsters are more similar to white-collar, than to rural youngsters. In Sweden, research was carried out to discover the influence of local and regional "sub-political environments", or in particular, to analyze the demographic and economic features of these environments. It was found that in both expanding and declining communities the willingness to enter into political discussions is greater than in a stable or static municipalities.

With respect to politics in the EC it was found in the Netherlands that young respondents from the countryside have a significantly greater feeling of Europeanism and are more willing to vote for the European Parliament.

#### **13.4.3 .u.Having contacts abroad**

Having contacts abroad is an important variable in international political socialization research.

In the Netherlands it was found that young respondents who have had more contacts abroad have more knowledge about politics in the EC and are more willing to vote for the European Parliament.

Travelling abroad is expected to be effective in diminishing stereotypes and prejudices with respect to foreign countries and the people living in these

countries and in diminishing strong nationalism. Research has showed, however, that this is not always or not even usually the case. Making observations and having contacts with people of another country, is not in itself enough to change existing stereotypes and prejudices (Schäfer, Six, 1978).

### **13.5 .u.Explanatory individual variables**

#### **13.5.1 Individual variables**

Considerable differences in political knowledge, attitudes and behavior have been found between adults and young people, between girls and boys, and between young people with little education and those with a more extensive education; these differences have been found in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in Western Europe. Other individual variables which have been included in only a few research studies are: the state of physical and mental health, the level of cognitive, moral and affective development, intelligence and positive or negative fear of failure.

#### **13.5.2 .u.Age**

In comparison to adults, young people have less political knowledge (the Netherlands, Sweden), support a political party less often (the Netherlands), believe more often that incomes should be leveled (the Netherlands), are less concerned about crime (the Netherlands), less aware of legal rights (Sweden), and less politically interested (Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Sweden), have a greater feeling of political efficacy (the Netherlands). A comparatively large number of young people support right-wing parties (United Kingdom). Young people vote less often (the Netherlands), read the political sections of newspapers less often (Yugoslavia), are less likely to be a member of a political party (the Netherlands) or of a trade union (the Netherlands), participate the least in electoral and conventional political activities (Yugoslavia), but take part more often in political activities relating to protest (the Netherlands).

With respect to the European Community it was found that the younger the respondents the less knowledge (the Netherlands), the less interest (the Netherlands), the less proud to be European (Federal Republic of Germany), and the less willing to vote for the European Parliament (the Netherlands).

Explanations which are named for why young people consistently report having less knowledge and being less interested in politics than their elders are the following. Young people have a more limited ability to acquire and process political information, have not come into contact personally with politics and problems which they consider to be political problems, and their attention is directed almost entirely to "existential" problems.

When a significant difference in attitude by age is apparent, the question can be asked whether this is a life-cycle effect or the beginning of an historical effect, which could be a generation or a period effect.

### **13.5.3 .u. Gender**

Differences have also been observed between boys and girls (men and women) with respect to political knowledge and so forth in various different European countries.

Girls' opinions on issues are more to the left than those of boys, not just concerning matters of health and welfare but also concerning economic issues (United Kingdom). The support for the Conservative Party and support for left-wing parties is lower among boys (United Kingdom). More boys than girls report being interested in politics (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden). Girls have less racial prejudices than boys (Netherlands: Hagendoorn et al., 1983; Raaymakers et al., 1986). More boys than girls say that they would like to have the right to vote (Netherlands). More boys than girls say that they would vote if made eligible (Netherlands). Girls are less likely to discuss politics than boys (United Kingdom). In many Western European countries (without a compulsory voting system), the voting percentage for men has been higher than the percentage for women. These differences have decreased in recent years. In Finland in the parliamentary election of 1987, women's voting activity for the first time surpassed the voting activity of men. This was mainly a result of the higher turnout among women in the younger age groups.

Boys and girls differ even more in knowledge and so forth with respect to politics in the European Community. In the Netherlands, boys have significantly more knowledge, more interest, a more highly developed feeling of Europeanism and more willingness to vote than girls. These differences between boys and girls with respect to the EC seem to be even greater than those with respect to domestic politics.

Explanations, expressed in some publications, for why girls are less politically knowledgeable and interested are the following. Sex role socialization results in a situation in which girls (women) see politics as a male domain because it involves processes which unfold outside the house. This feeling is strengthened by the weak political identity of a large number of mothers. Girls have also been shown to be more interested in personal issues than impersonal ones. Girls are likewise less attracted to the conflict-laden atmosphere and hefty discussions which are typical of politics. Other publications point to intervening variables such as educational level (girls are less likely to compete higher levels of education) and whether or not older girls and women work outside the home. The question still remains, however: why are the differences between boys and girls greater with respect to European Community politics than with respect to politics in their own country?

#### **13.5.4 .u. Level of education**

It has been shown in various investigations that there is a strong correlation between the level of education and political competence. The higher the level of education, the more extensive the political competence.

In Poland (in 1987), it is pupils, students and young people with higher education who are most critical about the political system and regime. In this group the support for the political opposition, Solidarity, is most pronounced. Young farmers are the most supportive of the communist government, while at the same time expressing the least interest in political questions. Young workers are somewhere in between. In western European countries it was found that the higher the education the higher the knowledge, interest and the more political participation (the Netherlands). Young people attending school are, in comparison to young people who are working, more interested in politics (the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden), more aware of their legal rights (Sweden).

With respect to European political socialization, there is a difference between students and working (and unemployed) youth. Students are more interested in the problems of the EC. "...it is the best educated young people, with the level of knowledge required to understand European problems, who are best suited to being interested in them" (Commission, 1982, 123).



Explanations given in some studies, are the following. The more education the more stimuli for broadening a respondent's outlook, for interesting him/her in politics and for convincing him/her that politics is an important matter. The level of education achieved by a respondent's parents is an important factor determining in part whether or not a respondent completes a higher level of education (as intervening variable). Young people who stay in school beyond compulsory age come relatively often from families with higher education and thus with higher political "involvement".

### **13.5.5 Attitudes**

Another important variable relating to the individual is the totality of attitudes (acquired through socialization) which are themselves non-political, but which have political relevance. For example, self-concept (Neubauer, 1981), self-confidence, religious, attitude towards those in authority (parents, teachers, clergymen), post-materialism (Inglehart, 1977), motivation for learning and achieving, and fear of failure. Social ambition is an individual variable which has been researched only sporadically. In Sweden it was found that the higher the level of social ambition (= "social goals in terms of social mobility") the greater the degree of political knowledge, interest, belief in political efficacy, and willingness to join a political movement in the future. A crucial question is then: why do some youngsters have a more positive self concept than others, why are some youngsters socially more ambitious than others, and so forth and what are the explanatory variables here?

## **13.6 Explanatory political socialization variables**

### **13.6.1 Introduction**

In the research in Eastern, Central and Western Europe presented in this book, the influence on political competence of the following agencies have been investigated:

- Family: Poland, Hungary, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Spain
- School: Poland, Hungary, Finland, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain
- Church: Poland
- Mass media: Hungary, Yugoslavia, Sweden
- Peer groups, friends: Hungary, Finland, Sweden

- Political processes: Yugoslavia, Sweden

Some interesting research findings to be found in this book are the following.

### **13.6.2 .u.Family**

The influence of the family on political socialization of children and youngsters has been studied frequently in many countries. The family is the first socialization structure that an individual encounters. In former years the influence exerted on political socialization by the family was thought to be extremely significant. In recent years the family's influence has become subject to discussion.

In Poland a high degree of similarity has been observed between the political attitudes of the younger and the older generation. On the level of individual families, however, when children are compared to parents one by one, the similarities were much less pronounced. There is a distinction between families with different social positions (education, profession, income). Parents from the intelligentsia, white-collar strata, seem to be most effective in the transmission of parental values and attitudes to the children. In Hungary (Szabo, in this book), consistently similar research findings show that (political) communication is decreasing within families. At the same time a "privatist-economic, anti-political value system which instills young people with a defensive attitude towards politics" has become dominant. The political socialization in the family is a major source of the "anti-politics attitude" of youth and of their political passivity. In Sweden, research provided no evidence of parental influence on the children's political values (basic democratic values and attitudes toward some concrete societal problems). In the United Kingdom it was found that the family plays an important role in transmitting loyalties to party, a sense of class identity and attitudes towards trade unions, but not in transmitting attitudes on wider social and political issues. In general the expectation is that the significance of the family's socialization role in general is decreasing because of the growing employment of mothers outside the home.

It is noteworthy that families are not equally effective in the transmission of parental opinions and attitudes. Instead of asking whether a family does or does not exert influence on children, it would be more fruitful to ask which families with which characteristics want to exert more or less influence on which opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and/or beha-

viour, and whether or not they succeed in doing so. Research in this area will have to look beyond effects such as political party preference to effects having to do with other opinions, knowledge, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviour.

### **13.6.3 .u.Church**

The church as socialization agency has a special position in Poland. Research showed that the church is the only institution trusted by a majority of young Poles in 1985. A majority of them believed that the church defended the interests of workers against the state. At the same time a majority said that the church should not interfere in political matters. The church seems to be more a moral authority than a political one by transmitting values such as human dignity, justice and so forth. Thus influence on political socialization is exerted in an indirect way. In Hungary, however, the church does not play an important role in political socialization (in 1988) since it supports the existing social-political system.

### **13.6.4 .u.School**

Comparing the role of schools in political socialization processes in different countries the following observations can be made. In some countries schools are controlled by the state, in other countries not. Control by the state takes on the form of control of programs and textbooks, for example. Whether schools are controlled by the state or not, teachers are relatively free; the state is not able to control all teachers' behaviour in the classroom.

In Poland, teachers were on average a little more critical towards the political system than the rest of the society. Almost all teachers (in a survey of 2.5 thousand teachers in 1986) declared that teachers should not try to influence the pupils' political opinions. Schoolbooks are not so much aimed at shaping positive attitudes towards the political authority, but rather at the promotion of a society which is harmonious and consensual and at the same time atomized. In Hungary, the school's role in political socialization is mainly an indirect one in transmitting authoritarian anti-political and conformistic attitudes to students. Direct political socialization (political education) is missing; it has been handed over by schools to youth organizations. In Yugoslavia, history and geography textbooks for secondary schools contain many ideological or political features.

In some countries there is interest in studying the role of language (training) in political socialization. In the contribution about political socialization in Yugoslavia in this book, an interesting example is given. According to Siber the mother tongue was (and is) taught making use of content with strikingly political overtones.

### **13.6.5 .u.Mass media**

The fourth socialization agency is the mass media.

In Sweden (Johansson, in this book), a distinction was made in a research study between young people with high/low, direct/indirect exposure to mass media. The effects of these different forms of exposure were studied with respect to political knowledge and democratic values. The conclusion was that young people with both strong direct and indirect exposure tend to have more democratic attitudes than young people with both weak direct and indirect exposure to mass media. In Hungary, in the 1980s "alternative publicity" is an important factor in the political socialization of youth. In this unofficial publicity, themes receive attention which have been neglected in the official political information and education. The main consumers are young intellectuals who are the intellectual elite of the future. In the Netherlands the role of pop music has been studied. Two socializers are especially interesting: experiences in pop concerts which are sponsoring political aims (for example, "Rock against Racism", "Live Aid") and political content of pop songs.

### **13.6.6 .u.Peer groups, friends**

The next socialization agent is peer groups (friends); childhood play groups, friendship cliques, small groups at work, and so forth.

In Hungary, the official youth organizations are not effective in carrying out political education. Only the political education of functionaries is effective. "Alternative movements" are factors in political socialization aimed at transforming the authoritarian political personality. The "folk" youth groups have an indirect political nature and promote the commitment to national and local community values. In Sweden, a study clearly shows that being a member of a hard-rock group acts as a strong influence on views in political and societal matters. Membership in such a group leads to the youngsters' originally differing views becoming more uniform. In Spain, the frequency of conversations on politics among friends was

studied. Almost one third of the 15-21 years olds reported in 1984 having had frequent political conversations with friends.

### 13.6.7 .u. Political processes

The next socialization agency which has been mentioned in the contributions in this book are experiences with political processes. The level of political interest is known to be strongly related to political temperature in the debates during the election period. In Sweden, the knowledge of actual politics is considerably higher among those who have been in contact with politicians, participated in political meetings or read campaign materials. In Yugoslavia, negative feelings with respect to politics are the most prevalent among those age-groups which are, formally speaking, the most involved in political processes. "This suggests that perhaps the very fact of involvement and direct experience, with all that politics entails, and sometimes the impotence to act, may be the sources of such responses" (Siber, in this book).

### 13.6.8 .u. Influence

In some countries research was carried out for the purpose of finding an answer to the question: who or what had the greatest influence in the processes of political socialization.

In Yugoslavia, the question was asked in a direct way to Croatian youngsters. Meulema asked the same question to Dutch youngsters with respect to politics in the Netherlands and politics in the European Community. The findings are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1:** The most influential agencies of national political socialization, according to respondents themselves.

	In: Croatia with respect to politics in Yugoslavia 15-19 year olds Siber, 1977		In: the Netherlands with respect to poli- tics in the Nether- lands 16-18 year olds Meulema, 1988
	%		%
Parents	23		26
School	29	Teacher	20
Church	1		-
Mass media	28	Television	87

		Radio	19
		Nat. paper	27
		Loc. paper	20
Books	4		-
Friends	7		3
Political organizations	2		-
Personal experiences	6		-

In the United Kingdom, Denver and Hands (see their chapter in this book) attempted to assess the relative importance of socialization influences upon knowledge, party choice and participation of 16+ years olds using regression analysis as the basis of the comparison. The involved agencies are parents, political education, media, friends. Other variables involved are social-economic position of parents, gender and type of school attended. The findings are the following.

**Diagram 3:** The most powerful explanatory socialization agencies with respect to political knowledge, party choice, and participation in the United Kingdom

Agency bias	Political Sex education;	Index of media exposure;	Reported interest of parents; in pol.	.U. Friend's partisan-ship	Family of .U. news-paper read	Party
Effect						
- Knowledge	+++	++				+
- Party choice				++	+++	+
- Behaviour	+	+++	++			

Source: Denver, Hands, in this book, 237

An interesting question is how (in)coherent are political socialization processes? In the contribution in this book about political socialization in Poland, Barbara Fratzak-Rudnicka makes the distinction between "internal" and "external" (in)coherency. Internal (in)coherency consists of the similarites or contradictions stemming from the different socialization influences. External (in)coherence is caused by phenomenon beyond the socialization process itself. In Poland, political socialization processes are characterized by a general incoherency, both internal and external. The internal incoherence stems from the repeated reconstructions of the political educational system and a lack of coordination between the state-

controlled agencies of political education (schools, youth organizations, mass media and the army). The external incoherence is caused by "old" ideological influences (originating in the political culture of the previous political systems), persistent, deeply- rooted stereotypes, alternative, informal socialization in the families, the church, foreign radio broadcasting and so forth and by the contradictions between the propagated norms and values and "the real life". In Hungary, political socialization is rather contradictory as well. "Youth is building an existence among inconsistent, contradictory effects which neutralize one another and which are unable to promote their growth toward becoming adults with critical and participating capabilities" (Szábó, in this book). In Yugoslavia the great gap between the ideological projection of social development and the actual possibilities also hinders a consistent political socialization.

### 13.7 .II. Multivariate analysis

This concludes our consideration of the system, social, individual and political socialization structures variables.

An important factor, along with the significance of variables, is the relative weight of those variables. Which variable exerts the most influence on political knowledge, insights, opinions, attitudes, behavioral intentions and/or behaviour?

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**Diagram 4:** Some independent variables in political socialization research

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- System variables:	Political system Economic system
- Social variables:	Social-economic position of parents Social-economic position of respondent Level of urbanization of environment Whether or not the respondent has a paying job Whether or not the respondent has children Whether or not the respondent has contacts abroad Level of being organised Nationality
- Individual variables:	Age; life phase; life crisis Gender Health Intelligence; intellectual ability Level of education Cognitive development

Moral development  
 Attitudes: self confidence  
 religious  
 social ambition  
 and so forth

- Political socialization variables: Socialization agencies  
 Socialization processes

A bivariate analysis is not an effective means for discovering the relative significance of the independent (system, social, individual and socialization variables). What is needed is a multivariate analysis.

An example of such an analysis has recently been given by Leijenaar (1989). She was interested in finding an explanation of gender-related differences in conventional political participation. The following independent variables were included in her study: gender, age, level of education, social economic status, having children wether or not, having a paying job wether or not, political interest, opinions about emancipation of women. The analysis showed that characteristics such as being a parent or not, and the views held with regard to the emancipation of women, lead to one effect in the case of women and quite another in the case of men. Moreover, the effect on participation of the attitude toward emancipation is greater in the case of women since it has an indirect effect by way of political interest. For women the indirect effects of being a mother on the level of participation are numerous and complex. For men, being a father has an impact on just one factor, the involvement in the labour process. Most important variable for both women and men for explanation of the variance in conventional political participation are education and political interest. It should be noted, by the way, that the explanatory power of the model used in this study is quite limited. Only 13.3% (for the men) and 10.1% (for the women) of the variance in political participation is explained. "This means that the prevailing theories being tested in this model regarding conventional political participation fail to take into consideration a number of apparently essential aspects... which points to the necessity for empirical studies of political participation in which other variables than these above are included" (Leijenaar, 1989, 86/87).



### **13.8 .u. Political education**

#### **13.8.1 Introduction**

Political education is often advocated in the concluding sections of political socialization research reports. The reason is concern about the outcomes of the unintentional political socialization which have been observed until now. All too prevalent among respondents appear to be: lack of even the most elementary political knowledge, superficial political interest at best, a move to extreme right or left-wing opinions and attitudes, an unsatisfactory degree of willingness to participate in political activities and a disappointing voting record. Great differences have also been perceived in political competence between youngsters and adults, between boys/men and girls/women, between highly and less highly-educated people, between people with different social economic positions, between ethnic majorities and minorities. These disparities result in different levels of political participation, which can in turn lead to different in- and outputs of the political system and can even form a threat to democracy. The reader's attention is called to the fact that only the school is in a position to ensure that everyone acquires a minimum amount of knowledge about politics.

In this book, political education is advocated in the contributions about political socialization in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, and Hungary. In the United Kingdom political education is recommended by Billig and Cochrane (1987, 51; cited by Denver and Hands in this book), for example. "The policy implications are clear... The dangers to a democracy of ignoring political education are likely to outweigh the controversies which might attend its introduction".

#### **13.8.2 Goals**

An important question is: what are and should be the goals of political education?

In Hungary, the goal of political education in the late eighties is both emancipation and "conservative, manipulative tasks". Present-day research into political socialization is consciously connected to the increase of individuals' social-political autonomy, and to encouragement of a critical attitude toward existing institutions. Research seeks to contribute to the development of "critical politically participating personalities", to the formation of "a democratic personality with the capability of criticism, debate and participation" (Szabó, in this book). In Yugoslavia the function of po-

litical socialization (political education included) is seen, ultimately, as "to form the individual as a member of the body politic, to inculcate in him/her the appropriate ideological orientation, value system and patterns of behaviour which are needed for the operation of the society within the framework of a given political system" (Siber, in this book). Two schools of thought on political education can be identified. The first says that marxism should be insisted upon, since it represents a firm, inherently consistent and the only "orthodox" world outlook. The second school of thought wants a cultivation of an independent, critical stance towards society, maintaining that this standpoint conforms with the fundamental postulates of Marxism.

In Western European countries different answers are also given to the question of what the most desirable goals are. Some examples of goals are the following: "a democratic, that is a politically interested, active citizen", and "knowledge of the structure and functioning of ... national institutions in order to understand and exercise the personal and democratic rights deriving from them". Differences, primarily with respect to the ultimate goal which is desired or thought to be achievable, have been expressed in readers such as the one compiled by Fischer (1980, the FRG), Dekker and Rozemond (1983, the Netherlands) and Dekker and Rozemond (1984, the FRG). One didactician may opt for the pure acquisition of knowledge, while another may also consider that shaping attitudes is also desirable and realizable. Writers also differ in their definitions of "politics". A distinction can be made among the following definitions: "politics" is the government; "politics" is the preparation, realization, execution and evaluation of governmental policy (government and other organizations); "politics" encompasses all those situations in which actors with conflicting interests try to realize these interests by acquiring and using power and influence within the framework of a system of decision-making (with respect to government and to schools, business and so forth).

### **13.8.3 .u. Grade; age**

An other important question is what the appropriate age is for young people to be exposed to political content in school?.

With respect to this question the following observations are of interest. In Yugoslavia, it was found that it is only in the last year of secondary school that young people begin to take a real interest in general social issues.

According to Siber (in this book), this means that they are then more susceptible to certain political content. With increasing age the impact of the school diminishes and the individual is more and more politically influenced by his/her own experience (with other socialization agents). In Sweden it was found that viewpoints on issues were established earlier than party identification which was found to occur comparatively late. In the Netherlands, it was found that most 16-18 year olds, say that they received their first information about politics in the Netherlands and in the European Community when they were between 12 and 15 years old. Girls received information about politics at a later age than boys.

Of course, one question which arises is whether the age at which political education in schools should start, can or should be determined by the age at which children begin to be interested in politics and/or begin to acquire their first elementary political knowledge.

#### **13.8.4 Effects**

What are the effects of political education?, is another important question. This question has been receiving attention in Europe since the startling disclosure in the publication of Ehman (1980) about the effects of political education in the United States. Ehman concluded after inventarizing the results of a number of empirical investigations in the US that the regular secondary school civics and government curriculum has no noticeable impact on political attitudes and participation orientations of students except for students from ethnic minorities. A positive relationship was found, however, between political attitudes and an open school and classroom climate and participation in school government.

In Poland, in the 1980s the political education conducted by the political system has a low effectiveness. Only some very general and abstract regime norms are accepted by the majority of students, and the practical manifestation of the norms of the regime is clearly rejected by most young Poles. The government is not trusted and there is a widespread scepticism towards activities of the regime. According to Fratzak-Rudnicka (in this book) this low level of effectiveness of political education can be ascribed to the following three major factors: the political education itself and its quality, the existence of different, often contradictory agencies of political socialization and also, and - to a very great extent - to the objective economic situation. In Yugoslavia, political education in school ("Fundamen-

tals of Marxism") likewise does not seem to be very effective. Siber mentions the following expression: "As boring as Marxism". It is an expression of resistance against political content which has a doctrinaire rather than instructional character. In the Federal Republic of Germany, research studies indicate that political education in school is more successful at passing on knowledge than that it is at changing political attitudes or acquiring political participation skills. Research showed that an open political climate in schools exerts a positive influence on political interest of students. In the United Kingdom, a clear relationship has been found between levels of political knowledge and formal political education in politics in schools for students of 16 years or older. The impact of formal political education upon knowledge is sustained even when a range of other variables is taken into account. The gap between girls and boys is narrower among politics students than otherwise. Girls who study politics are more knowledgeable than boys who do not. A greater number of politics students know which party to support. Politics students are much more likely to be certain to vote and to discuss politics than are non-politics students. "... it seems likely that extended education in general, and formal political education in particular, help to produce young people who are better prepared for democratic citizenship. They are knowledgeable, keen to participate in politics and have opinions about issues which are clearly related to their choice of party" (Denver, Hands, in this book).

With respect to European political education in the Netherlands, it was found that youngsters who have had classes on politics in Europe have significantly a greater feeling of Europeanism, but are less willing to vote for the European parliament elections. Other relationships, for example with the level of knowledge, could not be found. A study into the effects of a European Studies Course in 1982 in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany showed in fourteen to sixteen-year-olds a relatively modest increase in knowledge, a greater tolerance for foreigners, a marked decrease in nationalistic views and an increase in pro-European attitudes (Armitage, 1988).

In most publications it is concluded or assumed that political education in schools has either a modest impact or no impact at all. The explanation cited most often for the absence or the limited nature of the impact of political education is the redundancy hypothesis. In my opinion two other hypotheses should be tested. The first one is the deficiency hypothesis. The absence or limited nature of the effectiveness of political education is due

to the absence or poor quality of the political science training of the teachers and to the quantity and quality of the information offered in textbooks. The second one is the socialization hypothesis. This hypothesis ascribes the absence or limited nature of the effectiveness of political education to the fact that the starting point of political education is usually a negative one because of the outcomes of the preceding political socialization. In addition, most teachers are not aware of this and fail to take this preceding political socialization into account in their political education classes.

The results of political socialization research can be of vital importance in increasing the effectiveness of political education. The following is an example of an insight gained from political socialization research which can be put to good use in the didactic of political education. In the Netherlands, young voters make less use of their right to vote in elections than any other group. This failure to vote is very likely to be grounded in a lack of commitment to a specific political party. In several studies a high correlation has been found between these two variables. The consequence for political education which aims to increase electoral participation could be to increase the commitment to a political party (of the student's own choosing, of course).

### **13.9 .II. Political socialization research**

#### **13.9.1 Western Europe**

In various Western European countries, political socialization research has been experiencing a second youth. The first youth was in the nineteen sixties. The reason why research flourished during that period was apparently related to the influence of successful political socialization research carried out in the United States. Research into the background of voting behaviour was a particularly powerful source of interest in political socialization.

A great deal of criticism of political socialization research began to be expressed at the beginning of the nineteen seventies. Researchers were reproached for having failed to predict the student rebellions in the late 1960's and at the start of the 1970's in any of the numerous youth studies which they carried out. Other points of criticism, which have cited in this book, were the following. Critics object in the first place to the emphasis on studying children in research. The assumption that "the child is the father of

the man" has been found to be without foundation. In the second place, it has often been incorrectly assumed or claimed that there are strong links between attitude and behavior. Third, the concept of socialization has been expanded to include all learning and all possible influences. "... the loose usage of the concept of politics is threatening to empty it of all content: anything ranging from knitting socks in women's club to jumping up and down to the rhythm of rock music seem to be seriously regarded as evidence of a new political culture" (Jääsaari, in this book). Fourth, there was no detailed account provided of the connection between the micro-level process of childhood learning and the macro-level maintenance of the system. In addition, research into political socialization was pushed into the background because political scientists began to be attracted more strongly to studies of the ever-expanding activities of the state, and to display an increased interest in political philosophies, especially Marxism. One final reason why there have been fewer publications devoted to political socialization is that elements of that research area have been and are accorded some other designation (for example, political culture research, voting behaviour studies, public opinion research, youth studies).

A number of large-scale research projects have begun to appear since the middle of the nineteen eighties which have been characterized by more modest theoretical claims and a shift in the objects of research. Shifts of focus of research were the following: from macro-level to micro-level; from children to adolescents and adults; more interest in female political socialization, political re-socialization of immigrants and political resocialization in a radically changing political system; political socialization with respect to international political entities, for example the European Community; and the introduction in research designs of "new" independent variables (self-concept, social ambition, for example).

### **13.9.2 Eastern and Central Europe**

In Eastern and Central Europe, the interest in political socialization began to grow from the late nineteen seventies to the beginning of the nineteen eighties.

In Poland, for example, the social unrest of the years 1980-1981 and the great number of young people taking part in an awakening political activity, followed by an ongoing deep economic and political crisis and its consequences in the sphere of social consciousness and behavior, all gave

rise to an impulse for political socialization research. Political socialization processes as seen by marxist theory are always class-related and not homogeneous within one society, rather they are processes of integration and desintegration of large social groups (classes) whose function is to reproduce political practice. In the beginning, the research was closely linked to political education, which was seen as a tool for a socialist transformation of the social consciousness. Later the research took place in an atmosphere of growing criticism toward the political system itself, a call for a greater pluralization and democratization of the system. Western theories and research findings were the basis for empirical research (for example, the "inheritance" of parents' political attitudes by teenage children). One of the most important questions was: how can we explain the gap between the political apathy and conformism of Polish youth of the nineteen seventies and its later revolutionary behaviour in the early eighties?

### **13.10 .II. International comparative political socialization research**

In all three parts of Europe, the interest in international comparative political socialization research seems to be growing. This is probably a result of the growing economic and political interdependence among European and other countries.

International comparative studies are very worthwhile for three reasons.

In the first place, these kinds of studies help us to understand the system operating within our own country. In gaining knowledge of other structures, cultures and processes, we become aware of the fact that our own structures and so forth are not self-evident, and alternatives come into view.

In the second place, comparative studies are needed for testing some (in)dependent variables (for example, political and economic variables and nationality).

In the third place, a comparative approach helps researchers develop explanations and test theories of political phenomena within a more general framework. When we discover similarities and differences in the course of such research, we are inspired to look for explanations and to develop more general theories. The ultimate goal is the development of an "universal" political socialization theory. This theory can be constructed using two customary types of methods. The first avenue is an inductive one, leading

to empirical generalizations. The second is a deductive one, leading to empirical propositions which lead in turn to further research whose results may result in a higher level of generalization.

International comparative political socialization research, involving countries in Eastern, Central and Western Europe seems to be extremely difficult. Not only are there great differences in political structures and processes, but there are also differences in interpretations of basic concepts (for example, "politics", "democracy").

This book is a first step in the development of plans for such international comparative research. It provides a representation of the state of the art of political socialization research in the various countries involved. The next step will be the formation of a research group which is international in its composition, and which will make use of this knowledge in the development and execution of research projects. The overview of dependent and independent variables presented in this chapter might also be of use in this research planning process. Research designs could focus upon international comparisons of political socialization within individual nation states, and upon international political socialization, with a particular emphasis upon the extremely rapidly growing cooperation and integration of the countries of Europe.

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