Michael Daxner

A SOCIETY OF INTERVENTION

An Essay on Conflicts in Afghanistan and other Military Interventions

BIS-Verlag der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg

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Content

Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (German Federal Foreign Office)
AAN	Afghanistan Analysts Network
ABCNEWS	American Broadcasting Company News
AFP	Agence France Presse
AHRRAO	Afghan Human Rights Advocacy
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ALS	Areas of Limited Statehood
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ARD	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Association of Public Broadcasting Corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany)
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ASAP	The Alliance in Support of the Afghan People
ASIK	Arbeitsstelle Interventionskultur (Working group: culture of intervention), Univ. of Oldenburg
ATA	Afghan Translation Association
AUAF	American University of Afghanistan
BA	Bachelor of Arts
BAMF	Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office of Migration and Refugees)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
C9	Research Project C9: Aid, Minds, Hearts: A Longitudinal Study of Governance Interventions in Afghanistan (Collaborative Research Center at the Free University Berlin SFB 700)
CDC	Community Development Council
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency

CIM	Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung (Centre for International Migration and Development
CIMIC	Civil-military Co-operation
COIN	Counter-insurgency
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DGAP	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (German Council on Foreign Relations)
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
DRRMA	Digital and Robotic Revolution in Military Affairs
EU	European Union
EWIS-EISA	European Workshops in International Studies in European International Studies Association
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation)
GO	Governmental Organization
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HBS	Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Heinrich Böll Foundation)
HKW	Haus der Kulturen der Welt (House of World Cultures)
IAHE	International Association of Humanitarian Education
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	International Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IT	Information Technology
KB	Kabordino-Balkarskaya, Russian Federation (Russia)
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MA	Master of Arts
MC	Middle Class(es)
MD	Michael Daxner
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MoHE	Ministry of Higher Education

LARA	Land Reform Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N.B.	Nota Bene
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUG	National Unity Government
NYRB	New York Review of Books
NYT	New York Times
NYTI	New York Times International
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PTSD	Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
R&D	Research & Development
RGI	Rahman Group Inc.
RMO	Risk Management Office
RoL	Rule of Law
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SFB 700	Sonderforschungsbereich 700 (Collaborative Research Center 700)
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SMB	Spectrum Management Bureau
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TLO	The Liaison Office, former Tribal Liaison Office
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

WoT	War on Terror
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	Second World War

1 Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to reflect on the relationship between intervention and governance. Interventions, notably military ones, play a significant role in the research on governance under the conditions of limited statehood. One of the main concerns of this research is the comparison of governance in consolidated states with well-developed statehood, such as in OECD countries, and governance in the rest of the world, where statehood is fragile, unstable, or even non-existent. More often than not, statehood cannot easily develop due to either preceding wars and violence or conditions of attempted conflict regulation by armed forces. Consolidated statehood shows a limited variance regarding the quality and sustainability of consolidation. The analysis of the many limits of and limitations to statehood is more complex and often related to the similarly complex field of governance. All this is a challenge to mainstream constructivism. Readers may wonder how little I explicitly refer to the theory and application of my research center's special approach to governance. While this essay can be partially understood as an homage to the SFB 700, its original approach to "governance" has undergone several empirical turns that have put it rather in the framework than in the core of the Center's investigations. Societies of interventions, as I am describing and analyzing them, have an evident connection to governance. It is these societies that are at the center of my considerations, not the multifold facets of governance in context.

This book is coming at the end of my active engagement in and with post-intervention Afghanistan. I have been working on topics related to the country since 2003, investigating, counseling, and trying to understand interventions. My text is both a summary of and a pause in the ever-open typical *work in progress*, where every detail and change in the objects of research provokes further ideas and corrections. Much earlier, in the late 1990s, I reframed my key interest in research and shifted my focus from international higher education policy to global conflicts, mainly political and cultural ones. Afghanistan has become my target not by chance, but because of assignments I received following my strong engagement in the UNMIK government in Kosovo[1] and my unwillingness to join the Iraq war of the United States. Fourteen years of

1 After some work for the Council of Europe in the 1990s, I was assigned to the UNMIK mission in Kosovo from 2000 through 2002, where I was mainly responsible for the Department of Education and Research.

intensive engagement with a country under intervention have produced quite a few insights, errors, and new scientific approaches.

Moving to Berlin from my old university in Oldenburg and away from international assignments[2] offered me the chance to combine several fields of practice and research; I have therefore been able to utilize my sociological and humanities-oriented approach and my political experience within the framework of an extended research cluster concentrated on *governance*. I stepped into an ongoing empirical project on Afghan perceptions of security and of an investigation of a concrete topic under aspects of governance, *and* under an *ongoing military intervention*. As a *sociologist* and therefore mainly interested in interventions, the governance context was of theoretical and pragmatic interest to me since I stepped into the project very late (in 2010), when I had already developed a concept of intervention theory and gained six years of experience working on Afghan issues. I began to systematize my observations and propositions, and in the course of writing this essay I realized that a certain underlying subtext was becoming increasingly pressing: the boundary between *policy* and *scientific research*. I am not referring to the high level of epistemological reflection and considerations regarding science policy. On the contrary, and far more humbly, I want to take a more thorough look at the inevitable relationship between the policy impact of our research and the impact of political discourse on science. *Semantics matter.*[3] This focus has been a leading feature of my work and of our research, the longitudinal study of structured order at the bottom of society. Without a critical approach to the discursive practices, and thus to the semantic conventions and attitudes of all speakers, a qualitative interpretation of the immense amount of data in our research project on Afghanistan would have been incomplete.[4] Apart from some aspects of higher education and of migration to/from Afghanistan, I myself have not engaged in *quantitative-qualitative* empirical research in Afghanistan. Rather, I have concentrated on the critical analysis of policy (mainly decisions and their effects), investigations by others (mainly at the intersections of political consultancy, research, and journalism), and my own observations and experience

2 Cf. APPENDIX on the SFB 700: Collaborative Research Center "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood" at the Free University Berlin (FUB): p. 221

3 Koehler (2012b): This rich paper displays Koehler's excellent understanding of the research of C9 until 2012, as well as a summary of the governance-zone design. His choice of words, and the choices made by his interviewees and investigated target groups are distinctly different from the "ordinary" social science jargon from a Western perspective.

4 Qualitative interpretation of the longitudinal study results: Böhnke (2017: 91-116)

from other interventions, which is also an *empirical approach,* but in a different way. This last aspect is of high importance to my own work: I have studied interventions under a number of different circumstances and regularly collected my observations and conclusions related to these circumstances, e.g. as a member of the executive in UNMIK's civil administration in Kosovo, as a researcher on site, observing the MINUGUA mission in Guatemala, and, since 2003, in my capacity as a researcher on Afghanistan, my work at the Free University Berlin being only my most recent engagement with that country, without being exclusive. HOW DO I KNOW WHAT I KNOW? This imperative question, derived from the French school of sociological self-reflection (Bourdieu and others), has been one guiding idea of my academic work for the last few decades. The answers do not always match the work in progress accurately, but they do serve as a rather sharp admonition not to trust the oversimplified constructed models that are so useful for explaining what might be plausible, but is neither proven nor tested. I am looking for both, reality and truth.

1.1 Academic social science as one starting point, intervention research as another.

Some of my direct considerations regarding the main academic research project on Afghanistan will be condensed in Appendix I. Here, I will just sketch the framework within which I have been working since 2009. The central research focus of the Collaborative Research Center's (SFB 700)[5] C9 project is the security and dynamic stability of the social order in North-East Afghanistan *within the framework of the intervention*. At some places in this text, "C 9" will simply appear as a bridge to our work within the SFB 700. The chief researcher, Jan Koehler, has carefully recounted the project's history and modifications;[6] he has been with the project since 2007 and has directed the research

5 Christoph Zürcher/Ulrich Schneckener: Transnationale Kooperationspartnerschaften und die Gewährleistung von Sicherheit in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. SFB 700, Antrag, Bd. 2, Berlin 2006, 439-480 (Project C 1); 2009: Christoph Zürcher: Aid, Mind, Hearts: A Longitudinal Study of Governance Interventions in Afghanistan. SFB 700, Application for the 2nd Phase, Berlin 2010, 441- 471 (Project C 9 under Michael Daxner as of 2010; 2013: Michael Daxner, Jan Koehler: Aid, Mind, Hearts: A Longitudinal Study of Governance Interventions in Afghanistan. SFB 700, Application for the 3rd Phase, Berlin 2013, 248-260.

6 Koehler (2008), Koehler (2012c: 21); Koehler (2011: 26); Koehler (2013); Koehler (2009: 54); Koehler (2012c: 21); Koehler et al. (2013: 11-14).

design from the early proposal stage to maturity and application in wider contexts.[7] A *longitudinal study* covering four selected districts in North-East Afghanistan is in itself a big undertaking. Based on a highly reliable questionnaire, focused interviews, and many valid observations, the changes and continuities in the mindset and perceptions of household elders (> 3,000) provide a solid knowledge base regarding reflections on the intervention, specifically as to its effects on security and development in their rural environment. The project has, over the years, received additional resources[8] and gained insights from results and extensions into broader quantitative data, in which we find intersections with evaluative research on the impact of development cooperation, both German and international, and cooperation with other research, in the methodological vicinity of projects elsewhere.[9] It goes without saying that such research requires both particular elaboration of appropriate methods and sound knowledge of underlying theories and concepts that are capable of explaining why certain foci and methods are adequate or even necessary.

It is only natural that I take our project as a starting point for my considerations, though I am well aware that there are quite a few parallel research projects around. German researchers touch on some vital themes: thematic proximity to other research, e.g. with Schetter and Mielke (Cf. Mielke, K. et al. 2011; Mielke, K./Schetter, C. 2009; Schetter, C. 2006, 2010a, 2010b),[10] who work on similar themes, but do not rely on such extensive *empirical databases*. Paramount news agencies and political analysts, such as AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), provide excellent insights and facts, and their viewpoints are often similar to ours, but a *think tank's analysis* is more *policy*-inclined than

7 The continuity and modifications of the research design are in themselves a worthy study in empirical research under uncommon circumstances; Koehler wrote most of the application for the 3rd phase, not least in order to maintain methodological continuity. The quantitative extension of the project and the duration of empirical observation added to the qualitative reliability of data and interpretation.

8 Such as: Koehler et al. (2015: 61-74).

9 This is the basis for cooperation with Prof. Magaloni-Kerpel and Alberto Diaz Cayeros (both Stanford University), who specialize in Mexico regarding questions of methodology and concerning the linkages between governance and violence. A strong link was established with a new DFG-funded project at the Berghof Foundation on "Corruption and Patronage in Afghanistan" in 2014. The Cooperation with GIZ/GOPA "Govern4Afghanistan" in the field of sub-national governance was another nodal point in the research network (2015-2016).

10 Other, earlier accounts were not aware of the SFB 700 investigation, though parts of it were already available. Typical is the otherwise helpful anthology by Chiari that was written with a narrower focus on securitization and the hidden legitimacy of the German engagement Chiari (2009). Jan Koehler has also contributed to studies of intervention as shaped by the military: Koehler (2014: 65-86).

basic research is allowed to be. AAN experts are much closer to realistic analyses and scenarios than political peers; however, their empirical strengths often surmount the analyses of government research agencies, like SWP in Germany.[11] Some foreign research organizations and think tanks serve both our research and for comparison, e.g. the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations), or the official CRS (Congressional Research Service) that augmented CSO, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations,[12] in the United States. The reorganization of the German Foreign Office (AA) via the introduction of a new department reflects similar considerations (2015) regarding the need to better cover *fragile states* and *limited statehood.*[13] There is a vast body of literature on the subject that is focused on pre-intervention anthropology and ethnology and historical developments throughout the 20th century until the most recent interventions in Afghanistan in particular, as well as more generally on interventions within the frame of peacekeeping or nation-building. We utilize much of this research at C9, and more often than not we ask why some of the

11 After the retirement of the eminent investigative journalist and expert Citha Mass (in 2012), SWP replaced her half-heartedly with Philipp Münch, who then left the organization in 2015: Afghanistan has begun to become less attractive. Following the end of ISAF and the beginning of RSM, public awareness of the German engagement has dropped rapidly, while internationally, and for different reasons, some sectors of global international relations have shown a constant interest in Afghanistan (cf. Hansen (2015). However, there is a significant change in the perception of the intervention. For the first time in Germany, the HKW (Haus der Kulturen der Welt/House of World Cultures) organized a high level conference on the narration of war (*Krieg erzählen*) in Berlin in February 2014. Despite its importance for Germany, Afghanistan was not the focus – the examples were from other conflicts. For me, it was significant that the overwhelming majority of the participants were journalists, film and video reporters, and photographers. Almost no scientists and only a few practitioners from interventions were present, and no section on veterans' discourse was established. Daxner (2017: 607-631). However, *the knowledge* of/on interventions was intense and well-displayed at the conference, and in many cases it was compatible with the findings of scientific investigations.

12 The acronyms are difficult to sort out, even for specialists; I recommend reading www.crs.gov, R42775: Serafino (2012). This CSO is a governmental think tank that reports to the Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (p. 3). Its functions are closely linked to several other departments and organizations that represent the status of securitization and its rationale for US policies in interventions. This is not to be confused with CSO (Central Statistical Office) or with its predecessor S/CRS, the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization, which differs significantly from CRS.

13 The semantic differences between intra-governmental discourse and scientific approaches such as those utilized by the SFB 700 are significant for the incongruent intellectual and procedural common ground between the counterparts in the AA and the SFB's project T3. Terminology matters, and the process of translation has become one of the more important parts of the partnership between the AA and T3. The interdependence between foreign policy and scientific counseling has become vital for this partnership, mainly because it had not been established on equal terms earlier.

most important studies are not sufficiently included in the *lessons learned* by official policies.[14]

However, with regard to the concrete impact of an intervention in a concrete situation, I would rather insist on the setting of standards for research by C9. It is also a privilege to refer to Koehler's data and methods within the research frame of SFB 700. Rarely do you find such a combination of practiced theory and empirical foundation in other real time research. Comparison with vast data collections, such as (Examples: ABCNEWS/BBC/ARD 2010; AREU 2009; Asia Foundation 2006; Asia Foundation 2007; AsiaFoundation 2012; Rennie, R. et al. 2008)[15] is recommended in order to judge the differences in methods and the reliability of the collected data. Most empirical data, statistical surveys in particular, are either unreliable or recycled from older studies, or both. Where necessary, I am using these data to the best of my knowledge. The Afghanistan sections of global overviews, such as CIA and OECD fact books, etc., at the very least indicate where more thorough investigations would be appropriate. In this respect, at least the reliability and validity of our C9 data are the best one can get, and are far from being exhaustively interpreted.

Reflecting on the results after two periods of research, each lasting for a total of four years, and upon completion of the third and final phase of the project, one can conclude that, in C9, we can study hard empirical results from research on local communities in a *country under intervention*. This research is a strong contribution to political ethnology and anthropology insofar as it investigates and validates social stability and the impact of an ongoing intervention on local communities. Some of our methods had to be developed, some invented outright, in order to cope with the difficulties of broad scale empirical research in an insecure environment. For example, mapping and categorizing *incidents* have made good progress. In this respect, Koehler and his colleagues have developed methods that have reach far beyond the Afghanistan case. Meanwhile, the results – intermediate and still incomplete – allow for a thorough evaluation

14 My bibliography of more than 2,500 titles specific to Afghanistan is available.

15 It is necessary to point out a very high recycling rate both of statistics and of very current reports. While the sources of the statistics can be well reconstructed, their credibility is questionable, e.g. if there are data on women interviewed in rural areas, which does not happen at the same rate as interviews with men in the same locations. There is another issue with regard to newspaper and media reports. Very large newspapers like the New York Times, or major agencies like Reuters, AP, or Al Jazeera, have their own correspondents on-site. Their original contributions are very often recycled by smaller organizations.

beyond the criteria relevant for the second and third extensions of the project within the SFB 700.

However, this essay is not another assessment of the research within the frame of the Collaborative Center. Before I even learned about the SFB 700, I was looking at *societies of intervention*. This examination of *the societal complement* of state building, nation-building, and peacekeeping is one other guiding motivation for this book. As a parallel to the C9 approach and only partially converging with it I have been concentrating on some aspects of social structure during the last years of the intervention, specifically on the emerging middle classes as a signifier of changes in Afghan society. My early results on this topic will conclude my essay.

The goal of this essay is not to simply recount my results. Instead of repeating, condensing, and assessing them, I want to bring them into different contexts; all of them relate to fundamental questions not only of research practices, but also of the perspectives opened up by this research, at times challenging the relation between policy and science. I want to reflect on the *relation* between intervention and governance. This requires an operational and practical approach to interventions, and I hope to disclose some of its theoretical foundations in what follows. In a simplified scheme, I shall start with three propositions on interventions:

1. Interventions[16] can be understood as a particular form of conflict *regulation*; the concept is based on conflict theory.
2. Conflict theory is understood as a constitutive element of a theory of *society*.
3. I have chosen a narrow understanding of interventions in order to limit the variety of transnational interventions and invasions at large. I shall concentrate on military interventions within the framework of *Human Security, the Responsibility to Protect*, and *Peacekeeping Operations*.[17]

16 I use the term ”intervention” rather than “invasion,” which in many cases is more common in the American usage. The semantics of warfare are interesting insofar as they stem often from medical terminology (“surgical operation”) and allow the association of organisms fighting against each other or allow “interventions” into the body of the other. In 2005, in the early days before the establishment of the SFB 700, Zürcher took a closer look at the systematics of recent interventions concerning *state-building* Zürcher (2005). Recently, Joel Winckler looked into the relations between institutions and organizations in *peacebuilding* Winckler (2014 t.b.p.).

17 One wider concept of intervention, both in theory and policy, is currently being discussed in the context of international law and human rights. Recently, Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg held a landmark symposium on the deconstruction of sovereignty in the context of

The first two statements are examined thoroughly in the foundations of Jan Koehler's dissertation and in the principles of the social science approach to conflicts (cf. Bonacker's magisterial anthology (cf. Bonacker, T. 2005 15f.), in particular on Marx, Weber, Simmel, Dahrendorf, and systems theory). The third statement is a direct deduction from both my personal experience and the observation of post-1989 peacekeeping operations by diverse coalitions of interveners (Bonacker, T. et al. 2010; Daxner, M. et al. 2008). Of course, other approaches are possible and have been pursued. I will not go into a review of what's on the market; the few propositions upon which I build my concept are compatible with most of intervention concepts based on other foundations.[18]

Some more assumptions on the narrow definition of interventions will be helpful when we reconsider debating governance in its relation to interventions: The shift from the neo-realistic paradigm to a constructivist doctrine focused on humanitarian purposes (cf. Schetter, C. 2010b) and R2P literature is the most important, as some countries transgress the classical non-intervention lines of Westphalian sovereignty with their interventions while at the same time being unwilling or unable to reconstruct states with sufficient sovereignty as a result (Scott, J. C. 1998).[19] Limited statehood under intervention is also an effect of supra-national arrogation of legitimacy for military interventions (cf. FN 10) (Cf. Johannsen, M. e. a. 2011).

There are several possibilities for legitimizing military interventions. If an intervener chooses *security* as a key issue for justifying military action, *the sovereignty* over the territory of the intervened is no longer a property of the state. *The loss of sovereignty through increasing securitization is evident; however, we do not know whether the people, i.e. society, are weighing sovereignty as highly as the ruling elite in a functioning state*. If, in contrast, we choose another approach, such as human rights-based foreign and intervention politics, we shall arrive at different assessments.

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military interventions ("Dekonstruktion von Souveränität. Diskurse zur Legitimierung militärischer Interventionen," Hamburg, June 2-3, 2014. In Honor of August Pradetto. t.b.p.). This aspect of limiting sovereignty by external actors, e.g. in interventions, plays a significant role in the debates of the SFB 700 focus group on "Normative Questions of Governance."

18 The wide field of intervention research in the context of peacekeeping and state building is well represented and accessible; on the micro-level, the same is true of studies on violence and the local effects of interventions.

19 Scott's rich examples always show that the state moves away from the society; legibility and simplification are by no means reductions of complexity in the service of people's needs.

In a brief aside, let me state that this observation opens up a wide arena for assessing the new right wing and autocratic movements and regimes on a global scale; *security* is one of the leverages that seems to justify all anti-democratic revisions of the prevailing frames of liberal democracy. Ideological securitization is no less effective than security concerns regarding provocative transgressions of international law and moral certainties, such as the Russian occupation of Crimea or the intervention of Eastern Ukraine, the policies of the Turkish or Philippine governments, and the threat from the newly elected President of the United States. The Crimean case is a good example because of the effect this invasion had on the perception of national security in the Baltic States and Poland and, furthermore, on NATO strategies. Interventions matter.

It should also be noted that seemingly inconspicuous and ubiquitous interventions, in particular by economic and cultural activities, are more frequent in the global context than the "tip of the iceberg" of ostentatious invasions. We are well advised to distinguish various kinds of interventions as elements of global economic and political communication from military and other interventions that apply force and lead to entanglement in violent confrontations.

> **Excursion**: Diverse forms of interventions aim to have different effects in the country of intervention. The aims and purposes of interventions have changed over the centuries. Thus, the historical dimension is as important as the political context and the layers of legitimacy under which interventions occur. For our research it is also interesting to note how the distance between statehood and governance is affected by the respective intervention. The following table gives a (very rough) overview.

Key issues of interventions (focus of the interveners)

Focus on important intervening variables

	Statehood		Governance	Intervening Variables	
Colonial	-		+	Ethnic, religious, and cultural conflicts Insurgency	
Occupation	- → +		+	Exit	
(Indirect Rule)	+ / -		-	More external actors (non-state, supra-national, etc.)	
Humanitarian	+		- → +	Homeland Discourse	Democracy vs. local institutions

Figure 1 Narrative: The colonial system does not encourage statehood in the social system of the intervened; its own statehood is at stake when the colony does not maintain a minimum of stability due to governance deliveries (the alternative is in some cases a continuous military suppression).

Occupation does encourage the establishment of strong statehood when the occupied country is going to receive sovereignty and independence. Some unofficial debates over the Afghan intervention after 2001 raised the question of whether a temporary occupation would not have been a better solution than the premature establishment of a legitimate state, however weak a state it would have been. Of course, this argument is only valid since the interveners had missed the Golden Hour until 2005, but nevertheless, it should remind us that occupation is an option when the exerted power of interveners (or one of their leaders, the U.S.) so strongly dominates the structures of early statehood, as was the case in Afghanistan under Ambassador Khalilzad (2003-5).

Indirect rule is mentioned as a *result* of military intervention. In its actual status, the state under (external) influence cannot develop strong statehood unless the hegemonic power interferes, but good governance is necessary to uphold the social order and prevent insurgency. The modes of indirect rule are different today than they were in previous eras, but the effect is similar. Another aspect touches on the functions

of brokerage and brokers, blurring the lines of internal and external actors. This is an important factor, not only of trans-cultural communication, but also of the establishment of trust and confidence among actors; brokerage translates between the actors' different semantic properties, but it is also a contingent element of attaining certain powers and influence for those actors.

Humanitarian interventions occur with the justification that they are regulating conflicts. They do not aspire to long-term territorial occupation or rule, and therefore tend to lead to the establishment of a state with strong enough statehood that said state can survive, but the entity doing the intervening still maintains the pretext of wanting to keep influence in the developing state. The outcome of the Kosovo intervention, which began 1999 and is ongoing, demonstrates the negative effect of being neither consequential in replacing a state nor being able to hand over power to a state in the making. Intervention itself does not start with a complete program for good governance. Rather, it learns over time that hybrid structures would be preferable to remaining endlessly in the country. Here is a point where interventions cannot be easily compared to each other – because the concrete societal variables differ widely. The focus on *either* statehood *or* governance does not exclude the impact of the respective other pole of attention. The quality of "hybridization" depends on the relative distance between the two poles.

1.2 Some further propositions for *military* interventions

Recent reflections on military interventions have displayed interesting extensions of established knowledge: what does a *military* intervention bring about in the *intervened* society, and subsequently in the *interveners'* own societies? This is the more important question, because normally there is not just one intervener, but an alliance consisting of various actors. The communication among them on the subject of a particular intervention is as important as the reciprocal communication between each intervener and the intervened country. Changes in society may or may not become reflected in the respective states' policies. Fiction and films have always produced a broad variance of insights into the real constitution of occupied or intervened societies, both in "high" and "low" cultures. Science, mainly history, has, of course, produced a lot of research on occupation and intervention. But the reaction at home, in the intervener's own society, is a highly sensitive issue. The researcher is always under

scrutiny, either for his or her bias or for his or her objectivity. That is why I will frequently point out the discursive dimension of intervention. Homeland Discourse is a constant companion of my reflections (cf. 2.1)

Three "constructivist" turns can be observed in many military interventions:

(a) There is a *humanitarian* turn emerging that clearly gained importance following the end of the Cold War. The implications for established patterns, such as (neo)realist approaches, seem to be clear, but a return to the past is not impossible (cf. the European refugee crisis and policies with Turkey in 2016). The humanitarian turn is clearly challenging and requires realistic strategies as well as new geopolitical approaches.

(b) Military interventions as the creation of a *state of emergency* (Distler, W. 2009).[20] The exceptionalism[21] of intervention rivals its *normalism*.[22] The effect of this shift can be relevant when the resilience of the people is also moving from normality towards a level of emergency and alarm.

(c) The *ambiguous* character of interventions is a generalization of the Afghanistan observations.[23] This element of analysis is central to my considerations and was described comprehensively by Florian Kühn in his first reflection on the topic (Kühn, F. 2014).

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20 The ambiguity of "emergency" was very clearly demonstrated in the UNMIK policy framework after 1999. Its program of civil administration went from *peacekeeping through administration* during emergency to *peacebuilding through development* in the next phase. For more on governance under emergency circumstances, see p. 9ff. in this paper.

21 I deliberately chose this term because it allows me to build a bridge to another semantic field. Exceptionalism is normally used to describe the United States' justification for all kinds of military and other forceful action, the point being that (only) the U.S. has a right to act in this way, beyond the rules of law and convention. American exceptionalism is a critical element of U.S. global policies and the legitimacy of its interventions (cf. Danner (2011: 4); Patman (2006: 23); Miller/Stefanova (2007)). It has different roots in earlier forms of exceptionalism that were derived from an assumed divine law, or simply from a colonial past.

22 When our first book on the culture of interventions (Bonacker et al., 2010) came out, I was sharply criticized for stating that (military) interventions had become *normal*. Apart from everyday usage of the term, normality and "normalism" have become a very important element for discourse theory and the problems stemming from a quantifying society. Jürgen Link's theory of *normalism* is a relevant ingredient in our concept of *Homeland Discourse* (cf. Daxner/Neumann (2012); Link (2009); Link (2010); Grindle (2007: 553-574) and other contributions, mainly in the journal *kultuRRevolution*.

23 This ambiguity has become obvious in cases like Libya or Syria. It may also include changing sides to fight a worse enemy, e.g., negotiating with the Taliban in order to win them as allies against IS or taking the side of Assad for the same purpose. This was recently discussed at the German-Turkish Roundtable (Berlin, 5-6 November 2015) at SWP "Interventions of the West in Muslim Countries – Lessons to be learned from Afghanistan."

I will now elaborate on these specifications of the sparse frame for interventions in order to indicate their relevance for the topic:

Humanitarian turn: Very often, interventions are considered incompatible with the "humanitarian" legitimacy with which they are coated or sold to the public.[24] This misunderstands the humanitarian aspect of a significant change in political legitimacy after the end of the Cold War. Any humanitarian approach or such foci like "Human Security" indicates the normative priority of all kinds of realistic strategic considerations, even if those prevail or are maintained over long periods. The humanitarian dimension is also significant for all constructivist approaches. Normative aspects can be differentiated into several dimensions:

Regarding *Homeland Discourse*, "humanitarian" is not only applied in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe that requires military intervention (it could also be a natural disaster like in Haiti). Rather, the term is *translated* into other sets of values (what may be a value threat at home may be a far greater threat in the country of intervention). An analogy would be policies of refugee protection: in some rich countries, the value threats are much bigger than the real economic and demographic challenges, while in others the humanitarian imperatives cannot be met by the receiving countries' capacities and infrastructures. It is therefore not by chance that women's rights, child labor, minority protection, etc. were often the focus of legitimizing exercises at the beginning of interventions; these sectors have a humanitarian appeal for a majority of people, while security or the structures of law and welfare governance in other countries seem much further away and require more translation. Translation and interpretation of the motives of interventions are never static. They change with the ongoing intervention, or they oscillate, e.g. between security and human rights.[25] Since the research in and analysis of motifs for interventions occurs in retrospect – and often very belatedly – there is enough leeway to reconstruct and modify them. This is a problem inherent in all history writing, but in an era of real-time policies it becomes more important for decisions to be taken while the intervention is still ongoing. In terms of the German policy

24 Don Scheid recently displayed a good understanding of the debate about ethics and politics of humanitarian military interventions. Scheid (2014).

25 I am not going to discuss the frequency with which *security* is used as a justification for delimiting the territorial integrity of an intervened country. Since 9/11, the WoT has given unlimited leeway to such pretext. Drone attacks and kill-box strategies now occur within an otherwise mandated intervention as de-territorialized acts of undeclared war. Schetter (2014: 310-322).

on Afghanistan, it was difficult to shift public attention from the original humanitarian intentions (post-war nation-building) and the participation in the War on Terror (i.e. the extrinsic motivation to stand by the United States) towards a more realistic involvement in combat and security operations as a condition for and a result of state-building engagement.

The humanitarian concept demands interventions because of the inability of a state to maintain its monopoly of violence and its effective governing statehood. At the same time, the value base of humanitarianism would insist on a strong influence of human rights, minority protection, prevention of extreme ethnic and religious outbursts, etc. It is only ideal-typical, but not realistic, to see both aspects positively united in an intervention. Normally the human rights side becomes weaker as the security side becomes dominant[26] – an almost classic condition for *good enough governance*.[27] I shall raise this problem again when discussing the dichotomy between the rule of law enforcing human rights and the ownership of the intervened communities insisting on self-determined rules apprehensive of human rights. Very often, *local ownership* is a guiding principle of the transition from intervention to self-determined national sovereignty. The normative background of the ownership concept can be the attempt to avoid accusations of (neo)colonial policies by the interveners and to shift responsibility in the case of unsuccessful development policies. Both can be observed with regard to Afghanistan, especially when ownership remains an unattainable ideal because of poor governance. I reject the whole concept of ownership as a hypocritical notion of the interveners, if they disguise it under a kind of unwillingness to take action or to launch reforms, and of the intervened, if their insistence on ownership is just an excuse for not changing things that would otherwise be critical for the existing pattern of power sharing.

26 If the focus of security becomes a part of "Security Sector Reform" (SSR) within a state-building concept, then very special conditions apply which call for closer inspection in the future. Ursula Schroeder and Fairlie Chappuis recently published a leading approach from a theoretical point of view with regard to Afghanistan: Schroeder/Chappuis (2014) in the introduction, and in the Afghan context by Koehler/Gosztonyi ibid.: 231-250).

27 The term is inseparably linked to Merilee Grindle (2005). This concept suggested that not all governance deficits need be (or can be) tackled at once, institution and capacity building are products of time, and governance achievements can also be reversed. Good enough governance means that interventions thought to contribute to the ends of economic and political development need to be questioned, prioritized, and made relevant to the conditions of individual countries (see p. 1). This article was reprinted in (Grindle: 553-574) and is a paradigmatic reference. It was written for DFID, but more often than not the instruments and effects of good enough governance can be found in military interventions, and not in the prioritizing operations of development policy.

The German public became more aware of the humanitarian aspects of a human-rights-based foreign policy when ambiguous decisions appeared on the agenda. Some examples would be Germany's stance in NATO vis-à-vis Russian aggression; the problem of the refugee return agreement with Turkey, a country which has become an authoritarian, non-democratic ally, rather than a partner; and the refugee policy in and of itself and its ensuing consequences in terms of a new direction for development cooperation, e.g. for large parts of Africa, etc. This approach is best examined by taking a look at actions by the Foreign Office (AA) in *Review 2014* and *Peacelab 2016*.[28]

State of emergency: Emergency creates an exceptional situation, and each emergency is an *exception from normality*. If the integrity of a territory, based on sovereignty, is in focus, the invasion of foreign troops is certainly *exceptional*, and so is their dominant share in claiming the monopoly of force. **Normative legitimacy for an intervention very often claims that only with these "exceptions" will more normality be created than would be the case without an intervention.** This banal statement is one of the strongest arguments legitimizing military intervention. *Normality* simply means that there is a state, or there are at least representatives of a *real*, *existing power that can be negotiated with and would guarantee a minimum of implementation of measures agreed upon*. This is important when the existing power is on a local level and more likely to influence social stability than the far-away central state. But more important for my context is the following question: *what or how was normality before the intervention*? One needs data in order to answer this question. It is an illusion to ask for a restoration of normal life if the perception of positive or negative change, compared to a real period in the past, remains imaginary or relies on an invented narrative. My proposition is that, because society is ever changing, normality can never be *restored*, but only *newly created* in a different way.

In a broader context, the question of normality is critical to our discussion of governance. It very much depends on which kind of reality is perceived as *normal*. The present pattern of foreign policy – not only in Germany – tends towards a perpetual state of emergency by declaring the state of *crisis* as the frame for all operations, i.e. crisis prevention, deterrence of acts of terrorism,

28 See http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/de/themen.html and www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab/debatte/. One must concede that many of the contributions follow a rather idealistic humanitarianism, facing opposition from the reality of domestic politics, e.g. in regards to refugee problems.

peace-building, and all kinds of interventions into the social system of another country or territory (cf. my observations regarding the establishment of a new division in the German Foreign Office dedicated to stabilization and crisis prevention). Certainly, an intervention is the consequence of a crisis, but if crisis is the ubiquitous situation in all political fields, then what is the particular trigger motivating an intervention? Governance in an emergency is different from governance under consolidated circumstances. That is as trivial as it is complex in practice, because the return from emergency to another kind of normality is not trivial at all. Security measures, restrictions on individual freedom and liberties, etc. will be repealed when normality returns, unless the system itself changes into a dictatorship. *If the crisis perpetuates, there will be a permanent state of emergency.* This is a dangerous, self-referential cycle. The crisis discourse is a product of the increasing *securitization* of the overarching discourses in international relations. This aspect will play a certain role in the chapter on intervention, because the angle from which governance is being analyzed in intervention significantly shifts good governance concepts towards another priority, i.e. security prerogatives.

Excursion: Another aspect of this exceptional or emergency status created from interventions is that normative plurality is the rule, and its effects on governance should be considered. I do not want to go deeply into philosophical considerations on this issue. However, there is a linguistic and ideological problem that is a burden on German discourses. Infamous totalitarian lawyer and philosopher Carl Schmitt has become notorious for his apodictic formula: "The sovereign makes the decisions in a state of emergency" (1922). We should distinguish between emergency as a situation of exceptional constellations and emergency as a constellation of urgent imperatives for actions that will abrogate established and accepted norms and rules. Military interventions face elements of both. But the urgency of immediate action under exceptional circumstances must not destroy or suspend those rules under which society would remain stable otherwise; this refers i.a. to human rights, the rule of law, and the rights of minorities and particular social groups. Another German, Odo Marquard, provides a philosophical escape from Schmitt's challenge: "He who avoids emergency statuses is rational" (Marquard, O. 2007, 38).

This little excursion seeks to create some awareness of the following question: how can generalized confidence be gained and regained under

the state of emergency? My formula for this is that all applicable and established norms that are not affected by the circumstances must be recognizable by the people. Very often, unrelated elements of illegitimate rule are justified by the circumstances that impede the creation of such confidence.

An interesting variety on the pluralism argument is Chantal Mouffe's idea that democracy itself is in a permanent "agonistic" situation, which I translate as crisis because she distinguishes between adversaries in a democracy and enemies (Mouffe, C. 2005), strongly following Schmitt's arguments.

Ambiguity as a multitude of reference systems and applied to governance under intervention is a real challenge for any theoretical concept and practice. This debate has been going on as long as interventions have been the object of scientific investigation. Kühn's theoretical framework for a concept of ambiguity can be applied to any intervention. *For the Afghan case,* I've taken the liberty of listing a few ambiguous problems and observations in the course of this essay that are not only worthy items for further investigation, but also provide a view of the multitude of dimensions to be found in the Afghan intervention.[29] On the discursive level, what is most important is that the correspondence between the intended and expressed aims of the intervention needs to be deconstructed in order to find moral, political, pragmatic, etc. subtexts.[30] A good example of this is the ambiguity of intervention aims over a longer period of time, e.g. the divergence of tasks linked to the War on Terror and of all efforts of state and nation building.[31] (Bürjes, D. 2015)

29 My reflections are based on Kühn (2014: 193-211), with whom I remain in frequent contact. He will continue his approach in a wider research project. I have been discussing the issue with him for a significant period of time. The starting point for his new project is that the intervention is not perceived as a reality (or its *term), but as* a metaphor for an activity in which Germany has a part, and thus as a bundle of either opinions or doctrines. Kühn's list of ambiguous elements is complex and rather long, implying that ambiguity does not exhaust itself in dual structures. There may be more than two reference systems for an ambiguous element of the intervention.

30 The intended aim of an intervention might find public acceptance and even support that would never be gained if the true motifs of an intervention were to be disclosed at an early stage. However, it is not as easy as that, because sometimes the motives are more honest and worthy than the legitimizing rhetoric needed to persuade some actors, e.g. the military or the media. This does not only point at the aspect of ambiguity, but also at the rhetoric problem, i.e. that you need speakers in order to advocate for a cause, not just speeches. (Cf. Vidal ibid.: 213-223)

31 Dennis Bürjes has just finished a PhD thesis in which he investigates the costs of the Afghan intervention under the aspect of this ambiguity. The thesis bears the title, "Die Kosten der

For systematic reasons, allow me to make a remark on linguistics. I speak deliberately of *ambiguity* and not *ambivalence*. The latter is a reference to two options which *we do not know* (Goodenough, W. H. 1970). Ambiguity, in contrast, means *that we know*, but must decide which reference system we choose to use when we form our opinion. One reality can be more than one truth in context.

Excursion: One political statement is necessary here in order to avoid repeating it on several occasions later in the text. It would be naïve to pretend that basic research on security governance in any context can exist without a significant interface with policy. Politicians, spin-doctors, pundits, and the military and international relations establishment of an intervening nation tend to *generalize and aggregate* scientific results. This is their right, but we must also see that many conclusions and prognoses taken from research become superficial, insignificant, and sometimes even wrong when elevated to a general level. In many ways there will be statements no longer based on scientific research, but instead account to a highly opinionated selection from findings, methods, and cases. Since our research is taking place in a highly sensitive field – security and development under ongoing intervention – the temptation to generalize beyond reason and then draw volatile conclusions is great. While we try to avoid such traps as best we can, there is no way to shield our results from undue generalization. Since Afghanistan is a central case for my concepts on intervention, let me state for our research: *For reasonable political planning, it would have been advisable to conduct as much parallel research as possible – after concluding that the methods work and bring results – in other regions of Afghanistan in order to cover the whole territory.*[32] If this would have been considered by the actors in politics, planning or advisory science would have much better served the general statements about success or failure of the intervention in the eyes of the respective actors, who, even now, do not have an impressive degree of concurrence with the research findings and analyses. On the other hand, even a nation-wide extension of our

Intervention" (*The Cost of Intervention*), and is accessible under the title "Interventionsökonomie." Its data concentrate mainly on military expenditures, but they provide many points of connection with other sections of an intervention.

32 This refers mainly to the work of Jan Koehler, cf. FN 6-8. It is less applicable to my own research, which has been policy-oriented from the beginning. But the same argument will be valid when I proceed to the concrete questions of urban social structure in chapter 4.

research approach and findings would never have covered all aspects necessary for a conclusive assessment or have sufficiently explained the intervention. It would not have served as a sound forecast for strategic provisions in the future. This statement is important because, in the course of discussing results and methods, political decision makers and pundits quite frequently ask for the *political conclusions* we can draw from our results – and we are often reluctant to answer. On other levels and in other contexts, our experience and political judgment on Afghanistan may allow such conclusions, but even then, we still cannot draw them *directly* from our research, beyond certain particular statements within a specific context.[33] This statement should be remembered at every point where research and policy seem to approach each other too closely.[34] There have, however, been some serious attempts to provide generalized overviews. For some of them, we would have to ask under which circumstances the data were collected, while for others the problem is more in the methodology of interpretation.[35] One of the few efforts to answer these questions is the CSIS report of 2012 (Cordesman, A. H. 2012). There are a few indicators about the methods of data collection that make some of the findings comparable to our results and trends.

For me, another statement, almost hidden in his text, is important:

What […] does not show is how slow the US and its allies were to react in their build up of forces and in funding and providing trainers and advisors for the Afghan forces. It also cannot map the extent to which the US and its allies left virtual power vacuums in terms of troop and aid presence in the east and south – allowing the Taleban and other insurgents to regroup and build up their

33 Such occasions occur rather infrequently, e.g. when Jan Koehler testified at the hearing by the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 2, 2014 (Deutscher Bundestag, http://dbtg.tv/cvid/3270612).

34 The SFB 700's Transfer Project T 3 is trying to meld the basic research and a kind of proto-application of methods and findings as one frame for foreign policy and international relation (cf. www.sfb-governance.de/T3). When it comes to political dialogue with the Foreign Office, it is useful to ask if methodological applications in basic research provide results that may promote prognostication of conflicts and circumstances favorable to prevention.

35 The CSIS data are very helpful in retrospect when we compare them to present findings and trends in analysis. Other data, as provided by many surveys, raise methodological doubts regarding how they were generated. I do not trust any political survey in which women are interviewed on a broad scale, knowing as I do how difficult it is to obtain unbiased or uncensored statements from them.

influence until the US and its allies finally began to seriously react in 2009 – decisions that could not begin to be fully implemented until 2010. As the following figures show, the present state of the war is now very serious, but this should not be ascribed to the difficulties in nation building and COIN, or to cultural issues. It took half a decade of gross under reaction and under resourcing, as well as a US focus on Iraq that led the US to ignore key developments and trends in Afghanistan that led to the current situation (p.4)

This paragraph can be read as a criticism of the interveners' practices during the Golden Hour and immediately after, when the insurgency and Taliban resurfaced. It also points to the subcritical understanding of the society of intervention by the security branch of this intervention, while it is normally exactly those "difficulties" that are blamed for unsuccessful operations. I shall refer more than once to SIGAR, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction of the United States.[36] Reading the reports demonstrates a broad understanding of the effects of reconstruction practices that differ widely from the legitimacy of the programs, and they offer insight into the incompetence even of experts and experienced peacekeepers when it comes to the implementation of programs in a real society of intervention. SIGAR should be used as a source of knowledge about the country of the intervened as well, and as a perfect field of comparison between Western and local corruption.

A further aspect is met by returning to my earlier question – *how do we know what we know*? I believe the concept of *translation* is a valid approach for addressing people who are not laymen, but also not experts:

Information on research that is addressed to educated experts who are not involved in the research process (i.e. politicians) starts with a process of translation. Communication among those who are participating in the research

36 At https://www.sigar.mil/ one can find an admirably updated examination of expenditures, futile investments, fraud, and nonsensical payments by the U.S. in Afghanistan. In my personal conversation (2015) with the Inspector General, Mr. Sopko, I learned how sensitive and important continuous information about this billion-dollar complex is for the Congress, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. When Mr. Sopko visited Germany, I was astonished by how uninterested German administrators were when he visited the US Embassy – the audience consisted mainly of researchers, and not many of them. SIGAR is important because of its permanent quest for legitimacy for a policy that people normally do not understand. Bürjes (2015) could never compare his study to the in-depth research and findings of SIGAR, simply because German-style evaluation does not meet the high standards of the U.S. expenditure policies – when it comes to war and peace. This might change under President Trump, however.

process becomes, at the same time, a narration of this research for those who are not directly related to the research process. (Krohn, W. 2013: 74)

This statement is an apt description of our discussions with experts from the Foreign Office or Parliament, which take place when our research is being used to explain or question political decisions and comments on a *situation*. The debate among scientists is never only about the question of whether or not a colleague meets scientific standards and fits into the grid of "permitted" or "legitimate" science; it is also a way of communicating about the origin of the subjective concepts and approaches, if not biases, e.g. as given by *Homeland Discourse* (see Chapter 2.1, p. 21) or by the role and function of discussants in the political field.

The essay will start with a chapter on interventions, to be followed by a chapter on governance. References to the Collaborative Research Center and our project there will continue to be visible on some occasions, but shall mainly appear in the Appendix. Governance in societies of interventions takes on a special scent. This is certainly different from governance modes in consolidated states, and it is also different from fragile states that are not weak because of preceding wars, followed by interventions. The definitions and limiting aspects of the topic as brought forth in the introduction should be kept in mind. I shall turn then to a long chapter on the social structure and the emergence of a middle class in Afghanistan. This may surprise some readers who would not expect a lengthy excursion into applied political economy and class concepts without the provision of a comprehensive and adequate theoretical fundament of either. I have chosen to rely on the readers' understanding. The discrimination of theoretical varieties is not my aim. Rather, I seek to demonstrate that a society of intervention produces a very specific type of social and class structure.

1.3 Thoughts for the reader

This is a book about intervention. It is also about governance and not primarily about Afghanistan. And yet, it is a book about Afghanistan under intervention. Afghanistan is the prominent backdrop against which I develop my observations and ideas. Other societies of intervention like Kosovo have contributed information, enabling me to bring together relevant aspects of intervention theory and my very particular approach to governance. Despite its many footnotes and excursions, it is an essay rather than a textbook or a thesis. Certainly, it is not an exhaustive treatise on the topic. I wish I could say that my starting point

is in peace and conflict studies, or governance theory, or the recollection of my experiences in many countries under foreign intervention of various kinds. But I cannot. This essay is, rather, the re-translation of multiple experiences and observations into social science, freed from disciplinary tidiness. This may appear to be defensive. It is not. Indeed, this summary of my ideas and constructions may come at the right time, when public interest in Afghanistan is decreasing sharply. The country tends to be perceived as *normal*, even though it is still far away from normality. The excursions on the refugee and deportation policies of Germany and the European Union in Chapters 4 and 5 may contribute to further understanding of this approach.

One warning may arouse curiosity rather than frustration: I do not follow a straightforward path from assumptions to solutions and conclusions. I meander, and deliberately so. My ideal geometric procedure is the spiral. In doing this, I hope that my readers never trade one complex, e.g. the concepts on intervention, for another, e.g. the political economy of Afghan middle classes.

The readers may kindly distinguish between the "I" of the author and the "we" of the collective research team, which refers alternately to the project at the Free University of Berlin or to a generalized understanding of common knowledge or opinion. It goes without saying that all errors and misunderstanding are solely mine and not ours. The "we" has further implications. Like any scientist, I am part of several groups that hold distinct positions in intervention discourses. In many cases I am writing from a particularly "German" point of view, whereas in others I am writing as a member of a scientific community and attempt to maintain as much distance to my discursive environment as necessary and possible. Each "we" has a voice that wants to be heard, but in different ways:

> We – the nation state *Germany in her sovereign foreign and defense polity;*
> *We – the deploying actor-state of troops, police, and co-funding of an intervention;*
> *We – the homeland of casualties, veterans, and wounded;*
> *We – the Federal Republic as part of a network of obligations (NATO), alliances (OEF), conventions (human rights), etc.;*
> *We – the "Germans," citizens in a moral and pragmatic relation with people in Afghanistan, who are ready to politicize these relations (using empathy, apprehension, economic, and cultural interests) and who try to influence decisions;*

We – who discuss as experts and scientists what can be expected in the country of intervention, and deduce from this what we can expect here "at home."
I – the chronicler and part of all these "we's." (Daxner, M./Neumann, H. 2012: 20, my translation).

And one last piece of advice: do not look for colorful anecdotes or too much subjective input from my more than 15 years in the environment of interventions. My diaries, reports, pictures, and correspondence would make another book – a very different one. Perhaps I will have to write that book next in order to illustrate some of the assumptions that appear overly dry and vague in this one, since, out of consideration for the protection of my sources, not all information and events could be reproduced adequately here.

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37 Special thanks to all doctoral candidates at the Collaborative Research Center, whose presentations provided a fascinating supplement to my knowledge base simply by posing *new* questions.

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2 On Intervention

2.1 Propositions and Frames

In the introduction, I presented an outline of my motives and concepts for this essay and laid out propositions for a concept of military interventions. More specifications will now follow in the context of interventions and governance. I shall start by wrapping up my statements on intervention from the introduction and elaborating on the first systematic concept that we wrote in 2010 (Bonacker, T. et al. 2010), which was based on the work of the study group on "Cultures of Intervention" at the University of Oldenburg from 2008. This is a *sociological* concept, rather than one based on political science, and thus it is closer to *anthropology* and *conflict theory* than to political action. Participatory observation and other ethno-methodological approaches do not require justification. Each proposition or thesis bears quite a few optional hypotheses for further research. I shall not present a grand comprehensive theory of intervention, nor do I intend to do so. Instead, I develop the design of several theory-based elements of a concept that is strong enough to support some theoretical offspring and empirical research. Let me begin with a couple of strong statements on intervention concepts.

Each intervention produces a society of intervention.

A society of intervention is one whose structures are basically determined by elements *created* by the intervention. It implies an irreversible change in social order and communication. **Conflicts that stem from the intervention and develop in the course of an emerging society of intervention are not causally linked to the "root" conflicts that originally were the reason for and the justification of the intervention. The longer an intervention prevails, the more these conflicts dominate over the root conflict, at least in the eyes of the external actors.** In many cases, the intervened reject the interveners altogether, along with, or even because of, the conflicts the intervention has brought. This appears as a certain "demand" for a return to the root conflicts; the return to ethnic or religious divides can be a symptom for this nostalgia.

A society of intervention is a classification that bears both the emergence of this particular type of society and its specific differences with regard to other types of society. This is only possible under the condition that intervention is not used in a broad or vague sense that allows interventions to be ubiquitous

events, or in fact, to be *communication*; instead, I insist that the type of military intervention I mentioned in the beginning of this text is the leading force in the construction of societies of intervention.

I have found an almost bizarre, if singular, proof with regard to the first and central assumption, the society of intervention. At a major conference on Afghan development and transformation,[38] the speakers at the introductory session and panel spoke about Afghanistan as if this country could be any one around the globe, with no difference made between German and Afghan speakers. At issue was the answer to the following question: where are we, and where do we want to go after the pullout of foreign troops by the end of 2014? It was a true "progress report," without any real criticism of the situation and the associated dangers and risks, and with an incredible optimism that Afghanistan would become *normal* within the next ten years, i.e. the period of transition. The wording and context of the contribution by Afghan Finance Minister Zakhilwal was clearly influenced just as much by the *interveners'* discourses as by the native Afghan Homeland Discourse (cf. p. 48). This impression was not mine exclusively; it was shared by quite a few members of an audience which could well be described as *the* German Afghan pundit and expert community. This experience continued to haunt me, mainly after the exit of ISAF.

But, of course, this proposition is so strong that I must introduce some caveats: if a society of the intervened enters into a structural merger with another society, viz. a society of interveners, then the outcome as a *new* society is daring. We can prove this only if we understand what is *new* in this "third" society; **it is certainly a hybrid, but it is not completely defined by its origins**. How do we delineate a society of intervention from other hybrid structures or governance, as we so often find them in micro-social contexts and under intervention?

How sustainable and durable will the new society be, especially after the exit of interveners?

How can we distinguish a short-lived government or state-induced *hybrid* governance from a society of intervention?[39]

38 BMZ/GIZ: Reliable Partnership in Times of Change – New Country Strategy for Afghanistan, Conference Berlin, March 12-13, 2014.

39 The mode of hybrid governance (state/non-state actors and authorities) plays a significant role in research on local Afghan structures (cf. Koehler 2012). Such empirical findings cannot be transferred without modification to the entirety of a society. The identification of hybrid governance by Jan Koehler is a challenge to the concept of societies of intervention insofar

(a) The first question raises immediate associations with colonial and post-colonial societies. Certainly there are similarities. However, the new society is not simply an amalgamation of social, cultural, and economic elements from both societies. It is more of an alloy that brings together some elements – not an entirety! – from both societies, largely inseparable and with features that cannot easily be deducted from either society of origin alone. These elements shall not be restricted to a few particular fields, e.g. judicial institutions representing different normative systems.[40] All such fields must be included when searching for societies of intervention. (It would be interesting to apply this and the following definitions to a territory like Crimea. I hold that this peninsula displays many characteristics of a society of intervention and not of a simple *return* to a "country of origin.") A society can be called *new* if a new sense of and a framework for self-determination of its members is occurring and exhibits at least certain elements of a breach with the past.[41] And we should not forget that the interveners play a variety of roles in the application of their power. It is not the simple vertical force that is implied to make the intervened compliant with the rules of the interveners or occupants. I insist on the novelty of such society because very often the society under and after intervention is simply framed within a concept of *progress* or within the poles of *success and failure* (of the intervention, rarely unto itself). If this is the case, the society described has increasingly little to do with the society at the beginning of the intervention. It requires serious ethnological and anthropological research to understand that *society* in Afghanistan in 2014 cannot be described in the categories used when it was first described in 2001, even if those categories were fully acceptable then,[42] which I doubt. It is much easier to describe changes in *statehood, government*, and the presence or absence of the *state* during such a period of time. Many occupied and intervened societies develop movements

as we can assume that every society of intervention bears a certain hybridism of interveners' and intervened governance, without this being a sufficient condition for its emergence.

40 Schuppert and Kötter have been dealing with this problem since the early days of the SFB 700. Cf. also Part II in Kötter et al. (2015b).

41 One very strong example from a society under occupation ("mega-intervention") is the changes that West Germany underwent after 1945. The changes have gone far beyond accepting an imposed democracy and social structure. While Tony Judt uses "post-war" as a paradigm for such interruption of the established pattern of historical development Judt (2006), Ulrich Herbert meticulously describes the concrete elements of the change and its hysteresis effects (cf. Bourdieu (1977). Ulrich Herbert points out further inconsistencies in his recent German history: Herbert (2014).

42 What did the interveners know at that time? And to what extent did the shock of 9/11 and the perspectives of the War on Terror distort this knowledge?

similar to the radical populist movements in consolidated states within supranational frameworks: the rediscovery of an ethno-centric nationalism that replaces democracy as a principle for legitimate statehood and governance. One key term is "true": it is always the *true* Turkishness that is at stake. In earlier times, the true Italy was enshrined in Italianità, and today we again have debates about a "German" Lead Culture (Leitkultur) where nobody knows what "German(ic)" means. This phenomenon was extremely visible in the Kosovo case, when the rift between "true" Serbs and "true" Albanians dominated the discourse, while sub-structures created equally extreme conflicts among three different tribes of "Gypsies" (Roma, Egyptians, Ashkali) and ridiculous fights between true Serbs, Croatians, and Bosniacs. The Afghan "truisms" are more difficult to discriminate, but it is certain that ethnic divides have grown since the intervention of 2001. It is what happened *before* that moment that needs to be further investigated.

(b) The second question can be answered only by longitudinal research and a concept of time that would allow even a *longue duree* for the existence of a society of intervention. In Afghanistan, it is evident that the society of intervention does not come to an end simply because of the fact that most ISAF have pulled out and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) has replaced it; it is also evident that the resurgence of the Taliban in many areas in the North has only changed the constellations and relational distribution of power, but not the principles of a society of intervention (cf.Call, C. T./Wyeth, V. 2008). Nobody can predict how long a society of intervention will last before it becomes a normal society. In the Afghan case, a few interventions have overlapped in a sort of cascading process. Occupations produce similar effects, most often in a negative, almost collusive relationship (Israel and the Palestinians on the West Bank).

(c) This question is critical in the context of the Collaborative Research Center's governance concept and our C 9 project in particular. There are two possible answers: one concerns time and sustainability. This aspect can be explained with the concrete example of Community Development Councils (CDC) in the local governance of some districts. If some institutions or structures have been induced by the interveners,[43] but become integrated into the

43 It need not only be *interveners*, but often can also be transnational actors such as UN organizations or GOs, and less often NGOs. However, for the latter type of external induction, we have the paradigmatic example of the Soros Foundation in Albania during the late 1990s and

social fabric of the society, it is difficult to speak of an *imposed* effect driven by the interveners. If a hybrid constellation proves to be constitutive for new structures in a society and is sustainable, we can speak of *one* element of a society of intervention.[44] This is the second answer, and at once indicates that only a multitude of hybrid constellations can be considered as to form a society of intervention. As a side note, there does not need not to be a fundamental antagonism between this new society and the phenomena of hybrid governance.

Colleagues from political science very often do not perceive the implicit criticism of disciplinary narrowness that I am intending to communicate when I insist on the main difference in the approaches: while many books and theories on peacekeeping, nation-building and state-building concentrate on **the rule *by* the state**, I focus on **the order of society, in a society**. It is not trivial to tell me that both "belong" together. Do they? **If statehood is truly limited, then the equivalents lie in social order, not in a substitution of institutional state-like regimes**.

Of course, this concept is related to *occupations* as a result of external invasions. The Allied occupation of Germany after 1945 is the classic example; more recently, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, in particular under the regime of Paul Bremer, offers many similarities and demonstrates a decisive difference between such occupations and other military interventions in my concept. The interaction between the *absolute* rule of the occupation force, civilian and military, does not require any legitimacy in the discourse between them and the occupied people, at least in the beginning. The distinction between ruling as a state and like a state will be important for many constructions of a society of intervention, as I shall explain later in the case of Kosovo. (Cf. pp. 11, 29, 48, 57f.)

Occupation societies unite colonial and current forms of regime. They do not even simulate the certain sovereignty of the imposed governments, which are mainly administrations and executioners of the occupying force. The societies

early 2000s. Soros organizations (mainly the Open Society Foundation) have, in a way, "privatized" big parts of the public school system in the name of the state, but by bypassing normal communication between state and societal institutions. Cf. www.soros.al/en/legacy/aedp.htm A broader discussion of the problem can be found in Schlichte/Veit (2010: 261-267).

44 An indirect proof of this assumption is given by Schroeder/Chappuis 2014, p. 140; Koehler's continuous debate on the role and changes in the CDC development is also a very convincing way to understand this context.

of intervention maintain a formal division of labor between the intervener's regime and the administrative rule of local institutions, while always favoring the side of the interveners (e.g. in many cases represented by an ambassador or special envoy). The Kosovo case is interesting insofar as UNMIK acted both as intervention force and as a state, with representatives of the intervened functioning as "partnering" executives, but ultimately without real power.

All societies of intervention are structurally similar and comparable, irrespective of their diverse cultural embedding.

Irrespective of the reasons, causes, and purposes of a military intervention, the intervention will have some features that appear under any circumstance. This does not contradict the respective impact of cultural contextualization of social phenomena. (The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan do not share many of the same roots, but the social phenomena in the course of the countries' being "intervened" are quite similar in many aspects; cf. the reflections on occupation.) This has very negative side effects, viz. the differences between the interventions are becoming irrelevant or flattened in the critical discourse on military interventions. Protesters against the engagement in any intervention sum up the realities under "war" and "illegitimate," or even "illegal" actions, accusing the interveners of violating both human rights and international law. In this example, the comparison does not go far, and it also blurs the view on societies of intervention. This lack of conceptual clarity has a certain effect on the policies and exercises of legitimizing their policy by the interveners, and thus leads to more volatile decisions.

The ambiguity of my assumption is obvious: depending on the intention, legitimacy, instruments, and implementation of the intervention, we find quite *diverse systems of reference*. They build the foundations for diverse forms of legitimacy of government and governance in the country of the intervened, and partially in the society of the interveners. It is logically and rationally risky to reverse this relation between the phenomena of an intervention and its "background" and origin. Very often, similar phenomena raise the temptation to ask for *comparison*, but the same phenomena do not level the causes and roots of an intervention. This is evident in the false comparison between the legitimacy of the Iraq war and the intervention in Afghanistan, and it is bizarre when the Kosovo intervention is compared to the occupation of Crimea. *It is dangerous to use international law only formally, without taking into account the context*

and the analysis of the affected persons and their social constellation. However, my main argument is that **the cultural diversity and particularity of a society of intervention does not make an intervention "unique" in structure and effects**. The "anthropology of interventions" follows structures that belong to *social anthropology* as methodical and systematic instrument.

N.B.: This little excursion does not directly fit with the main arguments in this essay, but it seems to be critical for all methodological considerations on the criteria of social stability and legitimate governance.[45] A good example is the cycle from enthusiasm to adaptation to disappointment to open aversion regarding the reactions of all or part of the intervened society. There has been no intervention that I know of where this cycle did not manifest itself in the course of the intervention. Cautiously enough, I suggest that it is one of the stabilizing factors of a society of intervention. A realistic polity in terms of quick impact could never meet the enthusiastic expectations at the beginning of an "intervened" liberation. Disappointment, though, is a facilitator of political discourse; it allows opposition within the society of intervention, not least by demanding a public space to negotiate the sources of disappointment and even hostility (which, in rare cases, lead to open aggression against the interveners. The society of intervention has its stabilizing effects, too).

Societies of intervention are characterized by dynamic relations between interveners and the intervened.

These relations may lead to partial fusion, collusive situations, and the development of new social structures; the latter are no simple compromises among interveners and the intervened. Indeed, the new structures tend to be irreversible. This assumption is central to analyses of interventions and of governance under intervention.[46] It is daring to postulate a "new" society as a result of the communication and interaction between interveners and the intervened.

45 Types and structures of societies vary to a certain degree, but some structures are analogous in all societies, among them ways of organizing dynamic stability. "Culture" plays an eminent role as an intervening variable, but is not the essential substrate of this structural homology. Readers will kindly forgive that no further excursion is made regarding this grand assumption. The old rift between culture and social anthropology has been stored in the archives. The "social" component is more often the leading element in considerations about the changes in structure and dynamics of a society, "culture" adding accelerators or retarders. Hysteresis effects belong to both domains.

46 Cf. Zürcher (2010: 19-30): Communication among interveners and the intervened can have contractual features and add to the social order, with or without the action by the state.

If we consider conflict theory as a central element of the theory of society, the new society is *new* insofar as its procedures and actions of conflict resolution can be described as *beyond a compromise* between the interveners' societies and the society of the intervened; even if the "compromise" comes into existence by force from the interveners' side. It is clear that a new society is not a normative claim, i.e. that it comes from an intervention. Rather, the attribute "new" is the summary of observable societal structures that are, however, not observables with regard to details or disaggregated findings, insofar as it is difficult to differentiate between elements that belong to the society of intervention and those that were part of the society as it was before the intervention. When it comes to research, it is important to concentrate on the demonstration of those elements of the society that are irreversible and would obviously not be observable without the intervention. I am aware that there is a critical interface between policy and political or social science. The logic of the argument cannot be reverted. The effects from the intervention inevitably produce a class of conflicts that are not part of the conflicts that had caused the intervention. The root conflicts may influence particular conflicts stemming from the intervention. These conflicts in turn can refuel the root conflicts, but they do not cause them. This argument is a variation of the observation in thesis I, where I stated that sometimes, when the intervention conflicts become an object of aversion for the intervened, there can be a certain nostalgia for the root conflicts.

The properties of *trust* (in persons or groups) or confidence (in institutions) are essential for any society, and thus also for effective governance. Trust will play big role in my discussion of new social structures in Afghanistan (Chapter 4). But at this point, I wish to highlight a more general problem. We know that any kind of stability requires trust. When it comes to setting the rules for embedding conflicts, people must trust in their counterparts, authorities, even in their adversaries, and they must develop a minimal level of confidence in institutions, especially when the rules coming from these institutions have a direct impact on them. In any context relevant to the intervention, the interface between individual trust and collective confidence plays a big role.[47]

47 This plays a big role for almost all projects in our research context. A cross-section forum on *Trust* has been established dealing mainly with generalized trust and social trust as relevant factors in understanding the stability and structure of social change. Connectivity is important, e.g. with social capital or effective delivery of goods, but also with the idiosyncrasies of accepting the delivery, but not trusting the deliverer.

Collusion is a frequent phenomenon in societies of intervention. The collusive mode appears when two actors, each ascribing to a different system of norms, unite in wrongdoing, i.e. their action is not permitted in either of their dominant value systems. Many everyday acts are collusive, and most of them are not consequential, but if you have big cases and big crime involved, then collusion becomes a major spoiler in any constructive process. Collusion has hidden "rules" that do not add formally to the embedding of conflicts, but often do have a strong bonding effect on the immediate actors involved. This is in addition to similar effects from corruption within the limited ranges of effects and time. One example may serve as an explanation: while the Taliban were identified as "the enemy" to intervention forces, some Taliban were pacified temporarily to allow the construction of a road through "their" territory. This is not corruption, but collusion. The interveners often underestimate collusion both in its ethical dimensions as well as in its effects. They are not aware that they are not only a part of collusive communication in the intervened country, but have a story of collusive embedding at home as well. A telling example for the entire Western world is the Mafia, which is often opposed to the rule of law and prosecution or judicial institutions but abuses this opposition by using the appearance of legality and the methods of the legal system in order to do business with their opponents.[48]

The system level of these new societies of intervention is in particular tension with the life-world of the intervened.

This directly affects the system of rules (institutions) in such societies, and all aspects of governance on a micro-social level as well (conflict-regulation, tradition, values, *habitus*). The main reason for this tension is the fact that interveners normally start to focus on and deal with the system-level while neglecting the life-world and micro-social structures.

The rationale of this argument is enshrined in Habermas' interpretation of the relation between system and *Lebenswelt.*[49] However, in order to make my

48 Mafia utilizes the judiciary in order to get impunity or even protection. Cf. the most recent publication by Sandro de Riccardis: "La mafia siamo noi" (We are the Mafia), Torino 2017, add. Reviewer Thomas Steinfeld rightly comments that there is an almost overwhelming literature critical of the Mafia that insists on a dualism between the pure citizens and criminals, while clientelism at all layers of society survives all attacks by functionally embedding into the core structures of society: Thomas Steinfeld "Freunde von Freunden" SZ 2017/03/03.

49 As a philosophical term, and a significant one in the social sciences, the original "Lebenswelt," as used by Husserl, Schütz, Habermas, Blumenberg, and others, is preferable to "life-

point, I do not require a complete political judgment on his thesis regarding the colonizing effect of the system on the life-world. I think it is more important to realize that most legitimizing aspects of the intervention are at the system level, while most effects from the intervention can be observed (only) at the level of life-world – or, in slightly polemic terms: **the discourse at the system level does not reflect the *empirical* richness and variety of effects that occur in the *Lebenswelt* of the intervened (cf. Scott, J. C. 1998:7). I dare say that there is *another* discourse at the system level, far away from the experience of the intervened people but strongly embedded in the culture of intervention and in the established pattern of communication among interveners and the representatives of the intervened**.

This assumption has its traps. It is obvious that the theoretical base is typically "Western" in its structure and logic; the system is linked to formal institutions, and the life-world, colonized by the system, fights for the preservation, if not transformation, of informal institutions and communication. Ideal-typically, the two spheres meet at a point that could be declared "public space," where interests, power, and politics are negotiated and lead towards an ever-dynamic governance. Reality is far from this ideal in any occupation or intervention regime, but its normative appeal is powerful in itself. It has an impact on all agency and communication in the social field and thus affects all actors. "Non-Western" views would not perceive such a vertical system, e.g. if the strong patronage structures of old prevail. One could assume that a great distance between system and life-world would be enriched with buffer institutions in order to moderate necessary conflicts between formal and informal institutions. When the distance is short, the probability of either standstill or rash conflict without moderation may be bigger.[50]

Each society of intervention develops its specific culture of intervention (albeit often diachronically, with both the intervened and the interveners).

This thesis emerges out of the specificities of changes in society; matters of public vs. private, gender issues, value orders, and *habitus* are becoming more relevant.

world." However, the English term can be self-explanatory in our context and shall be used to establish a certain distance to *philosophical* terminology.

50 I owe Anke Draude for some most important insights into the problem.

I have often been criticized for concentrating too much on the discourses among the interveners and not giving the intervened enough of a voice (in our research group explicit in: Robotham, C./Roeder, p. 2012). I hope to ameliorate this criticism by distinguishing between two different aspects. One aspect is the discourse of the intervention that is developing and differentiating its aspects in the society of the interveners (intervention discourse, Homeland Discourse (cf. Daxner and Neumann (2012)) and all through Chapter 4). But the other aspect, and this is what I want to focus on here, is the fact that the society of intervention is building its "own" *culture of intervention*, which is more sustainable than elements of such a culture in the societies of the interveners. Another hypothesis delves into the field of memory and declares that some of these elements will be constitutive for the *cultural* memory of these societies as well. (Without belaboring the point, I would like to call attention to the postcolonial framing of this aspect of lasting cultural memory over many generations.) For the society of the intervened, it is evident that the intervention is a central part of the new society's cultural fabric. It is the intervention that offers a *symbolic space* that can be compared to previous periods. I chose the examples I did for these comparisons with ideological intentions, in a way almost forcing certain associations and analogies.

Later in the text, I will return to this aspect in order to account for the hysteresis effect as explained by Bourdieu: cf. p. 54, 152, 162.

I have extracted a few examples from the notes I have kept over the years. One stereotype is clearly linked to behavioral phenomena. Afghans say, "The ISAF soldiers behave 'like the Russians' 30 years ago…" or, "Ambassador X's influence on the president is similar to that of Ambassador Y on the king…" Collective memory, before it becomes solid in cultural memory, is reconstructed and distorts historical events. Many young Afghans have an almost nostalgic notion of the times under Zahir Shah, times that they cannot know other than through the stories of their grandparents and other older individuals. When I realized around 2005 that students and other young people were turning out to be more conservative than the young generation during the Golden Hour, I asked many of them why they would prefer the life under the previous king (Zahir Shah, more than 30 years ago), or why they prefer traditional arranged marriages to a more liberal and self-determined mating routine. Their answers were vague, but did offer one piece of insight: as the intervention did not improve their *individual freedom of choice* and their *individual opportunities*, they would rather **avoid risks** and escape into the cultural memory of a

time in which, according to the narrative, the **collective** was better off, even though this is a narrative that cannot produce any evidence that it would have been better for them as individuals, had they been alive at the time. The culture of intervention is always a hybrid, but this classification remains meaningless as long it is abstract. When certain narratives turn concrete, it is not so important that their story is true to the historical facts. For those for whom belonging to a certain place in society is important, the legitimacy of their place in said society is fixed by the interpretation of and commentary on the narrative. This attitude is relevant to processes of adoption or rejection of changes in habitus that come along with the intervention. I deliberately do not say that these changes are brought by the interveners or are an effect of the people's resistance, because we cannot know exactly how the effects from the intervention are processed in the minds of individuals and groups. There will always remain an element of mystery or an inability to know everything in these sorts of situations.

I have been attracted to the culture of intervention since my first days in Kosovo, and this attraction has guided my interest in the "anthropology of intervention," which is not a direct subsection of the anthropology of war. We have good reasons to think that such an anthropology might be very useful, not only for reasons of research (mainly in ethnology), but also with regard to the very practical aspects of a society under intervention. The intervention *provokes* changes in culture and habitus – and this is the main difference when compared to to simply saying that the culture(s) of the interveners meet or clash with the culture(s) of the intervened. Such encounters and clashes take place, but within a new social system, of which one cannot easily say which side has just taken over what elements from the respective other side.[51] "Culture" in the age of post-colonial critique and in global communication is a rather ambiguous term. The only attempt to define my concept is negative insofar as I do not reflect

51 It would go too far to explain in detail why it is better not to conduct these studies of the culture of interventions with the instruments of cultural anthropology. Social anthropology and conflict theory (subsequently theories of society based upon conflict theory) are simply better approaches. Many more observations are described in my personal accounts on Kosovo Daxner (2004a). My Afghan experience in this field, after 13 years of studying the country, is still too limited as to further elaborate on it here. This is neither a humble nor a hypocritical account of the fact that I am not an anthropologist or ethnologist. Any policy-oriented expertise, not only a sociological approach, is well advised to accept more support from these disciplines than they normally do. My criticism of the little knowledge that political decision makers and their advisers possess regarding the culture of intervention is based on the fact that many of the hegemonic discourses that seek to legitimize an intervention are not built upon sufficient knowledge of either side.

upon the dichotomy of high culture and popular culture, and it is always the cultural practices on all levels of the life-world that I am interested in, more than the cultural reflections on the system level. In Chapter 4, I shall describe the effects of the culture of intervention within the frame of the emerging new middle classes.

As a precaution, it seems to be useful not to allow this consideration on culture to become an argument against anthropological and ethnological research in the context of intervention. Often, such research is denounced as being in support of the war.[52] It is true that warfare and reconnaissance have always utilized ethnological tools, and that these have been upgraded after unsuccessful wars, e.g. the U.S. disaster in Vietnam. The reason is that military strategists are convinced that it would help their strategy if they "understood" their enemy better. I believe this is an invalid argument because the opposite is as true, or even truer: you must "understand" your partner or the beneficiaries in peacekeeping if you want to intervene successfully. Spies and development aids have a tendency to "go native" and then get lost in the culture of the "Other." Their findings are often useless. This is the reason why good research in the context of intervention should try to "understand" both cultures equally, the interveners and intervened. Well-grounded "understanding" is the precondition for letting empathy develop when building stronger moral norms in peacekeeping and peace-building; without empathy, peace operations are not really possible.

Furthermore, the cultures of interventions do not mirror the "clash of civilizations," as Samuel Huntington has imagined a late period of new global disorder. On the contrary, cultures of intervention can be understood as the complex dependent variable for which the intervention, and not the intransigent civilizations, provides the most solid interpretation and meaning.

Knowledge about your partner as a principle is absolutely necessary. No less an expert than Samantha Powers makes this knowledge a central point of her diplomatic code (Powers, p. 2016). The problem is much deeper than just instrumental teaching and preparing for actors in times of intervention, and it goes deeper than knowledge management. Very often, what you know about the intervened transforms your self-perception as one of the interveners.

52 Cf. Waterston (2009); Roberts (2011: 81-98)

Only recently have some of these reflections been met by a discourse on "stability" in the cooperation between the German Foreign Office and our Cooperative Research Center.[53] The German foreign office has defined *stability* as an intermediary stage in the attempt to make a society ready for good governance and the building of statehood. One diplomat compared the stabilization mission as an act of intensive care before one could continue the process of healing a patient – not a bad image. There are many elements that make for a stable society, i.e. one that provides solid ground for reforms and institution building. Stabilization is not a softening synonym for peace building; it is a process during which a society that has yet to become ready for stable reforms shall be shielded from negative interfering events.

Stability is something like a compromise between a goal one wants to achieve (e.g. security) and resignation (e.g. there is no chance to end violence). The term has recently become linked to fragility and fragile states. A "fragile system" does not necessarily have a negative connotation, but increasingly it is a synonym for systems at risk or failing societies or states. Almost always, fragility is linked to violence, in particular in the context of the interaction of social violence and political violence. In the more recent construction of fragility by OECD, Afghanistan is extremely fragile in almost every dimension described: Economics, Environment, Politics, Security, Society. (OECD 2016, 76-102) Stability is often shaken by violent terrorist attacks. There are some similarities to the "Amok"-phenomenon that is appearing in many Western societies. Amok as an anomic societal problem should be more closely compared to the terrorist patterns. This is part of a phenomenology of violent conflicts, represented by researchers like Wolfgang Sofsky and, very recently, Jörn Ahrens. (Gabbert 2004, Sofsky 2002, Ahrens 2017)

A culture of trust is different from a passive one in which acceptance of political changes is only forced; a society of intervention does not necessarily and/or quasi automatically provide such a culture of trust. Rather intensive efforts are required in order to make the society of the intervened ready to accept certain changes without the application of illegitimate force. Without a profound and verifiable knowledge of this society, a culture of intervention will not connect with both actors as necessary for any societal progress. I am well

53 I owe many insights to Kristof Gosztonyi from our research project, who was assigned to the Foreign Office crisis prevention division in 2016 and whose concepts of stabilization are no longer under the spell of securitization. The spell was broken when *security* was replaced by *stability*. But there are also traps in the new connotation, as will be shown.

aware that this can also be read as a neo-colonialist argument for penetrating the hearts and minds of the intervened society. Indeed, the similarity of legitimate and illegitimate practices is obvious. Very often the practices are the same, but their intentions and directions vary. **A cultural submission of or surrender by the intervened is not what makes a society of intervention stable**. This not an argument for the (neo-)ethno-nationalisms of many occupied or intervened people, as described earlier. Development cooperation, diplomacy, and open communication can be developed in order to avoid a hegemonic discourse and culture imposed by the interveners instead of by former colonialists. However, this requires more than good will or a collateral occupation with the cultural interfaces of the intervention. There is one direct, but complex, connection with terrorism as an epiphenomenon of intervention. It is not the cultural differences as such that are the hotbed for violent actions, but the openness of a local culture to be hijacked by an aggressive, primarily religious ideology. It is a tragic mistake to hope to avoid a clash by strategically attempting to win *hearts and minds*, as is at times the policy of the interveners. It would only be partially successful if the original culture of the intervened were *one*, or isolated and inaccessible for other influences. This has never been the case. Two effects are likely to emerge the very moment that the superiority and authority of the interveners touches the surface of the life-world of the intervened: the life-world breaks up into a multitude of "life-worlds," depending on the position of the respective groups within the social space created by the intervention, and an imposed inferiority complex seeks compensation, or even revenge. If the "hearts" component of *hearts and minds* implies an emotional implantation via open-heart surgery, then it is likely to fail (the good colonialists will only be replaced by the trustworthy liberators or another species of benefactors). However, objective rescue and relief does not necessarily mean cultural complicity; at best, an appeasement approach may create some stability, which is a stage far ahead of reconciliation.

We come across similar problems with regard to the cultural aspect of gaining the "minds" as an intervener's approach. One never knows how deeply and how sustainably the directing of minds can succeed, even if the arguments look convincing, e.g. the understanding of subtexts in new discourses cannot be proven instantly. Here, education matters above anything else, and pedagogical processes take more time than training and competence building strategies.

It would be helpful here to delve into a controversy within cultural anthropology, viz. the prevailing difference building approach, which seems to be deconstructing social cohesiveness. But this would require another full chapter on society and culture of intervention theory and go beyond my present considerations. (Malešević, Siniša, 2008)

The Homeland Discourse of the interveners plays a decisive role in shaping the relationship between interveners and intervened.

Homeland Discourse is an element of intervention research that has been underestimated for a long time (or was underrated as critical media research). The intervened also have their Homeland Discourse, and both discourses are more or less integrated in the culture of intervention. However, during an intervention, the impact of the intervener's Homeland Discourse tends to be hegemonic, or at least more effective regarding their practices.

More than five years of intensive research have brought some significant results for one country of the intervening alliance – Germany. We claim that Homeland Discourse displays abundant influence on political and military decisions and reflects abundant feedback from individual actors in Afghanistan, thus creating a very specific mindset and public opinion regarding the intervention in Afghanistan. Indeed, we postulate that the interventions with German participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan have changed Germany (Daxner, M./Neumann, H. 2012). I am not going to unduly condense the research and findings here, but will instead refer to the book (and other recent publications[54]) and provide a definition of Homeland Discourse:

Homeland Discourse comprises all discursive practices and strategies that refer to the legitimacy, recognition, and assessment of policies and the engagement of troops out of the (national or alliance) area. It is a stream of knowledge without distinct authors and with uneven authority.

Homeland Discourse effectively structures the public mindset, the interaction between the media and the public, the backstage of political decisions, and the policies of legitimacy for out of area engagement and global alliances. Ultimately, Homeland Discourse is, of course, not restricted to military and humanitarian missions, as could be shown with regard to the fields of

54 Daxner (2014c); Daxner (2014b); Daxner (2013d); Daxner (2014d)

international justice, indirect interventions through boycotts and restrictions of movement, or support provided to rebellions and insurgencies. Of course, a Homeland Discourse has been developing in Afghanistan as well, and there is growing evidence that the new society of intervention also produces its own Homeland Discourse.[55] However, for the time being – i.e. with the intervention still going on, even after the ISAF pullout of 2014 – Homeland Discourse in the societies of the interveners dominates this level of understanding the intervention. I do anticipate clashes on a discursive level that will be far more aggressive in the future than they already are. The interpretation of the intervention and its inclusion in collective and cultural memories will also provide indicators of the eventual diminishing stability of the society of intervention and the partial creation of two or more narratives of the intervention.

A very recent test of this assumption is the present debate in Germany about deporting Afghans back home who have not earned the right to stay under the asylum and refugee laws. The Brussels Agreement as a collateral result from the donors' conference of 2016[56] very clearly reflects Homeland Discourse in

55 The mode of disappointment is nothing new to an intervention. Interveners are no longer seen as liberators or friends, but become functionally more distanced. The following headline is typical for the last months before the pull-out of ISAF: "Karzai: Afghan War fought in West's Interest" (Al Jazeera.com/news/asia/2014/03/karzai …(acc. 2014/03/03). In 2015, Karzai even said that the West had "betrayed" Afghanistan and criticized drone-strikes and other military actions. (Cf. NYT 2015/06/16) Typically, no leading politician wants to be seen as anti-American, but rather, on another discursive level, as "anti-western and opposed to the U.S. activities."

56 On October 2, 2016, the EU and Afghanistan signed a document on the subject of opening the country for more deportations in exchange for continuous financial support: "Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU." Since then, media and humanitarian NGOs have protested intensely against the policies of the German Ministry of the Interior's execution of deportations. Until the end of February 2017, "only" some 70 Afghans were deported, out of a potential number of 50,000 without residence permits. But the ideological effect on the right wing of society was looked for by the Minister of Interior. He wants to demonstrate that the government is much better at this business than a lawless populist opposition ever could be; and of course, a deterrent effect on more Afghans willing to leave their country is also intended. At the moment, I am doing research to analyze the effect of these measures on the Afghan Diaspora in Germany. For the EU/German agreements also cf. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/eu-and-afghanistan-get-deal... (2016/10/06) *and* https://thruttig.wordpress.com/2016/10/05/; I have contributed to the complex matter by doing some research for the GIZ: Mapping the Afghan Diaspora and Report (2017, t.b.p.). One main focus is on a concept for voluntary returnees. Silvia Nicola and I wrote recommendations under the title Prepare, Protect, Promote. The study has not yet been reviewed by GIZ. The most recent document is "Relocation and Resettlement – State of Play," February 7, 2017. (www.factsheet.relocation_and_resettlement.en.pdf) by the European Commission, based on the Ninth Report on Relocation and Resettlement (Brussels, 8.2.2017 COM(2017) 74 final) (all acc. 2017/02/28).

Germany. In this document, and thereafter in German policies, all attempts to denigrate specific rights of Afghan migrants and refugees are condensed in a nutshell.

The refugee and deportation crisis points at the heart of the theory of a society and culture of intervention. A rather rough and exaggerated observation is that the **German policy on this complex issue makes it seem like no intervention ever happened**. Not only is this policy driven by domestic, partisan, and intra-EU considerations; Afghans in this case are treated like arriving migrants from any other country like Syria, the Maghreb, or Central Africa. They are treated as asylum seekers or unwelcome immigrants. (The German debate about replacing the "or" with "as" shall not be discussed here, but it is responsible for the terrible deterioration of domestic discourse. However, I believe that their little knowledge about the intervention intensifies the non-empathetic attitude towards the discursive patterns of those in the higher ranks of politics and their followers on lower levels.) At the core of the problem is the question of whether Afghans who do not enjoy the right to asylum, according to the constitution, should be sent back forcefully. (I call it *deportation*, which is the adequate English term anyway; the common German term, "Abschiebung," is slightly milder. In official documents, the Germans stamp "DEPORTED.") Afghans do come to Europe for several reasons, but all of these are linked to the intervention; they come despite the intervention that has liberated the country from Taliban rule. They come because of the intervention that has brought many more conflicts in addition to the root conflicts already there. They come from a country that considers itself at war despite the fact that there is not even a civil war in the common understanding. They come because they do not see any future in their home country, neither for themselves nor for their children. Together, all of this makes them different from refugees who come because they simply want to save their own lives and have the option to survive, both they themselves and their families. They come from a country for which Germany has partly taken responsibility by engaging in the intervention. **The migration regime is part of this liability, and it is, unfortunately, not aware that its governance is poor because of the unawareness of the causes in the intervention**.

It is necessary to be very clear that this criticism is not to be generalized; all German policy does not follow the more populist and ethnophobic discourse strategies. Many politicians and a significant cross section of the general public

are, on the contrary, highly empathetic and supportive. However, this is impeded by the government, which has bluntly declared Afghanistan to be a safe country of origin and *for return*. Here lies the problem: the intervention has created a discourse in which Afghanistan must appear as safe and secure for returnees *because* of the German engagement in the intervention. This is a counter-factual reasoning backed by poor logic insofar as the conditions for returnees are even worse than for those who live in Afghanistan. Despite a large German diaspora and good information about the dangers and risks for Germans in Afghanistan, the future of those to be deported plays a lesser role in the legitimacy game regarding popular consent to the deportations. Within governance discourse, one could ironically say that **the highly consolidated statehood in Germany adopts strategies further weakening the poor statehood in Afghanistan by adding to its instability and insecurity through sending back some thousand unwanted migrants.**[57]

The complex of refugees and returnees is a very good example of the repercussions of intervention policies on domestic affairs and Homeland Discourse; it also shows that the increase in numbers of actors makes state-borne governance attempts less coherent and effective and creates a lot of uncertainty. Knowledge is one of the major intervening variables.

2.2 The knowledge of the intervention[58]

"We did not want to see what we could know" at the beginning of the intervention.[59] This statement by a ranking expert in the Ministry of Cooperation

57 The entire refugee/migrant policy and discourse is part of recent research and consulting activities in Germany, very often structured along the lines of administration (different ministries with different tasks) and organizations (such as the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees, known by its German abbreviation, BAMF). There is no coherent or comprehensive approach. Many of these difficulties in the formulation and operation of a unified policy suffer from overarching partisan attempts to fence in the right-wing populist movements and parties, as well as preparations for the coming German electoral campaigns in the near future. I am personally involved in research on the diaspora and the contributions it can make to prepare for a humane and sustainable return of voluntary repatriation; this work has been commissioned by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development.

58 The term is borrowed from my colleagues Berit Bliesemann-de Guevara and Florian Kühn. What grammar does not say, the context does. I have determined that interventions are not actors. However, they incorporate knowledge and communication. Cf. FN 61.

59 Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka, from the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development at the Berghof Conference on "Patronage and Corruption in North-East Afghanistan," 2016/06/13.

and Development (BMZ) seems to reflect the common experiences of actors in interventions. In retrospect, the statement is always right; the intervention in itself is a learning system with a wide variety of learning actors. In the case of Afghanistan, 2001 is a treacherous date. More than 25 years of foreign intervention had already passed at that time; what kind of knowledge has been passed to the actors and the interpreters of the respective situations?

Knowledge is related to familiarity, and familiarity is a condition for trustworthy communication (Hölck, L. 2016: 384f.).[60] Let us assume a society of intervention, and then interpret statements like these: *The Afghans tend to know the Germans better than the Germans know themselves* (a sentence with high significance in the refugee debate), or: *After six weeks I know the Afghans better than they themselves* (a U.S. PRT commander in 2006). Where and how did the diverse actors (and the collectives they belong to) get the chance or develop the ability to accumulate this knowledge, to acquire this certainty about their counterparts? The answers will be found in the analysis of the society of intervention, but only in concrete environments. And the different functions of that knowledge should also be differentiated; it may serve for lending legitimacy to certain actions and policies, and it also may serve to bolster legitimacy when under scrutiny at home. It may also provide a head start before the other side starts a new move. Familiarity, as well as disappointment, distrust, and caution, also develop within a society of intervention. We have to learn how to trust what we think we know about this society – at least for as long as we do not know any better.

Would it be advisable to test our "knowledge of the intervention" (as both a transitive and intransitive term, coined by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara)?[61] Which theory of an intervention provides the backdrop for the entire thesis of my investigation? Again, the question is not trivial, because most of the founding literature of the project was taken from the peacekeeping and state-building literature, which is more focused on state and statehood than on governance in areas apart from state, and not only in the Afghan case. The changes in headers are already an indicator for changes in the concept or on the discursive level of recipients.

The results of a two-year research project, initiated by H.J. Giessmann and myself, and operated by Kristof Gosztonyi, Basir Feda, and Hayatullah Jawad, are a good example of transferrable methods on exploring social change.

60 This is one of the fundamental conclusions by Lasse Hölck from his study of colonial and post-colonial society building. I will come back to this in my conclusions. Cf. Hölck (2016)

61 Cf. Bliesemann de Guevara (2014: 67 - 93)

Knowledge is critical to all political action. This is trivial. Less trivial is the observation that the gap between *opinions* and *knowledge* can be either wide or narrow. The dominance of short-lived opinions and emotions regarding a topic that has become a problem makes for discursive strategies that often are less short-lived and can even become stable prejudice. This is what we have investigated in the Homeland Discourse studies, and it is all the more important because politics wants to release a domain into self-reliance, as is the case with Afghanistan.

2.2.1 System and life-world/Lebenswelt

I will come back to this issue and approach it from an angle other than the one I used to examine the theses on intervention (cf. 2.1). The old image of the *system/life-world* (Lebenswelt) dichotomy is more than useful (Habermas, J. 1981; Preyer, G. et al. 1996; Sacchi, S. 1994).[62] Traditions, rituals, and all practices beyond questioning appear as visible and observable parts of the villagers' perceptions and thus their "mindsets" – of course, within the limitations of such *observations*. All culture or value threats and the fear of being uprooted can be interpreted in this context. (In some countries not undergoing military intervention, the value threat and generalized suspicion against Western values are similar to what we find in local Afghan communities. It is very difficult to find the source of the value threat directly in the intervention; there could be an indirect impact of Western values and ideologies, using the intervention as trajectory.) Habermas' observation for our society – that the system is colonizing the life-world – can be applied to the Afghan villages as well: we can also call it the *return of the state* (Evans, P. et al. 1985; Koehler, J. 2015).[63] In a more daring metaphor, I would conclude that **the state is the imaginary "Other" to the self-determined societal structure at the bottom of society**, i.e. where the life-world has provided and still is providing some solid frames for social practices. No doubt the entirety of the life-world has been affected by war and intervention; it is also the materialized memory of the collective

62 My particular interest in the concept is not so much philosophical as it is focused on confronting the discursive figure of colonizing the life-world by the system: Habermas, p. 188.

63 The return of the state is a constructed metaphor with a subtext biased by the specific "Gestalt" of the state. Actually, it is quest for *statehood* that is locally demanded, even if "the state" is considered weak, corrupt, and inadequate. In the most recent publication by Böhnke (2017: 91-116), this demand for statehood is linked to the diachronic emergence of such demands. "Not all good things at the same time" is also one of Koehler's notions related to the observation of reversible processes.

experiences and institutions – formal and informal – that have dominated reproduction through the year and life cycles of the local population. The people may reject the state, or the effects from particular statehood. The imaginary belief in the "Other" is one of the occasions where we can see a concrete relation between society and the state. For any aspect of governance the question is not only how commons are delivered, but also within which frame the deliverer – the state – is positioned in the delegating imagination.

The challenge is how to describe and classify the bottom of a society under intervention. We have some models from early research that look into this question. With regard to winning the *hearts and minds* of an intervened society, one can start with British efforts in Malaysia in the 1950s (Koehler, J. 2010, 77).[64] But what did it mean to win hearts and minds then, what does it mean today, and does it make any sense at all? (Sangar, E. 2014 33-49, 50f.). How does this aspect relate to the participation of the interveners' populations in the direct and indirect decision making of the interveners? (Venesson, P. 2014). From Bourdieu one can learn how to observe the effects of uprooting small communities and how to follow the heavy and lasting impact of an intervention on all its subjects as they become objects of unwanted change. Honor and dignity, as well as the certainties of coping with an environment that can be trusted *because it is known*, immediately become political when the factors of *resistance* emerge. This is one of the essentials in Bourdieu's research on Algeria after 1960 (Bourdieu, P. 2003; Yacine, T. 2004). The pursuit of hearts and minds, which was an explicit purpose of COIN, was no success.

Excursion*:* I am going to take you on a detour. Knowledge of the intervention also implies that you must know each other before you can

64 In a moment of rare openness, the Wikipedia article on the Malayan Emergency (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ malayan_emergency, acc. 2015/08/29) denounces the ambiguity of any hearts-and-minds-approach and compares the British experience to the Vietnam wars to come. Hearts and Minds in post-Vietnam warfare is different from earlier strategies: it is embedded into COIN (Counter-Insurgencies) and the WoT. It is no longer the broad population at the base of society that is the main target, but guerillas or insurgents. The CIMIC approach is different, aiming at the real hearts and minds of the people, but under a military imperative, such as troop protection. A problem I cannot touch upon here is what "behind the lines" means in asymmetrical warfare, which is what most of the intervention situations are. For the military, aiming for hearts and minds often means that they could not get support from friendly forces. It is like heroism in post-heroic times. Cf. also my remarks on Major Jim Gant in the following pages. All of this sheds an ambiguous light on the title of the first project (C1) in the SFB 700. Cf. FN 5.

understand each other. First, a little anecdote may serve as an introduction. As far as the minds are concerned, one of our competent Afghan partners made an interesting remark: the well-educated and politically experienced former Woliswoli (Governor) of the district of Warsaj, a man named Amanullah, said that, "If only the people were better educated to understand the Western concepts, they would adopt less hostile and more productive opinions about the West."[65] There is some logic in an intended accord of mutual understanding. The interveners and their projects and practices represent western concepts. To know them, to learn whether they are representative of a coherent system or whether they are contingent upon it, is one of the basic lessons for the intervened; for the interveners, the learning process of the intervened turns into their own process of perception and interpretation. It would be not self-explanatory if you were to postulate that winning minds and hearts without understanding is not possible. Therefore, in the beginning, you have to get to know one another.

The second anecdote is telling. In 2006, close to the Pakistan border, with heavy artillery smoke over the hills, I was invited for lunch at the American PRT in a place where a UNAMA mission had been opened that day. We shared lunch with many local elders who had listened to the UNAMA SRSG rather reservedly only an hour before. Now everything seemed to be all right, and the American colonel told me, as quoted above: "*After six weeks I know the Afghans better than they themselves.*" This kind of "knowing the other" is not simply a post-colonial attitude; it is the deeply felt certainty of a superior knowledge base that cannot be attained reciprocally by the intervened. It is linked to power, and it replaces the empirical "world" with an imaginary one.

Is there sense in gaining *hearts*? Are not those who *trust* the interveners' offers and incentives to get support through power and assistance in their life-world struggles and conflicts betrayed – not political in the big sense, but local inter-community hassles? They are betrayed because they become instruments in another conflict that is not theirs by becoming allies and friends of an officer whose unit is fighting for information and against insurgents. I am going to tell an exemplary story of an American Special Forces officer, Major Jim Gant. This officer has published memoirs, with the consent of his superiors. He tells

65 Rügen Seminar of Project C9, transcript Michael Daxner, December 15-21, 2014.

his story, set in a remote village in the east of Afghanistan, as an example of how to subversively gain the hearts and minds of villagers and, ultimately, to draw generalized conclusions on how to make an intervention a success (Daxner, M. 2010c; Gant, J. 2009).[66] Gant, a true warrior and veteran of many missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, had adopted a village, a "tribe" (his term) to do Special Operations work and, later on, to support the building of the ALP in a remote Kunar area. The deconstruction of his heroic text is, in a nutshell, a perfect account of relations between interveners and intervened **without the interference of the rules of the emerging society of intervention**. (Perhaps one could say that he established his own rules, pretending to be the legitimate representative of the U.S. intervening power, which is a good example of a **non-institutionalized set of rules without integration in the society of intervention.**)

I am introducing Jim Gant for several reasons. At first glance he appears to be a crazy colonial officer or a local tyrant, a kind of contemporary Kurtz from Joseph Conrad's "Heart of Darkness." He might be a typical, though not representative, member of a contested occupation regime. But at a closer look, he reveals some qualities that go much deeper into the understanding of interventions. He is selling benefits for intelligence; that is not unusual. But *his* way of contextualizing the situation goes far beyond post-colonial paternalism. He behaves like – indeed, he is – a local strongman, in common language a kind of little warlord. That this did not come to the attention of his superiors for a long time is not atypical for the intervention. But I consider it to be very dangerous that his private ethnology about the character and life-world of the Kunar villagers has penetrated into American Homeland Discourse as an example for how interveners *invent* their areas of intervention.

The story has an end that does not correct *this* aspect of the story, but is more of a routine end of an affair. Five years after his acclaimed report appeared, his now wife revealed the story of his rapid fall and final demotion. The former journalist had lived with Gant for most of his time in the village. The home-story of the drug addicted, alcoholic, dysfunctional hero is another side that is worth investigating.[67] When it comes to the privatization of official tasks,

66 There is some literature on PsyOps (Psychological Operations), much of it highly self-referential, that tries to overcome doubts and scruples about such practices. A model for Afghanistan is Roberts' "Villages on the Moon" Roberts (2005). Gant's book goes far beyond PsyOps.

67 The warrior framework and its problems for intervention armies will play a significant role in any research proposal that focuses both on German veterans and, more specifically, how

Gant's fate is not atypical. The memoirs, including Gant's last step into forced retirement, were written by Ann Scott Tyson (Meek, G. J. et al. 2014; Safranski, M. 2014; Tyson, A. S. 2014), and, more remarkably, reviewed by a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the DoD, Col. Joseph P. Collins, in a military journal.[68]

For me, this singular story is significant because it elaborates on more general aspects of the characteristics of a society of intervention. On the surface, an intervention brings with it a specific form of communication, a contractual communication or relation between interveners and intervened (Zürcher, C. 2010). But the more we leave the system level and dive into the life-world of both interveners and intervened, the more we discover quite a few different subtexts and dimensions. One dimension has already been named, the *privatization of ethno-social perceptions*, in Gant's case with an analogy to a famous Native American hero who ultimately had to *surrender*: *Sitting Bull*. Gant gave this name to the village elder, Gant's "brother" and "family." Another dimension is the extrapolation of personal experience into a general strategic *criticism of the military establishment and commanders*, linked to the notion of how to win a war that, at the time, was clearly not going to be won anytime soon. The *warrior* knows what is unknown to both his commanders and the politicians. This discourse is exactly what links the highest levels of policy and the most basic experiences of individual actors and social groups under circumstances of intervention.[69]

It will not distract us to take another detour. I remember the hearts and minds slogan being discussed among us in UNMIK in Kosovo. Let us compare the Afghanistan Intervention with the Kosovo Intervention, which took place from 1999 to 2008 (when the country declared independence). In the beginning, KFOR and UNMIK were well-loved. The hearts of the majority were with the

they compare to US veterans. Bestselling memoirs of Afghanistan veterans like Marcus Luttrell's *Lone Survivor* Luttrell/Robinson) shed significant light on the perception of local counterparts that depicts the interveners as far from wanting to win the hearts and minds of the intervened. The writer of *Lone Survivor* is a patriotic terminator. Gant adopted another role, becoming the "chief" of one tribe, fighting against this tribe's enemies while gaining its support for his COIN mission.

68 Cf. http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/the-rise-and-fall-of-major-jim-gant/. acc. 2015/08/25

69 Cf. FN 90. The example of Marcus Luttrell (Luttrell/Robinson (2014)) shows how important this element of warrior discourse can be. Luttrell's bestselling veteran's memoir is full of his resentment towards the enemy, all the while "knowing" what is supposed to be known by the reader, i.e. the American supporters of US Army and special operations soldiers.

interveners, because they were considered to have liberated the (Albanian-Kosovar) people from the yoke of the oppressing Serbs. When liberation shifted into occupation, love consequently shifted into realism, then disappointment, and finally a certain aversion and hostility. At that time, such a development was considered normal. Kosovo had a very short Golden Hour (1999-2000). Despite a negative turn in the population's perception, the protectorate managed to achieve a partial handover and a final disenchanted recognition of the newly independent state. My observations on the Afghan intervention are quite different from how I observed the Kosovo engagement. In Kosovo, after the failure of the Rambouillet conference, the urgency to protect people from ethnic cleansing was linked to a correction of the 1995 Dayton accords to allow Milosevic to stay in his position as an equal partner. The political prologue to the intervention had taken almost five years and developed its own history. Winning the hearts and minds of the Albanian majority need not have been planned for or intended. Liberation and rescue were triggers for the interveners' confidence. Afghanistan, in contrast, had suffered from 30 years of war and violence, but would never have progressed to an intervention after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 if 9/11 had not happened. (The U.S. support of the Northern Alliance in early 2001 was not an intervention in the sense of my theses.) The retaliation motif of the first stage of intervention after the fall of the Taliban was so dominant that winning hearts did not show up on the priority lists of the OEF and WoT strategists. This is also a proof of the proposition that root conflicts are not necessarily reflected in the building up of conflicts during the intervention.

Hearts and Minds has become a rhetoric tool instead of a clarifying trope, used by the actor who needs to win trust with the social groups he intends to gain influence upon. **The amount and intensity of trust may indicate this actor's position within the social field of the intervention.** One should think that to win and lose hearts is easier than winning and losing minds. **If this will become a rule depends on what each actor knows about all the other actors.**

The knowledge of the intervention is very often identical to the *dominant narrative* as told by the relevant actors. The semantics of these narratives vary widely. Their deconstruction is extremely useful in understanding how an indirect impact on decision-making comes from the diverse discourses of intervention. But this does not relieve social scientists from conducting research into the *facts* of the intervention.

The knowledge of the intervention is a key element in weighing success or failure – from all sides, not only that of the interveners. What has changed, and why has it changed? These questions define the viewpoints that serve as a springboard for answering many more political and practical questions. They are questions about the before and after of the intervention, about improvement or backlashes, about the sense of the intervention. Thus, they are rather part of the respective Homeland Discourses than of a process of fact-finding by digging into the practices of the intervention. *The intervention becomes an actor* in the *perception* of many people. Those whose lives have not changed – or seem not to have changed – tend to evade the intervention discourse. They believe that, no matter the circumstances, their lives will not change in the future. In this case, *subjectification* means de-contextualization. There is no "world" outside their very limited life-world. In Chapter 4, I shall explain why so many poor people at the bottom of society remain outside the emergence of the new middle class. The other extreme is a kind of pan-intervention discourse in which all phenomena and events are ascribed to the intervention. Within the education system, one can hope for a syllabus on the intervention embedded in subjects like Afghan history and civilization. Apart from formal education, interveners and Afghans alike lack basic facts and knowledge about the intervention. The subjectified intervention does not know itself. This deficit leads to unforced errors in communication and makes it difficult to establish meaningful discourses of the intervention, beyond, of course, the basic before and after pattern, which remains important.

The aspect of system vs. life-world also has one physical dimension: the human body does not occur on a system level, but as an abstract quantity, while in the life-world there is a dis-aggregated assembly of bodies that can breathe, eat and drink, and reproduce, but they also suffer and feel pain under duress and torture. Refugees bring their bodies with them into the countries of the interveners, at which point a resurrection of the bodies, of the whole persons, takes place. While the interveners have recently discovered the bodies of veterans[70] through PTSD and an extended amount of literature, the same is not so easily accessible for the intervened.

2.2.2 The purpose of the intervention and its justification

My concept of interventions shall serve for any military intervention. However, without concrete examples, it is difficult to differentiate its diverse strings

70 Cf. Daxner (2016: 107-118); Daxner/Mann (2016: 624-633); Daxner (2016: 107-118)

of arguments. For me, Afghanistan is an ideal model for these concepts because it demonstrates many of the elements displayed in the intervention theatre. The arguments I am using for the Afghan case could be applied to other interventions as well. Interventions can be read as an instrument with which to regulate conflicts. From conflict theory we know **that the causes and origins of a conflict ("root conflicts") do not causally indicate the ways and means of its regulation**. Interveners therefore *must add* their interests, capacities, and the normative framework of their legitimate agency to their political decision whether or not to intervene in a foreign territory.

As a part of critical discourse approach, I point out that opponents of the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, and prior to that, the Kosovo KFOR invasion, claimed the intervention was *war*. In the case of Afghanistan it has indeed *become war*. In the midst of the complex policies that go into legitimizing an intervention, going to war would be less credible than entering a stabilization mission. In Germany, the chancellor only officially permitted the usage of the term "war" in early 2009 (Daxner and Neumann, 31ff.). For the United States, the engagement in Afghanistan was considered a war before 9/11 and the undeclared support of the Northern Alliance, and after 9/11 with the War on Terror and support of ISAF.

I refrain from interpreting the Afghan intervention in the terms of grand theories like neo-realism or constructivism, and I do not enter the realm of geopolitical discourse. It is not always easy to abstain from interpreting my observations against the backdrop of these theories, but the advantage is that I am able to avoid pre-empirical concepts. Many of the findings in society cannot be directly applied to a concept like R2P or to the academic debate on whether an intervention more resembles a just war or a covert occupation. I hope to remain steadfast and truly concentrate on society, not the state. Intersections and frictions cannot be avoided, but I do not want to avoid a very specific dividing line between policy and science.

The Afghan intervention never constituted itself as a selfless and humanitarian act of liberation; its ambiguous aims failed to constitute the sense of liberation in the perception of an Afghan majority because the Golden Hour was wasted. The Golden Hour's waste has been, inter alia, the consequence of the neglect of one of its constituent elements: good will (Dobbins, J. et al. 2007: 15f). Without following Dobbin's general theory, his definition of the Golden Hour is as helpful as the problem is marginalized today. My observation is that, at the time, many international policies towards Afghanistan were still under the

spell of Donald Rumsfeld's and George W. Bush's concept of *no nation-building!* (Rashid, A. 2008: 74, 75). Where state-building was attempted, it was often upset by U.S. interference, as in the case of the imposition of pre-mature elections against the will of almost all Afghan peers, including President Karzai, in 2004. Even those who represent the unbroken righteousness of the interveners can locate much of my skepticism today in summary assessments. (The office of SIGAR regularly assesses and evaluates the cost/benefit strategy of all Afghanistan intervention activities (e.g. Sopko, J. F. 2014, cf. also FN 38) at a level of meticulous detail unheard of in Germany.) Political statements are embedded elements of the quarterly reports, and they are sometimes all but flattering for the political and military leadership. For Germany, the recent thesis by Dennis Bürjes gives some insight into how far behind the German calculation of the "costs of the intervention" has become.[71] If we omit the Golden Hour, the result of 13 years of intervention and war sounds more plausible, but anyone who has observed the sense of liberation expressed by so many people in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005 must be even more depressed by all that has not met the expectations of those hopeful individuals during the Golden Hour. I want to shed more light on this strain of arguments in order to better understand the present uncertainty regarding transition and upcoming transformation. Every sudden change in a social situation and every military occupation or intervention inspires hopes or fears in different parts of the population. When an intervention is understood to be a liberation from tyranny or an authoritarian regime, big expectations and hope prevail with the majority. Those who lose power and significant position will not welcome the change, but many among them will adapt quite effectively to the gap between the old elite and the new very important persons that organize themselves around the new powers (cf. Chapter 4 and the accounts of Frangis Spanta's research p. 114f.). In the beginning of every occupation that is perceived as liberation, the Golden Hour for the liberated people is different from the mindset of the interveners. For the people, the truism that *liberation does not equal liberty* is proven true very quickly. For the interveners, the process only begins when they realize whether the people's aspirations correspond with the aims of the intervention. The interveners try to establish modes of governance that will stabilize their rule and, at the same time, meet the expectations of the intervened. In Kosovo, UNMIK called this *peacekeeping through administration*,

71 Bürjes (2015), in his dissertation, makes it very clear that an intervention cannot provide sufficient overview on its material costs *when it is split into more than one purpose from the beginning*. Cf. p. 15.

and after one year, *peace-building through development. Administration* can be translated as governance through legitimizing *procedures*; *development* meant the development of *institutions*, i.e. the *rules* for such policy required a strong government, which is what UNMIK was in the beginning. Security and welfare governance initially met the expectations of most of the intervened; the judiciary was questioned from the beginning, and the rule of law was never established comprehensively. Very soon, the public mindset switched from trust in the new regime to doubt and disappointment. Consequently, *all modes* of governance were met with distrust; often, effective modes of delivery were considered illegitimate when they antagonized the idea of relevant social groups regarding the use of their new liberties. In Afghanistan, in contrast, disappointment arrived later in those sections of populace that truly felt liberated by both the victory of the Northern Alliance in 2001 *and* the following intervention. In Kosovo, the intervention was greeted as a change that would end all dictatorship and intra-state colonialism. In Afghanistan, the invasion was considered by many as the intervention to end all interventions, from indirect rule to obvious occupation. This created a vast public space that was allowed to nurture desires, interests, and optimistic expectations. But this is only the bright side. Had the interveners not immediately, i.e. after the Bonn Agreement, established the rule of the elite, who had played a major part in previous conflicts? The Golden Hour was an overarching period of optimism, but at no moment was that the optimism of a *unified* people, or of a significant majority (as in the case of the Albanian Kosovars). The Golden Hour ended in disappointment when two elements merged: the government of the intervened did not succeed in sustainably unifying the Afghan people under a leading idea of the future, and the interveners did not do enough nation-building as to prepare the people for a defensive action against the resurfacing Taliban and other insurgents. Policies intended to contain disappointment are an element that has been underrated in many assessments of the intervention. The effectiveness of governance under this shadow of disappointment must still be further evaluated, particularly because much of the intervened's lack of trust can be traced back to this disappointment.

2.2.3 Micro-social observations on Afghans and the intervention

Other overarching approaches to my issue can be found in the concepts of micro-social research. Randall Collins provides a possible sociological foundations (cf. Rössel, J. 2012 esp. chapters 2 and 3). The transfer or extrapolation from micro-social results to macro-societal and political structures is important

for interventions, as it is for many other fields. It is also methodologically fragile and limited in application. But Collins is useful for the methodical mix, which is sometimes close to ethno-methodology and interaction theory. All negotiations and bartering depend on certain patterns of interaction that can be discussed within diverse theories of conflict. Collins' approach, as opposed to the consensus-oriented theories of Parsons, etc., bridges conflict theory and micro-social research design.

This opens perspectives to linking intervention theory and conflict theory. In his PhD dissertation, Jan Koehler proves extensively and convincingly that his conflict theory, similar to Collins', is applicable to the explanation of empirical findings on the dynamics of social order in rural areas of Afghanistan.[72] It does not limit us to understand Koehler's conflict theory as based primarily on theories by Elias and Elwert, which means that his view is close to the paradigm that conflict theory is a *theory of society*. Of course, he uses many elements from other theories as well, but the paradigmatic foundation is important because of the following consideration: if interventions, notably those that are military-backed or even purely military, are elements of conflict constellations or configurations, then their impact on the societies of the intervened territories must be observable.[73] This is what our research in Afghanistan accomplishes – within limitations that I will discuss later. Two research questions emerge. *To what extent can we conclude legitimacy and practice from the results of the intervention? Where are the limitations of the research project concerning its position within or under intervention?*

These two questions are interesting for many reasons: politics likes to understand its purposes and aims for an intervention at a level that barely mentions the life-world of the real people involved and operates with a comprehensive notion of the state as the object of salvation or reconstruction.

72 Jan Koehler's doctoral thesis, *Institution-centred conflict research. The methodology and its application in Afghanistan* (2013), will be published in a modified version in 2017. In the original thesis, Koehler proves that conflict theories, based on social anthropology, can be applied and transmitted from one field to the other without being held hostage by the "uniqueness" of the *case*.

73 I am far from writing a second review of Koehler's dissertation. But it is important to focus on some of his foundations, as not much research on Afghanistan has taken his perspective, which entails understanding what allows social stability to emerge at the bottom of society, without remaining in the limitations of pure ethnological research, i.e. without Koehler's background (that he knows that he is doing research under the terms of intervention and within his knowledge of this intervention). (A mirror of this consideration is my own observation of Afghan society after 2011 on a different, less local level.)

2.2.4 What, then, is the intervention?

This question seems to be either simplistic or only philosophical in nature, but it is neither. Even a superficial inspection will show that there are quite a few definitions of and frames for "interventions," but neither a stable generic terminology nor a unified theory of intervention.[74] I narrow the field to interventions with military backing or to *military interventions* proper. It is easier to construct a variety of terms and define them by their respective contexts. My starting point is that ***an intervention is not an actor***. It may be *perceived* as one by those who do not feel affected by it, but it is not. Rather, it makes for a *political space*, within which other actors, including states, act, or it creates *situations* that in turn provide *opportunities* for other actors, or it changes the *constellations* among actors and therefore intervenes in the existing *power relations*, and by so doing changes the *social order*. **Under any circumstances, an intervention *changes the society* in which it *occurs***. This provides a frame for further considerations: the intervention cannot be restricted to the system level, i.e. the normative institutions of an intervened state, and, as a social and political space, it always impacts the society and all its members directly or indirectly, even if there are some who do not consider themselves affected. From the disciplinary view of social research, an intervention creates a field within a social space that has been changed irreversibly by it (Bourdieu, P. 1960; Schultheis, F. 2004). Political science can also define interventions as the creation and emergence of an emergency status for an intervened society, as well as for the interveners' systems (Distler, W. 2009). It is also significant that, simply by virtue of the frequency with which interventions occur, they have become normal in the sense of the theory of *normalism*. It is common for people to accept such normality, even if in the subconscious, and it means that no intervention is totally contingent or unique; each fits into a regular pattern of policy that is also defined by norms (For Link (Link, J. 2009), *normalism* and *normativity* are related; cf. p. 11). All these specifications can be projected onto the concept of societies of intervention insofar as interventions instigate or make societal change that is irreversible and in the end affects not only the society of the intervened (and their state), but the society of the interveners (and their state) as well. The narrow term of interventions linked to military helps us avoid an endless field of interventions in the areas of law (e.g. by the

74 Since contemporary theories of conflict are also far from unified, and since I will show the interface and overlapping of intervention theory with conflict, this may give a hint as to the theoretical level of the question. Bonacker (2005) in his introduction gives a clear account of the context and let his authors return to it throughout the book.

ICC), economy (e.g. boycotts or forced free trade arrangements), or political sanctions. It also is useful to focus on violence, armed conflicts, and the tension between military and civilian actors within a social space, as defined by the circumstances of an intervention.

Interventions do not simply *occur*. They "sort of" emerge out of a mix of causes and projections. In order to make them happen, one, or, rarely, more than one *main purpose* is used to legitimize the intervention. This can be viewed as a rule, i.e. that additional interests on the side of the interveners and of the intervened join the intervention – contaminate it, if you will – and create a more or less effective internal competition. The purposes reflect the ambiguity of the intervention (Bürjes, D. 2015; Kühn, F. 2014). It is not easy to discern the elements of this competition. On a macro-level, the most obvious conflict of goals is between the WoT and OEF and the state-building mission, including ISAF. Less obvious are interests that may have existed before but would require an intervention on different grounds to emerge as a spin-off or sidekick, e.g. economic interests or strategies derived from humanitarian obligations. On a micro-level, one can see the effects of different strains of an intervention because the space given by it opens more than one option for developing effects. At this point we can then reconstruct the paths these effects have taken. In Afghanistan, a fine example is the competition between CDCs and the World Bank (WorldBank 2011)[75] as institutions whose establishment is part of two different efforts by the intervention which were executed by two branches of the same central government, that is in turn affected by different intervening powers. I like to use the image of a double pendulum to demonstrate this chain of causes and effects.

75 Cf. considerations on the international initiation of a concept (CDC) that has been accepted and taken over by the Afghan micro-level organizations, i.e. villages (World Bank, 2011). Based on their studies, Gosztonyi and Koehler have developed numerous examples for the social order based on such basic organizations, as described frequently in this book. Gosztonyi is about to develop a concept linking "stabilization" (as a political and practical mode) with our knowledge about these forms of social order at the bottom of society. (Cf. pp.46, 82)



Figure 2 This double pendulum makes it clear that prognosticating the effects of the interveners' imposed rules on the bottom of society is almost impossible. The whole problem of sub-national governance, one of the core aspects of any governance research, suffers from this fact.

To draw conclusions about the micro-level effects on the general purposes and strategies of the intervention is simultaneously daring and problematic. One instrument can be the sound knowledge of the structures of a society of intervention.

While it is difficult, and sometimes not necessary, to disentangle all the roots of an intervention, it can be said that **only a few interventions have a particular concept of governance from the beginning**, and some never gain it. This statement will be the guiding idea of Chapter 3.

Interveners in an actual intervention are likely to be dominant; *they govern*, at least in the beginning. This is the period when the legitimacy and justification of an intervention do not need to explain why it is necessary and/or rational. For the researcher, this is a good opportunity to analyze the *reconstructed* rationale of the "intervention"; however, this opportunity must be used in retrospect, because in real time, one can observe that little effort is being made by governments and parliaments to legitimize an intervention (and by doing so their ideas of ruling) publicly. Instead, a rhetoric of justification "without saying" takes place – easier after events like 9/11, more complex when it comes to sending troops to Mali. The envisaged success is painted as a mere function of going to the country in question; neither exit scenarios nor a long-term engagement support the initial legitimacy. A sarcastic person could say that *governance* only becomes thematic in a state with fragile statehood *in the making*. Society is ubiquitous, and so is the relational distribution of power. But when the state arrives, and statehood gives society an ordering frame, the pendulum of power may move towards the state, and good governance becomes an implicit perspective in any governance discourse.

Observing an intervention from the viewpoint of local communities does not mean archaically observing from "below." The bottom of society does not exclusively own the domain of life-world, just as the top level of the system need not always be "up." The relationship between the two spheres is more complex, but always represents their interactions at all levels on an imaginary vertical hierarchy. What kind of conclusion can we expect to draw from the micro-social perspective? One basic assumption is that the macro-structures of society can be determined by analyzing micro-societal entities (Rössel, J. 2012). If we apply this proposition to the intervention, then it is clear that one can learn about the intervention in those fields where measures and policies have left traces and effects in the villages and districts. The interaction and policies that are separate from these effective impacts remain enigmatic. This is also true for all conflicts, both among interveners and between interveners and local actors in the villages or farther up in the hierarchy. In any case, it is necessary to distinguish between actions and facts that come from the interveners (directly or via the instances of local government or power). Differences between the

two levels allow assumptions about the real status of interveners. These considerations are interesting for those who do investigations into the working modes of interveners – and the reactions of local actors (the intervened) to them (the interveners).

There are other concepts of and theoretical reflections on interventions; the whole path of research and assessment based on the concepts of peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-building, as well as the literature mirroring the intentions and experience of certain actors, e.g. the UN or certain GOs and NGOs, form the vast corpus of such concepts. Their critical evaluation and continuing modification is in certain contrast to patterns that do not seem to follow the path of theoretical "progress" or even "lessons learned." It is of interest to learn about a selective choice of their concepts when the angle of perception is national or focuses on a field instead of an entire intervention, e.g. the costs of an intervention or the military point of view. My observation is that both theory and moral/political justification of interventions are ahead of practice. There are not many cases where we can prove that practice is attempting to catch up with such theories or normative designs.

2.2.5 Limitations and challenges of intervention research[76] – methodological reflections

An intervention does not have clear boundaries; it is without borders. Where does it begin, and where is the territory of the "normal" situation? The past might have been normal, or at least, it is remembered as normal. When speaking of the intervention it is sometimes tempting to shape it as an actor, as a player that sets his actions and makes decisions according to logical cause-effect strategies. But, as I said, the intervention is not an actor. It is a situation that penetrates the country – society and state – and affects all actors, collective and individual, at the top and at the bottom of society.

One recurrent interpretation of the Afghan intervention of 2001 – starting on October 7 – is that it was little more than a proxy. The war in Iraq had been decided by then, and, in the words of Henry Kissinger, "[Iraq must be attacked] because Afghanistan is not enough," because the radical Islamists had wanted

76 Intervention research is neither a distinct discipline nor a subsection of political science or defense studies; it is a crosscutting subject with quite ambiguous paradigms, depending on the theoretical starting point and its consequential methods. Cf. Betts (1994: 20-33); Smith (2002: 441-460); Boettcher (2004: 331-355)

to humiliate us, "and we need to humiliate them" (Danner, M. 2013, 90).[77] Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on October 7, 2001, with some 70 nations collaborating in the War on Terror.[78] Rather the virtual (and real?) setting of a revenge action gives a rather a frame to the intervention than the nation-building reconstruction scenario that has received the UN mandate (Security Council Resolution #1386, 20 December 2001, reaffirming Resolutions #1378 and #1383)) and its Security Assistance Force (ISAF), based upon Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is not difficult to reconstruct the two incompatible sources of the intervention, but its ambiguity betrays a split perception of its essence, structure, and effects (Bürjes, D. 2015; Kühn, F. 2014). Whatever follows from the intervention, this ambiguity's every effect can be attributed to the intervention. This ambiguity is one of the decisive intervening variables in all research, insofar as the attribution of effects and their assessment depends on which focus of the intervention is projected. There were two incompatible foci from the beginning: the War on Terror and the nation-building agenda. One can argue that, in reality, one does not distinguish between the two foci, and that the ongoing intervention has leveled out the differences between two sources, but it remains true that any assessment must relate to one of them. The ambiguity also influences the background of any research. Whenever results are being transmitted, whenever the focus on Afghanistan meets the demands from policy, researchers will be positioned in a certain way, unconsciously or strategically hiding their opinion.

77 Marc Danner has written a multi-piece essay (NYRB 2013/12/19, 2013/12/29, 2014/01/09, 2014/02/14) based on Rumsfeld's own memoirs ("Known and Unknown: A Memoir," Sentinel 2013), the movie "The Unknown Known" by Errol Morris, and other sources. I have chosen this particular critique in the context of my considerations on the knowledge of politicians, and also in order to depict an approach that is mostly unknown in the sphere of German reflections within Homeland Discourse. Rumsfeld muses by and large about what we do not know that we do not know, instead of what we know that we do not know. Most important for me is the insight into real governance, i.e. the way one of the top decision makers of the most powerful nations on earth actually acts, and what we can learn from that insight.

78 For an uninformed public, there might be no confusion about terms: the **War on Terror** Nowotny et al.), also known as the **Global War on Terrorism** (**GWOT**), is a metaphor of war referring to the international military campaign that started after the September 11 attacks on the United States.[44] U.S. President George W. Bush first used the term "*War on Terror*" on September 20, 2001 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Terror), acc. 2016/02/09). But, in science as well as in political semantics, the distinction between terror and terrorism is fundamental. Terror is the unlawful and brutal direct use of violence by a state and its organs, whereas terrorism is the use of violence against the state (legitimate or not; that is no trivial question).

From what happens on the ground, one can – though cautiously – draw some conclusions regarding the effects of the "split intervention." President Karzai's dismissal of many prisoners[79] considered terrorists by the U.S. can be seen as a negative or hostile activity, challenging the War on Terror. The same action can, however, also be considered as an effort by the President to level rifts in society and to bridge gaps between different factions. Neither interpretation is obvious; both were suggested immediately after the decree. This is not only a problem on the level of policy. In empirical research on social stability in local communities, the role of militias can be viewed quite differently by the affected population, as an attempt to keep away insurgents, or as another insurgent front weakening the legitimate security forces of the state.

Analysis of the German viewpoint should carefully reconstruct whether the ambiguity of the intervention was reflected between December 2001 (the Bonn Conference, known as the "Petersberg Agreement") and the first mandate for the deployment of the Bundeswehr *out of area* by the Parliament. This reconstruction is easier today, when ISAF has pulled out and, at the moment, redeployment of intervening military is an option, but not yet a reality. The interesting aspect of the reconstruction is the Homeland Discourse's convincing effect on the criteria for assessing the intervention. It is too early for historians and too late for politicians to conclude this chapter of military intervention (Münch, P. 2015), but it is true that Afghanistan is on the brink of oblivion, and not only from the German point of view. I hope to contribute to this first step of keeping awareness alive, however modest my contribution may be, by concentrating on a few sectors of evaluation. Another question that is sensitive in any coalition partnership (except in regard to the U.S.) is whether the German partner enjoys full sovereignty regarding its engagement in Afghanistan. I do not directly answer this question here, although it is critical for the development of a new policy towards the country under its National Unity Government and in the midst of a severe increase in insecurity.[80]

79 Two significant cases: www.democracynow.org/2014/1/10/Headlines (72 detainees); www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EDuKbvNnCY (2014/02/13) (65 detainees). Acc. 2015/11/10.

80 In the U.S., daily news on the security situation in Afghanistan represents a keen interest in politics, media, and the public, including veterans. Every day, one can read assumptions and forecasts on the near future for Afghanistan, all through the lenses of securitization. I have selected some significant sources – always ahead of scientific analyses: Daniel L. Davis: It's Time to ask Hard Questions on Afghanistan (on General Campbell): http://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/the-skeptics/it-tim... (acc. 2016/01/04); Newsweek magazine reprinted a recent article from the Hoover Institution: www.hoover.org/research/white-houses-seven-deadly-errors, which appeared under Mark Moyar on 2017/02/16 "Where we went wrong,

As a second step, we should learn about the continuities and changes in the structures of all societies involved. This is a scientific endeavor of immense volume – and necessity. What did the intervention really *mean* to interveners and the intervened? The impact of a whole intervention is different from the impact analyses of certain segments of the intervention. Societal change on every level is more interesting than the grand actions of the global players for the sociological analysis. But, of course, you cannot separate the two levels.

Political anthropology, ethnology, and social science frequently tried to explain developments in Afghanistan up through the defeat of the Taliban regime by investigating the history and role of Afghanistan in regional and international relations. The other timeline begins with 9/11, or perhaps two days earlier with the assassination of Ahmed Shah Masood. Within a few weeks, the U.S. established itself as a global leader in the WoT, with Afghanistan as one target among many. This policy was constitutive for one strategy that hoped to keep terrorists away from other parts of the world by fighting against them where there were at the moment. From here we can interpret the first sustainable contribution to the German collective memory: Minister of Defense Struck declared that German security would be defended on Hindukush (March 11, 2004, in an official Parliament briefing). This was official information and set the agenda, which would be focused on *security*. Security became the discursive core of all exercises to legitimize the German engagement in Afghanistan. However, public perception very soon *shifted the attention from security to freedom.*[81]

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from Afghanistan to ISIS (acc. 2016/02/22). Moyar, who published earlier on counterinsurgency Moyar (2011: 18), is a sharp critic of an exaggerated belief in democracy (by Presidents Bush and Obama), which weakened the effectiveness of armed forces in the intervention. You also find series that are directed to interested lay public on a better level of understanding: a three-part series on the "war in Afghanistan" (!): www.vox.com/2016/1/25/10816330/afghanistan... "The dam is about to break": why 2016 could be a very bad year for Afghanistan (Jason Lyall); www.vox.com/2016/1/25/10816576/isis...; on the emergence of IS in Afghanistan; and www.vox.com/2016/1/27/10834882/vanda... "They are riding a tiger they cannot control": Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan (Vanda Felbab Brown). Out of a huge collection of articles I selected these few because they are significant examples of how the American homeland discourse is being shaped (in contrast to the German tendency to sideline Afghanistan, ostensibly due to other priorities; the only vibrant link to Afghanistan is the questions regarding the numbers of Afghan asylum seekers and refugees and whether to let them in or how to send them back).

81 The controversy is over, since the German troops have returned to their bases. However, it is still present in the media today. There is an anamnestic process that turns the quotation and its transformation into "Germany's liberty is defended on Hindukush" into a part of collective memory, and even a forerunner in the cultural memory of the nation. On September 5, 2013,

If one takes the political-historian's point of view, one has to take into consideration the changing phases of Afghan *modernization* (under Amanullah Shah from 1919-1929, during the Second World War, urban development under the Soviet occupation 1978-1988) and social changes, especially during the first years of the Republic and the transition into war (1965-1978). Especially given the long wave of Afghan history in the twentieth century, with its bitter ending in brutal invasions and wars, it is impossible to avoid the question of whether an intervention would not have been appropriate much earlier, e.g. between 1988-2001, after the retreat of the Soviets, or during the atrocious fights among the Jihadis, or as an R2P measure against the Taliban after 1995.

Of course, this kind of reconstruction is just a prompt for the analysis of the mistakes and inconsistencies of the ongoing intervention. But purposes, perspectives, expectations, and prognostication by the intervention can set the political, i.e. qualitative, standards for the assessment of the effects of the intervention(s). We can use this as a heuristic tool, bridging the gap between plausible interpretation of our experience and intuition on the one hand and conclusions from the empirical research on the other.

This tool and procedure is not alien to research on war, intervention, and violence. It is a combination of ethnological observations and analyses and political frames. Bourdieu, in his Algeria research, has bridged the gap between empirical research and the political "situation" within which the "social" situation is placed (or vice versa). This bridging is no longer possible using the tools of ethnology alone. More than simple empathy for the communities under investigation is required in order to understand what is going on with them and "for us." For Bourdieu, the step from ethnology to sociology is more than symbolic; it provokes a much stronger empirical research design, and it is innately *political*. Otherwise, the changes in social order and stability of the uprooted villagers could not be "understood" (Alkemeyer, T. 2008; Bourdieu, P. 1960, 2003; Schultheis, F. 2004). The pattern has since been repeated: when social research asks why social orders become unstable or change, the answers will be *political*. The interface with policy is unavoidable and does infiltrate pure research. This is not meant to be a meta-reflection on the field research in C9

the national newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau (left-of-center liberal) staged a debate between two prominent politicians on whether "Germany's liberty is defended on Hindukush." There can hardly be any discussion or political evaluation of the German engagement without citing the original sentence (security) – and its miraculous transformation into a high-value item (liberty).

or any comparable project. It has massive practical consequences; certain biases arise via the affinity for policy into research. A certain level of selectivity in the frames of policy, or here, of the intervention, is obvious, and the researchers become – whether it is unintended or not entirely innocent – actors in the political games of those who shape the intervention (actively, as advisers, or legitimizing certain aspects of political legitimacy). We have become part of the system called *intervention* that we explain and discover.[82] Without exaggerating this aspect of research, I would like to point out that talking about the research methods and findings, especially in the political environment at home, links the investigation to what we call the *Homeland Discourse* and the permanent pressure to readjust not only research, which is normal, but also the legitimacy of the object, i.e. the intervention. We have strong indicators that show how the actions of the interveners, and subsequently of the intervened, are governed by this discourse.

This brief excursion seems to be necessary in order to make visible how we are aware of the traps in our research. In each methodological debate, the problem of how the researcher interacts should be considered. Since the debate on whether or not the Afghan intervention is a war (and if so, whether Germany is consequently at war), is still ongoing, Dirk Baecker's reflection should be taken seriously. Social science and political reflection can never escape from the ambiguity that lies in the object of investigation, i.e. war (cf. Baecker, D. 2002: 21). The separation of moral and political or military systems is a problem that many experts in the field or in the public discourse on war and intervention simply neglect or reduce in importance.

Since its beginning, the *security discourse* has dominated all other discourses on the intervention in Afghanistan. Security was mainly defined by the perception of the interveners: it is our security that is at stake in Afghanistan/Pakistan, either more broadly due to Osama bin Laden's continuous activities, because of the concept of the WoT, or, more rationally, because the West did not want to let go of Afghanistan again. The West wants Afghanistan to become an ally before it becomes "itself."

82 From the perspective of the concrete research of C9 and comparable investigations, this remark does not make Luhmann's paradigm about the difficulty of being part of the system that one observes seem banal. It has a variety of consequences, e.g. when discussing research issues with political actors on the ground (interveners and intervened) or when seeking to create good research opportunities by bargaining with these actors. I personally experienced such ambiguity from the "other side" when I was a political officer for UNMIK in Kosovo and had a rather different view on the intervention (2000-2202) (cf. Daxner (2004a)).

This is one of the most intricate chapters of Afghanistan's intervention history. When the Soviet occupation came to an end, the West seemed content to simply watch as Afghanistan ceased to be part of Moscow's sphere of the crumbling Cold War bi-polarity. Thereafter, Afghanistan was downgraded to a problem of lesser relevance. Only after the Taliban regime and after the 9/11 turning point would the West recognize its interest in gaining an Afghan *ally* rather than another unstable nation under reconstruction.

The international community, led primarily but not exclusively by the U.S. and NATO, very soon agreed that *nation-building* would be a necessary, though not particularly "well-liked" policy frame, within which elements of the WoT could be continued (with the importance of nation-building decreasing over time). A series of international conferences accompanied the diverse phases of the intervention. In retrospect, one can use the resolutions and proceedings of these conferences to generate a chronology of the successes and failures of the Afghan intervention. However, it is not so easy to deconstruct the documents and unearth their subtexts. What is "behind" the focus on security, the war on drugs, the war on terror, and the Afghan government's increasing admonition to improve "governance"? For Germany, the official interpretation of governance = "gute Regierungsführung" is of special interest, because the German government's progress reports start relatively late (2010) and tend to reflect the subtexts of the preceding international conferences. I read the proceedings not so much as reports on the effect of negotiations among the interveners as reflections on the social and political space that the intervention offers to both the interveners' policies and the development of a sovereign state by the intervened.

At present, such considerations are all the more important because I assume that – cautiously, and without exaggeration – the German government will soon try to re-evaluate Germany's engagement in Afghanistan, and, indirectly, the success or failure of the intervention as a whole.[83]

The interveners failed to provide *solid enough security governance*: this was the reasoning behind President Karzai's refusal to sign the agreement concerning the stationing of American troops after 2014. His argument was that there had been too many civilian casualties due to U.S. reckless combat practices. The formal argument about the *impunity* of interveners' troops is not serious

83 Frank-Walter Steinmeier (then Germany's Foreign Minister) 2014/02/09: "Not all aims achieved" (Visit to Afghanistan, DLF 12.00 p.m. news)

because it is a rule to protect such troops from local justice,[84] even if they are committing ordinary crimes unrelated to military operations. Let us go back to 2013, when the U.S drafted the agreement on further military support. Since Karzai's legislative and advisory bodies had mandated the agreement, his argument was that either he really wanted to place the burden of the decision on his successor in Spring 2014, when a new president would be sworn in (Ashraf Ghani, as head of National Unity Government (NUG), did eventually sign it under pressure from the intervening powers), or he wanted to demonstrate something more important for the Afghans – that the delivery of security by the ANSF will be more legitimate (and potentially more successful, without violating too many rules) than the interveners' delivery. He stuck to his stance despite growing impatience from the U.S. Even Germany, which was also facing strained relations with the U.S., urged Karzai to sign.[85] The troop agreement would also protect German soldiers should they remain or return after 2014, even for a strictly training-oriented mission; this is another subtext. If the *Resolute Support Mission* (RSM) will empower ANSF, the rationale is not obvious yet. The ANSF will be trained to fight insurgents rather than enemies from across the borders. But there might be confrontations with Pakistan in the future. ANSF is not yet a state within the state. It is not likely that it will become one soon. But the forces look like a domestic counter-terrorist unit. In a reform concept, they could also serve as a "school of the nation," i.e. strengthening national unity over fragmented identities.

On the surface, i.e. the statistical level, there have been an increasing number of civilian casualties since 2013.[86] I have not even tried to provide an overview

84 The *Cavalese* incident is a good example of the limited reliability of alliances in case of disasters caused by "strong" partners in such coalitions: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavalese_cable_car_disaster_%281998%29 (acc. 2016/09/08). This was an unforced act of violence by NATO, not an adversary. This incident has had a very stark impact on me because it shows how limited human rights approaches appear in the face of powers that do not even reflect the consequences of using force-bending, universally accepted rules at their convenience. There have been quite a few "Cavalese incidents" in Afghanistan, but they have not gained broad recognition.

85 Steinmeier pressed the Afghan government: cf. German press on 2014/02/09. The signing of the agreement under the new NUG on 2014/09/30 caused a similar amount of press hype.

86 See https://unama.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-hit-new-high-2015 (acc. 201/03/15) for statistics. The overview is also telling: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ civilian_casualties_in_the_war_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29, (acc. 2016/03/15). Again, in most cases the perpetrators were insurgents, but, of course, many people died as the result of "friendly" attacks, or even assaults on civilians by the ANSF (cf. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-ansfs-zurmat-operation-abuses-against-local-civilians/ by Fazal

on the real security situation. Instead, I have presented a few fragments from texts that are significant for the change in the *tone* of intervention discourse. Today, more than two years later, some aspects must be reconsidered: the new president faces shrinking credibility at home, while his foreign policy is attempting to consolidate sovereignty and increase external support. Afghanistan faces a rising level of insecurity due to many factors within the structures of the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as criminal feuds and a growing uncertainty as to whether the ANSF will be able to cope with a permanent state of emergency.[87] While interest in Afghanistan *as a problem* has drastically dwindled, apart from the U.S. in its post-electoral mode, the problems in the country have reached a dimension that cannot be ignored by the international community. But there is no common base understanding of what the problems really are.

One new facet has emerged recently and is changing the picture again: the German intention to send back Afghan refugees is being justified by both the "partially safe situation" (German Minister of the Interior) and President Ghani's policy of restraining citizens who want to escape from their country. I am in the middle of researching and actively engaging with the political and social problems of Afghan refugees. Even an intermediate summary of this situation would be impossible here; what I can conclude, however, is that the role of the Afghan diaspora has also been underrated in regard to security and refugee issues, and that sending back Afghans will increase the danger for Germans as part of the remaining interveners groups. This may also have consequences for segments of the society of intervention (cf. pp. 30f.).

Muzhary (acc. 2016/03/08); Taliban Gunmen Kill 16 Afghans in Northern Bus Convoy Hijack, by Eltaf Najafizada, http://bloom.bg/1Y0xo8u (acc. 2016/09/09); Six killed as Taliban bombers raid Afghan courthouse. AFP June 1, 2016 (acc. 2016/09/09). The best and most continuous records, apart from military overviews, can be found with AAN (https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org). Recent numbers speak of 31,000 civilian dead and over 70,000 military casualties, mainly Afghan (cf. Watson Institute of Brown University: Data from August 2016: http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan (acc. 2017/02/28); UN says: In the first six months of this year, 5166 *civilians* were either *killed* or maimed in *Afghanistan*, a half-year record since counting began in 2009. About 65% were victims of intra-national violence, 35% of the casualties were caused by international troops. The numbers are rising. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54543 *(*acc. 2017/02/28*)*.

87 The fall and recapture of Kunduz shook the international and national actors in the Afghan play. AAN has covered this incident closely. Compare Obaid Ali: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-2015-insurgency-in-the-north-3-the-fall-and-recapture-of-kunduz/ on 2015/10/16 and the analysis three months later by the same author: www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-2016-insurgency-in-the-north-beyond-kunduz-city-lessons-not-taken-from-the-Taliban-take over/ (acc. 2016/03/15)

All these pieces require a thorough look into the security governance agenda. At this point in the essay, let me first determine a few specific strains in the discussion. Of course, the perception of (in)security is different from insecurity caused by material actions or the spreading of fear and threats. The perception side is not simply psychological, but also closely related to aspects of trust and confidence. It is a bit like the debate on peace and conflict; you can describe and analyze what a *conflict* is, but it is not so easy, and the debate is certainly never complete when it is about *peace*. The reasons why, and how one can trust in realities that may or may not protect a person, can be highly material or based on vague promises, experiences from the past, or expectations in the future (e.g. if a strongman in a community can uphold his promise to protect the lives of the populace, subject to their allegiance towards him). If such a complex structure occurs under intervention things become even more complicated, because the rift between at least two cultural annotations of trust plays a critical role in the perception of security. Trust requires not only conviction, but also manifestation in "signs," i.e. in concrete actions. An open question for research is whether *trust* in a society of intervention attains specific forms that can be applied by and implied in security governance. Safety and security can be interpreted either by objective events and their effects, or by the interpretation of these events, led by different normative sources. If the perception of an insecure environment is "counter-factually" secure, it does not make much difference whether this is substantiated by the "will of God" or a fatalistic attitude that there will be no further harm because a local warlord is protecting the community. However, certainty about some independent sources of security or insecurity plays a big role, in the real social order as well as mentally; the mindset of a collective is different from individual judgment. The semantics of security play an enormous role in judging mindsets, when the conclusion should serve expectations whether Afghan security governance will or will not be capable of upholding or enhancing security. Much of Jan Koehler's research successfully provides information on perceptions of (in)security and different reasons for fear and trust in selected districts of Afghanistan (e.g. Koehler, 2014). To a certain extent, researchers can pursue the vertical strain of transmission of these perceptions to the top of society (i.e. the system level). But it is almost impossible to establish a solid causal model that shows the relation between these perceptions and the triggers to security policies.

The debate over mixing governance with *good* governance and good enough governance has become a standard element of both government theory and the

assessment of interventions. There are numerous analyses of governance structures and their link with measures of good governance, which are based on empirical evidence and the principles of international strategy (Grindle, M. S. 2007; Nixon, H. 2007; Stapleton, B. J. 2012). The quarterly SIGAR[88] Report to the U.S. Congress is an example of the sober and precise listing of (perceived) shortcomings in the field of governance that has no *public* equivalent in Germany. SIGAR, a highly credible source, has not challenged the following statement by Pauline Baker: After a 2013 visit to Afghanistan, Pauline Baker, president emeritus of the *Fund for Peace*, wrote*:*

"Over the past dozen years, ISAF has created a virtual state within a state that will shrink dramatically once combat forces depart. This will leave a much weakened, highly militarized, and deeply corrupt narco-state that could descend into outright civil war and, possibly, partition. The central question is not whether the Western-trained, supplied, and financed Afghan security forces will be able to contain the Taliban insurgency, as is commonly thought. Even if they can, the more critical question is whether the state itself will *hold together once Western life support is removed*." (Sopko, J. F. 2014: 8)

The general statement is that no or too little progress has been made, and quite a few organizations hold the U.S. officials responsible for this failure. This is a strictly unilateral point of view, with the focus being the effective spending of taxpayers' money. This allows for many more facts, without getting entangled in a quest for politically correct balance. Recently, the tone has changed, and the critique of the whole intervention has become less best case oriented. If it was a virtual state in 2014, do we now have a truly failing state because some progress in state-building has been made and now there actually is a state that can fail? (Cf. Anatol Lieven in his accurate review (Lieven, A. 2016: 47): "For the past 135 years, the central theme of Afghan history has been not outside interventions in Afghanistan – crucially important though these have been – but the attempts by Afghans themselves to create an effective modern state.") Lieven, among others, draws a picture of a society that, through unsuccessful state-building, almost *invites* a society of intervention to come into being.

However, the weight of good governance progress and perspectives has also been significant in all reports of the German government on Afghanistan ("Progress Reports": (Bundesregierung 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)), though

88 SIGAR refers to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. The office of SIGAR was established in 2008 and reports to Congress, and additionally keeps the State Department and the Department of Defense informed on its activities.

much more moderate in judgment. It is important – and meaningful? – to note that, in a recent report (2014, p. 18-22), almost *no progress* is reported compared to 2013, while there is a list of what Germany is willing to deliver, if certain conditions are met, *in the future*. Even where measures that have already been initiated are listed, the conditions for continued commitment remain vague. "*The leading principle of all programs in the sector of governance is a close attachment to Afghan structures and processes*" (my translation, p. 21). This must remain ambiguous; since all recommendations in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-drug, and civic administration are based on universal or Western models, the inconsistency is obvious. Which Afghan structures are in focus? The examples of the longitudinal observation of the "Shura-Complex" by Koehler in C9 and Kristof Gostzonyi and Basir Feda in the Govern4Afghanistan Project[89] contribute to understanding the importance of this point. One interpretation is that "Afghan" means indigenous Afghan structures of developing and maintaining social order. These structures would have been retrieved from a distant past or developed as antagonists against the intervention's effects on basic social order. Alternatively, "Afghan" could mean an adaptive process in which effects and demands from the intervention become amalgamated with local policies to stabilize or change the basic structure of communities. If the latter is the case, adaptation follows certain patterns that are, at the same time, indicators for social stability, change, and independent variables that explain "progress" or "backlashes" in governance. From here, one can make arguments for and against the earliest concept of societies of intervention (Daxner 2010, p. 75-100). If the first interpretation were valid, we would need much more information about a resurfacing or new forging of the basic modes of delivery and their legitimacy for all levels of governance.[90] One of my main hypotheses is that **the majority of Afghans, in particular the war generations after 1978, do not have enough knowledge or ideas about their own societies to be able to present rivaling models for modes**

89 The thematic issue paper on sub-national governance was published in July 2016 at AREU, Kabul. A condensed version was also included in a cross-thematic reader for a German and international readership, also in July 2016.

90 Without pettiness, I hold that too much insistence on *Afghan ownership or Afghan authenticity* is hypocritical or parochial, and in many cases simply based on superficial information about what is considered to be *Afghan* and what the related interests are, as frequently remarked on by Afghans and not by their translators, as far as the terminology and patterns of the interveners are concerned. The ownership concept is related to authenticity, which in itself is an ambiguous construct. Cf. also some clarifying remarks: Maaß (2008); Donais (2009: 3-26); Chesterman (2007: 3-26); Carbone (2008: 241 - 255). The last two also refer to the practices of UN and EU policies.

of delivery and effective governance. There are many sections in this book where this proposition can be applied. "Knowledge" and "Knowledge Management" are not high on the priorities lists of either the interveners or the intervened. This is true for almost all military interventions, humanitarian or not. However, I hold that the knowledge of the intervention ought to be prioritized by interveners, as well as by the intervened, from the moment of cessation of hostilities.[91] Applied sociology of knowledge finds a host of plausible interdependencies between knowledge and democracy, including the "knowledge of the weak" (Stehr, 2015, pp. 60-74, 277-283). The problem of not "knowing" has become *political* within a discourse, raised by Donald Rumsfeld (Danner, M. 2013), and is systematized by Stehr and Adolf (Stehr, 2015, p. 69-97).

This shows how, in the short run, the attempt to introduce "modern" administration or to import academic curricula in unchanged higher education may be both effective and, at the same time, alienating for the clients of such measures.[92] To close the circle: how much power and force must an intervention produce to make governance *good* for both the interveners and the intervened? In the long run, the Afghan government will have to prove that their measures produce equal or better governance than those of the interveners. The impact of measures under intervention should not be observed solely through the "eyes of the locals,"[93] but by all members of the society of intervention. This is not a trivial point, because we have to investigate situations that are obviously appreciated by the local population, but disapproved of by interveners if observed separately. If we assume the effects from an intervention to be irreversible, then the policies and strategies of the interveners at this stage of transformation should focus on **preparing the *quality standards* for good governance, which is more than transferring responsibility for diverse sectors of statehood.**

91 I have written extensively about the deficiencies of an intervention when the interveners, as in the case of Kosovo/UNMIK, do not meet this condition for peace-building. (Daxner, 2005)(Daxner (2004a).

92 At a meeting with USAID in 2007, an American expert tried to convince Kabul higher education peers to introduce a credit system and quality assurance methods, which are routine in the U.S. It was not difficult to "understand" for the Afghan professors, but they reacted to the proposal as if it came from another planet.

93 "Through the eyes of Locals" is the title of Hannah Neumann's excellent PhD dissertation on the effects of peace-building and negotiation in the Philippines http://www.cultures ofintervention.org/about-us/members/hannah_neumann (acc. 20160315).

For many years, Jan Koehler, Alexey Gunya, and, since 2010, myself, have conducted a project on conflict research with partners in the North Caucasus (Kabardino-Balkaria (KB)) and Kyrgyzstan. The rationale of this transfer was the initiation, establishment, and fortification of conflict research within the local academic structures. This was more than just good cooperation. In Nalchik (KB), the last project led to the establishment of an MA program and the foundation of a graduate school where expertise and an encounter with the practical tasks of conflict identification and resolution will be developed.[94] I consider this to be an example of the establishment of standards of *good* governance, even if it is not under the circumstances of intervention. An analogue pattern of development is advisable in Afghanistan, e.g. in the sector of developing higher education research without external domination (Daxner, M./Schrade, U. 2012, 50f.).

Very often, progress is linked to organizations that would support institutional change, i.e. change of the rules among diverse social groups. The key word is *civil society*, but it must be questioned if the wider range of organizations like the Afghan Women Network has any impact on the increasingly restrictive policies against gender equality and emancipation. I have often observed that backlashes in such policies lead to an illusionary hope that the ideas of such policies will not be forgotten under threat and backlash, and that they may resurface one day. This is not wrong. However, it is not very helpful when it comes to actual policies and strategies.

The diachronic constellation is another aspect. If we observe a current famine, a long-term sustainable agriculture project may still make sense, but it does not help cope with the problem. To fight hunger may demand extraordinary actions by the interveners (they are in power) and may require measures that are not in line with the policies a society of intervention aspires to. This requires trust in the interveners and their embedding within society. Again, ambiguity is one of the leading concerns when considering such frequent ruptures in "masterplans."[95] Personally, I believe that organizations on the ground are almost

94 All information about our project *Institution-centered Conflict Studies* can be accessed at https://ncgscs.wordpress.com/ (registration required).

95 Compare the reports and comments on a permanent hunger emergency: an early account by Doctors without Borders: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/press-release/alarming-food; later reports such as Una Moore: Afghanistan's Coming Food Crisis: http://www.undispatch.com/afghanistans-coming-food-crisis/; more recently, Ron Nordland: Afghanistan's Worsening, and Baffling, Hunger Crisis. NYT 2014/01/04:

drunk on the success of their implementation of long-term and promising development projects, while at the same time they are unable to cope with actual crises – and critics refer to these crises in order to discredit the long-range projects.

The crucial question for any intervention is whether the circumstances for the people have improved or, at least, have not deteriorated. The idea that an intervention is better than no intervention is implausible, but it can be convincing when the intervention includes a regime change for the better.

We can observe analogous patterns of indicators that make the connections between life-world and intervention visible in each society of intervention. Koehler has developed indicators for stabilization (Koehler, J. et al. 2011).[96] Other approaches examine trust or cultural impact.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/world/asia/afghanistans-worsening-and-baffling-hunger-crisis.html?_r=0 (all acc. 2016/05/17). Hunger has always been a strong trigger for migration. However, more recently, it is rarely the reason refugees who are seeking asylum in Europe are doing so.

96 A good explanation by Koehler et al. (2015: 61-74). I am using his construct in a different way; it offers a frame for making a specific local life-world more concrete.



Figure 3 (Koehler, J. et al. 2015, Kim Braun's translation) The indicators can serve as variables in both directions: explaining the social order and being explained by this order. I read them as markers. Each indicator asks to what extent it is a result of the intervention. Facts (number of vehicles in the village, number of development projects) and perceptions (opinions on wealth, threat to values) merge to form a very vivid picture of how the society of intervention is being structured. A clear separation of the original, "autochthonous" society and the important elements of the new one is impossible.

Koehler was a kind of forerunner for a form of methodological development that was not an obvious strength of OECD when our research began. At that time, both statistics and the interpretation of data by the political think tanks from the wealthier parts of the world were not as differentiated as one might have expected. Now, OECD is discussing people-oriented approaches and takes society much more into account than statehood alone. A very good example is the newest report on fragile states and violence (OECD 2016). Not only does the term *fragility* come under scrutiny. An extended methodological

annex (pp. 147-173) explains in detail how important categories that describe fragility had been developed and with which methods the complex interrelations of more than 50 indicators were carved out of the immense data stock. More broadly, this is exactly what Koehler and our research team have been performing. Many of the OECD's findings can be directly linked to our results on the perception of security and social order at the bottom of Afghan society. The OECD study is a fine example of providing a macro-political frame within which some of the micro-social investigations of our research can be placed.

If there is a connection between the intervention and economic reconstruction, one direct impact of the intervention is certainly the project line, coming down from the decision-making bodies in the system (the state or the interveners' headquarters), and thus, indirectly, from the donors. Sometimes it is the people that are affected by such projects; sometimes it is only the projects themselves that are the results of external influence. The stringent exposition in their anthology is focused on the delivery of *common goods*, with the status of statehood – from deficient to failed – as background. The translation of "delivery" into "projects" is not as difficult as the translation of external influence into an action scheme by "the state." I do not think that Afghanistan can be considered a failed state (p. 550); it did not even have the chance to fail. It is fragile, fragmented, and torn by many forces, but it is not failed, other than in the sense of the disillusioning effects of the external powers since 2001. This is also a question of **how governance is being realized in a society of intervention.**

3 Intervention and Governance

Prelude

The imperative quest for legitimacy in the discourse of all interveners is borne by a translation of their aims into an interpretation of *good governance*. In German, "Gute Regierungsführung" is very often reduced to effective public management and administration, excluding discourse on powers and authority over rules. The end result is the *image* of a functional state and functioning statehood. In my understanding, governance is at the same time both less and more than this. The analysis of governance should not take place only on the level of a state (like our consolidated states), but also in terms of its effects on the society as well. In order to learn about the common goods to be delivered, one needs to know what is common in the communities of the intervened. Jan Koehler has described this impressively:

> "Governance, as a rule, is a mundane affair. It helps people organize their unspectacular and unheroic daily lives within the confines of socially accepted norms. Even in a place like Afghanistan, amidst decades of violent conflict, households and communities are able to solve most of their daily problems via institutionalized forms of coordination. Self-help and strategic action are more common than in stable states, but they are still the exception rather than the rule. When local institutions fail to provide commonly accepted outcomes, people tend to turn to the state in search of a neutral external arbiter. There are, however, specific dynamics that limit the reliability of governance and in some cases even lead to the breakdown of governance altogether:
>
> 1. The state's inability or unwillingness to provide governance when local societal institutions fail and the communities demand state intervention;
> 2. The government itself resorts to informal, manipulative political intervention into local affairs that damages the governance capacities of local institutions;
> 3. Violent contests between the government, the powers of foreign intervention, and competing actors (most importantly the Taliban) over the right and power to implement their vision of governance;
> 4. Finally, the general limitation to horizontal, societal governance in terms of scope: social control as the only proper functional equivalent to hierarchal enforcement of rules against foul play and power interference is limited to what anthropologists call the "eye of the

village." Sanctions of reputation (the social allocation of shame and honor), leading to social exclusion and limiting access to vital resources or, conversely, the fostering of social integration and access to those resources, is geographically limited to tightly knit face-to-face communities.

Hence, we find indications of governance without the state in the research region, but its scope is very limited. Most governance does take place in the shadow of weakly institutionalized states (rather than the shadows of statehood) – though it only occasionally enters into direct intervention of the state". (Koehler, J. 2012a: 24).

Koehler's statement includes an essential view on my considerations in chapters 2 and 3. I have inserted his critical questions at the beginning of this chapter as an inducement to look at the societal rather than the state side of the problem, and as an effort to broaden answers under the circumstances of external military intervention:

> "State and society, statehood and social control, government and governance may be set apart in academic discourse and treated as conceptually distinct from each other, but this does not correspond to contemporary empirical reality. It is not sufficient to identify functional equivalents to the state in the production of governance (or, as anthropologists would call it, social order). It is the interplay, not the alternative that matters. Summing up, the empirically interesting question is not the categorical question of whether there is governance without statehood. The question is not one of either/or, but rather one of more or less. Modern statehood may be the point of reference and the dominant manifestation of formal political power in all corners of the world. But how and to what extent does governance occur when statehood is contested or too weak to be the final arbiter in case all else goes wrong?" (Koehler 2012: 11)

3.1 One concept of governance

In this chapter, I shall deal with the connections between intervention and governance. The research at our Center focuses on governance in areas of limited statehood (ALS). *Governance research* has been solidly established as a frame from the beginnings of the Collaborative Center, but it uses an approach that is not left unchallenged by other concepts and perspectives (Grande, E.

2012).[97] The *particular* angle of the Collaborative Research Center regarding governance in ALS is important insofar as the concept of governance is no longer placed within the frame of a fully consolidated state. Instead, our observation is forced into fields off or beyond such a state. This is true for all the SFB 700's projects, be they focused on historical dimensions or a wide variety of governance tasks in the fields of law, welfare, or security, set worldwide in states off the domain of the OECD domain, or in past, pre-modern societies.

Perhaps the division of world – into OECD nations with consolidated statehood, and everybody else with more or less limited statehood – is overly schematic. Many countries in the OECD world are facing substantial challenges to their statehood, which weakens OECD world's consolidated status. This need not be a weakness of the research design; many findings in ALS research can be applied, if partially, to OECD countries, e.g. in places where statehood is being challenged by bottom-up anti-state and anti-establishment movements that are strictly opposed to the ever stronger rule of the state by differentiating statehood. However, they do not offer any plan B in case they really are successful in "replacing" the system (i.e. their view of the state). This is not just an account of the right-wing movements that are currently widespread in Europe; it is also a principal consideration of the narrow focus on state(hood).

There is one aspect of our particular project that is not shared by many other projects: our **research is focused on a state that was under military intervention when the investigation started, and still is**. Indeed, we have been looking into the connection between (a part of) society and its state, and indirectly into *social change under the terms of intervention*. This has two aspects: while North-East Afghanistan is by all means an ALS, the *state* of Afghanistan is not the central object of investigation, though it plays a decisive role both as

97 I have chosen Grande from the broad spectrum of available references because he was both a reviewer of the SFB 700's extension plan and a critic of the governance research field. His skepticism towards a theoretical concept of governance research does not point explicitly to the basic concept of SFB 700, but it is an incentive for reconsidering the theoretical construct of governance (p. 585f.); Francis Fukuyama, in a condensed commentary, is also skeptical about rational choice approaches and believes that one must consider "concepts first" approaches before one can begin to measure. http://governancejournal.net/2013/03/04/fukuyama-asks-what-is-governance/ (acc. 2016/03/17). The SFB 700 has advertised its concept by publishing on it widely: http://www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen/gesamtverzeichnis/index.html. Very recently, Martin Schulte dealt with statehood and law in an essay that explicitly refers to the SFB 700 and other research regarding this field (Schulte 2017). It remains to be seen, however, if statehood and governance can be separated in circumstances beyond those of a other than in a constructivist modeling, and what the consequences for the rule of law or the legal system would be in that case.

an actor and a key institution. ***Statehood* is a category that, like *governance*, can be more easily applied to *society and social change* in a defined territory than to the *state* as a system and a puzzle in the wider scope of international relations**. Generally, statehood requires a "state" as a base. But the obvious possibility of developing elements of statehood without a state points to a relevant aspect in the discourse on all these constructions: functional elements of statehood orient themselves on societal structures. **Statehood is constantly oscillating between *like a state* and *as a state*.** The Kosovo experience is proof of this assumption. *Nation-building* as a generic term frequently unites state and society.

We must not forget that the concept of the ongoing intervention and its discourse are both formulated in the terms of *Western* political thought and policy, and we should be aware that the *interveners are ever present*, if not always on site. This is not a trivial point: there was an undefined number of people who said they were not affected by the intervention in the sense that their concrete lives had not changed since the intervention began. This need not depend on whether they communicated with interveners or not.[98] My proposition is that **nobody in a society of intervention can escape its effects** (Daxner, M. 2008a, 2009). *Subjective perception* is another issue, e.g. the perception of *security* may be in sharp contrast to the exact data of incidents and obvious insecure environments; the perception of *progress* may not match empirical data for the entire nation, or it may depend on underlying ideological particularisms. Additionally, the subjective perception of functioning institutions in the jurisdiction may depend on which section of the rule of law the individual may rely upon (civil law, constitutional law, religious law, etc.).

A decisive positioning of particular views and approaches is necessary at this point. One can project all concepts and methods in our project on the paradigm of *governance*, but one should also consider positioning methods and research design both in the field of *intervention* research and of *conflict* theory. Indeed, it also makes sense to *subsume interventions into a special class of conflicts*.

This is important because most of the findings and ongoing investigations trace the effects of the intervention in Afghanistan on the social reality of villages and districts and their institutions and communication, i.e. they are *subnational*. All fights for power and resources, all relations with government and

98 This aspect was introduced by Christoph Zürcher at the first meeting on interventions by ASIK in Potsdam (Daxner et al. (2008)).

non-government organizations, all concrete development projects and all security measures are either directly or indirectly dependent on the intervention. It is one of the big achievements of Koehler's field research that one can use concrete intentions and methods applied "by the intervention" as an independent variable that explains the perception and interdependence of security and development under the circumstances of village societies and their social order. However, the quotation marks concerning intervention point to a problem: we can observe *certain* elements of the intervention that have a concrete effect on social life at the bottom level of the society. But it is not *the* intervention. (And, what can be more important in other contexts: *an intervention is not an actor* like the state or a particular social group is. An intervention is a particular social space within which several fields provide specific leeway and limitations for defined actors. Even a state with limited statehood acts within the conditions set by the intervention.)

What, then, is the problem? One can satisfactorily reconstruct the intentions and measures by certain actors or agents of the intervention by examining the effects of their policies and the reactions of villagers and local peers. The reverse conclusions are less convincing. Can we draw conclusions about the intervention from the observed effects, or only on the sector the original cause was derived from? The question is not trivial insofar as a generalization of our conclusions may be valid in some sectors of the intervention while leaving others out of context.

Let me come back to the last rule in the concept on interventions.

The "whole of intervention" may be the source of an infinite number of effects, but distinct effects find their causes only in specific elements of the intervention.
The deduction of micro social effects is possible in many cases. The conclusion from micro social effects on the whole of intervention is questionable.
Therefore, one should know about the "whole of intervention" even if those parts that cause observable effects are known to be less representative or significant for the intervention.

This plausible rule simply links the concepts (and theories) of a concrete intervention to the concrete conclusions drawn from empirical research at the level of life-world. It is obvious that one will never get a complete, deducible description of any intervention. But it is also obvious that many interventions have so many features in common that quite a few analogies can be drawn, and

similarities can gain significance if compared to the results of inductive research. It is useful to keep the rules handy for any discussion concerning the intersections between empirical findings on the ground and effects on policy.

We can attribute contemporary military interventions to the phenomenon of asymmetric conflicts. This may or may not correspond with the theory of "new wars,"[99] but the asymmetry is obvious when the intervention becomes reality. Before that event in time and space there may have been asymmetries among the conflicting parties on the territory to be intervened, but these do not have the same quality as the basic difference between the powers of the interveners and *some* of the intervened, i.e. those who, in the society of intervention, want to get rid of the interveners and act as insurgents, guerilla, or violent opposition inside or outside such a society. The imagery used for such conflicts is interesting; Herfried Münkler speaks of *heroic* insurgents and *post-heroic* nations as actors in such conflicts (Luttwak, E. N. 1995; Münkler, H. 2014)[100] (). Such symbolism evokes several associations, attributing heroism to archaic or romantic notions of politics or to religious martyrdom, and post-heroism to an enlightened, almost economic interest in applying force. Certainly the experience of the Vietnam War still plays a major role in the traditional discourse, and modern warfare is also likely to change the setting towards conflicts without individuals on a battleground (aka DRRMA) and the construction of drone wars that, in reality, have changed the relations in asymmetric warfare. The Afghan theater represents all these changes, which are far from imagined or fictitious, like no other intervention.

Regarding the relation between intervention and governance, it is important to understand that all violent or otherwise antagonizing actions within the society of intervention occur **after the intervention**, i.e. they are **not a direct element**

99 The debate about new wars is exaggerated with regard to political implications. However, asymmetric armed conflicts are highly relevant for actual warfare. One paradox in the Afghan conflicts, in particular with the Taliban and violent insurgents, is that the interveners have ultra-modern instruments of reconnaissance and troop protection, while most of the insurgents are more or less traditionally armed. When it comes to combat, ISAF and Special Forces fall back into almost medieval modes of fighting, creating implicit heroism – and individual representation of a specific warrior type. The best examples of this are the high level account in Sebastian Junger's "War": Junger (2010); On a rather trashy level the best-selling veteran's account by Marcus Luttrell is significant: Luttrell/Robinson (2014). It is only consequential to extend this side-road of research into investigating veterans' narratives on intervention wars. In Germany, this is a relatively new field for scientific awareness: Seiffert (2012: 79-121), Bohnert (2016) related to the Homeland Discourse.

100 Luttwak associates post-heroism with the end of the Cold War, while Münkler takes a broader view on deconstructed myths/mythologies of warfare.

of the root conflict(s). It may be that some actors have already had their part before the interventions, e.g. U.S. special forces before 9/11 on the side of the Northern Alliance, but they become actors in the *counterinsurgency* only afterwards, when insurgents attack the government under intervention and thus directly or indirectly the forces of the interveners as well. There are quite a few ways to answer the questions regarding the fate of the root conflict(s) when an intervention gravitates towards becoming steady and permanent:

(a) The root conflicts can be eroded by the intervention and disappear (e.g. when an actor is completely defeated or exhausted or annihilated).
(b) Some of the root conflicts will be transformed into intervention conflicts and add to these (e.g. social inequality will increase in some areas).
(c) Other root conflicts may resurface (e.g. ethnic clashes, in the diaspora as well).
(d) Root conflicts stimulate actors other than intervention conflicts; new actor constellations arrive.[101]

Each of these options must have an impact on governance practices. The typology of interventions and the phenomenology of conflicts are likewise affected.

As I have widely argued in the beginning of this essay, my angle is taken from the Collaborative Research Center's ongoing research (Koehler, J. 2012a). My observations, using the terminology of the third period application that some essentials for a *sociological* concept of governance have entered the stage, point to the practice of governing within a social system:

(a) The whole aspect of *power* – real[102] or symbolic[103] – is embedded in the **modes** of governance.

101 The present Syria conflict, including violent wars in the whole region, is a good example of constantly changing constellations of actors. An increased number of actors also increases the level of ambiguities.

102 There has been an endless debate about the correct translation of Max Weber's typology and terminology www.sociology.org.uk/wspo3.htm, (acc. 2016/09/05); *more interesting is Christopher Morris' statement on the incompleteness of Weber's typology and on the fact that a state without "coercion and force" can be conceived as a state.*

103 Ethnological findings on representation, honor, dignity, etc. can always be applied to the typology of conflicts emerging.

(b) The interface between governance as a framework of delivering common goods and *good* governance as a normative claim is embedded in the categories of **effectiveness** and **legitimacy**[104] – and implicitly, without direct focus on the theoretical base*, efficiency* and *sustainability***.**

Our research has introduced the aspects of **social stability** as a result of and a precondition for certain **constellations of governance** (Koehler, J. 2012a); Koehler's research allows conclusions to be drawn about the effects of the intervention on selected social groups in a defined territory.

From a *sociological* point of view, the question is not so much what the results of a separation of statehood and governance are, but *how a society acts and reacts under intervention*. **The intervention itself does not act, and it does not govern.** It is the social space within which constellations of powers arrange themselves, in cooperation, competition, and accord. The conflicts in a society of intervention follow the basics of a theory of socialization by conflict, beginning with Simmel one hundred years ago (Simmel, G. 1992). Conflict theory split after Simmel: one major branch understands conflict as a constituent element in the making, and the sustainability of any society whose stability is consequently a revolving effect of conflict resolution. The other branch, following Parsons, views conflict as an abnormal deviation from the *normal* course of society that should be treated adequately so as to restore normal order – this is Parsons' paradigm.

Many elements and contexts have changed. However, one cannot understand why and how a state (government or military) acts in certain conflicts without knowing how these conflicts are structuring society, or at least parts of it, in a given moment. Sometimes, the reconstruction of such societies can only happen when traumatized refugees enter the narration and tell their hosts, who are sometimes the interveners, how the situation they have escaped really was and how it was perceived. Sometimes, conflict perseverance – the perpetual violent crisis – stabilizes a society internally while profiting from the instability created by this fact. Sometimes, the absence of any effective external intervention fuels the conflict and leaves the society in permanent disarray. My observation is that, in the *Homeland Discourse*, the intervened territory and society of intervention are imagined rather than experienced by the political leaders, and even more so by the public.

104 An early reference to the aspect of statehood and legitimacy linked both to a set of criteria for success that is still useful: cf. Zürcher (2005), p. 18. This was before the methodological and terminological split of statehood and governance.

3.2 Governance deconstructed

The link between the methodological framework of governance in ALS and the – always and necessarily or potentially – *normative* increments is clear in the research done by the Collaborative Research Center, but is the connection between this link and all notions of *good*[105] governance also clear? We can partially answer this question through an investigation of the key texts on governance under the political situation of an intervention. Such an examination then leads us to the much discussed and normatively loaded issue of the transition from good governance to good enough governance as a result of the changes that the policies of both interveners and intervened have recently undergone.

We speak of *external actors* causing externally induced effects on governance. From an investigation of the intervention as a space for these actors, we can draw conclusions as to the *intended* effects, which are different from the unintended or collateral effects. I use one example that demonstrates my approach in connection with studies on Afghan governance by one of the country's most reputed social research institutes – the most recent AREU report on governance in Afghanistan (Nijat, A. 2014).[106] Nijat's study was presented at the new German-Afghan cooperation strategy meeting in 2014, in the wake of the presidential elections, and was deemed a positive review of progress made.[107]

The intersections with *good enough governance* have been frequently discussed, most recently by Barbara Stapleton (Stapleton, B. J. 2012) in the context of transition. Stapleton analyzes both the Afghan compromise on behalf of human rights and other normative essentials and the reinterpretation of these changes in the German perception of progress (Bundesregierung 2013, 2014).

105 The debate over good and good enough governance looks broadly at both theoretical approaches and the practice of people on site. It is not trivial to note that not every activity in the context of development cooperation or intervention stabilization is to be considered as an *immediate act of governance*.

106 Another starting point could be Hamish Nixon's investigations: Nixon (2007: 40). This research was one of the basic texts for an interpretation of governance in Afghanistan, especially in Germany, e.g. by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which has been very active in Afghanistan ever since the beginning of the intervention.

107 Some of AREU's considerations are also a part of the more far-reaching program "Governance for Afghanistan" (*Govern4Afghanistan*), in which AREU plays a role as a consortium partner. The program is intended to promote Afghan-German dialogue and sustainable cooperation. I shall use Nijat's report as a foil in order to develop some ideas on the deconstruction of "governance" by making subtexts visible.

One of the main sources of friction between the construction of governance and the empirical features of good/bad governance is the lack of contingency in the construction, while in reality contingencies may massively influence a situation or the constellation of actors. One example is the sudden death of a main actor, warlord, or local strongman. Of course, one can anticipate that any such contingencies *may* occur, but there is no way to *predict* if, when, and how they will occur and what consequences they may have. Another equally striking example was the uncertainty over when or if Karzai or one of his successors would or would not sign the Troop Agreement with the United States (cf. pp. 75 and 187). One can analyze the reasons for certain actions without offering any conclusive answer to such a singular event. I would like to meet some of Kahneman's rigid demands for scientific bases of prognostication, but at least some of the trends our project reveals can improve forecasts within limited social spaces.[108]

Another problem is that the well-grounded category of *effectiveness* is very often replaced by another variable, *efficiency*. This introduces quite a few normative subtexts, and thus becomes incrementally more complex. If a measure is not judged according to lead indicators for effectiveness such as goal-adequacy, sustainability, etc., but instead is guided by the wish to complete it before a certain moment in time, e.g., the end of a fiscal period, this may seem rational in the eyes of the political actors, but it is widely detached from the logic of the project itself. Efficiency is often reduced to a cost-benefit frame. The costs of intervention, i.e. the costs of providing the conditions within which external factors *can* have an impact on governance and statehood, play a remarkable role in legitimizing both the intervention at home and the relations between the intervening states and the intervened. However, this is not always perceivable when the effects of external action are being observed or measured. The dependency of cost development on goal consistency is one of the factors that is difficult to discern on the ground, and not only because the

108 The renowned psychologist Daniel Kahnemann should be considered in the context of limited time and intellectual resources Kahnemann (2013) ZEIT online, 2012/05/16 and 2012/06/01). Only recently, his and his colleagues' research has raised severe considerations about the openness of irrational and emotional situations to manipulation. This does belong both to PSYOPS and to the rather complex psychological situations that we find in societies of intervention. The concept of "availability heuristics" is, by the way, an important explanation of the disproportionate fears of terrorism after 9/11. Tamsin Shaw offers good insights into this complex topic in a review of Michael Lewis reference to Kahnemann and his late colleague Tversky: Shaw (2017: 62-65)

dimensions of military and civilian input differ by many dimensions. Goal consistency and adequacy are the primary factors that determine if there is enough financial substance and capacity available for a certain intended input.

The AREU report is called an "Introduction," and indeed it reads like an introduction to "limited statehood" and to both statehood and governance, with a nod to progress made and progress to be made. It is also an exploration of the tools needed to describe progress, and as such it is not very different from Western "progress reports" in system and structure. A few aspects, however, draw attention from the very beginning: the statement that "The core of Afghan Governance is feudal in nature…" (p.10) suggests, in context, that the revenues depended on farmers and foreign rents, i.e. on agriculture and remittances – with an important insinuation that, under Amanullah Shah, an attempt to implement *direct taxation* was imminent. A description of limited statehood follows, including only a few accounts of the modes of governance that result from it. The term is not used, but the context analysis also exhibits uncertainty concerning how to establish modernizing rule within the framework of the growing legitimacy of the state. A second impression ranks high among the opportunities of the "adaptive nature" of challenges that can "save … resources from being misspent" (p. 3). The other opportunities are the long-term fight against corruption, an under-estimated appetite for change, and an over-estimated resistance to reform. The first opportunity can be brought into accord with our findings on adaptive change in the context of local social stability (Koehler 2013). In my context, the last opportunity is the most accurate one – does not it hint at the discourse co-created by the interveners and transported to the donors and then re-imported by them?[109] We have strong evidence that, in Germany, most prejudices lie on the level of denigration of the intervened regarding their level of civilization (Herzog, L. et al. 2012). It is not clear whether the Homeland Discourse(s) in the interveners' countries is (are) responsible for the poor coordination among donors, or whether shifting responsibility from the interveners to the intervened is also a result of the diverging discourses. Both can be read deduced from a rather clear criticism of the international actors (p. 11), who are nevertheless invited to play a strong role in Afghanistan's future development.

109 I would like to juxtapose this with the new findings of donors' policies and errors; van Veen (2015: 1-32). Compared to earlier assessments OECD (2007), the new insights are less diplomatic, but more accurate. They also include an *implicit* political ethnography of the country.

Chapters that would be called an overview of the political system in Western textbooks follow the report. Governance and statehood are intertwined, entangled in an imprecise jumble of institutional and organizational realities and options. However, this description is an adequate, if not explicit, demand for research. The short section on "Subnational Governance" (p. 21f.) describes a formal system that is not entirely mirrored in the local features, as a few of the hybrid constellations are missing; the question of who has real power over what is avoided. This view of implicitly normative statehood-arrangements is confronted somewhat in Nijat's chapter 4.7 on "Customary Governance" (p. 25f.). Here, the issue of power is more explicit and clearly attributed to rural leaders, mainly religious ones. At first glance, one statement is particularly striking: many of the mostly non-registered mosques are used for strong anti-government propaganda, something that could have been avoided had the international community sufficiently engaged with this cohort (of mullahs). AREU quotes only one article focused on preachers' salaries. But even mentioning the context of interveners and the rise of mullahs is a decent account of the fact that the Western actors had been very active in agitating and supporting conservative clerics in rural areas when the urban population became inclined to Soviet and socialist ideologies – in the 1970s! In this context, the competing proselytizing groups – who could also be considered interveners in a strict sense – are still being downplayed (p. 26). A direct link to the debates on middle classes should be identified, since these debates raised questions regarding which class or social stratum mullahs belong to.

A third key issue is the listings of donor-supported interventions (p. 42ff.). This time, the term "intervention" is more than clear; it is the source of effects that come intentionally from the interveners. Other than what the German government suggests with regard to its own role, Germany is not listed among the donors of *relevant* interventions (the EU as a whole is listed, as well as eight other donor nations). This aspect is the more interesting one; AREU CEO Nadery addressed the broad audience at the Berlin meeting of BMZ (in February 2014). His outlook was widely discussed, but the German role was not considered in the light of the AREU Afghan perception.

The first conclusion I draw from the AREU report is that one of the best local R&D agencies is suggesting – though perhaps not loudly –that *the country needs much more insight into its own situation*. The key informants for the study are all Afghan (Malešević 2008), some of them directly involved with governance issues. The bibliography, alas, still reflects my critical judgment

that Afghanistan is being defined by external interpreters rather than by autonomous and self-determined research. However, we can learn from the document how governance and statehood are being seen together: as a union of pragmatic implementation under a still fragmented political structure that does not really reflect its power distribution aside from mere hints.

My second conclusion is that AREU has a very clear critical view of the social fabric, especially concerning the development of women's rights (p. 38f.). Here, the critical account of international prejudices is sensitive; it is true that the Taliban did not begin with women's oppression (p. 39), but they did go on to aggravate the situation. I admit that many misdiagnoses have diverted away from the examination of the critical problems of women's participation in the peace and reconciliation process, but AREU's account of the urban intellectual women minority and their political representation somehow belittles the problems. However, if we leave gender alone, then the AREU report correctly observes that all actors know too little about the social fabric of the Afghans – not only the actors themselves, but their intervening partners as well. **The construct of Afghanistan obscures the real society.**

My third conclusion is that AREU's own assessment is not so far from the better part of international experts' analyses of Afghanistan in times of transition and transformation.[110] It reads like a checklist for analysts and pundits (p. 45ff.). For me, the most striking items are the honest acknowledgment that there is no merit-based link between intended measures and the actors in their implementation, and that misunderstanding governance as "urban governance" (p. 48) excludes rural governance from reflection and judgment.

This short review is relevant for one of the main problems of both research and intervention policies: **the translation and interpretation of problems and situations that have been perceived by both sides, but that do not produce consistent effects.**

110 "Transition" was the questionable title of the period during the pull-out of ISAF from Afghanistan (2011-2014). It indicates the transition from a state with limited statehood and little sovereignty regarding security towards a state that should become almost fully sovereign and autonomous. It must sound a bit strange that the period of "transformation" was intended to follow transition after 2015. The country has been under transformation at all times since 2001. But the meaning of the term is obviously that Afghanistan should be empowered to transform its society towards more flexible structures and better governance, and also towards more recognition.

3.3 No failed state under intervention

One extra note is necessary here; interveners are regularly labeled as *external actors*, while in most cases they become part of the society of intervention. The relationship between external actors and governance was discussed in a recent special issue of *Governance* (Krasner, S. D. a./Risse, T. 2014). In their introduction, Krasner and Risse adopt the concept of failed states to make their point about a distinction between *fragile* states and *failed* states (Krasner, S. D. a./Risse, T. 2014: pp. 549-551). I'd like to argue that a state under intervention and a state in the making *can never be failed*; this is true irrespective of whether we accept the concept of failed states as a functionalist metaphor and whether "fragility" is the true opposite of "consolidated." If the nation-building efforts of the external powers had failed, then the present dynamism under newly elected President Ashraf Ghani would be unlikely, and no donor nation would agree to continue its efforts under the Bonn all main actors Declaration of 2011 and its commentaries and the conditionality of the Tokyo Agreement of 2012. Still, dutifully state that "progress" has been made, while "challenges" remain. That much has not changed since the first big conferences, but responsibility and accountability have been shifted toward the Afghan government. This simply means that the state might not be in good condition. However, there is some trust in self-reliant governance, which is not a sign of a failing state but of fragile statehood, and some expectation of the emergence of an ordinary, poor, and underdeveloped state like so many others. I consider this to be a premature conclusion.

In much political discourse, *failing* and being a *fragile* state intersect. Failing is seen as a process under which consolidating elements of statehood are destroyed or get lost. One could argue that more failing leads to more fragility. But fragility need not be linked to increasing weakness or missing structures; it can also be a status of resilience and flexibility. The subtext lies in the reason why these terms are being used. Sometimes my impression is that there is an interest in keeping some states and their statehood fragile, while others are being defined as *consolidated*, even though I would say they are far from it. The distinction is necessary for the SFB in order for it to be able to compare the consolidated OECD world with those parts of the world that are characterized by *limited* statehood.

3.4 Detour into fundamental questions

3.4.1 Rule of law

Each debate on the society of intervention unavoidably enters the conflict between state and society at a variety of levels. The rule of law (RoL) as a pillar of governance does not only have a substantial impact on social order, but also on social structures at the level of life-worlds. I shall give one example for how this debate has enriched the original concept of our research. Many answers remain open regarding a great deal of very consequential questions: what does it mean if the Taliban install magistrates immediately after seizing power, when their rule is often far from the procedures of the RoL, but gives the claimants the certainty of a sentence? What does it mean when customary law or divine law function solely as pretexts for political particularism or as a trajectory for politicization?

I am highlighting a strain of thought elaborated on by my colleague Jan Koehler, who I have mentioned frequently in this text. Since we first began our research, he has enriched the debate with an increasingly large number of results gained from longitudinal surveys and empirical research, and we are on the verge of harvesting some of the results and applying them to ongoing debates in other projects, in particular the so-called transfer projects. After focusing on parallel judiciary structures between state law and customary law as discussed by Schuppert and Kötter,[111] Koehler intervened with a provisional comprehension of our project's findings in order to explain such ambiguities; indeed, they are even more complex than a simple dualism between customary and state laws would be. Along with his example, I shall try to approach an answer to the following question: **What would be different in the legal/social structure if there were no intervention (and thus no external actors)?**

Koehler's model consists of four elements:

- Divine Law
- Customary Law
- State Law
- Legal Pluralism, enforced by the external actors of the intervention

111 The ongoing debate about the diverse domains of "law" and "legality" provide two "exits" toward connectivity: one is the large field of the rule of law under the aspect of good governance, and the other is the interdependency of the intervention and the law as a question of social stability and the change in social structures, e.g. when customary law has been reduced to only a façade and divine law is just a pretext for resistance against democratization Kötter et al. (2015a): 155-187.

Divine Law refers to faith-based and religious laws that are not to be questioned with regard to authorized interpretation by those entitled to exegesis. It is composed of the Sharia, different religious "schools," local interpretation, and "radical" (power-based?) interpretation. The link with state law is Article 3 of the Afghan Constitution, which establishes the unchallenged consistency of all laws with the dogmas of Islam. This is inconsistent, because Afghanistan is also, under state law, signatory to quite a few fundamental international laws and conventions (e.g. concerning child labor or women's rights; quite a few conventions were signed much earlier (1983), and most of them after 2001, but ratification and entry into effect are quite questionable) that are not without relativism compatible with a rigid understanding of Islam. Here is one link to the interveners' enforcement of legal pluralism and "globalized" legal fundaments such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Legal pluralism includes international law, the national laws of the interveners, and normative non-binding statements. Customary law is not congruent with a dogmatic interpretation of Sharia; it can be moderately effective through Pashtunwali (in Pashtu communities), tribal law, feuds, and local traditions.

The four elements are interlinked in a complex pattern of *communication*. Radical interpretation of divine law antagonizes state law; all divine law repudiates legal pluralism or interveners' legal preferences; customary law and state law interact somewhat in pragmatic applications or enforce selective integration; there are normative contradictions between customary law and divine law, but also a pragmatic syncretism between the two. The major universities host departments of Sharia *and* of (secular) law; very often it is difficult to distinguish the two by methods and principles, when examining their teaching practices. Legal pluralism enjoys increasing recognition by state law and vice versa. However, there are normative contradictions between the two and a limitation to the state's sovereignty, i.e. to strengthening statehood. Contradictions between customary law and legal pluralism often stem from a mutual lack of knowledge and understanding, but there is also a selective connectivity between the two.

This is rather complex. Pace of communication and local variance add to this complexity.

We find *hybrid institutionalized conflict regulation* between self-determination, the state, and institutions like Jirgas and Shuras. The state does have a role to play, despite differing aspirations stemming from a concrete pattern of self-determination at local level. My questions are therefore, **1) Is this hybrid**

constellation part of a wider *society of intervention*, i.e. would it be different without external actors? and 2) How sustainable are such hybrid constellations, and what intervening factors are likely to change the constellation?

The architecture of the CDC-Shura structure of local governance presents an interesting link to the intervention. The CDC model was originally introduced by the World Bank, a powerful external actor, and should have been met by more than distrust or opposition on the local level. However, this was not the case, and we find the local connectivity of institutional engineering as a sort of bottom-up governance for filling in the void between state and local community order. My question is **if the central government, in demonstrating statehood, would have been able to set up something like CDC on its own, without any initial action by an intervener**.

Koehler concludes his organization of normative and judicial pluralism with a few lead questions that must be derived from the complex scheme:

- Where do we find competing plurality?
- Where is syncretism prevailing, i.e. integrated plurality?
- Where do we find polytaxis, i.e. parallel plurality?
- Where are collision regimes, e.g. in cases of subsidiarity?

I add the following question: where does *collusion* create a functional solution for a limited period of time without following the normative rules, but in a collective undermining the institutions? Many reports and accurate assessments describe collusive situations and constellations. The mechanisms of collusion cannot be fully subsumed under corruption. Collusion is an ambiguous result of two distinct normative systems uniting for a common purpose *without a shared value base*. The functional aspect is to limit competition, while different purposes can be met through unlawful and often secret agreements. When a development project pays protection money to an insurgent group in order to be allowed to use a certain road, then collusion can become a normal instrument; when the insurgents are the Taliban operating a few miles from this road as a deadly danger to the project operators, then the situation becomes more complicated. Collusive elements have become a rule rather than an exception in societies of intervention. Mapping collusion would mean a rather precise insight into the distribution of power in a given social space. (Cf. p. 25)

At this point I would like to request that my readers remember my caveat from the beginning of this book that, as a matter of fact, similar research in all regions of Afghanistan would be required in order to draw conclusions regarding the overall situation of social order and institutional development in the country. Nationwide surveys alone are no substitute for such research.

I will now come back to the initial question in this context: is Koehler's scheme not quite normal in ALS? This means that one does not "need" an intervention to arrive at such findings under application of comparable research methods. My assumptions are the following, and this will conclude my detour:

Without the inclusion of the external actors in the intervention, the structure of communication among the three legal/judicial systems would be the same. However, their effects would be different, because, in the concrete case of Afghanistan, we do not know how intense both integrative and antagonizing relations would be, and how different the actors would behave without backing or rejection by the interveners.

The political space of the intervention provides various opportunities for both the intervened and the interveners to interact on behalf of incentives and discouragement regarding the development of stable statehood and the application of certain modes of governance. These opportunities are not consistent with the rationale of the intervention; they are a result of the specific circumstances of the society of intervention.[112]

In other words, it could be that the interveners overestimate the intervention's effects on society, even if there is a society of intervention; they may even exaggerate their own impact. The opposite can also be the case, when it comes to deep-rooted cultural and social conflicts, which we know from many postcolonial situations. Both deviations occur, and actors compete for influence. **Interventions are intervening variables for many constructions of social change, on both micro and macro-levels.** More often than not they serve as scapegoats for unwanted development, and sometimes they are praised for having been the spark that ignites positive change.

These reflections show how useful a transdisciplinary detour into social research can be. Jurists rarely communicate on equal level with social scientists and vice versa, even in academia.

112 The references to Koehler's colloquial intervention are based on my recordings of several meetings in 2015.

My question as to whether the modes of functionally *effective* laws are not similar or even equal in societies of intervention and societies under consolidated statehood can be partially answered. While in societies of intervention the interveners orchestrate the procedures and, to some extent, the effectiveness inside a system of law ("the rule of law"), in a consolidated state the same categories apply to incoming migrants and asylum seekers who are forced to adapt to the existing rules and procedures. For them, it is better to comply with rules imposed upon them to avoid the risks of not being accepted or deported. I call this the external colonization of refugees. In societies of intervention, the local population is dismissive of colonization by external forces. Imposed or important rules do not bear their benefits as marketable brands. **In societies of intervention, diverse modes of governance try to reconcile the life-world with the system by making the habitual and internalized rules compatible with the superior quality of the imported framework for the rule of law.** One cannot expect *intrinsic* motivation for the changes in the normative framework, imposed by the state, but effective in society. The state inevitably appears as an *agent of the interveners*. Good governance tries to link expectations from the life-world to the ability of the state to deliver; the state needs trust credited in order to create trust in the delivery of new rules. Upon delivery, effectiveness makes the difference. But beforehand, confidence in the governing instance is inquired.

As a point of contrast, in Germany, many people, perhaps the majority, are eager to protect their internalized ascription to the RoL against an import of rules, as if the asylum seekers and refugees were interveners seeking to forcefully impose their life-world on the host countries' realities.

3.4.2 Political economy

As I indicated earlier, the political economy of interventions is a rewarding field of research and analysis for societies of intervention. Since this essay is not intended to function as a textbook, it may be helpful for readers to get an impression of the framework within which I understand political economy and how I would like to apply the categories to my studies on *intervention*.

Political economy was a keyword for both the Marxist and Socialist ideologies and their critics. The term has undergone many interpretations and variations and has no single accepted definition. However, its meaning is relatively clear, at least in terms of most concepts that would otherwise be controversial. The question posed refers to **the relation between politics and economy**. This is

too abstract to be practical. But when we ask what policies are needed in order to support economic growth, or where we need to restrain unlimited freedom of the markets, then we come close to the heart of the matter. It is not wrong to describe the relation between the two domains as dialectic, yet not dogmatic.

Political economy is a *concept* (not a *theory*) that refers to the macro-structures in international relations and the micro-structures of a local community. There are a few classical relations that can guide us: state vs. society; state vs. market; exchange vs. authority; exchange vs. coercion; power vs. money; power vs. wealth markets vs. hierarchies.

All of these concepts incorporate the idea that there are certain necessary power(s) and forces that regulate or set free markets and the process of exchange (Gilpin, R. 1987).

The examples presented by the theorists always represent the underlying *ideologies*. It is not so much a question of **how** a market should be regulated or **how** to balance unequal distribution of resources or inequality in access to common goods; the better question is **who** should regulate, and entitled by what power? The problem of legitimacy emerges immediately. The basic problems of political economy can be discovered in any actor-related system, though they are often hidden and found only in subtexts.

Political economy is never merely conceptual. Every economic theory is confronted by reality checks. Since the problem of power is in the center of political economy, there is one more problem in addition to legitimacy: to what extent and with what effectiveness can politics interfere in the forces and movements of the markets? Here, ideologies demonstrate a wide gap. Should the state interfere by formal institutions (laws) and force, or will the markets regulate problems of inequality with their unhindered development? And what happens if there is no developed or consolidated statehood and social orders have to compensate and substitute for its regulatory capacities?

It is not difficult to understand that political economy is always linked to conflicts. Different conflict theories help us understand different political economy concepts:

If the concept of humankind is one of a basically aggressive and self-interested species, then political economy will develop different concepts of regulation conflicts than those emerging from an optimistic, cooperative constitution of humankind. Let us replace this grand term “humankind” with a denomination of the intervened people (Afghans, Pashtus, Taliban, etc.) and attribute such a

concept to "them," but not to "us," and the asymmetric structure of societies of intervention appears immediately. The anthropological concept is then a justification for the exploitation of the intervened or their being coerced into a narrow cage of interveners' market interests.

If the concept relies on unchangeable economic "laws," i.e. inaccessible regularities in the causal course of history, then the aim of political regulation is to create acceptance and minimize opposition. It is more difficult to approach interdependence between oscillating poles of causes and effects. Should policy interfere, regulate, or deregulate the market? Should economy dictate the main strategies of policy? This is a comfortable option for those intervention policies that separate politics and economy; the political sphere is the one of the state, and the economic sphere belongs to the market. I experienced this quite frequently during the Golden Hour. Consultants, working on behalf of external economic interests, tried to re-regulate public service or certain organizations without any consideration for welfare governance.

Facing these options, we continue asking: is conflict the normal status of socialization? If so, how can permanent regulatory practices create a stable environment that serves reproduction as the first and prominent aim of all economy and politics? If we believe in cooperation as the basic human condition, then conflict prevention must serve the same aim.

A good understanding of the importance of political economy can be gained if we apply its problems to the sphere of "justice," i.e. equality. Referring to some very eminent thinkers, Edmund Phelps helps us to define practical questions that focus on both markets and conflict (Phelps, E. 2015). For a broad understanding of the range of conflicts from a labor-related criticism of liberal theories, I recommend Michael Walzer, who spends a great deal of time addressing conflicts that stem from the unequal distribution of dignity and value in a workplace (Walzer, M. 1984). There is an ongoing debate on whether grand theories and concepts of global economy can match the experiences of an economic reality at the bottom of society. Many critics of global "neo-liberalism" do not understand "liberalism" and see all conflicts at the bottom of society as a consequence of this neo-liberal attitude of exploitation and rejection of the state. If neo-liberalism is linked to Western concepts, criticism is consequentially likely to turn against all Western economic theory and favor ideologies even if they act in their economic strategy like their Western antipode, only from a different political angle. With regard to individual freedom,

liberals and modern Marxists should have fewer difficulties understanding each other with regard to policy than on economic/market regulation.

It is with these considerations that I also discuss Afghanistan's emerging new classes and changing social structure. I have participated in numerous discussions, panels, and encounters in which these problems were either more or less openly voiced or appeared only in the subtexts.

4 The Middle Class and Governance under Intervention

Prelude

The temptation to inflate my concept by entering into the field of *political economy* was not insignificant. Indeed, this is a field with a surplus of empirical and situational insights and not enough theoretical frames into which the investigated situations of the intervention must be pressed. The entire discourse on governance cannot be understood without knowledge of the elements of political economy. However, this discipline does not appear to be explicit or dominant in the political discourse – or economists want to give preference to elements of political economy in the political discourse. I decided to concentrate on a particular element of society, i.e. the *social structure*, and explain its relationship to the intervention. It would be possible to recapitulate the whole discussion on class, stratification, and social environment jointly with interfering variables from culture and law in order to match such a consideration to a general theory on intervention. Instead, I have chosen Afghanistan as the example and will demonstrate how my views and perception can be easily applied to other societies of intervention. This chapter has a history of permanent revision and correction due to the rapid changes in the Afghan society; most of it was begun in 2013, while the theoretical aspects of the first two chapters of this book were still in progress. What I am presenting here is a highly condensed foundation that shall, nevertheless, contain enough examples to display sufficient understanding of how a society of intervention operates and develops diverse forms of agency. As part of my background studies for this chapter, political economy belongs to those fields of science without a clear profile or borders. Problems of cooperation and competition thus infiltrate all governance discourses.

4.1 A brief on class analysis

I would like to discuss whether it is necessary to support the emerging **middle class** in order to stabilize Afghanistan under increasing sovereignty and ownership. This has never been a starting point for so many political analyses of interventions and societies of interventions and still is not. What is tricky is considering the changes in social structures as the dependent variable of the intervention. Of course, they change in the course of the intervention and with each significant turn in policies and activities, but they also change in terms of

the actors' constellations, which have an impact on social structure. However, from the first moment when an intervention becomes real, i.e. on the intervened territory, the society starts to influence institutions and actors brought by the interveners, and inexorably the society of intervention comes into existence.

We know from post-war occupations that the reconstruction of social structures can only succeed if some of these mainstays of government and administration have survived the military defeat and periods of heavy demolition. Survivors who are trained, loyal, and understand the bureaucratic functions of administration are also required. This was the case after WWII in Germany, at least with regard to skills and administrative understanding. Loyalty was not delivered, but more or less enforced – or given a chance by the opportunistic choice to serve the new rulers. This was not the case in Afghanistan. There were several layers of administrators who had served under more than one regime; some had survived prison, exile, or persecution, others only degradation. But they were administrators in a structure that did not at all represent the state and statehood as expected by the architects of the Bonn Summit of 2001. Putting "ministers" and other representatives of a statehood-to-be in charge did not mean that their *institutions* would suddenly exist. There were no formal institutions that were capable of functioning in the present. At best, people simply remembered that they had previously been functional. Since the interveners wanted to place most of the administrative burden of reconstructing governance on the shoulders of those people "who were already there" or who had seized power on their own, it was difficult to find fertile ground for statebuilding (which always and without exception requires a few functional institutions that gain authority by both representing the state's monopoly of force and providing a perspective for delivery of public goods). This was definitely not the case.

Let me give you one of my few personal, almost anecdotal accounts of the situation. When I arrived in Kabul in 2003, the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) looked like a ministry, in the same way as the universities looked like universities. I worked next door to the Minister of Higher Education, Sharif Fayez, a highly educated Herati with United States citizenship. He was a professor and understood higher education, though he had not been that involved with the academic world during his time in exile in the U.S. My first impression of the MoHE, and it would prevail for the next two years, was that of an unhinged clock. Many other institutions functioned similarly. The clerks did what they had done before, but they were doing what they had done before

without any solid grounding in the work. To be even more specific: in 2004, academic programs in Afghanistan were either almost non-existent or in very bad shape. At closer look, buildings and equipment no longer resembled universities. In order to receive a Master's graduate certificate, a candidate had to speak with 27 separate offices and individuals, including a scribe, in order to get their hands on the document, which then had to be signed, not by one of the minister's deputies, but by the minister himself. This did not mean that the administration and its bureaucracy were functioning well. Rather, they were trying to bar any attempt at reform of the administration.

The bureaucrats in a ministry were typical for what I would later call the "old middle class." (They informally employed quite a few underlings who were their own servants, not members of the staff, therefore keeping alive a system of micro-patronage and micro-corruption.) To become a civil servant, specifically a high ranking one, depended on formal graduation from an institution of higher education. Therefore, enrollment was critical for the reproduction of the middle class in Afghanistan when things began to change. No wonder, then, that the admission procedures were a first-class field for ethnographic studies and, at the same time, a clue that pointed out the places where the system had to be changed. (cf. Daxner/Schrade 2012).

When the minister was dismissed because many of his peers thought he was too secular, he became the founding president of the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF), which has become the foremost private institution of higher education in the country, comparable to a four-year college in the West. There is currently no proper legislation on higher education and no organized academic structure that would provide a solid base for teacher training and professional education in the most needed subjects. Compare this situation to Germany in 1945: the University of Marburg reopened in October 1945, and others followed. This was the result of immediate action by the Allied Forces as part of an occupation regime; they recognized the importance of revitalizing higher education. Comparison is always risky, but in this case, it is telling. In Afghanistan, the interveners did not really care to make administrative reform a condition for good governance. They wanted to install a government and a judiciary that would be able to take over the burdens that accompanied the establishment of their new administration, instead of simply re-constructing what was bottomless. These observations, which I systematized and collected through 2015, obviously contradict the perceptions of the interveners and donors, who thought reconstruction could start by transferring established models

and patterns of administration to a country, thereby simply replacing everything that seemed obsolete. But this was neither modernization nor functionalization. Had the interveners taken their time studying what had happened to the institutions during decades of war, violence, displacement, and social derangement, they would have had a better idea of where to start. The society of intervention would have had a different face.

The Golden Hour was not reflected in the interveners' peace-building and reconstruction efforts. The society of intervention therefore became a more open and demanding *society* than *governance structure* during the first few years after 2001. Only upon the return of Taliban and the violence that ensued after 2005 was the citizens' disappointment met with interveners' increasing insight regarding modifications of their impact on the social structure. These problems prevail today.

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Afghanistan is certainly post-war, has never been post-conflict, and is currently not occupied (at least not occupied in the sense of legally and formally acceptable terms of occupation, i.e. by statute or international recognition). There have been no reliable resources available to rebuild statehood by extending and transforming the leftovers of public administration as one pillar of good governance. This is a very important aspect of comparative analysis; many argue that it is a common experience of occupation or post-intervention governance that the new administration should be built on the functional remainders of older regimes to the greatest extent possible. (The German experience after 1945 under Allied rule is a strong argument for this view. Contrarily, Paul Bremer's dismissal of almost all Baath Party members from the Iraq public service, namely the army, proved to be fatal for the occupation and the reconstruction of the country.)

This implies an assumption that the conditions of a *society of intervention* are different from those in any other developing country regarding the emergence of a middle class. The intervention has the "role" of supporting and enhancing the social reconstruction of the country by strengthening the middle class. I do not want to establish a normative a priori with this request. However, I do not see many realistic options outside this framework. The role of the intervention is to provide the incentives and means that would promote a certain class-building; ideally, this happens through the influence of the dominant forces of

the interveners. The entire arsenal of international relations and military routines would cooperate in convincing a government under intervention to actively support the task of class building. Have we not now come very close to the paradigms of liberal state-building, democracy cum market orientation? Reality and experience teach a different lesson. Class building under the rule of interveners sounds a bit one-dimensional and neo-colonial. Indeed, that is what it is, although not exclusively. There are a number of subtexts hidden under the surface of the interveners' authority. To build a new class is nothing exceptional; indeed, it is functional, and often normal. (When a bilateral chamber of commerce is introduced to a country under intervention, the interest of the intervening state seeks support, from both the intervened government and its social stratum, which can make use of such institution.) A contemporary intervention requires a functioning administration, including a disinterested bureaucracy, except for when it is taking place under colonial rule.

In Afghanistan, there was no groundwork of bureaucracy and functional administration upon which such policies could have been built. Even today, the Afghan population often has the impression that the interveners start reconstruction projects by building a roof, but fail to see that the building itself has no walls or foundations.[113] Secondly, when they begin to enter a society of intervention, the interveners put most of their strength and strategy into cooperating with the elite that already exists. It is unlikely that this elite has a well-grounded interest in the principles of democracy and market economy, as the interveners understand them. This is not the case, because the well-chosen representatives of the new legitimate government – in our case, the result of the Bonn Agreement – would not know about these principles. Many of them had

113 In addition to my previous comments on higher education, I would like to bring up a related example. Sometime in 2007, a USAID envoy tried to convince the University of Kabul to introduce a credit system for BA/MA programs. Most of the faculty and students could not even imagine what such a system would entail, since the basics of curriculum construction were still unknown to most of them. The situation was simultaneously ridiculous and serious. The credit system would have required a working system of admission and enrollment beforehand, but these were still parts of the anachronistic legacy of the past. Furthermore, a curriculum would also have been necessary, as well as academic teachers who could work with it – and only a minority of the faculty had that capability. Many academic disciplines did not yet exist. Thirdly, and this is very typical of hegemonic interveners' attitudes, the colleagues from the United States were actively attempting to introduce their credit system because the Afghans had exhibited some preference for the European system ("Bologna"), and losing their battle would have meant retreat from a highly interesting future market for the Americans.

been educated in the West, and others would at least understand the implications. But they knew, from the very first moment, that following these principles would also mean a stark and consequential reordering of the structures of power in the state-to-be, and in the society. The newly installed rulers' declarations of belief in democracy and liberal state-building concurred with the demands of the dominant interveners, but even if honest and well-intended, they never did reflect the reality in the country. **There was no "state" in 2001**. There was, of course, the Afghan society, and thus a contingent variety of **social order**. Social orders develop as functional equivalents to governance, and as such they are not contingent at all, but borne by the options of a very concrete local constellation.

4.2 Elite and classes

It goes without saying that most interveners in any invaded system would primarily approach either members of the elite or translators between such elite and their own leadership. This has been the typical experience in all kinds of interventions and invasions. However, my first question, based both on my experience and the evident weakness of such approach, would be: who knows who the real elite are, and who would be able to find the right local people to explain the intervened society to? This section of society simply must be *known* in order for peace-building and stabilization to succeed in a society of intervention, or the policies will fail. But, as I mentioned before, this knowledge was neither readily available, nor had previous knowledge even reached the masters of post-9/11 actions at the time of the recent 2001 intervention. Intelligence, even very high-level intelligence, often misses basic anthropological and ethnological facts; in situations like 9/11, intelligence is often biased by the prescribed aims of war, intervention, and strategy. Only long-term occupation or colonization allow secret services to establish a system of bilateral collaboration that will supply the rulers and their local representatives with sufficient and efficient information. (One good example, and one that is even related to the region, is Rudyard Kipling's 1901 novel *Kim*; one can also find proof of this assumption in political literature, for example in the early Malraux works on South Asia.) My point is that interveners very quickly become aware of a clear double bind. Since they must communicate with the intervened elite on a system level, they will always have to maintain a certain level of distrust and doubt regarding the motives and credibility of these elite. On the other hand, a "population-centered approach," as applied by

COMISAF General McChrystal, can only embed with the population if their relationship with the elite is rational and distant enough so as to allow them to collaborate with the interveners.

In this context, it is also evident that interveners will meet not only members of the elite, but also members of several establishments. (Recent global discourses have clearly shown how important the distinction between one *elite* per society and diverse "establishments" in this society are: U.S. election campaigns and the world-wide anti-establishment crusade by members of different establishments show how useful this distinction is for political analysis.) Much of any hearts-and-minds approach depends on such analysis. In the Afghan case, I have long been both fascinated and frustrated by the fact that potentially every intervener, from the Soviets to the Wahhabi supporters of the Taliban to the Western allies in the post-2001 intervention, should have known much more about the structure of Afghan society and its configurations on all levels. A kind of universal ignorance seems to keep interveners away from using the available sources to shape and refine their models of rule and governance. In a kind of background screening, I was astonished to again find that Gen. McChrystal is the one who has read ethnologists like Nancy H. Dupree, while the same blanks appear in the veteran's and returnee's literature in the official reporting and press releases of many earlier or succeeding leading interveners.

In the case of societies of intervention, when it comes to the structure of society, it is necessary to distinguish this structure well before the period of wars, violence, and displacement has begun. The "peaceful stagnation" under Zahir Shah's monarchy produced an elite whose children often enough had enjoyed encounters with Western culture and ideas long before they could be challenged by the danger of losing their position within the elite. Other parts of the elite, sometimes national, sometimes local, were protected and sustained by their membership at the top of patronage networks. Things never came to rest again after 1975. Interventions, warring, violence, displacements, exiles and returns, and social turnovers have changed the social texture of the country as well as its cultural structures, while hysteresis effects have had to cope with the various effects of war and authoritarian regimes. What kind of elite participates in the rule of the society of intervention? I am asking for a broader understanding of the conception of the "elite," apart from simply looking at high positions in government or administration.

There are two reasons for that: one is that I have observed the complexity of the discourse between interveners and the intervened, including the "third estate" of interpreters, translators, and the media. Opinions and changes in the interveners' mindsets could be analyzed more thoroughly by these observations. The other reason is directly related to my theme in this essay: if the elite change, it is likely that some of its features will trickle down to a middle class that is currently undergoing rapid change itself.

Who are the elite, what kinds of establishments compete in trying to create hegemonic structures within this new middle class, and how do the elite and their representatives react to the changes in society? This is important for the understanding of habitus, hysteresis, and the mindset of a new class emerging. An older middle class certainly existed before the new one arrived. In order to understand the differentiation of society as a consequence of political, economic, and cultural turnovers, one must understand the poor classes in a newly differentiated society. At the same time, we must understand the society as one that is split into those people who can envision a future for themselves and those who cannot.

One cannot detect the elite by merely applying results from surveys or measuring their influence on political or cultural changes or their wealth and assets. Understanding the elite requires an almost intimate relationship with their habitus (affinity), as well as access to their members – adversity, hostility, or simple feuds notwithstanding.

Two years after conducting my own empirical studies and engaging in participative observations of this new middle class, one magisterial doctoral dissertation by Frangis Dadfar Spanta is in the making.[114] In this dissertation, a member of precisely this elite is investigating her layer among the upper classes in today's Afghanistan. This implies that the elite does not directly correspond with *the* upper classes, but using their habitus, lifestyle, political opinions, and propensity to explain the society of interventions helps in turn to explain many of my findings.

114 Frangis Dadfar Spanta: Umstrittene Regierungsführung in Afghanistan: Kulturelle und politische Ordnungsvorstellungen der afghanischen Eliten. Doctoral dissertation t.b.p. 2017, Berlin. (Challenged Governance in Afghanistan: The Afghan Elite's Cultural and Political Notions of Order; my translation, MD). I have been using Spanta's provisional text as background for parts of this chapter, with her permission. Her completed dissertation should be available by June 2017.

In order to understand the complexity and richness of Spanta's unique interview situation, it is necessary to change the disciplinary paradigm from sociology and political science to social anthropology and ethnology. Spanta's work is solidly based on Bourdieu's methods and findings. She uses the young anthropologist as a guide for her ethnological *observations*; the older author, a sociologist, leads her *interpretation*. I can derive one important aspect of the knowledge of the intervention and the society of intervention from Spanta's dissertation.

In her descriptions of and historical excursions on habits, fashion, attitudes, modes of communication, and non-verbal expressions of social perceptions, Spanta has provided me with an ex-post understanding of my research environment on the middle classes. She has had the same experiences as I did when it comes to distinctions within the society of intervention; some attitudes seem to have remained the same for generations, just "corrected" or "modified" by modern augments, such as flat-screen televisions or smartphones. Among others, these are the very easily observed elements of a rapid trickling-down process, and they fit into the paradigm of acceptable "Western" influence. On the other hand, the elite's family and clan structures, *including* the system of being protected and served by members, have been modified over time, but are still basically the same, i.e. they appear unchanged even though the environment has changed dramatically, and family protection is different from private or ISAF-provided security. It seems to be typical for a society of intervention that family relations do not retain the structure and framework that they had maintained for a long time before the era of interventions began. In Kosovo, I could observe that in a very short period of time many traditional structures of the family as institution and life-world had changed by the time of our – the interveners' – arrival, without any offer for replacement or substitution on our part. Thus, a dangerous void appeared, dangerous not only for the locals, but also for some of the interveners as well, who fell into all kinds of traps sprung by the unsettled families. This process has not come about quite so quickly in Afghanistan, and its background is also somewhat different. Violence, wars, and exile over many years have caused questionable and asymmetric modernization that has also resulted in a certain leveling in lifestyle and class distinction. This is important to understand because some of its effects on the new emerging lifestyle of the middle classes are not simply the result of trickle down from the elite. Rather, these effects are also the result of decades of war. In particular, the IT revolution and communication via smartphones has

changed not only the speed and range of communication, but also many traditional modes of deliberation and negotiation that would have traditionally been the purview of the old middle classes and inter-familiar relations. This revolution is part of the acceleration of the new middle classes' experience in a dynamic urban setting. It accommodates both the new entrepreneurial spirit and, partly, the intellectual extension of social capitals. This is also true for most of the elite.

One defining characteristic of the elite is a) belonging to the first families, and b) having been important under each of the previous regimes; the other is the experience of persecution, escape, exile, and return. During the expatriate periods, many members of the elite were "middle class" in exile. They adhered to politically radical ideas, which they did not forget upon return. But the application of these ideals occurred only within the limitations of these former expatriates' re-assumed position within the elite. (Those who were elite under the Soviet occupation had more difficulty entering or returning to the elite.)

This would be interesting enough if it were only in regard to learning about the construction of the elite in Afghan society. With the exception of a few very powerful individuals, e.g. ministers under the new system (both under Hamid Karzai or Ashraf Ghani), many members of the elite feel a certain downgrading within the society of intervention. Their immediate access to and impact on the interveners is no longer unquestioned or certain. While their positions within old patronage networks are slowly loosening – the effect of urbanization and the new establishment of entrepreneurial middle classes – their views on politics and the fact that they are peers the new elite in an intervened country are certainly more critical than before.

It is surprising that Spanta includes people in her panel whom we would normally count among the intellectual middle classes, i.e. journalists and artists. Here, it is clearly the habitus transfer that members of this stratum are those who are likely to become game-changers, system critics, and influential in changing the mindsets of broader groups, mainly middle class youth.

What I have learned from Spanta's investigation into the very elite of today's Afghanistan is that this class is, 1) either disconcerted by the political situation and highly critical of it, while its attitudes and lifestyle partially trickle down to the new middle classes and mix with the question of whether the new situation bears any future for economy and lifestyle, or 2) there is no future on the horizon, and the trickling down will potentially produce the opposite effect:

radicalization or the wish to leave the country. The consequence of this will be disappointment with the society of intervention and promises left unanswered, and this explains why large segments of the young middle class are conservative or turn traditionalist where one would not expect it. Part of this disappointment might be located in the fact that the elite is increasingly perceived as being "Westernized," and the West did not add to the hopes for a good future. I have a vague idea that the culture of disappointment among the youth is using "Western" arguments and rhetoric to counter Western impact on their culture, of which they definitely know less than they pretend to (except, of course, for the elite, who know the lines of distinction very well).

Spanta also teases out the problems surrounding returnees from the diaspora, both problems for the returnees themselves, who must adapt to a new situation in their home country, and problems for others. These returnees appear ready to become the new middle class, but they are perceived as being poorly informed about the situation in a society of intervention. They are inexperienced, except for their inclusion in working and discourse environments that are governed by international actors, military, or IGOs, and they are the direct competitors of local middle class social climbers. Their income often exceeds that of the locals by 1,500%. They feel "protected" by the internal structures of their programs and projects which at the same time require a certain distance to the local "experts" and subordinate collaborators. These returnees from the West also bring with them typical middle-class attitudes and attributes (like entitlement to health insurance, distinction between work and leisure, etc.). Certainly, reputation gains and losses play a role as well (Spanta 6/p. 53).[115] Indirectly, the repatriates from the diaspora become part of an elite within the middle class. This will play a certain role for those countries, like Germany, that are eager to send back many refugees. These returnees may not become middle class because jobs and positions have been reduced by the exit of ISAF and international organizations, but their expectations and the perception of the residents may label them as the unwanted and incompetent competitors that many of them undoubtedly are.[116]

115 Relates to Chapter 6, page 53 in the provisional manuscript of Spanta's dissertation.

116 Returnees from exile or a diaspora bring as much of an "invented" Afghanistan with them as the "invented" Afghanistan has developed over time in the society of interveners. This is not only what we have investigated in the Homeland Discourse; it is also experienced now in daily discussions with those who are considering a voluntary return to their country. It is a big development aim to replace the imaginary country with more realistic views. A few organizations, including some in Germany, are actively assisting the bigger ones like IOM: Cf.

Spanta is such a valuable source because she belongs to both the Afghan elite and the Afghan diaspora in Germany. She is what I call the "commuting diasporist" (a term coined by Kitaj): someone who frequently visits her home country and also receives many visitors from her home country here in Germany. In a way, she is a personification of the society of intervention abroad, but she is no longer in exile.

I have utilized Spanta's considerations in my introduction to the middle classes in order to demonstrate a few aspects of the difficulties that emerge when dealing with this topic:

After the most recent intervention (2001), the social structure partially extinguished earlier layers of the society, while some classes and segments of society altered their features at different speeds; synchronic and diachronic changes depend on the impact the intervention has had on their life-worlds.

Returnees and repatriates from the West and more developed countries of exile have brought considerable competition to a country in which a middle class is only just emerging. Competition is also an effect of being a society of intervention.

The trickling-down effect of habitus changes and new attitudes and lifestyles from the elite to the middle classes is uneven; material elements, such as means of communication, trickle down more quickly than values and virtues that are perceived to be "Western."

The anti-Western, i.e. conservative effect is supported by the Western lifestyle and behavior of some new establishments in the business world, as well as in financial crime and fraud.[117]

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the recruitment policies of the German CIM Program, which are of course not only for Germans, but for well-trained Afghans as well: http://www.cimonline.de/; (acc. 2016/09/02). This is one example of close cooperation between members of the diaspora in Germany and development agents. The mediator in this case is one of the most prominent activists in the field, Dr. Yahyia Wardak, from www.afghanic.de, a relevant diaspora organization. Up until recently, Dr. Wardak also worked for CIM in the MoHE, mainly as a publisher for academic textbooks in local languages.

117 Spanta's description of the Kabul Bank scandal is a highly illustrative example for this assumption. Her view also sheds light on the grey zone of elite family relations and the distances between family members. Also cf. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/kabul-bank-afghanistan-financial-scandal (acc. 2017/03/02), an article that provided most of the information that Western recipients and commentators received on the scandal. One personal remark is needed here: Certainly, this was an incredible loss of credibility and value for the emerging financial sector in Afghanistan. But the amounts of money and the

A thorough study of today's elite still needs to be completed. In particular, the role of the elite has changed slightly since ISAF pulled out and hundreds of thousands of jobs with international employers were lost. Since the new middle classes have to struggle to become stronger, rather than to maintain their achieved position, it is likely that the elite's influence is shrinking. Meanwhile, certain segments in the economic and ideological establishments will gain in importance.

Many of the interveners do not want to *go native*. They insist on communicating only with local members of the elite. This makes up a good part of daily life in such a society of intervention. There have not been many ethno-methodological studies about the features of such societies, but a few diarists and journalists provide vivid, if individualist pictures of communication between the intervened and the aliens who have suddenly arrived and become part of their daily lives.[118] Again, this is a middle-class phenomenon that is worth considering. The interveners in command (as the *elite among the interveners*) rarely share any important information with servants or low-ranking counterparts. Most of them communicate through interpreters, for whom the rules of the games are complex. Or, more likely, they try to learn from their "indigenous" elite counterparts, which seems to be the natural approach to the local culture – and politics. We can learn about another side of the society of intervention through novels or television series that give an everyday account of the society of intervention. At the same time, we also learn about how Spanta's

practices of fraud clearly follow Western models, rather than traditional models of corruption in the country.

118 A very typical example is Ronja von Wurmb-Seibel, a journalist writing for several media: https://www.vonwurmbseibel.com/ (acc. 2017/05/04). Cf. Von Wurmb-Seibel (2015). There are a broad variety of genres, but there is always a mix between accurate "facts" and the images from an "invented" country. A popular title by Roger Willemsen found much acclaim because Willemsen was well known to the public as a sponsor of the Afghan Women's Association in Germany: Willemsen (2006); "travel journalism" into areas of crisis and conflict is relatively new to post-war Germany; Afghanistan had to be "rediscovered," and a new audience had to be found – or educated. Another example of an addiction to the country is Susanne Koelbl: Koelbl/Ihlau (2007). For me, it is significant that "stories" from Afghanistan from before the Soviet intervention are often a kind of spin-off by scholars and appear to be naïve. However, they reflect the old middle class, e.g. in a combination of everyday stories and recipes for family cuisine. Marianne Schmidt-Dumant was in Afghanistan 1972-1974 and is a sponsor of another Women's Association (IAWA) in Germany: Schmidt-Dumont (2012). None of these stories and reports are apolitical. But the methods and perspectives change. Similar relations to the American Homeland Discourse can be observed, but, of course, the U.S. has a long history of intervention, and one can feel it when reading the various stories from Afghanistan.

descriptions and observations of the elite are mirrored and altered in a mainly middle-class milieu. There is almost no account of how life is for those in the lowest and poorest classes, and few of the authors refer to the elite. What we get is typical middle class: booksellers, teachers, landlords, service professionals, students, etc. We can recognize many of the characteristics that Spanta has described in her elite interviewees, and some distinctly different ones, especially when it comes to economic restraints. Here, the middle class meets the new intellectual elite, who need not belong to the wealthiest layer of society. As is so often the case, we learn more about the reality of a complex society by meeting their normal constituents, not their representatives.

As an aside, I must recapitulate my experience from the years 2003-2005, when I got all my relevant news about political change and violent incidents from my driver and bodyguard.[119] As I said in the beginning, I do not usually work with anecdotes from the field, but this one in particular is so typical for the society of interventions; those who know (something) and those who want to know (something) communicate better on the issue than all the reporting and chains of commands, fake news reports and false attributions included. What was important in this particular case and can therefore be generalized to apply to a range of cases is that a base of mutual trust and regular exchange has to be established in order to get reliable information. This is only possible within the new pattern of social interaction, and not beyond it as a normative frame for societies under intervention. In the concrete case of my driver, I had to deliver too. Those, who easily *go native* do not deliver; they perceive themselves through the eyes of the locals, which does not leave enough space for an empathetic approach through the eyes of the interveners.

Much of the consciousness surrounding the concept of "state" was enshrined in *memories of former states* (kingdom, republic, occupation, Mujahideen, Taliban, warlords, militias, foreign troops, etc.) and *concepts imposed by the interveners*.[120] Between those two poles there was the immediate and troubled

119 He came from a highly respected Tadjik middle-class family, had a military career, suffered under the Taliban, was rehabilitated in the army, and needed a second job in addition to his assignment as captain. He would know enough news from his unit, which was responsible for security at some important embassies, to be able to explain to me what had happened the night before. When I called the German embassy some hours later, they would not release any confirmation or denial of my driver's reports, because his information came from unofficial sources.

120 Whether the memory of the past is supportive or detrimental is a question intensively debated in Afghanistan. An Afghan returnee aid worker who demands that the next generation be spared the burdens of memory details her very explicit position in the following contribution:

experience of trauma: violence, death, displacement, lack of orientation, and the need for reconstructing simple structures such as families, communication, and the bases for reproduction: food and shelter. Here begins *the history of the society of intervention*, because the immediate remedies were – of course – not only imported, but also directed toward their destination by the interveners, but never without the assistance and the interest of local powers. Social structures cannot be ordered, but good (or not-so-good) governance can affect the direction in which the restructuring process of a society is likely to go. This is the link to the first two chapters of this book, and it also connects with the research background with which I started.

Afghanistan in 2001 had no social structure that could be described in terms of the structural mapping of other poor and war-torn societies. There were remainders from many layers of recent history (one hesitates to say "recent development"). There were actual centers of gravity, primarily but not only in the big cities, and there were forgotten areas. We have a fairly good account of the events and processes that were staged in Kabul and in the capitals of the major interveners. We know less about communication between the local peers and their counterparts on the side of the interveners. Spanta's interviews give a fairly precise account of this communication and how those members of the elite who were in the country at that time remember it. Other recollections, rarely written down, come from those who either attended or helped prepare the Bonn meeting of December 2001. We do not know much about the perception of this communication at the base of society; real understanding based on research and observation came much later, I would say after 2005, when the security situation deteriorated and all sides needed more insight into societal processes in order to understand what was happening. People were able to foresee or visualize what the effects would be, but they neglected to consider the processes leading up to those effects. The factor of time was also underestimated. How can social structures open up and become subject to change under these circumstances?

I am entering a field of political economy that is usually not immediately linked to conflict theory, but has always been associated with state-building and peace-building activities, even if not explicitly so. Without such a concept, the main assumptions in this context would appear more volatile than necessary.

Mina Sharif: Supporting The Future Of Afghanistan Means Loosening Our Grip On The Past. 2016/02/03. (www.huffingtonpost.com/mina-sharif/supporting...), (Acc. 2016/02/04). Cf. the chapter on Youth, p. 150.

Recently, I have also been working on the example of the costs of interventions with Afghanistan; this subject forcefully demands a position in the political economy of warfare and civil reconstruction, or, if you will, under the circumstances of normalcy versus a state of emergency.[121] An analysis of all donor conferences and a large number of political decisions by the interveners, as well as the existing reality at the bottom of a society of intervention, confront us with an implicit political economy, and no such construct exists without an account of classes, strata, milieus, social environments, and their related discourses. I wish I could be more ironic about the fact that donor conferences and much of the communication on the system level are based on a mutual ignorance of facts about the respective other side. In any case, the intervened country is seen as a kind of invented map with symbols that fit into the mindsets of the interveners or donors, while the empirical experiences of exile, repatriates, and a few travelers mix with the ideal-typical or stereo-typical imagination in the mindset of the intervened.

These discourses are linked with the original question of what we know and how we acquired this knowledge, and of course, about our blanks, what we do not know, but know that we should learn. It is in this context that I want to define societies of intervention as **learning societies in which one side possesses a strange surplus of knowledge on the other side** (Cf. 2.2 The knowledge of the intervention, p. 51ff.). This is very important for discourses on society and economy, as inconspicuous as it may seem. The surplus is a paradox. Let us assume that everybody knows a lot more about his or her own society than a foreigner who is stepping into this society from the outside. This is, however, not true. The intervened know more about the interveners than the interveners know about the intervened, at least in a majority of cases. (I refer to a learning tradition of the subjects of colonial rule; they had to read their masters' thoughts in order to get along with them or to survive.) And through

121 At the EISA EWIS Conference in Tübingen, I presented a provisional version of an article entitled "The Cost of Interventions – Lessons from Afghanistan." The following can be found in the abstract of this article: "The political economy of interventions is less developed than the calculations of the costs of war. An intervention does not work in the binary field of victory and defeat. Its real costs cannot simply be represented by budget figures and fiscal operations on the side of interveners. The structure of expenditures for civilian and military purposes in humanitarian military interventions, such as in Kosovo or Afghanistan, has a significant impact on governance and the economic and political wellbeing of the intervened society." (Tübingen, 6-8 April 2016, t.b.p.). A comparative cost analysis is also useful here: http://www.statista.com/statistics/271526/us-war-costs-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/

this, the life-world of the interveners' society was quietly imported; the learning society of the intervened and the learning society of the interveners merge in the society of intervention, but this does not level all distinctions of the learning process.

By this I do not mean to point exclusively to highly complex disciplinary knowledge, like that of an ethnographer or economist. I am referring to the internalized knowledge of "what is."[122] This knowledge must be translated for the interveners, and vice versa, for their knowledge of the intervention. In a second instance, their knowledge of their own society requires translation into the understanding of the intervened. This is where the allusions and expectations regarding a possible country of exile or destiny come from. Each side has a surplus of self-related knowledge and a deficit in knowledge about the respective other(s). Incomplete knowledge, based at times on incomplete information, together with asymmetric levels of communication, leads to incorrect or deficient interpretations. So far, so trivial. When it comes to the problem of *knowing one's own society*, things become less trivial.

4.3 State of mind and statehood

My concept is simple: I follow a mix of theories – Marxist, Bourdieuan, Putnamian, etc. – and support my concept empirically with the fact that many societies are structured in perceivable "classes":

Every society under reconstruction needs a vital, sustainable middle class in order to become more stable. This is also true for societies of intervention or post-war societies.

I have just touched on the problem of whether the creation of classes falls under the domain of state and statehood or whether classes emerge from certain societal conditions *with consequences for the respective governance modes*. I will discuss potentialities and opportunities for a middle class in Afghanistan as a country under intervention. There are certain fields of explanation that can be easily used for generalization (e.g. the function of IT communication, urbanization, secularization), while others might be specific to the society of interventions (e.g. the permanent interaction and antagonistic communication between interveners and the intervened, the role of external actors, the status

122 Hannah Neumann has written a valuable doctoral thesis on this topic: "Through the Eyes of the Locals: Two post-war communities and their struggle from war to peace" (Berlin 2015), which extensively addresses this kind of knowledge.

of permanent crisis and insecurity due to an incomplete peace process). While the society of intervention is exceptional as compared to a consolidated stable society, it is not so clear what the significant differences are with regard to social change, hysteresis effects,[123] and faults.

As a participant in a discourse where Western and native views necessarily confront one another, I will argue this point more cautiously than usual. My recent experience with Western intrusion into actual governance reforms (cf. and the role I have been playing in the project Govern4Afghanistan)[124] has taught me that the problem is less the "post-colonial" confrontation of the epistemic superiority of the Western counsels ("we know better") than the interpenetration of values and norms in a society of intervention. When arguing social structure, sometimes I am dumbstruck when confronted with arch-(neo)liberal Western views while I am trying to establish more self-reliance and ownership over ideas and practices with my Afghan counterparts. This is, of course, the old Edward Said notion, but clad in rather new habits.

It seems that nation-builders like Dobbins always have an ideal-typical imaginary social structure in mind when they advise for or against strategies and procedures. But it also seems that the military has a different map and toolbox for such imagination in their mind. A short detour might be useful here for clarification purposes: I call it the military *blind spot*.

Military interventions rarely aim for a specific *structure* of *society* as a result of their actions and policies. Instead, they focus on a kind of vision of a *renovated* society that will be deduced from the changed *structures of the state*. Apparently, this is a paradox. Military intelligence has always tended to know a lot about the society to be invaded, but very little about the society to be, after the regime has changed. Even if state-building alone is at the core of an invasion, there is an idea about how the new state should look like; this is even more true if regime change is in the portfolio. In some cases, secret services and commissioned ethnological and sociological studies support the preparation of an intervention. The moment of truth comes when forces clash and different societies interpenetrate each other. Military interventions have often not been well prepared to consider such problems because most civilian achievements are seen as functions of the victorious seizure of power. It should have

123 Cf. p. 90, 11-112

124 A few months after my exit from Governance4Afghanistan, the project adopted my original ideas on two major tasks – urban development and migration/IDPs – in a second round of discussions (October 2016).

been clear, and will be obvious to all actors and the general public, that any intervention will shake up the entire structure of relational communications among classes and social groups, etc., and will also include the changing of the environment of (a) habitus for these groups. **One of the problems is that neither interveners nor the intervened themselves "know" what the society looks like at the moment that its structures are being changed through the intervention.** Whatever might have been known before that moment – see the paradox above – is overthrown by the immediate reality on the ground when the rule changes. A good example of this would be UNMIK's uncertainties when it became "the state" of Kosovo in 1999.

Even if an intervention has been carefully prepared and uses all kind of intelligence to anticipate the peoples' perceptions and reactions, a wide gap in knowledge and understanding remains. However, the quality and implication of *not knowing* is quite different for interveners and the intervened. Ideal-typically, a society should anticipate what the changes will be like if a certain external force intervenes – a highly volatile undertaking. And the same figure would be mirrored in the interveners' plan for invasion and occupation. Instead, social structures, the concrete texture of a society and its cultural surface, and the mechanisms of its cohesion, are usually in the dark. Research conducted by ethnologists and anthropologists, social analysis, and many other fields of "area studies" in a broad sense may have existed at the moment of intervention, but all knowledge, including data from intelligence and more specific sources, is densely filtered through the Homeland Discourse, i.e. the views and opinions of a foreign country in the interveners' society. **On the side of the intervened, the knowledge of their own country depends on their experiences during the conflicts and wars before the intervention, as well as from the duration of war, exile, atrocities and social derangement.** In a way, some of our research, e.g. the trends in perceiving local security and shifts in the roles of actors (such as ISAAF, ANA, ANP, ALP, etc.), adds to the information we have received from ethnological research. Without this information, interveners would be lost when it came to their decisions on how to place projects and how to protect them. In addition, there is the problem of language: when almost no intervener, irrespective of rank and position, speaks the native language(s), communication between actors relies on the credibility and ability of interpreters who are members of either the intervened society or of the interveners' staff. But this does not resolve the problem of how to play back this information to the intervened people in order to strengthen their self-reliance based on their own knowledge and collective self-perception. Such an

endeavor is beyond military rationales and logic, and it is only a rare addendum to the political decisions leading towards an intervention. In both cases, it is not only a question of trust and credibility whether this distinct group can become the effective trajectory of an over-complex political event.

This is true for all kinds of interventions and post-war situations. In Afghanistan, there has been a *policy* of hiding the recent past from curriculum and public discourse, at least as far as education and media are concerned. This contradicts Mina Sharif's appeal to get rid of the memory of the recent past (FN 134), and makes us aware that knowledge and memory policies are different from the discourse on history and the effect on the life-world.

In Afghanistan, the social structure certainly changed massively after the beginning of the Soviet invasion. The society had not been stable before 1978, but occupation, Jihad, civil war, the Taliban regime, the battle for liberation, and finally the intervention of 2001 and its ongoing repercussions have changed the structure of Afghan society more than once. If a sociologist were to analyze this society today, he or she would certainly find a quite different society compared to 1965, 1975, 1985, or 2001. It would also be rewarding to analyze what structures in the *life-world* of Afghans have survived all changes, as compared to other parts, which have adapted to the conditions created by the interventions or have undergone asymmetrical modernization simply through the effects of war or displacement. Changes in Afghan society after 2001 are most interesting for my research, as there has been a double structure of real changes and perception ever since. Taking into account good examples such as Rubin, Barfield (Rubin, B. R. 2012; Rubin, B. R. et al. 2001; Barfield, T. 2012) or the continuous flow of information from AAN, the researchers are all somehow oriented on a future that did not come to an end with the exit of ISAF in 2014. Nevertheless, many events and texts, notably in Germany, seem to reflect an "end of the (Afghan or intervention) history" in their summaries. *Social change* has never been analyzed as *the* independent variable that explains the various developments of a society of intervention. Instead, there has been a steady collection of explanations for diverse changes in social structure. While the changes in the perception of the security situation have been met with quick, and often false, answers, due to evident facts (incidents, attacks), other changes – in the mindset and in lifestyle, attitudes, and habits – have never been related to each other. **We cannot have expected such research to happen; even in our interveners' societies, it would have been complex, lengthy, and difficult to conduct. However, the approach to such research**

would also have been an agent of change, if the intervened had been part of it.

What would have been needed much earlier and is still needed today are comprehensive social studies of Afghanistan that give the Afghans a solid base for their self-perception.[125] This creates a certain uneasiness in the discussion of the achievements and deficiencies of the country when judging the intervention, hence my urgent quest to establish the field of Afghan social studies, in order to give the intervened people a chance to learn about their own society (which is simply one aspect of dearly needed education reforms).[126] In loftier phrasing, this means that only a highly self-reflective society can create enough social space to negotiate the answers to the question of **how it wants to live in the future.** The expectations that interveners are confronted with due to their real actions stem from this. (Such an approach would mean a balanced and, at best, equal discourse on political options after *the change of regime.*) The reality of most interventions is that **the interveners take the first step to interpret their invasion in view of their predictions for the changes in society.** This does not contradict the paradoxes in the knowledge of the intervention, as repeatedly described. In many cases, the discourse remains as superficial as minimally necessary: *we* are going to *build democracy* or help a *market economy* emerge. The main burden of agency lies with us. At this level, the generic terms also allow a good deal of legitimacy in the homeland discourses of the interveners. But in reality, such rhetoric does not tell us anything substantial. "Society" means, inter alia, the varieties of life-world and the interface with the system, the social orders beyond and beside the imposed structures through formal institutions, the modes and procedures of conflict regulation, and, last but not least, the ability of people to negotiate their own agenda.

Today, there is a certain relief in Germany that neither public awareness nor political priorities will focus insistently on the intervention. There are quite a few "lessons learned" events that wrap up the past more critically than before,

125 The role of such "social studies" in the making of the German post-war experience should not be underestimated. Beginning with Dahrendorf (1965), quite a few of these studies established a critical and dynamic discourse on social structure and its changes.

126 This brings me back to my original field of higher education. In recent years, specialized studies and research in particular societies were replaced either by area studies on much larger regions or by a narrower focus on international relations, i.e. with a focus on state rather than society. In academic life, the humanities fight with political science – and usually lose. Political science and international relations then fall short of deeper insights into the societies they are dealing with.

but are cautious about going too deeply into the prognostication of an Afghan future and the role the interveners will play in it.[127] Certainly, such considerations might influence the mindset of the interveners and parts of the intervened elite, but they are not a priority in the strategy of an intervention. This can be proven by the voids in strategies and progress reports.

The fixation on the state, and, consequently, on statehood, governance, and good governance, has reduced the ability of the interveners to understand the society that the intervened must consolidate and change in order to survive and have a good future. This is a stark and critical statement that cannot be easily proven solely by empirical research, simply due to the fact that not much research has been done and political events are bypassing continuous observations. However, we know more than nothing. Indicators for stability in rural local communities in North-East Afghanistan, which the C9 group has been carefully noting over many years (Cf. FN 3, and p. 68), are a good example of this. It would be daring and less than sound to draw conclusions on the entire Afghan society from these findings alone. A description of the entire basic structure of Afghan society and a long-term investigation would help us to better understand both the changes in the recent past and the options for the near future. At the same time, such an exercise will allow for a methodological look at the relation of a state on its way into increasing independence and a society answering its most urgent questions about how it wants to live in the future.

The military blind spot is evident: as long as the intervention is seen as a military activity in order to prepare the ground for civilian reconstruction, it is challenged by the state of emergency, the exceptional situation.

The military blind spot has had effects on warfare and tactics. The debates concerning the dominant elite-oriented approach and COMISAF Gen.

127 Recently, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), together with the German Atlantic Association (DAG), organized a high profile "lessons learned seminar" ("Lehrstunde") in order to summarize the collective memory of a very special episode in history: Berlin, 2015/22/04. Critique of the intervention was outspoken, and the recommendations for the future were vague. The aspect of the role of complete or deficient information was not well represented. The issue could have been discussed more thoroughly during the "Afghanistan Week," when the Afghan President, Ghani, and some of his ministers visited Germany in early December 2015. But the chance was missed because every statement and piece of information was knee-jerk projected onto the refugee crisis hype. This was unlucky because the question of why young educated Afghans want to leave their country is part of those first approaches that can stimulate adequate research. (Only in early 2016 did the Foreign Office discuss a related study with an Afghan Human Rights Advocacy: AHRRAO, Hayatullah Jawad). (Jawad, 2016).

McChrystal's population-centered approach are a good example of the need for better knowledge than intelligence alone can provide. In a personal discussion in early 2010 with the general, I learned that his motive was mainly to avoid creating new recruits for the Taliban through the neglecting of communications with the population, since "their peers," i.e. the elite did not care about their demands and needs. The entire "hearts and minds" debate is a mirror of this controversy. What is most important for future interventions is the outlook that **predominantly non-state actors in violent controversies and warfare interact more closely with and penetrate social structures than those societies of intervention where statehood is something like a buffer between the state and society.**[128]

4.4 Middle class conceptualization

If we want to allocate the categories of governance reasonably, it is useful to place them in the context of Afghanistan's existing fragile statehood and to examine their interactions with societal structures. I shall narrow my reflections to governance regarding the emerging *middle classes* in Afghanistan.

This is no arbitrary choice. The Western concept of a functional and balanced relationship between state and society is based on theories of stratification or class structures. For all Western (i.e. capitalist) societies, the middle classes play a central role in the construction of a stable, dynamic, and functional system. I do not want to insert myself into the ongoing struggles between Marxist, post-Marxian, neo-classic, and other theories concerning the existence and function of middle classes. Instead, I limit myself to the adoption of a pragmatic sociological concept that is broad enough to accommodate several mainstream theories. Very early in my observations of changes in Afghan society, I predicted the emergence of a middle class – or, more precisely, of an **urban middle class in the big cities** (Daxner, M. 2011b). I shall return to the complexities of urban societies and urban middle classes in chapter 4.9. Here it is necessary to understand that one assumes a link between the middle class, economic growth, and development through urbanization, despite the fact that an increase in city population produces a wider gap between the lower and middle classes, a general lack of shelter, and a risk that all who do not profit from the

128 Joel Migdal has been a strong inspiration since his magisterial book on weak states and strong societies. Migdal (1988)

"urban" environment will be downgraded socially (Habitat, U. 2014). *Demography* is a critical aspect of such ambiguity. Even the very sober UN estimates are lagging behind reality in their prediction of population numbers in cities: a 50% share is prognosticated for 2060, while today (as of 2016) it is already estimated at 40%. It is unclear if population growth will increase at a lower rate when living in the city is met by social upward mobility, or if it will remain as high as it is now if the informal cities remain unregulated by any kind of governance. These informal cities are growing steadily. In an audit for the USAID Land Reform Program (LARA), SIGAR discovered the following:

- By some estimates, land values have increased by 1,000 % in urban areas since 2001, creating increased economic incentives for theft and fraud. Afghan land reform experts say the scramble for land will accelerate over the next decade as economic development increases.
- Land is increasingly a major source of conflict and a factor in approximately half of the personal and communal disputes in Afghanistan, according to a U.S. Institute of Peace expert. "Under the current Afghan government, millions of displaced Afghans have returned home, often seeking to reclaim the land they previously owned."[129]
- The hundreds of thousands who have not been able to reclaim their land have resorted to squatting on the outskirts of urban areas in informal settlements unrecognized by the government. The U.S. Institute of Peace has reported that around 70 percent of urban residents in Afghanistan live in these types of informal settlement.[130]

At about the same time (2010ff.), the term "middle class" began to appear occasionally in Afghan political reports and newspaper headlines. It is only lately that it has become more popular. We now find the term everywhere in the newspapers, and it is used in the same way as in the West. It has been adopted by the new Afghan middle classes and by their media.

My theoretical foundation that necessitates the use of "class" is based on Bourdieu (Bourdieu, P. 1983, 1985), and not only because his theory of *relational* class construction transgresses the narrower Marxian approach. It is also compatible with concepts of social capital in other theories (Putnam, R. D. 2000),

129 The situation has become so dramatic because of the deportation policy of Pakistan and Iran; it will be further aggravated by the European deportation of Afghans from Europe. Cf. an earlier report from 2016/07/28, same address: audit regarding U.S. and Afghan government efforts to assist internally displaced persons Spence/Schmidpeter: 93-108) in Afghanistan.

130 Cf. jennifer.george-nichol.civ@mail.mil from SIGAR (Released 2017/02/09)

and with research on social stratification in societies of intervention and at war (regarding all of Bourdieu's work after 1960 focused on Algeria). Of course, Bourdieu did not develop a class theory from scratch; he came to his revision of classic Marxist class analysis when he investigated the fine lines of social differentiation that do not relate to ownership of the means of production. When he turned to our most advanced Western European societies later in his life, echoes from his earlier studies in deracinated societies remained.

Another aspect of my theoretical foundation is my belief that liberal state-building, and therefore market economy as well, relies on a (strong) *existing* middle class. The support of, dangers for, protection of, and idolizing of the middle classes have become running slogans in all kinds of electoral campaigns and exercises in political legitimacy, especially when it comes to justifying either continuous policies or political reforms in order to keep society functional.

I do not need to delve deeply into economic theories to elaborate on the recent variations in a concept of middle classes in order to link it to the aspect of *governance*; for my purposes, it is sufficient to focus on sociological categories. But, of course, economy and business play a decisive role in the concept of the middle class. Since there is no Western society in Afghanistan, and also almost no fragile non-OECD society in which the permanent appeal of being or becoming a *middle class* does not appear everywhere, we should not underestimate the symbolic relevance of the term and its radiance. Furthermore, an even more interesting question is whether the term applies to a society of intervention. On the other hand, the idealized version – as in the American emblem of the middle class as the backbone of the society, which at this point has simply become untrue in that country – is not helpful when it comes to identifying the strengths and flaws of a real emerging middle class.

Let me introduce four theses:

In Afghanistan, a distinct middle class is emerging. This is first and foremost an urban phenomenon, but to a certain extent it is also occurring in the rural areas.

This class is split into two branches: the entrepreneurial and the intellectual.

Good governance cannot be derived only from functional statehood, but must be directed foremost at a dynamic and stable middle class in order to become rooted in society.

Ownership and self-determination will rely on the existence of a sustainable middle class.

(a) The older middle class still does exist; as an economic phenomenon, elements of guilds and bazaars (Dittmann, A. 2007) can be identified, as well as a sort of nouveau riche via traditional exploitation of patronage and corrupt structures (cf. Minola, G./Pain, A. 2015). Such investigations do not only show the transition from older forms of middle class to the new ones; they are also linked to the political economy of a rentier system, emerging from the intervention.

I will not go into the details of the older stratum because I want to expand my discussion of another hypothesis of higher importance: **The new middle classes will try to change the elite, while the old ones are likely to protect them**. Some older references show a non-systematic distribution of crafts and trade, mainly in contrast to a vast agricultural sector, and certainly not within the scope of a stratification theory (Barin-Zuri, A. 1981; Büscher, H. 1969; Dupree, L. 1973; Schweizer, G. et al. 1981). However, Büscher has another observation to make: a new middle class was already emerging in the 1960s due to increasing communication with foreigners and the beginning of industrial development (Büscher 1969:54). The first cause is reasonable, because Afghanistan sought development aid from Western and Eastern sources in the early days of the republic, and therefore there might have been increased cultural contact with foreigners. But there is no causal explanation for why this fact should help create a middle class, other than the fact that these are nationwide growing economic activities. Industrial development would have created a socially secured working class of sorts, if it had only reached a critical volume (p. 134). Büscher explains his observation by emphasizing two other factors that are more plausible: a stronger functional differentiation of society and better education. I support his view because he points out that education transcends mere (vocational) training. Of course, all stratification and differentiation took place under very traditional structural conditions: in 1966/7, 77.2% of the workforce was engaged in rural production and only 11.2% in manufacturing, with an industrial share of 0.6%, in contrast to the crafts, which amounted to 5.4% (Büscher, H. 1969). In Büscher's comments on the rise of the middle classes in towns and cities, he observes a sharp distinction between these and the lower classes (Büscher 1969:88). He thus anticipates a development that had sped up under Soviet occupation, notably through the enormous growth of urban populations during recent decades. Trade and services are

showing big growth rates, industry and mining are developing in somewhat of an "expectation" mode, and agriculture is facing major obstacles to its basic survival.

(b) The two branches often overlap, especially when education and experience with other cultures bridge the gap. The availability of solid education, both general and professional, is a condition for the solidification of the middle classes. This may be costly for the individual or his/her family. Such fundamentals are preferable to urban environments, and they widen the gap between the middle classes and the poor, who never come close to being able to replicate this link between entrepreneurial options and education. The notion of an intellectual branch is ambiguous. I do not think that the Western idea of intellectuals (as public critics and as representatives of a critical and knowledgeable subclass) is still applicable. But those who read, who utter their opinion in public, who teach and have been taught systematically, are intellectuals in the sense that they are reflecting their own social situation and can judge this situation in a manner that is not purely subjective, while their personality supports subjectification. It is typical for the society of intervention that one is unable to distinguish the exact origin of its mindset, since it is "more" and different from *fusion*. Their capacity for communicating while maintaining a certain distance to their individual interests is the criteria that places them in the intellectual branch, which, however, does not preclude them from also belonging to the entrepreneurial branch. However, the entrepreneurial branch may be partly void of any intellectual add-on, and members can even turn radically religious and dogmatic in their convictions. Parts of the habitus of both branches are the result of a trickling down from the elite, while other parts come from experience abroad and the opening of the country through the intervention.

(c) This hypothesis is linked to the overarching assumption that only the middle classes have a genuine interest in the rule of law section of governance, while the upper classes and the bottom of society do not. Only the middle classes will appreciate state protection of their property. This is important for their priority of position among governance aims; the poorer classes will demand better delivery of welfare goods that can be consumed instead of invested in in businesses. For the middle classes, the deontological catalogue is probably much more important and enters the habitus of this class (from taste and fashion to a certain discursive routine that is significant for their belonging to this class). I am not going to analyze the upper class and the nouveau riches except

to state that for them neither rule of law nor state-born welfare is of much importance (cf. references to Frangis Spanta's doctoral dissertation in Chapter 4.1). It would perhaps go too far to assume that the middle class is the only class with a genuine "republican" spirit because they alone can consolidate social order with sufficient public space and the will to accept institutional rules that they have a role in co-deciding.

(d) Emancipation from the interveners' dominance and the structural formative power of the interveners should be automatically associated with the quest for sovereignty, in particular after Tokyo 2012 and the change in government in 2014. But it is not likely that this will happen quickly or spontaneously. Rather, there will be a period of transition that may even dissolve some elements of the society of intervention.

The building of a middle class has also become part of German foreign policy concepts (Kaim, M./Stelzenmüller, K. 2014), though it was not so explicit in earlier progress reports.[131] The political implications are far-reaching: all dimensions of governance are directly affected by the quest for a growing, sustainable middle class that can and will be the bearer of the steady and continuous development of the country.

131 One interpretation of the reluctant usage of the term can be found in the history of the German term. Normally, it is not common to use the term "Mittelklasse," which directly translates as "middle class," but rather "Mittelstand," which implies a more economical understanding of the group ("small and medium-sized businesses"), or "Mittelschicht," which is translated as "middle class" but is more sociological in connotation (*Schicht* translates as "layer"). Both terms, however, are still most often translated as "middle class(es)." The aversion to Marxian terminology comes from the early years of West Germany's post-war development: Schelsky's "Nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft" (1953) provided paradigmatic ground for the development of a socio-economic concept equally detached from both Marxist societies and from a steep hierarchical capitalism. His research on family, youth, and the distribution of welfare and status in post-war Germany was certainly influential, but it was heavily attacked by left-wing class theory (e.g. Leo Kofler, who was also critical of Habermas' Frankfurt School theory), and by theories of social inequality and differentiation, e.g. by Dahrendorf (1965), i.a. 79ff., 94ff., 109 et al. Since then, "middle class" has become an idealized term, even after the erosion of its empirical elements. For this study I have used the term "middle class." Dahrendorf's innovative approach also distinguishes a productive and unjust inequality that is an important aspect of any discussion on middle-class evolution, since productive conflicts and competing interests often conceive of inequality as an inevitable spin-off, and *this* is no German or Western privilege. Today the term is inflated, but it maintains a strong subtext: people want to belong to the middle classes without having to share in middle class fears of a downward spiral. This is a core problem for populist movements.

I shall come later to a more complete catalogue of qualities that are ascribed to the middle class(es). Let me just note a few assumptions that link the middle classes to governance: the rule of law and a reliable legal framework is necessary in order to protect private property (which is one of the properties of the middle class); welfare governance is needed to allow the middle class to act both in accordance with the market and within a certain framework of social security; and security governance is needed for a secure and safe environment for the activities of the middle classes. One would like to add the existence of a democratic system and a foundation of human rights as preconditions for emerging middle classes, but unfortunately both are not necessary to allow these emerging middle classes to develop, at least for some time.

The first assumption (rule of law) is highly important for Afghan development because the middle classes would want their recently accumulated private property protected by the state rather than by the older patterns of patronage. As an associated effect, the functional differentiation of society would require a disinterested "Weberian" bureaucracy that, indeed, is in competition with the old, dysfunctional, and highly ineffective administration. This is a source of ongoing conflict that not only hinders the full emergence of the middle classes, but also hampers attempts to functionalize statehood. A very cautious hypothesis to follow from this one would be that it might be easier to adapt civil laws to the needs of the new middle classes, rather than penal laws, to say nothing regarding property laws. This assumption is based on sharp and opinionated positions towards Sharia laws in confrontation with a "Western" or "Westernized" civil code.

The second assumption regarding welfare governance points to education and social advancement through training and professionalization, rather than to welfare policies that follow egalitarian concepts. The rewards for using accessible education and vocational trainings are, however, a very ambiguous aspect, since disappointed expectations in the gratification of qualification (material) and titles (symbolic) through education lead to unrest, disloyalty, and refusal. The deferred gratification pattern has entered the society of the intervention (Daxner, M./Schrade, U. 2012).

The third assumption holds that peaceful post-war economy and development provide a healthier environment for the middle classes than an economy of war. While this may be true in general, the startling exception is the "security paradox": there are many Afghans, e.g. craftsmen or full-time farmers in rural areas, as well as potential new middle class members in the cities, who are

afraid of accumulating evident wealth in order keep from becoming victims of attacks on their properties and lives.[132] There is frustrating evidence that the present state of insecurity (2017) backs this paradox.

Given these preliminaries, it is not so easy to say who is part of the new middle classes in Afghanistan and who is not. And here we come to a critical aspect that others would have raised much earlier: Is my argument thus far not a typical Western discourse that cannot be applied to Afghanistan and other countries under intervention? Of course, this question has haunted me from the very beginning of my foray into this discussion on the middle classes. Let me present a few findings in this regard.

4.5 Western concepts versus Afghan property[133]

Without any doubt, concepts of class, stratification, and social groupings, especially in the political and social sciences, depend on the cultural and social background of their respective systems. Much of post-colonial theory has been based on the truism that one should not compare incomparable phenomena. On the other hand, certain concepts of social theory have become global in character and cannot easily be attributed to Western or capitalist realms of thinking alone. I have done a bit of research in order to get an idea of the state of the discourse with regard to the concept of the middle classes. My research is neither systematic nor complete, but it is able to provide me with a more differentiated assessment of the problem: Not with Western eyes… but what if Western eyes are the ones with which the Afghans themselves see their social system?

In many recent books and articles where one would expect to see the problem mentioned explicitly, one finds that this is in fact not the case. Dodge and Redman are rather typical of this: the middle class and social structure of the country are not even mentioned (Dodge, T./Redman, N. 2011).[134]

132 There is no empirical research on the *fear of possession*, but many participants in the workshop in 2015, as well as individual experts (Urs Schrade from the GIZ), have discussed examples. Poor security governance and weak law enforcement come together when such fears emerge and grow. But what is the Western market economy going to do if there is truly a broad push *against* the accumulation of property or money? For Schrade's partners, it was a clear matter of bartering low and steady income for security; i.e. growth rates would be risky.

133 For this chapter I owe special thanks to Krisztof Gostonyi, a specialist and stern critic of unproven Western approaches to the social reality of societies under intervention.

134 Dodge/Redman (2011); We find only fiscal and global economic terms, and an almost trivial mainstream economic outlook. See in particular chapter 4 by Redman, pp. 97-113.

More promising is Susanne Schmeidl on civil society, though she too does not explicitly name the middle class (Schmeidl, p. 2007). Qualities that are considered typical for the middle class are indirectly mentioned (pp. 124-125, graphic). In the same volume, Danspeckgruber and Finn (Danspeckgruber, W./Finn, R. P. 2007) refer to the association between large numbers of refugees and school enrollment (if school participation is a signifier of the middle class, then we have a strong point here: p. 152). Education is generally mentioned in the context of the middle class. However, more often than not, income classes and consumer behavior define the middle classes in the countries that I have chosen for comparison: e.g. Indonesia: >3,000$ p.a. (Economist, T. 2011). Afghanistan is far from becoming a BRICS country, and thus we cannot compare it to the countries in that group. But in another context, the fragility of the BRICS societies seems typical; whenever the dynamics of economic growth slow down or stagnate, a typical phenomenon, the *Angst*, captures the middle classes – the fear of becoming downscaled, of losing.[135]

On this point an excursion is necessary. One of the most influential sociologists in Germany, Heinz Bude,[136] made an important statement in a recent interview:

> "Bude: [T]he global middle classes are growing, in particular in countries like Brazil, India, or South Africa, but in the "old economies" of the West, they are shrinking, or, as is the case in Germany, they have stopped growing entirely.
>
> Interviewer: A defender of the middle classes would argue that they are in a difficult situation: they will be crushed between the excluded at the bottom and the elite that is excluding them.
>
> Bude: I want to refine my point: think of the UK, of the USA, which both give the impression that we have returned to two-class societies. A big group of privileged people and a much larger group of underprivileged people clash when there is no middle ground between them. This missing ground is a real danger for our kind of societies…"

The clash of only two major groups is what many people in countries like Afghanistan fear. At the same time, for Afghans it is not so "easy" to support the growth of a middle class as it exists in the BRICS states.

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135 A typical headline referring to the leader of the BRICs, Brazil: "Angst in der Mittelschicht" (Thomas Fischermann), DIE ZEIT Nr. 35, 2014. Many attributes of the middle class are listed here in an exemplary way. We find similar eye-catchers in the Afghan press.

136 Interview by Jens Bisky with Heinz Bude in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2014/09/29. My translation. For further reading: Bude (2014)

Zuzana Olszewska's account is a model study. (Olszewska, Z. 2013). This kind of study, in this case concerning Iran, is necessary for Afghanistan. Armed with Bourdieu, Weber, Foucault, and an understanding of socio-economics, Olszewska analyzes the ways in which a new generation is adapting to a political system that has taken away some of their liberties while at the same time offering them something in return. Aside from income and education, the aspect of generational change is important for the creation of middle classes because youth are very often detached from the traditions and myths that prevail among older groups. This is probably more true for the ordinary people (lower and middle classes) than it is for the upper class and elite.

A traditional and fully Western-oriented study is Durr-e-Nayab's *Estimating the Middle Class in Pakistan* (Nayab, D. 2011), which utilizes some South Asian comparisons. Income and occupation are quantified as main categories, while political circumstances and security aspects are missing.

In a recent review (Hynek, N./Marton, P. 2012) of multinational contributions to Afghan state-building, economy and class structure are not central: it is NATO and ISAF-centered, but the social structure plays a fundamental role in the background, especially when the threats are focused on terrorism and the drug trade. Threats are defined as permanently securitized issues (p. 8). My question is as follow: What threats endanger the emergence of a middle class?

Nabi Misdaq, a former Afghan radio journalist for the BBC, has made some valuable contributions on this topic: "In other words, through transport, administrative infrastructure, and related urbanization, an attempt could be made to tackle the problems of a multi-ethnic state like Afghanistan" (Misdaq 2006, p. 237). Each group will behave according to their proper rules and norms. This is a key summary by Misdaq (Misdaq, N. 2006), who presents a historical and sociological self-inspection based on ethnicity, religion, and tribalism. It is not very deeply rooted, but it is certainly rich in detail and shares similarities with Nancy Dupree's recent insights (Dupree, N. 2011). Dupree emphasizes the polarization of tradition and modernization. Can the middle classes even *unite* the diverse groups? This is a question rarely posed. All our research points in another direction; the *state* has come into the focus, even of detached and traditional communities. However, it does not automatically represent modernization or tradition. Rather, it functions as a center of power; people expect some action by the state.

I was particularly interested in statements like Misdaq's, as such ideas grant me some level of insight into non-Western approaches to the question. A critical account of the capitalist effects of stratification by Dilawar Sherzai[137] denounces the upper classes as unfit for responsibility, noting that, "They do not seem to have the ability to implement for what they are gifted." In Dilawar Sherzai's system, the upper class consists of landlords, tribal heads, and religious leaders. He attributes increasing inequality and the growing gap between high and low incomes to intense stratification. While the attack is sharp and precise, he provides no remedies, and he does not consider the potential narrowing of the gap by a growing middle class. Facing the exit of international troops and the drying out of international, mainly U.S. aid, and amidst growing insecurity, the *Angst* is growing.[138]

In addition to the purely economic approach, there is one field that addresses the core of the middle class, worldwide, without exception: *education*. Dana Holland and Hussain Youzofi (Holland, D. G./Yousofi, M. H. 2014) recently conducted a landmark empirical case study on this topic.

A few elements of the attributes of the middle classes are centered on policies for a society-wide system of education that allows for the following:

- Advancement through education for the individual;
- Value added for individuals and the entire society through higher levels of qualification;
- Trajectories for value-based attitudes.

The advancement motive is not only intergenerational and economy-oriented. It is also an important argument for the improvement of status. A whole family benefits from the educational status of the children and grandchildren.

The core economic message of middle class education is that qualification matters and allows for more effective job performance, entrepreneurship, and flexibility. Material qualification (abilities) and formal titles (degrees, certificates) play a big role in the symbolic politics of competing systems.

137 Dilawar Sherzai: Social Stratification and Afghan Society. www.outlookafghanistan.net (2011/08/06). Seen 2014/08/07. The article was republished under the headline "Afghan Culture and Stratification" in November 2012 without accounting for changes in the society.

138 It is interesting that Bude perceives the *German Angst* to be vanishing, replaced by a kind of indifference which nevertheless expects "the worst" to come in the future, while the older generation – the traditional middle class – also nurtured the *Angst* as a result of the worst being behind them, in the past. As an anthropological assumption, this is an aspect that requires further observation.

Education is also recognized as the entity that transfers (new) values and norms to the socialization process and thus challenges old lifestyles in order to enable people to adapt to new symbolic orders.

Aside from economic perspectives, the building of *cultural and social capitals* through education is considered to be the core promise of education for the middle classes; inherited capitals (upper classes) and precarious substitutes for such capitals (violence, ideological commitments, etc.), as are often observed in the lower classes, play a lesser role in this concept.

This inconspicuous assumption suffers from quite a few complications. On the one hand, education is never free from ideological, religious, or nationalist bias, and it can be concentrated in liberal, pluralist, or authoritarian ways. For a state that wants to get its hands on education, it is rational to secure as much congruency as possible between private and public educational objectives, mainly in the nationalistic direction. For the mullahs it is the religious compliance that counts; for the market liberals, these biases are best avoided by providing a non-ideological vocational or professional *training*. It can be easily shown that such training would not be enough to create a new generation of *citizens*. All dangers listed should be avoided by offering a general civic education to everybody – which is likely to draw fire from all three particular interests.

On the other hand, the new middle classes should not hope to gain allies from the lower classes. The further away these classes are from the basic accumulation of wealth and savings, the more they will be fixated on the welfare delivery of functioning statehood, which is their right, and perfectly understandable. But it is this inequality that makes for an irreducible barrier.

We can observe that this catalogue of virtues and characteristics is a central piece in the deontology of Western societies, and, indeed, has become almost global. The only big debate remaining from the 19th century is whether the state should provide the main structures and contents of education systems or if there can be substitutes (religious, political, or communitarian institutions). It is exactly at this point where the question appears: Is such an originally Western concept ready to be imported to societies like Afghanistan, or, for that matter, any other Central Asian society under transformation?

In light of the debate that I have briefly highlighted above, I hold that globalization is most advanced in the field of education, even more so in higher education and research, and it is far ahead of any economic global status (WTO,

TIPPI, etc.) or social policy unification. We took a closer look at this aspect as it concerns higher education and developed it even further (Daxner, M./Schrade, U. 2012), (Daxner, M./Schrade, U. 2013). Comparative studies are also available: (Bordman, G. R. 2012; Ebrat, F. 2012; Hayward, F. M. 2012; Kohistani, S. 2011), all of them within the Western paradigm. There is also Ekanayake, (Ekanayake, S. B. 2004), who looks at this topic from an indigenous point of view.

Based on this material, I attempted to acquire sound information from local experts in Afghanistan. While many of the addressees replied quickly to grant me meeting and interview appointments during my next visit (which was planned for November 2014 and did actually take place, while the workshop had to be postponed for two months), I also received an extremely rich set of answers from experts approached by Dr. Adrienne Woltersdorf of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kabul . In the following, I reproduce both my questions and the corresponding answers, which I will comment inter lineas. These are the answers that I received shortly after sending the letter.

4.6 Answers to the questionnaire regarding Afghan middle class(es) (MC)

This is a direct transcript of previous work in progress. I have reproduced the questions that I sent to key representatives of the new middle class. I sometimes use the plural "classes" when a homogeneous definition is less necessary than the need for differentiation. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Office in Kabul (Ms. Adrienne Woltersdorf and Mr. Fraidoon Sekander) distributed the questions. Mr. Sekander was highly successful in his organization of the distribution and feedback. He delivered an exemplary set of answers gained from his direct environment at the FES, all quite well educated graduates of the Afghan higher education system. There were no clearly opposing views unless otherwise stated.[139] My own comments were written upon receiving the answers and then amended during the writing of this book.

> ***Q:*** *What role do the MC play in the political life of the new Afghanistan?*
> ***A:*** *The MC consist of mostly young educated Afghans with comparatively liberal views. Since the political affair is still dominated by Afghan elite, people with tribal influence as well as people with background in US*

139 Typing, spelling, and punctuation errors have not been eliminated from the received answers; they remain unedited.

sponsored Jihad in 1980s, the MC are still on the sidelines of politics. In recent years there have been some involvement of the MC in political affairs but with little significance or minor roles which is still suppressed by major players.

MD: This answer clearly indicates the aspects of education and of a competitive status with the old elites. The combination "young, educated, middle classes" can certainly be referred to in many analyses, but we should be careful as to not use the semantics in an overly narrow Western context. Youth or education are deeply rooted in the context of local civilizations and in the more recent context of societies of intervention. The fact that this person mentioned tribal influence is also not trivial, because it refers to both patronage structures and the hysteresis effect that we also found in Spanta's elaboration. Obviously the elite are aware of the pressure from *below*, as the major players keep the middle classes at bay.

Q: *Which elites are the MC oriented towards?*
A: *In the aftermath of 2001 and the subsequent establishment of the new government billions of US dollars were poured into the country either in form of international aid or military spending. This created an economic boom, created thousands of jobs and business, today's middle class are the ones who took a share of this pie. Most of the better qualified, young Afghans either took jobs with international organizations or private service companies, therefore, now the middle class is oriented towards two elite groups, influential politicians and entrepreneurs. There is also a group of MC who are independent of any side and they are employee-turned small business owners.*

MD: My original comment was: "One of the questions raised here addresses what the MC will make of their inclination towards politicians and entrepreneurs. If the flow of money from the outside is going to dry out after 2014, and many jobs will be lost through the exit of military forces and GOs, then this segment of the MC will have to re-orientate itself. Will this be a chance for the independent small business segment *to become stronger? What kind of governance do they expect, apart from reliability in the rule of law sector?"*

Today, my questions must be broader. Will there be opportunities for those returning from exile after unsuccessful efforts to stay abroad to establish businesses there or to send remittances? Will they even have to compete with those young members of the new middle class for those opportunities? There will be

conflicts, and the account of reformed governance will have to deal with the problem. If the newly returning expatriates receive substantial aid from their deporting countries, the phenomenon of rivalry between residents and newcomers may be interpreted differently, with the difference being that the first group of deported Afghans are neither highly skilled nor likely to want to be integrated into the new middle class strategies in their country of origin. From the first deportations in 2016 and 2017 it is known that the numbers were not big, but the symbolic aspects were important: One group of the deported was delinquent (mainly young, unaccompanied men), while the other group consisted of individuals who had been very well integrated in German society.

This situation may only change after the next wave of returnees are better prepared and qualified for return, but then the old phenomenon of conflicts between residents and well qualified repatriates will occur, since the Afghan government has neither the means nor the skills to deliver enough support and promotion to the residents. This double bind will be a major point of critical discussion in Germany and between the human rights organizations, the diaspora, and the refugees.[140]

> ***Q:*** *Is the MC (already) inter-generationally stratified?*
> ***A:*** *Yes, since most young MC population benefited from their education and in some cases family connections to change their social status, middle aged and older middle class also exist with a slightly different social status. They either have higher government ranks as consultants, influential elite's "tag-alongs" or small business owners.*

MD: The answer is self-explanatory. As mentioned above, a whole family can participate in the status change of their younger and educated members. I would like to raise the question of possible alienation between the generations, particularly if the changes in status of the younger generation also implicate a change in values and lifestyle. This is not a one-directional process. Generally, one would assume that the younger generation is more modern or able and willing to adopt new lifestyles more quickly than the older generation. But, as I mentioned above, we also have a group of young people who have become more conservative than their parents because they have profited more from modernization than they are aware of.

140 Cf. pp. 118 and 119. At the moment, this question is a highly controversial issue in Germany's policies on asylum and refugee problems.

Q: *How is the MC's position towards social upgrading by education/professional training?*
A: *Education and professional training is the motto of the MC. They believe the only way Afghanistan can be saved is by the power of the pen instead of sword. During the past 10 years there has been a boom in many sectors, considerably education. Many private education institutions have been established. In spite of all the positive attitudes towards education upgrading, the MC lacks the understanding of difference between being educated and being a professional.*

MD: While one could expect to hear this sort of answer, the last aspect is most significant for a critical approach towards all kinds of external influences on the education system. The German foreign policy mainstream has strongly favored a professional approach (vocational education and training), but has not given much political and expert attention to the contents and forms of "education." I fully agree with the implicit criticism in the answer's last assumption. We perceive a conflict between traditional elements in the ownership notion and the potentialities as of yet underdeveloped from a new concept of education. Such a concept will require preparatory research and an unbiased support system to establish such research that does not anticipate a "curriculum" by its proponents. We must not forget that education is one of the most sensitive fields in post-war and post-conflict situations and will certainly meet many actors on an ideological turf. Among other problems there is a widening gap between training and all kinds of general education. Ownership policies necessarily implicate a conflict between different approaches in general education, moreso when, in a society of intervention, Western ideas and local traditions clash with all the entanglements brought into this new type of society.

Q: *What do we know about MC consumers' attitudes?*
A: *As the economy develops so is consumerism, Afghans in general save little and spend more. Middle class contribute a huge portion of consumers in the Afghan economy, most businesses target the Afghan middle class these years compared to a few years back when most of their customers were either wealthy Afghans or expats. The businesses are shifting their consumer base more towards the middle class, this is true especially due to the deteriorating security and an increase in organized crime. The wealthy Afghans either shift their wealth to Dubai and other safer regions so their spending mainly is based abroad, the number of expats are dwindling and those expats who work here now has limited movement and the*

low income community has limited purchase power. So the only option for service providers and consumer product business is now the MC.

MD: I connect this mentioning of security concerns to the original questions of the SFB 700's C9 project. The associations between a secure environment for consumerism, lifestyle, and middle-class attitudes is a key aspect of analysis, and there are certainly some differences between urban and rural environments. The last aspect conforms to the non-ideological notion that the middle class is required in order to maintain any sustainable stability. Today (2017), the situation has changed. The entire country is by no means secure, and the main actors, like Germany, tend to downplay this situation. This also leads to a less secure climate for start-ups and investment for the middle classes, as well as, most likely, less trust that the government is capable of providing a safe environment for business.

Q: *How is the stance of the MC towards the rule of law (property, juridical procedures)?*
A: *As an educated group the MC has a positive stance towards the rule of law. They respect and support the law enforcement officers, they help in creating a common sense for everyone in the society to do the same. The MC is less corrupt and they indirectly fight corruption by creating a moral value to it. But when they are asked about the judicial system, they think Afghanistan has a long way to go to perfect its judicial system. Property rights like any developing nation remains a problem, basically because of two reasons, no enforcement and not understanding the concept of it. Pirated CDs and DVDs are openly traded on the streets and stores, counterfeit brands are sold in high end stores.*

MD: This answer is both representative and typical of all the answers I received. Here, the first aspect (allegiance to the rule of law) is a rather idealistic construct. It can only be understood when one deconstructs the second argument (proposing a market economy and protection of property), similar to the education/professionalism divide. What incentives can come from the state in the form of good governance (diverse improvements in delivering certainty, functioning rules and rewards for compliance) and where self-organization should complement this governance should be discussed. The answer to this question also mirrors respondents' self-expectations, as well as their expectations of my intentions. The psychological factor does not play a big role; none of the interviewees had ever met me before. But my decision to select them for the answering panel referred to a group in which typical expectations can be

considered common. One can believe that the middle classes are less corrupt than the lords and peers of the patronage system, at least with regard to amounts of money. But, on the other hand, the corrupt side of the market economy is not considered to be immune from the temptations of corruption.

> ***Q:*** *What are the attitudes of MC like towards lower and upper classes?*
> ***A:*** *The MC do not resent the upper class nor are jealous of them, in contrary to the lower class who always see wealthy or even middle class people as corrupt and "thieves" who earn money in a "haram" way. MC's attitude towards lower class can be described as sympathetic, people who need help or need to be taught how to help themselves.*

MD: This is an area that social research must continue to investigate. While the attitudes towards the upper classes sound more "American" than "European" Western, the stance towards the lower classes is rather idealistic. Normally, if the MC is performance and output-oriented, it demands a "protestant" work ethic from the lower classes, and if this is the aim of empowerment and self-help, it is a highly complex political concept that requires a great deal of community orientation by the MC. This orientation can be brought with the social empathy and welfare concepts of traditional middle-of-the-road Islam and would have some socio-political implications for the formation of the MC as a political force.

> ***Q:*** *Is there a specific lifestyle of the MC?*
> ***A:*** *MC groups have a relatively modern life style, some opt to live in apartments built like a community, they prefer Western house decoration style to traditional Afghan style where people like carpets and sit on cushions on the ground. Famous choice of car is Toyota corolla 2009 models or the recent Chevrolet imported sedans. They like to dress suits and formal Western dresses at work and traditional afghan clothes on weekends. They like a short recreational trip to the outskirts of Kabul with family or friends.*

MD: The answer demonstrates what I have described as a *culture of intervention* and a *society of intervention*. My assumption is that, without an intervention, the process of Westernization would not have been so thorough and so ambiguous. If cultural pressure by the interveners continues to fade out, the interesting socio-cultural question is whether there will again be changes in

lifestyle that are more distanced from the attitudes and fashions of the interveners, without abandoning the society of intervention (which is impossible anyway, in the short run).

> ***Q:*** *What is the MC's attitude towards paying taxes and expecting returns from the state?*
> ***A:*** *The attitude towards taxes is negative since they believe the government is not transparent and still doesn't have the capacity to spend the tax generated revenue wisely or to the benefit of the people. The MC complain that we don't have parks, good roads or any other public facility so why should we pay taxes. If they can they would rather evade tax.*

MD: This answer is self-explanatory. What other entity, besides the state, should provide common goods for the citizens? The middle classes do not trust the state (=statehood, administration, modes and efficiency of governance), but at the same time the state it is expected to be the sole deliverer of common goods. The idea of private replacement of the state in this regard should not be overestimated, except when concerning the upper classes.

> ***Q:*** *Do the MC have a specific attitude towards corruption in the state's agencies and in private environments?*
> ***A:*** *Corruption is a deep rooted problem in all parts of Afghan society. It is so intertwined that to clean one agency from corruption it will have a dominos effect on all others, whether individuals, private sector or other government organizations. Since the system is weak and outdated, there are loopholes that anyone can take advantage of, and therefore even the most transparent person would opt to bribe an official to get something done easily rather than being passed over from one department to another by government officials.*

MD: My questions, then, following the argument, are: 1) How can the lead agency be established in order to initiate the domino effect, and 2) What incentives should be provided? Ideas like self-help organizations, whistleblowing, or active opposition are rare. However, throughout my research, my impression was that most people understand how to distinguish "good" or "less dangerous" corruption from real "big" corruption. In order to understand this situation in Afghanistan, it is necessary to differentiate corrupt practices from traditional or modernized practices in patronage systems. This would require investigating the turning point, when "productive" corruption turns into its opposite. (Priddat, B./Schmidt, M. 2011)

Q: *What are the MC's attitudes towards security governance?*
A: *The MC believe that Afghan security forces are on the front lines sacrificing their lives to protect others, but they are not happy with the governance over the security forces, it is believed by most Afghans including MC that criminals arrested by police are set free after a while by paying a bribe to the attorney general or prison warden and going back on the streets more boldly continuing their crime while sometimes some police officers even lose their lives arresting dangerous criminals.*

MD: I am interested in threats specifically directed at the MC. Again, I would like to compare the situation in the rural areas with the urban agglomerations. At the time of my brief survey, there was no imminent debate about refugees and returnees. The security aspect was therefore less up-to-date than it would be today. At several points in the survey I gave an account of problems with returnee policies and reactions in Afghanistan. The interweaving of political and criminal insecurity has not been investigated in depth. A recent study by Hayatulla Jawad and others (Jawad, H. et al. 2016) reflects many aspects of the urban middle classes' reactions to insecurity with regard to the wish to leave the country, but it does not dig more deeply into this problem.

4.7 Society must learn about itself

I prepared my visit to Kabul in November 2014 based on further exchanges with experts. For the context of intervention and governance in Afghanistan, I continued looking for answers to my initial questions: 1) If the situation, not only of the middle classes, but of the general structure of society *had developed differently without intervention*, what would have happened? and 2) What effects has the intervention had on specific forms of governance?

At first glance, Afghan post-intervention society resembles both a post-war society and a society under occupation. These types of societies certainly share a number of similarities. While the differences are quite sizable on the level of state, government and statehood, they are less explicit at the level of everyday life. On the surface, there are many features that are typical both for an emerging middle class and the entanglement of the cultures of the interveners and the intervened. Small businesses, new services, advertising, and semantic copies of imported models have become common; there are restaurants, consultancies, real estate dealers, cultural events, etc. that display a very clear infiltration by "Western" role models and attitudes. Some of these are considered threats

by the traditionalists, while the conservative opponents of a value change easily acquire other imported items. This is not surprising, and it is not a particularly Afghan phenomenon. However, in Afghanistan we also have a silent, even hidden imperative by the interveners, donors, and other actors who exercise some authority over the intervened, notwithstanding the fact that they are also influenced by the traditions of the life-world among the intervened.

It is necessary to acknowledge the forerunner business class after 1992, which partially became the entrepreneurial branch of the new middle classes and in some cases is similar in structure to that of the *oligarchs*. Antonio Giustozzi presented a magisterial overview of this phenomenon, from the days of Jihad till the end of the Golden Hour (Giustozzi, A. 2007: 75-76, 79) and beyond, in his book *War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan's Strongmen*. Strongmen often developed effective economic interests, despite the fact that they remained "politicians." Their financing schemes during the war-economy morphed into a sometimes mafia-like peacetime economy; they accumulated big fortunes and considerable assets. While those who remained entrepreneurs rather than politicians followed our rule that the protection of property produced a positive inclination towards an enhanced rule of law, this is not true for the big business men, whose networks operated beyond the state-induced rules. Today, most of these strongmen would count more as a branch of upper-class patronage peers than as models for the new urban middle class, but there are connections, obviously. Giustozzi is a good example for the need to introduce categories from political economy and a historian's chronology into the analysis. Afghan history did not begin in 2001 with 9/11 or OEF. It is, however, useful to let the analysis begin with 1992, when the Soviets were gone and the violent period of internal re-arrangement began. But Giustozzi does not explain why the owners of newly acquired fortunes have not made many attempts to establish the rule of law in order to protect *their* properties. One possible answer is that there has never been enough trust in the development of any kind of statehood; another would be that the social status of the nouveau riches was not yet ready for an organization according to *interests* (in the sense of A.O. Hirschman's famous account of the long way *from passions to interests* (Hirschman, A. O. 1977, 1984)). This corresponds with an observation (2015) by a GIZ expert (Urs Schrade) concerning the unwillingness of rural farmers to perceive themselves as members of economic or entrepreneurial structures. On the other hand, there are some intervening facts that are often neglected in the course of an analysis of new social structures, one of which is the relationship between strongmen/warlords and the local economy. This also includes

the emergence of a local business "community" that is not ideologically fixated on a particular militia, strongman, or Taliban commander. Another element is the micro-trans-nationality of transactions, e.g. in the case of smuggling or cross-border exchanges. Further considerations would question the functions of strongmen, since they create a kind of governance and rule of "order" within their hegemonic territory that is potentially analogous to the state's rule of law. The difference is that the major motive of the strongman is his desire to protect his domain of power, not to protect his subjects.

It would be normal if the growing middle classes were to emancipate themselves from restraints and adapt to aesthetic and moral attitudes that make it easier for them to develop some individualism and modernity; at the same time, they might also adopt a strategy that reconciles this modernization with conservative values, similar to the *Bazaar* in Iran.

This requires further investigation, so additional conclusions cannot be drawn at this point in time. However, it is clear that some of good governance's specific demands would depend on the direction the middle classes want to go in, politically, economically, culturally, and morally.

4.8 Youth

The following findings support my concept and provide it with additional dimensions. I have chosen **youth** as the center of my argument:



Figure 4 This figure shows a scheme in which Youth is at the crossroads of four antagonistic dilemmas. All sorts of combinations are possible, but not all of them are equally likely.

Youth does not refer only to the construction defining a certain age group in a specific social context. It is, in Afghanistan, a post-war generation, a generation in transition and in a passage of status and of rites, and it is a demographic factor of the highest significance. These characteristics interact with one another and reciprocally depend on the *urban environment* within which they become perceptible.

The category of *youth* appears to be useful as central focus for further investigation for several reasons. We know quite a lot about Afghan youth. We have some ability to compare their situation at the beginning of the Golden Hour with their present situation. Youth are a target of advertising and lobbying; nearly all the discursive dimensions of the new middle class place youth above the older generation. But we have seen, and will continue to see, that the older generation, and not only the *whitebeards*, is not ready to simply surrender. My own sources are not only based on my observations since 2003 and my studies in the education and higher education systems; there are various other statistics to augment them. The recent study by The Liaison Office (TLO, former *Tribal* Liaison Office) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation (TLO/HBS)(TLO 2014) is most relevant for this text. Dana Holland and M. Hussain Yousofi (Holland, D. G./Yousofi, M. H. 2014) presented the most recent and explicit look at the youth impact on social change, based on more than 100 targeted interviews. For a study of social structures it is not trivial to say that, in such a context, it is important to look at who is pointing to the youth as a driving force of social change – and why.[141]

The construction of status passage (or passage of transition) youth is important for several aspects within the governance discourse. All of these statements correspond to opinions uttered at the workshop. Less clear or ambivalent statements are not listed:

- Youth have a very particular *attitude* towards the realization of their aspirations (e.g. concurrent projections in participation modes and in a modernized, consumerist lifestyle);
- The pressure to become *employed* (unless entrepreneurial start-up) with or without protection through patronage;

141 Cf. also Mina Sharif FN 120.

- The quest to be *recognized* by traditional peers despite new directions of personal development (fear of disrespect by parents and elders); or aspirations to be included in the ranks of the new middle classes, accepting the rules of increased competition;
- (Re)gaining *certainties* about correct attitudes towards mating, marriage, family, and communication within an unstable milieu.

The affinities in habitus are no longer inherited capitals in a slowly moving habitus; they are under permanent stress from the society of intervention and exist within closer social ties such as families or friendship bonds.

> Another excursion into the cultural texture of the society of intervention is useful here. All fragile societies produce an abundance of literature on childhood, coming of age, and adolescence. This is reasonable insofar as hopes, expectations, and visions are projected onto the next generation, and such wishful thinking or empirical analysis (even in the form of docu-fiction) is a good carrier of ideas and criticisms. In the case of Afghanistan, we should never forget that the generations of parents and grandparents have never had a stable period of peaceful development in their lifetimes; they are collectively traumatized by war, violence, and exile, on top of poverty and injustice. The intervention has changed some of these contexts, but we do not yet know how much and how sustainable these changes might be. We should not forget to investigate why some of these accounts have become immensely popular in the West, i.e. in the countries of the interveners, like for example *The Kite Runner* (Hosseini, K. 2004). Some other books suppress or replace systematic ethnological and sociological research while still remaining reliable sources to a certain extent. Focused on certain milieus, such texts are important in that they help to bridge the gap between external observation and Afghans' perceptions of themselves, e.g. in the sensitive field of gender and marriage in *The Kabul Beauty School* (Rodriguez, D. 2007) or coming of age in informal urban places, such as *Skateistan* (Fitzpatrik, J. 2013). Both books, by the way, can be directly linked with the new middle classes' socio-cultural questions. I will not go into a more in-depth review of fiction and docu-fiction here, but I do want to point out that we can learn from these accounts of how youths' perspectives on their society reveal their, the young generations', potentialities and uncertainties in areas where we do not base our opinions on solid evidence and research.

The construction of "youth" as an age group is difficult insofar as the Western model, which locates youth between childhood and halfway into adolescence, including the "moratorium" (Erikson), cannot be easily transferred to the Afghan society, and *less so to a society of intervention* where there are even fewer stable clues for orientation. Analogies to Western societies are certainly clear in that the *education* system structures youth and adolescence in a similar way as in the West. But, until the Soviet invasion, this was simply not the case, and, during the periods in which the education system could fully unfold its strengths, under the Jihadi and the Taliban regime, there was certainly no emancipatory capacity in schooling and higher education. The Western model is no longer an unquestioned role model. This is not an encouraging notion, as Western public education loses its impact on *coming of age* and is replaced by social media and school as a repair workshop that erodes family ties. School and education, however, do nurture higher expectations than can actually be met in reality. On the other side of the education status passage, at high school or university, disappointment is growing concerning non-existent or minimized opportunities to move into regular employment or independent enterprise.

Social communication inside families and other groups has even less ostentatious features. Formal institutions have begun to set standards which are frequently forcefully attacked by traditionalists: a marriage age of 16 for women, 18 for men; permission to open a business (18 years) or join the army (18 years) are other indicators. In order to enforce the respective laws, state agencies are required to measure and set up statistics. This creates the ambiguous role of statehood (Scott, J. C. 1998).

The demographic facts – more than 50% of all Afghans are below the age of 25 – certainly have different effects on the different layers within the youth cohort. The coupling of a certain age group with the labor market distinguishes it from other sectors in which age does not play a significant role. The age/gender correlation is also important for the development of new social structures.[142] Here, many young people wonder if the relative emancipation of educated women, which has been significant for the period of intervention, will

142 There should be much more specified materials, as in Jenny Nordberg's series of interviews: Nordberg (2015), e.g. as a recent contrast with the slightly older *Kabul Beauty School* Rodriguez (2007). The present situation of women must also be contrasted with life under Soviet occupation, notably in the big cities, as compared with rural life for girls.

not lose ground in the coming period of extended ownership, combined with a shrinking labor market for clerical and service occupations.

The early years are also a problem. There is no transition between childhood as a kind of full dependency on the parents and becoming part of the workforce (or at least providing unpaid service like childcare), which begins at a very early age, especially for girls. This does not directly influence the debate on classes, but indirectly it is extremely important. With obligatory schooling and increasing legal and moral pressure against child labor (carpet knotting, stoving bricks, mining, etc.), the traditional pattern of being a child (with few privileges) and a juvenile (with even fewer privileges) gets confused, without having any real quick-impact effects on the social structure of families and their socio-economic environment. This also touches on the field of housing, in particular when families with children move to the cities.

4.8.1 Generation gap

Conflict might arise between the young population that benefited from education or family connections that helped them to change their social status and vertical top-down rule by family elders. (The authority of parents and elders seems to belong to a void traditionalism with very little connection to changes in micro-social structures.) An even more intense generation gap exists between aspiring, possibly educated youth and tribal, governmental, and community leadership staffed with personnel between the ages of 40-70. As reported in media and policy analysis, extremist groups are increasingly successful in addressing those youngsters who feel excluded from the traditional hierarchy. Consequently, radical or anti-state interpretations of events (like drone strikes, mainly on the Pakistan border) or perceived deprivation fill the participatory void (National, T. 2014; TLO 2014). Furthermore, middle aged and older parts of the population, which have acquired certain status advantages (i.e. higher government ranks as consultants, influential elite's companions in enterprises or small business owners) and new entrepreneurs compete for their places in society (Mielke, K. 2014b). It is assumed that those in the middle classes are able to mitigate conflicts between the elites and the extremist movements (Lipset, S. M. 1959; Wietzke, F.-B./Sumner, A. 2014).

That is why, in the face of the generational gaps that have arisen in Afghanistan, the possibility that aspiring youth could become part of a middle class that could moderate conflicts should be investigated. With the rising number

of internally displaced persons (<1.2 million by May 2016),[143] opportunities for young people to join the nuclei of the middle class are dwindling. What's more, one can certainly assume that this group, more than any other, will seek-better opportunities in exile.

4.9 The City: urban and urbane environments for *Social Capital*

The location in which governance "takes place" is not irrelevant; the environment within which acts of governance (specifically, the delivery of common goods) occur is a set of many intervening variables: distances, hostile or friendly social embedding, public space where politics – and thus judgment on governance – is being negotiated, etc., all adding to the complexity without being distinguishable in each case. I started from the paradigmatic point that **social capital is the strongest factor in the making of the middle classes, and urban environments are more advantageous for the building and maintenance of social capital when compared to rural areas**. In addition, urban environments also support the accumulation of cultural and economic capitals.

According to recent estimates, the share of the population living in urban areas is 24.4 percent of the total population, with an annual rate of growth change of 4.41 percent between 2010-15 ((CSO), C. S. O. 2014; CIA 2013). Drivers of urbanization are internal displacement with a strong influx of people to the informal settlements in big cities, work migration, and insecurity. These drivers cause economic stress, scarcity, and poverty, which in turn increase dependence on the cash economy in the cities. Non-monetary ways of exchanging goods and services are fading away. Because of the disintegration of social networks as a result of city migration, delinquency rates might increase – only one symptom of the increased pressure on governance. There is no inclusive policy for re-integrating formal and informal city dwellers ((BMZ),; Esser, D. 2004). Studies on income generation in the urban context show that a large segment of city dwellers live under severe, unstable circumstances. The main livelihood sources of Afghanistan's urban population are

143 As always, figures and statistics are uncertain. However, the question of internal displacement and the motivations behind seeking asylum or exile are relatively consistent. Cf. Mirren Gidda: Afghanistan: Number of Internally Displaced People has doubled to 1.2 Million. Newsweek 2016/05/31. http://europe.newsweek.com/afghanistan... Acc. 2015/05/2016. The problem is rapidly becoming worse; both Iran and Pakistan have initiated radical repatriation or deportation policies in order to empty their refugee camps, and they also send back Afghans who have managed to integrate into their host society.

informal employment, self-employment, and casual wage labor and home-based work, as shown in figure 5.

Economic activities of working individuals across the study year
(share of reported incidences of work falling under each employment category)



Figure 5 The graph shows types of work in urban areas (Beall, J./Schütte, S. 2006) pp. 2, 35

Due to Afghanistan's increasing urbanization, the identification of related changes in both spatial and societal patterns and their consequences regarding the sustainability of statehood and the stability of societal development is definitely important.[144] At least two major implications of urbanization should be emphasized:

1) Urbanization challenges the routines of everyday life through new contexts or figurations. Formerly undisputed norms and societal rules might need to be renegotiated or redefined (Mielke, K. et al. (2011)). For example, urbanization processes in other developing countries have resulted in lower birthrates due to a rising standard of living in the formal urban areas, decreasing space, and increasing living expenses that perpetuate or worsen the marginalization or ex-

144 Sociological analyses and an integration of big cities into the research concept of C9 cannot rely only on our own empirical approaches. We have sought expertise from renowned big-city sociologists like Rolf Kreibich (Berlin) and Walter Siebel (Oldenburg) and local experts like Nawid Royaee (Kabul and Berlin) and others.

pulsion of poor parts of the society (BMZ, 2014, (Sassen, S. 2014)). The emergence of "go" and "no-go" areas, which seem to have become a common form of separation between new residential areas and informal settlements, is symbolic of the divide described above.[145] There are more no-go areas that have been created by security considerations, e.g. the noble Wazir-Akbar-Khan quarter in Kabul may be no-go for many groups, and the informal periphery is certainly no-go for many of those from better-situated strata. Mielke draws a rather realistic sketch of the intrusion of modern power games into the typical middle-class breakup (Mielke, K. 2014a).

2) The density of networks and capital in urban areas increases, whereas rural areas deteriorate. A research question would ask if a certain liberalization of the rural communities could occur alongside this process of internal nomadism, or if the local countryside becomes petrified in a more conservative or traditionalist resilience. Access to economic or political resources is comparatively lower in rural areas than in urban areas. Therefore, a divide between uneven developing spatial areas might result in new societal conflicts (TLO 2014). What we do not know much about is the quality and structure of social capital in informal urban areas. Among the big cities in Afghanistan, only Kabul has the potential to become a *mega-city* with very distinct qualities (cf. Baumgartner/
Kreibich 2014). Other big cities may profit from the benefits of network-building and communication opportunities, but without the stimulating vicinity of the center of power. The "mezzanine rulers" (cf. Daxner 2011), such as those in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, are gaining in autonomy, and perhaps they will soon also have the ability to encourage peripheral epicenters, at the expense of a reduction in the capacities of the central state.

Earlier in this essay, I introduced the distinctions between *urban* and *urbane*. While sociology, city planning, market economy, and demography have little problem distinguishing cities from towns and villages, and a wide range of empirical data exists on the topic, an *urbane* environment is a construct that is

145 Fairlie Chappuis Chappuis (2016) has provided a strong account of these problems in her doctoral dissertation, "Security-building for Development in Post-war cities" (Chapters 6-9). While she focuses on West African cities, many of her findings can be applied to Afghan big cities as well. The rift between development and security is one of the main concerns in context, aggravated by IDPS, *refoulement* from Pakistan, Iran, and Germany, and a weak government. Chappuis' account of alternative social orders is exactly what we find in studies of local order in the periphery; the alternative powers are not always beneficial to the legitimate central powers of the state. The same is true for the informal cities.

more difficult to comprehend. Most of the interveners follow the concept of the American or the European city. Sometimes, travelers discover remainders of an *urbane* past in mega-cities on other continents, a nostalgia that can be explained as post-colonial memories. But my question takes aim at a more fundamental level: if the European concept of an urbane city is taken as a standard, will the new Afghan middle class contribute to the building of an analogous or comparable urbanity, or will it simply copy a model that seems farfetched? The answers to these questions are not trivial; indeed, I hold that social capital – every variety of social capital – requires an urbane environment.

One of the most eminent urban sociologists of our time, Walter Siebel, attributes three associations to the European urbane city: a certain image, a lifestyle, and the space for emancipation (Siebel, W. 1999, p. 119). The image has to do with our memory and recollection of the emergence of urban culture; the lifestyle, according to Siebel, represents (among other qualities) "education and civilized attitudes," and emancipation of the individual can be summarized by the slogan "city air makes you free."[146] To a certain extent, this observation is not the exclusive property of European cities. But we should carefully investigate what kinds of frames the freedom of the city provides for the creation of public space as a condition for the participative development of civil society – and for the creation of an environment that is conducive to an active middle class. Again, we should try to understand the differences between a European concept of spatial allocation of public space in a city and comparable concepts in other cultural contexts. Such space is necessary for the creation of social capital, but the ways one should let it emerge and grow are by no means clear, and an imported public urban space is hard to imagine.

Development cooperation and reconstruction projects in the past have focused foremost on governance, infrastructure, economy, ecology, and the planning of urbanization. It is assumed that the spatial or physical changes caused by these interventions also have an influence on peoples' preferences, habits, values, and behavior. It is necessary to find out to what extent urbanization relates

146 This proverb has produced a wide variety of commentaries in the history of Western cultures. Originally, serfs who managed to stay in a town or city for more than a year became free citizens. But this legal principle has become much broader as secularization and urbanization have progressed. I have observed elements of the new meaning in our discussions at the workshop, and more so in the debate on mass movements from the countryside to the big cities. (In other countries, like India, coming to a big city also means stripping off one's legacy from tradition, e.g. belonging to a lower caste.) Cf. also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stadtluft_macht_frei (Acc.: 2016/05/31).

to the empowerment of youth or alters the composition of society as a whole through mechanisms like comparatively higher access to electricity, means of communication, to education, and to members of the peer group. Cf. Falke, T. (2014).

Many people leave rural areas, not least because of modernization efforts happening there and decreasing opportunities for developing sustainable perspectives for the future. We do not know much about the micro-social adaptation of the newcomers within the informal urban environment. Early studies show typical symptoms of weak adaptation to urban contexts, i.a. stress (Panter-Brick, C. et al. 2008). It can be expected that other effects from rural migration to the big cities, e.g. rising numbers of diabetics, will also arrive in Afghan cities. Research into this field is an exemplary aspect of health governance; it has not yet been decided whether this can be initiated by a state health system or by specialized NGOs, like for example the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

I have mentioned the importance of social capital for the making of the middle classes several times in this text. In the following, I shall present one strong assumption that might serve two purposes: to create a strong link between urban environments and governance and to explain why urban environments are the most advantageous for the emerging new middle classes. The assumption is that **urban social capital is a common good that is delivered in a way that reduces it to a club good for members of the new middle classes**.

One of the problems that will plague further research in this area is that there are fewer varieties in defining common/collective and club goods than in what social capital is in reality and on a symbolic level. However, in our context there is a clear, though Western, connection between the two constructs, based mainly on Ostrom, Bourdieu, and Putnam. There are a few examples in which the questions and propositions fit into our middle class construct, but the problem of the non-Western approach remains. Nevertheless, it might be useful to exploit ideas like SME in the context of common good and social capital (Spence, L. J./Schmidpeter, R. 2003) or to utilize an extension of Ostrom's approach by giving the state and social capital bigger roles (Anthony, D. L./Campbell, J. L. 2011). The application of the generic notion of cooperative behavior to the Afghan society of intervention (and not only to traditional Afghan habitus alone) is challenging. At the core of cooperative potentials we find the common good of getting access to a field, or public space, **where communication according to a group's needs can effectively occur**, and in most

cases membership is needed in order to utilize/use this structure for one's individual status and development within the group, i.e. the new middle class.

Social capital has many ingredients, and according to the angle of description, these elements may be religion, hierarchies of recognition and reputation, or academic or social merits. Only when the ingredients of social capital are clarified can the banal definition of "who knows whom" be understood: who knows whom, in what respect, why, and with what intention and perspective?

A lot of social capital can be found in the old patronage patterns. There is a different type of social capital in the guild-like communication of the bazaar and other traditional functional relations.[147] The new social capital is both functional and technical. In order to get a business license it is not enough to know the rules. It is necessary to know how the rules are being interpreted and by whom, who will divulge the price for accelerating the process of gaining a license, and who should better be avoided when applying. It is very typical of functional differentiation that a new start-up entrepreneur will seek advice and support from a professional business consultancy or accountant in order to speed up licensing and avoid unforced errors in the procedures.[148]

It is not difficult to make this assertion, but it will be rather complex to prove the hypothesis with sufficient empirical substance/capacity. Social capital is a valid and meaningful construct, but it is a construct. In the course of the ongoing project, the empirical testing of the paradigmatic assumption requires both a broad enough questionnaire and a straight path of meaningful categories within which social capital can be explained as a key condition for constituting a new middle class.

One specification can be given at once: an *urban and urbane* environment is required in order to allow the new middle classes to emerge within a particular setting for social capital. This implicates a sufficient, large number of potential partners in communication – e.g. many peers in contrast to a single actor or a few powerful actors in patronage – and certain structures that serve as trajectories for building sustainable potential social capitals (the plural indicates that

147 Gustav Reier, from the GIZ in Kabul, recently debuted a new approach to the investigation of possible new functions of the bazaar in his projects: Bazaar study Afghanistan and conclusions for a systemic approach. Bonn Conference on Adult Education and Development, October16-17, 2014. An impressive overview on many of the middle class characteristics as described above can be found here: http://www.bocaed.de/media/Gustav_Reier_Bazaar_study_Afghanistan_and_conclusions_for_a_systemic_approach.pdf (acc. 2016/05/31).

148 Interview with Wafi Walim, a successful local consultant, 2014/11/10.

individuals will compete for the best positioning within the structures of social capital and for a maximum individual share). The quantitative aspect is self-explanatory: each individual needs to have a certain level of choice in selecting those whose acquaintance or communicative interaction may support his or her position within a social field. In our case, I hold that the new Afghan middle class is not yet big enough to establish sustainable lines of communication. It is still building and fortifying these lines.

As I did in my discussion of the *structures*, let me give an example. When the state or private entrepreneurs plead for fast internet connections in the most developed Western countries, they are seeking to provide a *common good* – the condition for free access to general communication without restrictions on content or origin. One of the intentions is to avoid club goods that permanently threaten to gain a sector simply for reasons of profit or political interests. This approach is only possible because virtually everybody owns the hardware necessary to use fast internet. This example is rather realistic insofar as, in Afghanistan, it is primarily the members of the middle class (and upper class) who possess the hardware (computers) and the aspirations to use them, and mobile phones, for **class-specific communication**. In my example, fast internet would become a club good immediately. This is the technical side; non-material examples would take more elaboration, but work according to a similar logic. A certain language and proficiency in specific articulation is part of the necessary social capital. This example emphasizes **education** within the welfare governance for a specific clientele, providing common access by principle but limited access in reality. The combination of social and cultural capitals is a pivotal element of this consideration. This is why professional education and the formation of certain types of personality are considered as important as training and vocational proficiency, even within the new middle classes.

All this will be more easy in big cities, and certainly in Kabul, than in the rural areas, though of course elements of the emerging new middle classes and left-overs from more traditional middle class structures can be found there as well. But the indicators show that density of population and technical infrastructures prefer urban environments. With regard to urbane milieus it can be said that the structures described above do not occur in peripheral and informal quarters with a poor and disoriented population.

4.10 Changing habitus

Most economic elements of an appropriate contemporary theory of social classes or strata follow the global patterns of capitalism, in particular at places where the norms and routines of capitalistic development can reach the potential agents of change. In a society of intervention, this clearly produces many clashes and idiosyncratic relations regarding elements of this capitalistic mainstream; however, apart from the security paradox (cf. p. 135), the main conflicts do not occur merely on behalf of the economy.

The security paradox[149]

- Normally, the middle classes are eager to accumulate wealth and property. It seems that, for many citizens, the danger of being attacked because of their status and property is a big risk, so they “avoid" collecting assets.
- The middle classes advocate a strong rule of law, in particular in order to protect their wealth and personal security.
- This is a key distinguishing factor between the middles classes and the upper classes, who can buy security, and the lower classes, who do not possess much worth defending.

This is why we need political economy and socio-economic frames. There are rules and routines in doing business that are less alien to Westerners or interveners than the social and cultural turbulence behind the market. Or, in other words, and phrased more provocatively: one of the problems with liberal statebuilding is not the market economy, but everything around it. Changes in *habitus* come with changes in the structure of society. This is not trivial because we have the phenomenon of *hysteresis,*[150] i.e. a *habitus* from times past as well as based on projections of the future that is not based on *present* experience. Hysteresis may help to explain why young people turn to traditional or reli-

149 Slide 11 from my introductory presentation at the Kabul Workshop on Middle Classes, 2015/02/24, slightly adapted to this text.

150 The concept of hysteresis was developed by Bourdieu in his early studies of Algeria under conditions of intervention and war, Bourdieu (1960: 25-37); Bourdieu (1976), and many more. The recent reception of his theories of classes and capitals is again gaining momentum, Alkemeyer (2008). However, these recent pieces only infrequently focus on hysteresis. I consider Kerr and Robinson’s article on post-Soviet Ukraine to be very important for our topic because the aspect of transitional cultures and habitus can be transferred from their case to Afghanistan. They explain phenomena of previous dissent as a better ground for adaptation of habitus than conformism, cf. Kerr/Robinson (2009: 829-853).

gious forms of social organization when they are part of an emerging modernizing group. This approach can help us understand conservative enclosures in otherwise dynamic environments. Hysteresis can also help to discover outdated or shallow traditions and rituals, and it also explains why stark terms like "honor" lose their unambiguous meaning.

Habitus is something that is very difficult to change, and that therefore normally changes slowly. It is not a superficial adaptation to occasions and opportunities, but it stabilizes the position of a person within a certain layer within a certain social field. Nonetheless, changes occur, often accompanied by hysteresis effects, and these changes require a thorough inspection if we want to understand how and why some social and cultural structures are changing more sustainably and effectively than others. For the purposes of further research into these structures, it will be necessary to ascribe/attribute the changes in Afghan middle class habitus to the very existence of a society of intervention and to the particularities of a time when many of the foreign actors from this society are leaving the country. Observations and empirical findings from the time of intervention must be systematized. At the same time, they should undergo a process of prognostication that will examine how much of the *habitus* that has changed will survive the present period of transformation.

Emerging *habitus* certainly has some flexibility and the potential to adapt to new realities in different ways. The new realities are the stimuli that can enhance functional differentiation and establish a new middle class that represents the new economic, cultural, and political opportunities in the country. Even if the process of differentiation within a specific *habitus* of Afghan middle classes develops analogously to comparable developments in Western societies, it is not advisable to simple transfer patterns and experiences with such developments. A few clues that are available indicate certain particularities in an entrepreneurial variety of middle class attitudes and taste (cf. the list of examples below, pp. 167ff.). It seems to be easier to demonstrate the economic aspects of a developing habitus. Things become difficult when we look at the middle classes from a cultural or socio-political perspective. We do not know enough about the explicit interests and underlying motives as to define the *habitus* or to engage in designing patterns. This would be premature. However, we also have a few indications concerning the *habitus* in the making:

– Fatigue of political controversy and violence, of warfare at large, and of rivalries that are attributed to the "past." (There is, however, controversy surrounding this past, i.e. when it begins and when it ends);

- Tendencies to emancipate from traditional informal rules and the life-styles dictated by a life-world dominated by the present elites and the outgoing family structure. (We do, however, have examples of young people who want to connect more modern ways of reproduction with traditional lifestyles, e.g. in religion);
- It is not yet clear which milieus will prevail in the future middle classes;
- One very strong indicator is that the new middle classes will rely on the level of *education and training* of their members. Training can be substituted for very well by experiences in exile, while education and the formation of a certain class-specific cultivation would need to be adapted to the reality in Afghanistan, even if the period of exile had played a constitutive role in forming such qualities;
- A new class of intellectuals will be members of the middle class. There has been a long tradition in many cultures of ascribing a certain functional universalism to intellectuals, or, in another term, to the intelligentsia.

This aspect requires an excursion and is of major importance to my concept. Certainly, a majority of members of the new middle classes will have degrees from institutions that provide secondary or higher education. Knowledge will be a formative part of the emerging habitus. This is not a very daring prognosis. But what will be the role of those members who will not exclusively adopt the entrepreneurial variety of the new *habitus*, but instead will work as teachers or doctors – both of which will require a sustainable extension of welfare governance – or as journalists, artists, and consultants – thus functioning as interpreters rather than creators of the new circumstances? These professions require a certain degree of universalism, unless they will only be used within established networks and social groups unaffected by societal changes. *Universalism* is very often equated with Western or foreign influence on the authentic Afghan mindset. This equation is then used as a justification for rejection, defense, and exclusion, with religious and ideological rationales. Even the emergence of a new middle class is considered alien or a betrayal of authentic Afghan/Islamic *values.* In the workshop, I could observe the opposite view: it seems that traditional structures retrain aspirations to widen the scope and to extend the perspective on the "world." The betrayal of intellectuals is a perpetual theme in all social analyses. The standing quotation of this betrayal (since Julien Benda (Benda, J. 1978)) is justified by the inclusion of intellectuals under *identitary* or ideological restrictions that do not allow for political and cultural negotiation in public space, which by itself is one condition for the sustainable development of social capital.

In the case of the middle classes, it is not enough to deconstruct the accusation of undermining traditional values and the Islamic foundations of the Afghan society with a critical post-colonial argument. The adversaries' resilience to new social structures is permanently fed by the struggle for Afghan ownership that is so typical for a society of intervention, and that is one of the ambiguous main concerns of the interveners' policies (cf. pp. 21, 105, 122).

I shall next show a few examples of the reality of the changing habitus.

4.10.1 Appeals to the changing habitus

There is a feeling that one must advertise merchandise and services in a new way. People no longer know where goods are produced and traded. A certain competitive spirit is visible, and obviously there should be an encouraging appeal by the new circumstances to Afghans, otherwise the whole effort will have been in vain. Here are some examples: I have taken from the internet. Some of them were also addressed to me personally via email.

www.afghanopportunitiesbusinessservices.com
A German-managed firm that provides consulting and advertising services for small and medium businesses. Wafi Walim, a consultant with a start-up, explained that such services are useful for entrepreneurs because they free their clients from tiresome routines. Of course, they also have their price and must satisfy their clients. This is a good example of outsourcing and functional diversification. Services become an economic field of their own and ask to be recognized within the middle classes. They join manufacturing and trade and remain sharply distinct from bureaucratic (state) administration.

The Blue Lantern Restaurant
This restaurant does aggressive advertising both in Kabul and to frequent visitors to Afghanistan (like me – for a certain period I was getting regular ads and invitations). An invitation to a Halloween party shows that even in the limelight of public attention, Afghan traditions count for little, and the cultural achievements of the interveners' culture are advertised. This is still only possible if there is a patron protecting the company. However, in order to frequent such an establishment, one must have a certain distance towards the traditional life-world. This is no surprise in a society of intervention. However, many Afghans criticized the Blue Lantern in the same way that the public would in the West: as immoral or indecent.

The nouveaux riches

www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-12-18/afghanistans-new-rich-navigate-us-pullout (acc. 13/04/2015): A report on the lifestyle of new rich elites; this certainly does not refer to the average new middle class, but it is doubtful whether it really points to a new upper class: the people are anti-Jihadi and secular (in Helmand and elsewhere in the country).

As a contrast: Spiegel 36/2014, p. 78:
Handwerk des Überlebens: Teppichknüpfen im Frauengefängnis von Herat.

(The Craft of Surviving: Knotting Carpets in a Women's Penitentiary in Herat, translation MD)

140 female inmates are being trained to knot carpets to help them find employment after their release from jail. This might be a return to the old middle class of crafts, but perhaps it's also a new kind of manufacturing. It is one of the few accounts in the West that demonstrates that linking business interests with social responsibility is, at least an option in Afghanistan. When you know the situation of women in prisons and the way they are treated by state employees, then the force behind this project must be unusually strong and well protected.

These were more or less entrepreneurial aspects of the emerging *habitus*. The following overview, collected mainly in 2014, shows more cultural aspects that can be taken as results from the new societal structures produced by a society of intervention.

Afghan National Institute of Music (2013): **Afghan Youth Orchestra opens season finale of Afghan Star**
http://www.afghanistannationalinstituteofmusic.org/latest-news
(acc. 2015/04/14)

Such information is typical for the culture in a society of intervention. The format is not entirely new and not entirely traditional. The Bamyan Festivals are a similar example for induced fusion. The Silk Road Festivals are mainstream: *8th Silk Road festival* Bamyan 2016 – YouTube *https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NiIPJMzqlL4;* The *Hamdeli* Festival (2015) is a very successful off-festival with thousands of visitors: *www.youtube.com/watch?v=X0pU2GGXNKA (*both acc. 2017/03/21*)*

In the case of *Hamdeli*, one of my few anecdotic accounts is necessary. In December 2016 I had a meeting with a group of rather elite and upper middle class politicians and intellectuals; the politicians were all kind of non-conformist game changers, often in high positions. The intellectuals – film producers, art directors, etc. and their very urbane families – had an intense debate about the values and virtues of an open cultural environment. It was in this context that I first learned of the *Hamdeli* festivals and their rewarding cross-cultural aspects. The meeting was suddenly interrupted by a blast from a heavy attack in a neighborhood nearby. What impressed me most was that after a moment of shock and informing families and friends about the blast, the discussion continued within this insecure environment. I was the only foreigner at this meeting.

ASAP[151] (December 17, 2013): **A leap in the new generation of Afghanistan's cinema (film industry)** – BBC [Persian]
http://afghanalliance.org/leap-new-generation-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-cinema-film-industry-bbc-persian
(acc. 2015/04/14).

Cinema has played a certain role in Afghanistan's cultural history that is similar to that of the film industry in Iran. Many people watched movies during the Soviet occupation. This BBC feature is directed at young audiences and the international appreciation of cultural change. My own filmography of the early years of the intervention lists quite a few good movies, but no public relations to match them.

Shortly after this feature we find the following:

ASAP (January 13, 2014): **Kabul: Five Day Film Festival Launched** – BBC [Pashto] from
http://www.afghanalliance.org/kabul-five-day-film-festival-launched-bbc-pashto
(acc. 2015/ 04/14)

"This is the third biggest film festival in four months in Kabul."

Third biggest means there were even bigger ones, and more than a few. The country is open, and the cultural life is thriving.

151 ASAP = The Alliance in Support of the Afghan People

ASAP (December 3, 2013): **The Glass-artist and craftsman of Herat [province] with Half a Century Experience** – BBC [Persian]
http://www.afghanalliance.org/glass-artist-and-craftsman-herat-province-half-century-experience-bbc-persian
(acc. 2015/04/14).

This is public relation on the transition from old to new middle class in manufacturing. It also poses the question of who among the new middle classes will buy designer art, and what does that mean for export and for (future) "tourists," since the old tourist shopping centers, like Chicken Street in Kabul, have become no-go areas for many internationals for security reasons.

ASAP (December 2, 2013) : **Bloody Heart and Liver "hanging" Art Exhibition in Kabul** – BBC [Persian]

http://www.afghanalliance.org/bloody-heart-and-liver-%E2%80%9Changing%E2%80%9D-art-exhibition-kabul-bbc-persian
(acc. 2015/04/14)

Art exhibitions are always more sensitive than other sectors of cultural change; the visualization of objects is more likely to offend conservative or religious feelings than other arts (except perhaps for dancing or certain moments in a movie). On the other hand, art exhibitions and openings are a perfect meeting point and a nod to social capital development.

ASAP (November 9, 2013): **Afghan Girls Major League Soccer Match in Kabul** - BBC [Pashto]
http://www.afghanalliance.org/afghan-girls-major-league-soccer-match-kabul-bbc-pashto
(acc. 2015/04/14).

Such news must provoke former and present Taliban and many more traditionalist or ultra-religious people. But it also indicates that there are parents who permit their daughters to play soccer, and that there is a community, however small, that protects such events, and there must be some public filling the playgrounds.

ASAP (November 2, 2013): **Afghan Mountain Climbers on the High Summits of the Mountains** – [BBC Pashto]
http://www.afghanalliance.org/afghan-mountain-climbers-high-summits-mountains-%E2%80%93-bbc-pashto
(acc. 2015/04/14)

The title hints at Afghans matching other top performers. Mountain climbing, like football, is typical for leisure, but more so than soccer it is a middle class obsession. Most of the Afghan mountain slopes are not inviting for "normal" alpinism because of the high-up talus – and because many mines are still awaiting removal. But there are other stories, written for Westerners, like (Newby, E. 1958), which tells of mountaineering in Nuristan in the 1950s, that may create an appetite for conquering peaks. And now it is the Afghans who are climbing up…

A look at the intellectual and cultural events in Afghanistan in 2013 – BBC [Persian]
http://www.afghanalliance.org/look-intellectual-and-cultural-events-afghanistan-2013-bbc-persian
(acc. 2015/04/14)

A review of past events is also a typical agenda for the middle class. It provides a baseline for the upcoming cultural season and for progress reports. I observed quite a few customs of the Western event routine being introduced to the Kabul community almost as an insider performance, i.e. without an adequately abundant audience. I call this an investment-in-the-future habitus. Recently, this enthusiasm seems to be dwindling due to decreasing security.

ASAP (March 3, 2014): Men and Women Skiing in Bamiyan Province [Central Afghanistan] – BBC [Persian]
http://afghanalliance.org/men-and-women-skiing-bamiyan-province-central-afghanistan-%E2%80%93-bbc-persian
(acc. 2015/04/14)

"Last week, Bamiyan hosted the fourth rounds of ski competitions in Afghanistan… The ski tournament was organized in the *Ba Ba* Mountains. Men, women, young and old climbed up for half an hour to reach the starting point of the race."

Again, note the gender aspect in the headline, as well as the competitive element, which has become an obvious segment of a culture of leisure.

Matter (February 9, 2014): **From Afghanistan with love.**
http://medium.com/matter/from-afghanistan-with-love-93a8df828fa8
(acc. 2015/04/14)

Mujib Mashal demonstrates a new use of media: *Afghanistan with Love*. Photographs by Kiana Hayeri. Call-in show.

This call-in show is typical of the new lifestyle, with its orientation towards youth and the middle class. It is not quite clear what is really an account of "Western" culture. Where are the autochthonous elements of entertainment that one could call global? Branding everything that is disliked or advertised in a society of intervention directed at the people as *Western* makes it increasingly difficult for the Afghans to define what is authentic and definitely non-Western.

Rod Nordland: **Rough Path to Kindness.** On the *Wall of Kindness.* NYTI 02 April, 2016.
This is a social sharing event: *If you don't need it, leave it; if you need it, take it.* This is very typical middle class virtue, which Nordland ascribes to an elite school graduate.

Rod Nordland: **Afghan Women, Eager to Play, Are Kept on the Sidelines**. NYT 27 April 2016. A survey on progress made and backlashes endured in women's competitive sports.
Again, the gender issue is used to describe both progress and backlashes for an audience that wants to be convinced of progress and legitimacy in reconstruction policies. Implicitly, I also see this as a report on a middle class endeavor: to get women into their place, but not necessarily to give them all of their rights.

*

This list could be extended endlessly. I have used mainly Western media examples because they demonstrate an assumption that Western audiences will be interested in Afghan culture and lifestyle. There are hundreds of similar accounts in the Afghan media. The Western interest is split; coming from the interveners' side into the society of intervention, it shows a certain entanglement with this society, avoiding a "We-They" confrontation on lifestyle issues (this is only different in regard to drinking alcohol). On the other hand, it is

directed at us in the West. What could symbolize normality better than extended reporting on leisure and cultural activities? At the same time, all this is not necessarily linked to the politicization of everyday life.

It is noteworthy that, meanwhile (2017), there are so many similar accounts of media-connected communication, both on business and cultural events, that it would not make sense to single them out without categorizing them more widely. The strategy of addressing an ever-broader public has not changed.

These examples were not collected systematically for this text. Rather, they served as a random sample for a lecture on creativity and survival after times of violence[152] and as discussion material for the workshop. I have added some more recent examples. They are all early examples of events and practices that are stimulating an environment for the emerging *habitus* of the new middle class. At the same time, successful expressions of individual class members also stabilize and enhance the environment. Role models are highly recommended.

I like the example of sports. Certain sports become typical for the middle classes because the lower classes cannot afford them. (Cross-strata sports also exist, but then other questions come up, e.g. quality and affordability of equipment.) The connection between middle class *habitus* and sports has a long tradition that is strongly linked to the role of *leisure*. Thorstein Veblen was the first to establish a sociological field (1899), which proved to be immensely fertile (Veblen, T. 2008). From here to Bourdieu is a direct line (Bourdieu, P. 1985). My observations in recent years were that many Afghans appear to copy a certain leisurely behavior from the interveners and their experience abroad; this might just be superficially prettifying by accessories or fashion, or a preference for some sports that had previously been less popular. More important is the fact that only the middle class has a good reason to distinguish between work and leisure and calculate the times for each. (Middle class expressions of attitudes, such as looking for the fine arts, watching movies – there are not many, yet – or certain channels on TV, developing a certain taste, etc. are clear signs that an individual wants to be recognized as a member of a distinct layer within the class structure, and also that this individual desires this recognition as a part of his or her self-assertion as an individual.) Leisure as a precious period of time separate from work is different from occupations that aim at a change of *habitus*, but not yet at the integration into class, e.g. as

152 Michael Daxner: Lecture at the IAHE Convention, Witebsk 2014: Daxner (2014a: 1-5)

is the case of the skate project (Fitzpatrik, J. 2013) described in *Skateistan*. However, such projects sustain the faint idea of projecting their beneficiaries into an emerging *middle* class; i.e. to not leave their subjects where they had been, in the lower spheres of the social structure. In the eyes of aid organizations and the extended tools of interveners, such approaches may look like pure humanity or charitable development aid. However, the partial elevation of young people beyond the life-worlds of their references may also alienate members of the same class or stratum and create very different notions of the future. The extreme case is when a young person's preference is a life in exile or as a refugee instead of waiting for their environment to change in favor of their "future," despite the fact that, as members of the new middle class, their chances at education and social promotion are better than anyone else's. Sports are, in all respects, an ideal field for the study of social changes.

This aspect is immensely important and has not gained sufficient awareness, in both the academic world in the interveners' minds and in the Afghans' considerations. On the one hand, the link between sports and military, as is generally the case for the link between the disciplined body and power, has very particular features in any emerging new society and state. We do not yet know which direction this link should develop in and how it will diversify, and therefore it has become a priority research target. On the other hand, sports are important for lifestyle, and we can apply the categories of mimesis, adaptation, and deduction from the attitudes of other (higher?) classes and strata.[153]

As is to be expected, sports are always connected to the gender issue. Discrimination against women is in permanent competition with the emancipation of women through sports, in particular when the public space is being widened. But, as in the case of women's cycling, the underlying structure is undermining the little progress made so far. Nordland states that, "With few exceptions, team sports programs for women are riddled with corruption and undermined by conservative Afghans who never liked the idea" (Nordland 2016). In a very instructive overview, Nordland also provides one explanation: "It is a conspicuous failure of Western efforts to improve the lives of Afghan women." This sentence is seemingly just up-to-date, but it contains a host of critical explanations: while women's emancipation was one of the strongest triggers for the legitimization of Western participation in military and civilian reconstruction missions after 9/11, efforts were not solid enough, and they led at once to the

153 This leads into complicated theoretical ramifications, taking the pattern of Elias' trickling down of attitudes as a starting point, Elias (1979).

rentier state mentality. This is not untypical for societies of intervention, as sports are a good trajectory for communication and attitudes that the intervened should acquire. It can be used as one of the rare occasions with which an international reputation can be gained (e.g. in women's cricket) and thus serve a national purpose, assuming "national" already means anything to the people, not only the political elite. It is no surprise that conservative and traditional opposition to women's sports is growing. Body policies always tend to endanger established male dominance and cults of masculinity. On the other hand, body politics are an important level of symbolic interaction among women in the new middle classes (there had been older politics among previous upper and middle classes at all times, but it is the changes that make things so sensitive now).

Unfortunately all leisure activities are under the spell of highly resilient conservative observation and increasing insecurity. Competitive sports and international appreciation of artistic production are features that can be easily destroyed.

4.11 Business, enterprise, governance

As an introduction to this section, I would like to start with a few examples, retrieved in the course of meditating about the ambiguity of the new middle class activities, which demonstrate more facets of growing middle class spirits.

AFP Anuj Chopra:

Taliban flex muscles with new telecom "tax" (= protection tax), acc. 2016/01/18

Accountants & Financial Services:

Rahman Group Inc. www.rahmangrp.com, very professional with a newsletter

VISTA Renewable Energy Services Company

www.vistasolar.net, highly professional information. Company has existed since 2007.

The Financial Times Millie Dent

We built a $335 Million Power Plant in Afghanistan that Can Barely Turn on Lightbulb. (acc. 2015/08/13). MD: This is one typical example of wasted development aid that SIGAR presents so many of.

Afghan Translation Association (ATA):

info@afghantranslation.asia (acc. 2015/12/15). This is a typical middle class enterprise that offers services in English, Pashto, and Dari. Advertisements display that the company is proud of serving ministries and other important patrons.

These examples show a multitude of functionally diversified enterprises that do not simply copy Western business style, but try, in one way or other, to adapt to Afghan circumstances. Diversification has been growing since 2014, which may be linked to the ISAF pull-out.

If the provisions for building social capital are signs of good governance, then members of the entrepreneurial branch can use the benefits to develop their businesses and their share in the social capital. Recently I have been receiving quite a few advertisements at my personal home address inviting me to use very typical services for such development. They may have gotten my address through the workshop or through some of my interviewees. This one of them:

*"**Rahman Group Inc. (RGI**) Auditors & Advisors which is an associate member of PrimeGlobal International delivers measurable value to clients through a team of diverse professionals who bring unmatched depth and breadth of expertise.*
RGI provides audit, tax, consulting, and financial advisory services to public and private clients spanning multiple industries. RGI brings world-class capabilities and deep local expertise to help clients succeed wherever they operate. More than 20 professionals are committed to becoming the standard of excellence.
We are Kabul-based local Afghan auditors and advisors firm combining fresh, able perspectives with actual sweat of the brow from our own experiences. We are part of the community and like to work with companies, NGO,s and with people who have challenges in their organizations including planning, business development, strategy, and moving ahead.
We are a team of highly qualified and experienced individuals to help you out in different domains of your business in such a way that you feel your

business is being look after by individuals who are fully conversant with the regulatory requirements of the country and are there to help you out in achieving your goals in timely, effective and efficient manner.

Address: Office No.B8, 6th Floor Gulfarooshi Street, Share Now Kabul"

A thorough linguistic analysis provides deep insights into social change. The terminology and vocabulary used certainly follow global (i.e. Western) standards: "unmatched depth and expertise," "standard of excellence," etc. But at second glance, we find more specific hints, like "we are part of the community," and, even more eye-catching, "individuals who are fully conversant with the regulatory requirements of the country." The subtext implies another floor of action and communication modes, both local and truly efficient. The local level may be independent from the overarching national framework.

This is a typical service for multipliers in a growing business community: a club good within a club good, made possible by the existence of a freedom that is potentially open for everybody, but actually can only be used by a minority within a new class. The entrepreneurial branch is much smaller than the intellectual branch and the little-merchants and service-people branches. It is common knowledge that the living standards of the lower middle classes, old and new, are at risk of stagnating. (These branches will need more state action and targeted governance than the business community, even if the state decides to invest more in the country and does not escape with their assets.) In addition to education and the opening of public space, the welfare system must provide social security for those who earn regular salaries and indirectly stabilize the middle class as a whole.

The list of possible examples is not endless, but it is long enough. Each example shows that the adaptation of Western models within the society of intervention is working. It would be plausible if we were to attribute the new phenomena to a kind of systematic import of habitus and labels, but it seems that it is actually an adaptation of the interveners' attitudes and lifestyles, or of returnees' narratives. Individual acts of adaptation are striving for a social environment to be, and not one to improve or amend.

4.12 Business spirit is telling

As I have already mentioned, the entrepreneurial or business spirit was a common bond among many participants at the workshop and beyond. When we

were preparing the event, we asked for certain preferences out of a very informal selection of choices. We got quite a few encouraging answers, but without a more formal description of styles of doing business.

Tendencies towards dealing with business complexities:

← Mode Value →						
Short term			x			Long term
View from inside				x		View from outside
Exploit existing sources		x				Explore new knowledge
Decide upon planning					x	Decide upon situations
Authoritative			x			Participative
Cooperative				x		Competitive
Growth				x		Profit

Figure 6 Complexity check: preference concepts between two poles – The question was "Where would you position these aspects?" (N=17)[154]

The entrepreneurial element is stronger among young businesspeople, but it is still present within members of the middle class who do not run businesses or start-ups; there is always a certain overarching debate on values and virtues. The only surprising result is the clear positioning for situationism and against planning. Competitiveness and profit-orientation are not surprising, since they are part of the entrepreneurial spirit; people who are not interested in competitive practices and (!) profit would not perceive themselves as entrepreneurs, or even businesspeople. In this case, one cannot apply entrepreneurial behavior to them.

Figure 7, derived from one of our proto-questionnaires (N=17), presents a rough picture of a value and virtue set in the making. From here, we can proceed towards a more subtle differentiation of the interdependency between diverse sorts of capital and virtues/values that make up for the habitus and the milieu of the middle classes.

154 The scale was adapted from Peter Kinne: Simple solutions are of yesterday, SZ 27/10/2014, as a brief from Kinne (2009). The list of juxtapositions and antagonisms did fit surprisingly well with the repertoire of my discussants in quite a few interviews, as well as the workshop.



Figure 7 N=17, from the proto-questionnaire.

At this point, it is quite obvious that a limitation of the discourse of the middle classes to pure economic or political-economic structures will not suffice. **Before social capital can be triggered or enlarged, cultural capital must be activated**. We know that there is not much *inherited* cultural capital in Afghanistan – probably the highest accumulation is in the old urban middle and upper classes – and therefore *acquired* cultural capital, mainly through education, is the ticket that allows people to enter the new class and start building an appropriate habitus. This consideration also provides a clue as to where to enter the magic circle: occupation/profession → education/training → parental income/status → occupation/profession. (Reir's study (2014), as cited, supports this model and enriches it with more micro-social detail.) The cultural capital accumulated by the parents provides an economic future for the next generation that will not satisfy the youth. Emancipation from the narrow parental scope comes through education, not only regarding contents, but status and entitlement as well. This implicates conflicts on several levels: estrangement from traditional families and their values, adoption of a new code of conduct and virtues, and, in the end, a different means of social and economic reproduction. I would not automatically call this *modernization*, because we know from several aspects of C9 that modernization indicators may be volatile under certain circumstances.[155] **But it goes without saying that modernization will not be possible without such conflicts**.

At this point I would like to remind my readers that the unfolding of the "middle class" construct has thus far followed a recognized "Western" model which has quite a few critics in Afghanistan, particularly Ekanayake and many articles in the media, but more frequently in colloquial situations.

The threat that exists "inside" a class construct is not only one of fear of losing the customary life-world. It is fear of modernization that holds risks for everybody who will not be one of the "winners." While one can intuitively perceive this motive of apprehension, it is difficult to describe or to measure because it not often uttered verbally. More frequently it is hidden under the pejorative "anti-Islamic" or "against tradition."

155 There is rarely only one reason for the rejection of modernizing actions, e.g. in projects. It is therefore not easy to find a dominant cause. We found examples in which cellphones had been a cause for reproach, but in this case it was not the technology but the way in which it was being used that was the problem. I hold that the understanding of what modernization is and what it means are the two sides of every story in the society of intervention.

The consequences of this ambiguous approach towards the new class structure reach beyond a sober analysis of the status quo; all political concepts of Afghan *ownership* depend on the interpretation of the new social order in light of the fear of modernization and alienation. When the West, or, more concretely and according to my own experience, when the German Foreign Office turned down a concept on the reform of higher education with the argument that it would endanger Afghan ownership, the German notion of ownership was clearly rather different from the Afghan perception of the case. The concrete case was that we (Daxner and Schrade 2012) had suggested the establishment of a center for research into higher education with some outreach to the beneficiaries' social self-reflections, but under the guidance of German or international advisors, because Afghanistan does not have any higher education research. Due to this paradoxical intervention by the German Foreign Office, this project has not moved forward, and higher education is still not fulfilling its potential. Earlier in this text, I pointed out the problems with ownership during a period of strong intrusion into an intervened society. At the same time, it is a sign of poor governance if these efforts to modernize are not sufficiently supported so as to reduce the desire to migrate from the country.

My intention here has been to show a few aspects of a changing habitus. There may be many more facets to this endeavor; however, **under no circumstances is there a way back to the diverse habitus of a social order from before the intervention**.

4.13 Good governance and public space

The perfect square, it turns out, is also a state of mind (Michael Kimmelman. The Craving for Public Squares. NYRB April 7, 2016). Tahrir Square, Gezi Park, and many other urban squares have acted as the staging grounds for political and cultural outbursts, even revolutions. The public sphere is not an imaginary space in a void; it is physical.

If it is a sign of good governance when the conditions for building sustainable social capital are delivered and when there are broad options for the acquisition of cultural capital, together they imply that two major reforms are needed: the creation of public space and the renovation of the education system. While I have often emphasized the diverse aspects of education reform, the other endeavor requires more explanation. How can a state in the making create public space as part of its central backbone and structure? When I discussed the city,

I addressed the necessary conditions for the creation and improvement of social capital; this has also been linked to urban youth. I understand public space as a real "space" that has not lost its spatial dimension, as opposed to symbolic public spheres. Hannah Arendt devoted much of her work to the elaboration of a theory of public space, and many of her successors have differentiated her approach. Originally the *place* was a place in the polis, but it has been transformed into later periods and structures. It is the place where opinions and ideas are negotiated, developed, or repudiated, and where democracy can develop. Seyla Benhabib (Benhabib, p. 1992) offers a broad introduction to the contemporary debate, while Hénaff and Strong (Hénaff, M./Strong, T. B. 2001) focus more on the field of representation and discourse. Good governance can help create such public space, but it cannot command it into existence. The very complex process surrounding the people's needs for recognition and participation and the constitution of the space is – in contemporary terms – also **the place where civil society meets the state/government**. This is, in a nutshell, the basis of my considerations. Despite the fact that this place is meant to be concrete, in an age of virtual communication it may well become virtual as well, e.g. through social media. Freedom of communication and unrestricted access to the web plays a big role in Afghanistan. Another sphere that I have already discussed is the arts, which, when self-expression becomes more than an individual concern, can become political. Much of the resistance to modernization or a change of values lies in the fact that there is no public place where people can test new options for communication and community building.

Governance does not create virtues, but it can, through effectiveness and legitimacy, create the framework for those virtues, which in the end may be called democratic or republican virtues. They help distinguish between public and private affairs and keep communication alive when antagonistic forces threaten to tear a social context apart. My point here is that *virtues are not values*. Guilhot argues that the rule of law may contradict republican virtues and declares this as one problem of democracy export or import (Guilhot, N. 2005). In a society of intervention, values clash; virtues may clash, but they may also bridge the gaps between diverging values. Telling the truth can create trust among people of rather incompatible convictions, and empathy can pave the way to communicating cases beyond the question of guilt. There are many possibilities and a lot of potential, and, of course, there are vices that provoke the opposite of a productive canon of virtues. Middle class virtues and habitus de-

pend on the same ethics that the members of these middle classes want to expand and maintain. If this is generally true, it might appear rather different in the West than in Afghanistan. Anecdotally, a few Afghans told me that the reason why they "don't want any middle class" is that they do not want the ethical connection and do not want to become Westernized. Such an argument may lead to a somewhat bizarre ambiguity: some successful new middle class businesspeople are rather proficient in the usage of modern technology and business structures, but they are dogmatic and quite orthodox in their religious views. Western superficiality often would prefer to think that the new middle classes are automatically progressive, which is an error. Some Afghan (neo-)religious businesspeople, in turn, do not understand why this link between religious orthodoxy and capitalist attitudes does not go without saying when talking to the interveners. Religion is, of course, also a safe haven in otherwise risky discussions between new and old middle class members. But, as I stated before, this is all taken from informal conversations and cannot pretend to represent general views.

4.14 We and they, again

The emerging young urban middle classes are an interesting object of study and deserve to be thoroughly researched instead of merely being speculated about. The example of the workshop that I have been discussing so broadly served two purposes: **I wanted to show how a real change in the social structure can be observed and interpreted and provide us with quite a few reasons and starting points for further research. Secondly, I tried to make a connection between this emerging class and good governance, focused on the creation of conditions for enhancing social capital.** The development of legitimacy and effectiveness, as well as relations built on trust or distrust, could be developed starting from here. The mere fact that commons are delivered and the rules of access are sustainable and observed is a necessary but insufficient condition for the embedding of good governance into a changing social structure. Traditional agents for social stability and reliable relationships between all kinds of groups may have been criticized or even antagonized by other groups and actors, but they were known, they were calculable, and people have learned how to adapt to them over time. Social change always brings with it *the novelty of the unknown*. Under intervention, one of these novelties is the *habitus* of the interveners and the ensuing expectations that the intervened have

of the interveners. In Chapter 4.5 I touched on changes in habitus of the intervened. One problem is and will continue to be that changes in habitus happen slowly and cannot normally be predicted by simple causal deductions. There are more unobservables and uncertainties than solid prognoses. True, some information, and even some sound knowledge, may exist, most likely amongst the educated and versed elites or political activists rather than the ordinary people. But there is one big uncertainty from the beginning of any intervention: how will communication and cooperation between the interveners and the intervened actually *function*? The answer is decisive for the concrete structures and features of a society of intervention. I assume that this answer is common to any military intervention, and there are many similarities among different sorts of intervention regimes and occupations.

In Kosovo, I made a startling observation regarding the perception of "us" interveners by the Albanian Kosovars. This majority had cultivated a construct of their idealized *tribal* past, following ancient pre-modern rules and rituals, which were decisive for their patterns of honor, social interaction, and the legitimacy of political statements and actions, even if these by no means belonged to any past. Reference was made to the Kanun,[156] which is analogous to the Pashtuwali in Afghanistan.[157] There were hypocritical debates about how to kill an adversary with contemporary armaments instead of an honorable single bullet, and there were serious attacks on imposed rules and order as contradictory to "traditional values." This is a safe ground for a comparison of different societies. What I realized from the outset was that we at UNMIK and other international organizations were seen as other tribes who were in confrontation with the existing and well-known "tribal" system that was held to be traditional. Kosovo society was *far from tribal* in 1999, but the construct of a tribal system allowed for a widening of the horizon by the arrival of (a) new tribe(s), UNMIK or KFOR tribesmen, or "the internationals."[158] I concentrated

156 Most frequently referred to as the Leke Dukagjini (an assumed name for "the law" (late 15th cty.), codified by Shtjefën Gjeçovi.

157 Cf. p. 54-55: When Jim Gant ("One Tribe at a Time") (Gant 2009) developed his highly private ethnology, he somehow *doubled* the imaginary construct of tribal societies and their institutions and rules. In his case, all the circumstances of his twilight missions are well disclosed and documented by now: (Safranski (2014: 1-4ZP); Meek et al. (2014)), but the question still remains as to why the villagers trusted him for such a long time despite his counterfactual behavior and lifestyle.

158 Many accounts of this construction can be found in the work of famous writers like Ismael Kadare or Rexep Qosia. The tribal notion has a certain attraction to self-made anthropology: just recently, a Navy SEAL wanted to be attributed to a tribe rather than a group: La Roche (2016). To be a member of a tribe means complying with the informal institutions and their

on the art of *reading* another tribe: what were the significant elements (all kinds of *symbolic* tattoos, attitudes, gestures, etc.) that allowed groups to be distinguished from their known social environment, and what were the specific distinctions they had to learn in order to read *us*? They expected that we would also take pains to read *them*, but that is another problem; we were less interested in the processes of comprehensive differentiation.[159] I learned to accept that the better I read, the more I could establish trustful relations with the local people (Albanians). Typically, the approach towards the Serbs and other Slavonic groups that had no tribal-designed external structure was totally different; *they* treated us more often as of their kind, and this often seduced us into supposing that we had a better mutual understanding with them or would have an easier time building confidence – which could have been a trap.

I have taken this detour in order to arrive at some fundamental ideas regarding trust and confidence in the relationships between interveners and the intervened. Without trust in persons and groups and without confidence in institutions, no social change that is sustainable and intrinsic can be expected to happen. With the arrival of interveners – Soviets first, all kinds of internationals later – the Afghans learned very fast that some of their established habitus could be maintained, while other elements were forcedly changed, and still other attitudes ended up being open to change by social differentiation and the aspirations of the new middle class. Who can be trusted? What institutions should a member of the new middle class confide in? The answers are not one-dimensional; they focus on gains in power, material, or immaterial profits. One element is certainly cooperation in the building of social capital (cf. the main approaches by Bourdieu and Putnam. An early account of the weaknesses and vagueness with economic/management addresses Kai Riemer in order to create a *space for trust* (Riemer, K. 2005: 148f, 158)). The combination of public

rules and at the same time being independent from societal rules imposed by formal institutions from outside the tribes. In this observation there are strong connections with all kinds of communitarianism.

159 The greater theoretical frames for this consideration are theories of functional differentiation. I am building on Uwe Schimank and his conception of the actors-centered turn after a period of system-theoretical hegemony. (Schimank (2007) However, there is no explicit conflict-orientation (17f., 220f.); Collins' micro-social perspective is a useful addendum, Collins (2012). Reading differences requires a very special approach to phenomenology and ethnology. One of the most sensitive problems is answering the question as to why the interveners' interest in the self-perception of the intervened is relatively reduced, while the structures of the society of intervention are functionally embraced. It has some touch of neo-post-colonialism, but that does not explain very much.

space and social capital is a precondition for change, in particular when the simple gaining of more power is not the principal task of the change.

I learned that the new young Afghan generation that represents the new middle classes is deeply distrustful of all institutions that want to control their development and endeavors. The old patterns, through which a certain sort of interdependency had created frameworks of confidence, have disappeared. New patterns have yet to emerge.

Cultures of distrust are the result of experience and prejudice. The latter is part of the field of education, while the former is a focus of political change. The entrepreneurial branch of the new middle classes must, from the very beginning, try to gain the trust of their clients. They want to be confident in the institutions that secure their acquisitions and protect their property. There are several strategies (or tactics?) that can help to achieve parts of this goal. One is to form temporary alliances with the old layers in society, e.g. patronage networks or strong individuals within the state bureaucracy; another is to demonstrate trustworthiness by ostentatiously collaborating with the interveners while still aiming at a local clientele; a third is trying to participate in processes that are likely to improve the quality of institutional counterparts. This implicates political engagement. The intellectual branch of the new middle classes and large group of employees in middle management positions seek authority, mainly through their impartiality[160] and their proficiency in the role and capacity expected of them. Here, the variance in habitus plays a big role in the display of social and cultural capitals, e.g. titles, academic degrees, professional affiliations, and networks (which are sometimes supported by traditional affiliations in patronage or family relations, but are increasingly doing without this assistance).

The intervention in Afghanistan is still seeking to establish sustainable and effective statehood. Even if this attempt may be incomplete and has failed to reach certain levels of consolidation, all relevant groups and classes have to orientate themselves accordingly; the state must be reconsidered. There are a few observations and many more assumptions about the relationship between the new emerging middle classes and the state of Afghanistan and its institutions. This relationship will not only influence the chances that good governance will meet its targets. It will also complement the building of social capital

160 This strategy follows Max Weber's framework for bureaucracy 1922, Weber (2001).

and the embedding of the class in structures that allow for *certainties on relevant issues.* The entrepreneurial branch of the new middle classes requires confidence in formal institutions, normally provided by the state, in order to certify their participation in the market. This includes procedures of registration, licensing, and taxation, as well as the range of liberties these entrepreneurs can use: advertising, acquiring clients, negotiating and contracting, etc. Members of this group told me that they consider themselves entitled to take part in the process of establishing and fixing the necessary procedures. But this can only become real if the necessary public space is granted. It is not likely that a state that is still struggling to solidify its structures can provide such space without support from the beneficiaries – and the powers supporting them – in lieu of consolidated state structures and proven modes of governance. The contextualization of the new middle class in its relation to the state must rely on mutual reconnaissance and trust. The state will want to know whom it has to deal with, who will be a taxpayer, who will be held liable, whenever the laws require it. Such knowledge must be based on information, collected and interpreted through quantitative methods and measurement. At this point, the skeptical view of the ambiguous role of the state in measuring and standardizing modern societies must be applied to a society, like Afghan society, that is not yet at the level of high modernity, but that is externally aiming towards becoming incorporated into the global standards for consolidated statehood (even if that happens far in the future). (Scott 1998: 4-6). It is not only the vertical standardization that seems to be a requirement for effective government, but also the "coming out" of the individuals in order to be recognized by partners, clients, and peers in their respective social networks. In the following section I shall examine some of James Scotts' insights on urban development, while at the same time noting the closeness of his findings to Jürgen Link's theory of normalization and its consequences in a world of increasing quantification (Link, J. 2009). The normative power of this normalization is remarkable because it is relevant for the dominant elements in the discourses that underlie communication within the new networks. When it is integrated into the procedures of the protective and legally granting state, the entrepreneurial branch accepts the institutional rules and gains in a gesture of recognition. This can be a decisive tool for attaining the trust of their clients and business partners.

When I conducted my studies on the emerging young urban middle class in Afghanistan in 2014, my country, Germany, was on the brink of the refugee crisis. Then, however, it was not Afghans who were the problem, but the increasing number of asylum seekers from the war zones of Syria and Iraq, and

those from Africa coming to Europe through the Maghreb. Today, Afghans are one of the largest groups of asylum seekers (or more or less legal migrants) to Germany. **It is not possible to construct a causal link between the intervention and the stream of refugees and migrants after 2001. But it is possible to link the stream of migrants to the emerging middle class and their related aspirations, and to link the emergence of these middle classes to the intervention.**

There is a wind of change concerning the assessment of the Afghan intervention. For the United States of America, its longest war ever has achieved nothing. (More recently, the voices of anthropologists have become prominent in this: (Coburn, 2016 #8870).) Barfield's review is significant because it refers to an Afghan readership: "Coburn's experienced eye demonstrates that understanding local culture is a two way street. Highly recommended for Afghans, or anyone puzzled by the policies of international military and civilian institutions and in need of practical advice on how to cope with their strange ways of thinking" (publisher's flyer). The most impressive American voices do not come from political science, but, in my eyes, from SIGAR and its regular analyses.

For most other Western interveners, the outcome is at best ambivalent. There is one unifying aspect for humanitarian aid and for a majority of the theoretical evaluations: **Unless the entire 2011 intervention is not seen as illegitimate and futile, its results are, at best, unsatisfactory, and at worst unsuccessful due to the errors and mistakes of the intervention itself, and not the root conflicts.**

The change in government (President Ashraf Ghani and his CEO and former rival, Abdullah Abdullah) took responsibility in October 2014. This arrangement is called NUG, or the National Unity Government. More often than not, it is more a symbol of stagnation than of united effort, but there are some positive exceptions and even progress in those areas in which a minister or director general is successfully following his own agenda.

ISAF's exit is nearly complete; by now there are only some 10,000 troops on the ground. The remaining U.S. troops under the Troop Agreement have not yet found their mission, while military troops from other countries, like Germany, are still under the pressure of mandating the deployment of troops because of the parliamentary prerogatives. They are not yet sure what their main

goals for still being there are. The new U.S. administration is hesitant to terminate all deployment to Afghanistan, while many U.S. military commanders are urging a re-deployment following a number of violent incidents.

The security situation was far from stable in 2014, but it was certainly much better than pessimists had predicted. Today, however, security is deteriorating, and getting worse by the day. Yet the state of security is one of the differences between the Golden Hour (2001-2004/5) and a new mindset that can be compared to the situation at that time. Talking about an "Afghan Spring" is deceptive in many ways, though the relation between a middle-class-backed uprising and political events is attractive for some arguments; deep mistrust or scorn of the Karzai administration and the former president himself is a very strong unifying element for people who would like to be counted in the new middle class or are obvious members of it. From here, expectations regarding new forms of governance, which also seem to reflect the first steps of Ashraf Ghani, are formulated. (In short, from effective governance towards good governance; Ghani's inclination towards micro-management had already appeared and was widely discussed.) It will be useful to study some of the president's steps under this aspect of targeting certain sections of society; some of the related discourses can be easily categorized as typically *urban*. This will open up a wide field of interpretation, as well as one of new research requirements. New opposition groups will emerge. Their composition sometimes seems unlikely from the outside, and I am not really sure of my own judgment of the quality of the relationships among the peers.[161] The fact that there is an in-built opposition in the NUG makes things more volatile than ever. Opposition can mean both competition for positions and power within the new democratic "system" to be, i.e. within statehood as the constitution demands, or opposition against exactly this system for religious and other reasons.

The Conference of Brussels in late 2016 and the Agreement on the forced return of refugees in exchange for further economic support is one of the most

161 The best overview is Ali Yawar Adili and Lenny Linke: The Politics of Opposition: A challenge to the National Unity Government? (2016/10/27) https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-politics-of-opposition-a-challenge-to-the-national-unity-government/ An important group appeared on the stage in 2015: Mujib Mashal: Afghan Government faces New Set of Rivals: Sayyaf holds a strong patronage network (http://nyti.ms/1OhDnD1 (2015/12/21) Among several opposition groups, there is a non-violent Islamist group that is interesting because of their outreach to the Palestinian conflict and their opposition to the presidential elections: Thomas Ruttig: Trying to Stop the Bases: Another opposition block in the making? (12 August 2014) https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/trying-to-stop-the-bases-another-opposition-block-in-the-making/ (all acc. 2017/03/04).

ambiguous recent developments. The negligence of increased insecurity and the hope that returned Afghans will be sheltered and hosted by their families or the Afghan state is somehow irrational, given the many signs that indicate the opposite. No accounts of possible retaliations against returned refugees have been made, nor has the probability that returned persons will immediately start their next attempt to reach Europe been taken into consideration. To hope for a stabilization of business and service enterprises under these circumstances is a dubious hope indeed.

Afghanistan is a typical society of intervention. Its path towards statehood and good governance will be paved with all the elements of conflicts stemming from the intervention, which are often merged or confused with conflicts coming from its civil wars, feuds and internal rifts, or root conflicts with its neighbors, which often originate in a distant past. Many of the problems inherent in a fragile and unstable state with underdeveloped statehood would have been different under both full independence and autonomy or under foreign occupation. Nevertheless, societies of intervention are not simple in-betweens of these foci; they are something different. In order to understand this something, it is necessary to identify the elements that make the society new and to prove that there are really no places where the impact from the intervention did not shape this society. I hope I have at least partially succeeded in presenting both.

"Afghans don't need a state…" This was, at times, my own frivolous consideration, when I thought that direct communication between the social order (and its representatives) and external actors would have been more helpful than the ambiguous and highly erroneous military intervention on the one hand and the rather inconsistent Central Asia policy of most of the interveners on the other. Of course, a state as an actor administering statehood through good governance is required, or will be required, for awhile after liberation has begun to transform into freedom. But a society-centered approach would have changed things for the better.

5 Intervention and Governance – A Provisional Reflection

My entire text circulates around the question of how the social structure of an intervened country makes decisions and adapts to the changes in statehood that come with the intervention. The interdependence of a state-to-be and its society is obvious. This interdependence is less obvious and more difficult to observe and analyze when we assume that the society is one of intervention and that the actors' roles and perspectives cannot be logically and easily separated along clear boundaries. As I am arriving at the end of this essay, I can readily admit that I am still in the middle of a process of theoretical consideration of problems that will ultimately utilize the observations I have made over the course of many years, as well as the rapid changes that have occurred on all levels of Afghan society. This, at least, can be generalized and proven immediately; the pace of change in societies of intervention is significant. However, I think this is the right moment to deliberately interrupt the view on a historic process in order to present a snapshot. I was concluding parts of this text a few months after the cabinet of President Ghani had won confirmation by the parliament and was thus offered a period of temporary relief in the consolidation process of one sector of statehood – the separation of powers. Another few months have since passed, and the NUG has not gained much trust and appreciation from the people. Many other sectors are still fluid, while two pivotal facts blur the perspectives for the future: one is the rapidly deteriorating security situation,[162] and the other is major international players' dramatically decreasing interest in Afghanistan, at least in the West and among major interveners. Insecurity may or may not be the causal effect of ISAF's withdrawal, with no comparable international protection forces to follow (Resolute

162 Cf. Lenny Linke: Deciding to Leave Afghanistan Motives for migration, AAN: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/deciding...migration/; Jelena Bjelica: Deciding to Leave Afghanistan (2): the routes and the risks. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/deciding...risks/; Martine van Bijlert: Deciding to Leave Afghanistan (3): What happens after arrival in Europe. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/deciding...Europe/ acc.: 2016/05/31. This is a very comprehensive series of studies that are also based on interviews and background research. It serves as a bridge to better understanding of (and for) the Afghan diaspora in Europe, notably in Germany. AAN's director Thomas Ruttig and I also summarized some of the recent findings on this subject at a workshop held by the Austrian agency for dealing with Afghan migrants (ACCOR, affiliated with the Red Cross), on 2016/05/04, briefing t.b.p.

Support Mission[163] is not meant to replace ISAF). The U.S. is openly considering postponing the full pull-out of forces, and some are discussing an even stronger military commitment, at least until ANSF becomes a reliable defensive force.[164] But now, under President Trump, this position may completely deteriorate. I will refrain from any comment on Trump's ideas on Afghanistan because the daily news is so incoherent and confusing; it oscillates between continuing a war and ending a futile engagement. What is visible, though, is the poor coordination between the White House, the DoD, and the State Department, while pundits, think tanks, and media are given a wide berth. The present situation is not simply a return of the Taliban; there are diverse groups of insurgents operating under the flag of Taliban. Moreover, various groups of commandos, militias, local police, and other groups form constellations that are also fluid or volatile and have rather inhomogeneous patterns regarding confrontations with or approaches to the "state."[165] ISIS is spreading; its ability to take root in the Afghan insurgent milieu is limited, but it is nevertheless certainly a trigger for nervous and exaggerated alarmism in the West. Under the pretense of sovereign foreign policy, President Ghani on one day abruptly stops talks with the Taliban to re-animate them the next.[166] **The state of emergency has become one of normalcy.**

Kosovo is another forgotten society of intervention. One may call it a rogue state that was created under the eyes of its international protectors, or one may

163 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm, acc. 2016/05/31, RSM was launched on 2015/01/01 "to provide further training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions."

164 Cf. Noor Zahid: Kabul Wants US to Back Afghan 4-year Security Plan. VOA news 2017/05/04. https://www.yahoo.com/?err=404&err_url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.yahoo.com%2fnews%2fm%2f98d918ff-eeba-3564-b4bb-31a2a5; Paul Szoldra: What are we even doing in Afghanistan? 2017/05/09 https://www.yahoo.com/?err=404&err_ url=https%3a%2f%2ffinance.yahoo.com%2fnews%2fhell-even-doing-afghanistan-154331

165 We do not yet know what kind of negotiations between the government and the Taliban, belonging to the Quetta or Peshawar Shuras or rendering as independent, will be possible. Reputed researchers like Michael Semple and Antonio Giustozzi are observing the unsteady development of push and pull policies by the Afghan President and other actors. Cf. Lieven (2012: 3); Lieven (2016: 47-49); Semple (2012).

166 A typical mixed message was sent on 2016/04/25: Hamid Shalizi and Mirwais Harooni (Reuters): Afghan president blasts Taliban 'slaves', says little time left for peace. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-idUSKCN0XM0TN (acc. 2016/05/25); more in-depth information: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/Podcasts/aans-thomas-ruttig-on-the-new-afghan-Taliban-leader-may-2016/ (acc. 2016/06/07). This recent message from 2016/05/25 can be compared to the earlier analysis on https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/Podcasts/aans-thomas-ruttig-on-the-new-afghan-Taliban-leader-may-2016/ on the transition from Taliban leader Mansur to a new head person.

call it the prototype of states failing before they are founded. Compared to Afghanistan, Kosovo is tiny; however, many signatures of a society of intervention can be observed there, and nobody in Europe really cares anymore, since, following the last Balkan refugee crisis, there is now another, much bigger problem. The interveners' mistakes in Kosovo were totally different from those in Afghanistan. But their effects are comparable; the state of emergency has transformed into an emergency.

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Limited statehood is not so much the problem as the grey zone between governance on and off state and its varieties concerning the distribution of *power* on the one hand and *social stability* on the other, with security being one of the major intervening variables. I have started describing and presenting the concept of societies of intervention because I hold that it is also a solid framework for society-oriented analyses for statehood and governance. Of course, this frame is much too large to truly be capable of providing a comprehensive picture of the situation. The segments I have chosen serve as exemplary aspects of a society of intervention that form a study of the emerging urban middle classes. This example is, in my view, one of the most convincing and rich fields that prove the thesis that society must be studied and understood in order to find viable options for state-building – which also implicates criticism of the ways and means of the intervention. Such criticism does not simply mean pointing at the interveners' mistakes and errors; it also includes the intervened, and if the main assumption of a society of intervention is correct, then the two cannot be easily kept apart as long as the disentanglement for a new period after transition has not arrived, which is obviously not the case in the much advertised transformation period of 2015-2025.

The chapter on the emerging young urban middle classes was an exemplary exercise. There are many aspects of social analysis that necessitate basic and refined investigations, but there are also valid observations that add empirical findings to a complex issue. We have to be very careful not to draw more from this exercise than there actually is. But, on the other hand, we should make good use of what we have learned. We know by now that there is a new middle class with two main branches, *entrepreneurial and intellectual/service-oriented*.

The entrepreneurial branch does not care much about the ideological closeness to or distance from the interveners. They look through the eyes of business,

start-ups, and their intervening counterparts as tutors, patrons, or clients. If this class consolidates, and when it reaches a certain mass, it may become a class that the elite cannot afford to ignore or diminish; in other words, it will partially become part of this elite. Even if the military pull-out and the thinning of the interveners' professional presence might be viewed as a backlash to this emerging branch, it will bear the imprint of the intervention for a long time, similar to the economic beneficiaries of occupation in other countries. The interface with the intellectual branch is clearly in the fields of education, higher education, and professional training. But the intellectual branch is much wider and more differentiated; it does not simply imply taking part in a modernizing professionalization of an emerging class. The arts, media communication, the creation and expansion – and defense – of a newly acquired public sphere are also part of it. My observation is that any statement about the likely ideological development of this branch is premature. However, I am reasonably sure that the whole context of migration and return, of communication with the diaspora, and stark urbanization are elements that will influence the orientation of this branch.

While the economy and businesses seem to develop, or, rather, stagnate like in any other poor and fragmented society, the mindset of the people should indicate how to get away from the normalcy of emergency, almost like an early warning system. This normalcy is also dangerous because the country is on the brink of being forgotten (again). In such a situation, self-awareness and self-perception are necessary elements of reflexivity, which in turn is one of the few proven tools that create political space and outreach for reforms. The intellectual and service-oriented branch of the new middle class can be viewed as the laboratory of the future…, which is pathetic, and perhaps exaggerated. But it is what I have been learning about educated Afghans' attempts to penetrate the ruling elites' resilient state of mind in order to bring about a new social order since I first arrived in the country in 2003. They are, however, often disappointed because they are marginalized or underestimated by the interveners. This permanent disappointment has become an element of the society of intervention; it adds to a climate of distrust and dwindling confidence in the future, an aspect we can learn about from Afghan refugees. Using a superficial terminology, I'd like to say that there is no intellectual class opposed to the political class.

The distinction makes sense when we observe that one part of the external actors deals with one of the two branches, while another communicates with the

second. This is not only a rational choice in a defined game. When the cultural and mindset-oriented external actors concentrate on universities and the education of democratic elites, while being relatively excluded from the governance dialogue – as in *Govern4Afghanistan,*[167] where universities and the MoHE are not even included as partners in debates – then the division becomes more permanent. On the other hand, the experience imported by the intellectual branch will be slightly different from the ideas and connections brought by the entrepreneurial branch from their external relations. From this we can conclude that any class, like the middle class, is not a homogeneous structural unity, but always volatile in structure. One must add a trivial point: every "middle" has an above and a below. There are far fewer differentiations in popular studies of the upper class; the lower classes also appear in a strange and often undifferentiated homogeneous form, shaped by poverty and despair. But the middle classes crumble into as many layers as there are in reality.[168] It would be an oversimplification to assume that the study of middle classes in Afghanistan alone could lead towards models for good governance and public space. The opposite is true: I**n societies of intervention, no study in governance and the public sphere can succeed without the study of the middle classes**.

Let us, for a moment, unite the middle classes of Afghanistan into one significant group: T**his middle class tends to be young and urban, and it aspires to either replace the ruling elite or to succeed it**. We also have solid conjectures about the main attributes of the new classes, i.e. urban, young in age, educated, and uncertain about intrinsic or extrinsic motivations for their strategies. To a certain extent, the historical roots of the emergence of this class are important for understanding the fine texture of such a new structure, e.g. the connection between local peers and an economic environment between politics and business. From this we can learn that the political economy of such micro-

167 This project ends far below its initial lofty goals. It has narrowed the sustainable governance dialogue to a twinning partnership of international and local experts under the stark influence of a think tank close to the NUG (AREU). The expertise is valuable, but the project is far from its vision of a dialogue that supports the emancipation of Afghan governance from the restraints of a rentier system.

168 Bourdieu's famous original title was "La distinction," in English, "Distinction," while the German translation, "Die feinen Unterschiede," emphasizes the real meaning of the products of distinction. Distinction means both inequality and difference. The idea that each layer is represented by a specific taste leads us to the origins of the distinctions (and their perceptions). Thus the subtitle, "Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste," is almost a blueprint for a research program; from the different tastes, we can learn about their origins in inequality and objective differences.

social environments requires further investigation. Most fascinating is the context of global development and local structures, which demonstrate stark asynchronous features. This applies in particular to the changes in traditions and life-world attitudes, and in the course of modernization, which has never been a synchronic development.

One of my major propositions for future research is to take a closer look at the effects of wartime modernizations on a peace economy and on social differentiation. I have often emphasized the changes that have come through wartime road building and, even more so, by the ubiquity of mobile phone communications. These are my master examples. Wars bring with them special demands for transportation and mobility. Roads are one of the preferred means of supporting military deployment and strategies. When fighting ceases, and sometimes even before, the roads allow the civilian population to move on them and thus change their traditional concepts of mobility. Places that had been far from each other by human standards, if not geographically speaking, suddenly seem closer together; physical communication shortens procedures and rituals. Finding a son-in-law or a bride took a long time when the individuals involved had to climb through mountain passes and walk over rough terrain. Feedback necessitated physical movements that are abbreviated by the existence of a road. Combine this sketch with the effect of telecommunication, especially cell phones. Procedures become shorter, more condensed, the time one must take for consideration shrinks, and the time that it takes to complete an agreement or a contract is reduced. Afghanistan is typical for changes in life-world regularities that can be observed over centuries. However, something about it is very special: the changes described fall into the period of rapid global modernization of communication, and thus the challenge for traditional lifestyles is even more drastic than for other societies in previous times. It goes without saying that this partial modernization does not always correspond with the changes in mindset, and that it plays a very special role in transporting news, rumor, denunciation, and warnings in ongoing conflict situations.

(In a brief side note that links this consideration to the middle class context, one can say that this change affects the existing middle classes more than other layers of social structure. The upper classes did not need to exert themselves in order to adapt to the new technology, and the truly poor may gain access to the new forms of communication, but they experience fewer effects on their everyday life. This assumption requires a more thorough investigation, as it

might be disproved empirically when the lower classes gain access to stronger positions in active conflict situations.)

The generalized context of political economy in conflict environments can best be studied using Hirshleifer's very strong assumptions (Hirshleifer, J. 2001). If you take his blunt views on predatory motives and combine them with the situations of conflict-ridden change, you might get a realistic view of the "dark side of the force," as his book is called. More accurate is the present problem of what the material and immaterial costs of the intervention mean for the interveners and the actual state of the society of intervention. Afghan society is at a stage where it is developing its own Afghan Homeland Discourse, and its impact on the interveners' respective Homeland Discourses is beginning to form a very particular narrative or changes in the collective memory of this intervention as compared to newer or more threatening ones. This is what I have observed in my recent diaspora studies as well. Memory will have it that the intervention was costly and that expenditures have never met the cost/benefit balance approached. The interveners' input was less predatory or targeted than *investing in a black box*. Inside this social and political space, the intervened people get used to some of the basic features of a society of intervention, i.e. the rentier status of the state, the diachronic development of statehood, governance and social structure, and an economy that is behind a process of class modernization that has already begun (socially and culturally) through the society of intervention. Slowly, the black box becomes transparent, and – alas! – the political economy appears as one asymmetric and volatile frame of a state that is not sovereign and therefore cannot establish its primacy of politics over economy (Daxner 2016; Ahmadi 2016).

The effects of incomplete modernization inevitably lead to the question of human capacity (individual and collective). Digital literacy is an ambiguous issue in a society with very uneven levels of general literacy or illiteracy. I have been able to demonstrate on almost all possible levels the impact of the education system and its effect on habitus and the building of social and cultural capitals of the new classes (and their counterparts). From this we can also understand the links with welfare governance (access to qualification and recognized professional titles) and the rule of law (access to upward mobility, status and distinction, often through a lawful protection of property and gaining trust in procedures). The non-economic elements of a changing class structure in a society that has not yet found its aspired structure of statehood have thus far been

underestimated. A new perspective on the relation between system and life-world is needed.

The answer would be a false simplification if we assumed that the entrepreneurial middle class is a collective non-state actor that provides the conditions for the accumulation of welfare within the class and for its members. In many cases, advocacy groups and typical middle class NGOs even take over the role of the state; they act in lieu of statehood. In these cases, it is difficult to separate state and non-state actors. The oscillating position is what makes these organizations work more or less effectively.[169]

Off-state or hybrid governance models are not on the immediate agenda in Afghanistan, but their preconditions are. These are mainly the quality of the social environment and an outlook into a future that will provide one answer to the following question: *How do we want to live in the future*? This is not a question to be posed to the leading actors on system level, if this level is narrowly occupied in order to create statehood alone, i.e. separate from interaction with society. The answer can only be found through the active participation of the people embedded in their life-world, which does not imply that these people do not want to change or develop their life-worlds. Answers to the key questions will provide indicators for priorities and qualities in all segments of (good) governance. This sounds like a return to idealistic concepts, but it is not. Instead, the construction of a prioritized model of governance must follow a deliberation of those goods that shall be delivered and therefore recognized as common by access and effect.

I have no doubt that such development is realistic and possible, subject to sufficient time and a minimization of intervening events that interrupt the process. One condition of this approach towards good governance is a specific combination of personalized trust and generalized confidence in institutions. People can only be trusted if their contexts are known and not (only) transmitted by evident power and bequeathed traditions; power is actual, while tradition increasingly becomes constructed and invented. Institutions can be trusted if their rules are credible, legitimate – and effective.

169 Findings of the Govern4Afghanistan expert group on Civil Society Organizations (CSO), under the expertise of Prof. Karin Ida Werner and Dr. Orzala (2016), with a great deal of information contributed by Margreet Goelema, from GIZ, and Hayatullah Jawad, from AHHRAO in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Trust and confidence under intervention

While we know quite a bit about the mental and micro-social constituents of trust, we are not so lucky regarding the context of trust in governance structures. The process of growing confidence in a collective or community can be described and partially explained by psychology, but the decisive parameters do not come from the individual mindsets. The process of socialization itself is the variable we should investigate more closely.[170] Empirical research often finds statements according to which a person or group trusts someone or has confidence in an institution. Two questions can immediately be raised. One is about truth: How reliable is the statement? The other question concerns the immediate or indirect cause of the statement. This can be a hard fact – the interpretation of an act of benevolence or the delivery of an aspired good – or an impression. Then we are back in the field of psychology. Or perhaps the cause is already predetermined in a deontological system: it is considered a virtue to trust in your local elder, in your father, in an "authority" at large. Societies of intervention, like those of occupation, complicate the already complex context, because different modes of trust meet, fuse, or reject one another.

The descent from a mandatory "trust in (a) god" to trust in leaders and role models and bribing competitors for power is a remarkable anthropological process that takes place over many centuries, but it is certainly accelerated by events such as war and the forceful confrontation between different cultures and habitus. On the system level, the opposite of mandatory trust is *treason*, which, in the penal and state laws, is more than just betrayal. In the religious context, which is never purely faith-related, *infidelity* is another *heavy weight* in the discourse.[171] Infidel behavior in religious and marital spheres is related. All these aspects are not the exclusive property of societies of intervention. However, they are sometimes even more accentuated there; to confide in an intervener, e.g. a foreign soldier, requires more of a capacity to interpret the situation than would be typical within the routines of the life-world and traditional rituals. In my discussion of interventions, I emphasized the eminent role

170 I am indebted to Lasse Hölk from SFB 700 for many of the valuable pieces of information and aspects to consider that I have utilized in my brief excursion. A wider contextualization, based on Hölck's findings and the debate over his presenting project D9 of SFB 700 makes it plausible to work with political-anthropological constructs like Bourdieu's and Putnam's (Social Capital) in order to understand mistrust/distrust as correspondent environments in the context of control, and to delineate clear borders against an equivocation with legitimacy (cf. Hölck on 2014/05/22).

171 Hetherington (2010); Gannon (2005)

of *translation and interpretation* as bridges between interveners and the intervened and as cornerstones for societies of intervention. Acts of translation occur in such mixed communication on a very complex level, as anybody who has ever followed a critical conversation among partners in communication who are not necessarily partners in politics or practice has experienced. At this point we can see the connection to the quest for public space. The delivery of common goods will only be less accompanied by undertones or tongue-in-cheek misinformation if trust can be generalized in a way that transforms the *I* or *We trust* into a *One can trust* in... It is a mutual learning process that can be part of the consolidation of a society of intervention and a self-reliant society based on mutual knowledge.

Gosztonyi, Koehler, and Feda had a major achievement in their research linking the Berghof project on patronage and corruption with our SFB 700 and the Afghanistan project (Patronage and Corruption in Afghanistan 2013-15). The trio of *Trust, Aid, Violence* was thoroughly investigated, and the results shed a bright light on the methods, their potentialities, and their limitations. For me, they are much more capable of understanding local communities than answering questions about the improvement of projects and delivery.[172] Another question remains: Can one follow the *Do no harm* imperative if one tries to be single case sensitive, i.e. tries to understand the distinctions between each community? Anthropology and ethnology hinder development cooperation. This is a stark statement about the difficulties political actors have when dealing with essential knowledge that does not fit into their kind of thinking. *Do no harm and deliver to satisfy people* is one of my governance imperatives. This does not mean it is unimportant to select the methods and goods delivered to the basis of society, as long as they are sufficiently "good" and accepted. This would make many case sensitive approaches almost haphazard, therefore losing the general political aim. This is a strong argument against my volatile question, if the basis of society really requires a "state." It is no argument against my apprehension of the simple delivery of what is accepted, because it is accepted. One should really try to understand why common goods are accepted. Satisfaction is more than acceptance. One of my many paradoxes is that, in a society of intervention, this constellation may be established more easily than in normal development communications.

172 The debate at the Berghof conference on Patronage and Corruption was very lively (2016/06/13). The great and lasting achievement of this research is that it put anthropology and ethnology at a very high and differentiated level. However, the political concept or strategy of donors to transform *their* interest in the intervention into delivery of commons is poor.

The discussion on trust and confidence addresses the core research on governance from different sides. Apart from aspects of game theory and concepts of business behavior, one would not assume that trust is a central category in structural aspects of governance. But whenever it comes to communication, you will need this term. There is always a philosophical/anthropological dimension that is beyond the empirical foundations of research with all their analytical studies. When examining the aspects of trust and confidence in the new middle classes, I expect my considerations to be a trustful handshake that served as a contract among rural partners… it is part of the old habitus and at the same time necessarily a customary norm without which, in some areas, no cattle trading could have happened. It is different from the psychology of stock traders, who trust in "statistics," emotional inspirations, and some intuitions that they cannot explain.

Governance under intervention is rarely built upon sustainable trust, even if the intervention started with a bonus for *liberation*. Trust out of gratitude is possible, but it has short half-life times. Gaining confidence in the new powers (external and internal!) means weighing the actions and deliveries of both sides, and of their communication with regard to the modes of recognition by the intervened. Reciprocity, together with recognition, is the base for sustainable webs of trust.

Let me guide you on a final detour. The philosopher Ernst Bloch famously stated that *hope is not confidence.*[173] (Bloch, E. 1998) The difference between hope and confidence is rather relevant for political and social change; hope argues from the end point, from the perspective of aims and goals, while confidence is based on evidence, prediction, or experience. Both can also, under certain circumstances, be derived from intuition, i.e. experiences buried in the subconscious. But you will never calculate the chances of hope, because you can never calculate the options beyond a prognosis, as exact and as sound as it may be.

173 The debate over this almost proverbial phrase is highly elaborate and extended. But apart from the eschatological and theological context, it is eminently political; societies of intervention, and not just Afghanistan, tend to lose their *sense for future* if the circumstances do not give them enough substance for hope – as regards the situation that might and should come. Hope can be *disappointed*; this is one of its characteristics. Equally disappointed expectations may be fulfilled when others (powers, rulers, warlords, etc.) do not act as expected. Hope is disappointed if what was hoped for was not the real thing that arrived at the right time under the right circumstances. (Much of the hope surrounding a revolution is disappointed after its victory, while the expectations are directed at the modes of governance and often turn out to be adequate or inadequate)

Whenever a new class or group emerges, hope is (also) its reason or rationale; this is not trivial, because the hopes for and expectations of a better future are more often than not based on material or spiritual needs – or on ideologies and suggestions intended to substitute for these needs. No hope can become reality without action, and this where the whole concept meets the world of politics. The expectations people must have in order to plan for and execute their concepts for change require placing trust in individuals and having confidence in institutions. I must trust those with whom I want to realize my plans, and I must establish confidence in the rules that are significant for the institutions. Both are necessary for the notorious *yes, we can* – trust and confidence.

This brief excursion serves as a replacement for a long introduction to the role of trust in the making of both habitus and effective governance. One of my early observations concerning Afghanistan's changing society has become more significant over the course of time. The Golden Hour produced a lot of hope and confidence, which were strongly linked with expectations of a fast improvement of living conditions, security, stability…if you will, of "everything." This is understandable in a traumatized society that is tired of war and violence. The normal progress of any intervention leads, sooner or later, to a period of disappointment. With that in mind, the relationship between the intervened and the interveners begins to become more realistic. This is a sobering phase, and a cultural sub-stream of growing distrust is likely. The most obvious segments of societal dysfunctions lie in continuous corruption and in the retardation of expectations realized. The latter is often underestimated regarding its effects on the collective mindset. All of this is no surprise if you have studied military interventions and their post-war environment. In Afghanistan, there may have been two more aspects that "consolidated distrust." One clearly involves the (majority of) people who were never able to rise to high expectations and did not believe that there would be any substantial change under governments and systems changing.[174] A decisive moment in my studies of the Afghan society of intervention came when Christoph Zürcher brought up this aspect in the 2008 Potsdam workshop. He picked up on the fact that an undefined number of people remain (in their perception) *unaffected by the intervention*, even if the social and cultural framework of their lives is changing. At that time, generalized trust or even *confidence in the state* under construction

174 Christoph Zürcher, at the time the project director of C1, was, like Jan Koehler, a participant in the first German conference on the culture of interventions: Folgekonflikte nach militärgestützten Interventionen. University of Potsdam, 2008/04/18-19. My cooperation with the SFB 700 dates from that conference. Cf. Daxner et al. (2008)

was not my focus to the extent that it would later be when I learned about the complicated mechanisms of social stability far from central government and visible statehood. But what I learned then was an almost intrinsic informal vote of no confidence in institutions that resembled their predecessors or reminded people of any life-world experience. (By the way, this is one reason why it is common in the rhetoric of revolution and messianic religion that a change must be radical and extinguish the memory of the (recent) past altogether. It never works, but it does have a cost…)

There was an initial bias in my early observations of the *culture of disappointment* insofar as I communicated only with individuals belonging to the functional elite or with people communicating between this elite and myself. The latter group was part of both branches of the emerging middle class that appeared a few years later. The culture of disappointment as a correlation to the societies of intervention is one of the lesser of the perceived effects from external influence. The interveners enjoy their superior status only when they are associated with hope; when it comes to realistic views of what can be expected from their delivery of common goods, progress, or whatever else, confidence begins to shrink until it breaks even with fatalism or disappointment. The more closely the new rulers can work with the old elites, the more a sense of déjà-vu will add to disappointment. One side effect is that the elite does need to be familiar with the people (cf. Hölck, L. 2016: 387).

It might be clear how important a role *time* plays in this debate. The *instant* change of living conditions for a majority of poor and deprived people never occurs, and under the circumstances of violent conflict and post-war it happens even later than might be expected. What we have learned from all our reflections on peacekeeping and state-building is that, at an early stage of change, the conflict between democratization and introducing the rule of law is a thematic discourse among all the elites in the society of intervention, even while it does not directly affect the majority of people. They would recognize their share in *participation* in political processes, if accompanied by improvement of their situation, as the common denominator. The further either one – functioning democracy or the effective rule of law – drift away from a perceivable improvement in material well-being and liberties, the less the new institutions can expect to be trusted.

Jumping into present times, one experience from the discussions in 2014 and 2015 was that the deep mistrust most members of the new middle class feel

towards the institutions they need for their development is a source of a paradoxical constellation. There is a clear no-confidence attitude towards new offices and function within unfolding statehood. A start-up business will require registration and licensing. The bureaucracy in charge is regarded skeptically because those who need it know about those involved and about instances of corruption and elements of disorderly conduct within the range of the new institutions that – by themselves – would represent a lot of progress in governance procedures. Therefore, even shrewd businesspeople try to circumvent their distrust and seek the assistance of service brokers and consultancies. It is hoped that these professional handlers will cope better with the new institutions and function through a routine that is effective simply because of their large number of clients and established ways of communicating with the new operators of legal procedures. The paradox is that, under normal circumstances, it is this division of labor and functional diversification that signals a new and pragmatic era for the middle classes. The state would be needed both for its own devolvement and for legal protection.

Another example, for the intellectual middle class members in public service, would be the labor market. However, the security paradox can also be explained by a no-confidence attitude towards the rule of law as it is currently established. SMB cannot wait until the new rules bring sanctions on those who do not comply or even fraudulently attack the newly attained assets or fortunes. My explanation, which will require careful testing before it can be used as a generalization, is that potential "accumulators" of wealth abstain from actually getting rich not because this would contradict any cultural particularity (as a life-world tradition, value decision or hysteresis effect), but simply because they do not believe that sanctions will hit the perpetrators in a timely manner. I have often heard it said that one does know the person who is now in the position to speed up or to retard a procedure, and nobody expects from him that he would impose sanctions on anyone who is not complying with the rules. The expectation of sanctions that are not likely to be imposed is a strong trigger in societies where the resource reserves are not vast. Thus, older structures, like sanctions through patronage or escapism, resurface.

Much of my meandering through the Afghan society of intervention circles around a few nodes in a rather complex grid: urbanization, changes in class structure, stark asymmetries in education, lifestyles, modes of communication, and visions of the future. Most of these phenomena are so common to societies of intervention that Afghanistan is just one striking example.

At several points in the text I have spent quite some time reflecting on the embedding of my considerations in the overall frame given by the SFB 700's research. Afghanistan is certainly a special case in a rather common divided world; the SFB focuses on countries outside the OECD, which already implies a strong if not outspoken moral and sociological judgment. The OECD comprises the rich, the developed, and the consolidated states – compared to the rest, which is the majority of states. The divide would look different if drawn according to the power of the respective state, or the population, and it does not work when we draw the line according to cultural indicators. After more than ten years of intensive collaborative research, the divides have become even more ambiguous. Afghanistan and other societies of intervention are clearly non-OECD turf, right? Is it unlikely that we will find such societies inside the gated OECD community, perhaps in the near future? I am not contravening my theme, but in asking these questions I wish to emphasize some similarities that the OECD and the non-OECD worlds share: **Certain tensions between state and society, and the quest for just and fair relations between the two, are the results of good governance.** These similarities make it easier to find common discursive ground, but they tempt us to fabricate analogies between the two worlds too readily.

Intervention and governance are a theoretical couple that comes to life only empirically, and then they are a couple no longer.

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Appendix

A look into the workshop of writing a book from the sidelines of the Collaborative Research Center (SFB 700).

Writing my book could have never been done this way without the SFB 700. Why should readers be interested in this statement? My colleagues told me that, in all likelihood, no one would want to know about my reflections on this liaison outside the Collaborative Research Center 700, pride of the Department and the Otto Suhr Institute, and simultaneously academia's envied focus of institutional power. The SFB 700 will come to an end at the end of the year 2017. While a few of its projects will find future lives in the widespread research networks and routines, this 12-year research collaboration will be conclude rather successfully, and, like all relevant research projects, somehow also still in progress.

Before I began writing my essay, I had already begun reflecting on the very strange familiarity between an aging scholar and a thriving up-to-date research institution, in the very mainstream of an academic system that has become performative to the extreme. Universities must compete for recognition, or rather for being ornamented by ranks on the scales of excellence and bibliometric impact. Working conditions for young scholars are definitely worse, socially and personally, compared to my time, though those young scholars have also gained in independence and autonomy. I know that this sounds old-fashioned, conservative, and indeed, I have become nostalgic. For many years, two decades almost, I have tried to be in the frontline of academic reforms (we did not call this the *revolution*). And now, after two major changes in my core disciplines, I am rather puzzled by the growing distance between my modes and aims and those of most of my colleagues. I will not fall into the trap of adding an autobiographical meta-reflection to my book. Instead, I shall present a few reflections on the process of creating the work. Since I have reached the end of my academic career and of my political byroads, I can freely mix methods, styles and disciplines. I am only responsible to the readers, and, indirectly, to the people who have always reminded me of the purpose of all science, as of all politics: freedom. (In this case, I am speaking specifically of the Afghans, the Kosovars, the people on their way from the intervened countries to our islands of wealth and liberties.) It would have been *Kitsch* or *Schmonzes* to dedicate the book to these people or to some representatives, but what else should my engagement in the Balkans, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, have been

for, if not to serve as support for them. Knowledge as part of so many virtues and polities, R2P. Human Security, Development Cooperation, Peacekeeping, Peace Making, State-building…The capital letters symbolize the agency and the urgency of the motives.

Without the SFB 700, it would have been more difficult for me to complete this work, and perhaps the results would have been different. Let me share a few impressions and reflections on this research unit, which will end at the end of the year, as will my contract. It certainly feels like the work-in-progress will continue to be done beyond the formal dates of the research project.

Why did I end up in *governance*?

The SFB does offer a good background for my topic, providing orientation for my interest in governance. This goes well with my other key interest: concentrating more on society than the state as the field for institutions and actors. Beyond all the theoretical reflections and deductions, I realized instantly that there was, there *is* one strong motive behind theory and application of governance as a framing theme and object. The state's capacity for rulesetting no longer goes unquestioned; and the state as an actor in areas of limited statehood is not the one that we are familiar with. It seems like I was looking for a confrontation, a real challenge. For many years, since my days as a higher education specialist, and later as a sociologist of conflicts, I have always looked to the society as the field where all considerations should begin, rather than the state. It was appealing to learn that in the SFB, governance was used almost as a trajectory for political vehicles establishing rules and norms off-state, beyond the state. I would be disappointed, but in a different way than I had expected. What I have been doing, apart from my administrative role as a project leader, was obviously different from what I had done on most of my other projects. As you can read in this book, I composed a medley out of many different disciplines. I tried to place observations and intuitions into rather strict formal grids, and I cared less about the demarcations between social science and policy than I did about my selected group of addressees. This may appear to some as lighthearted disinterest in academic habitus and rules. Far from it. The writing took so much time because I found it difficult to put the material that I collected in order, only to reorder it when the situation in Afghanistan changed or the way in which I perceived or observed the reality there changed. It made a difference whether I was working next door to a minister and transferred my experience from Kosovo to Kabul, or whether I was privileged to travel with the UNAMA SRSG to remote places that I never could have visited without

protection, or as an anthropologist who had to learn what has fallen into obliviousness. Between 2003 and 2016, I published mainly accurate articles: people should know what was going on in Afghanistan in real time. And that means I did not publish for the scientific community exclusively. My field diaries from 2003 to 2015 will be prepared for publication at some point in the future. They might be part of what I would call the next step in the process of making Afghanistan less of an invented and more of an accurate reality.

Today, I feel that I have adequately fulfilled my duties as the formal project leader since 2010, when the extension for the second period of funding of the SFB by the DFG was due. There was never much leeway for interfering with the existing research procedures and design. Thus, my role has been and still is more on the interpretive side, and in particular it has focused on contributing my Afghan experience since 2003, which was significantly different from Jan Koehler's, the main researcher on the project. This is why Jan plays such a big role in my statements and considerations. Secondly, I arrived at the SFB 700 after a decade of experience and research that had not focused on the theoretical concept of governance, but did try to focus on the practice of good governance under emergency circumstances. Modes of delivery, practical problems of legitimacy, the building of trust, effectiveness, and communication had, however, been my practical field for a long time. My interest in the relationship between interventions and governance kept growing, not only because of the SFB 700, but also because of its stance regarding a valid and sustainable perspective for the C9 project's results.

It is perhaps necessary to note that, in this respect, Koehler and I follow complementary, but not concurrent research paradigms. Though we both come from a sociological background rather than from political science, Koehler is more oriented towards empirical research with both quantitative and qualitative methods, while I prefer the hybrid definition of policy-oriented and public sociology, as Ute Volkmann has recently described (Baecker, D. 2002; Volkmann, U. 2015: 32-34). The controversies concerning public sociology in Germany are rather hefty, primarily because the discipline has good reasons to fear its marginalization in both society and academia (Lessenich, S. 2017; Vobruba, G. 2017). However, Koehler and I concur on the necessary ethnological and anthropological foundation of all on-site research and analysis. I am revealing this not only in order to describe the limitations of such a yearlong background of my considerations, but also to answer, for me and for my

colleagues, one of the most urgent questions in the context of the military intervention to Afghanistan (and, in general, for all scientific work facing both empirical research and political relevance): How do I know what I know?

Research being done at the SFB 700 and the German Foreign Office is connected through the SFB Transfer Project T3. The question of information coordination by German polities towards Afghanistan has been raised recently and is still being pursued. Governance Forum Afghanistan (Govern4Afg), which was recently launched by GIZ, has chosen another angle, that of pursuing the creation of "visibility, trust, awareness" through dialogue and a sustainable cooperation with Afghan peers. As an international senior policy advisor to the program, I can also observe the differences between the foreign policy and development cooperation approaches, not a trivial imbalance in the intervention policies of a major actor like Germany. Both lines of cooperation do effectively blur the lines between science and policy, otherwise typically part of the unwritten code for normal science – especially when it comes to sensitive topics.

I have tried to avoid ostentatious subjective bias wherever possible, but when subtexts need to be deconstructed, the load is also shared with the reader. Within my research in our project and the entire Collaborative Research Center, such rifts can be made visible e.g. at the intersection of my sociological approach with the prevailing political science frame. When addressing my experience with Afghans, the position shifts very easily from the one that I hold in my debates on the project T3 approach. ("Advise without being politically explicit" would be my judgment.) Since some of my statements have been met by very mixed reactions from different public audiences, it is not trivial to point out the difficult balance I wish to attain (that is, unless I seek to flatten out all controversies and contradictions). In the T3 project, a regular scholar in residence is working with the Foreign Office (AA) and the newly established Division S, which is focused on stabilization, crisis prevention, and fragile statehood. Under Chatham House rules, the T3 meetings are remarkably open, and they provide a window of opportunity to exchange scientific and political basics on an surprisingly critical level. One problem, however, is ever present, and more than complex in everyday practice: How can scientific (not only empirical) results be used for the prognostication of crises? The circumstances under which crises have been declared to be "normal" are widely described in my book. But discussing this issue with an administration whose point of view is exactly this frame is a different beast.

For readers who are not familiar with this work, let me tell you that it is not necessary to get the full scope of this research center in order to understand the arguments. Take the arguments as examples for a generalizable approach. I do not repeat the theoretical background and the process of fortifying a certain linguistic embedding of the governance concept of the SFB 700 in my essay; it is interesting enough because of its very particular core issues and unknowns. There have been many cross-references with other SFB projects that have found their way either explicitly or implicitly into my and our considerations. Deeper insights could be gained from the interpretation of the answers to the C9 project's basic questionnaire, applied in villages at the bottom of society.[175]

The C9 project's data will be worldwide one of the best resources of information about the bottom of Afghan society. It is this empirical richness that makes research on social stability in rural areas such a good example of the general problem of observing and interpreting the effects of interventions. Of course, the territory and examples covered by our project are in many ways not representative for all Afghanistan, and do not pretend to be so. But the research design and some results are certainly capable of demonstrating the relationship and distance between system and life-world regarding the legitimacy and effects of the intervention. In the transition from the first to the second of the C9 project, however, a bridge between the society-oriented concepts and the state fixation could be observed. With regard to C9, Zürcher and Koehler made some efforts to bridge the two spheres (Koehler, J. 2010a; Zürcher, C. 2010). Koehler has expounded on the problem of the questions raised so far: Interventions, notably those using military force, or under the more recent concepts of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have changed their contexts. New sociological aspects appear, e.g. the concept of a society of intervention and a culture of intervention (Daxner, M. 2010b). These are theory-based concepts and not yet elaborate theories, but they are strongly attached to both conflict theories and theories of society that are predetermined by a related theory of state and statehood. Aspects of this concept were collected in an earlier anthology, to which the C9 protagonists Koehler, Zürcher, and myself contributed (Bonacker, T. et al. 2010a). The question remains: hat is the intervention in

175 Cf. minutes and presentations of SFB700 jour fixes and the meeting on 2015/02/27, papers can be obtained from project D9. I am indebted to Lasse Hoelck for many inspiring ideas. For the broader theoretical context cf. the references in ESS EduNet http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/cms/topics/2/ (acc. 2016/03/17) on Social and Political Trust Kenneth Newton – correctly starting with Georg Simmel; Niklas Luhmann's very influential approach is basic for our debate: Luhmann (1989).

Afghanistan? It is significant because every author who wants to provide an answer has to explain his or her foundations. Koehler and Gosztonyi (Koehler, J./Gosztonyi, K. 2014) present a phase model that is not consistent with the official German view on the development of the intervention, as presented in the earlier Progress Reports by the Government (Bundesregierung 2010, 2011, 2012) . The phases are relevant because they help explain changes in local communities. This can be proven with the 2014 findings of Gosztonyi and Koehler. But the chronological classification is also relevant for understanding the intervention itself. From the failure or success of certain measures, as observed in the villages, one can conclude, if without certainty, that right or wrong decisions have been made at the top. The sub-national level is related in many cases to the national level along a vertical structure; in many other cases, it has developed a kind of autonomous or non-related social structure that allows for another perspective on the penetrating force by the intervention and processes of acceptance and rejection.

There are different theoretical approaches that can be combined when the relationship between the intervention and its effects on the social structure of the villages and communities is being investigated. All of the results from C9's longitudinal research can be interpreted over time in the light of the concept of interventions; I would suggest that some of the results even add to the conceptualization of societies of intervention.

The normative effects on definitions have, as a side effect, been remarkable in the course of an "empirical turn" of the longitudinal surveys. The outline and project description give a clear overview of the main elements of governance under intervention. But for me, it is exactly this bond with governance that was all but clear. One of my main problems was the strict rationality of concept that does not leave enough room for contingencies. Governance must change when a leader suddenly dies; often, this means going back to square one. Another problem has to do with the rationality in rational choice models that are frequently applied to governance principles. Any application of sectionalization principles would deliver ambiguous results. Therefore, a lack of ambiguity follows my uneasiness. And finally, there was never enough critical discourse analysis in the whole process for me, which means that questions of subtext and deconstruction were never given the space they deserved. This impression did not impede my work on the society of intervention. Perhaps governance from the sidelines allows for another, complementary view of the encounter between system and life-world?