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Myths, Gender and the Military Conquest of Air and Sea

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Cover: 'The Space Shuttle 'Challenger' explodes 73 seconds after take-off'. Wikimedia Commons. Available from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/Challenger_explosion.jpg [Accessed 15 December 2015]

The photography on the cover of this book is enigmatic. It shows the trail of the exploded space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986. Seven crew members died, including a female civilian teacher. The very last contribution to this book treats the memorial culture in this case, including the jokes as a form of coping with the horror. Here the picture is used as an eye catcher. We, the editors plea for a forgivable sin – and for not overlooking the violence that may be hidden in fascinating pictures. See the "original" image on p. 244.

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Silke Wenk

Myths, Gender and the Military Conquest of Air and Sea. Introduction[1]

An interdisciplinary conference at the Carl von Ossietzky University, Oldenburg of historians, art historians and cultural studies scholars from Britain and Germany provided the impetus for this book. The central question concerned the traces left in the two cultures by the conquest of undersea and air space as they came to be military operating areas in the First World War. The focus was not exclusively on the cultures of remembrance in the two countries, which were enemies in the battles in air and at sea, but was also on shared and potentially transnationally potent patterns in the narratives around the conflicts in the two spheres and their received myths. Last but not least, the impact on civilian life was also considered.

It has been almost six years since the conference, and much has occurred both to affirm as well as to call its concerns in question. Mass media has engaged with new forms of military conflicts, hitherto hardly conceivable in the 21st century. War has become a part of our normality, by no means only beyond Europe. On the one hand, helplessness and resignation may have eroded the interest in studying wars and their effects, on the other hand they have also intensified the interest in the same subject. The book market in the past decade has been flooded with publications on bomb wars and submarine wars as well as on the remembrance and memory cultures in different regions, peaking on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the First World War. Weighty monographs on the First World War have raised new questions around blame and responsibility, coincidence and inevitability. Why then this publication in 2015?

1 Translation by Simran Sodhi

The two terms in our title signal that which from our perspective needs to be more concretely and precisely examined: *myths* and *gender*, as well as the manner in which they shape the relationship between the military and the civilian.

The construction of sex, gender roles and the relations between the sexes has seldom been an explicit topic in existing research. As this collection of essays shows, they are not only determined by military or war developments, but that narratives around war as well as conflict-free zones are distinctly structured through the category of gender. The "hero" is a man, but he needs the foil provided by the "other sex" in order for the narrative to function. Gender roles may dissolve in times of war, result in rearrangements and open up new spheres of action for groups of women. In the context of territory and air space, traditional gendered ascriptions acquire plausibility in new ways, not in the least through mythologising narrations.

In the following, myths do not primarily refer to "major narratives" or "political myths", that is, national narratives around important men or major events, a debate most recently revived by the political scientist Herfried Münkler (2009) (and as they could be included into our considerations via, for example, the "Red Baron"). They also do not necessarily refer to old tales from European mythology such as that of Icarus, frequently cited in discussions of aviation successes: the victory of the human body over Earth-binding forces, especially that of gravity, is often explained by a supposedly primeval Icarian desire. In contrast, Hannah Arendt situated the desire to leave the earth very much in the 20th century (Arendt 1958: 10). With this, she expressed an objection to the perspective myths supposedly explain, that there are universal desires, wishes and fears, constant over all times – an objection to explaining away historical developments and creations as universally human and to thus naturalize them. Roland Barthes (1957) also analysed this as a central dimension and function of myths. The critique of naturalization – and gender roles are also implicated here – certainly does not intend to unveil a hidden "truth", as classical ideas of "Mythos" imply may or must be the case. Rather, the authors of these essays are mostly interested in the function of myths in terms of how they produce meaning and institute communities; a function which should not be underestimated particularly in the light of man-made catastrophes. An analytical perspective which does not simply dismiss myths as 'false', but assumes 'that as the basis for both social memory and social action, even seeming falsehoods deserve to be taken seriously' proves

to be far more productive than the search for supposed underlying 'truths' (Howell 1999: 58). Myths, according to the author of a study about a myth around a civilian catastrophe in the early 20th century, namely the sinking of the Titanic, cannot be used as historical sources for facts about what happened, but 'they express the values of the societies that made and encoded them in concrete form' (ibd.). Moreover, both 'pre-literate and the contemporary myths can be thought of psychoanalytically in that they are the unconscious results of "untamed thinking" in which societal needs are expressed and fulfilled' (ibid.). Myths or mythemes are never fixed for all times: traditional and time-specific elements intertwine in the continuous *Work on Myth* (Blumenberg 1988).

To summarize: the articles here are concerned with narrations, legends and mythemes that intertwine in different ways to shape memory and practices of remembrance, through which military and civil matters, hopes and fears overlap and also blend together. They are about the effects that the military conquest of new spaces produces on civil life and conversely, of course, also about that which is forgotten, suppressed, does not want to be known, and gives rise to controversies.

The articles bring different aspects into focus, and based on these aspects they are organized into three sections: national competition, the meanings ascribed to space or spaces, and last but not least, remembrance and memory politics between popular and official culture.

National Investments

The technologies involved in the conquest of air and sea were and still are controversial, their recorded history continuing to be a field of national investments and critiques thereof. David Edgerton (1991) incorporates the critique he first made on the eve of preparations for the 50th anniversary of the Second World War in *England and the Aeroplane* in *Myth of the Blitz*. Closely linked to this is a conception of a weak British nation, threatened by war in particular by fascists and ultra-nationalists, by Nazi Germany, and thus forced to resort to bomb wars using aviation technology originally meant to serve civilian purposes. Edgerton emphasizes 'the fact that Britain was committed, long before the war, to a strategy of strategic bombing'.[2] In con-

2 Quotes from this volume are not annotated.

tradiction to the popular view in Britain that the 'liberal internationalists were pacifists, naïve believers in world peace and disarmament', he describes a 'liberal militarism', where the power of aeroplanes in war derives from their character as 'world-transforming civilian technologies'. Edgerton analyses H.G. Wells' (1933) futuristic novel *Shape of Things to Come* with its project for an International Air Police as paradigmatic of this point of view. This idea was 'a commonplace of the interwar years among liberals', the 'power of aeroplanes in war derives from their character as world-transforming civilian technologies'. It becomes clear that the most advanced technologies for the conquest of space and the historically new possibilities that they keep opening up – even when they appear to only serve civilian purposes or for that matter, are expected to ensure world peace – enable their deployment in military operations.

However, it is necessary to add that such a deployment was not only about European nations fighting among each other. As *Thomas Hippler* (in his article subsequently added to this book) shows, the idea that the air force could be useful not just for ensuring peace but also for the control and subjugation of foreign, non-European countries came to be persuasive in science fiction and (closely connected with it) in military and political policies even before the First World War. Aerial warfare was tested even before the First World War outside of Europe and on people who were not white – and not considered to be human either. Put another way: 'civilian technologies' were also to be instruments for the civilizing of "barbarians". Colonized countries served as testing grounds even before 1914 for the later bomb wars between and in European nations (Hippler refers to the deployment of the British air force against striking workers in the period between the wars). Again, this was about bringing a people who had gone out of control to compliance. The people ("Volk"), who also had connotations of "femaleness", were the antithesis to 'the coherent nation of which the male citizen-soldier is the perfect example'. Between fiction and scholarship, myths of masculine 'self-sacrifice' and heroism came to be potent.

The fluidity of the boundaries between civil and military use of new technologies becomes clear in *Evelyn Crellin's* analysis. Even in the period between the world wars, women were given a chance as pilots (both) despite and because of traditional gender myths. Their deployment would prove that aircraft serve technical progress – while a simultaneous remilitarisation of the aircraft could proceed. Female flyers such as Marga Etzdorf and Elly Beinhorn, not

feminists by any stretch, but simultaneously prototypes of the "new woman", were proof of emancipation; especially during the period between the wars. In contrast to their male colleagues, they were convenient to the state and the air force as peaceful 'ambassadors of the nation'. Despite the differences between Britain and Germany, Crellin sums up: 'the prejudice against women paradoxically begot opportunity'. While it was stereotyped ideas of femaleness which enabled women in the period between the wars to become pilots, these continued to remain unchallenged and ultimately resulted in the exclusion of women from the heroic story of aviation and from the memories connected to it.

Jim Aulich is interested in the cultural memory of war as 'a variety of public discourses'. His subject matter is advertising posters which were equally concerned with 'selling the war' as they were with using 'the war as a marketing device'. He examines how posters from Britain (collected mainly in the Imperial War Museum) and Germany are different from each other. His material-rich image analysis leads him to the conclusion that there are striking differences in visual imagery. British posters favoured mostly traditional, non-avant-garde images; heroic representations of pilots or submariners were also rare: 'the viewer is constructed as a financial contributor, witness and citizen rather than a subject caught up in narratives of fate and destiny'. On the contrary: in the image-politics of the Axis powers, one frequently comes across the submissive and combat-ready subject 'rather than the democratic citizen consumer in the commercials determined publicity that characterized British liberal democracy'.

In his article, *Jan Rüger* demonstrates how war technologies became simultaneously occasion and material for mass spectacle. He describes the symbolic significance of the navy in Britain and Germany up until the end of the First World War as 'powerful cultural symbols that conceal otherwise divergent ideas of nationhood and belonging'. The example of mass media events such as naval reviews, for which, despite several protests, no costs were spared, makes clear how 'war as mass culture' came to be established in the early 20th century (see Holert and Terkessidis 2002). Rüger analyses the specific fascination with the military navy in connection with nostalgic ideas 'about adventure, "overseas" and man's battle with nature' in terms of the significance ascribed to notions of rationality and the effectivity in the machine age. Both visions, in Britain and Germany, were strongly gendered. Moreover, the mass spectacles were about the (re)constitution of masculine

hegemony – in the face of provocations of traditional gender roles, as writers of the Bloomsbury Group dared to make.

Semantics of Spaces

The spaces which were conquered by new technologies were layered with old and new mythic visions – between (technological) science and popular culture. They appear to have the potential to unite different positions. *Sabine Höhler* explains how myths about the world under water shifted between fiction, especially science fiction (Jules Verne is exemplary), and oceanography. She (with the philosopher Hans Blumenberg) sees the extraordinary power of myths or mythic narratives in their ability to connect traditional elements and contemporary variations in a single story. 'Mythical narratives are not made up but made', she concludes with Donna Haraway; they oscillate between fiction, construction, and fact, a central effect being the naturalization of the historical. Höhler traces 'the process of naturalizing the third dimension' through 'the long standing traditions of naturalists' travels and journeys and their related narratives of scientific self-restraint that, like Humboldt's account had done before, would be rewarded by the mastery of the space under inspection. Aerologists and oceanographers once more presented themselves as trained and tireless observers, as skilled and swift athletes, and as rigorous soldiers'. Even as the issues concerning the conquest of spaces have historically changed and shifted, 'crucial elements like exploration, discovery, and conquest persisted' and remained gendered.

Ute Rösler traces the myth of the Titanic, looking at how a traditional story about one of the major catastrophes at the beginning of the 20th century, with a reach (extending) well beyond the 20th century, changed with changing national and political contexts. The author looks at examples from American and especially German mass media, as well as at the positions and characteristics ascribed to the men and women in works of literature. The narratives do not only reflect the anxieties around new technologies but also reflect changes in the gender order: threats are connected with femininity, which are beyond "masculine" mastery of technology. 'Within the Titanic myth, war, technology and masculinity formed a complex that clearly signalled that only the technologically experienced man at the technological and scientific forefront of the world guaranteed protection, security and stability'. Reportage on the discovered wreck was replete with gender metaphors. The ship was fe-

male, somewhere between a 'beautiful virgin' and an 'old battleaxe', and at the same time was also an 'extension of the male body'.

The U-boat presented a special sort of (war) ship; *Herbert Mehrtens* engages with its specifics. The U-boat type VII C as a specimen is central, made familiar through the film *Das Boot* (1981), which in turn must be seen in the context of shifting practices of remembrance, as it took a long period of silence for it to be possible to speak about the suffering of the U-boat crew. The author examines the specific relation of human/man and machine, a machine that does not merely transport weapons and deploy them to their deadly purposes, but is itself a weapon. The use of the U-boat demands spatial and functional adaptation to the machine, and based on this, a unity of team and machine. The crew is subordinate to the commander, who has become the representative figure on the U-boat, but is simultaneously shaped by the machine and its movement under water. Masculinity appears to establish itself via the nearly automatic and repetitive bodily actions of the crew, the exclusion of women unquestionable. At the same time, this learned bodily memory (as one could conceptualize with the sociologist Alois Hahn) forms the basis for a community of submariners, which even after the end of the Second World War is desired and repeatedly performed across national borders. The U-boot myth appears to be firmly grounded in specific bodily interactions in the tight space of the hull and its interaction with the sea.

The gendered ascriptions given to spaces as well as to the technologies that enable the conquest of spaces never remain fixed and constant forever and everywhere. *Silke Betscher* analyses a media campaign in East and West Berlin during the (first) Berlin crisis. She examines how images of spaces and technologies – especially aircraft – and gender are used for propaganda while simultaneously setting each side apart from the other. Both campaigns fall back on traditional semantics and myths, and attempt in contrasting ways to re-articulate these. In West Berlin, the aircraft of the Allies was recoded as a symbol of freedom, the pilot – a former enemy – reintegrated 'in a transnational (...) civil society in the moment of the crisis'. The pilot thus simultaneously indicates 'the continued existence of a concept of the military male hero'. The mass media in the East on the other hand, emphasized the connection between aircraft and destruction, countering the widespread image of the (male) liberator, the "Rosinenbomber". In the photographs circulating in magazines and newspapers in the East and West, which would come to have a lasting impact on the narrative of the Berlin crisis, the space was gendered:

in the West, 'the inner space was feminised as a space of women and children, whilst men were in charge of the outer space as well as of the connection between inner and outer'; in contrast, in the East, 'they focused much more on the male civilian hero distributing Soviet food'. In both cases, however, the imagery stood in contrast to the actual situation, 'where women were mostly responsible for the supply of food and basic goods'.

Memory, Remembrance and Commemoration

The relationship between 'public memory', that is, representations of the past which circulate in arenas of public culture, and private constructions of memory in the confined space of the family, community or other social groupings is the focus of *Graham Dawson's* article. 'Cultural power – exercised by the state, by political movements, by organisations within civil societies' shapes the interaction between both forms of memory, whereby the competing narratives must be taken into account as processes of subordination and marginalization, of silencing and forgetting. Of relevance here are the theoretical concepts developed at the *Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies* in the eighties, with an emphasis on cultural representations, conflicting ideologies and the historical construction of subjectivities. 'Cultural contestation between competing memories occurs as an element in ideological conflict centred on discontents and aspirations in the present, and at the level of subjectivity, in securing the sense of continuity between past and present necessary to both collective and personal identities'. Dawson discusses the productivity of this approach through various case studies of memory culture in Britain and Australia (Anzac Memories), where processes of selection, reinterpretation and re-presentation are at work in the transition from private to public memory.

Jonathan Rayner writes about the significance of films in memory culture, while focusing on the depictions and contrary meanings of U-boats or submarines in British and German films. The British film *We Dive at Dawn* from 1943 and the German film version of Buchheim's *Das Boot* from 1981 stand at the centre of his analysis. Observing the conspicuous and diverse presence of U-boats and submarines on film screens, he perceives a tension between cinematographic concerns with visualization and story lines with moral meaning. Though the invisibility of the (German) U-boats is connected to their ambush attacks, displays of malice and poor sportsmanship, the cinema simultaneously demands a tribute: compensation through the views afforded

to the commander through the periscope, privileged points of view, 'the "money shot" of the torpedo detonation and the sinking target'. In contrast, the cinematic point of view in *Das Boot* on the crew appears to be an attempt to exonerate them as victims. 'If the adjustments of convention seen in *Das Boot* reflect the exoneration of the U-boat and her crew via the representation of their ordeal at the hands of an unseen and unrelenting enemy, the deliberate obfuscation of victory in *We Dive at Dawn* belies not simply forbearing, documentary discretion, but an unwillingness to embrace the innate characteristics and specific history of the submarine within British naval war (…) For national as much as formal reasons, the British submarine remains unseen'.

The manner in which war memorials in Britain and Germany, despite differences and contradictory national value judgements on the matter of submarines, nevertheless display common patterns, is the subject of *Katharina Hoffmann's* piece. While on the one hand the U-boat was initially seen as the weapon which could bring Germany to victory, and correspondingly the submariners were primarily seen as embodiment of aggression and an unconditional readiness to die, on the other hand positive ascriptions in British depictions were predominant: the British submariner was honourable and civilized. Both portrayals nevertheless shared central elements of the U-boat myth: 'the power and potential of a modern weapon symbolising the fusion of men and technology'. After the end of the Second World War, this myth persisted not only in the supranational communities of the EU and NATO, it succeeded in displacing the negative images of the German submariners. A shift in the memory culture with regard to German and British submariners is apparent. 'In both memory cultures the deeds of submariners continue to be understood as outstanding. The submariners are shown to brave the human fears of claustrophobic spaces and the hostile and life threatening space below the sea'.

Eileen Pollex's article brings us closer to the present, to the end of the 20th century. She does not debate how war experiences come to be processed, but explores a "catastrophe" of civilian space travel, the failure of space shuttle Challenger. This pattern of (official) commemoration is comparable to that for war dead, to the extent that the people who died in the failed take-off became not just heroes, but also "sacrifices" – while the only civilian crew member, a female teacher, was granted a special status at least in the official visual representations of the tragedy. What the official culture of remem-

brance could not or would not accomplish was helping people cope with the shock following the disaster. This was instead the subject/stuff of individual memory practices, which created a community spirit: through jokes that circulated through mass media. Pollex describes here another level of memory culture, which can be ascribed to popular culture and which simultaneously resists the mythologising "gravity" of official memory: jokes are not only a form of dealing with or coping with horror and anxiety, which seek to becalm official memory rituals' sacralisation of the dead. Humour, indeed black humour, can also protect threats and horrors from being forgotten.

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Part I
National Investments

David Edgerton

England and the Aeroplane Revisited

The aeroplane, British and German, remains central to the national myths of wartime Britain, in a way in which warships, or merchant ships, let alone tanks and artillery do not. National memories of the Second World War centre on the aeroplane and its effects, in particular on the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. In 1989 the 50th anniversary of the start of the war was commemorated by British television with the showing of aeronautical films. Twenty years later, in 2009, if these films were less central, the Blitz of 1940 was if anything more significant. It seemed to stand for the whole war. My short book *England and the Aeroplane* (Edgerton 1991) was written as the fiftieth anniversary of the war was underway. In its treatment of the war *Aeroplane* sought not so much to rethink the Blitz and its myths but rather to put the historiography of Britain at war a new basis, one in which the Blitz and its supposed effects (above all the supposed creation of a welfare state) were not the main and sometimes only story. For *Aeroplane* much more important was the fact that Britain was committed, long before the war, to a strategy of strategic bombing, that it launched the bombers on Germany, unsuccessfully, in May 1940, before the Blitz of late 1940 and early 1941, even before the Battle of Britain of the summer of 1940. By contrast, Angus Calder's *The Myth of the Blitz* (1991), an important reconsideration of wartime history from within a national social democratic perspective, still focussed on the Blitz and the welfare state, though now challenging received wisdom about both. In that it was one work of many, telling new stories focussed on long-established agendas.

Putting the British bomber, rather than the British fighter and the German bomber, in the centre of the picture is no easy task, both because the Blitz is so central to the overall history of Britain at war, and because the story of British aviation during the war as whole is so strongly associated with the fighter. Thus the burned faces of fighter pilots are the focus of the remarkable story of reconstructive surgery performed on burned pilots and aircrew, de-

spite the greater number coming from the huge British bomber raids late in the war (Mayhew 2004). The association of terror bombing with the Nazis, to which the British were to respond on a greater scale, is deep seated. After the war, especially on the left and among liberals, what was seen as the adoption of the Nazi policy of bombing civilians was regarded as a major military as well as moral error. Only a handful of experts held that strategic bombing was a British invention, central to the existence of the Royal Air Force, central too to British strategy in the 1930s, and the early years of the war. Neither the significance nor the implications of this argument were sufficiently grasped by historians. It was in part because the standard story of England and the aeroplane was one which insisted that pre-war British aviation was weak, distorted by imperial concerns, held back by a pacifist electorate, not sufficiently promoted by governments indifferent to requirements of modernity and so on. All these arguments were almost inversions of reality, at least in my account, which suggested mythmaking about British aviation had been conducted, and influentially so, on a heroic scale. In my account British aviation of the 1930s, like that of all major nations, was overwhelmingly military, was strong, was strengthened by the demands of imperial policing and central to the peculiarly modernist war-fighting strategy of the British state. British anti-militarism, wrongly taken to be pacifism, encouraged aviation alongside other alternatives to conscript armies.

An alternative picture of England's relationship the aeroplane required a new account of how the aeroplane was understood in England. My argument was that a liberal-internationalist, and thus anti-nationalist and anti-fascist ideology, was central to British enthusiasm for the aeroplane, and for bombing, from the interwar years. This was counter-intuitive for a number of reasons. The first was that historians, far from noting the existence of enthusiasm for the bomber, stressed fear of the bomber as the key British attitude in the 1930s, a fear which originated in the qualities of the aeroplane, and the particular geographical isolation of Britain which the aeroplane now rendered useless (Bialer 1981). Secondly, enthusiasm for aviation, and the bomber in particular, was associated by historians (as it was by some in the 1930s) with fascists and ultra-nationalists, with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Thirdly, there was the idea (very strong after 1945) that liberal internationalists were pacifists, naive believers in world peace and disarmament.

By contrast I argued that liberal internationalists saw great dangers in the rise of nationalism and militarism. They sought to counter these enemies of liber-

alism not only by collective security, but also with modern machines, particularly aeroplanes, which they associated with a possible world organisation charged with defending a liberal world order. I also argued that what I called liberal militarism, placed high-technology weapons at the centre of British strategy, as a way of challenging larger opponents and of limiting the militarisation of British society.

The liberal view of the aeroplane (as I identified it) had many elements. Aeroplanes were seen as civilian technologies. That is to say they originated with civilians, and had a primarily civilian purpose, which was transportation. In this influential view aeroplanes were technologies of (long-distance) communication which crossed political and geographical barriers. In doing so they realised liberal internationalist dreams of free trade and peace. Although the term 'global village' was not used, the idea that the aeroplane was bringing about a smaller world – shrinking time and space – was a standard cliché. This is not to say that the role of aircraft in war was not recognised, far from it, but it is to say that the power of aeroplanes in war derives from their character as world-transforming civilian technologies. They were seen as immensely powerful, transforming war completely, civilianising and industrialising it. Aeroplanes were also potentially very powerful weapons of war which, in the hands of a world authority, would bring the world to its liberal senses. H.G. Wells was an influential, though hardly the only, purveyor of the view, especially in the *Shape of Things to Come*, made into one of the great British movies of the 1930s. In it an international air police based in Basra, Iraq (in fact a British base in the 1930s, as it was to be again in the 21st century) brought peace to a warring world by the use of a gas named *Pacificin*. Ironically enough scenes from the film are routinely used to illustrate 1930s fears of the bomber, its central pro-bomber message obliterated.

The idea of the International Air Police was a commonplace of the interwar years among liberals. Much new work has now been done on these particularly by Waqar Zaidi (2009, 2011a) and also Brett Holman (2010). As Zaidi has shown, it had a great deal of support, not just in Britain but also in France and in the United States. Although it waxed and waned through the interwar years, it got a new lease of life during the Second World War and its aftermath, though it was displaced astonishingly quickly by its exactly analogous descendent, the idea that a world body should monopolise atomic weapons (Zaidi 2011b). More generally he has shown just how significant liberal inter-

nationalist views are in a whole range of conventional academic thinking about science, technology and international relations widely defined.

While the idea of the international air police was long forgotten, the basic assumptions of the liberal view proved to be highly influential in the ways the history of aviation is thought about. In histories of technology and industry they appear under transportation. In museums of science and technology they are central, again as transportation. While tanks and guns do not appear in such museums, aeroplanes do. Only in war museums do aeroplanes stand alongside other weapons. In histories of production, even war production, aeroplanes are seen as the product of civilian industry; histories of the aircraft industry emphasize the civilian markets for aircraft. In relation to war, they are seen as fundamental, bringing war to civilians for the first time. The Blitz fits perfectly into this narrative.

England and the Aeroplane challenged this whole narrative insisting on the military origin of the industry, showing that throughout the century in the key nations, military demand were very significantly greater than civil. Aeroplanes were, and to a considerable extent still are, primarily weapons of war, designed by competing nation states for national purposes. I extended this analysis suggesting that the whole historiography of industry, technology and war (which came together in academic form in the 1980s), was based on a complex of ideas of a similar sort: civilian technologies and industries had transformed the nature of war from the outside (Edgerton 2005). I emphasized the importance of specifically military industries, closely tied to states, in the provision of armaments in both peace and war, and 20th century war as involving a process of militarisation, rather than the civilianisation so many accounts assumed. This reconsideration of the assumed historical sociology of war, which paralleled that undertaken by historical sociologists in the 1980s who pointed to the inadequacies of liberal and Marxist accounts, went further in showing how historical accounts were deeply affected by liberal assumptions about the character and supposed origins of what were taken to be the key machines of war.

It is very significant that an analysis of liberal thinking about aeroplanes, the clichés about air police, the power of aeroplanes to shrink the world and transform war, were not highlighted as such in the growing literature on thinking about aviation. Much of it seemed to me to be trapped within exactly this framework itself, being interested in what it took to be deviant forms. The great bulk of the emerging literature on aviation and culture in the inter-

war years (very much the focus of attention) was concerned with linking enthusiasm for the aeroplane with ideologies with what were taken as problematic relations to modernity. Enthusiasm for aviation was associated with nationalism and fascism, with the search for the spiritual in a material age, with a search for heroism in an era of bourgeois tedium and so on. Think Marinetti (and especially Walter Benjamin on Marinetti), Le Corbusier, Antoine de St Exupery, etc. It was also associated with the aeroplane itself, with that fact that it flew upwards, and that it flew fast. All these themes were echoed in the plush and rich two volume work by Robert Wohl (1996, 2005), and in the remarkable quantity of earlier excellent work on the topic from Wohl himself and many others (Bailes 1976, Mosse 1981, Kern 1983, Cunningham 1988, 155-210, Wohl 1988, Ekstein 1989, Fritzsche 1992, De Syon 2002, Rieger 2005). Only a few historians challenged the assumption of a distinctive continental European nationalist/fascist view being central, notably Neufeld in relation to space flight fad in Weimar Germany (1990). But only now, through the work of Zaidi in particular (2009, 2011a) are we beginning to get a full picture of nature, power, and influence of the liberal internationalist account of aviation.

Although the liberal internationalist account was the most important in interwar Britain, there were others too. Indeed *England and the Aeroplane* established a series of connections between enthusiasm for aviation and the ultra-right in Britain that had been systematically forgotten from the war onwards. Enthusiasm for Hitler and Mussolini was often associated with enthusiasm for aeroplanes, even if enthusiasm for aeroplanes only rarely implied enthusiasm for fascism. From the leader of the British Union of Fascists, Oswald Mosley, to important conservative politicians and press lords of the hard right like Lords Londonderry and Rothermere, one finds enthusiasms for aviation and fascism closely linked. Furthermore, the aircraft industry and its leaders were surprisingly often committed to hard-right positions. The important aeronautical magazine, *The Aeroplane,* was edited by a rabid anti-semite and pro-Nazi, G.C. Grey, whose tenure ended only with the outbreak of war. All this was deeply problematic for a national narrative in which the aeroplane is presented as the key anti-Nazi machine, particularly of course the fighter, and it was quickly wiped from the record, even though some of the personalities were not. Take *First of the Few* – a film which appeared in September 1942, an account of the history of the Spitfire. It was the top British film of 1942, and Leslie Howard, who directed, produced and starred in it, was the second most popular player of the time. The film played fast and loose with the his-

torical record in very many ways, including the politics, as might be expected. One of the important characters in the film is the patriotic Lady Houston, who funded the Schneider Trophy race of 1931. She was in fact the proprietor of a significant hard-right publication, and open in her admiration for Mussolini and later Hitler. None of these crucial political points is in the film, which otherwise makes fun of Italian fascists and has the usual British wartime image of Nazis.[1] This is not remarkable in itself of course; what is interesting is that the character is included at all. It is worth noting that Leslie Howard was partly Jewish/Austro-Hungarian, which makes his whitewashing of British fascism all the more remarkable. Interestingly, books on British wartime film while noting the liberties taken with the story of the Spitfire itself, do not note the politics of the story, except in as much as the film invokes a rural gentlemanliness (Richards 2007: 327-8, 61-66; Mackenzie 2007: 23-46).

Another case of a well-known wartime aviation film gliding over the hard right-wing politics of a person on which a character was based was Powell and Pressburger's *One of our Aircraft is Missing* (1942). This features a fictionalised version of a pre-war pro-fascist member of the British Parliament and a noted enthusiast for science, Sir Arnold Wilson, without making clear his political significance. Despite the film being well known and much commented on, the connection is not made in the abundant historical commentary on it, a measure of how successfully the British far right was hidden from view.

That the political right was interested in the promotion of new machines and new sciences was a central theme of *Aeroplane*. While obviously far from surprising in the context of 20th century European or world history, this thesis was novel in the British context. Here there was a powerful assumption that what technocratic impulse there was came from the left, that the right was either traditionalist, or liberal, and in either case not enthused by the possibility of new machines and new knowledge. Yet as *Aeroplane* argued, and subsequent work makes even clearer, there was a powerful connection between the political right and enthusiasm for machines, which needs to be grasped in order to make sense of the broader political history of British

1 In *Aeroplane* p. 60 I incorrectly state the date of release as 1941, and mislead slightly on Lady Houston – it is clear she is attacking the British government of 1929.

machines (Wright 2000, Edgerton 2005, Zaidi 2008, Zander 2010, Edgerton 2011).

The aim of most historical studies of technology has been to place it in its historical context. This contextual history is not always engaged either with the questions which concern historians generally, or with historical controversies in the history of technology itself. There has been a very consensual approach to the historical context, perhaps necessarily so since without a consensus the programme could easily become rather strained: what historical account should count as context would become the subject of contention. But contention about history is a key part of participation in the enterprise of writing history. There is a more significant flaw in contextualism in that it assumes that the existing historical work, which defines the context, does not already have a particular account of technology in it. But it generally does, at least implicitly, resulting in a potential problem of circularity. For example, it would have been pointless to contextualise the history of the English aeroplane in national history using the usual histories, for the aeroplane was already there in accounts of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, accounts which centred on fighters and the weakness of the aircraft industry and air force. The problem was one of rethinking the already contextual history of the English aeroplane, and the history of England as conventionally written. Doing this requires understanding the deeply ingrained way the aeroplane and its relation to war has been theorised, not least by historians. That means understanding the standard narratives, often derived from popular sources that shape our accounts, as study of the *historiography from below* (Edgerton 2007, 2010)

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Evelyn Crellin

Women Sport Pilots and their Contributions to Expansionist Policies in Germany and Great Britain between 1918 and ca. 1935

The Race for the Skies after World War I

Worldwide, the interwar years were shaped by the dualism of nationalism and modern technology. When aviation emerged from World War I, it was considered a highly masculine and militaristic endeavour. Only in the 1920s were the commercial and political potential of aviation discovered. But to make this potential profitable, the public had to be convinced that a new era in flight had arrived, and that aviation could be made safe and cost-effective**.** The 'intrepid bird-man' of World War I, a male pilot who took to the skies in a technology that was still in its infancy, was now replaced by a new generation of expert pilots in highly sophisticated machines, mastering a rapidly advancing technology, setting new records on an almost weekly basis, striving to go higher, faster and further than ever before. Local and regional air shows, aerobatic contests, air races and soon breath-taking long distance flights by sport pilots made national and international headlines in the 1920s and early 1930s.

Germany and Great Britain, two central players in European politics, found themselves at very different positions in 1918. After victory in World War I, Great Britain had developed a 'conservative modernity' that was firmly based on a sense of historical continuity and the Empire's mission. The country realized the importance of aviation as a tool to protect and strengthen the Empire, to guarantee a status quo in the world, and to mark Britain as a modern power. Thus began a serious upswing in aviation. In the early 1920s, Great Britain produced more than two hundred different types of airplanes and became one of the leading nations in aviation. More and more air routes and ultimately airlines were developed to connect Great Britain with its colo-

nies. As David Edgerton (1991: 21) has suggested, the commitment to the airplane was closely connected to the commitment to the Empire.

Germany, on the other hand, suffered from severe political, economic and social instability after its defeat in World War I. The rigid restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles put heavy burdens on the nation. Especially rigid were the restrictions against German aviation: inter alia, the prohibition of an Air Force, and severe limitations on performance parameters for planes produced in Germany. This treatment was considered unfair and hostile by the majority of Germans (see, among others, Fritzsche 1992). German aviation accomplishments of the inter-war years thus had to serve two purposes: to prove propaganda which described aviation as a profoundly German technology, since it could only be mastered by a people with the necessary technical and intellectual skills, and to advance German claims to be accepted as an international power player again.

In the mid-1920s, German and British women began to conquer the modern technology of aviation. Although both countries had a significant number of male and female sport pilots, it was the women pilots who experienced the most significant transformation during these 'golden years of aviation' in the 1920s and 1930s. It was the women's flights that attracted the most national and international attention, due to their acting contrary to traditional gender roles in a highly modern technological environment, and their mastering of a technology that was supposedly consummately masculine. Women played an integral part in changing the general image of aviation in the 1920s and 1930s. Their efforts proved that flying was safe, even when handled by representatives of the allegedly technologically challenged gender. Women thus turned out to be a very efficient factor in this process of 'making flying thinkable' (Corn 1979: 570) for the general public. They also played an eager part in their countries' battles to acquire and maintain so-called 'air authority'. Participating in the race for the skies, and redefining the modern world of the early 20th century, they also symbolized a new era of political emancipation that stretched well beyond the traditional realms of their gender.

Gender Battles in the Air

There is no doubt that the phenomenon of women pilots was encouraged by the increasing equality of the genders achieved after World War I. But emancipation had not necessarily been at the top of the women pilots' agenda in

Germany and Great Britain. With rare exceptions, the flying women did generally not take to the air in the interest of improving the situation for all women. Born between 1900 and 1910, the female fliers belonged to the first generation of women in both countries for whom professional training and responsibilities had become a matter of course. As well-educated women often from a rather privileged background, they had the social and economic means to pursue their individual aspirations. Thus, in popular understanding women pilots were seen as icons of female emancipation. Their professionalism, modernity, and striving for independence – suported by their phenotypical, very often almost androgynous and athletic appearance – seemed to make women pilots a distinct category of the socio-cultural phenomenon of 'new women.' Public appearances of aviatrixes and their presentation in contemporary media, in posters, journal articles, postcards, and even musical pieces seemed to substantiate this interpretation.

However, the contemporary image of the modern flying woman of the 1920s and 1930s roaming the skies without limitation was mostly artistic liberty. (For a first internationally contextualized study of the contributions of women pilots to aviation in the early 20th century, with special consideration of the German case, see Zegenhagen 2007a). It disguised the fact that the phenomenon of female pilots was limited to select, often rather wealthy strata of the female population. In Germany as well as Great Britain, women pilots constituted only a very small group, presumably not comprising more than one to three percent of all sport pilots.

On an individual level, male and female pilots often cooperated and respected each other. In fact, marriages between male and female pilots were not uncommon. Yet operating at the crossroads of masculinity and technology, women pilots experienced discrimination and exclusion. They were primarily met with resistance from two areas: from the aviation establishment and from society's general understanding of gender roles. ICAN, the International Commission of Aerial Navigation, had already ruled in 1924 that women were never to be employed in the cockpits of commercial planes, because of their alleged physical and emotional instability. With no career paths open to them in emerging commercial aviation, women pilots were forced to pursue their ambitions as aerobatic and sport pilots. Both fields proved to be expensive and risky, with unstable incomes and high rates of competition among the pilots. Women pilots clearly understood the reason behind their exclusion: the threat their competition posed to the evolving establishment of a

male monopoly in commercial aviation. 'When aviation was in its infancy, there was no ban, and no restriction against a woman running a joy-ride company,' British journalist Stella Wolf-Murray (died 1935) and British pilot Lady Sophie Heath (1896-1933) remarked in 1929 in their book *Woman and Flying*, referring to the years before World War I. 'It is not difficult to guess how the ban came about, though of course it will be denied.' (Heath/Murray 1929: 30). Heath – who held a degree in physiology, was a champion high jumper and the founder of the Women's Amateur Athletic Association of Great Britain – decided to fight ICAN's decision. With the support of influential politicians like Sir Samuel Hoare (1880-1959), the British Minister of Aviation, Heath forced ICAN to temporarily ease the restrictions on female pilots, and was able to become a co-pilot with the Dutch airline KLM. But her commercial career was short-lived, and ended within a year – as did the career of German pilot Marga von Etzdorf (1907-1933), who had served as a co-pilot with two German airlines in 1927 and 1928. In her memoirs, von Etzdorf reports that passengers were never able to identify her as a female pilot because she was camouflaged in fur coats, fur boots and a giant fur hat to protect her from the elements in the airplane's open cockpit: 'After we landed, passengers usually came to thank "Mister Pilot" for the wonderful flight, and I always took great care to not rob them of their illusion by making sure that they never heard my voice. With a silent and manly bow, I accepted all their compliments.' (Etzdorf 1931: 30). Despite both women's uneventful co-piloting careers, ICAN never officially changed its rules of employment. Women would remain effectively banned from the cockpits of commercial aircraft until the 1980s.

Neither Marga von Etzdorf nor any of her German female fellow-pilots made any attempt to fight discrimination against women pilots in Germany. The Treaty of Versailles had forced thousands of military pilots out of their jobs and made the nation practically defenceless in the air. Thus, it had transformed the issue of aviation into a military and political concern, a cornerstone of national defiance against the Versailles 'Treaty of Shame'. With aviation such a highly political charge, it was clearly considered a masculine area of activity, where a woman's role could only be auxiliary and supportive. German aviation strove hard to keep its martial image: the country's official airline, *Lufthansa*, proudly pointed out the military past of its pilots as a distinctive feature of the quality and reliability of its services. In 1932, Thea Rasche (1899-1971), Germany's first woman pilot after 1918, clearly stated: 'We women do not want a job in aviation; we don't want to take any man's

job away.' (Rasche 1932: 8). In a society shocked by the bitter outcome of the war and shaken by economic and political crises as well as by a crisis of national identity, there was enormous pressure to keep consistency in the interpretation of gender roles. In wide strata of society, emancipation was seen as 'egoistic', as detrimental to the goals of the 'Fatherland', and as unpatriotic. At best, the 'new women' of the era were seen ambivalently by large strata of society, as 'projections of fears and hopes, of disgust and desire' (Hauch 2000: 99). German women pilots were fully aware of the explosive danger they allegedly constituted to society, and therefore never made any attempt to present their interests, ambitions and agendas as a group effort.

In Great Britain, on the other hand, the relative economic and political stability of the interwar years provided a slightly more relaxed background for emancipatory issues to thrive, enabling Sophie Heath to pursue her public quest for equality in the cockpit. Emancipation had been introduced gradually between 1918 and 1928, giving society a better opportunity to adapt. Nonetheless, 'flightiness and irresponsibility' (Beddoe 1989: 24) were often attributed to the 'flappers,' whose lifestyle and appearance were in stark contrast to the familiar old-fashioned ideals of femininity. In public opinion, a woman's place was her home (Beddoe 1989: 3), and only their frequently upper-class background saved British women pilots from these harsh interpretations of their ambitions. Still, contrary to the German women pilots, who never considered any all-women flying events, British women pilots organized their first all-female air race in May 1931 at the Reading Aero Club in Woodley, and a first All-Women's Flying Meeting at the Sywell Aerodrome near Northampton in September 1931 (Zegenhagen 2007a: 65).

Largely excluded from a career in commercial aviation and viewed with suspicion by society, women pilots had to find their own niches. In both countries, they quickly discovered that they could take advantage of the current needs in aviation by connecting their individual objectives with the nation's economic and political needs. In the early 1930s, women pilots began to thrive. At that time, Germany had about fifty to sixty female sport pilots, Great Britain about 200 (Penrose 1979: 82). With the women's flights, the airplanes they handled found fame as well. Once women pilots had proven themselves, aviation companies usually supported their endeavours eagerly. Beside aircraft, women pilots quickly turned into powerhouses for advertising a whole array of products: fashion articles, cosmetic products, cameras,

books, and household items were advertised by these young, successful women, often represented in an exotic, alluring environment. A mutually satisfying relationship also began to develop between pilots and their states: Government officials realized that the flights of women pilots were remarkable propaganda tools which contributed efficiently and significantly to their respective nations' ranking in the race for the skies. In both countries, authorities soon granted women pilots financial and administrative help, provided support for obtaining visas and flight permits and offered their logistical local assistance wherever the women landed. The women took advantage of the heightened attention given to their individual ambitions, and began to speak out publicly as representatives of their states, turning into active propagandists of their nations' goals. The prejudice against women, which traditionally ascribed non-political qualities to them, begot opportunity: While male pilots were often greeted at their destinations with suspicion that their flights could have clandestine political or even military goals, women pilots seemed to represent nothing but charm, modernity, and a desire for peace and understanding in the crisis-ridden world of the inter-war years. Acting as 'flying ambassadors,' aviatrixes thus lent an appealing face to their nations' ambitious agendas.

Fig. 1 Lady Mary Bailey (1890-1960), one of the first British women to perform long-distance flights in the late 1920. She used her popularity and her public position, among others as chairwoman of the Ladies Committee of the Air League, to support the creation of a system of commercial aviation that would connect all parts of the British Empire. Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung 1930.

Fig. 2 New Zealand woman pilot Jean Batten (1909-1982) set a number of records flying from Great Britain to Australia and back in the early and mid-1930s. She became one of the most celebrated women pilots of her era, receiving multiple international awards. Deutsche Flugillustrierte 1934.

Fig. 3 Amy Johnson (1903-1941), the 'flying secretary,' was another famous British woman pilot, subject of songs and stage plays. Married to renowned pilot Jim Mollison and competing with Jean Batten, Johnson set multiple long-distance records herself. Johnson died in 1941 while ferrying aircraft as a pilot with the British Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA). Wikipedia Commons.

Fig. 4 Elly Beinhorn (1907-2007) in August 1935 at her arrival at the Berlin-Tempelhof airport, after a flight over two continents on 13 August 1935, from Gleiwitz to Jesilköe near Istanbul (Turkey) and back to Berlin in her Bf 108 'Taifun'. Her record setting speed flight over 3,470 kilometers made the aircraft one of the best-known, best-sold sport planes of the 1930s, and made its designer, Willy Messerschmitt, internationally famous. Der deutsche Sportflieger 1935.

Fig. 5 Elly Beinhorn advertising her use of a Leica film camera during one of her flights. In need of extra income to support their expensive projects, women pilots often promoted a large variety of merchandise and manufacturers – from skin care products, books, cameras and fashion to fuel companies, aircraft supply parts and aircraft. Manufacturers appreciated the marketing value of women pilots and used it extensively. Deutsche Flug-Illustrierte 1934.



Fig. 6 German woman pilot Marga von Etzdorf (1907-1933) posing as a tourist in Bangkok on her way back from the 1931 flight to Tokyo, Japan, awaiting the arrival of the King of Siam. The cover of Germany's popular entertainment journal 'Die Dame' presented the pilot not in flying gear after a record-breaking flight, but as a typical upper-class tourist who traveled to Asia in search of exotic images. Die Dame 1932.

Fig. 7 Marga von Etzdorf in her Klemm Kl 32 sports plane shortly before her take-off to Australia in 1933. The plane was owned by the Klemm Company; after two prior crashes von Etzdorf no longer had the funds to afford a plane. Within days, von Etzdorf would be dead: while approaching an airfield near Aleppo (Syria), her plane was caught in a wind gust, and crashed. Minutes later, the pilot committed suicide. Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung 1933.



Fig. 8 Famous German aerobatics pilot Ernst Udet (1896-1941), from 1939 Director-General of Equipment for the Luftwaffe, sketched this little drawing, titled 'A woman world traveller prepares her aircraft for the start.' The sketch represents common notions about women pilots: it ridicules the amount of equipment women pilots used to (or had to) travel with to make sure they were able to appropriately present themselves in a 'ladylike' fashion. It also indiciates the sexual undertones with which women pilots were viewed. Deutsche Luftwacht – Luftwelt 1934.

The Charming Face of Aviation: Elly and Amy and Jean and Marga

In 1931, the German Embassy in Great Britain asked the German Foreign Office to support the plans of the German pilot Elly Beinhorn (1907-2007) for a flight to East Asia. An embassy employee stated: 'Incidentally, sport flights of this kind are realized in other countries to a much larger degree than in Germany. … In Great Britain, even women participate in great sport flights much more often than women in Germany.' (German Embassy London: 1931). The Berlin Foreign Office quickly agreed: 'Successful sport flights abroad – even when they are not record breaking flights in which there exists general national interest – have an enormous advertising power for the

German aviation industry.' (Foreign Office, Berlin: undated). There is no doubt that German officials had paid close attention to the endeavors of British women pilots like Mary Bailey (1890-1960). In March 1928, Bailey flew 8,000 miles from Croyden (London) to Cape Town in southern Africa, encountering all kinds of technical problems and bureaucratic obstacles along the way. Between September 1928 and January 1929, she flew 18,000 miles back to London – the longest solo flight accomplished by a woman so far. Politicians and newspapers celebrated her accomplishment, and in a letter to the editor of the *Times* one reader claimed that her flight had 'advanced the progress of civil aviation more than any flight since Orville and Wilbur Wright' (Falloon 1999: 165) – in the reader's opinion even trumping Charles Lindbergh's transatlantic flight from 1927.

German officials had also learned their lesson from Elly Beinhorn's first long-distance flight around Africa in early 1930. Beinhorn had not been successful in finding financial support, so she left Germany somewhat unprepared and poorly equipped. In Africa she met Walter Mittelholzer (1894-1937), a famous Swiss pilot who soon thereafter in a Swiss newspaper article criticised her for flying without adequate preparation over the dangerous continent. Mittelholzer's comments were picked up by German media, and suddenly the largely ignored flight of the unknown woman pilot turned into a political uproar: The Swiss pilot's criticism, German papers replied, was inappropriate, unfair, and nationalist. The controversy intensified when Elly Beinhorn crashed her airplane near Timbuktu, in today's Mali. Days later, a replacement plane was send to her destination, and Beinhorn triumphantly returned to Berlin. State officials and thousands of people waited for her at Tempelhof airport. The woman pilot who once had unsuccessfully begged for support had turned into a symbol of national pride and invincibility. As one journalist wrote after her return: 'This is the reason why our hearts beat stronger when we shake the hands of people like her; it is the hope that these young people some day will burst the chains that bind tight our Fatherland. In this sense, good luck, dear courageous Elly!' (Unnamed and undated newspaper article clipping in Elly Beinhorn papers, in private possession, ca. 1932).

Beinhorn's individual childhood dream of flying to Africa to see rhinoceroses had undergone the same transformation that her fellow-countrywoman Thea Rasche had experienced years earlier. In 1927, in youthful enthusiasm, Rasche had followed American pilots to the US where she realized: 'My

mere existence had suddenly become political ... here, in this foreign country, I realized how German I was.' (Rasche 1941 [?]: 49, 50).

The process was very similar in Great Britain. Weeks after obtaining her pilot's license in May 1930, Amy Johnson flew from Croydon near London to Darwin in Australia, in a tiny Gipsy Moth with 100 horsepower and an open cockpit. Johnson's goal was to prove to herself that she could accomplish this flight, and when she succeeded, her individual triumph was put in a larger context as well. 'Amy, wonderful Amy' became the hero of songs and stage plays, and her success was quickly translated into gender and political terms. The Returned Soldiers' League, an association of veterans of World War I, announced: 'We welcome you as the embodiment of that spirit which prompted British womanhood during the war to innumerable acts demanding the qualities of self-reliance, endurance, resoluteness, and sheer pluck.' (Penrose 1979: 23). Almost immediately after Johnson's flight, New Zealand flier Jean Batten (1909-1982) entered the scene, becoming Amy Johnson's most serious competitor as well as one of the most celebrated women pilots of her era. Three times Batten attempted to surpass Johnson's record for the flight from Great Britain to Australia. In May 1934 she finally succeeded, flying 10,500 miles in 14 days and 22.5 hours. On her return, she was even faster, flying the distance in five days and 18 hours – faster than any man or woman before her.

When Amy Johnson failed in January 1931 to fly from London to Tokyo – bad weather over Siberia forced her to end the flight prematurely –, Marga von Etzdorf took off in March to fly from Berlin to Tokyo, 11,000 kilometers in 12 days. Her accomplishment was not only seen as an athletic achievement in the German and Japanese media, it was also celebrated as an economic and political success. As a spokesperson of *Luft Hansa* pointed out, 'as well as the commercial planes of *Luft Hansa* when they show their flags at the Bosporus, beyond the Alps, at the Canary Islands, in the catapult flight service in the harbors of North America and in all European capitals, stand up for German air authority in the world, as well do sport flights to other continents serve German reputation and are useful for German aviation, and even in a larger degree for the whole German industry and economy. ... Thus Marga v. Etzdorf could be confident that her flight to Tokyo would serve her fatherland in this sense.' (Etzdorf 1931: 172).

For their endeavours, women pilots were showered with honours: Amy Johnson was awarded the CBE (Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the

British Empire), while Mary Bailey received the title of DBE (Dame Commander of the British Empire). British and German women also competed for the International Harmon Trophy, awarded annually to the world's outstanding aviator, female aviator and aeronaut. Mary Bailey received the award in 1927 and 1928, Amy Johnson in 1930, and Jean Batten in 1935, 1936 and 1937. German women pilots fared less well: In 1931, Marga von Etzdorf was honored with the 'National Trophy,' the Harmon Award given to the most outstanding aviator in each of the 26 member countries of the International Trophy. Elly Beinhorn, who had won the Hindenburg-Cup, Germany's most prestigious award for German sport pilots, in 1932, received a 'National Harmon Trophy' in 1934 and 1935.

Wherever they landed, women pilots seized the opportunity to speak up as representatives of their states, presenting a modern, attractive image of their countries. The stereotype of the daring and charming woman flier worked perfectly: In 1934, during one of Beinhorn's highly acclaimed tours through the United States, a spectator wrote an enthusiastic letter to the German Foreign Office: 'We were pleasantly surprised not to find an elderly cranky spinster, but a highly energetic, attractive young girl. This is what we need here, especially after all these horrifying stories were spread about the German housewife chained to her stove. ... Miss Beinhorn was pleasing to all. Please send us many more such people!' (Bülow 1934).

To prove the outstanding quality of German airplanes despite the restrictions imposed on them after 1918, Beinhorn went on two record-setting flights in the ultramodern travel sport plane Bf 108: to Asia and back in one day (1935), and to Africa and Asia and back in one day (1936). As a result, the Bf 108 became the bestselling German travel sport plane until 1939, thus also launching the career of its designer, Willy Messerschmitt. In Great Britain Lady Mary Bailey, who had flown repeatedly to South Africa since 1928, used her position in society – inter alia as Chairwoman of the Ladies Committee of the Air League – to lecture for the creation of a system of commercial aviation that would connect all parts of the Empire. When in January 1932, Imperial Airways did indeed launch their first scheduled flight from London to South Africa, Bailey celebrated it as a personal success and a proud British accomplishment.

Still, women pilots who had to survive as outsiders in a predominantly male world practiced caution. Being fully aware of their status as tokens, women pilots camouflaged their ambitions, downplayed their achievements, and

stressed their female 'virtues.' They usually avoided direct competition with men, pretended to be mostly ignorant of the technical aspects of flying, dressed and behaved in a way that was considered 'appropriate and female,' and showcased their features as wives and mothers. Though Elly Beinhorn knew about the need to protect her face from sunburn, she put on her protective covers only high up in the air when nobody could see her in this 'unattractive' outfit. She cleverly disguised how committed and competitive a pilot she was when she wrote about one of her flights,: 'And here I sit now, and my thoughts are halfway at home, and halfway already in Asia, and I wonder if my [housekeeper] will water the rubber fig and polish the Hindenburg Cup, and all this stuff.' (Beinhorn-Rosemeyer 1939: 16). Marga von Etzdorf always presented herself to the media with her flying pet companion, a cat named 'Ju.' Lady Bailey, mother of five daughters, made sure to present herself in public with her children and downplayed her political ambitions by calling her record-breaking flight to Cape Town 'a rest cure,' because she needed 'a change of scene and interest lately.' (Falloon 1999: 78). Lady Heath, despite her militant insistence on women's rights, changed mid-air from her flying clothes into more appropriate gear 'so that she could emerge from her aircraft looking her best.' (Lomax 1987: 42) and Amy Johnson gladly played along with the submissive image of the 'flying secretary' that had been attributed to her at an early stage in her career, although she held a BA degree and had become a very qualified pilot, even competing with her pilot husband Jim Mollison.

Crash Landing

Initially, the Nazi regime seemed willing to continue the employment of women pilots as the most efficient propaganda tool for influencing the perception of Germany abroad. In 1933, Hermann Göring (1893-1946), the future minister of aviation and head of the German *Luftwaffe*, declared: 'I believe nobody is better suited to be the ambassador from nation to nation than the pilot, and especially the woman pilot.'*(Die Luftwacht* 1933: 210). But times were changing quickly. When Hermann Göring announced in 1934 that the German nation had 'to become a nation of fliers,' (Gritzbach 1940: 122) he referred to a German sports aviation that had undergone a complete restructuring. Its striking military appearance no longer stressed the individual pilot, but instead the performance of the trained flying formation operating with military precision. The exclusion of women also extended to the newly

founded German Air Sport League, whose press officer announced that '(n)ow, after the reorganization of our sport aviation, where duty and discipline will form the foundation again, there will be no chance to include a woman into the larger body of our sport pilots. For those women, however ..., who pursue successful sport flying with body and soul, no stone should be set in their path; on the contrary, we wish to stand by our female comrades. Only, they should accept that we won't need them everywhere any longer.' (Schulze 1933: 138).

The era of spectacular flights of German women pilots came to a tragic end with the death of Marga von Etzdorf in summer 1933. On her way to Australia, she crashed her plane at an airbase under French mandate near Aleppo/Syria. This was von Etzdorf's third accident in succession, and she was acutely aware that this incident would make future funding of her flights virtually impossible. Even worse, in desperate financial straits von Etzdorf had accepted a private sponsor's offer to secretly market a German machine gun abroad – an activity strictly forbidden under the Treaty of Versailles. Fearing potential persecution by the French, von Etzdorf committed suicide. In Germany, the death of a national hero was received with disbelief. The Foreign Office dispatched a special envoy to investigate the incident, and the German state awarded von Etzdorf a hero's funeral, with SA and SS troops standing guard at her coffin. Sophie Heath, apart from von Etzdorf the only other woman to ever have held a commercial copiloting license before 1945, did not fare any better: after a crash at an air race in the United States in 1929 from which she never recovered, Heath died in 1939, following a fall from a tramcar.

After von Etzdorf's death, the 'golden era' of German women sport pilots was over. With the official founding of the German *Luftwaffe* in March 1935, new political and military goals were revealed as well. Germany did not depend on its female flying 'ambassadors' anymore. British women pilots, however, were able to thrive for a bit longer. But when British female pilot Pauline Gower (1910-1947) responded to the threat of an imminent war by suggesting in the late 1930s that women be allowed to become ferry pilots within the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA), she hit a nerve with the male establishment. Charles Grey, editor of the widely popular aviation journal *The Aeroplane* replied to her request: 'We quite agree that there are millions of women in the country who could do useful jobs in war. But the trouble is that so many insist on wanting to do jobs which they are quite incapable of doing.

The menace is the woman who thinks she ought to be flying a high speed bomber when she really has not the intelligence to scrub the floor of a hospital properly.' (Taylor 1988: 71).

With the outbreak of World War II, all sport flying activities ceased in Great Britain and Germany. In 1940, when Great Britain began to suffer from a shortage of pilots, eight women began to serve in the ATA. They ferried airplanes from production sites to military air bases all over the country. Towards the end of the war, 108 women were pilots with the ATA, providing 14% of its total manpower.

Although *Luftwaffe*'s general staff was aware of preparations in the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to employ women pilots, it did not consider this option. Only with the declaration of the 'total war' in 1944 did women start to serve as members of ferrying units. In 1944/45, there were five women employed among the forty pilots of the Ferrying Group [*Überführungsgruppe*] *Mitte* stationed in Berlin-Tempelhof. Hundreds of women pilots followed an appeal in summer 1944 to be employed as gliding instructors of the NS Fliers' Corps. In camps all over Germany, they pre-trained *Luftwaffe r*ecruits for missions in aircraft like the Bachem Ba 349 B-1 *Natter* (Viper), a vertical take-off interceptor, which the pilot hat to direct at the target before parachuting, the Heinkel 162 *Volksjäger* (People's Hunter) a jet plane mainly made of plywood, or a manned version of the V1 robot bomb. None of these projects came to fruition; the women's efforts did not contribute to the outcome of the war in any way.

Like their British counterparts, German women were driven by two major motivations. One factor, of course, was patriotism. Equally important was a second motivation: employment as pilots during the war gave women access to a wide range of highly sophisticated aircraft that otherwise would have been reserved for male, military pilots. Serving the military either in a full or an auxiliary capacity, the women were able to broaden their aircraft expertise immensely.

Conclusions

The history of women pilots in German and Great Britain proves that, amazingly, in the 1920s and early 1930s, gender stereotypes provided their ticket to fly. Gender stereotypes made this era the most successful period in history for women in terms of participating in introducing and implementing a new

technology. It is striking that despite fundamental differences in the political system and in the challenges their countries faced after 1918, German and British women pilots acted and were utilized in a very similar way, thus able to take advantage of international phenomena in the development of aviation and politics. Despite the obvious differences in their countries' history after World War I, the public images of modernity presented by women pilots in both countries, as well as their celebration in the media, are deceptively alike. And while women pilots were definitely a part of modernity in the 1920s and 1930s, terms like 'gender,' 'modernity,' and 'mobility' offer no satisfactory answer in explaining the enormous popularity and success of women pilots in the inter-war years. Instead of being seen merely as a phenomenon of emancipation, women pilots need to be understood in the context of their era's economy, and, even more, its politics. Rather than emancipatory, economic and political interests were often instrumental to the successful performance of a woman pilot. Here, the ambitions of women pilots to participate in their respective countries' struggle for 'air authority' met with their states' need for representatives who could raise maximum attention on a national, and – even more significantly – on an international level. Operating in a predominantly male environment, women pilots integrated themselves into this world, and thus secured safe positions for themselves. By acting 'like men', these women also laid claim to a privilege that women had been denied for centuries: the privilege of citizenship, which can be defined as a relationship 'inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices, and a sense of belonging' and states that 'those who were excluded from all or some citizenship rights on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity frequently took up the discourses and rhetorics of citizenship to make claims upon nation, state, or local communities.' (Canning, 2004: 241).

Since the foundations of bourgeois society, men's citizenship had been based on the right and duty to serve their nations in the public arena, in a civilian as well as military capacity. For men, gender identity and national identity had been intertwined in their identities as citizens. For women, relegated to the domestic sphere with little room to manoeuver, this connection was not as obvious. In the 1920s and 1930s, when nationalist notions were at the forefront of the political agenda, British and German women pilots took advantage of the supposedly non-political character ascribed to women, and eagerly and willingly entered into a mutually agreeable relationship with their nations' needs. Collaborating with men, they seized the opportunity to lay claim to issues of political citizenship, delivering convincing evidence that

the relationship between state (national identity) and women (gender identity) was far more reciprocal than previously conceded. Thus, the quantitatively rather insignificant group of women pilots in Great Britain and Germany in the first half of the 20th century can provide some qualitatively significant answers as to how both genders complemented each other productively in nationalist ambitions and movements and how they cooperated to pursue shared political goals.

After the 'golden era of aviation' aviation history was quickly rewritten after World War II as a myth of male accomplishments. Women pilots were reduced to the image of smiling, daring 'new women' or 'flappers,' as a curious side story in history. Their true legacy has been largely forgotten in the cultural memories of their countries. Only recently have efforts been made to begin to include the women pilots' contributions into their nations' identities.

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Jan Rüger

The Symbolic Relevance of the Navy and the Sea in Britain and Germany, c. 1880-1918

The navies of Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain have been in the focus of historians ever since the end of the First World War. Yet this attention has been almost entirely about technology, strategy and warfare, about administration, personalities and politics. The two fleets' symbolic dimension, in contrast, has remained largely unexplored. This is surprising given the undeniable prominence which battleships enjoyed as cultural symbols in the decades before 1914. The dreadnoughts of both countries drew huge crowds at public displays. They were embraced by popular culture, entertainment and advertising. Whatever their real strategic value might have been, they turned into public symbols, located at the intersection of cultural and political contexts. It is this symbolic quality that I would like to focus on here.[1] When Michel Foucault (1986) described ships as 'the greatest reserve of the imagination', as 'heterotopias' that symbolically unite spaces or sites that would otherwise be seen as incompatible, he did not think of the British or German battlefleets in the age of empire. Yet these fleets were precisely that: powerful cultural symbols that reconciled otherwise divergent ideas of nationhood and belonging.

Competing ideas about what constituted 'the nation' existed both in the United Kingdom and in Imperial Germany. In the case of the *Kaiserreich* this tension was felt particularly acutely. The new construct of a unified German state faced competing ideas of tradition, loyalty and belonging. The 'persistent struggle between cohesion and fragmentation', which James Sheehan (1981: 22) has stressed as a key theme of 19th century German history, continued after 1871. Indeed, Bismarck's *kleindeutsche* foundation challenged

1 This chapter is a synthesis of previously published research; see especially Rüger 2007.

traditional ideas of German nationhood as much as it offered a solution to them. Not only did the German-speaking parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire pose a reminder of the *großdeutsche* alternative that had been at the heart of much thinking about German nationhood, but challenges to the Prussian-dominated idea of a *kleindeutsche* nation-state also existed within the new *Kaiserreich*. The states that formed Imperial Germany continued to exert considerable power as separate entities, both culturally and politically. Some of them – Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Saxony in particular – had fought with Austria against Prussia only five years before unification. A number of recent studies have explored regional and local Germany in the late 19th century and its relationships with the more distant vision called the *Kaiserreich*. The picture that emerges shows a Germany that was, despite unification, deeply fragmented (Applegate 1990, Confino 1997, Green 2001).

This fragmentation was reinforced by a high degree of regional autonomy, especially where culture and education were concerned, and – particularly strongly – by confessional division. While Prussia and the German Emperor were staunchly Protestant, roughly a third of the Kaiser's subjects, mostly in the West and in the South, were Catholic. And although Catholicism in itself did not necessarily imply an opposition to the *kleindeutsche* nation-state (Langewiesche 1995), its loyalty to a supra-national institution was not easily reconciled with the Prussian-Protestant national project. What made matters worse was the *Kulturkampf*, a conflict that went beyond the question of what role the Catholic Church should play in German public life. As Helmut Walser Smith has argued, the *Kulturkampf* amounted to a 'strategy for nation-building', an attempt to impose by state means a Protestant-Prussian vision of 'the nation', which ultimately failed (Walser Smith 1995: 14). It left a divisive legacy for ideas of German nationhood, which had reverberations long after the conflict between the Prussian state and the Catholic Church had been laid to rest. In short, there were many reasons why, as Alon Confino (1997) has put it, 'in spite of the unification of the nation-state, German nationhood continued to exist as a patchwork of regions and states'. The idea of the nation was just as contentious an issue in the United Kingdom (Pocock 1975, Kearny 1989, Clark 1989). After the first Act of Union, new manifestations of 'Britishness' had developed alongside, and in competition with, English, Scottish and Welsh ideas of nationhood (Colley 2009, Robbins 1995, Robbins 1998: 262-294, Hastings 1997: 1-95). With the incorporation of Ireland into the United Kingdom and the expansion of the Empire questions of nationhood were complicated further. Mounting Anglo-Irish tensions and

the fierce debate about Home Rule meant that by the end of the century this was 'already a disunited kingdom' (Clarke 1996: 1). The conflict over Home Rule was the strongest factor, but by no means the only one. In parallel to the continuing crisis about the future of Ireland, the awakening of Scottish and Welsh nationalisms produced a growing articulation of uncertainty about British identity (Kearny 1989, Ellis 1998, Readman 2005, Remhold 2000). Notions of nationhood were similarly challenged from outside the United Kingdom. The Empire, an important source of a shared vision of 'British-ness' seemed heavily stretched. The South African War in particular severely tested the imperial construct – and simultaneously galvanized particularist and anti-imperialist movements, especially in Ireland (Lowry 2000, Searle 2002). Threats to the British command of the sea also undermined senses of national identity, closely connected as they were to naval superiority in this period. All this meant that a strong sense of unresolvedness characterised the issue of nationhood in the United Kingdom of the late 19th century, a kingdom that was increasingly struggling to accommodate its four nations and to define what was their common purpose. This, one might add, came at a time when the monarchy as an institution was still facing the effects of its transformation into an institution with limited political power and therefore a heightened need to convince national and international audiences of its continued relevance.

In both countries the navy and the sea were highly relevant for the processes in which these challenges were negotiated. The Royal Navy was one of the most important agents of national sentiment in the Victorian and Edwardian eras. While the army was bound, by tradition as well as recruitment, to regional allegiances, the navy offered itself ideally for a British, unionist and imperial emphasis. The Imperial Navy also presented a remarkably well-suited vehicle for a national emphasis. Unlike the army, which remained fragmented in structure, the navy was an imperial institution. It unequivocally symbolised the new united Germany. As a result, the fleet was paraded in an ever more spectacular fashion towards the end of the 19th century. The expansion of this cult can be seen in a number of arenas. Perhaps most remarkable was the rise of official ceremonies. Fleet reviews, launches of warship and a range of related rituals became more elaborate and professionally stage-managed, and they took place more often and on a larger scale than at any time since the late 18th century.

The most conclusive way of illustrating this is by looking at the rising costs involved. Between 1887 and 1911, expenditure on fleet reviews went up almost tenfold (Rüger 2007: ch. 1). Alarmed by this rise, the Treasury engaged the Admiralty in a behind-the-scenes battle that continued until 1914. In June 1912 the secretary of the treasury wrote an internal memorandum about what he saw as the excessive costs of naval celebrations. The forthcoming 'parliamentary inspection' of the fleet seemed particularly wasteful. He complained that the Admiralty had asked for 'an enormous sum for this "picture"'. 'I can conceive of no reason at all', he continued, 'why it should take place this year' (The National Archives, henceforth TNA, 1912). In a letter to the Admiralty, the Secretary of the Treasury objected strongly to the 'altogether excessive' use of funds (TNA, ADM 1/8317). Yet faced with pressure in the cabinet, the Chancellor of the Exchequer footed the bill for the unprecedented spectacle.

The rise of naval theatre caused similarly unprecedented expenditure in Germany. In November 1908, the German Imperial Audit Office reprimanded the naval leadership, lamenting the massive increase in the cost of launch celebrations. Originally, when regulations for the launching of battleships had first been set up in 1876, these had been regarded as low-key affairs without much pomp or ceremony. Now, wrote the Audit Office, 'costs for such celebrations, which had formerly never been considerable' had reached 'very substantial heights' (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 1908). Local authorities struggled to keep costs at bay too, especially in Hamburg and Bremen. In 1909, the Bremen Senate broke all records with the cost of festivities held around the launching of HMS *Thüringen*. It put on a dinner for Prince Eitel Friedrich, the duchess of Saxony-Altenburg, and a host of 'high guests', costing a staggering 10,000 Marks. Realizing that such a sum was not to be found in the city's coffers, the burgomaster rushed an amendment through the Senate and the Bürgerschaft, the lower chamber. He did so by evoking paragraphs 49 to 51 of the Bremen constitution, extraordinary instruments reserved for moments of crisis that empowered the Senate to speed up the legislative process if the 'welfare of the state' (*das Staatswohl*) was under threat (Verfassung der Freien Hansestadt Bremen 1854: 8-9). To keep all this from public scrutiny, the Senate obliged the members of the Bürgerschaft to treat the budget amendment as top secret and the official printer was instructed to destroy all references to the amendment (Sonderprotokoll 1909). These were remarkable financial and political manoeuvres, undertaken for the celebration of a warship. They demonstrated how far these rituals had come since the

1870s when naval ceremonial had aimed at avoiding 'all costly elaborations' (Marineverordnungsblatt 1876: 15).

Given these figures, there is little doubt that the celebration of the navy was an arena in which monarchs and governments were busy projecting their power. Yet it would be wrong to explain the rise of this public theatre merely as an exercise in the 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawn 1992). By the end of the century, monarchs and governments had to contend with new actors and new audiences that lay outside their direct control, yet had a key influence on the character of public ritual. Modern transport and tourism brought a dramatically widened radius of direct participation, turning naval ceremonies into mass events. Cinema, *Flottenschauspiele* (naval re-enactments) and many other forms of urban entertainment celebrated the navy and the sea in places that were distant from the coast. Yet the impact of mass culture and commercial initiatives went considerably beyond simply 'popularising' the navy. Popular culture represented new sources of power and participation. The 'opening' of private aspects of ritual to the public, the intrusion of mass participation into the core of royal ceremonies, the changing spatial character of naval rituals, the increasingly prominent role that 'the crowd' played in stagecraft and choreography: these were important new features brought about by mass media and popular culture. It is thus not simply government initiative or propaganda, but its intersection with the new forces of the 'age of the masses' that explains why the navy turned into such a powerful symbol in this period.

But let me come back to the initial quote by Michel Foucault: why was the navy so well suited as a 'heterotopia'? If we want to go beyond the factors sketched so far, it is necessary to look more closely at the cultural context in which the Edwardian and Wilhelmine fleets operated. What was it that made battleships so 'strikingly impressive', as one journalist put it at the launch of the Dreadnought in 1906 (Portsmouth Evening News 1906)? Crucial was their role as icons of modern technology. Like the zeppelin and aeroplane, the modern fleet was at the forefront of technological advance, provoking admiration and curiosity. It embodied innovation and progress; it was an icon of the rationality and efficiency of the machine age. Helmuth Moltke the Younger, the German general, was captivated by the character of modern dreadnoughts as 'machine organisms': 'A ship like this has its own brain and its own nerves, just like a human being. The electric connections control every limb; and the ship moves its gigantic guns to the right and the left,

upwards and downwards, and starts its machines with the same ease with which we stretch a leg or move an arm' (von Moltke 1922: 357).

Such fascination was not only for *what* these instruments of war could do, but for *how* they did it, as high-tech organisms that operated with the overriding goals of efficiency and rationality. They mirrored important aspects of modernity in that they expressed a new relationship between individual and machine, offered new experiences of space and time, and involved new forms of risk (Kern 1983, Rieger 2005, Marvin 1988).

Importantly, the fleet was not only an icon of modern technology; it also made it possible to represent power in new ways. Perhaps the most impressive example of this is to be found in the searchlight displays that so many naval celebrations involved. The use of powerful light beams for public displays was not, as is often assumed, born out of the use of anti-aircraft searchlights. It was the fleet with its naval searchlights which pioneered this public theatre in the decade before 1914. In a distinctly modern fashion, the representation of technology and power merged in these light displays. This was all the more effective since it coincided with innovations in the reproduction of images, in particular moving images. Photography and film captured the monsters of steel and might and reinforced their visual impact (On film and technology see Rieger 2005).

Yet the navies in both countries not only projected a striking imagery of technology, novelty and power. They also evoked nostalgic or romanticised notions of adventure, 'overseas' and man's battle with nature. In popular culture they appeared as instruments of imagined chivalry and tradition as much as a high-tech symbols of efficiency and progress. Indeed, in its public representation and popular appropriation, the navy seemed to reconcile the contradictions and challenges that modern technology brought about. What made it so fascinating was that it brought together the new feasibilities with older ideas of adventure, heroism and chivalry. The navy combined the traditional 'story of the sea' with the unprecedented possibilities offered by new technology.

What made this all the more appealing was that this spectacle of technology and power could be experienced in an entertaining fashion. Audiences could 'play the naval game' in a range of activities in which the representation of power and technology, adventure and risk, came together with fun and amusement. Fleet reviews and mock battles in particular afforded the oppor-

tunity to watch representations of power, violence and battle as entertainment. Here, rivalry and antagonism could be performed in isolation from the complexities of international affairs and the secret diplomacy of cabinets and courts. This game was so fascinating precisely because it brought together play and war. It allowed audiences to approach violence and aggression, otherwise supposed to be 'serious', as something playful and entertaining. At its heart was the continuous ambiguity between *Spiel* and *Ernst*. It was the performative 'as if', the opportunity to experience conflict while not having to engage with its reality that made the naval game so appealing: in this theatre you could play war without having to want it (Huizinga 1980: ch. 5, Turner 1982, Schechner 2003: 98-103).

The symbolic value of the Wilhelmine and Edwardian fleets was further heightened by strongly gendered associations. Official representation stressed that the working of this machinery of steel and technology was a male prerogative. The 'one vast machine' that was the navy was a realm of masculinity in which 'guns and men' came together (Daily Express 1909, Official Programme of the Coronation Review 1911). Ships and men alike were to show bravery, discipline, stamina, willpower and the readiness to die for the nation. In Wilhelmine Germany the gendered representation of the navy went further than in Britain. A remarkable demarcation between men and women existed at public rituals such as warship launches, a demarcation that was not only informed by ideas about separate gender spheres, but was also about the divide between military and civilian society. The separation of 'the ladies' from the male actors and special guests, who were in the vast majority, was minutely planned and strictly adhered to, both at government and private yards. It was a key mechanism by which the Wilhelmine naval theatre constructed the 'the nation' along gender lines. While this demonstrative demarcation between men and women was a uniquely Wilhelmine phenomenon, the naval theatre projected a strongly gendered image of 'the nation' in both countries. At a time when traditional gender images were profoundly contested, this celebrated the 'hegemonic masculinity' that was expressed in the navy (Delap 2011, Tosh 2004).

No wonder, then, that some could not resist ridiculing the navy as a prime symbol of male pomp. In February 1910 a party of six Bloomsbury literati, amongst them Virginia Woolf, announced themselves to the Commander of the Home Fleet by telegram as 'Prince Makalen of Abbysinia [sic] and suite' (TNA, ADM 1/8192). Disguised with brown face powder and false beards,

they were promptly received with royal honours and shown all over the *Dreadnought*, the flagship of Admiral Sir William May. As the Admiralty's internal report put it, the officers attending 'never detected anything' about the party that 'consisted of four dark skinned persons in Oriental costumes and two Europeans' (TNA, ADM 1/8192). The press had a field day when the story was revealed, while at the Admiralty 'the question of what should be done about that wretched hoax was still a matter of perplexity', as its Secretary admitted in a private letter to Admiral May ten days later (TNA, ADM 1/8192). What made the incident so 'wretched' is explained by the gender politics involved (For a more detailed analysis see Delap 2011). The Admiralty were particularly incensed at the inclusion of a cross-dressed woman. A decision was taken that the males of the group should be 'beaten' by naval officers. In the end, only two 'beatings' took place – two male hoaxers were briefly abducted by naval officers and taken to secluded spots. But as it turned out, the beating was no more than a ceremonial tap on the bottom with a cane – apparently just enough to avenge the honour of the navy. The farce of these events clearly made a deep impact on Virginia Woolf, vividly bringing home to her the 'ludicrous points of honour and formalised revenges' of homosocial institutions such as the navy. It apparently left her permanently sensitive to the 'masculine absurdities' of the establishment (Stephen 1936: 16). As Quentin Bell (1972: 52) put it, 'she came out of it with a new sense of the brutality and silliness of men.'

In short, the navy and the sea were powerful cultural symbols that merged some of the most important sources of Wilhelmine and Edwardian self-understanding: technology, gender and war, as well as monarchy, empire and nationhood. Importantly, all of this took place in an arena that was at once national and international. 'The other' was, directly or indirectly, always present in the public staging of the fleet. Not only because of the Anglo-German naval race itself, but more generally because of the culture of deterrence that unfolded in this period. Creating an image, a visual and emotional impression of threat was critical. For intimidation to work, it had to be felt, the source of threat had to be shown and exercised (Lambert 1996). For Sir John Fisher, impressing and intimidating were what naval strategy in the Dreadnought era was all about. In a 1903 memorandum he said boldly: 'The word intimidate is used since the history of the world points to intimidation being the greatest safeguard against hostile operations' (TNA, ADM 116/942). There was thus a strong need for the *display* of deterrence. The

public staging of the fleet and the celebration of the sea catered to this need, emphasising that this was a national as much as an international symbol.

It is thus the coming together of important political and cultural contexts that best explains why the Wilhelmine and Edwardian navies turned into such potent symbols. The intersection of government initiative with voluntary and commercial agendas; the rapid rise of mass media, leisure and entertainment; the attractiveness of the naval stage for the projection of local, regional, national and imperial loyalties; the curious combination of modern and traditional themes offered by the fleet as an instrument that acted at once as the pioneer of technological advance and as an arbiter of the nation's past; and finally its obvious role in international rivalry and the Anglo-German antagonism: these are the main factors that explain the symbolic relevance of the British and German fleets in this period.

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Jim Aulich

Ducking and Diving: The imagery of aerial and submarine warfare in posters issued by Britain and the Central Powers during the First World War

During the First World War aerial and submarine warfare was represented on posters published by voluntary organisations, commercial concerns and governments. The intention was not to illustrate or document the war. Concerned with recruiting and cajoling civilians to contribute to the war effort, these posters communicated successes in the air and at sea, demonised the enemy and inspired patriotism, fear, resistance, and vengeance. Equally, the posters marketed consumables, exhibitions, entertainments, films and books. The selling of the war and the war as a marketing device were intimately connected (Aulich and Hewitt 2007).[1]

Used in the promotion of war aims, or to sell war bonds and consumer products, the pictured subject matter was secondary. Unlike news photography and film, fine print or painting, the print media in general were perceived by the British establishment to have a questionable institutional foundation in commerce incapable of supporting the moral weight of the affairs of state. Graphic artists, as likely to be employed on government as on commercial contracts, worked in a complex state of affairs where within the rules of censorship laid down in the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 government campaigns were left to the discretion of advertising agencies. As a result image vocabularies owed more to popular art and advertising than traditional iconographies of the state found in the faux classicism and allegorical schema of official documents and rolls of honour, for example. Encouraged by the media industry, government and commerce realised the need to reach little

1 This essay should be read by using the reference numbers in the text in association with the database *Imperial War Museum: Posters of Conflict* at www.vads.ac.uk through the Advanced Search and the Narrow by Collection option.

represented sections of the community. Working men and women, for example, were pictured in this visual vernacular as particular types of citizens and consumers. This made them visible to themselves and in their recognition they gained new forms of representational enfranchisement made legitimate by their presence in publicity sponsored by government and commerce. As pervasive as it was invisible to the upper echelons of society, printed ephemera offered new ways of seeing and challenged established orders.

It is difficult to gauge the impact of this imagery. But it is possible to reflect upon how it functions in the production of the cultural memory of the war. To this end, the analysis takes from Henri Lefebvre (1991) an understanding of memory as a variety of public discourse, in this case preserved in posters and printed ephemera held and exhibited in museums, sold in shops as reproductions and on the Internet, and illustrated in various stories of warfare, factual or otherwise. In this essay the posters are drawn from the collection of the Imperial War Museum whose holdings of First World War posters is as comprehensive as any in the world. Determined by the vagaries of collecting and the aims and tastes of the holder, the collection was originally conceived as a store of 'War Publicity:' a visual record of the war for future generations (Aulich and Hewitt 2007: 11-33). In a letter to the magazine *The Poste*r its curator, L. R. Bradley, set out his desire for

'A comprehensive picture of national conditions in every sphere of public and private activity during war time. … Advertisements provide first hand material for historical and social students; whereas "news" and other editorial matter is apt to be so filtered and colored that its value as evidence is much impaired.' (Bradley 1918)

The range and significance of acquisitions was subject to museum policy, arbitrary donations, the market and available funds. Subjected to 'natural processes' and in contradiction to the commonly assumed neutrality and transparency of the archive, as Jacques Derrida and others have pointed out (Nesmith 2002), it is no surprise that the collection has 'genetic' predispositions determined by the circumstances of its creation and prominence in the public domain. The fact that it included proclamations, advertisements, cartoons and illustrations affirms Bradley's pursuit of a complete, objective and neutral record. No matter how transient, these pictures were understood to contribute to the public's understanding of itself and to its cognitive grasp and memory of the war. Not passive but active: the imagery is a mediation

and its survival is subject to processes of continual interpretation by those who make use of it and consume its narratives.

The high status of the Museum in the national culture as a record of modern British warfare and the significance of its poster collection guaranteed it as a primary source for historians of every complexion. Many posters in the collection have become iconic in histories of design and in the memory of the war. Most were not easily accessible until 2003 when the process of digitizing the collection as a searchable database began. Previously, a representative selection of posters of historical or aesthetic significance were separated out, photographed and made retrievable through physical storage, photographic record and the skills and knowledge of the curators. Posters were reproduced because of their accessibility and their suitability as illustrations, not because they were necessarily the best known or most effective. They contributed to the imaginary of conflict through institutionally created memory, reproduced and reinforced by the frequency of the posters' citations and use as illustrations in school book, popular, and academic histories of gender, memory and warfare in all of their varieties, as well as in accounts of propaganda, publicity and design.

Memory in this context is a culturally produced visual discourse, caught in a feedback loop echoing through popular illustration, advertising, public information and propaganda. Precisely how far the images contributed to the formation of identity and gender, history and memory is difficult to ascertain. However, the historian can be sure they function as symptoms or indices of what the present and past would choose to forget or remember, and what they hint at in the reproduction of contemporary and historical notions of nation, class and gender. W.J.T. Mitchell (1994, 2005) has argued that for images to be seen at all, there must be something in them we recognise or deny. The fact they have currency in a vernacular popular image bank confirms their value in gauging the formation of public attitudes and self-understandings of the individual subject.

Aerial Warfare

The image of flight is at the heart of modernity and progress. Some of the most telling depictions in the field of the high arts championed the impact of technological advance, often to elitist, anti-democratic and proto-fascist ends (Carey 1992). Artists employed radical aesthetics and developed iconogra-

phies to embrace modern industry, the ship, the racing car, the bicycle, the aeroplane and the skyscraper and combined them with sophisticated approaches that grappled with advances in psychology and the science and philosophy of perception.[2] To expect comparable representations in popular and commercial art leads to disappointment. An exception was the British poster *Buy War Bonds Now* 1918 (fig. 1). Here flight is instantiated within an abstracted visual vocabulary as the crowning glory of an industrialised war machine.

In art the fascination with movement and speed was as frequently reactionary as it was progressive, and especially in iconographies coined in central Europe, the horse featured more than machines. In Germany fine artists put these expressionist vocabularies to spiritual and atavistic ends which tapped into psychological constructions of the self, myth and nation.

The process was paralleled in the commercial arts in more literal-minded ways by the use of the eagle as a symbol of imperial and national preeminence. It elided easily with flight and the destiny of the heroic fighter pilots who literally soared into the narrative of the war promoted by the Central Powers (7733). A German poster for a memoir by Max Immelmann, known as the 'Eagle of Lille,' shows the raptor as an overwhelming presence dominating the city's skyline (fig. 2).

Others, advertising exhibitions of air-war trophies featured its emblematic silhouette perched on a shot up Royal Flying Corps roundel (6112), and one has an eagle diving after a crippled enemy aircraft (11239). They share nothing with the diminutive aeroplane propelled by the vision of industrial might in the British poster. They have a transcendent romanticism absent from other generally more pragmatic and realist British representations which emulated the War Department's policy to avoid making heroes of individuals (10184, 10186, 10240, fig. 3).[3] The viewer is constructed as a financial contributor, witness and citizen rather than a subject caught up in narratives of fate and destiny.

2 In the visual arts: the Futurists in Italy, the Vorticists in England, the Cubo-Futurists and Constructivists in Russia, Expressionists in Germany and the Orphists in France.

3 A policy abandoned after Lord Northcliffe's January 1918 campaign in the *Daily Mail* to glorify British air aces for propaganda as the Germans had with Baron von Richthofen, Max Immelman and Hans Boeckle.



Fig. 1 Anon., 1918, Buy War Bonds Now, National War Savings Committee No.94.

Fig. 2 A. Rother, 1916. Immelmann – Meine Kampfflüge. Selbsterlebt und selbsterzählt (My Combat Flights. Experienced and told).

The commercial arts were the products of an accelerating technological environment as much as the aeroplane, submarine and the machine gun. Yet their means of expression generally remained resolutely traditional and illustrational. In Britain, radical aesthetic experiment was not thought to be an effective means of communication. Coined in the 1870s and 1880s by the illustrators of Jules Verne's *20,000 Leagues under the Sea* and *Robur the Conqueror* (fig. 4), the iconographies of aerial and submarine warfare framed progressive technologies as objects of suspicion. In the frontispiece to *Robur* well-dressed males hold up their forearms in gestures of protection and one flees in terror. Flight is a threat to the established order, an affront to bourgeois values and the 'natural order'. *The Albatross* and the *Nautilus* approach silently. Under the cover of night or deep water they sneak upon their prey.[4]

It was an image that framed contradictory feelings of admiration and suspicion of new technology, its effectiveness and a sense of fair play in warfare: for many, including some social progressives such as H.G. Wells in the novel discussed below, for example, whatever the benefits of flight treachery was of its essence. The phenomenon affirms Bernhard Rieger's observation: 'Hovering between elation and anxiety, ambivalent evaluations of technological change threatened to undermine enthusiasm as the rhetoric of the "modern wonder" brought into view the uncanny and even fearsome aspects of technological innovations.' (Rieger 2005: 25)

4 *20,000 Leagues Under the Sea* was adapted to film by Verne and Georges Melies in 1907 and engaged with the fantastic and the grotesque rather than the technological. An American film by Stuart Paton released in 1916 seemed to draw on the submarine war, and depicted the *Nautilus* as a vengeful sea monster plying its revenge on international shipping, pursued by the ship the Abraham Lincoln by order of the American government.

Fig. 3 Bert Thomas, 1918, Help to buy an Aeroplane, National War Savings Committee No.76.

Fig. 4 Leon Benett, 1886. Frontispiece for Jules Verne Robur the Conqueror.

Air power represented a threat to the widely held view of Britain as an impregnable island fortress. In the shape of the Zeppelin it appeared in fiction as a necessary adjunct to naval supremacy and the capacity of the German armed forces for invasion, an event fictionalised in 1908 by H.G. Wells in *The War in the Air*. Illustrated by A.C. Michael, an artist accomplished in depicting scenes from British history, his image of phalanxes of aircraft preceded the coming reality of the mass bombing in the Second World War. The threat further encroached upon the popular imagination when sightings of aircraft were reported in the press. In spite of the technical impossibility of German Zeppelins being able to reach British shores at that time, *The Graphic* vividly illustrated an air raid in its edition of 22 May 1909.[5] These sightings added to the growing hysteria concerning German aerial surveillance, spies and the threat of invasion assiduously pursued by Lord Northcliffe's *Evening News* and *Express* newspapers and exploited in the popular novel *The Invasion* by William Le Queux serialised in the *Daily Mail* in 1906 and published as a book in 1909 (Clarke undated; Thompson 1999: 13). Simultaneously, John M East's dramatic spectacle *Invasion* attracted crowds of 25,000 spectators as parachutists guided by foreign spies descended from Zeppelins, only to be repelled at the last minute by British soldiers (Tropp 1990: 175).

January 1915 saw successful air raids over Britain as Zeppelins struck Great Yarmouth and Kings Lynn (Morrow 1996: 33). A poster advertising an account of these raids *Zeppelins over England*, showed the aircraft caught in searchlights surrounded by ineffective flak (fig. 5). The air war generated genuine fear and outrage and attacks on civilians and the Red Cross were exploited in British propaganda. Images of aircraft caught in the glare of searchlights over city skylines urged men to answer the call and be killed at the front, rather than at home (12052) or to 'Feed the Guns with War Bonds and help to bring them down', 1918 (10424).

5 This was followed by an announcement on the front page of the *Daily Mail* from Lord Northcliffe following Louis Bleriot's successful channel air crossing on 25 July 1909: 'Britain is no longer an island!'

Fig. 5 Anon., 1916. Zeppelins over England! Amar Ullstein War Books.

Fig. 6 Howard van Dusen, undated. Knights of the Air.

Howard van Dusen's satirical poster Knights of the Air. My German Heroes! (fig. 6) has aircraft strafe and bomb the Red Cross. A poster by the print maker Frank Brangwyn abandons the black humour and a 'Tommy' makes 'The Vow of Vengeance' over a slaughtered mother and crying child. The poster occupied that netherworld between propaganda and commerce, advertising insurance against aerial action to *Daily Chronicle* readers in an affirmation of the stability of British institutions.

The Tommy embodied the dominant characterization of the serviceman as anti-authoritarian, defiant, self-deprecating and good spiritedly resilient (Reader 1987). The figure belonged to a prevalent democratic narrative in the popular media where service and duty were owed to a nation of freeborn Englishmen more than to the Secretary of War, Lord Kitchener, and the King. He first appeared in Bert Thomas' design *'Arf a mo' Kaiser!* (10799) as the indomitable character from the *Weekly Dispatch Tobacco Fund* campaign who asks the Kaiser to hold his attack for half a moment ('Arf a mo') while he finishes lighting his pipe. In *Help to buy an Aeroplane* (fig. 3) his inferiority to the air officer and inquiring enthusiasm for the new technology is signaled by his faithful dog and aligns him to a view that could see no dishonour in the new technology of war. Constructed within conventions of class difference the image is nevertheless remote from the suspicion of technology found in prewar illustration of popular fiction in Britain or the sense of higher purpose in the Central Powers that sometimes took unfortunate forms. Prescient of things to come in its bald racism *The Wolf Cub*, 1918 (6110),[6] for example, displayed a naked African man terrorized by an aircraft in an echo of the assimilated French African in the bottom right hand corner of the image from *Robur the Conqueror* (fig. 4). In this poster advanced technology was linked with racial superiority in a reactionary narrative opposed to the liberal democratic ideology of the British poster that embraced the new technology of flight as a socially unifying, if not class defying power.

The imagery of conflict in Britain often traded on male stereotypes and warfare as a form of entertainment. In caricatures of rites of passage, illustrated narratives circulated in popular magazines aimed at adolescents of military age. *The Captain, A Magazine for Boys and 'Old Boys' Fine Stories of War*

6 The Wolf Cub was the name given to the Friedrichshafen FF.33e, a two-seater seaplane that was originally launched from the Armed Merchant Seaman, Wolf.

and Sport, for example, deployed the technology of war in a discourse of adventure, mystery, espionage, sport and individual combat remote from the experience of war. The issue for May 1915, for example, mingled stories and pictures of aerial dogfights, bird nesting, Native Americans, and submarine warfare among pictures of fierce cavalry charges and plucky infantry advances.[7] Articulated in a popular vernacular of words and pictures the images belonged to a normative, constructed and commonly understood realism. The illustrations shared with posters an idiom of dramatic, theatrical gestures and actions seen from low perspectives in shallow space. The intention was to create a sense of involvement through what was understood to be a transparent and immediate mode of depiction capable of direct communication. That it was largely illusory helped to sustain the will to fight and protected those at home from the reality of life at the front, in the air and at sea.

Submarine warfare

Royal Navy submarines did not feature widely in posters except in War Bonds Campaigns (10195) and War Weapons Weeks (10202). When they did appear it was as underwater weapons with little evidence of human agency suggesting acceptance of their technological pre-eminence and dehumanised lethality. Captains do not man the conning towers, men do not handle the guns: all we see is the sleek, silent, metallic form of the submarine in an iconography established with *20,000 Leagues Under the Sea* that endlessly repeats itself to the present day (10195, 10202).

German U-boats were depicted far more frequently. Posters from the Central Powers aimed at raising money for the war effort depicted U-boats on the surface sailing into the sun (6352, 7366, 2794). Their intention was not to demonize the enemy or to hearten through good humour but to inspire the population and to identify the actions of the submariners with the myth of the nation. The manned conning tower made of the U-boat captain a charioteer binding the mythological with progressive technology. The iconography summoned codes of destiny, chivalry, sacrifice, duty, honour and crusading

7 Titles included 'Bear-Child: A Blackfoot War Story'; 'Birds and Bird-Nesting'; 'Held by the enemy. The Thrilling Adventures of a Motor-Scout'; and 'The Captain's War Portfolio', with illustrations titled, 'A German Submarine [U9] Netted by a Dutch Trawler' and 'A Collier Rams a Submarine'. A series of illustrations plotted 'The Devil's Cauldron. Relating How a Submarine Lured a German Warship to Destruction.'

knighthood. The conning tower alluded to the iron breastplate and shield of the Teutonic order. Iron was embedded in the symbolism of the state that was forward looking in its promise of industrial supremacy and backward looking in its embrace of Germanic '*Kultur*' (Frantzen 2004, Goebel 2009). In a Wagnerian atmosphere enhanced by foreboding yellow-gold and fire-orange skies perhaps inspired by Expressionist experiment, the hero's moral freedom and purity of soul promoted German genius and redemption in sacrifice for the nation (5941, 2794, 3218, fig. 7).

Counter-productively the imagery served to feed the image and memory of Germany as an authoritarian, militaristic and imperial power.

In the opening months of the war German submarines had operated 'prize rules' that allowed civilian crews and passengers to abandon ship before it was destroyed from the surface. These tactics were finally superseded in 1917 by unrestricted submarine warfare. The abandonment of the last traces of a gentlemanly war at sea left the Central Powers open to attack in propaganda campaigns in Britain and more importantly America. The Germans had first employed the strategy in 1915 and it had seen the loss of 'The Lusitania'. Perhaps the most widely reproduced American poster concerning the sinking is Fred Spear's *Enlist*, 1915, featuring a drowning mother and child. It is a good example of the American and British colonial approach to poster campaigns that made a democratic virtue of accurate reporting at the risk of hyperbole and the need 'to tell it as it was.' Bernard Partridge's *Take Up the Sword of Justice* (12145) was unusual because of its images of the drowning. It was also unusual because it made use of allegory: British designers preferred commercially derived visual vocabularies free of cultural distinction and aesthetic sophistication. The commercial artist David Wilson, for example, executed a series of low circulation posters aimed at exploiting the treachery of the 'Hun'. *The Freedom of the Seas* played on the inhumanity of the decision to attack neutral shipping (13533). It mimicked posters such as that advertising the Hungarian film *U-Boat Hero* (fig. 7) and turned its heroism on its head. In the foreground, the ever-present conning tower with its complement of commanding officers is contrasted with the sinking merchantman and abandoned survivors.[8] Another design commemorating the

8 When Wilson was not producing chauvinistic designs on behalf of the extreme nationalist organization the British Empire Union, he put his graphic skills to producing humorous advertisements for shaving soap. Among them a Jack Tar adrift in a lifeboat, the victim of a

loss of the hospital ship 'Rewa' in the Bristol Channel was even less equivocal in its condemnation of unrestricted submarine warfare. Over the caption 'The Red Cross to the Hun', a U-boat surfaces in the dark and the trace of its torpedo, illuminated by phosphorescence, is directly on target for the Red Cross on the side of the ship. The pictorial representation of atrocity was rare because the advertising and bill-posting trade had been self-regulated since the late 19th century in their effort to neutralise accusations of sensationalism, poor taste and subverting public morals. In wartime posters were situated in places where they were not generally seen, such as civic and religious spaces and buildings. This had the effect of simultaneously lending posters legitimacy and exacerbating their indiscriminate reach: they were as likely to be seen by a worker on the way to the factory or office as a child on the way to school. As a result, posters depicting atrocities or explicit violence, unlike popular prints by graphic satirists such as Louis Raemaekers, were unusual. More commonly, typographical posters addressed these themes and were to be read in the manner of military proclamations and government notices. Perhaps aimed at an adult audience thought less likely to be seduced or corrupted, these posters published by the British government described in words the impact of the indiscriminate submarine warfare by propagandists eager to exploit the barbarism of the enemy. They called men to join up and serve the King under the slogan, 'Avenge the Lusitania' (6060) and 'Cold-Blooded Murder! Remember Germany's Crowning Infamy the Sinking of the Lusitania with Hundreds of Women and Children' (11821, 13586)[9] and so on.[10]

U-boat attack, has a 'close shave'. This kind of self-deprecating black humour was a staple of the British propaganda armoury.

9 The slogan was backed up with the text 'Germans have wantonly sacked Cities and Holy Places. Germans have murdered thousands of innocent civilians. Germans have flung vitriol and blazing petrol on the Allied Troops. Germans have deserted the drowning … '. Another, 'German Words and German Deeds' (13585) cited and quoted from the Bryce Report which verified German atrocities and was widely discredited after the war.

10 A series published in May 1917 by the Department of Information under the caption 'A Reminder' listed an account of the war and Germany's duplicity with the rejoinder 'The invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania are typical' (13554, 13560 and 13557).

Fig. 7 Anon., undated. The U-Boat Hero. Corso cinema: Budapest.



Fig. 8 Hans Rudi Erdt, 1917. U-Boote Heraus! (U-Boats Out!). IWM PST 0515.

The most aesthetically successful of posters that used the U-boat as a leitmotif were object-posters (8323, 5958). Hans Rudi Erdt's *U-Boote Heraus!* (U-Boats. Out!) 1917 (fig. 8) is iconic in the history of the poster and is widely reproduced as an example of a modernist poster in its simplification of form and use of typography as a pictorial component of the design. But perhaps more interesting for our story of flight and submarines is his equally modern design employing the map of Britain and schematic silhouettes of submarines for the propaganda film *Der Magische Gürtel. Deutsche U-Boote Wider England*, 1917.[11]

The effectiveness of the U-boat blockade was widely propagandized and concentrated on the statistical evidence of how the destruction of shipping was bringing Britain close to defeat. Many designers used modernist designs incorporating two-dimensional maps and charts. Louis Oppenheim, one of Germany's pre-eminent poster artists, presented in *The U-Boat War* (6931) the evidence of the boat's success in the form of a schematic set of scales, tipping sunken tonnage against new ships, printed over the stereotypical image of a U-boat's conning tower in a storm tossed sea. There was a curious balance in these posters between illustrational realism, diagrammatic schematism and notions of sacrifice and calculation: '*Kultur*' and scientific rationalism. Neither approach proved particularly successful with the people at large.

In Britain popular illustration was in denial of the success of the campaign. U-boats were depicted rammed by Allied ships in an iconography that became a staple of the narrative submarine war for the Allies in the Second World War.[12] Captain Charles Gilson's story *Submarine U-93*, for example, was serialized in the *Boys' Own Paper* from November 1915 to May 1916. When published as a book the image by the illustrator and lithographer Charles Soper was embossed on its spine and appeared inside as a colour plate. As part of the Don't Waste Bread Campaign launched by the Ministry of Food, the image was used in the montaged background for domestic

11 The film tells the story of U-35 which sank 23 ships over a period of 36 days in the Mediterranean. At first the film shocked audiences because of the waste involved in the sinking of merchant vessels. The title of the film refers at once to a magic circle and a talismanic girdle. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, first used the term to draw a comparison of the U-boat blockade with the kind of spell that confines and emasculates the hero. However, in Germany the meaning is different, referring to a talisman that makes the wearer stronger.

12 Marc Stone, Back them up! (14875): Arthur Sims, Contribute to the Battle of the Atlantic (1571).

scenes featuring women and children who 'Save Two Slices Every Day and Defeat the U-Boat' (6545, 13354, fig. 9).[13]

The image portrayed the demise of U-31. The boat was the source of rumours of a submarine forever on patrol (Dowling 2006: 155).[14] The poster literally sank the phantom and drew women and children into the common cause as active participants, even if they did wait at home. This was quite unlike the portrayal of women in the posters of the Central Powers, where they were either unreal allegories, or all too real victims of the shortages caused by the war.

To a large extent visual imagery in the poster shared its vocabularies with popular illustration. The rammed U-boat, the aerial dog fight, the mass aerial bombing of civilians and sights of 'Hunnish' or 'Allied' barbarism survived into the Second World War and beyond as a means of telling the story of submarine and aerial warfare. Even at the height of the Cold War the Germans remained the principal enemy for the British in comics, film and on the box lids of plastic models. As a testament to the success of one aspect of the German propaganda machine, the memory of Baron von Richthofen, the so-called 'Red Baron' survived unscathed in pictures and even popular song[15] into the late 20th century, while British air aces such as Albert Balls, Edward Mannock and James McCudden were forgotten.

In the Central Powers these pictorial narratives unfolded within mythological and allegorical notions of the individual and nation. Initially, these were broadly successful at addressing the wider population and the issue of national. As the war dragged on demands for ultimate sacrifice on the altar of nationalism defined by the ruling elites later exploited by the Nazis, had little appeal to an increasingly hungry and politically divided population (Welch 2000).

13 The Ministry of Food campaign to reduce grain consumption was to limit the need for ships carrying grain, therefore putting fewer ships at risk.

14 The U-boat ran aground on the east coast of Britain. The crew had died in their bunks, asphyxiated by poisonous fumes.

15 'Snoopy vs. The Red Baron' by The Royal Guardsmen, released 1966, charted number 2 in the USA and number 8 in the UK.

Fig. 9 Anon., 1917, Don't Waste Bread! Ministry of Food.

Other posters fell within the discourses of design without necessarily abandoning traditional heroic narratives. Object posters by designers such as Hans Rudi Erdt, for example, and the anonymously designed British War Bond poster discussed above (fig.1) subscribed to modernist formal strictures of economy of design. They deployed pictorial devices reliant on flat planes of colour, singular objects such as roundels or silhouettes and typography to participate in wider debates about the efficacy of traditional realisms versus the so-called art poster in communicating ideas and messages.

The most significant difference between Britain and the Central Powers was summed up by the contemporary Thomas Reece, who made the crucial point that patriotic service could at the same time provide profit (Reece 1918: 48). In the Central Powers gender and identity were constructed within the notion of the subservient subject rather than the democratic citizen consumer in the commercially determined publicity that characterised British liberal democracy.

Bradley had conceived of the museum as casket or chamber of memories for future generations. Much of the imagery drew on iconographies coined before the battles had taken place and were reinforced by already-existing discourses of paranoia and anti-German feeling. Produced by artisans of commercial and popular culture, the imagery was close to commerce and base politics far removed from the eschatological reality of total war. They were not artists seeking to record, document or otherwise capture the realities of fighting. If these images are to serve as memories they do so only as the recollection of narratives in the print media. They are an index of the formation and reproduction of public consciousness and they articulated widely held anxieties and formulaic class and gender stereotypes. Their function was to sell media products, consumables, war bonds and government agendas. They reproduced sanitised, instrumental popular views of conflict. So why look at them? The point is to examine their sustaining power through their institutional and discursive existences, in their functions as part of retrievable archives and popular narratives in history and memory. As mnemonic devices they do not bring to bear the documentary record or the experience, they are fictional representations in discourses that mingle the represented present with prior fictional futures to memorialise for those who were not present aspects of the past remote from the reality of the war. The evidence of the poster is that it performed a task and employed a ‘natural’ language alongside what it ostensibly depicted in narratives where we as subjects, then and now,

are able to recognise aspects of our constructed gender roles and identities. They are part of a closed feedback circuit of recollection where the classified, ordered and retrievable summon a memory in a chaotic cocktail of narratives that by the Second World War had settled into on the one hand a modernism that of itself embraced technological advance as progressive (Rennie 2010), and on the other an adolescent heroic comic book realism. These articulations took place within the visual vocabulary of the popular arts, finding their lasting embodiment in the Battle of Britain Memorial on the Embankment, London, unveiled in 2005, where bronze panels emulate realist narratives more redolent of Trevor Howard in the 1969 film of the same name than the men and women it memorialises.

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Fig. 3 Bert Thomas, 1918, Help to Buy an Aeroplane, National War Savings Committee No.76, J. Weiner Ltd., London. IWM PST 10184.

Fig. 4 Leon Benett, 1886. Frontispiece for Jules Verne *Robur the Conqueror*. Available from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:'Robur_the_Conqueror'_by_L%C3%A9on_Benett_01.jpg [Accessed 9 November 2015].

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Fig. 7 Anon., undated. The U-Boat Hero. Corso cinema: Budapest, IWM PST 3218.

Fig. 8 Hans Rudi Erdt, 1917. *U-Boote Heraus!* (U-Boats. Out!). IWM PST 0515.

Fig. 9 Anon., 1917, Don't Waste Bread! Ministry of Food, Clarke and Sherwell Ltd: London. IWM 13354.

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Thomas Hippler

Bombing Barbarians. The Imperial Origins of Bombing and the Imagination of a European Civil War

Herbert George Wells' science fiction novel *The War in the Air* was published in 1908 and it had an enormous impact on European consciousness (Hobsbawm 2003: 221). H. G. Wells was both a Fabian socialist and a member of the Air League of the British Empire (Hynes 1968: 15-53 and Smith 1986: 86). The novel is plotted around the story of Bert Smallways, a 'vulgar little creature', who finds himself embarked on a German airship on a bombing mission against New York City (Wells 1926, vol. 20: 162-3). Confronted with the selective bombardment of the city's infrastructure, the authorities decide to hoist the white flag. However, public opinion reacts against this decision and an insurrection movement for national defence breaks out. Given the German inability to land troops and to occupy and pacify the city, they have to bomb New York into submission 'because she was at once too strong to be occupied and too undisciplined to surrender in order to escape destruction. Given the circumstances, the thing had to be done' (ibid.: 200-1).

Aerial warfare presented a decisive shortcoming: its inability to occupy territory. There was a fundamental contradiction between its enormous power of destruction and its helplessness in controlling the ground. The particular strength of Wells' analysis lies in the connection he established between technological means, forms of social organization and warfare. According to Wells, the specific political contradiction of his time was that between democracy and war (ibid.: 100-1). But, contrary to today's fashionable theory of democratic peace, Wells did not argue that democracy was inherently in contradiction to war. According to him, the nation had abandoned the thought of war to the professional military: 'War had become a matter of apparatus of special training and skill of the most intricate kind. It had become undemocratic' (ibid.: 176). Democracy is linked to some forms of patriotism and the needs of the scientific age to a certain professionalization of the armed forc-

es. Yet, the highly specialized technological arm of aviation is unable to contain the insurrectional movement of a population driven by its patriotic feelings. Wells sums up the difficulties in the following paragraph: 'The difficulty of the Germans ... came from the impossibility of landing any efficient force or, indeed, any force at all from the air-fleet. ... From above they could inflict immense damage; they could reduce any organised Government to a capitulation in the briefest space, but they could not disarm, much less could they occupy, the surrendered areas below. They had to trust to the pressure upon the authorities below of a threat to renew the bombardment. It was their sole resource. No doubt, with a highly organised and undamaged Government and a homogeneous and well-disciplined people that would have sufficed to keep the peace. But this was not the American case. Not only was the New York Government a weak one and insufficiently provided with police, but the destruction of the City Hall and Post-Office and other central ganglia had hopelessly disorganised the co-operation of part with part. ... The Germans had struck at the head, and the head was conquered and stunned – only to release the body from its rule. New York had become a headless monster, no longer capable of collective submission' (ibid.: 195-6). With admirable clear-thinking Wells thus hints at a decisive dilemma of democratic government: the 'constitutive power' of the population and the 'constituted power' of the government.[1] Moreover, the depiction of the population of New York City as a 'headless monster' hints at resemblances between urban populations under warlike stresses and the colonial imaginary of 'savage people'.

The vision of Wells is a very sombre one, as it is indebted to a vision of a crisis of European democracy in the years around 1900. The sharp awareness of the 'democratic paradox' potentially leads him to anti-democratic and racist positions. In Wells' novel, the Japanese actually join the war between Germany and America, and their swifter planes rapidly destroy the more vulnerable German dirigibles. And the British protagonist Bert Smallways, who had been embarked by the Germans, even ends up feeling sympathetic to his captors in the face of the 'yellow peril': when the airship Hohenzollern had been brought down, 'the visible world [was left] to Asia, to yellow people beyond Christendom, to all that was terrible and strange!' (Wells 1926, vol. 20: 266). In his description of the bombing of New York, Wells thus

1 For the conceptual history of '*pouvoir constituant*' see Negri 1999.

depicts 'men, women, and children mixed together as though they had been no more than Moors, or Zulus, or Chinese' (ibid.: 201-2). 'The special peculiarities of aerial warfare were of such a nature as to trend, once it had begun, almost inevitably towards social disorganisation. […] Nothing comparable to this state of affairs had been known in the previous history of warfare, unless we take such a case as that of a 19th century warship attacking some large savage or barbaric settlement […] Then, indeed, there had been cruelties and destruction that faintly foreshadowed the horrors of the aerial war. Moreover, before the 20th century the world had had but one experience, and that a comparatively light one, in the Communist insurrection of Paris, 1871, of the possibilities of a modern urban population under warlike stresses' (ibid.: 238-9).

Wells' science fiction thus establishes an explicit parallel between 'uncivilised people' outside Europe and methods of colonial warfare on the one hand, and social disorganization, insurrection, and technological war in Europe on the other. These themes were to become prominent in the interwar period, especially in German military literature. Erich Ludendorff, for instance, remarks that the totalisation of war, whose origins can be found in universal conscription and thus on the reorganisation of politics upon a popular basis, has features similar to colonial war. Limited wars are actually deemed to be morally suspect, since the existence of a community is not at stake. The morality of fighting, in other words, stems from the existential danger to which a community is exposed. And in this sense, colonial wars are total wars, at least for the non-Europeans who wage war for 'ethical reasons' (Ludendorff 1988: 6). In contrast to this limited view 'cabinet wars' are considered more as organised theft than as morally legitimate existential struggles. Ludendorff's argument is thus underpinned by the idea that the total mobilisation during the First World War had the effect of overcoming the split between the state and the population; state and population had become united. This kind of argument clearly shows that Ludendorff opposed older and monarchical forms of war in favour of the new wars of the 20th century that are characterized as *völkisch* (ibid.: 61). These views are certainly not incongruent with his being an early supporter of the Nazi movement and of Hitler's putsch in Munich in 1923. What is puzzling, however, is to recognise that what Wells had called 'democracy' bears some resemblance to what Ludendorff called '*völkisch*'. On a conceptual level, this should not surprise us, given the fact that the Greek *demos* – 'the people' as opposed to the elite (*aristoi*) – is one of the meanings of the German word *das Volk*. *Volk*, how-

ever, as with most of the equivalents in modern European languages – like the French *le peuple* or the Italian *il popolo* – also included what the Greek language had called *ethnos*, that is, a community of descent. The modern vocabulary denoting both the people as a social category and the people as an ethnic community implies that the two meanings are indeed close. In both cases the emphasis is put on the idea that the political form, the state, had to be a consequence of the social organization of the population and that no split has to separate the population from its political form.

Another dimension, however, has to be added to this picture: the gendered imagination of 'the people'. In the European theatre, the people is a fundamentally unstable entity. The notion designs, on the one hand, the subject of politics and conveys, as such, a male connotation. The exemplification is the citizen-soldiers fighting for his fatherland. On the other hand, however, the people is also a permanent threat to social stability. In this respect the people has an essentially female connotation. This latter connotation is exemplified in another hybrid text: Giulio Douhet's *Come finì la Grande Guerra* (How the Great War Ended) of 1919 is situated somewhere between a novel, counter-factual history, and a work of military strategy. The Italian general had become increasingly famous as a military writer on air power and is most known as the author of *The Command of the Air*, where he recommends ruthless bombing attacks on urban populations. In his 1919 military fantasy, Douhet hints at the same nexus between aerial bombing and its revolutionary impact on the urban populations. In addition the description of the social disorder induced by aerial bombing always involves the presence of women (Douhet 1919: 62). Women perform here and elsewhere the function of a metonymy of the people, and more particularly of the undisciplined rabble, in contrast to the male discipline that constitutes a coherent body politic out of an anonymous mass. Air warfare thus has a gendering impact on the imagination of warfare. The coherent nation of which the male citizen-soldier is the perfect example is shattered and becomes an anonymous and disorganised rabble with a female face.

Similar ideas can be found in much of the military literature of the inter-war period, such as Hans Ritter's *Der Zukunftskrieg und seine Waffen* (Future War and its Weapons) of 1924, which discusses the employment of air power in some detail. In the original situation at the beginning of human history, war was 'a war of annihilation' (*Ausrottungskrieg*) of one tribe against another (Ritter 1924: 5). The subsequent development of absolute monarchies

introduced a split between warriors and populace and thus a barrier between two different political classes. Ritter argues that the whole 19th century had been characterised by a paradoxical development: on the one hand, the legacy of the French Revolution had mobilised the whole male population for the national war effort but, on the other hand, international law had upheld the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. This intrinsic paradox had to be overcome and, according to Ritter, it was 'the superior logic and the cold vision of the purpose of English politics which made the necessary first step towards the rupture of the sacrosanct law of humanity, when enacting a hunger blockade, regardless of age or sex, on the inhabitants of the besieged fortress of Germany' (ibid.: 7). In this way war has now returned to its former and more original condition of an existential struggle of one community against another. Accordingly, it is legitimate to bombard civil populations from the air. French authors also adhered to this vision, arguing that only the part of the 'the civilian population not taking part in the manufacture of military equipment' was immune from being targeted (Rolland 1916: 70). The author of a 1923 doctoral dissertation in international law held the same point of view when concluding that international law had not provided clear criteria as to what determines the military character of a given target. Consequently, he bluntly states that 'aeroplanes should not be forbidden to attack these necessary auxiliaries of the enemy army' such as railway workers, workers in ammunition factories, and anybody whose economic role is of direct or indirect military interest (Bouruet-Aubertot 1923: 63-5).

It is puzzling, however, to find strangely similar analyses of the political situation in the pre-1914 writings of H. G. Wells. These lines of thought led Wells to cast doubt on democracy as a viable form of political organization and to envisage more authoritarian forms of government.[2] Commenting on the implications of Blériot's crossing of the Channel in the *Daily Mail* on 27 July 1909, Wells pointed out that 'the days of natural democracy' were coming to an end (Wells 1927, vol. 4: 422. See also Wohl 1994: 89). In his political writings, which are a useful complement to his highly influential science fiction novels, he drew the logical conclusions from these views (Hillegas 1967). As he points out in his autobiography, he had been convinced, from 1900 on, of the necessity of a world state 'and the complete insufficiency of the current parliamentary methods of democratic government', ideas that

2 See his texts *Democracy under Revision* (1927) and *After Democracy* (1932).

were to take different forms in his writings (Wells, 1934, vol. 2: 651). During the First World War, he developed the idea of a 'League for Peace', that is, a supranational organization capable of effectively controlling the non-proliferation of modern weaponry (Wells 1917: 275). An 'International Tribunal' for the 'discussion and settlement of international disputes' should be set up. It is at this point that Wells' politically informed science fiction converges with the perspectives that can be found in the writings of military strategists. In order to be able to prevent war effectively, 'The International Tribunal' would need also to have power to intervene in the affairs of any country or region in a state of open and manifest disorder' (ibid.: 278).

The idea is actually almost as ancient as the discussions about the military uses of air power. Victor Hugo had already formulated the idea that air power would bring about universal peace in 1864 (Clarke 1992: 4). In two of Rudyard Kipling's science fiction stories, *With the Night Mail* (1905) and *As Easy as A.B.C.* (1912), an 'Aerial Board of Control' – the A.B.C. of the second story's title – has developed from the technical necessity of regulating aerial traffic into a form of world government. With sovereign states on the verge of extinction, technocrats have seized power and keep the world running smoothly. The second of these stories revolves around three aviators called up to deal with social unrest in 2065, which clearly shows that the A.B.C.'s world government ultimately relied on its air power (Paris 1992: 39 and Carrington 1955: 375). In his 1933 work *The Shape of Things to Come*, H. G. Wells was to pick up the ideas of 'World Air Control' and an 'Air Force for Mutual Assistance' as executive organs of a world government. In his early writings, Douhet, the ruthless Italian 'air-power prophet', adhered to exactly the same vision of universal peace made possible through air control (Hippler 2011. See also Beaumont 2001).

In 1910 French writer François Mallet had argued in his *La conquête de l'air et la paix universelle* (The Conquest of the Air and Universal Peace) that the advent of air power had not only rendered war impossible, but had underpinned this idea with the idea of a civilising mission against 'black races' and other barbarians: 'Wars between civilised nations no longer produce material or moral benefits for the warring parties; but, in the case of the black races, one wonders if these peoples, whose level of moral and intellectual development is obviously inferior to that of the white race, were not created as spoils of war for conquerors. Did pitiless nature make it that way?' (Mallet 1910: 38).

There is thus a direct yet puzzling link between pacifism, racism and Social Darwinism. And this link leads to yet another paradox: the first employment of air power in war did indeed take place in a colonial space or on the European periphery in the Balkans. At the same time, however, European soldiers and airmen seemed to have considered these experiences as not being 'real' wars, as indeed has most of the historiography that asserts that it was in the First and the Second World Wars that air power was systematically used in real war situations. It is possible, however, to read the story the other way around.

It was in the context of the colonial war in Libya in 1911 that an Italian plane dropped the first bomb from the air. The next year, air power was used during the First Balkan War, in which the Ottoman Empire was opposed by a coalition between Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Immediately before the First World War, both France and Spain began to use aircraft in their colonial wars in North Africa (Paris 1991: 100-3). The use of aircraft in colonial wars was a constant theme in pre-1914 treatises of future warfare and in science fiction literature – if the two genres can be effectively distinguished. And there is indeed some evidence that military science and science fiction are intimately interwoven. In this respect it is interesting but not astonishing to note the affinity of early aviation science fiction before the First World War with racist themes: novelists who wanted to depict the fascination and the military usefulness of dropping bombs or hunting and machine-gunning aeroplanes were naturally led to situate the plot in an extra-European context.[3] On the one hand, this introduced an effect of asymmetry to European readers, since Europeans were never victims of these kinds of military practices. On the other hand, these horrifying practices seemed to be more legitimate if they were performed in a context of colonial warfare against 'uncivilised races'.[4] The first target of literary science fiction was the 'yellow peril', as in Matthew Phipps Shield's greatest success *The Yellow Danger*. The Chinese villain Dr Yen How is a source for the fictional character of Dr Fu Manchu. The same holds true for French writer Émile Driant, whose novel *L'aviateur du pacifique* (The Aviator of the Pacific) of 1909 'foresaw the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor over fifty years later, and divined the critical

3 To be sure, this characteristic changes after the First World War, and in particular during the 1930s, when European consciousness begins to conceive of itself as a potential victim of air warfare. See Lindqvist 2001 and Hippler 2007.

4 The following paragraph relies on Lindqvist 2001.

role that flying machines would play in the conflict for control of the Pacific' (Wohl 1994: 86). Two years later, he published *Au-dessus du continent noir* (Above the Black Continent), another aviation novel in which aircraft are employed for missions of colonial control, such as punitive missions against barbarous rebels against French colonial rule. Science fiction literature thus endorsed a theme that Englishman R. P. Hearne had developed during these same years from a military point of view. In his 1910 *Airships in Peace and War* he declares that 'in savage lands the moral effect of such an instrument of war is impossible to conceive. […] The appearance of the airship would strike terror into the tribes. […] It will enable an expedition to be made with astounding rapidity, it will create the most terrifying effect on savage races, and the awful wastage of life occasioned to white troops by such expeditionary work would be avoided, whilst the cost would be considerably reduced' (Hearne 1910: 183-5).

The early discussions about the military use of air power – especially among the colonial powers – were indeed centred on the idea of the colonial possibilities of air power and the employment of the new device in 'small wars'. And the 'moral effect' of air power is an important argument in this respect.

As already seen, the first military employment of aircraft did indeed take place in the colonies, during the Libyan war of 1911, and in subsequent conflicts, virtually all colonial powers made use of air power. In their conquest of Morocco in 1912-14, the French used aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing (Niessel 1926). According to René Martel, author of a history of the French Bombing Fleet up to 1918, bombing – and not reconnaissance – was the most important contribution of aircraft to the conquest of Morocco and the 'projectiles coming from France make a great impression on the adversary' (Martel 1939: 11). Lieutenant Armand Des Prez de La Morlais wrote thirty years later in an internal report that these bombardments 'produced a considerable moral effect on the native rebels. ... We ourselves were aware of the fear we were inspiring due to the rapidity with which groups of fighters were dispersing as the plane approached.' De La Morlais adds that in several villages the local markets did not take place any more for fear of aerial attack.[5] In a memorandum, French commander Lyautey spoke of the employ-

5 'Les origines du bombardement par avion', Service historique de l'Armée de l'Air, fonds Des Prez de la Morlais Z 35 342', cited by Pernot and Villatoux 2000: 96.

ment of aviation in support of troops acting against 'rebel tribes'.[6] It can be inferred from this that attacks on basic economic and social structures such as marketplaces were intentional and systematic.

As for the British Commonwealth, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, commissioned a report in 1914 on the possible use of aircraft in Somaliland and proposed employing an airship in the colony to the cabinet (Killingray 1984: 429); and in a memorandum entitled 'The Future of Air Power', dated 27 June 1918, Frederick Sykes developed the idea of the imperial use of air power.[7] The real breakthrough in colonial air policing, however, was made after the First World War. Formed on 1 April 1918, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was the first independent air force in the world. After the war the service was drastically cut, mainly for budgetary reasons, and even threatened in its institutional independence. In this context air power advocates in London came back to Churchill's idea in 1914 of employing aircraft against a rebellion which had been going on for some twenty years in northern Somalia, the Dervish resistance movement led by Muhammed Abdullah Hassan, called the 'Mad Mullah' (Jardine 1923). The mission started in 1919 and was accomplished in January 1920 (Gray 1980). According to one British author describing the operation, the Somalian fighters had been ignorant of the existence of aeroplanes and 'conjectured that the airplanes were chariots of Allah coming to take the Mullah to paradise, or a Turkish intervention come to tell of the Turkish Sultan's victory in the First World War' (Jardine 1923: 239). Almost killed by the first bomb, the Mullah fled to the desert where he was hunted by the RAF until he gave up (Hess 1964: 432). This success was of great importance for the RAF and actually ensured its survival as an independent service. Aircraft could be promoted as a swift and cheap means to perform missions of colonial policing, and this was indeed the main task of the air force in the interwar period (Beaumont 1979). 'The most common feature of colonial air policing was what was called an air blockade. The operations started with heavy bombing from the air for a couple of days. In a second step, the intensity would be lowered, but bombing would remain persistent in order to keep the rebels far from their villages, fields, grazing grounds, and water supply. In other words, the tribe was bombed into starvation or they resigned to colonial rule. In other cases, aircraft directly attacked

6 Rapport du général Lyautey au ministre de la guerre, 4 septembre 1913, Service historique de l'Armée de l'Air, C 34, cited in ibid. 96-7.

7 The memorandum is reproduced as Appendix V in Sykes 1942: 544-54.

the rebels or opened machine-gun fire on their cattle. Sometimes aircraft were used to support the infantry, attacking carefully defined areas and their flanks, front and rear' (Ellis 1995: 137).

The first territory in which the practice of colonial bombing from the air was systematically employed was Iraq, but similar features were also employed on the North-West Frontier of India, that is, Afghanistan, and in Sudan, Syria and Morocco by the French and Spanish, and by the Americans in Nicaragua (Omissi 1990). The archetypical concept of 'police bombing', however, was developed and employed in Iraq (Paris 1989). An effective occupation of the formerly Ottoman territory was too expensive for the tight British budget, and so British forces were extremely reduced. They included eight RAF squadrons, four armoured-car companies, a modest indigenous force, and a single British infantry brigade (Paschall 1991: 20). In cases of insurrection, the regulations required that at first, warning leaflets should be dropped, and then villages would be bombed no more than forty-eight hours later (Harris 1947: 22-3). However, in reality the poor navigation systems often caused confusion and the wrong villages were bombed (Corum and Johnson 2003: 62-6 and Towle 1989: 9-55). The advocates of air policing argued that it was 'both economical and humane since it inflicts neither great nor permanent suffering upon the people against whom it is used nor heavy casualties among those who have to wield it'.[8] Critics of air policing, on the other hand, insisted on the inability of the device to control the populations effectively. Lord Lloyd thus stated in the House of Lords on 9 April 1930 that 'whatever air control can do, it can never civilize people nor pacify people' (cited by Townshend 1986: 157).

The method of indirect control through air policing may indeed be considered as a major historical shift. Within Europe, traditional international law had considered occupation of territory within the necessary scope for legitimate warfare. Occupation establishes a pacified relationship between occupying power and civil population. To the extent to which the populace does not engage in a national resistance movement, the occupying power acts as executive sovereign on the occupied territory. There is, in other words, a relation of obedience and protection between occupiers and occupied. In the extra-European sphere, on the other hand, this model has never had any normative

8 Air control in undeveloped countries, Air Staff Memorandum N. 41, 1 January 1929, AIR 20/674, cited by Killingray 1984: 440.

value. Colonisation aimed at permanent control of the subjected territories, and this permanent dominion was ideologically justified by a civilizing mission on the part of the colonial powers. In order to be able to civilise, however, the social structure of the colonised country had to be substantially modified. The method of indirect air control, as employed since the 1920s, cancelled this social interventionalism. Colonial rule thus relied on existing tribal structures and it was these tribal entities that owed submission to their colonial yet distant masters. And in case of rebellion, these tribal structures were bombed in an exemplary manner.

The employment of air power was generally acceptable in the context of 'uncivilised', that is, colonial warfare against non-white populations. In 1919, the South African government under Jan Christiaan Smuts – author of the famous report that had led to the creation of an independent Royal Air Force (Luck 2007) – requested aircraft from the imperial government, however reassuring London that 'the machine will not be used against the white population of Johannesburg but will be held in reserve mainly for demonstration purposed and consequent moral effect against the natives on the Reef should they become out of hand' (Killingray 1984: 432). Despite this promise the South African government did not hesitate to employ air power in order to crush white miners on the Rand in March 1922. Unconditionally forbidden according to the rules of civilised warfare, the employment of indiscriminate bombing against civil populations was reserved to non-white 'barbarians' outside of Europe. At the same time, however, a notable extension and evolution of the notion of the barbarian can be observed in the years around the First World War. And the employment of air power – real or only in strategic planning – is a good indicator of this shift. In December 1917, in the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, British aircraft were first employed on the British home front in a non-violent but heavily threatening way: aircraft dropped leaflets urging workers in Coventry to end their strike (Omissi 1990: 40-3). During the 1919 rail strike and the 1926 General Strike a significant number of aircraft were employed to ensure essential transportation within Britain and to provide the provinces with daily copies of conservative newspapers like *The Times* and, in 1926, the governmental *British Gazette*. In early 1920 Hugh Trenchard, the 'father of the Royal Air Force', had already drafted a memorandum which discussed the possible use of aircraft to suppress 'industrial disturbances or risings' in 'settled countries' such as India, Egypt, Ireland, and England. If 'murder and arson' were being committed in cities in which 'a majority of the inhabitants are definitely hos-

tile' it should be made possible to fight the insurrection with 'a limited amount of bombing and machine gun fire'. Fearing a bad reaction in the press if it became known that the employment of the RAF against British workers was under discussion, Churchill urged the military authorities to withdraw the references to the British Isles – at least in the written communication. Nonetheless, the RAF was instrumental during the 1926 strike in transporting volunteer strike breakers, 'who manned steam engines, drove underground trains, maintained power stations and arrested "prominent communists". Trenchard had good reason to be pleased with the work of the air force during the strike, and he received letters of fulsome congratulation from several railway managers' (Omissi 1990: 41).

After 1926 there was no further need to defend Britain's internal order with the air force, one exception being the discussions about the bombing of warships held by mutineers at Invergordon in the autumn of 1931. In contrast to England, however, the 'Celtic periphery' and Ireland in particular, has always been a different case in point. During the Irish revolt of 1920, aircraft were employed for reconnaissance missions and for the protection of armoured cars from ambush (ibid. 42-3).

It thus becomes clear that the 'barbarians' who can legitimately be fought by bombs dropped from aircraft need not necessarily be extra-Europeans. In the face of what German conservative historian Ernst Nolte has termed the 'European Civil War', insurgents, rebels, or communists within Europe were subject to treatment that was formerly reserved for extra-European space. And the example of the use of air power in different forms of conflict – traditional wars between Western powers, colonial wars, or revolutionary war within Europe – gives credibility to Hannah Arendt's famous insight on the continuity between colonialism and totalitarian dominion. However, it is puzzling to see that the ideas of employing air power against workers on strike were most developed in Britain, a country with a long and well established democratic and liberal tradition.

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Part II
Semantics and Spaces

Sabine Höhler

Myths of Spatial Conquest: Air and Sea Between Obscurity and Enlightenment

Extraordinary Voyages

If there are residues of the strange and mysterious in the modern world we can expect to find them in the vast spaces of the air and the sea. Jules Verne's story of the undersea journey of the *Nautilus* presents a striking example of the known and the alien ocean co-existing in modern history. Published in 1870, the novel demonstrates that the more scientific surveys sorted out and classified the earth, the more compelling the adventure stories of exploring strange and unfamiliar spaces became. 18th century naturalists praised the observation networks expanding from Europe to encompass the earth as inspiring the Age of Enlightenment. Their methodical gaze no longer allowed for remoteness; courage and reason were to conquer the world's vastness and wonder. Only the most isolated and uninhabitable spaces – the poles, the deep sea and the higher atmosphere – escaped scientific rationalism deep into the 19th and even the 20th century. Endeavors to explore and chart these regions were themselves staged and celebrated as heroic quests to open up new empires to the rising nation states. The narratives of scientific prowess and of civilized mastery over the sea and the skies may have sought to restrain but never replaced the imagination of space as a boundless resource of the sublime.

Verne depicts the *Nautilus* as a 'ship *par excellence*' (Verne 2001 [1869/70]: 99), a masterpiece of scientific and engineering accuracy. To navigate its route around the earth the submarine employs the latest gear of registering instruments and control devices. Throughout its extraordinary voyage, physical, geographical, and nautical details are specified with scientific exactitude and numerical precision. To plot the journey of the *Nautilus* Verne embarked on a cable ship laying out the telegraph cables on the floor of the Atlantic

Ocean. He educated himself with the first comprehensive book on physical oceanography, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury's *The Physical Geography of the Sea* of 1855 (Maury 1859 [1855], Kylstra and Meerburg 1972). And yet, on its journey to illuminate the depths of the unknown and gain control of the underwater empire the *Nautilus* confronts mythical creatures like giant squids and passes through regions as fantastic as the lost continent of Atlantis, demonstrating how modern perceptions of the world did not dispose of popular phantasms but entangled the improbable and the incredible into new accounts. Twenty thousand leagues under the sea, science and fiction coexisted in a space that was factual and imaginative at the same time (Rozwadowski and van Keuren 2004, Adamowsky 2010, 2015, Helmreich 2009).

To understand the ongoing cultural fascination with stories of spatial conquest I suggest employing the concept of myth. Myth does not simply mean fiction but a narrative shared and preserved to substantiate a culture's self-understanding. Traditional mythology refers to stories returning in ever-new versions to substantiate and focus cultural self-images and collective memories. Alongside narrative recursivity and variability I propose to address the ambivalence of myth in order to analyze how stories about air and sea exploration gained power from their recurrence as well as from their potential to reconcile different epistemic positions regarding the spectacular and the scientific. I contend that the myths of air and sea conquest are best understood through unravelling the meanings of the ship as the vehicle of spatial exploration. In the 19th century, voyages of ships and airships thrived on their remarkable combination of security and vulnerability. Immersion and exposure as well as mastery and failure are at the heart of narratives of spatial conquest that worked on the thin line between confidence and terror, obscurity and enlightenment.

After discussing the widespread meanings of the ship in the prevailing narratives of Western culture I will turn to patterns of vulnerability and virility and how they turned the social space aboard the ship into a gendered space. Braving the elements of air and sea required an elite formation, an outstanding pilot and a loyal squad. The captain and the crew represented the valiant few, whether heroic or tragic, destined or doomed. The stories of their enclosure, displacement, and selectivity corroborated the heroic as well as the scientific triumphs over space. I hold that these stories did not fade away with the vagueness of unbound space in the era of enlightened geography. Instead the

motifs found their way into oceanography and aerology, the science of the upper atmosphere. Through their specific accounting practices and visualizing techniques the new disciplines transformed their objects. They constructed new travel narratives about the air and the sea that did not weaken but strengthened older myths.

Braving the Elements: Enclosure

From the early modern voyages of discovery to the Apollo lunar missions ships have served as a reservoir of collective memory and imagination. Symbolizing spatial expansion and exploration of the unknown as well as fragility, transition, and transience, the image of the ship has been at the heart of Western culture's most powerful narratives. Michel Foucault (1986 [1967]) considers the ship to be the 'heterotopia par excellence'. *Heterotopia* is his term for an exceptional site that exists within the world and, at the same time, lies far remote from or beyond it. Heterotopias, according to Foucault, are in relation with all other places and spaces, and yet in opposition to them. He describes the ship as a 'floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea' (27).

Roland Barthes (1972a [1957]) portrays the ship as a symbol of seclusion and refuge from life's raging storms. In a confined space it keeps the greatest possible number of valued objects at the traveler's disposal; the ship forms a singular universe floating amid the violent tempests of time. With reference to vessels like the *Nautilus* replicating the world on a small scale, Barthes depicts the ship as the vehicle of the encyclopedic project of the 19th century, collecting, archiving, and interpreting facts to encompass and conserve *en miniature* all the elements of a finite but rapidly proliferating world. Verne had described the library of the *Nautilus*, which holds 12,000 treasured volumes, in great detail. He also paid tribute to the ship's valuable collection of art and music and its magnificent museum whose cases display the varieties, rarities, and curiosities of nature (Verne 2001: 79-86). Thomas Richards (1993) describes such 19th century activities as a veritable 'obsession with gathering and ordering information', geared towards the conservation of culture through libraries and museums to defend mankind's achievements against the entropic processes of time. Metaphorically and literally, the *Nautilus* acted as an ordering device, an archive (9, 115-123).

Appropriating and preserving the world by compiling, registering, and neatly arranging the elements within it recalls the primal ship representing and archiving the inventory of the world, the biblical ark. This vessel from the Old Testament (Genesis 1, 6-9), furnished with specimens of life on earth, differs in a significant way from Verne's crammed but comfortable floating interiors: Noah's ark is the paradigmatic heterotopia, a storm-tossed place of survival and salvation in the face of catastrophe. Peter Sloterdijk (1999: 251ff) analyzes the ark as the perfect example of the 'ontology of enclosed space'. *Ark*, from the Latin *arca*, is the word for case or compartment, upholding a strict boundary between interior and exterior spaces. Following Sloterdijk, the ship denotes a 'swimming endosphere', an artificial interior space that under certain conditions provides the *only possible* environment for its inhabitants. Autonomous vehicles completely immersed in threatening surroundings frequently feature in narratives of spatial conquest. Command over the vessel, its machinery and its crew are essential signifiers to denote power over space. Captain Nemo admits as much when boasting to his involuntary passenger, Professor Arronax: 'I have complete confidence in the *Nautilus*, since I am her captain, her builder, and her engineer!' (Verne 2001: 99).

Immersion, Dislocation and Exposure

Aviation and seafaring have been glorified in countless descriptions of remoteness, isolation, and immersion in environments powerful, awesome, and sublime. Just as often, the vast surroundings of air and sea have been described as jagged, bleak, malicious, and desolate. Faraway worlds have been related with the violation of domestic conventions. At the edges of the known world, sites emerged that permitted retreat, irregularity, and aberration. In the maritime literature of the 19th century, descriptions of a homey idyll onboard amid a threatening environment are quite common. Lillian Nayder (1996) follows these motifs in Joseph Conrad's fiction, which stresses male camaraderie and fraternalism onboard, and a spiritual order that seems to exclude social inequalities and claims to private property. According to Nayder, in Conrad's seafaring fiction the ship becomes the real and the imagined space in which social tensions experienced on land could be suppressed and ignored, contributing to the sentimental idealizations of a life of order and solidarity at sea.

Gender has been one of the crucial categories for constituting stable social boundaries. Across the centuries navigation of air and sea has been an exclu-

sively male domain. Both historiography and fictional literature tell of the adventures of tough men on rough seas and their fight against untamed 'virgin worlds'. As the ship formed a contained and endangered space, the community on board formed a fragile union. In seafaring a special maritime culture emerged that Helen Rozwadowski (1996) calls a 'small world'. Equality among men was cultivated while a rigid and hierarchical order of spaces, ranks, and conduct prevailed. Through gender relations, life on board was romanticized, and discipline, supervision, and subordination were legitimized and enforced. Following Nayder, the solidarity of men constituted itself in relation to a ship that was imagined as female. A polyandrous community of men shared the ship as a common possession (Nayder 1996: 201).

The relationship of the captain to his ship mirrored the relationship with a woman who could – in accordance with Victorian images – be either angel or whore. The ship represented a servile asexual figure, an angelic bride or a good soul on the one hand, and a rebellious, demonic female body on the other; nevertheless, it was always seen as in the hands of the male crew. Nayder claims that ships were perceived as a man-made technology and thus in another way liberated from the image of destructive natural forces, attesting to patriarchal power instead of undermining it (197). Margaret Creighton (1996) contends that the strict separation of the sexes facilitated certain gendered structures among the crew. She argues that the ship needs to be understood as a heterosocial space that did not support one singular masculine self-image or one particular social style; sailors became 'men' in more than one way. It was the *absence* of women on board, Creighton suggests, that turned gender into a relevant category (121, 125).

The Chosen Few: Selectivity and Exclusion

The presence of women on board seemed only to emphasize the need for extraordinary manly character when cruel environments turned their powers against fragile humans with contempt and inexorability. In the novella *The Condor* by Adalbert Stifter, published in 1840 in the early days of aeronautics, a young woman is wildly determined to prove herself by taking part in a balloon ascent with two experienced male scientist-aeronauts. Stifter recounts in detail how the two practiced men make use of the balloon as an instrument for meteorological observations at great heights. To them the practice of aviation appears profane. They appreciate the airship as a vehicle of scientific progress in understanding the air through its atmospheric compo-

sition: temperature and pressure conditions, humidity and static, clouding and icing. In contrast the woman views the balloon as a vehicle of autonomy and liberty. Her flight is a means to declare herself free from arbitrary limits, a way 'to break the bands of oppression'. To her profound embarrassment, however, the altitude makes her dizzy. She nearly faints from a glance 'down perpendicularly through the aerial abyss'. The flight must be aborted, entailing angry remarks from the men: 'I told you, Richard, that woman cannot endure the sky' (Stifter 1859 [1840]: 234, 235, 237).

The masculine nature of spatial conquest becomes manifest in the aeronauts' practice of concentrated scientific observation, in their engagement with their instruments, and in their 'monotonous murmur […] as one dictated and the other wrote' (236). The freedom of the skies, noble and majestic, and thus the importance of the described event, is reserved to the men who prove to be immune to the impressions and temptations of elevation. In line with the requirements of objective observation of the 19th century the aeronauts are armed with a battery of mechanical gadgets to resist the temptation of merely contemplating the sublime wonders of the skies (Daston and Park 2001, Daston and Galison 2007). The woman is also excluded from their scientific mission. To her, the sky that the two men confront with their instruments appears cold and pitch-black. Stifter adds ambivalence to his story by employing the feminine as the means to point to the monstrous boundless abyss behind the disciplined secular sky – his outlook on the hubris of scientific and technical advance on nature in the second half of the 19th century (Höhler 2000: 78ff).

Myth: Narrative Performed

The recurring narratives of autarkic vehicles and selected crews immersed in the hostile environments of the air and the sea are not fictitious and they do not stand in opposition to reality. Mythical narratives are not made up but made, to borrow from Donna Haraway's thoughts on the ambivalence of fiction, construction, and fact. Following Haraway (1997: 99) acts of myth making involve 'contingency and specificity but not epistemological relativism'. Similar ideas are essential to Judith Butler's (1993) work on representation through performative practice, to which my analysis is also much indebted. Her work also stresses repetition and repeated citing in processes of 'materialization' of norms. Myth highlights the cultural formation of narratives that embrace and explicate collective human realities meaningfully. Such

narratives are powerful: they are performed and sustained in stories, traditions, rituals, images, symbols, and objects; consolidated in institutional settings; and stabilized and legitimized through repetition, through retelling and practicing. In all instances of narrative performance myth is not univocal but ambivalent; myth is not about establishing facts but about creating meaning and significance (Höhler 2001: 36-57).

Hans Blumenberg (1979) stresses the durability and the variability of myth as a consistent narrative. Following Blumenberg, the power of a mythical narrative lies in its combination of traditional elements and time-specific variations of a story. In ever-changing versions, a myth's core elements are combined and intertwined with specific historical situations. In Blumenberg's wake, numerous studies on myth have explored processes of reality formation through narrative repetition, with a focus on narrative coherence (Schlesier 1991, Greiner-Kemptner and Riesinger 1995, Völker-Rasor and Schmale 1998). Applying these patterns to stories of air and sea conquest shows how the timeless motif of the ship as the 'greatest reserve of the imagination' (Foucault 1986 [1967]: 27) is constantly expanded and adapted to account for the sciences exploring the earth's vast spatial resources and to authorize the modern image of human technological and scientific supremacy in space.

The power of myth lies in its capability to reconcile controversial positions: science and fiction, explanation and imagination. The vast spaces of air and sea seem to offer a resort for either standpoint. Pursuing the semiological foundations of myth construction Roland Barthes (1972b [1957]) states that myth 'hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion. Placed before the dilemma … myth finds a third way out' (129). Barthes discusses the 'third way out' as a form of naturalization: driven either to unveil or to liquidate the concept it presents, myth will 'naturalize' it. Subsequently, I will explore the discursive practice of naturalization by studying how the scientific practice of charting and mapping space brought forth the deep sea and the atmosphere as the naturally three-dimensional spaces common today. I argue that the scientists' accounts, though claiming to bring light into the vaguely known through the metric scale and the taxonomical order, necessarily involved 'recursive layers of stories and metaphors' (Haraway 1997: 135-141).



Fig. 1 Underwater landscape of Crespo Island, chromotypograph.



PAYSAGE SOUS-MARIN DE L'ILE CRESPO.

Fig. 2 Underwater landscape of Crespo Island, matching plate.

Two corresponding illustrations from Verne's novel about the *Nautilus*' journey may exemplify this tension of unveiling and elimination involved in the process of naturalization (Figures 1 and 2). The chromotypograph and matching plate showing the 'paysage sous-marin de l'île Crespo' are one of several similar pairs in his work that beautifully show how Verne, through the figure of Captain Nemo, constantly contrasted the emerging scientific or 'enlightened' view of the 19th century with the mythical and opaque oceans of his past. The first image depicts a colorful submarine landscape in panoramic perspective. Three aquanauts wander in awe through a newly discovered exotic space. The second picture presents the landscape schematically sketched and neatly labeled as if drawn by the hand of a 19th century naturalist who has just discovered a wealth of new species to appraise in taxonomical terms. Supposedly, the two pictures are paired to show the *same* space and objects. But do they? Strikingly, the aquanauts are left out of the second image. I suggest that the image neither reveals nor conceals the context of submarine wonder. The scientific version simply passes over the discovery of a new world by highlighting its biological diversity. The documentary version of the ocean has become as 'natural', that is, as widely accepted and 'true' as the version of the breathtaking ocean.

Naturalization: Scientists' Plots

To understand the scientific acts of 'naturalization' we need to appreciate that Verne's two submarine landscapes are not conflicting but complementary versions of ocean depth. 19th century sciences and technologies of spatial exploration took up the widespread themes of spatial conquest – exclusion, dislocation, exposure, selectivity, virility – and represented them in their specific disciplinary contexts. After all, mythical narrative is a question not only of persistent motifs but also of successful plots.

Ships themselves have been assessed as 'instruments': as technologies of remote investigation, operating in great distance from their national control centers, they figured prominently in narratives of the information-based construction of imperial territorial power. Richard Sorrensen (1996) describes the ship as a part of a larger instrumental entity operating out of a metropolitan capital and reaching across the globe. Rozwadowski (2005) puts forth a similar argument concerning technology's mediating role in shaping the image of the mid-19th century deep-sea floor. Investigating deep-sea research in the context of the Atlantic telegraph cable projects in the 1850s and 1860s,

she argues that the 'ocean-scape' took shape only within a complex interaction of instruments, methods, interpretations, and motivations for depth measurement. Leaving tracks, marks, and inscriptions on maps, the ship became a device of spatial perception and occupation. The ship can be understood as an instrument to organize oceanic knowledge into a coherent and comprehensive whole; it links, in Thomas Richards' words, 'the control of territory with a hermeneutics of information' (Richards 1983: 113).

In 1858 Lieutenant Maury, the reputed founder of oceanography, asserted that until the middle of the 19th century 'the bottom of what sailors call "blue water" was as unknown to us as is the interior of any of the planets of our system' (Maury 1858: 114). Deep-sea research could not rely on direct observations. Depth-sounding meant lowering a piece of heavy sounding lead fastened to strong twine into the sea to penetrate the dark body of the oceans of which only the surface areas and the continental margins were known. The British *Challenger* expedition of 1872, the first expedition equipped solely for the purpose of deep-sea research, is said to have marked a historical break in scientific ocean surveying with the sheer amount of data collected. On a voyage around the earth which paralleled the journey of the *Nautilus* just two years earlier, the *Challenger* drew the broad outline of the earth's deep seas (Deacon 1971: 333ff).

The single data points gained in the process of depth sounding were arranged into bathymetrical charts using the technique of isolines which Alexander von Humboldt developed around the turn of the 18th century to represent meteorological phenomena synoptically in a graphical form. By means of scaling and shading the collected data assemblages met the eye as coherent pictures. What became familiar as authentic or natural 'sections' or 'profiles' of the bottom of the ocean, actually reproduced mathematical relations or functions, relating measured numbers to the distance between two geographical locations (Höhler 2002). The technique of arranging single measurements as linear isobaths, isobars or isotherms in charts and maps served as 'a new way of accumulating time and space' in transportable and stable forms, as Bruno Latour (1990: 31ff) has shown. Stability in the transport and translation of abstract spatial concepts, he argued, mattered more than their scientific integrity. Indeed, much of the new immutability of the deep sea and the atmosphere depended on their 'optical consistency' (Latour 1986: 7-9).

The new views of the sea floor and the atmospheric composition could not exist independently from the scientific definitions, technologies, and instru-

ments that made them natural. At the same time the plots presented a consistent texture which suggested a mimetic relationship between data and nature. Through instrumental measurements and graphic representations the sciences of the air and the sea reconciled the fabrication and the reality of earthly spaces. To be sure, the scientific prose of the surprising wealth and diversity of the underwater and atmospheric landscapes of isolines and contours proved no less poetical than the descriptions of abysmal seas and skies. Modern travel narratives came in the form of logs, journals, and drawings, but they were also presented in the formalized and standardized languages of physics, biology, and geography; measured in the units of numbers and specimens, written with precision instruments, and structured as tables, graphs and maps.

The new empirically grounded and instrumentally based scientific approach to the earth in the 19th century has come to be known as Humboldtian Science (Cannon 1978, Dettelbach 1996). On analogy to Humboldt's program of a 'terrestrial physics', according to which the order of nature would emerge from a vast number of observations across the surface of the earth, the scientist-aeronauts around 1900 began to cultivate a 'physics of the atmosphere' that operated under the name of 'aerology'. The new discipline applied physical methods and theories to the higher or 'free' atmospheric processes and methodically employed standardized registering instruments to study and expose the skies by synthesizing discrete observations into a new overview (Höhler 2001).

The process of naturalizing the third dimension could draw on the long-standing traditions of naturalists' travels and journeys and their related narratives of scientific self-restraint which, like Humboldt's accounts had done before, would be rewarded by the mastery of the space under inspection. Aerologists and oceanographers once more presented themselves as trained and tireless observers, as skilled and swift athletes, and as rigorous and righteous soldiers. They reported about conquering distance heroically, penetrating dangerous wilderness, distancing themselves from their surroundings by dispassionate instrument use, and they returned with trophies in the form of data collections and of marks and inscriptions on their bodies. The accounts of spatial conquest may have changed historically, but crucial elements like exploration, discovery, and conquest persisted.

Conclusion: Neologism is Inevitable

'The Atlantic! A vast expanse of water whose surface covers 25 million square miles, 9,000 miles long, with an average width of 2,700' (Verne 2001: 284). Closing with these words from Jules Verne's story of the voyage of the *Nautilus*, we may conclude that the sciences of the earth did not replace but instead reclaimed former marvelous and fantastic views on nature. The sciences transformed the older stories into new accounts written in the language of precise measurements. Verne's novel may have been so successful because, like many works of science fiction, it presented two closely related narratives of the spaces to be discovered, the spectacular and the scientific.

According to Barthes, a mythology needs 'most often ephemeral concepts, in connection with limited contingencies: neologism is then inevitable' (Barthes 1972b: 120-121). The earth sciences arranged for this neologism: by the end of the 19th century the vast spaces of air and sea were no longer sealed volumes, opaque to direct human observation, but transparent in nature, comprising objective and consistent, reproducible and verifiable data. In another way, however, the air and the sea remained impenetrable, as knowledge about these spaces was now irrevocably reserved for the new experts of science and their refined measurement techniques and elaborate theories.

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Ute Rösler

Beautiful Virgin and Old Battleaxe: The Sinking of the Titanic

In April 1912 the famous British steamer 'Titanic' collided with an iceberg and sank to the bottom of the sea. More than 2200 people, men, women and children were lost; only approximately 700 survived in lifeboats. As a result of the new technology of wireless radio transmission, these facts emerged world-wide before even one of the survivors had set foot on land. Nonetheless, the actual circumstances of the disaster were little known, thus providing the perfect soil for the creation of a myth. Within only a few days this myth had been formed, mainly by newspapers and magazines, and encroached upon collective memory with an eruptive strength.

'[T]he symbolic Titanic', as the American historian Steven Biel once put it poetically, 'plunged into some very rough seas.' (Biel 1996: 10) In many respects the turn of the century was a time of fierce social and political disturbances. Questions of race, class, gender and religion strained the situation in Europe as well as in the USA. Due to the high profile of the 'Ship-of-State'-metaphor and the Titanic's remarkable iconographic suitability (inter alia), the evolving myth turned out to be exceedingly capable of carrying all of these discourses. According to Roland Barthes (1972), a myth is a brief meta-story which, as in the present case, might even melt down to one concept or name. 'The Titanic' is such a name, which will in many cultural contexts immediately evoke the association of the ship and its sinking. The '*Titanic* disaster was historically not intrinsically meaningful. While we like to think that the disaster's resonance is timeless – that it has to do with universal themes of humans against nature, hubris, false confidence, the mystery of the sea, hydrophobia, heroism, and cowardice – the *Titanic* seared itself into American memory not because it was timeless, but because it was timely. Americans in 1912 made it speak to the concerns of contemporary politics, society, and culture.' (Biel 1996: 132)



Fig. 1 'Der Untergang der Titanic' (Sinking of the Titanic) by Willy Stöwer, 1912. Wikimedia Commons.

Similar processes took place in Great Britain and in Germany immediately after the disaster. In this article, I shall focus on the gender images involved. The article consists of four parts: the first part will look at the gender images included in British and American myths, the second part focuses on the corresponding German situation in 1912, the third part will deal with the Titanic myth within the Second World War, and the fourth and final part concentrates on gender roles during and after the Cold War.

Great Britain and USA: Moral 'Apotheosis' of the White, Christian Gentleman

Shortly after the disaster, the following survivor statistics were released in Europe as well as in America:

	total number	saved	drowned	saved in %
First class				
men	177	58	115	34
women	144	139	5	97
children	5	5	0	100
total	**322**	**202**	**120**	**63**
Second class				
men	160	13	147	8
women	93	78	15	84
children	24	24	0	100
total	**277**	**115**	**162**	**42**
Third class				
men	454	55	399	12
women	179	98	81	55
children	76	23	53	30
total	**709**	**176**	**533**	**25**

Tab. 1 'Titanic's survivor statistics' (Köster and Lischeid 1999: 46f.)

Although on both continents the figures were (except for marginal differences) the same, the interpretation of them in part differed extremely. In America, to begin with, the statistics exemplified male superiority – or in other words: the moral 'Apotheosis' of the white, American Christians. This I have to explain further: if we take a closer look at the number of people drowned, it appears that many more men died than women (84% men compared to 24.3% women). To the American public it therefore seemed clear

that men sacrificed themselves for the weak: for women and children. With this – according to the general public – they fulfilled their natural responsibility as men.

At the same time, the conventional narrative told the story of a mob of third class passengers, which seemed to monopolise the panic on board. The valiant rescue efforts of the first class heroes were grossly disturbed by the arbitrary and inadequate behaviour of this mob, which was largely described as consisting of immigrants. Nevertheless, the 'first class heroes' didn't fail to save even the unworthy and – by doing this – they proved their greater value. With this act the differences between poor and rich, between first and third class were marked as a matter of character instead of social class. Finally, the heroes were denoted not only as men, but also as white and Christian. Clearly, the symbolic society on board the Titanic had been saved by the moral superiority of the white, upper-class male Americans. This self-sacrifice implied a high moral urgency for the living to accept the natural supremacy resulting from the sacrifices. The disaster seemed to have proved the benefit of male supremacy for all.

However, not everyone accepted this. First of all, as Steven Biel showed, 'feminists turned the chivalric myth against itself' (Biel 1996: 105). According to American feminists, 'male chivalry was exceptional and inadequate. To make care and protection the rule required an active role for women in public life.' (Biel 1996: 105). Therefore they adhered to their claims for women's suffrage and women's participation in politics. A contemporary image (Biel 1996: 141, Votes for Women) used the well-established analogy between the Titanic and current society to show male dominated politics as a sinking ship and the suffragette movement as a rescue boat. 'Suffragists', as the caption commented, 'compared the Titanic to the ship of state. With the vote, they argued, women would steer the ship clear of all sorts of dangers.'

But although the women's movement in the USA was much stronger than in Germany at the time, its arguments never became part of the conventional Titanic narrative, and the staff poet of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 'suggested, that suffrage agitation would fizzle out once suffragists realized the implications of their position.' (Biel 1996: 30f.) He rhymed:

Votes for women, boats for women

1. 'Votes for women!'
Was the cry,
Reaching upward
To the sky.
Crashing glass,
And flashing eye –
'Votes for women!'
Was the cry.

2. 'Boats for women!'
Was the cry,
When the brave
Were come to die.
When the end
Was drawing nigh –
'Boats for women!'
Was the cry.

3. Life has many
Little jests
Insignificant
As tests.
Doubt and bitterness
Assail
But 'Boats for women!'
Tells the tale.

While suffragists, like other minorities (e.g. African Americans and Socialists), exploited the myth more or less successfully for their own purposes, the majority continued believing in a 'natural' order, which set men over women, first class over third, Americans over immigrants, and 'Whites' over 'Blacks'. In other words: which legitimated the common social order.

The British for their part adopted this way of storytelling by extending the concept of male Americans to include male Anglo-Saxons. And while there definitely were distinctions between the American and the British reception of the Titanic disaster, both Anglophone myths shared the focus on male self-sacrifice for the 'weaker sex'.

German Contrasts: The Technologically Experienced Man as a Renewed Male Role Model

In Germany of the same period, the gender debate was less direct, but was nevertheless one of the most relevant contemporary discourses. Returning to the statistics, which were the obvious reasons for the restoration of gender concepts within the United States, these same statistics, in Germany, exemplified the gap between rich and poor. According to German newspapers there was a direct and obvious correlation between social class and survival on the Titanic: While at least 63 % of the first class passengers survived the disaster, most of the third class passengers died (about 25 % survived). Hence the German myth condemned the privileged wealthy, who boarded the lifeboats after threats of violence and/or bribery, while the third-class-passengers were forced to stay away by armed staff. (Of course similar interpretations existed in socialist circles in America as well as in Great Britain, but, like the suffragists' 'counter narrative', it never became conventional there.)

Gender images within the German myth, however, were less direct. An example of this could be found in a supplement *Der Zeitgeist* to the daily newspaper *Berliner Tageblatt.* On May 6th, 1912 it published a poem, which was characterised first and foremost by its too literal sense of maiden voyage as defloration. In florid words the Titanic was identified as a virgin, who abandons herself compliantly to death when he comes to take her maidenhood. She finally gives birth, but her children are born dead. The alliance of women and technology, suggested the poem, is fatal.

This form of criticising technological advancement was thoroughly popular at the turn of the century. It responded to two phenomena at once: technical advancement and female emancipation. To the public both of them seemed closely related. The breakup of traditional gender roles, however, was seen as a direct consequence of technological advances. German historian Ute Frevert (1990) once showed that it was the substantial progress of mechanisation that seemed to threaten alleged genuine male qualities such as fortitude, cleverness, innovative thinking, and individual problem-solving. It was a widespread fear that mechanisation would enable women to enter male dominions. Not only did German myth restore exactly these aforesaid 'male' qualities, but it also showed them as fundamental for technical control at the same time.

The following picture from *Illustrirte Rundschau* released in April 1912 exemplifies this:



Fig. 2 'Jack Philipps, the Titanic's wireless operator' (Anon., 24.4.1912).

The picture contains two halves. The bottom half shows Jack Philipps, the Titanic's wireless operator, accompanied by the words: 'Jack Philipps attended his duty at the wireless set until it failed. He perished by drowning.' To his right and left are two more wireless operators at work.

Jack Philipps was the redeemer in the German myth. Like the male, white, upper-class Americans – or in British terms: the white, Anglo-Saxon gentlemen – he (all by himself!) saved at least one third of the passengers through his own self-sacrifice. According to the conventional German narrative, he called for help by wireless radio transmission until he was literally in deep water. Even on the brink of death, he never thought of himself, but dauntlessly continued to work, keeping his wits about him. He actually fixed the broken apparatus – and above all – he never lost his humour.

After his death, the newspapers praised him as exceptionally brave, clever, capable, dutiful, and self-controlled. In other words, they reconstituted the very qualities, which seemed to be menaced by mechanisation, and, at the same time, showed them as socially beneficial. With Jack Philipps, the man in his most traditional and thus most solid double function as protector and saviour – protector of the family and saviour of the nation – returned to civilian gender arrangement. But it had increased its value: the man had gained control over technology. Instead of threatening his social position, it now stabilised and legitimised it. The new masculine ideal was the technologically experienced man, who since then has appeared in almost every mainstream movie of the 20th century.

The upper half of the picture shows a stylised world map, delineated by two antenna towers. Between them there is a steam ship and a zeppelin. Like no other inventions of the time, these two were widely known as collective symbols of modernity on the one hand, and of scientific and military conquest on the other. Air and sea were almost unexplored regions at the threshold of the 20th century, and their exploration and occupation was one of the most vital promises interlinked with technological advancement.

If you take a closer look, the two operators below seem to be physically connected to the masts above via the apparatus. They appear to highlight the means of transport as framing the world. So the image suggests the world's limits – as well the scientific limits, which assured human mastery of nature, just as the imperialistic ones – were technological limits and they could be arranged and controlled through men.

The choice of the word man is not accidental, as women never controlled the technological artefact. Here lies the vital difference between the metaphorical body images included in Titanic myth. They were definitely gender-related: while the alliance of women and technology was always associated with a loss of control and deadliness, the alliance of men and technology stood, on the contrary, for the reclamation of technical control. In the first case, the machine *was* female. There was no controlling will, but instead – if you remember the aforementioned German poem – the machine became out of control as soon as its sexual desire was aroused. In the second case, however, the machine was shown as an extension of the male body, controlled by his reason and volition. This was exactly on a par with the very old and very well established concept, which amalgamated women and nature as well as men

and reason, and that, moreover, over the centuries helped to legitimize male supremacy over women.

Regressive Role Models: World War II

Although the above concept of extending traditional male stereotypes by the new ideal of technical acquirement in the beginning of 20th century helped to reinstall common gender hierarchies after all, it nevertheless can be qualified as a progressive concept. It reconciled between past and future and helped overcome social upheavals resulting from technological progress. In 1937, just before World War II, the technologically experienced man still persisted as the masculine ideal. Between 1937 and 1939 three novels dealing with the sinking of the Titanic were published in Germany. All of them focused on a male stereotype which interlinked technological know-how and military virtues.

Only the outbreak of World War II led to a change. In 1943 Germany's monopoly state film company *Ufa* (more precisely *Tobis* for *Ufa*) released the propaganda film *Titanic*. This film never was officially shown in Germany during World War II. Obviously the metaphor of the sinking ship already seemed inadequate in this state of warfare. Nevertheless, the film is worth considering, for it was meant to organise the conditions of social life, first and foremost the specific gender roles and the relationship between 'battle front' (men) and 'home front' (women), during war. The issue did not appear from nowhere. After World War I German society had learned that it was almost impossible to revert to the pre-war gender ratio. In social and professional life a number of difficulties occurred because women, who often enough had replaced men in professional life, didn't always want to give up their newly gained claims. In private life the different experiences of men and women also turned out to be problematic (Cf. Daniel 1989).

The propaganda film *Titanic* referred especially to this set of problems in order to prevent a similar situation after World War II. It was meant to assign clear tasks to men and women and to adhere to traditional gender hierarchies at the same time. Though women were supposed to adopt male duties during wartime, afterwards they were expected to step back. Contemporary audiences – mostly women – could easily see the link between the Titanic disaster and the exceptional circumstances of war, just as easily as they identified

themselves with the female main character of the film, Sigrid Olinsky, who accurately demonstrated the requested female behaviour.

Fig. 3 Sybille Schmitz as Sigrid Olinsky in Titanic, 1943, photographer unknown. Wikimedia Commons.

I want to explain this by means of the following film scene. The Titanic is already sinking when the German officer Petersen meets his lover Sigrid Olinsky and asks her to get into a lifeboat. She refuses, telling him she'll stay where he stays and go where he goes – a phrase reminding of wedding vows. After a short moment of hesitation Petersen agrees. Because she is wearing her evening gown, he hands her his officer's jacket.

This simple gesture fulfilled two aims at once: on the one hand it was an act of conjugal care and a promise to protect her after she had just pledged her loyalty to him. On the other hand the jacket was a strong military status symbol, which marked Sigrid – representatively for all other women of the 'home front' – as militarily important. Dressed in Petersen's officer's jacket, and

thus identified as his deputy, she rescues women and children and prevents a barely controllable mob from running scared. The scene gave Sigrid a characteristic double role as woman and as soldier, for the relevance of her mission was immediately evident: if she had lost her soldierly self-control many lives would have been lost. Only her heroic attitude enabled a successful rescue operation.

However, it was never questioned that Sigrid had still acted under Petersen's command. When he comes back again to order her into the last life boat leaving, she now obeys. Again the jacket serves its purpose: since it makes her a soldier, she can no longer defy an officer's request.

Just a little later – in the meantime the ship has sunk and there is no life left to be saved but his own – Petersen arrives at Sigrid's life boat by swimming. Wet and freezing, he climbs on-board and is welcomed warmly by Sigrid and the other women. Because he is completely soaked, she drapes his jacket on his shoulders. For the third time, the jacket serves as symbol: it anticipates a women's role after the men's return. As demonstrated by Sigrid, she was meant to receive him, to coddle him and to give the leading position back to him.

In this way, the propaganda film included a strong promise of safety and stability after the end of the war. Despite the completely different living conditions and responsibilities of the battle front and the home front, the relation between men and women would be solid. The film therefore represented a home front which withstood as long as necessary and stood down as soon as possible.

To give a short summary at this point: We have seen in parts I and II that at the beginning of the 20th century, the Titanic myth focused on a progressive male role model to stabilise society. During World War II, however, it returned to traditional gender stereotypes in a very regressive way, but with the same objective.

Back to Technique: Ballard and Cameron

Simultaneously with the end of World War II came the end of the Titanic myth in Germany – at least temporarily. Indeed, there was some trouble around the propaganda film in the 1950s, but until the late 1970s no new adaption of the myth appeared. In 1978, admittedly, the famous German poet

Hans Magnus Enzensberger published a postmodern sequence of poems called *Der Untergang der Titanic (The Sinking of the Titanic)*. Because of its substantial complexity the epic caused quite a stir, but in matters of gender construction it is less relevant. Considerably more interesting is the re-discovery of the Titanic in 1985/86.

When a French-American team of deep sea scientists under the direction of Robert D. Ballard from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) discovered the wreck, the very fact caused a flood of popular science articles in Germany. Most of them were nothing else but translations of articles from American magazines. By this time, the public someone like Ballard would address was the Western world. It included Western Germany and excluded the GDR. In short: it reproduced the arrangement of the Cold War.

It was in this very situation that the stereotype of the technologically experienced man returned to the Titanic myth. Especially Titanic's explorer Robert D. Ballard wasn't shy about depicting himself as the epic hero, who overcame the last earthly boundaries through technology. The story Ballard told and Western press retold contained strong gender aspects. Firstly, it was an almost exclusively male story, as the women who were involved in the discovery were hardly ever mentioned. Secondly, it was male, because Ballard conceptualized himself as masculine to the same extent as the Titanic was traditionally pictured as female. Although the stereotypical femininity of the ship displeased him, he used the same metaphoric language as nearly all his predecessors: the Titanic was a woman, meant to be penetrated by his submersible. He didn't dismiss Titanic's femininity because it was a stereotype, but because it disappointed him: instead of the beautiful, desirable virgin the texts normally mentioned, he found an old and rusty matron.

'In July 1986, [Steven Biel paraphrased from an interview with Robert D. Ballard] with the manned submersible *Alvin* and their "proud little robot soldier" *Jason Jr.*, the explorers succeeded, as news reports repeatedly pointed out, in "penetrating" the ship. Yet Ballard sounded like a disappointed lover. […] "It's sort of like I just married someone –," Ballard remarked to an interviewer, "and is this something I want to be married to? It seemed nice at the time – you know, she was cute, she was nice and all that sort of thing – but now I'm married to her and wondering if I made a mistake. And I can't just walk away from this one. She won't let me." Consummation had its costs; finding the lost maiden saddled the hero with a shrew. "There is no

divorcing the Titanic," he complained. "Ever." The beautiful virgin had changed into an old battleaxe.' (Biel 1996: 209f.)

Fig. 4 Titanic wreck bow, 'photographed in June 2004, by the ROV Hercules during an expedition returning to the shipwreck of the Titanic.' Courtesy of NOAA/Institute for Exploration/University of Rhode Island.

Nevertheless, he continued delineating himself and his team as technologically experienced, clever and considerate, even in times of extreme stress. A good example is given in the account of their work with the Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) 'Jason Jr.', which Ballard's team used for penetrating the ship. On these occasions they frequently seemed to lose their 'little friend' (ibid., 145), and often enough only saved it by dint of intuition as well as essential know-how about technology and the conditions of the deep sea (like pressure, current etc.). Ballard always managed to salvage 'Jason Jr.' just in the nick of time.

As soon as the oceanographer came to report on these delicate situations, he increased the suspense of his story by switching to direct speech. Story time

and discourse time merged, so the reader literally felt the considerable strain and sensed that quick, clear and most of all correct decisions were demanded now. Directly in these moments of utmost concentration the scientists addressed among each other not with their names, but with their job titles. They didn't exist as a person any longer, but instead amalgamated with the apparatus. Ballard wrote about his colleague Martin Bowen that: 'Martin was now controlling *JJ* with such skill that this floating eyeball had almost become an extension of his own body.'(ibid.: 145)

Ballard left no doubt that it were the men who controlled the technical artefact, never the other way round. Again we encounter here the topos mentioned above of the technical artefact as an extension of the male body. Above all, in these moments of extreme exertion Ballard's language was characterised by another peculiarity: he frequently used expressions deriving from a military or warfare background. The ship's control centre turned into the 'bridge of an imaginary submarine' (ibid.: 68), while the 'sonar', i.e. the scientist who handled the sonar, was 'at daggers drawn' (ibid.: 88).

Conclusion

As we have seen above, a severe shift in social life took place in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. Gender hierarchies including role models were just one of many areas affected. German society perceived this change in particular as a consequence of technological advancement and the increasing expansion of technology in everyday life. The anxiety that women might occupy traditionally male working domains by means of technology was widespread. Many of the very qualities which were considered typical masculine attributes seemed to be replaceable by technology. The Titanic myth not only reflects this threat, but also tries to resolve it by representing stereotypical male qualities (such as fortitude, cleverness, innovative thinking, and individual problem-solving) as absolutely indispensable for holding power over the technical artefact. In this vein, technological experience itself became a male stereotype while at the same time women were again banned from male spheres of influence. To be on the safe side, the connection of women and technology was additionally shown as fatal. In the end, by instituting technical experience as a male stereotype the Titanic myth took quite a progressive approach to re-establishing the traditional social order. However, this stereotype became one of the most potent male stereotypes of the 20th century.

In all times of external tensions, German society particularly focused on the stereotype of the technologically experienced man as a role model of modernity. This can be seen happening in 1912, as well as in 1937-1939 and during the Cold War. Within the Titanic myth, war, technology and masculinity formed a complex which clearly signalled that only the technologically experienced man at the technological and scientific forefront of the world guaranteed protection, security and stability. When James Cameron's blockbuster Titanic was released in 1997 this nexus was still going strong – much as it is today.

List of Illustrations

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Herbert Mehrtens

Team and Machine. An essay on the relation of the reality and functionality in submarines to myth and memory of the German U-Boat type VII C

Following Winston Churchill's proposal, I shall call the German submarines of World War II *U-boats* without adhering to his ironic characterization of them as 'dastardly villains' in contrast to the allied 'gallant and noble craft' (Rayner 2007: 36). Churchill is also said to have seen the U-boats as a very serious peril up to early 1943, when the tide changed and the Allied Forces achieved a dramatic increase in the losses of boats on the side of the Axis fleets by breaking the Enigma code and through various technological improvements (Rahn 2011: 42-48). I shall not, however, say much about the naval war in the present paper. It is rather my general interest in man-machine interaction in history that led to me considering submarines as an extreme case. And the well-documented boat of the type VIIC, the work-horse of the German submarine fleet, is in myth and memory the main representative of this. It is the 'tragic' boat, and with 568 boats produced the most common type of submarine. It achieved a dramatic increase in the losses of ships on the side of the axis fleets, but only rather late in the war, when the technological and quantitative superiority of the Allied Forces had already become obvious. One boat of this type, more precisely the type VIIC/41, survived and has become an addition to the Laboe Naval Memorial near Kiel in Northern Germany as a technical museum.

With the internationally highly successful film *Das Boo*t (1981, D: Wolfgang Petersen) this type of boat became the iconic representative of the German U-boats of World War II.

The film, in turn, is based on the novel by Lothar-Günther Buchheim (1918-2007) of the same title (1973, more than a million copies, translation into 18 languages). Buchheim, an artist, prominent art collector and a proficient writer, is the best known German author on submarine warfare. He started as a 'war painter' in the propaganda division of the German Navy, and took part

in a patrol of U 96 in 1941 as a war correspondent with the rank of a *Leutnant*. There he constantly took notes and unofficially took thousands of photos. His first illustrated book *Jäger im Weltmeer* (*Ocean Hunters*) was written in 1942 and printed in 1943, but was never delivered to the bookshops. To show that it was not a 'Nazipamphlet' he republished it decades later (1996: 15). Buchheim also published three large-format illustrated books, in which the pictures tell the story. I shall use one of these works and not say much about the other two, which mainly present romanticizing seascapes. Anton Holzer (2003) has published a critical analysis of the pictorial material presented, on which I am drawing here, and the Canadian literary historian Michael L. Hadley (1995) has treated Buchheim and the 'Buchheim wave' in his comprehensive survey of German U-boat literature from the First World War up to 1988 (1995:140-171). Of all of Buchheim's books, *U-Boot Krieg* (1976) takes a technologically distanced stance in the report accompanying its photos; it was the most helpful for the foundation of my argument in the present paper.

Fig. 1 'U-995 Marineehrenmal Laboe'. April 2002. Wikimedia Commons.

Buchheim's writings express a strong motive in keeping the memory alive in a manner different from the then existing marginal literature with its hero worship and latent fascism. In the official and the dominant culture of German war memory up to the 1980s the U-boats were a taboo, associated with Nazi heroism. The success of Buchheim's book was an early sign of the change of tide, which finally took place in the eighties, when the general structure of the tacit rules of the discourse in Germany about the Nazi past underwent a fundamental change. One element of this change was the sudden growth of interest in local history. Buchheim's move in the politics of memory, which fitted neatly into the general trend, was to take the common soldier in the situation of one patrol of one specific boat as an opportunity to speak of the war in general, 'convinced that the account of the life on a U-boat can become a symbol of any claustrophobia during the war' (quoted by Holzer 2003: 135). This fitted very well into the general trend. His account of the life on the boat attempts to create empathy for those who had to bear it. He had lived with them and had shared their experience; he had been one of them; and he actively took the role of their spokesman. Holzer gives Buchheim a fair and differentiated treatment but leaves some doubt about the solution – or compromise – of treating the smaller heroes 'here below' and presenting those official heroes 'up there' as the traitors responsible for the deaths of about 30,000 of the 40,000 men in the boats[1]. To me the biggest problem with Buchheim's writings is his obvious fascination, strongly transmitted in content and style, with war in general, the sea, the war at sea, and the submarines and submariners, the 'men'.[2]

The movie follows Buchheim's novel to a large extent. Buchheim, however, was critical of it. He admired the reconstruction of the interior of the boat but wrote that the crew was a long way from the past reality. This applied especially to the war reporter, which had been his role, and who was played by a young blonde (Buchheim had black hair) actor, who acted like a 'wimp' ('*Hampelmann'*), writes Buchheim in his 'report' on the making of the film. (1981b). Buchheim had written a script for a film (1981) and was loosely involved in its making; the screenplay, however, was written by the director,

1 The numbers are disputed; I take the standard version. The choice is not relevant to my argument, rather, it represents an example of a side issue in memory discourses.

2 Women appear late as crew members of submarines. Scandinavian countries seem to have taken the first step. Cf. Wikipedia.org/wiki/women_in_the_military#Women on submarines. The same apparently reliable and well annotated source relates that the first female regular crew members of US Submarines started their service in 2013.

Wolfgang Petersen. Film and book mark the high tide of the U-boat myth. Hadley (1995) presents a comprehensive bibliography, which shows that there is some literature on German boats in the 1950s, practically nothing in the sixties and an avalanche of first and second hand memories in the seventies. Buchheim and Peterson are located at the high tide of their topic. They were on the crest of the wave which ebbed in the following decade. To talk of a' myth' is grounded in the fact that the single dominant representative of the German submarines is the VIIC boat.[3]

Working on this paper, I felt that I face a similar problem. I am not writing about the war in general and those 'up there', but I am indeed talking about those down below, those who were for some time below the surface of the oceans, and the machine they inhabited. And I will try to show that myth and memory are also grounded in the actual workings of 'the boat' as a team-machine complex. Trying to understand the workings of team and machine I found myself simultaneously trying to remember the smell of salt water, metal, oil, sweat, or mouldy bread, and to imagine all that being present at the same time. I tried to understand the everyday necessities on a boat, the care for the food, the torpedoes, the relation of the density of the sea water to the water in the tanks, the emergency trainings, the music, the toilets, and so on. My empathy, however, remains rather limited since I strongly dislike the frequent phenomenon of the over-performance of masculinity in purely male groups, a sort of inverted Don Juan syndrome. Masculinity is performed by collective pissing; there is a scene in the movie where several men of the crew piss a salute to the commander who is passing them in a car, and I have a photograph of several men, including my father, lined up on the foredeck of a German U-boat of World War II pissing for the photographer (private property, not to be published).

Life on the boat was in general not like an action movie but was a daily routine, with long periods of waiting for the 'hunters' before they would meet their 'prey'. Most of the time the boat was shipping on the surface, because the boats were not 'submarines' in the strict sense of the term, but rather were 'diving boats', diving only for exercise, to check the boat or to care for the torpedoes, which could only be done in calm weather or down below the surface, or to hide or attack.

3 A Google search (02.09.2014) in English counted 93 million hits for 'U-boat', 51 million for 'submarine'. The search in German for 'U-Boot' brought up 70 million hits.



Fig. 2 Celebrating Christmas. *In*: Hadley 1995, unpaginated picture part.

Although the historical sources I use in this paper relate to a variety of types of boats I shall in general descriptions keep to the standard type VII of German boats in World War II, where the team comprised 44 men, the tonnage displacement on the surface was little more than 900 tons, the length about 67 metres, and the weapons 14 torpedoes, an artillery gun and a twin flak. Since a submarine is a ship, the same nautical terminology and characteristics apply as for any other ship or more precisely warship, e. g. the fact that the work day is 24 hours and somebody has to be on watch all the time. However, there are some elements specific to a submarine: mainly that it is small and densely packed with machinery, supplies, and men. Most men have to share their bunks or hammocks with others, who are on watch, and many men have fairly little chance to see the daylight. Not all submarines are fighting ships like the type VII. In World War I a prominent type was the *U-Boot Kreuzer*, (cruiser submarine) hunting for commercial ships which were stopped, checked, and sometimes taken by boarding teams that would ship them to some harbour, or sometimes evacuated and destroyed. In World War II there also were the '*Milchkühe*' – dairy cows –, U-boats that were responsible for the supply at sea.

Here I am talking about the fighting type of boat, the submarine that has weapons, and – more importantly – is itself a weapon. To briefly clarify the concept "weapon": "*Die U-Boot Waffe*" – the submarine fleet and its subdivisions, the flottilas, seen as a weapon – is a weapon in the hands of the Admiralty. The single boat is a weapon in the hand of the commander, both in the metaphorical sense and literally. In a submerged torpedo attack the commander is the one who sees the object of attack, the one who aims the gun, which is the boat itself, and the one who shoots. This fact alone is a reason for the most prominent position of the commanders in U-boat memory and mythology. Their names appear on the Top-Gun or Aces Charts, e. g. the 'Most successful patrols' of German boats in World War II at the English language website 'U-Boat Net' (Helgason 1995-2015) with the date of the patrol, number of ships, tons and tons a day sunk, where the absolute number of tonnage sunk is the grading factor. In this list you can click on to more information and will find photographs of the commander and – obviously not so frequently at hand – of one or two of the officers. The names and photos obviously are collector's items. Memory culture of U-boats is at the same time a culture of collecting (to which I shall return below), and the commanders are the must-haves.



Fig. 3 The commander (Erich Topp) at the periscope, *In*: Topp 2009, unpaginated set of gravure print pictures.

The team, including the commander, lives in the boat where there is certainly no 'living room'. The commander has a small niche with a curtain for himself directly opposite of the radio operator's niche. All the traffic goes through the central alleyway and has to pass through the bulkheads, which are a necessity of the machine whose compartments secure the stability of the pressure hull, the core body of the boat. Outside the pressure hull there is a second hull, which is the 'boat' in the sense of a vessel that can navigate on the surface. The postures and movements of the team are strongly dictated by the form and the contents of the pressure hull. At the start of a patrol the boat is packed with supplies; only the time spent at sea and the ammunition used make for some more room. 'Human relations' on or rather in the boat are also physical, bodily relations dictated by the geometry of the machine, in movement or at rest. And – to get to my argument – the body has its own memory. This memory, the habitualization of movements and postures, is the aim of the routine alarm exercises. The war diary of U 96 notes four alarm exercises on the second day of the patrol (Buchheim 1976). Thus the team gets special physical education to interact with the machine. And they physically take part in the interaction of the machine with the sea. In an alarm dive, the men who are not functionally involved with the machinery have to move their weight, that is, run in direction of the bow, to add front weight for the dive, or, when problems occur with the vertical rudder the team has to level out the boat with its bodies.[4]

The spatial adaption to the machine is the precondition for functional adaption. Each man has one or more functional places. Most functions have three men and six or four hour watches. Thus at the commander's side there are three officers, that is two watch officers, who have specific fields of responsibility, and the Leading Engineer. It is possible to make a rough division between nautical and technical personnel. For example, the responsible radio operator is an *Oberfunkmaat* (radio petty officer) assisted by two *Funkgefreite* (radio privates first class). In the boat's submerged state radio operation is limited, and the radio operator's function thus changes to acoustic detection. As the radio operator he works with the standard or half-automated telegraph key (the side-swiper), both of which need an ability of brain and hand that must be habitualized to be done at high speed with help of the brain

4 I am neglecting sound and music; for this topic cf. Linda Maria Koldau's work (2008). She has also published a more general book (2010) on submarines and movies, including a close reading of sound and music in the film *Das Boot*.

without further thinking about the technical function of the hand-brain-eye cooperation. It is a bodily technique that functions like a machine, like in the routines of driving a car.

Obviously the work with the machine needs many such physical techniques: the machinists need them, the regular check of the torpedoes becomes a bodily routine, the closing of the hatch, or, last but not least, the quite complicated handling of the toilet in a submerged state. Many of these bodily techniques are teamwork, and in certain situations like an alarm dive or a torpedo attack the whole team is involved, to a large part without verbal communication. Thus the team is an integral part of the machine, and hence the organicist metaphor that occurs quite frequently such as in the quote of the World War I commander Martin Niemöller: 'We became regular guests of the imperial shipyard, completed an almost endless series of exercises sailing, diving and shooting with torpedoes and guns and grew together with our boat into a living unit.' (1934: 65)[5]. The human bonds among the crew are strengthened by the common habitualizations and the habitualized cooperation.

Most such habitual routines are body memories that might fade away, but very slowly. If you have not ridden a bicycle for a long, long time, you might feel insecure mounting the bike, but your body will know what to do. In this subconscious habitual memory new routines might intervene and the memory might partly or wholly fail, but this is no different from the brain memory. Like shared memories that create emotional bonds, shared body memories might produce an even stronger bonding. Common fear and common joy may add to the memory bond, but the common habitual memory certainly plays a major part. I take the concept of 'habitual memory' from the German sociologist Alois Hahn (2007), who also discusses the example of religious rituals that produce communality through habitualiziation. Werner Rammert (1998) has used the word 'routinization' in his discussion of the concept of techniques / technology in a sociological sense; my treatment (2002) prefers a somewhat more radical sound: *Technisierung* (mechanization or automation) of the body. Hahn's addition to the general concepts of memory and remembrance is of crucial importance in the present context, and Rammert's and my conceptualization of technology combine with Hahn's concept to form what I believe to be fitting tools of analysis for human-machine relations.

5 The name might sound familiar; Niemöller became well-known as a theologian after World War II.

Fig. 4 Captured German Boat U 505 1944 (Type IXC), later transferred to the Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago, Ill. Author unknown. Wikimedia Commons.

The strong memory bonds, strong because imprinted in the body, are an explanation for the communality of submarine veterans, as it is visible in their persistence in Germany when the topic of the U-boat war was almost a taboo in the general public and in their later presence on the internet. This argument must not be taken as an argument for a historically realistic memory. Since habitual memory rests in the body, the other memory that, when active, is conscious of the fact that it is recalling from what it has available to recall, is of different sort. It may supress, select and interpret its material to fit it into the context of collective memory. Thus U-Boot Kitsch, hero worship, and simplifying nostalgia are very much possible in the presence of habitual memory. The U-boat myths are the result of what one might call the collective, communicative reduction of memory. In no way does this mean that there is a real unity in the collective. The reactions and the controversies Buchheim's novel prompted in the veterans' community, which Hadley

(1995) discusses in the last chapter of his book and which Salewski (1976) has collected show this quite clearly.

Fig. 5 Destroyed Boat in the Harbour of Toulon, France: 'Deux U Boat de la 29 U Boat Flott, sabordés. retrouvés dans la darse des sous-marines de Missiessy à Toulon (photo de 1945)'.

The commander as hero remains intact, at least partly because he commanded the whole machinery and the living bodies followed his commands as the metallic machine did (if it did). He was the one to see, to aim and to shoot, and he was the one to stand for the team in public representation. He is also the most visible figure of the team. The commander as persona offers himself perfectly for symbolic reduction and myth making, especially in a case where you have an easy means of quantification to produce a hit list, the ships and or, better even, because it is free of problematic implications, tonnage. This part of the myth, the commanders and the aces, is the result of symbolic reduction that functioned as soon as submarines became functional. In the name of the commander a complex historic entity is shrunk into one ahistorical point, the name. And because it is a name, it is possible to extend it into any sort of narrative, a list of patrols, a hit list of tonnage sunk, a biography, a

poem or even a scholarly work of historical criticism: the name survives regardless.

Let me finally turn to the topic of gender. Gender is relevant, to relate this to Sabine Höhler's paper in this volume, because there were only men on the boats. The German texts I have seen give no indication whatsoever that the boat is taken as female. To the contrary, the fact that the supply boats were called *Milchkühe* (dairy cows) puts the fighting boats in a male position. 'The boat' remains in German a linguistic neuter, a neutral being. Through the 'unity' of team and machine the boat becomes a part of the male 'we'. The torpedoes, however, were called *Aale* – eels, animals with no or little sexual or gender implications, except in a marginal pornography sector, where eels appear as insertables. Exactly this happens in Buchheim's novel. He explicates the insertion as a violation. Erotic, sexual scenes are present early in the novel (by the way, a matter for objection to many veterans). In the later parts, when the boat is, once and again, in fatal danger there is an explicit expression of sexual violence; the torpedo mechanic loading the torpedo into the tube: 'Schön Vaseline drauf und rein in die Fotze' (nicely Vaseline on it and off into the cunt) and so on. Buchheim goes on with his own thoughts, which were written forty years later, at the time of what was called the 'sexual revolution':

'Vom obszönen Gerede in Schwung gebracht, kommt auch meine Phantasie auf Touren: Die Eisenhymen der Dampfer, in die sich der Torpedophallus einrammt. Die gezackten Schamlippen. Das Hochbäumen der Dampferkühe, wenn der Torpedo zwischen ihre Spanten eingedrungen ist und seine Ekrasit-Ejakulation entlädt. Und dann das Reißen, Brechen, Stöhnen und Röcheln...' (1973: 408).

'Triggered by the bawdy talk, my imagination revved up. The iron hymen of the steamer the torpedo rams into. The serrated labia. The rearing up of the Steamer-cows, when the torpedo has penetrated between the ribs and discharges its ecrasite ejaculation. And then the rupture, the cracking, ripping, breaking, moaning and rattling and groaning...' (translation H.M.).

This is the imagination of a text by the professional writer who a few pages later notes the banality of an image the commander uses, namely that he carries his coffin with him like a snail (1973: 417). The submariner's recollections I have read do not show any such fantastic imagery, be it sexual imagery or else; self-censorship may, however, been involved. No written

memory can be realistic, but it can be sober. What Buchheim wrote can be criticized in the same manner as he criticized the film. The world of the submariners was a male world in which the 'she' is the attacked steamer, the she-ship which is not even a warship. The possible joy is about the success, the victorious end of boredom, even the reduction of torpedoes left, but is hardly the lust of words the war correspondent developed in his recollection decades later.

The world of the boats of the two world wars is a comparatively small and limited man's world, and is thus a collectible world.[6] The small worlds which the veterans, the collectors and the gamers construct and perform are male worlds as well: these worlds of the myths and memories are open for sexualizing imaginations like Buchheim's. They are collective worlds, and I assume that the communality of submarine trained bodies is stronger than, say, that of the world of the collectors.

Submariners today have their national organizations, but they have also an active international community with meetings (almost) every year since 1962, after French and German Submariners had met the two years before in Paris with guests from five countries and prepared a meeting of what became the 'International Community of Submariners Associations'[7]. The numbers of participants was not usually greater than a few hundred, but which other 'weapon' is internationally organized? Their website has a succinct address: 'submariners.org'. I suspect that the physical, the bodily experience may strengthen a wish for a performative recollection among those who have had it, and be a meeting of peers disregarding national borders. My father was not interested in such meetings but he tended to use some (non-combat) naval vocabulary in everyday life.

6 On the cultures of collecting cf. Baudrillard (1991) or the English excerpt in Elsner and Cardinal (1994: 7-24).

7 The website is quite informative, even to non-members. It includes a list of the conventions since 1964: submariners.org, [Accessed 14 March 2015].

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Fig. 2 Celebrating Christmas. *In*: Hadley 1995, unpaginated picture part.

Fig. 3 The commander (Erich Topp) at the periscope. *In*: Topp 2009, unpaginated set of gravure print pictures.

Fig. 4 Captured German Boat U 505 1944 (Type IXC), later transferred to the Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago, Ill. Author unknown. Wikimedia Commons. Available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-505#/media/File:U505_bez_tekstu.jpg [Accessed 5 April 2015].

Fig. 5 Destroyed Boat in the Harbor of Toulon, France: Destroyed Boat in the Harbour of Toulon, France: 'Deux U Boat de la 29 U Boat Flott, sabordés. retrouvés dans la darse des sous-marines de Missiessy à Toulon (photo de 1945)'. Available from: sudwall.superforum.fr/t37-29-u-flottile-les-u-boat-a-toulon-83 [Accessed 9 April 2015].

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Silke Betscher

Recapturing space, technology and gender semantics: The propagandistic battle of images during the Berlin-crisis

A group of people standing on a rubble mountain watching an American aeroplane landing in the city of Berlin – this is the picture most of the people who grew up in West or the reunified Germany presumably have in mind when they are asked for images of the Berlin crisis in 1948/49.[1] This mental image originates in photographs taken by the American photographers Henry Ries and Walter Sanders. It creates a narrative about the airlift, in which the West Berlin population was threatened by starvation due to the Soviet policy of blockade and was waiting to be rescued like castaways on an island. Ries and Sanders, both German émigrés, originally took the pictures for the coverage of the airlift in the United States. With the help of this narrative costly relief supply for the former military enemy was promoted among the American public. As Christoph Hamann (2009: 762-766) has shown, this motif was iconised by its repeated reproduction in all West German schoolbooks between the 1970s and the 1990s. Even today nearly every historical book on the Berlin crises uses this image, predominately displayed on the cover. And it has been and still is being used in several exhibitions celebrating the anniversaries of the event.[2] As a result the motif of West Berliners waving at low-flying planes has become the visual icon of the airlift in West Germany. However, in highly circulated illustrated magazines in West Germany, which were one of the most important means of forming the visual discourse in post-war society, this motif did not play any role at all during the time of the crisis. This article will show that the imagery of the event was much more

1 A selection of the airlift photographs by Walter Sanders is published online. See the picture archive of *LIFE*: http://images.google.com/images?hl=de&q=Berlin+airlift+source%3Alife [Accessed 6 Dec 2008].

2 Compare for example the exhibition catalogue which follows a strong cold war style: Stiftung 'Luftbrückendank' 1988: 60-61, 83.

diverse and a highly contested field between East and West Germany. Both East and West German illustrated magazines used numerous images to visualise the political conflict. In these images the civilian population and the aeroplane as motifs played a crucial role. This article argues that both sides tried to build on pre-existing narratives, images and discourses and reframed concepts of space, technology and gender by en-, re- and decoding these motifs.

It is self-evident that the images explored have to be seen in historical context. Although the vast majority of historical research still speaks of the Berlin blockade, William Stivers (1997: 569-602) has shown that the Soviet blockade was much more permeable than was portrayed in the Western media. Even though the roads and waterways between the Western zones and West Berlin were blocked by the Soviets from 24 June 1948, West Berlin was not an isolated island. The routes into the surrounding Brandenburg region were still open and highly frequented for black market business (Zierenberg 2008, Steege 1999, 2000). Additionally, the airlift could not cover even a minimum of basic materials needed by West Berlin industry. William Stivers has also shown that without support from the Eastern side West Berlin industry would have collapsed during the time of the blockade (Stivers: 1997: 571-576, 584-586, Koop 1998b: 361-369, 364-366, Steege 1999: 59-77). Furthermore, the Soviet Military Administration for Germany started a massive campaign to bring food and material into Berlin.(Stiver 1997: 550) Although this served propagandistic aims, the delivery of food was temporarily so extensive that it began to decay in the store houses (Koop 1998a: 296). These facts were known by the Western allies. A weekly American intelligence report for Germany from November 1948 stated that 'the road, rail and water blockade of Berlin by no means constitutes a complete economic blockade either by intent or in fact.'(Stivers 1997: 570) Thus, in contrast to the official Western version, the airlift was not urgently needed to *rescue* the West Berlin population. However American politicians as well as West German ones knew about the incomparable propagandistic value of this undertaking, or as Wilhelm van Kampen (van Kampen 1998: 232) put it: 'If Truman had assigned a public relations company to stage the containment of communisms, they would have had to invent the airlift.'

The depiction of the crisis in West German magazines

When the crisis started, *Heute*, a magazine edited by the American occupation power and circulated primarily in the Western zones, surprisingly ran with the cover photograph of a woman in a bikini lying on a landing stage (Heute, 15 July 1948). The easiness of this summer picture shows nothing of the seriousness of the situation. Whilst at the same time the audience in the United States could read in the TIME magazine that a third world war was imminent and that 'the Russians were attempting to starve into submission 2½ million people in the city's Western sectors' (Time, 12 July 1948), the American publishers in Germany tried to reassure the German readership through a strategy of normalisation, as if they wanted to say ''We won't let the Russians either spoil our good summer mood or mess up our layout concept.' Although in this volume they did publish one image showing the blockade itself and another one with a brawny topless male civilian worker at the airport Berlin Tempelhof, *Heute* continued its reporting with a really surprising article on August 15th, 1948 (13-14) titled *Urlaub in Berlin – 1948* (Holidays in Berlin – 1948).

The article mainly consists of images of (sun)bathing people (fig. 1). These photographs served to show the continuity of normality in a critical situation. They were also supposed to show that women, children and young families could relax and rely on the help of the Western Allies, whilst the men of the air bridge worked steadily to assure the provision of basic supplies as the text and the image of the former article had told the reader. Next to a picture of a woman taking a photograph of the Sunderland, an aeroplane which especially evoked fascination among the citizens of Berlin, the depiction of the sunbathing, bikini-wearing women looking up to the sky implies that they were watching the aeroplanes over the city. Their relaxed facial expression signifies that these planes only augur well. Additionally, the fact that the women show themselves openly, nearly naked, indicates the absence of any danger or in other words: peace. In this way, the photographs function as counter images to recent experiences of war where one had to run for shelter behind thick concrete walls when the planes approached. But the images do not only counter the war experiences, they also work as a visualised policy of bodies in the beginning Cold War. In the context of discourses about mass rapes of German women by Red Army soldiers on the one hand and the many pictures of POW returning from Russia and looking the worse for wear, photographs like the ones published in *Heute* became all the more significant.

Fig. 1 *Heute*, 15 August 1948, 14.[3]

3 Inconsistencies in citation are based on the varied contemporary numbering of German post-war illustrated magazines.

Atina Grossman (2007) has shown that especially in Berlin, the end of war and the immediate post-war period was characterised by the German women's fear of marauding and raping Russian soldiers. Grossmann (Grossmann 2007: 48-57) refers to the numerous reports of memories of women hiding in cellars and draping themselves in rags as strategies of self-protection. Thus, the depicted bare and unscathed body (male and female) symbolises physical integrity as a result of American protection.

Nevertheless, images of a light-hearted existence under American protection were not unproblematic. They could also suggest that things in Berlin could not be that bad. A population on the brink of starvation looks different. Especially with regard to the stated aim of the US military government to invoke the West Germans' willingness to help and donate for the West Berliner, this approach was certainly not without risk. But at this point in time the American editors prioritised the reassurance of the population. In the end this was also a matter of the symbolic recreation of social order and therefore governability. In contrast to *Heute*, a publication edited by the American occupation powers, which focused its reporting on the civil population during the entire period of the crisis, the strategies of West German-edited magazines were completely different. From the beginning of the airlift onwards, *Spiegel* and *Quick* published several articles illustrated with pictures of aeroplanes. These images have to be seen in a broader context, since the reinterpretation of the aircraft had already started in West German magazines before the Berlin crisis arose. From the end of 1947 onwards the aeroplane was the most important motif that served to visualise the United States in the *Spiegel*. With the extended usage of this motif the planes were disconnected from their former function and meaning as a weapon in Second World War and again became a cipher for modernity, mobility and globalisation. The analysis of the *Spiegel* shows that the Berlin crisis led to a boom in these images. Most of them were used to show the smooth running of the operation and to emphasise the logistical peak performance of the Allies. For example, on 3 July 1948 the *Spiegel* published one image of un- and reloaded aeroplanes captioned 'Operation Berlin. The end of the umbilical cord' (fig. 2).

Not only the relationship between provider and provided for is described here. The former capital of the German Reich was also shifted into the regressive position of the foetus whose survival depended completely on supply from the umbilical cord. In the contemporary context, just one year before the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, the foetus metaphor

also refers to the birth of the new West German state. The contradiction between the image depicting technology and the physical metaphor is apparent. The lorries and the aeroplanes are depicted in a hinge situation, where the food was handed over. If one were to extend the lines defining the graphical composition of the photo, one would get a radial image build-up with the rays meeting at a point beyond the image margin where the fuselage is located.

Operation Berlin. Das Ende der Nabelschnur

Fig. 2 *Spiegel*, 3 July 1948, 8.

Here the associative visual connection to the foetus metaphor is produced by the protecting and nourishing internal space, the fuselage as a cave with its female gender semantics in discourse and image traditions. At the same time the number of planes in a line-up position not only underlines the magnitude of the Western Allies' power and therefore security, but it also suggests control in a regular process. (Härtel 2000: 61-76)

On 18 December 1948 *Spiegel* published a full-page article again emphasising the logistical peak performance of the airlift (fig. 3). The article was illustrated by two photographs. The first one showed an aeroplane in its final descent above a graveyard from a worm's eye view.



Silhouetten am Rande
Gräber, Kreuze, Nebellampen

Fig. 3 *Spiegel*, 18 December 1948, 3.

The tension in the photograph is created by the specific relation of the image elements which stand for the past (the gravestones), for the present (the fog lamps) and the future (the landing plane). The formal image composition

underlines the effect. The gravestones, the fog lamps and the crosses indicate vertically to the sky. The aircraft hovers horizontally overhead and looks like a hand giving a blessing over the rubble and destruction of war. Furthermore, the approaching aeroplane becomes a metaphor for overcoming the recent past and the promise of salvation in the future. Additionally, due to the perspective nearly a third of the photograph shows the sky. In the history of motifs the sky as heaven is highly charged with meanings of salvation. In the Christian iconographic and image tradition it is the place of God and the angels and stands for the hereafter with its promise of freedom from suffering on earth. With the numerous pictures of flying aeroplanes in West Germany this promise of freedom was secularised and generalised and received a special importance in the context of the Cold War where dichotomies of freedom and suppression were crucial discursive elements. The article's second photograph focuses on the aspect of logistics again by depicting military staff in front of radar screens in the command centre of the airlift (Spiegel, 18 December 1948: 3). The caption 'from one screen to the other: captured by radar' suggests gapless control and therefore security, also in a metaphorical sense. In particular the link to the radar, which was relatively new and first deployed on a huge scale in the Second World War, promises security by multiple control: the radar generates images of knowledge and evidence, which have the function of producing certainty.[4] Furthermore, the produced images themselves were permanently controlled on screens by military staff. The press photograph of this process functions as further evidence. The interaction of all these different layers of images induces a circular process of evidence production, confirmation and certainty. Furthermore, the combination of the two press pictures in the *Spiegel* serves as visualisation of the inside (command centre) and the outside (aeroplanes) of the airlift as well as the interaction between top (pilot) and bottom (ground station) and therefore as a comprehensive appropriation and control of space.

After the conflict had escalated in October 1948, *Heute* resorted to the motif of the aeroplane and to aspects of regularity, control, and security as well.

4 For the close connection between images and knowledge production see e.g. Deilmann 2004.

Fig. 4 *Heute*, 15 October 1948, Cover.

On 15 October 1948 jet fighters flying in regular formation over a snowy mountain landscape were depicted on the cover (fig. 4). The landscape combined with the bright play of light and shadow (re-)produces the myth of a clean air force and looks innocent. The aestheticising composition of the image demonstrates control and security at the same time. Although the title story did not directly refer to the Berlin crisis, a considerable militarisation of the visual discourse can be seen here. To the German readership this motif on

a cover was familiar. The *Berliner Illustri(e)rte Zeitung* had already used nearly identical images to propagate the national socialist war.[5]



Fig. 5 *Heute*, 15 October 1948, 7.

5 Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Vol. 19, 14 May 1942, cover picture, Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Vol. 17, 27. April 1944, cover picture, Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Vol. 29, 20. July 1944, cover picture.

In the second picture accompanying the article about technical details of American fighter jets (fig. 5), the composition of the jets creates a tight, impermeable net. The confronting perspective underlines the defence and threat potential of the military power. By means of images like these the presence of American military in Germany was normalised in a visual dimension. In this way, the rearmament of West Germany as well as the West German integration into NATO was prepared discursively *en passant*. How fiercely contested the field of the interpretational sovereignty regarding the Allied aeroplanes was cannot only be seen by the numerous reports in the West German media. It is also in evidence when an analysis of the East German visual discourse shows how massive the back reference to the destructive power of the military planes was in the East.

In the heightened atmosphere in autumn 1948 parallels between the American-edited *Heute* and the German-edited *Quick* can be seen. *Quick* also depicted an Air Force show (this time the Royal Air Force) on a cover photograph. But in contrast to the American-edited *Heute*, in which the male military American 'heroes' of the airlift were nearly invisible, the German *Quick* focused on Lord Marshall Tedder at the air manoeuvres, holding his two-year old son in his arms. Both are watching the planes flying in formation.

By the usage of this photograph of the former enemy and victor, bearing in mind that Tedder was the one who signed the German Instrument of Surrender as the representative for the United Kingdom, the Allied air force and the figure of the Allied soldier were redefined in Western Germany. The combination of Tedder as a marshal (his decorations are clearly visible) and Tedder as a father emphasises the reintegration of the military into civil society in general and its paternal role in occupied Germany in particular. Additionally, this photograph conveys the image of the male hero and therefore built a sharp contrast to the numerous pictures of the returning German POWs. With regard to the reestablishment of gender roles and gender semantics after the Second World War, this male hero in uniform perfectly matches the images of the bikini-wearing women.

The depiction of the crisis in East German magazines

When the Berlin crisis started there was already a massive media campaign to promote the Soviet Union in East Germany by emphasising the enormous support the East Germans received from the USSR in the form of food sup-

plies.[6] Interestingly, this form of promoting the East German-Soviet friendship referred directly to the way the 'good German-Soviet relations' (based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact) were visualised until 1941.[7] The national socialist magazines had published numerous images showing all kind of food and goods coming from the Soviet Union, particularly grain as a symbol for the proverbial granaries in the East. The post-war propaganda thus linked to visual traditions and existing visual codes regarding the USSR. Furthermore, the post-war reports were inter-discursively linked to the many simultaneously published articles and images showing the USSR as a utopian place of abundance. It was easy to implement the counter propaganda against the airlift within this context. On 14 July 1948 in a propagandistic move the USSR offered to provide the West Berlin citizens with all required basic goods. (Stivers 1997: 574) Whilst the Western magazines concealed this fact completely, the Eastern ones permanently emphasised it. In August 1948 the *Illustrierte Rundschau* published several articles including some big scale photographs showing food and goods. In these images three elements were crucial: the Soviet ships bringing goods in, the worker unloading cargo, and the goods themselves. With the ship as a motif the Soviet Military Administration tried to counter the aeroplane pictures as if they wanted to set up an aquatic lift against the airlift. But even though these images also showed the logistical effort on the Eastern side, one big difference to the aeroplane pictures remained: the ships did not have the same visual and propagandistic value as the planes. These images lack the tension generated by the image build-up connecting air and ground, or top and bottom. Additionally, as ships in harbour they lack the dynamics of the aeroplanes. Furthermore, there is nothing specific about the ships and they are conceivable in many different contexts. In the figure of the discharging dock labourer in particular, the *Illustrierte Rundschau* referred to the prototype of the socialist worker, identifiable by the worker's cap.

This figure of a single male hero built the civil counterpart to the militaristic images of air force soldiers in the West German-edited magazines. During winter 1948/49, when the reporting on the Soviet food supply was at its peak, there was a shift within the visual discourse: the single male hero as an iconic figure made way for a group of Germans unloading cargo ships or trains (fig.

6 Illustrierte Rundschau, Vol. 33, August 1948, 2, Illustrierte Rundschau, Vol. 15, August 1948, 2-3, Illustrierte Rundschau, Vol. 24, December 1948, 6.

7 Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Vol. 2, 11 January 1940, 2.

6). By means of these pictures the West Berlin population was directly linked visually to the relief supply. Similar to reports on the administration of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ), the staff of the Soviet military government is never depicted. The images focus on the Germans as a newly created collective of victims who jointly tackle the problem.[8] In these images the discursive figure of the German 'Volksgemeinschaft' (community of people) was revitalised. According to Atina Grossman (Grossmann 2007: 33) the extension of the 'Volksgemeinschafts' ideology was a crucial part of the narrative about the collective overcoming of post-war hardship.

Fig. 6 *Illustrierte Rundschau*, Vol. 24, December 1948, 7.

Surprisingly, the Eastern magazines were the ones who started to represent the Berlin population as victims.

In autumn 1948 especially the *Neue Berliner Illustrierte* published whole photographic reports following a strategy of victimisation in which the Berlin population were shown to be suffering from an aggressive American policy (fig. 7). Not surprisingly, the Eastern blockade was characterised only as a necessary reaction of self-protection. Food and goods were central elements

8 Illustrierte Rundschau, Volume 24, December 1948, 7.

in these reports as well. For example, the *Neue Berliner Illustrierte* (43, October 1948: 2-3) published a report on Berlin titled: *Muß Berlin hungern und frieren?* (Must Berlin starve and freeze?). The photographs with their sequences of half pigs and their piles of coal and grain, however, were in contrast to the heading. The pictorial language in each of the pictures tells of plenty and abundance and together the photographs create a symbolic triad of meat, bread and heat/energy/power with a symbolically highly significant meaning under the circumstances of the real situation in post-war Germany in the winter 1948/49. Against the background of the traumatic hunger winter 1946/47 this was particularly meaningful. The Western *Heute* (1 December 1948: 8-9) responded directly with a photo reportage on civilian victims of the Soviet policy of blockade.



Fig. 7 *Neue Berliner Illustrierte*, Vol. 43, October 1948, 2-3.

Yet the Eastern magazines also attempted to counter the Western propaganda directly. Where the aircraft as a motif is concerned there are two main strategies: firstly the attempt to reconnect the planes to the former experiences of

war and secondly images showing the airlift as a complete disaster. In autumn 1948 the Socialist Unity Party (SED) published a propaganda brochure, which looked like a common magazine and was perfidiously and clandestinely added to Western magazines. The impression of Western editorship was underlined by its bilingual title: 'Berlin – Einen neuen Krieg wert? Worth a new war?' (Fig. 8) The brochure drew a direct line from the bombings of the past 'Yesterday: Phosphor', over the airlift of the present 'Today: Raisins' to the atomic bomb of the future (Berlin 1948: 29)

Fig. 8 Berlin 1948: 29.

In the text the Western airlift was called 'the second airlift' and additionally several photographs of destroyed German cities were used to show the consequences of the bombings, which were sarcastically called 'the first airlift'. The American aid was denounced as preparation for the militarisation of the West and as the following decades have shown, the SED was proved right this time.

In their second strategy the East German magazines attempt to break the aeroplane fascination with images of air crashes. With the aid of these brutal pictures they tried to destroy the positive connotations of the plane in the West in the truest sense of the word.

In Volume 15 of the *Illustrierte Rundschau* in August 1948 the reader was told: 'One air crash follows the next at the American 'airlift' (fig. 9). The uneducated behaviour of the many uneducated American and British pilots endangers safety not only in the air but on the ground as well.' Indeed, due to the high volume of air traffic there were several fatal accidents during the 11 months of the blockade. Between 76 and 100 people died. (Provan 1998: 66) None of the Western magazine covered these incidents since they did not fit in with the glorification of the smooth running of the airlift. The East German magazines, however, did not miss the opportunity to report them. To this end they took images made by Western news and image agencies and transferred them into new anti-Western contexts. The images showing the chaos of the destroyed aeroplanes emphasised not only the failures and disasters of the airlift, but also countered the regular image compositions in the West.

Fig. 9 *Illustrierte Rundschau*, Vol. 15, 1948, 5.

In comparison to the Soviet-edited *Illustrierte Rundschau* it was the German-edited *Neue Berliner Illustrierte* which used a much sharper anti-Western style.

Fig. 10 *Neue Berliner Illustrierte*, Vol. 6, February 1949, 2.

One photographic report was captioned with the aggressively gloating headline: 'One Dakota less – one lesson more.' (Fig. 10) The whole report consists of six photographs. A text explaining the circumstances of the crash is missing. Next to an image of a crashed aeroplane a close-up of a burned skull was arranged. It is the violence of the images which makes the report stand

out from the others. The only dead bodies the readers of the magazines were shown at this point of time were the victims of the Nazi Terror and World War II. Depicting dead bodies in a close-up perspective located the airlift in the context of war again and went far behind the scope of the professional journalistic ethos. The editors of the *Neue Berliner Illustrierte* used the shock they provoked for their anti-Western propaganda. But it is not only shock they wanted to provoke. The tone of the report is indignant and triumphal at the very same time. Through this triumph the triumphal media editing of shot down Western Allied aeroplanes in national socialist propaganda during the war still shimmers.

Conclusion

On the occasion of the Berlin crisis in West just as in East Germany, massive media campaigns started to propagate the respective 'right' interpretation of the conflict. A detailed analysis of published pictures shows that the media of both sides permanently reacted to each other. This means that although on a political level the event led to a stronger division of both sides, they were so much more closely connected in the public sphere of media by discourse and counter-discourse. Furthermore, East and West tried to build on former existing discourses by reinterpreting images and motifs, especially the image of the aeroplane. By reanimating the admiration for aerial power which had been linked to national discourses since the beginning of aviation (Fritzsche 1992, Pascoe 2003), the Allied aircraft was recoded into a symbol of freedom in the West. Additionally, the Allied fighter pilot as the former war enemy was reintegrated in a trans-national (and international) civil society in the moment of the crisis and signifies the continued existence of a concept of the military male hero at the same time. That this hero had to die in the Eastern magazines was the more logical conclusion according to Cold War logic. Regarding the aeroplane as a motif, the Eastern magazines linked to World War II enemy images by drawing direct parallels between the bombings and the airlift planes. This strategy of propaganda fitted perfectly into East German nationalist discourses focusing on the German 'Volk' as victims first of Hitler and then of the Western Allies. In this interpretation the aeroplanes became symbols for a continued war against the German 'Volk', whereby the caesura of 1945 became less important.

Returning to the beginning, the analysis of widely circulated illustrated magazines shows that although the iconic images by Ries and Sanders were not

used contemporarily, there were other images referring to the narrative of a trapped population as a crucial and constituent element of the propaganda. Without being marooned, a narrative of the Berliner' willingness to make sacrifices and to resist did not make any sense. Thus the dramaturgic editing of the conflict was fundamentally based on perceptions of space, and these perceptions of space were inextricably linked with concepts of gender roles in the West. With the Berlin crisis the endangered inner space was feminised as a space of women and children, whilst men were in charge of the outer space as well as the connection between inner and outer. The gendered visual discourse stood in sharp contrast to the contemporary situation where women were mostly responsible for supply of food and basic goods. However, unlike what might have been expected, these images did not just appear in the West to emphasise the American intention to rescue Berlin. In fact, it was the Eastern magazines which started to refer to an enclosed and victimised Berlin population. Again this served to establish the founding myth of the nascent East German state with the German 'Volk' as a positive point of reference. And although the Eastern magazines had already started to promote the figure of the female socialist worker, during the times of crisis they focused much more on the male civilian hero distributing Soviet food.

Concerning the discursive afterlife of the Berlin crisis one has to ask why the iconic images of Henry Ries and Walter Sanders were so successful. In the Eastern magazines the crisis did not have a media afterlife. They immediately stopped reporting in summer 1949. In the West the images of Ries and Sanders offered the opportunity to narrow down the much more complex contemporary visual discourse. Their photographs were substantially based on the fact that they combined the different types of contemporary motifs showing the population and the aeroplanes in a way that led to the story of a trapped population waiting for help on a little island made of rubble. These images produced the impression of a blockade and helped to produce the Berlin myth.

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Part III
Memory, Remembrance and Commemoration

Jonathan Rayner

The Seen Unseen: British and German Submarines on Film 'U-Boats versus Submarines'

Increasingly in academic observation of the processes of commemoration and memory, movies depicting World War II have been seen to shape and inform what cinema audiences know or believe they know about that conflict (White 2002, Winter 2001, Ferro 1983). As a result, the depiction of the submarine in the cinema builds on existing impressions and presumptions about undersea warfare. The U-boats' war has been represented in numerous films, from both war-time and the post-war period and from the perspective of both sides in the conflict. Cumulatively, films featuring Germany's U-boats have offered conflicting images of the Battle of the Atlantic. By comparison, and also in comparison with films depicting the highly successful campaign undertaken in the Pacific by US Navy submarines, the wartime operations of British submarines have received scant attention. While the significance, achievements and moral judgement of the U-boat campaigns in the World Wars have permeated popular perceptions of both conflicts, knowledge and recognition of the roles and accomplishments of British submarines are comparatively rare. For example, the commander of HMS *Upholder* became the most highly decorated British submariner following attacks on Italian troopships in the Mediterranean which resulted in heavy loss of life (Barnett 2001: 370). Controversy has surrounded an American submarine's attack on a Japanese troopship alleged to have exhibited the ruthlessness popularly ascribed to U-boats (Johnston 2010, Dunn 2010).

Two quotations from Winston Churchill summarise the popular view of the *Kriegsmarine*'s U-boats and the conduct of their campaign against shipping, and highlight the largely unacknowledged contribution of Royal Navy submarines to Allied victory:

'Enemy submarines are to be called U-boats. The term "submarine" is to be reserved for Allied underwater vessels. U-boats are those dastardly villains

who sink our ships, while submarines are those gallant and noble craft which sink theirs.' (Kaplan and Currie 1997: 73).

'Of all the branches of men in the Forces, there is none which shows more devotion and faces grimmer perils than the submariner. Great deeds are done in the air and on the land; nevertheless, nothing surpasses your exploits.' (Anon. 2010)

What these two statements reveal (aside from the irony apparent in Churchill's disingenuous differentiation between Allied and Axis submarine warfare), are the complex distinctions and interconnections between visibility and invisibility, stealth and underhandedness, heroism and villainy, doctrine and dogma, recognition and denial, and morality and immorality, which threaten to dominate any discussion of the submarine's wartime role. The apparent treachery of the U-boat resides in its surprise attacks upon civilian targets, and instigates the demonisation of German submarines in contemporary and retrospective depictions. The heroism of British submarines is often predicated on a similar stealth in attacking naval targets, yet the recognition of innate tactical invisibility (and tacit admission of its essential equivalence to the operational realities of the U-boats) may lie behind the wider anonymity of British submarines and their relatively unpublicised, 'un-English' achievements.[1] The maintenance of such distinctions between the operations, targets and the implied morality of British and German submarine operations can be traced backwards, through respective submarine designs and plans for their tactical employment, and forwards, to the filmic representation of their wartime roles. War films in general and submarine films in particular are bound by visual, thematic and narrative formulae: the adherence to or divergence from such conventions exhibited by key British and German examples can serve to illustrate the propagation of persistent images of the submarine, and the inculcation of attitudes towards its role in 20th century war.

Submarines in World War II

The characteristics, missions and achievements of the submarines of all the navies involved in World War II require consideration, in order for the selectivity of their representation in the cinema to be interpreted. The acknowl-

1 Responding to the introduction of the first submersibles and speculation as to their likely employment in war, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson categorised the submarine as 'underhand, underwater and damned un-English.' (Winton 1999: 4).

edgement of the near-success of the German submarine strategy in starving Britain into submission in both World Wars must be read against both the vilification of the U-boat's tactics, and awareness of the overwhelming losses sustained by the U-boat arm (Williamson, 2005: 250-52). German submarines wrought havoc in shipping lanes across the North and South Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, off the Eastern seaboard of the United States and in the Indian Ocean. The tactical superiority of the U-boat packs in the early war years was reversed by Allied numerical and technological advances in the mid- to late-war period, which saw the Type VII (a submarine little different from its predecessors of World War I and the mainstay of the U-boat fleet) rendered fatally obsolete (Williamson 2005: 40). By comparison, British submarines conducted a little known and largely ineffective campaign in the Baltic and North Seas in the early part of the war, a well-known, successful, but very costly campaign in the Mediterranean in the middle of the war, and a highly successful yet often overlooked campaign in the Far East at the war's end. Where the majority of U-boats were medium-sized submarines designed for commerce-raiding, British submarines built in the inter-war period were larger, longer-ranged boats intended for fleet operations across the breadth of the Empire. U-boats featured fewer torpedo-tubes and multiple reloads, for sustained action against merchant convoys, whereas British submarine designs emphasized more tubes and fewer reloads for concentrated 'salvo' attacks against fast manoeuvring enemy warships (McCartney 2006: 3). By comparison, the distances to be negotiated in the Pacific Ocean led both the Japanese and American navies to favour large, long-ranged boats. Although both navies visualised fleet roles for their boats in pre-war doctrine, the US Navy redeployed its submarines in a burgeoning blockade against Japan's merchant marine, and in so doing achieved the strategic success which eluded the U-boats in both World Wars (Ireland and Grove 1997: 158-164). Misgivings on the part of US naval officers over the morality of unrestricted submarine warfare were overtaken by the perceived necessity for an effective counter to Japanese aggression after Pearl Harbour (Andrade 1971). Despite apparent differences in design, operational doctrine and intended employment, submarines of all the combatant navies attacked merchant as well as naval targets in the course of the war. The pervasive portrayal of the U-boat campaign against merchant traffic distracts from the inconvenient truth that the overwhelming majority of movies representing Allied submarine operations show only naval targets being attacked.

Conventions of Submarine Movies

Narrative, thematic and imagistic consistencies, comparable to those which define any popular film genre, can be identified for the submarine film. Although films of the war genre generally, and naval war films in particular, evince a noticeable commitment to realism and historical accuracy, submarine movies are among the most formulaic and predictable examples in these categories. In submarine films, certain narrative situations become conventionalised and are endlessly replayed: submarines are shown negotiating minefields or torpedo nets; raiding parties are put ashore on enemy coasts; a delicate repair, the defusing of an unexploded bomb or depth charge, or a vital life-saving medical operation, must be completed while the boat rests on the seabed; if surprised on the surface, the submarine may be forced to dive while crewmembers are still on deck; cornered subs will jettison oil, debris and dead bodies to convince enemy ships they have been destroyed; and in accomplishing their mission, the boat and crew are pushed to the limits of endurance, in yet longer patrols, ever deeper dives and incessant depth-charge attacks. Such episodes drive and derive from common thematic elements, such as: portrayals of the submarine's crucial contribution to momentous missions, including sabotage or intelligence-gathering; scenes of mutiny, arising from distrust of a captain's fitness to command, when he risks the boat or sacrifices members of its crew; and conversely, the affirmation of the discipline and patriarchal responsibility of the submarine captain, in safeguarding his boat and crew while completing vital tasks.

Connected to these continuities are certain conventions of representation, which accentuate the interaction between the cinema as a visual medium and the moral conceptualisation of submarine warfare as a cinematic subject. These conventions serve to provide omniscient views of the submarine (objective, external views, usually involving miniatures, of the boat passing through minefields, negotiating reefs and shallows, or beset by depth charge attacks), or the captain's privileged, subjective view through the periscope. Such shots emphasise the popular narrative film's commitment to comprehensive showing and sharing of spectacle and detail, even where this tendency contradicts the logic of the submarine crew's roles and capabilities and the verisimilitude of their depiction. Few crewmembers other than officers, and frequently only the captain, would look through the periscope, and plainly no one aboard the submarine could share the often dramatically ironic view of the submarine threatened by mines or pursuing warships, to which the viewer

nonetheless enjoys unqualified access. Such conventions offer a paradoxical omniscience to the film viewer, in showing the submarine objectively in relation to its environment, whether it is a lurking U-boat threatening an unsuspecting merchant ship, for example in *Action in the North Atlantic* (1943), or an Allied submarine pursued by an enemy surface ship, as in *Destination Tokyo* (1943). In such cases, the villainy of the U-boat and the victimisation of the Allied submarine are rendered visible in order to serve both cinematic narrative and propagandist rhetoric. War-time American features like the examples cited above use these conventions to create narrative suspense, by vilifying the stalking U-boat (hidden from its victim but visible to the viewer) and revealing the imminent danger to the American submarine (besieged by its enemies in hostile waters). While Hollywood films can be seen to embrace the narrative consistencies and didactic potential which define the submarine film, the partial adherence of British and German films to such clichés reflects a substantially more complex response to the realist requirements of the war film, and the simplistic moral representation of the submarine in action.

The British submarine film: *We Dive at Dawn*

In terms of British feature films, the successful later-war operations and even the Mediterranean patrols conducted by British submarines have never received cinematic representation. Those films which have addressed the British submarine fleet's war have confined their depictions to factually-based narratives of operations in the North Sea (*We Dive at Dawn*, 1943), the X-craft midget submarine attack on the battleship *Tirpitz* in Norway (*Above Us the Waves*, 1955) and fictional representations of the use of captured U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic (*Mystery Submarine*, 1962). In comparison with the visible and recognisable enemy submarine (often identified by conspicuous insignia on its conning tower) in Hollywood examples like *Action in the North Atlantic* and *Corvette K-225* (1943), in British naval films such as *The Cruel Sea* (1953) the U-boat remains abidingly unseen, as an invisible but ever-present menace. The representation of the British submarine in *We Dive at Dawn* also eludes the conventionalised portrayal of American wartime cinema, and weds the submarine film's formulae to a documentary film aesthetic.

Fig. 1 *We Dive at Dawn* (1942) Courtesy of Getty Images.

We Dive at Dawn follows a British submarine through a special mission in the Baltic during the early part of the war. At the film's opening, HMS *Sea Tiger* returns from an unsuccessful patrol, and the narrative then traces the crew's familial and romantic shore side entanglements and the boat's sudden departure to hunt down the German warship *Brandenburg*. Once the target is discovered, a tense and inconclusive torpedo attack ensues, followed by a counterattack by escorting ships in which the British submarine is crippled. The damaged *Sea Tiger* is reported sunk by the Germans, and families in her home port assume she is lost, but the submarine refuels during a far-fetched commando raid on a Danish port and returns to discover that the *Brandenburg* was sunk in the attack.

While the 'fanciful' raid which acts as the film's climax reflects a simple propagandist purpose, in the main *We Dive at Dawn* espouses the down-beat, realist representative strategies of the British documentary feature to show wartime difficulties and dangers overcome with committed, communal action

(Coultass 1984: 17). The film resorts to model work for the conventionalised external views of the submarine grazing mine cables, breaching an anti-submarine net and lying on the bottom, and replays the cliché of dumping oil and debris to dupe a pursuing enemy. At the same time, it incorporates location shooting and integrates documentary footage for scenes on board the submarine and on her depot ship. In these factual scenes, the film closely resembles the wartime drama documentary *Close Quarters* (1943). The opening titles of this short film state that it 'presents an authentic impression of a Wartime patrol in the North Sea', with the cast made up exclusively of 'officers and men of His Majesty's Submarines.' *Close Quarters* downplays the drama of HMS *Tyrant*'s mission off the Norwegian coast which (like *We Dive At Dawn*) entails occluded attacks on glimpsed targets, rescues at sea, and the boat resting on the bottom and in danger of being captured after depth-charging by German destroyers. While the enlisted crewmembers seek to enhance the *Tyrant*'s combat record in competition with their sister boat, the officers obey their orders stoically and stay within their assigned areas while they search for tempting targets.

The documentary aesthetic adopted at the start of *We Dive at Dawn* gives way to the heightened mise-en-scène and emphatic editing seen in the attack on the *Brandenburg*. The captain manoeuvres the submarine and prosecutes the attack in a tense, rapidly edited, under-lit and music-less sequence, which is set in the sub's control room. Throughout the sequence, the target appears as no more than a distant and indistinct silhouette. The decisive focus, via close-ups of the captain's face and connected point-of-view shots, is on the successive glimpses of the target through the periscope, and on the series of orders the captain issues as the attack develops. Similarly in *Close Quarters*, *Tyrant*'s crew listens to the distant sounds of another British submarine's torpedo attack, and the succeeding depth charges, without knowing the fate of the target or the other boat. *Tyrant*'s own attacks on a surfaced U-boat and an enemy convoy are represented with an impassive and concise observation of procedure (even more muted than the torpedo attack sequence in *We Dive at Dawn*) which undercuts the successes on both occasions.

The ignorance of *Sea Tiger*'s crew of the outcome of the attack on the *Brandenburg* until the boat's return counterbalances the heroics of the port raid, and the celebrations of the sinking are tempered in the film's final moments by the matter-of-fact acknowledgement of another submarine's departure on patrol in the wake of *Sea Tiger*'s arrival. Although *We Dive at Dawn* evinces

its propaganda purpose in the raid scenes and conforms to submarine film conventions in several areas, its documentary feature credentials are confirmed in the reticent determination of the submarine crew, the realistic strain of the torpedo attack sequence and the final recognition of the as yet unending conflict. The submarine's own invisibility, which is lost once torpedoes are fired, passes instead to the target and the obscuration of the attack's success, which facilitates the evocation of sympathy for the boat's crew as they battle flooding and face the possibilities of death or capture when the boat is immobilised through lack of fuel.[2] As a result, *We Dive at Dawn* avoids triumphalism, despite its propagandist features, by eschewing the most obvious conventionalised spectacle of torpedoes exploding on target and the sinking enemy warship seen through the periscope. The extravagant torpedo detonations and exploding, sinking ships which are satisfyingly delivered in Hollywood films such as *Destination Tokyo*, *Torpedo Run* (1958) and most recently in *U-571* (2000), are markedly absent from this and other British examples. Although sharing with *We Dive at Dawn* the same wartime propagandist justification for the inclusion of such scenes, *Close Quarters* is equally restrained in its depiction of the *Tyrant*'s attacks on its targets. The submarine's invisibility is thus extended or shifted to its target, and its combat success limited to a reserved celebration whose reticence, though in keeping with the style of the documentary feature, perhaps underlines an unease with the submarine's intrinsic hidden-ness. Ironically, this diffidence and discomfort in the portrayal of combat in the British submarine film mirrors the self-consciousness apparent in post-war German films of the U-boats' war, which seek to distance and devalue success to an even greater extent.

The German submarine film: *Das Boot*

As a modern reflection on the war and the U-boat campaign from the German perspective, *Das Boot* (1981) has enjoyed widespread critical and commercial success. Entering production as a six-hour television miniseries, it was circulated subsequently as a feature-length cinema release, and as an extended director's cut in 1997. Adapted from the novel by Lothar-Günther Buchheim, *Das Boot* has been equally congratulated and criticised for its revision

2 *Sea Tiger*'s tracking of the *Brandenburg* seems to be based on British submarine attacks on German warships during the Norwegian campaign (specifically the torpedoing of the pocket battleship *Lützow* on 11th April 1940 by HMS *Spearfish*), and the consideration of scuttling and surrender evokes comparison with the fate of HMS *Seal* (Winton 1999: 110-13).

of the image of the U-boat and its crew. In eschewing the exploration of wartime nationalism and politics in favour of celebrating the duty of the common man, the film has been seen to be in keeping with the cultural climate of Germany in the 1980s (Elsaesser 1989: 255-6). However, the national and international impact of *Das Boot* has tended to obscure its connection to and derivation from previous German films addressing the U-boat war. In addition to pre-war and wartime films such as *Morgenrot* (1933) and *U-Boote Westwärts!* (1941), other post-war productions have also approached the vexed subject of the U-boat campaign. *Haie und Kleine Fische /Sharks and Little Fishes* (1957) offered a similar interpretation of honourable and patriotic submariners (the 'little fishes') abused and betrayed by their political leaders (the 'sharks'). In *U-47: Kapitanleutnant Prien* (1958), the historical U-boat ace Günther Prien receives a revisionist characterisation as a troubled commander who has lost faith in the Nazi cause. These examples seek to modify and redress the condemnatory image of the U-boat in popular film and fiction, and Petersen's film extends this effort by showing the crew of *U-96* tested morally, divided politically and martyred collectively by their war experience.

The film in all its versions is an endurance test: the attempt to adapt Buchheim's novel and represent the duration of a U-boat patrol prompted the length of the original television series. The three-month sortie involves long periods of inactivity, a three-week mid-Atlantic storm, attacks on Allied shipping, a clandestine refueling in neutral Spain, and an ill-fated attempt to traverse the Straits of Gibraltar. Petersen's film negotiates an idiosyncratic relationship with the conventions of the submarine movie, which is necessitated by transference of victimhood from the U-boat's targets to its crew. While certain conventions persist (the captain's periscope vision, the external views of the submerged boat), these are included to exaggerate the U-boat's vulnerability. The captain attempts to torpedo a British destroyer, but loses sight of the target until it looms into view, filling the periscope as it attacks at point blank range. The objective views of the boat submerged reveal the close proximity of sinking depth charges, and suggest the mounting water pressure upon the boat's hull as it dives to evade detection and attack.

In comparison with the British submarine film's compromised representation of combat, *U-96*'s successful attack on a convoy bears a strong resemblance to the stifled strike on the *Brandenburg* seen in *We Dive at Dawn*. The surfaced U-boat launches torpedoes at several merchant ships before being sur-

prised by an escort and forced to dive. Objective shots, obviously inaccessible to the U-boat's crew, of the torpedoes striking anonymous targets are inserted for the audience's benefit. Consequently, the only confirmation of hits and sinkings comes from the sounds of torpedo impact and the collapsing bulkheads of the victims, and the muted celebrations within the boat are subdued altogether by a prolonged, retributive depth charging. As they endure the patrol and suffer this particular punishment, the crews' appearance is not one of fanatical, hierarchic, uniformed efficiency but rather of desperate, undifferentiated self-preservation in the boat's purgatorial interior (Combs 1982: 81). The eventual return to investigate a 'glow' on the horizon reveals a crippled, burning tanker. When the captain adds the coup de grâce on the surface, the unwanted spectacle of their target becomes unbearable when forsaken survivors appear on the tanker's deck, and swim vainly towards the U-boat before being consumed by the spreading burning oil.[3] The Captain's earlier, vocal contempt for Nazi propaganda valorising the destruction of 'tonnage' (rather than men and ships) previews and connects forcefully with this revelation of the infernal vision of the tanker. The crew's appalled response to this confirmation of the realities of the U-boat war serves ultimately as another exculpation of their reluctant role within it. In Buchheim's written accounts, despite the desire not to see such evidence of the consequences of the U-boat's role, the spectacle of sinking ships precipitates undesirable speculation on the fate of the crews of merchant ships, which progresses inevitably to the likely fate of the submarine itself:

'Usually, we fire from a greater distance – our target, steamers that seem no more than shadows. It helps to keep the imagination under control... The men on the forecastle will surely have been taken off by their pals in the boats – but what of the others? Did they stay by their cauldrons and burn? What can the scene have been in the engine room when the torpedoes came crashing against the brittle side...? I have to check my imagination, slipping like a runaway anchor chain, and swallow the rising lump in my throat... What does a steamer look like after sinking six or eight thousand feet? What happens to boats like ours when they can no longer be kept from drowning?' (Buchheim: 1978)

3 The vision of the burning tanker contained in Buchheim's *Das Boot* and *U-Boat War* also features in the list of the worst experiences of the convoy escorts, in *The Cruel Sea* (Monsarrat 2002: 260-62).

Here the mind's eye of the unwilling witness aboard the U-boat extrapolates from the details of the destruction of the target to furnish the sight of the future death of the anthropomorphised submarine, the logical end of a series of unwanted images, and scenes preferably unseen.

The pattern of the hidden and revealed aspects of the U-boat's attacks on the convoy is also contained within the danger which stalks *U-96* throughout the narrative. Allied aircraft which go undetected until the moment they bomb the submarine appear first on the outward leg of the patrol, and are later responsible for the damage and near-fatal dive at Gibraltar. They then materialise at the film's end to bomb and destroy *U-96* on her return to port. The fateful menace of the aircraft illustrates the historical factor of radar (on Allied ships as well as planes) which robs the U-boats of their invisibility on the surface at night. In an effective reversal of the objectively viewed escorts and depth charges which threaten the boat, the sudden unanticipated arrival of the aircraft (whose attacks increase in violence as the film progresses) eradicate the U-boat's invisibility to make it the victim of surprise, unstoppable attacks. As such the aircraft's symbolic role within the narrative is both to predict the historical erosion of the U-boat's invulnerability by radar and aircraft, and to enhance the sympathetic treatment of the hunted German submarine and its persecuted crew, suffering an enemy's unfair, unanswerable tactics.

Conclusion: The Morality and Expediency of the Seen Unseen

In the novel *The Cruel Sea*, the sight of the previously unseen U-boat, which is only revealed when forced to the surface by an escort ship, is viewed with repugnance, as something 'odd, and infinitely disgusting… like seeing some criminal, who had outraged honour and society…taking his ease at one's own fireside' (Monsarrat 2002: 235-7). The revelation of the U-boat in privileged omniscient vision in American and British feature films is predicated on a similar condemnation of its unseen nature, its hidden-ness as an index of guilt. The purposeful visibility of U-boats in post-war German films, while laying bare the same activities as those portrayed in wartime propaganda, seeks to reveal different and formerly unseen qualities: the vulnerability of the U-boat crews themselves, and the regret at the inevitable consequences of their operations. In *Das Boot*, the visible victimisation of the U-boat and her crew and the denial of triumphalism in their achievements are attuned to postwar national and international audiences. By contrast, the under-

representation of the British submarine in the cinema, and the excision of images of victory even from wartime productions like *We Dive at Dawn* and *Close Quarters*, suggest more than simply a documentary reticence in the depiction of the Royal Navy's submarine arm.

The portrayal of submarines in the cinema produces a paradox of visual and visible representation, in which the feature film's propensity for showing all contradicts the submarine's primary characteristic, its invisibility, whether seen in a positive naval or a negative moral light. Similarly, the feature film's objective representation of the submarine, its milieu and activities for narrative clarity and convention contradicts the logic of vision, but is made to serve ideological intentions to show partially and propagandistically. The hidden war of the submarine (far from land and beneath the sea) only lends itself to filmic recreation via a highly conventionalised visual format, which (partially at best) renders imagistically the operational realities of the submarine. The cinematic demands for and of the seen (the lurking 'U-boat' or heroic 'submarine' of Allied propaganda, privileged subjective/objective points of view, the 'money-shot' of the torpedo detonation and the sinking target) stand in conflict with the alternatives of the unseen (or for differing reasons, the *wished*-unseen) in British and German films (*Sea Tiger*'s and *U-96*'s obfuscated attacks, the British escorts seen only as hulls and racing propellers and heard as searching ASDIC pings, and the intolerable spectacle of the burning tanker in *Das Boot*).

If the adjustments of convention seen in *Das Boot* reflect the exoneration of the U-boat and her crew via the representation of their ordeal at the hands of an unseen and unrelenting enemy, then the deliberate obfuscation of victory in *We Dive at Dawn* belies not simply a forbearing, documentary discretion, but an unwillingness to embrace the innate characteristics and specific history of the submarine within British naval war. The considerable controversy surrounding the unfairness, even the illegality, of the only post-war action involving a Royal Navy submarine (the sinking of an Argentinian warship in the Falklands War) is suggestive of the same sense of unease and un-Englishness which accrues around the British submarine (Brown 1989: 129-139). For national as much as formal reasons, the British submarine remains unseen.

Illustration

Fig. 1 *We Dive at Dawn* (1942) Courtesy of Getty Images.

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Graham Dawson

The Theory of Popular Memory and the Contested Memories of the Second World War in Britain

This chapter introduces a particular theoretical model for the analysis of cultures of memory: the paradigm of 'popular memory' first proposed by the Popular Memory Group at the University of Birmingham in England (Popular Memory Group 1982), extended by the oral historian Alistair Thomson (1994) and the cultural historians Ashplant, Dawson and Roper (2004), and utilised in a range of work on the memory of war in Britain and other national contexts ranging from Ireland to Australia and from Palestine to Argentina (Swedenburg 1991, Dawson 1994, Archer 1997, Leonard, 1997, Noakes 1998, Lorenz 2004). Central to this approach is a distinction between 'public' and 'private' constructions of memory; the former involving representations of the past that circulate within the arenas of public culture, the latter describing memories restricted to and shared within private arenas of family, community and other social groups. Cultural power – exercised by the state, by political movements, by organisations within civil society, and by individuals within interpersonal relationships – is understood to operate within both public and private arenas, but also, crucially, to determine interactions between these arenas. This approach offers a complex and subtle model for understanding the politics of memory, in which competing narratives contest the past and vie for recognition within a field structured by dominant public memories and involving processes of subordination and marginalisation, silencing and forgetting. The paper will identify some of the key propositions in popular memory theory and explore various modes of interaction between public and private remembering, making reference primarily to popular memories of the Second World War in Britain.

The theory of popular memory was developed initially at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies during the 1980s (Popular

Memory Group 1982, Dawson and West 1984)[1]. It was shaped by the Centre's characteristic theoretical concerns with cultural representation, conflicting ideologies and the historical construction of subjectivities, and laid emphasis on the popular cultural politics whereby collective and personal meanings of the past in its relation to the present have been produced and contested (Johnson 1996, Turner 2002). Competing discourses and forms of representation are understood to mediate popular memory according to their various conventions, constituting a diverse range of memory-texts. These are opened to investigation by methods of formal, textual interpretation to establish how they structure the significance of the past-present relation and construct a subjective position of intelligibility from which sense can be made of that 'past' by readers, viewers and participants. Analysis is also concerned with the ways in which these productions of memory are organised and circulated socially, and with their interactions within a whole cultural field of representations of the past, as structured by relations of power.

These ideas originated in the Popular Memory Group's essay, 'Popular memory: politics, theory, method' (1982), which connected two previously separate debates; one concerned with the practices of oral history and popular, community-based autobiographical writing, the other with media representations of the past, especially in film and television practice. Whilst the Group reads the forms produced in each of these modes of cultural practice as constructions of popular memory, the visibility and familiarity of their narratives differs considerably. These differences are theorised in terms of a distinction between 'public representations' and 'private memory'. The former term refers to those representations of the past that 'win access to' and 'achieve centrality' within the public domain (Popular Memory Group 1982: 207), where their institutional propagation by the national and local state, the culture industries or the public media ensure their scope to make public meanings for vast audiences. Private memory, by contrast, refers to 'the more privatized sense of the past which is generated within a lived culture' (211), and circulates among particular social groups 'in the course of everyday life' (210). The dynamic interaction between public and private aspects of popular memory is understood in Gramscian Marxist terms as a hegemonic process of ideological domination, resistance and contestation whereby 'dominant

1 My account of popular-memory theory here borrows in part from an earlier version incorporated in Ashplant et al. (2004: 13-14). I am grateful to Timothy Ashplant and Michael Roper for their critical engagement with these ideas.

memory' (207) and its 'oppositional forms' (211) are produced. 'Private memories cannot ... be readily unscrambled from the effects of dominant historical discourses. It is often these that supply the very terms by which a private history is thought through' (211). By the same token, the power of dominant memories depends not simply on their public visibility, but also on their capacity to connect with and articulate publicly those existing popular memories which currently organise a 'common sense' (210) of the 'collective and shared' past within lived culture (207); giving selective public representation to some popular conceptions whilst actively silencing, marginalising and '[holding] to the level of private remembrance' those meanings which are to be subordinated or excluded (210). Cultural contestation between competing memories occurs as an element in ideological conflict centred on discontents and aspirations in the present, and at the level of subjectivity, in securing the sense of continuity between past and present necessary to both collective and personal identities.

As a case study in applying this approach, the Popular Memory Group took as its focus the dominant memory of the Second World War in Britain, and set out to examine how the wartime representation of Britain as an 'Island race' united in a spirit of patriotic determination and self-sacrifice under a 'totemic leader', Sir Winston Churchill, was re-evoked in the political rhetoric of the Conservative Party in the early 1980s (Dawson and West 1984: 11). In particular the Prime Minister of the day, Margaret Thatcher, 'reworked the meanings' of 1940 into a moment when the essential qualities of the British people were expressed (9), as in the great days of Empire once celebrated by popular imperialism. The re-assertion of this Imperial British identity found its most strident expression in the prosecution of the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, which was scripted in Churchillian terms as a defence of the 'British way of life' against the fascist threat of invasion (9). Dawson and West argue that a necessary condition of this mobilisation of conservative popular memory was the 'ubiquitous presence' of public representations of the Second World War from which it could draw (10). These included television and film productions, museum and historical tourist sites, military airshows, toy soldiers, advertisements, the vast output of the publishing industry, and the monuments and ceremonies of official war remembrance. A further condition was the war's significance in the personal memories of those who lived through it, and their narration of that experience in private contexts such as the ex-servicemen's reunion or the family gathering. Dawson and West's analysis points to the 'deep *popular* purchase' of the dominant memory (9,

original emphasis), despite the fact that private memories are always 'potentially … disconfirming of the dominant public forms' (11).

The continuing existence of a network of private, and privatised, memories of the Second World War in Britain, largely absent from and unvoiced in public culture but articulating alternative meanings that challenged, problematised or directly contradicted the dominant 'myths', was demonstrated by Pete Grafton's 1981 book, *You, you and you! The people out of step with World War Two*. Grafton (1981: 164-6) conducted forty-nine interviews with individuals from all over Britain, selected on the criteria of their location and wartime occupation to achieve the broadest possible coverage, with the aim of exploring their 'recollections and feelings' formed on the basis of 'first-hand experiences' of the war. These interviews were edited to draw out stories that 'rarely see the light of day' (165), covering, for example, racism including anti-semitism in British life, workplace strikes, black-marketeering, evasion of national service, and the fear and hatred created by the aerial bombing of British cities. One (anonymous) 'Glaswegian Lad', recalling his military service during the Blitz, remembers being called out to 'a densely populated working-class area ... where a land-mine had apparently dropped. When we arrived there the entire area appeared devastated – smoke, flames everywhere and you could still hear the screams of people in the wreckage. Our first duty was to cordon off the area ... [People] were scrabbling in the wreckage searching for relatives ... We were standing with our rifles and bayonets keeping the people out, it was that bad. I was helping carrying coffins. Sometimes two kids in a box and you could actually hear them, rattling backwards and forwards in the coffin. I was sickened with the whole situation. There was just hatred in me. I wanted to fight against people who could do this to working class men, women and children' (Grafton 1981: 27). In collecting stories such as these, Grafton believed he had merely 'prodded a massive iceberg' (164), and drew the conclusion that 'the British war effort was maintained on the basis of threat and coercion, rather than on any volunteer spirit that prevailed amongst the majority of the population' (169), as dominant memory would suggest.[2]

However, private memory is not necessarily oppositional in the way Grafton's study seems to suggest. Alistair Thomson's book, *Anzac memories*

2 For the wider critical debate about the 'myth', memory and history of the Second World War in Britain see, for example, Noakes 1998, Smith 2000, Connelly 2004.

(1994), draws on the ideas of the Popular Memory Group to study the hegemonic power of the Anzac legend, that founding myth of the forging of white Australian nationhood in the 'baptism of fire' undergone by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps during the First World War (53). Based on oral-history interviews with Great War veterans, and initially conceived (like Grafton's) as an 'oppositional history' of working-class experiences excluded and forgotten in public memory, Thomson's study explores the complex 'entanglement' of their private and personal memories with the public legend made of their lives (7). The personal memories of the veterans are understood as in process rather than as fixed, and grasped in relation both to the shifting forms and meanings of the public legend, and to the shifting identities of the men themselves at different stages of their life course.

By demonstrating that veterans of varying political affiliations 'had adopted and used the Anzac legend because it was resonant and useful in their own remembering' (7), Thomson shows how individual subjectivity is negotiated in relation to public memory. In detailed life-story work with three particular individuals, he explores how, as each has 'struggled to compose memories of their war ... they have drawn upon public narratives of Anzac that have provided interpretative categories to help them to articulate experience in particular ways' (216). For Fred Farrall, the Anzac legend was anathema to his own anti-imperialist and anti-war politics for much of his life, but came to be embraced in old age as providing a means of recognition and engagement with younger generations; whereas for Percy Bird, the legend offered narrative frames in which to cast his own remembering in relatively safe and fixed stories, capable of defusing and containing the impact of potentially disturbing recollections. While these 'negotiations between public and private sense' may work differently for each individual (236), Thomson argues that, insofar as the public narratives 'have recognised key aspects of the diggers' [Australian soldiers'] experience ... [t]he Anzac legend has ... helped many veterans to compose a past that they can live with' (216). By the same token, 'experiences and understandings that are not recognised and that cannot be articulated through the public narratives are displaced or marginalised within individual memory' (216), causing alienation, silence, and 'internalised trauma' (220). These dominant public narratives have constructed widely recognised and validated forms of Australian identity – including masculinities – useful not only to the veterans themselves but also to those who welcomed their return, mourned their loss, and commemorated their contribution to the story of Australia.

In Thomson's 1994 analysis of the power and subjective effects of hegemonic popular memories of war, considerable emphasis is placed upon the presence and availability of alternative narratives within public memory. Fred Farrall's oppositional stance towards Anzac mythology, for example, is shown to rest on the politics of war memory propagated by the Communist Party and wider labour movement in interwar Australia, and by the peace and women's movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Pete Grafton's (1981) study, by contrast, points to private memory as the source of alternative – and potentially oppositional – narratives. *You, you and you!* provides glimpses into the collective mode of existence of these private memories, circulated and passed on through local networks in a cultural process that anthropologist Julie Cruikshank (1990, cited in Thomson 1999: 35) has called 'the social life of stories'. For example, a 'London Boy' tells how: 'In Wapping a parachutist came down and apparently he was partially blinded. He'd obviously baled out of a plane. He jabbered away to the people that gathered around him in some foreign language. They assumed he was German and they smashed him to death. They learned later he was ... a Polish officer, which was tragic because he was like a British fighter pilot. This is common knowledge in Wapping. Many people will substantiate it, but of course none are prepared to say they took part in it, or saw it happen' (Grafton 1981: 27-8). In this example, individual memory has incorporated an element of the 'collective and shared' past that exists as a story within the lived culture of a locality. Held at the private level of remembrance because it was deeply disturbing to mythic constructions of the fair-minded and peaceable British decently going about the business of defeating Nazi militarism, it had nevertheless remained 'common knowledge' locally.[3]

A perceived need to think through more carefully these different but intricately related modes of memory, the public and the private, motivates a further development in the theory of popular memory and its application to the remembrance of war, in Ashplant, Dawson and Roper's 2004 essay on 'The politics of war memory and commemoration'. This draws into popular-memory theory some key concepts and perspectives from two other major paradigms in historical studies of war memory to create 'a more complex, integrated account of the interacting processes that link the individual, civil

3 Cf. another privatised local memory, that of the Bethnal Green Tube disaster in March 1943 (Stairway to Heaven Memorial Trust website 2007, *Independent* 2009).

society, and the state' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 12). The 'state-centred' approach (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: xii), associated with Hobsbawm and Ranger's concept of 'invented traditions' (1983) and Anderson's idea of the nation as an 'imagined community' (1983), has been concerned primarily with 'the role of war commemoration within the political project of the nation-state' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 8), a means of 'binding its citizens into a collective national identity' (7). By contrast, the 'social-agency' approach (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: xii), epitomised in Jay Winter's (1995, 1999) work on cultural responses to the First World War, emphasises 'the work of remembrance performed by the agencies of civil society' and is primarily interested in 'the role of ... [war] commemoration in translating individual grief into public mourning for the dead, stimulated by ... desire for psychological reparation of loss, in response to the traumatic impact of death in war' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 8).

In the revised model of popular memory proposed by Ashplant *et al*., both these perspectives contribute to a theoretical model for understanding the making, circulating, and contesting of the collective narratives of war memory, seen as a complex hegemonic process that operates within and between a number of different 'socio-political spaces', or 'social arenas'. Each of these arenas constitutes a different mode of collectivity: 'These range, in social breadth and political importance, from the networks of families or kinship groups, through those of communities of geography or interest, to the public sphere of nation-states and transnational power blocs' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 17). Both the form and substance of war memories, and their relative scope and reach, will differ according to the arena in which they are produced and the particular collectivity to which they speak. For Ashplant *et al*. (2004: 17), the politics of war memory is not only a matter of the clash between competing narratives but also involves 'struggles to extend, or alternatively to limit, the arenas within which specific memories are able to circulate, and hence make claims for recognition'.

Within the more intimate, face-to-face groupings ('ranging from family and kinship networks and gatherings of old comrades to local communities and interest groups'), individuals who have undergone a common or comparable experience – for example, the inhabitants of a bombed city, or the members of a military unit – exchange personal stories and 'begin to formulate a shared language and identify common themes' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 18). In this process, certain aspects of the personal remembering of individuals like

Grafton's 'London Boy' or Thomson's Fred Farrall – particularly those elements which resonate with the collective experience of their social groups – come to be recognised, articulated, and represented. At the same time, other aspects of personal memory may be silenced or suppressed and 'may never be articulated in any wider arena' or achieve social expression and recognition (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 18). The resulting narratives – described as 'shared/common memories' (19) – circulate within relatively private social arenas and recognition remains restricted and contained within the group itself. In order to secure more extensive public recognition, the members of a face-to-face social group or community must create agencies capable of recasting its narratives into a new, integrated collective form and projecting this into a 'public arena' (17) where it speaks to others beyond the immediate circle of memory. Such agencies include organisations of civil society such as a war veterans' group, a local commemorative committee or a grass-roots campaign seeking acknowledgement of, or reparation for, a wartime experience felt to be particular damaging.

In the case of British popular memory of the Second World War, one example of an organised agency of this kind is the London Far East Prisoner-of-War Association (1941-45) [FEPOW], established in 1947 by former inmates of the Japanese POW camps in the Far East to provide mutual support and 'keep going the spirit that kept us going' (FEPOW website). Now one of sixty such clubs and associations organised under a National Federation, FEPOW campaigns alongside the Royal British Legion for compensation from the British Government in recognition of the suffering endured in the camps by the former prisoners (Stanley 2004: 252-3). Another example of an organised agency emerging in civil society to contest official memory is that of the Bevin Boys Association. This was formed in 1989 to tell the 'forgotten' story of the men conscripted into the wartime coal-mining industry, who encountered popular rejection during the war and were subjected to official neglect thereafter (Taylor 1995, Hickman 2008); a story told to further the Association's campaign for symbolic recognition by the British state of the Bevin Boys' contribution to the war effort, through their inclusion in the annual Remembrance Sunday parade in Whitehall and the issuing of a commemorative badge (Bevin Boys Association website, Matthias 2008).

Shared or common memories 'enter the public arena when they are articulated in some cultural or artistic form, or into a political narrative' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 20). Such representations may enter into various relations with

dominant memory. Firstly, they may be aligned 'within the existing framework of official memory' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 20), as in the case of the narrative promoted by the Bevin Boys Association. Secondly, they may fashion a public alternative to it as a subordinated or marginalised memory; as in the case of FEPOW, whose fight for compensation has involved a challenge to the marginalisation of the war in the Far East (relative to the emphasis given to the war in Europe) within dominant British memory, and whose members participate in a transnational arena together with Australian, Taiwanese and American POWs organisations where criticisms of Churchill and the British military command for their inept loss of Singapore to the Japanese are commonplace.[4] Lastly, such memories emerging from below may constitute a directly oppositional 'sectional memory' which contests the very tenets of official memory and seeks to displace its centrality to state ideology (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 20). However, in Britain, the hegemonic memory of the Second World War has successfully blocked the emergence of any such fundamental challenge, unlike in Northern Ireland, where Irish Republican sectional memory has tended to refuse dominant British meanings of both World Wars from a perspective rooted in the assertion of Irish national sovereignty (Leonard 1996, Dawson 2007: 1-3, 288-94). In all three cases, a process of selection, reinterpretation and re-presentation is at work in this transition from private to public memory. According to Ashplant *et al*., any such public narrative of collective memory 'shapes the individual and common/shared memories from which it is composed, selecting some and excluding others, highlighting key themes and framing them within its preferred narrative tropes. Only when memories have been woven together into a narrative which is both widely held and publicly expressed do they have the potential to secure political effects' (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 20).

For Ashplant *et al.*, a politics of war memory and commemoration operates within and between all of these arenas, both private and public, as 'a diverse range of social groups, as well as individuals' struggle to produce or rework narratives of collective remembrance (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 17). Tensions, contradictions, and the potential for conflicts between existing and emergent collective narratives exist at each stage of the articulation process. At the apex of power, overarching and exerting influence within this whole, complex process of remembrance and commemoration, is the 'dominant national

4 See, for example, the websites of the Taiwan POW Camps Memorial Society and the Center For Research Allied POWS Under The Japanese.

narrative' that articulates 'official memory' at the level of the state (22). The making of war memories 'requires a constant engagement – whether negotiation or contestation – with the nation-state, its agencies and its narratives' (18). Dominant national narratives function to subordinate alternative public memories of war, but in so doing, they may 'have the effect of accommodating, constraining, reshaping or silencing [not only] sectional, [but also] shared/common and even individual memories' (22). These narratives have powerful effects in terms of subjectivities. One such effect stems from their 'capacity to touch off popular identifications' (10) and channel 'individual psychic investments' into forms of collective mobilisation (33). This can be seen in British national-popular support for wars such as the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the Gulf War of 1991, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, constructed in each case on the template of Second World War memory (Dawson 1994: 2-4, 283-5). Other effects of dominant narratives include their emotional efficacy with respect to mourning, and their role in the cross-generational transmission of cultural memories to younger people without direct personal experience of the remembered events.

With the dwindling of the survivor generation who have personal, experiential memories of the Second World War, this latter dimension of popular memory – its involvement of the second and third 'successor' generations (Ashplant *et al.* 2004: 43-7) – is becoming increasingly important.[5] Yet in early 21st century Britain, it is striking how the dominant memory of the Second World War remains focused on Churchill, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz spirit. On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary commemorations marking the end of the war, which occurred in the immediate wake of the London bomb attacks on 7 July 2005, an editorial in the left-of-centre *Daily Mirror* (2005) echoed several other newspapers in claiming that: 'The terrible events of 7/7 (the London bombings) re-affirmed the resilience and doggedness of the British people. There has been a rekindling of the wartime spirit which refused to give in to Hitler and now has decided that the bombings on [Thursday] must bring us closer together'; while the right-wing *Daily Telegraph* (2005) quoted the great man himself: '"What kind of people do they

5 Debates on cross-generational memory first emerged in relation to families of the Holocaust (for example, Wardl 1992, Burchardt 1993, Hirsch 1997, 2008), but more recently have come to be extended to other contexts (as, for example, in Jelin 2003: 89-102, Argenti and Schramm 2009).

think we are?" asked Winston Churchill in 1940. The Nazis found out soon enough; so will the [7/7] bombers.'

However, it is equally striking how new practices of war commemoration are proliferating, many of them through the agency of second- or third-generation descendants as well as ageing survivors, and creating public narratives of the war that pull in very different directions. In 1997 Carol Cooper founded an organisation called Children and Families of the Far East Prisoners of War, dedicated to research and memorialisation, after reading a news report about the diary of a POW in the Far East who had died under forced labour on the Burma railway, and discovering that the man was her own father (Children and Families of the Far East Prisoners of War website). In other cases, such public memorial projects are rooted in hitherto privatised local memory. In Kennington Park, London, where an estimated 104 people in a trench shelter were killed on the night of 15 October 1940 by a German bomb that buried the majority in a mass grave from which bodies were never recovered, a memorial was erected in 2006 to mark an event that had been 'forgotten except by those still living in the surrounding streets'. Guests of honour at the unveiling ceremony were James Holland, who as a 14-year-old was pulled out of the shelter alive but lost both his parents, and Kay Coster, who 'only learned the details [of the event] in the years before her father's death in 2002, after decades when he could not bear to talk about it' (*Guardian* 2006). Popular commemorative work of this kind is a vehicle for psychological reparation that is still felt to be lacking, and necessary, in the long afterlife of such traumatic events. In Bath, Somerset, targeted by the Luftwaffe as a major British heritage site, an annual memorial service to 417 people killed during two nights of bombing in April 1942 was organised by Chris Kilminster, who was born in 1947 and never knew his grandparents, victims of the Blitz (*Guardian* 2008). Kilminster told a local newspaper that: 'I did it for the citizens of Bath. I have done it to heal lots of wounds and lots of pain' (*Western Daily Press* 2008). In 2008 the narrative promoted by this commemoration was further transformed when a former Luftwaffe pilot and veteran of 120 bombing raids, 87-year-old Willi Schludecker, attended the ceremony to apologise for his participation in the attacks (as he has done at York the previous year), turning the event into a ritual of reconciliation between perpetrator and victims of violence: 'I wanted to come because I wanted to say sorry. When we were dropping bombs, we did not think of the people we might hit. I was very scared because I didn't know how I would be received, but the people here are very forgiving' (*Guardian* 2008).

Such practices signal the longevity and vitality of the afterlife of memory about the Second World War within private arenas, and the ways in which narratives emerge from below to contest dominant meanings of war many decades after the event. In these new politics of popular memory, narratives are couched in the terms provided by wider cultural discourses of the late 20th and early 21st centuries – discourses of trauma, of human rights, and of reconciliation – that enable new meanings of wartime violence and loss to emerge. This phenomenon raises important questions for our understanding of what we mean by 'silencing' and 'forgetting', and also invites reflection about the potential in popular memory for connection, dialogue and reconciliation across divided pasts (Hamber and Wilson 2003, Jelin 2003, Dawson 2007).

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Katharina Hoffmann

National and Transnational Formations of the Submarine Myth

The fascination for submarines seems to have been a transnational phenomenon for more than a hundred years. But the widespread particular designation 'U-boat' for the German submarine already indicates the important role of national contexts. In the following analytical description I draw on the representations of submarines and submariners in British and German memory cultures from the end of the First World War up to the present time. Both nations were enemies during the World Wars and represented different concepts of nation which were linked to distinct geographical structures and connections, but both nations have increasingly shared a common geopolitical and economic community since the end of the Second World War (NATO, EU).

My first reference points are the war memorials initiated in Britain and Germany by submariners after the end of the First World War. I will show the ways in which formation of new war heroes was intertwined with an emphasis on technical skills and a close relationship to the machine. The representations helped create the formation of a myth which integrated elements of myths about military masculinity, the underwater space and technology. I will then explore the ways in which the respective formations of myth are linked to the national popular and official memory culture after the First World War and the shifts and continuities which have taken place since the end of the Second World War.[1]

1 Parts of this essay are published in my essay 'Kontinuitäten des Ehrkonzepts in der deutschen Gedenkkultur: Das U-Boot-Ehrenmal' (Continuities of the Concept of Honour in the German commemoration culture: The U-Boat Monument of Honor). In: Ludwig, U., Pöhlmann, M. and Zimmermann, J., eds. 2014. Ehre und Pflichterfüllung als Codes militärischer Tugenden. Paderborn: Schönnigh, 241-256. Currently, only a few publications address the cultural ascriptions to submarines and submariners as well as their role in public

Although the formation of the submarine myth in memory culture was crucially influenced by national interpretative patterns of war events and experiences, it has to be taken into account that even before the deployment of submarines in the First World War (trans)national narratives, descriptions and images in fiction, newspapers and magazines were interwoven with ambivalent and apparently opposing ascriptions. On the one hand the weapon epitomized a fascinating new machine, a symbol of modernity with promising military potential, which was operated by audacious and technically skilled men. On the other hand the fear of the unknown below the sea, the destructive power of submarines and an invisible enemy were recurring subjects in popular culture (Rüger 2005: 259-265, Hadley 2001: 18-22, Redford 2010: 56-77. For the elements of myths related to the conquest of the undersea see in particular Hoehler in this volume).

Furthermore, disapproval of the weapon and the status of submariners within the naval forces also influenced memory cultures. Although every navy of the influential powers of that time supported the development and production of the new weapon, it was simultaneously described as 'an unfair and unsportsmanlike weapon, a weapon of piracy and barbarity' (Herwig 1996: 227). Yet at the Hague Conference in 1899 the German, British, and Russian initiative for a ban of this weapon failed. France and the United States saw the submarine as a cheap and effective weapon to weaken British naval supremacy (ibid.). In Great Britain and Germany as well as in other countries naval forces with battleships represented national unity, identity and power. Submarines did not fit into such a concept interlaced with the idea of a 'chivalrous warfare' with ships facing each other in battle. Moreover, engineers had a low position in the military hierarchy and due to the requirements of the machine the submarine crew represented a flat hierarchy in contrast to the strict hierarchical orders on battleships (Broelmann 2003: 185-186, Redford 2010: 10-14, 72f., Rüger 2005: 260-262, and in this volume, Scheerer 2002).

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and memory cultures over time and space in different (trans)national contexts. I would like to thank William Hathaway and Perdita Schulz who were a great help in enabling me to write my essay in English and translate quotes from German into English.

British Memory Culture

Four years after the end of the First World War the National Submarine War Memorial was inaugurated on Victoria Embankment along the River Thames in central London. The memorial is considerably smaller than other naval monuments commemorating the losses of the Merchant Navy and Fishing Fleets and the Royal Navy. However, it is noteworthy that all these naval memorials were erected a few years later than the National Submarine War Memorial, which was initiated by the Royal Submarine Service (Quinlan 2005: 218-227, Ward-Jackson 2003: 423-424).

Fig. 1 National Submarine Memorial London, Photo undated.

The main part of the monument is a bronze bas-relief. The central piece depicts the interior of a submarine with four figures. The leading position of the commander is represented by the figure in the centre of the scene, who is standing upright and looking straight ahead. His slightly opened arms with clenched fists point to or nearly touch crew members who are operating instruments. All the figures look serious, concentrating on their work. Nobody seems to be frightened, desperate or in panic in such a deadly situation,

which is allegorised by sea-living male creatures holding a net in which the submarine is trapped. The lower part of the central relief shows a submarine above the waves framed by the inscriptions of the dates of the First and Second World War following the rearrangement of 1959. The submarines which were lost in the First World War are listed on one side of the central image and those lost in the Second World War on the other side. The bronze anchors on the outer parts of the memorial are still used for the hanging of wreaths at remembrance days today (Ward-Jackson 2003: 423, Quinlan 2005: 227).

The style and design of the monument as well as the poses of the submariners follow the essential characteristics of the British First World War memorial. Mosse underlines that 'soldiers were pictured equally as manly and strong … their poses were not usually seminude or aggressive' (Mosse 1990: 105). These soldiers fought for higher values, which are represented on the submarine memorial by the statues of 'Truth' and 'Justice' next to the panels with the lists of lost submarines. The bronze material underlines the timelessness of such sacrifices (Abousnnouga and Machin 2010: 145).

Concurrently, the submarine memorial refers to meanings which go beyond the usual patterns of remembrance. In this vein, the depiction of the interior section of a submarine also symbolizes the submarine crew as a closely-knit team. Every crew member has his special task in order to enable them to operate the machine together. Moreover, the image can also be read as representing the submarine crew as the heart of the machine since the narrowness of the space connects the bodies with the instruments and the submarine shell. The emphasis on the unit of men and machine (see for this particular relationship Mehrtens in this volume) is also underscored by the list of lost submarines in the First World War. The list only shows letters and numbers and no names, thus designating the submarine as modern technical product (Rüger 2005: 263f.). These representations of men and machine are set in opposition to the aforementioned depiction of the undersea with living creatures which allude to the mysterious and dangerous environment in which men and machine operate, though the unit of men and machine may also be read as an organic unit which crisscrosses the binary between nature and technology.

However, the designation of submarines as being in contrast to navel traditions was not only due to an emphasis on modern war technology but was also an effect of the lack of acceptance of the submarines fleet by the Royal

Navy. This is why representations in the memorial of, boats' prows held by putti above the central relief and the image of the submarine above the waves may have been chosen to underline the submarine fleet as part of the Royal Navy. Additionally, the name of the submarine base 'HMS Dolphin' in Gosport, Hampshire follows the traditional naval naming practice and is symbolized by heraldic dolphins with crown and anchor in the centre of decorations above the relief. Even today the branch badge of the Royal Navy submarine service shows two dolphins. The use of the animal metaphor supports an additional reading. It underlines the interpretation of the unit of men and modern machine as an organism which represents the fusion of men and machine/technology as a seemingly natural unit capable of moving like a sea creature in a for human beings mysterious, fascinating and dangerous environment (Rüger 2005: 266-267).

It is noteworthy that the National Submarine Memorial does not inform the viewer about the number of submariners who lost their lives, even though the high number of deaths was a reference point at the inauguration in 1922. Rear-Admiral Sinclair, Chief of the Submarine Service, underlined this in his speech: 'the number of those killed in the Submarine Service was greater in proportion to its size than any other branch of His Majesty's fighting forces … one third of the total personnel' (quote from Ward-Jackson 2003: 424). The names of all missing and dead submariners, however, were listed first on panels and nowadays in a 'Book of Remembrance' in St Nicholas, the submariners' memorial chapel at the submarine base, HMS Dolphin (Memorial Chapel 2014, Tibbs 1997).

The submariners' efforts in setting up their own memorial have to be seen against the backdrop of the long-lasting discussions in the Royal Navy about the acceptance and approval of the new weapon system. The British submariners' low status in the hierarchy of the Royal Navy was symbolized by the term 'the Trade' for the submarine service due to the already existing labelling of engineer officers as tradesmen. Furthermore, there was an obvious lack of public appreciation for the contributions of the submarine fleet to the defence of the country. Rudyard Kipling's poem published in 'The Times' in 1916 picked up the latter issue, but nevertheless revived, e.g. feelings of uncanniness (see the first stanza, third line of the poem: They play their grisly blindfold games) and used the negative term for the submarine service as its title (Redford 2010: 72-75).

Fig. 2 Memorial Chapel. ‘Book of Remembrance’ with a replica of the submariner sculpture of the ‘Combined Services Memorial’. Photographed by K. Hoffmann, 2009.

The German unrestricted submarine warfare, in particular, strengthened negative ascriptions which saw the submarine as an 'underhand, unfair and un-English' weapon. First of all, submarines embodied the immorality and ruthlessness of a weaker power (Redford 2010: 56, 91-127). Above all, the sinking of the liner Lusitania by a German submarine in May 1915 became a historical key event for the further production of negative images of German submarines and submariners. According to Redford, the War Memorial Windows of St Cyriac Church in Swaffham Prior 'indicates [that] submarines, and especially unrestricted submarine warfare, was a new and horrifying development, even for the inhabitants of a remote inland village' (Redford 2010: 93). However, it is also noteworthy that the parts of the memorial dedicated to naval war show a British submarine at the top and beneath it the images of the Lusitania sinking and a German submarine caught in anti-submarine nets (Redford 2010: 91-93). Thus, the arrangement of images might also refer to the positive ascriptions to British submarines in contrast to the German ones. Since WW I the usage of the term 'U-boat' for the German submarine has underscored the different ascriptions of this weapon (see Aulich and Rayner in this volume, Hadley 2001: 7).

Nevertheless, the images of German submarines went beyond (these/such) unambiguous images. Moreover, as Hadley's examples of popular literature show, German submarine heroes were not only condemned, they were also admired and even the condemnations paradoxically expressed inverted admiration (Hadley 1995: 43, 57-59). Churchill's phrase 'the enchanted circle' (1917) as a metaphor for the German naval blockade is a striking example for ascriptions to the German submarine fleet alluding to threat as well as to power and admiration. The German war propaganda used a translation of the phrase as title for the U-boat film 'Der magische Gürtel' produced in 1917 (Smither 2000: 56-57).

By the end of WW II the submariners had become part of the official memory culture, as shown by the 'Combined Services Memorial' in the west cloister of Westminster Abbey, inaugurated in 1948. In contrast to the National Submarine Memorial, the submariners are here represented by a crew member in a strong masculine pose. That they sacrificed their lives for a higher purpose is indicated by the upward look of the figure and the inscription which reads 'To the Glory of God and in memory of the officers and men of the Submarine branch of the Royal Navy who have given their lives both in peace and war. ...' (Combined Service Memorial 2014).

Churchill's speech at the memorial's inauguration particularly underlined the strong masculinity of the submariners by emphasizing their technical skills and by comparing their corporal characteristics with machine features the submariners are again seen as part of the machine. Churchill explained: '… there was the quality of precision and the exact discharge of delicate and complex functions which required the utmost coolness of mind and steadiness of hand and eye. The excitement and the hot gallop of a cavalry charge did not demand the ice cold efficiency in mortal peril of the submarine crews and on many occasions of the Airborne Force and Commandos. There was also that constant repetition, time after time, of desperate adventure which marked the work of the Commandos, as of the submarines, requiring not only hearts of fire but nerves of tempered steel.' (Churchill 1948).

Fig. 3 Royal Submarine Museum, Gosport. Photographed by K. Hoffmann, 2010.

Redford states that since the Second World War the submarine in the Royal Navy as well as in public culture has significantly changed from a symbol of

threat to a symbol of the defence of British security and sea power. Moreover, the nuclear submarine has become a symbol of 'a massive national technological superiority' (Redford 2010: 251). The changed naming policy of submarines within naval tradition shortly after the First World War had already indicated the approval of the submarine in the Royal Navy and is also visible on the panel of the National Submarine Memorial which lists the lost submarines in the Second World War. The image of British submariners as civilized and chivalrous heroes which had been circulating even before the First World War was reinforced. The unrestricted warfare remained a reference point for negative ascriptions to German submariners. The British unrestricted warfare in the Second World War did not challenge the positive images of British submariners (Redford 2010: 123-125, 142ff., see also Rayner in this volume).

The increasing appreciation of British submarines and their crews has become evident in the continued development of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum in Gosport since the 1980s. The museum has been supported by the Ministry of Defence, and approved and promoted by prominent representatives of Britain. A core element of the museum's visual representations and narrations is the machine. This is also underlined by the submarine-like form of the main building with its zinc and steel roof and the display of old submarines. As Prince William stated in his preface to one of the museum's brochures: 'To visit the submarine [HMS Alliance, K.H.] gives unique insight into the courage and technical achievement of those who served in The Royal Navy's Submarine Service over the last hundred years.' (HMS Alliance Appeal undated).

The ways in which ascriptions to the submarine are intertwined with fascination and national pride as well as anxiety are shown in the BBC report about the launch of a new submarine in the presence of 10,000 visitors were present. According to the BBC '[the] HMS Astute' was 'the first of four new vessels that will be the UK's largest and most powerful attack submarines'. Cited comments underscore this assessment, though ambivalent feelings were expressed at the same time. One visitor uttered: 'It's a fantastic piece of engineering, a national achievement, but I think it looks quite frightening, all in black.' (BBC News 2007).

A striking example of the dominant patterns of remembering the German submarines and submariners can be found in Churchill's memoirs where he notes: 'The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the

U-boat peril.'(Churchill 1956: 472). Compared to his phrase 'the enchanted circle,' this statement more strongly revives the interlocked ascriptions of German submarines and submariners as powerful, horrible, fascinating, brave or ruthless, while at the same time emphasizing British supremacy. The statement has therefore become an important reference point in British as well as in German memory cultures (Sutter 2006: 105f.)

The memoirs of Karl Dönitz and German submariners as well as popular literature about the German submarine war by German and English authors found a broad audience in both countries. At the same time, not least due to the remilitarisation of West Germany and its NATO membership, reconciliation became a subject of discussion. Moreover, the depiction of atrocities was no longer the focus of British popular culture. Instead, the German submariners were presented as men who, while disapproving the brutal requirements of modern warfare, were nevertheless obliged to carry out their soldierly duty. Hence the novel *Das Boot* by Lothar-Günter Buchheim, first UK edition with the title 'U-Boat' in 1974, as well as the cinema film and TV versions (were) met with approval (Hadlley 2001: 97-147, Neumann 2011, Redford 2010: 222-232). In 2008 the BBC announced the broadcast of the film with the description: '[This/a] powerful tale of submarine warfare ... follows the perilous voyage of a German U-boat … The fear and claustrophobia involved in life beneath the sea is realistically recreated, while the sentiment is decidedly anti-Nazi.' (BBC Programme 2008).

German Memory Culture

Like the British, the German submariners constituted their own tradition which differed from the dominant culture in the German Navy as represented by the Marine-Ehrenmal (Navy Monument of Honour) in Laboe glorifying above all the Battle of Jutland. The U-Boot Ehrenmal (U-Boat Monument of Honour) was opened in June 1930 in Möltenort, six years before the main naval memorial in Laboe. Both naval memorials are very close to the city of Kiel on the Baltic Sea. According to the commemorative publication from 1930 the U-Boat Monument of Honour was dedicated to the heroic submariners and the submarines. Moreover, the machine and the crew were understood and presented as a unit. Characteristic for the memorial, made from concrete, was a high column with a stylized eagle as a symbol of the powerful German submarine fleet and its audacious crew. The pose of the eagle indicated its readiness to fly again through wings spread wide and a gaze

turned towards the sea. The Iron Cross, the U-boat war badge and the inscription: 'In World War 1914-1918 perished + 5132 + Heroes – 199 – U-boats' were engraved on the column facing the seaside and facing the landside (there) was an anchor as a 'symbol of hope' above the inscription 'The day will come' (Das U-Boots-Ehrenmal 1930: 5-11, Sieck 2006: 41-43). Given the fact that the Versailles Treaty prohibited a German submarine fleet and the production of submarines, the submariners' association underscored with this memorial not only the feats of their fleet during the First World War but also their hope for a new fleet and their readiness for a new war.



Fig. 4 Aerial photograph of the commemoration ceremony at the submarine memorial in 2007. Photographed by B. Wilke.

In 1938 the submarine memorial was replaced by a bigger one at the same location whose design verbally and visually emphasised the message of the first memorial. The basic form of the monument from 1938 has been preserved until today. The layout of the site still resembles an anchor in whose centre a bronze eagle with spread wings is perched on a high column, made from red sandstone. A semi-circular path leads to a 'Hall of Honour' on each end.

In 1938 the heroes and their boats were honoured by twelve inscribed flotilla stones, displayed in the semi-circular path. Additionally, the 'Golden Books' listed the names of all sunken submarines and their crew members and were located in a niche behind a forged lattice in one of the 'Halls of Honour'. The other 'Hall of Honour' displayed a sculpture titled 'The final decision,' symbolising the spirit of sacrifice by illustrating 'the comradeship in the sinking U-boat' (War Graves Commission in 1938, quoted from Sieck 2006: 60). The halls were designed as sacred spaces and decorated with evergreen oak wreaths (Festschrift undated: 9-10, Sieck 2006: 54).

Since the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 the German navy had been allowed to build a small submarine fleet again. The hope for the deployment of submarines, already visually and verbally underlined in the first memorial, thus promised to come true in the near future. Accordingly, the decision to shape the memorial site in the form of an anchor can also be read as the expression of a now realistic hope. At the same time the material used, like the red sandstone and bronze, may have been meant to accentuate the submariners as a community with tradition and strong bonds between the living and the dead sharing timeless concepts of duty, honour and sacrifice.

Both monuments were in line with the celebration of the submariner as new German war hero of the First World War. The hero construction interlaced pre-existing patterns of soldierly sacrifice and chivalry with technically skilled manliness (Schilling 2002: 252-271). The central figure was the commander who also represented the crew. These core elements of the hero construction as well as the submarine as symbol of men and machine were dominant in the spate of publications, often written by the submariners themselves, films and displays in museums. Moreover, even before the First World War the submarine was imagined as a powerful and effective German weapon which gained momentum with the successes of the submarine fleet (Hadley 2001: 23-72). Furthermore, it was emphasised in memory cultures that even a small submarine fleet was able to threaten the enemy and if political and naval leaders had believed in the potential of the weapon, it would have been possible to gain victory. Such belief was not only revived during the Second World War but has also been a reference point in popular or academic literature since 1945 (Sutter 2006: 60-80).

After WW II, the former hero constructions, emphasizing aggressiveness and the absolute willingness for sacrifice, seemed to be obsolete in the light of Germany's total defeat, the millions of dead and injured soldiers and civilians

as well as the crimes of National Socialism. Shifts in public commemoration practices signalled a distance to the previous concepts; the dead soldiers were now interpreted as war victims instead of heroic ideals (Mosse 1990: 211-225). The topos 'victims of war and tyranny' linked with appeals for peace and reconciliation, dominant in public remembrance, has also been part of the commemoration speeches at the submarine memorial in Möltenort (Sieck 2006: 145-203).

At the same time the former symbolic forms of commemoration are still in use. The names of the dead of WW I and WW II are visualized in a specific form, which underscores the unity of the boat, the commander and the crew. Bronze plaques of each U-boat and the name of its commander with biographical data, data about the place and the sinking of the submarine, and subsequently, information on the individual crew members are set up in the semi-circular path. The 'Golden Books' are now deposited by the Submarine Memorial Foundation and displayed on special occasions. In addition/Moreover, the continuing support of all activities, commemoration practises and the preservation of the memorial by the organisation of submariners construe a timeless community of submariners, a 'band of brothers' that connects past, present and future. In 2000 a new plaque was placed to dedicate the memorial not only to submariners who died during both world wars but also to all submariners who died during their service since 1945 (Sieck 2006: 130-134, 146-158, 196). In November 2001 the commander of the submarine fleet explained at the commemoration ceremony: 'Submariners of all generations are united in that they are welded together by the submarine experience: the confined space, being on one's own, the self-sufficiency, courage, comradeship, and at times a capacity for suffering. Thus, being a submariner is still something special, although nowadays it does not mean being part of an elite anymore. Submariners everywhere share this awareness of a common experience, which has certainly been passed down through the generations in Germany and still shapes the German submariners' consciousness today. This identity and natural closeness is a piece of living tradition' (Ansprache des Kommandeurs 2001).

Yet the commander of the submarine fleet also underscored a critical distance to the past and accentuated that today's German submarine fleet has being serving within NATO to maintain or restore peace and is ready to support deployments in the fight against international terrorism. Such perspectives are also part of other speeches and the publication about the memorial's his-

tory (Sieck 2006). Nevertheless, the commemoration practices or the phrases about the submariners' timeless community revive core elements of corporate identity and the symbolic meaning of the eagle is reinterpreted by pointing out the difference of the sculpture to the official national socialist type and the range of symbolic meanings which have linked the eagle to power, majesty, divinity, and fortune since the middle ages (Küppers 2006: 205-206, Sieck 2006: 40).

Such perspectives are not limited to the submariners' community. Both the presence of prominent politicians at the regular commemoration ceremonies and the fact that the German War Graves Commission, which has played an important role in public remembrance since 1919, is the owner of the memorial make obvious that this particular memory culture is part of the official memory culture. The memory patterns are also compatible with those of popular culture: novels, memoirs and works of popular science, films and documentaries on the submarine war have found a large audience since 1945. Yet, as Holzer underlines, the literature about the U-boat war and the memoirs were often published in politically dubious or revanchist publishing houses in the first decades after the war. Hence, the success of Lothar-Günther Buchheim's novel *Das Boot* from the renowned publishing house Piper in 1973 as well as the film adaptations in the 1980s and 1990s indicated a shift in public discourse. The U-boat-war has become a prominent topic and the interpretative model of the German submariners as 'tragic heroes' has now been widely accepted. It follows the dichotomous pattern that the submarine fleet commander and later Navy commander Karl Dönitz sent a 'seduced generation of young heroes' to the slaughter and betrayed them (Holzer 2003: 134-137, quote 137).

Fig. 5 Guided tours through Bavaria Film City near Munich inform about the production of the film *Das Boot* and offer a walk through the U-boat model which was used for the production. Photographed by K. Hoffmann, 2007.

Representations of the U-boat war focus not only on questions of responsibility, guilt and suffering. Apart from recurring motifs like fear, adventure or piracy, the representations continue to tell stories of technical progress and technically skilled manliness. The history of the technical development of the submarine was, for example central, in the jubilee exhibition '100 Jahre deutsche Uboote – Menschen, Technik und Geschichte' (100 years German Submarines – People, Technology and History) in 2007. To give another example, decommissioned submarines have been visitors' attractions for decades. Reports about new German Navy submarines also show the ongoing fascination with this technology. The advanced technology of the new class of German submarines is for instance a key part of the visual and textual representation of an article of the magazine 'Stern' in 2008. The title as well as the report refers to Buchheim's novel and uses the term 'Das Boot' as pars pro toto for German submarines in the past and present. Core elements of the

submarine myth are revived: the journalist points out that the commander of the new submarine believes the machine has a soul, thus indicating the close relationship between man and machine. The machine is again a powerful one with an overwhelming potential as the commander's statement demonstrates: 'Submarines create paranoia simply by being there. During the Falklands War it was a single Argentinean submarine which kept the British navy busy.' According to the commander the crew is a special community which has to cope with exceptional risks: 'We are indeed a close-knit community on board. … A team without mavericks and egocentric persons, who trust each other through good and bad ... When we sink several thousand metres we must simply be brave.' (Metzner 2008).

Conclusion

According to my readings the submarine memorials in Britain and Germany share a common pattern of representation: a closely-knit team with the submarine commander as the central figure is part of the machine. In this vein, the submarine symbolizes both the team and the machine. The ascriptions to military masculinity draw on traditional elements of war heroes: a strong masculinity dutifully fighting for the respective national higher values. But the emphasis on technically skilled men and the submarine as a product of technical progress goes beyond traditional representations. In both countries the high death rates of submariners are underlined. This signifies not only the particular devotion of submariners to fighting for national values but also alludes to the images of the dangerous space below the sea. These patterns of remembering are not limited to the submariners' associations; they are interlinked with narrations, images and descriptions in popular culture and museums as well as with speeches of political representatives.

Fig. 6 Commemorative postmark Wilhelm Bauer, 2007.

To this day the patterns of remembrance are still framed by the respective national contexts, but significant shifts have also taken place since the end of the Second World War. The fact that both nations have become members of the supranational communities the EU and NATO has marginalized the negative images of German submariners. The submariners of both countries are now integrated in a timeless community of dead and living submariners which transcends national contexts. The war victims of the submarine fleets serve as role models of soldierly duty, courage, a capacity for suffering and technical excellence as embodied by the unit of men and machine. In both memory cultures the deeds of submariners continue to be understood as outstanding. The submariners are shown to have braved the human fears of claustrophobic spaces and the hostile and life threatening space below the sea.

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Eileen Pollex

"Need Another Seven Astronauts" – The Space Shuttle Challenger in American Memory

On a cold morning, on January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after the launch on its tenth mission, the STS-51L. For the first time since its foundation in 1958, not only did the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have to bemoan the death of seven astronauts, it was also the first time that a disaster of this scale was witnessed by a large number of spectators both on the spot at Cape Canaveral in Florida and all over the world on their TV screens. When the Challenger exploded on that fateful day, where were you and what were you doing?

Such questions exemplify the different contexts of the collective memory because they directly refer to a concrete personal remembrance of an historic event. A small number of events are of such consequence as to affect and define the memory of a nation: according to a survey conducted by the PEW Research Centre (1999) 82% of the Americans asked can remember precisely what they were doing when they learned about the irrevocable explosion of the Challenger. As the Challenger accident recedes into history, it is remembered as a technical failure due to the Rogers Commission – particularly physicist Richard P. Feynman – that conducted an exhaustive analysis of the accident and revealed that the primary fault lay in the resiliency of the O-rings (Feynman 1991: 128).

But why has the Challenger disaster become such a significant memory in the lives of numerous Americans? First of all, the Challenger disaster is the only disaster that was a media event live captured – camera teams did not arrive at the scene after the event to film the tragic outcome, but were already present to follow the take-off of the Challenger mission. Secondly, the substantial interest in this mission among the American population and especially the

media was related to the fact that for the first time in the history of American space travel a civilian was allowed to take part in a mission – the social studies teacher (Sharon) Christa McAuliffe was supposed to teach the first school lesson ever taught from space.

Fig. 1 'The Space Shuttle 'Challenger' explodes 73 seconds after take-off'. Wikimedia Commons.

As this book's title indicates, the military and civilian conquering of the air not only contributed to visions of national power – since the identification with the space program entails an identification with the American nation – but furthermore, these (air) spaces have been signified by the creation of myth. Against this background, McAuliffe seems to be the key figure of the Challenger myth, the personalized image of the disaster and the vehicle of the narrative of exploring the 'new frontier' repeated in ever-new versions.

Since every disaster eventually generates a cultural dimension, every nation, every society that lives through such a major disaster produces some kind of cultural representation of it (Eyre and Webb 2000: 5), the multifaceted relations between culture, as well as popular culture and disaster will be a defining element within the text at hand. Again, given the fact that the tragedy of the space program remains vivid in the minds of many Americans, and the images of this moment are still a substantial part of the American collective memory, one has to inquire how Americans remember this historic technological failure. For this reason, this paper will present the various ways of remembering the Challenger disaster by introducing the places and media which were initiated in order to ensure the memorization of the shuttle and its victims. A society's experience with disaster is remembered both collectively, for instance through permanent memorization as in the Challenger Memorial, and individually, for example through temporary and spontaneously produced places of remembrance such as the Challenger jokes.

Places and Spaces of Cultural Memory: On speeches, memorials and murals.

Cultural representations of disasters shape a society's conception of what constitutes disasters and may not only influence society's reaction to them, but might also introduce subjective versions and diverse interpretations of this disaster. An important example in this respect is the first immediate institutionalised response to the disaster, a speech by President Reagan in the late afternoon of January 28, 1986, which was broadcast on both TV and radio[1]. Reagan's speech is beyond any doubt an act of cultural memory because the president as an orator adopts the role of producing the official national memory of this technological failure. This is in addition to the fact that all presidential addresses are automatically archived. In his speech he offers a specific version of the past full of his own interpretations of possible causes for the collapse, from which the American public is able to internalise the speech and store it in their collective memory as one significant cultural representation of this disastrous accident.

1 Originally the annual State of the Union Address was planned to take place on this evening, in which the president was supposed to chat with McAuliffe but in light of recent events the speech was postponed to February 4th, 1986.

Reagan's address to the American public is, in many ways, an excellent example of the transformation of the victims of a technical accident into sacrificial victims. He refers to the courage of the seven astronauts who had overcome their fears and brilliantly mastered their tasks. He addresses all of the seven astronauts by name and declares them to be heroes. (Reagan 1988: 67) In one passage he explicitly addresses the millions of school children of America who witnessed the crash live on TV. He explains to them that painful experiences like the collapse of the Challenger are needed to expand the human horizon because 'the future does not belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the brave' (Reagan 1988: 68). The president, as the most prominent agent of the official national memory, justifies the death of the astronauts in a public act by subsequently declaring them to be martyrs. By this means he cultivates and ritualises the redemptive concept of the sacrificial death. (Reinhart 2001: 415) Reagan interprets the death of the seven astronauts as a death for their beliefs in American progress and as honourable devotion to the American nation.

The same interpretation is indicated by the debate about the memorial which was erected to memorialize the space shuttle Challenger – the official cultural memory of a nation is partly constructed and represented by the memorials it chooses to erect. The Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial in Arlington National Cemetery – only one of hundreds (memorials) erected nationwide to honour the crew of the ill-fated spacecraft – is an example of this. The memorial was ordered by the 99th congress of the United States on June 12, 1986 and inaugurated on March 21, 1987.

The forefront of the cenotaph contains a memorial plaque made of brass on which the smiling faces of the seven astronauts are depicted, including their names and birthdays. At the centre of the forefront of the plaque one can see a depiction of the starting space shuttle. Below that one finds the following lines engraved: 'In Grateful and Loving Tribute to the Brave Crew of the United States Space Shuttle, Challenger, 28th January, 1986'. The memorial represents the history of the space shuttle and especially the history of the deceased astronauts – it was erected to permanently remind Americans of the shuttle and its crew via its representative features. The cenotaph is not by itself a place of remembrance; instead, the American Congress has turned it into such a place. At this point it becomes clear that historic events like the crash of the Challenger do not turn into memories by themselves but more

likely need meaning to be created by means of specific places and cultural manifestations.

Fig. 2 Memorial plaque of The Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial in Arlington National Cemetery, USA. Photographed by K. Hoffmann, 2015.

It might have been in the interest of the American Congress to present the faces on the forefront of the memorial plaque looking vital, healthy and content, which is something that appears to be problematic considering the fact that they died a terrible death by accident. The engraved lines, which refer to the fact that the memorial is dedicated to the 'brave' shuttle-crew, also deserve closer consideration. Were the seven astronauts brave, unknowing or naïve when they took their seats in the shuttle on the morning of this fatal day, only hours after the far-reaching telephone conference during which the engineers of Thiokol had pointed out to the managers of NASA the dangerous connection between frostiness and the flexibility of the O-rings? Apparently, the media relevant for the construction of collective memory are no neutral source of historic knowledge. The visual representation of the disaster at Arlington National Cemetery does not portray the disaster itself, instead portraying the unharmed, vigorous crew of astronauts, which was precisely how they were supposed to be remembered. The memorial, as well as Reagan's oratory, seeks to inscribe them into cultural memory as heroes for all time.

In that sense another influential artefact of American cultural memory is of great importance, namely the oval mural painting by American painter Charles Schmidt in the northern wing of the Capitol commemorating the seven Challenger astronauts. The painting's context of presentation is momentous: it embellishes the Brumidi Corridors in the Senate wing of the Capitol directly across from the painting America's First Moon Landing by muralist Alynn Cox, which further intensifies the levelling of the deadly technological failure, since the Challenger astronauts form an intense bond with Neil Armstrong, the first man on the moon and another hero of collective memory.

Although the failure of an O-ring seal was determined to be the cause of the Challenger disaster, gender was certainly a key factor in the decision-making process – or the 'MANagement decisions' (Maier and Messerschmidt 1998: 326) – that took place before the disaster happened. NASA, like many other governmental or organisational units, represents a 'gendered institution', which means 'men construct organizational masculinities in specific social situations and, therefore, masculinity is "made" through self-regulated practices.' (Maier and Messerschmidt 1998: 326) All the people who were responsible for launching the shuttle, or to be more precise, all the individuals who took part in the teleconference the night before the launch were male,

managers from NASA and engineers from Morton Thiokol. Maier and Messerschmidt further suggest that 'at least one central key to preventing it [the Challenger disaster], and similar organizational crises, must involve examining how identity as man is shaping our actions in organizations, including our interactions with other men: Whether we are men in decision-making roles or men in technical support roles.' (340f.)

In that sense the analysis of the mural is of great interest. In the foreground of the mural the astronauts are depicted as holding their helmets in their hands, g ready for take-off towards the next mission to space. In the mural, civilian Christa McAuliffe is, incidentally, the only one not to hold a helmet in her hand. As a woman she holds a globe, a symbol of (male) dominion, which is turned so that the USA is visible to the observer. McAuliffe, as a female, is apparently not associated with the mastery of the latest technology, and thus not influencing the technological future. Barbara Paul further specifies that, 'the association of the woman with the earth rather than outer space promotes the practice of a gender project with the aim of not merely upholding the existing hierarchical gender order but also extending it to outer space as an ultimately militarily justified complex of interests.'[2]

Obviously, the presentation of gender relations within the discourse of disaster often reaffirms stereotypes (Eyre and Webb 2000: 9), therefore the specific role of McAuliffe has to be considered in the study of the Challenger disaster in order to understand whose story is told through the places of remembrance and why. Additionally, the painting visualizes that the members of the crew had different ethnic backgrounds – the seven member-crew was composed of two women and five men and included African-American, Asian-American, and Jewish astronauts who seemed to represent 'Everybody's America', a fact that was highly promoted by the NASA and the American media (Williams and Zinner 1999: 24).

Nevertheless, not only the things depicted on the painting, but also the things not depicted are extremely interesting. The picture preserves chosen facts about the historic events relating to the Challenger, yet it blends out historically relevant incidents like the crash, its reason and its tragic consequences.

2 At this point I would like to thank Barbara Paul, who commented on my paper during the British German Conference, which helped me to gain new and important insights into the topic. I am quoting her from her personal recollections of her comment, which she kindly provided for me.

At this point the undeniable similarity between the unwounded and vital depiction of the astronauts on the memorial plaque and on the painting becomes obvious. The places and spaces of official cultural memory like the mural, the memorial and the speech represent the astronauts as brave, ready for action and adventurous, features that reflect the (desired) American self-image, but their suffering is concealed. American astronauts are being turned into American heroes by means of these visual representations of the disaster. The boundary between victims and heroes of the Challenger disaster thus becomes blurred and through that blurs the boundary between historical evaluation and national creation of meaning.

Individual acts of remembrance: The disaster jokes

Memory is not only embedded in institutionalized forms of commemorating, but is also a rather personal and individual experience. For this reason, I will now introduce a private act of remembrance in connection with the Challenger disaster, namely the so-called 'disaster jokes'. Individual memory processes the memories of the person remembering by means of verbal (everyday) communication and interaction. Humour is a specific form of communication; the telling of jokes is an integral part of all kinds of conversations – in this respect, humour can be seen as a suitable medium for individual as well as collective memory. In this way, jokes become a social and cultural phenomenon.

What people laugh about, or what people find funny has changed throughout the course of history but although agony, pain and disaster are as old as mankind, the so-called 'disaster' or 'sick' jokes are a fairly recent genre. Christie Davis (1998: 137) assumes that these jokes could only occur and increasingly circulate in the aftermath of the industrial revolution, especially since the essential theme of these jokes is disasters involving modern technology. According to Giselinde Kuipers (2005: 70) another significant characteristic of these jokes is that they usually refer to a large, heavily mediatized event, or as Kuipers stated: '[the crash of the Challenger] is a typical event that gives rise to disaster jokes: highly covered by the media, much talked about, tragic but undeniably sensational.'

The first series of sick jokes about the Challenger disaster emerged almost immediately after the detonation, namely within the first 24 hours. (Lewis 2006: 176) To fully comprehend the Challenger jokes in form and content

one has to tell or listen to some of them. It must be kept in mind that firstly most of these jokes expect that listeners know about 'Challenger' as a specific historic event and secondly, the following is only a sample of the jokes. Disaster jokes are a flexible subgenre of humour and most of them have many variants, and generally verbal jokes can be adapted to new circumstances and different historic events. This recurrent changing of the joke is reinforced by the fact that 'they are transmitted orally and adapted at every retelling' (Kuipers 2002: 451).

1. *Question: Do you know what NASA stands for?*
   Answer: Need Another Seven Astronauts.
2. *Question: Do you know what colour Christa McAuliffe's eyes were?*
   Answer: They were blue. One blew over this way and one blew over that way.
3. *Question: Did you hear that Christa McAuliffe has been nominated for the 1986 Mother of the Year Award?*
   Answer: Of course – she blew up only once in front of her kids this year.
4. *Question: Do you know what McAuliffe's last words were to her husband?*
   Answer: You feed the dog and I'll feed the fish.
5. *Question: Where did the Challenger Crew take their vacation?*
   Answer: All over south Florida.
6. *Question: How do we know that Christa McAuliffe didn't have dandruff?*
   Answer: They found her head and shoulders on the beach.
7. *Question: How many Astronauts can fit in a Volkswagen?*
   Answer: Eleven – two in the front seats, two in the back seat, and seven in the ashtray.
8. *Question: Did you hear that Tang[3] is no longer the official drink of the space program?*
   Answer: Yes, now it is Ocean Spray.[4]

3 'Tang', an American orange-flavoured drink, named after the tangerine, was used on NASA's Gemini flights in 1965 and since then has been closely associated with the U.S. manned spaceflight program.

4 All jokes are portrayed in Patrick D. Morrow's article 'Those Sick Challenger jokes'. (Morrow 179f.)

Assuming these examples are representative of all the sick Challenger jokes, certain characteristics may be observed: first of all there is the texture of the jokes; obviously a question and answer format is typically used. (Morrow 1987: 180) Secondly, there is the basic mechanism of these jokes, the so-called 'humorous clash', which means that:

'in the joke the disaster is linked in a humorous way with a topic that is felt to be incompatible with such a serious event. … The effect of this mixture of an extremely serious topic with such unserious themes may cause outrage and amusement.' (Kuipers 2005: 71)

A further significant characteristic of the jokes is their extensive usage of references from fields of popular culture like brands, commercials and song titles, which is then again interrelated with the creation of myth, as the two last jokes demonstrate. As reported by Kuipers the evanescent character of disaster jokes causes this specific distinction, since:

'jokes referring to commercials and other stock phrases are easily reproduced and transferred to contexts other than the original one. Therefore they rapidly transform from spontaneous jokes into "canned" jokes. Moreover, slogans and stock phrases are easily repeated, and the combination of everyday clichés with shocking events easily provokes a joke.' (Kuipers 2002: 454)

This implies that disaster jokes, verbal or digital, can be flexibly adapted to new occurring disasters or similar disastrous events.[5] Resulting from that, Kuipers introduces another aspect of the jokes, namely, that they 'put disasters back where they are usually seen: in fiction and popular culture' (Kuipers 2005: 81). Another distinguishing feature of these jokes is that most of them accentuate the figure of McAuliffe, rather than any of the other six remaining astronauts. Disaster jokes 'try to personalize the disaster' (Kuipers 2002: 454); with this in mind, McAuliffe can be identified as the face of the Challenger disaster. McAuliffe, listed as the Challenger's payload specialist, was a high school teacher from New Hampshire who had been among the 10,000 teachers who had applied for the 'Teacher-in-Space' project first announced by President Ronald Reagan in 1984, who proclaimed he would select 'one of our nation's finest – a school teacher!' (Maier and Messerschmidt 1998: 328). However her official assignment was less significant than her other

5 This phenomenon becomes clear when compared to 9/11 jokes or jokes about the death of Princess Diana. For instance, joke number 4 was transferred to the pilot who flew into the World Trade Centre and joke number 6 was transferred to the driver of the limousine.

task: to give two 15 minutes-lessons during the flight, which were supposed to be broadcast live on TV. In that way McAuliffe, an average female citizen, mother and teacher would have become a symbol for the American educational mission, the safety of the space shuttle Challenger and consequently for the progressiveness and infallibility of the American Space Program. Or as Hariman and Lucaites further noted, 'it was a national spectacle to foster democratic identification with the space program as the symbol of technological progress.' (Hariman and Lucaites 2007: 251) Resulting from that, the crash of the shuttle inevitably symbolized the end of the infallibility of the NASA missions. Thus the fact that McAuliffe was a part of the mission adds to the eminent significance of this failure and makes her of outstanding importance in the collective memory.

Since the creation of myth is constituted with cultural practice, such as the telling of jokes, the association with McAuliffe as the key figure of the Challenger myth becomes obvious. In general, disaster jokes have a tendency to extract one of the victims of a disaster (Kuipers 2002: 454). For instance, in contrast to the rest of the space crew, McAuliffe is the only astronaut mentioned by name. Patrick D. Morrow (1987: 180) states that there is a distinct bond between the joke teller or listener on the basis of McAuliffe being perceived as a sort of 'Everyperson', whereas the rest of the Challenger crew is perceived as a group of professionals and inevitably treated like that within the jokes. However, the jokes reveal less about the seven dead astronauts than about the people who have to continue to live on with the intense knowledge about this technical disaster and its aftermath. What seems like an assemblage of cruel attacks focussing on McAuliffe is on the contrary 'a cloaking device for attacking what caused her death and those responsible for this perhaps needless tragedy' (Morrow 1987: 175).

Functions of Humour

In the course of studying the Challenger jokes it becomes apparent that the jokes fulfil different functions with regard to the memorization of the disaster. The most common approach to the meaning of disaster jokes is definitely that they are a means of coping with grief and drama or – in this context – a strategy for dealing with a collective traumatic experience. Indeed humour can be seen as a form of catharsis by distancing oneself from this shocking incident and establishing company and solidarity with other survivors of the disaster. This approach can be traced back to one of the three substantial

theories of humour creation, the so-called 'Relief Theory' that attempted to describe humour along the lines of a tension-release model, which means that laughter results from a release of tension or excessive energy (Räwel 2005: 13). In 'Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious' Freud differentiates between three different sources of laughter – joking, the comic, and humour – which all involve the saving of psychic energy that is then discharged through laughter (1940: 118ff.). In addition to that interpretation, Morrow suggests that, these jokes can be seen as a 'psychological defense mechanism against failure and tragedy' (Morrow 1987: 182). A psychologist has put it well: 'Challenger jokes are a negative way of reasserting that there is some order. [...] Joking about it brings us back to the world where there is control, where there are limits.' (Morrow 1987: 182)

Since grief alone does not explain the emergence of these jokes, I am going to present a second very distinct approach to the meaning of disaster jokes, namely the conception that the rise of the jokes is connected with the coverage of disasters in the mass media (Davies 1998: 142). Then again one has to conclude that the jokes are best seen as related to the heavily mediatized disaster discourse rather than directly to the explosion of the Challenger. Oring goes even further by insinuating that these jokes are a 'rebellion' against this 'discourse about disaster' (Oring 1987: 276).

Media in general, television and Internet in particular facilitate millions of people to see, hear, and even experience a disaster without being present as the disaster occurs. The lift-off of the Challenger was broadcasted live on American TV; the number of journalists at Kennedy Space Centre increased from 800 before to roughly 1200 reporters after the crash, which shows that the collective memory of the American People is heavily characterized by the perspectives of the cameras which captured this technical disaster. The arising billows of smoke and the different kinds of components spinning around were shown live on TV, so that the crash of the Challenger now marks a historic event, which was somehow experienced by millions of Americans from a safe distance and in the security of their own homes. Within the scope of this televised spectacle the pictures of the exploding shuttle became of great significance, because these images became part of the American collective memory by means of which single observers developed their own powerful memories.

Not only the pictures but also the visual imagery of the TV-coverage had a great impact on Americans. According to a survey, 95% of the American

People had watched some of the Challenger coverage by the end of this fatal day (Zinner 1999: 35), which shows that the tragedy of the space program mainly exists through the mass media coverage of this historic event (Hariman and Lucaites 2007: 278). The explosion of the shuttle was shown countless times, in normal speed and slow motion, as well as the faces of the eyewitnesses, victims and their relatives. Peter Jennings, the ABC newscaster at that time, assessed the relevance of television related to the Challenger disaster in the following way: 'We all shared this experience in an instantaneous way because of television. I can't recall any time or crisis in history when television has had such an impact' (Zinner 1999: 35).[6] And Time's Lance Morrow annotates further, 'Over and over, the bright extinction played on the television screen, almost ghoulishly repeated until it had sunk into the collective memory.' (Hariman and Lucaites 2007: 251) In that sense the presentation of information and pictures are of great significance since the highly sensational and emotional coverage of this tragedy is 'sandwiched' between medial commerce and entertainment (Davies 1998: 142, Kuipers 2005: 72). Apparently, in such mediated disasters the boundaries between respectable news shows and fictional entertainment programs become blurred. One can therefore deduce that disaster jokes are somehow 'a comment on the discourse of disaster' and further 'a general reflection on the structure of modern media' (Kuipers 2005: 73). There is one last essential function to be named, namely the function of personal memorization. Every time a joker will tell one of these jokes, the joker himself and the listener (after all the telling of jokes is a social happening) will be reminded of the tragic crash of the Challenger including the relating images like the exploding shuttle or the shocked faces of the spectators. Consequently, it can be verified that jokes about the Challenger disaster portray a temporal act of individual remembrance and through media (TV, papers, internet) become part of a cultural memory.

Conclusion

It can be stated that every disaster eventually generates a cultural dimension, because every society that lives through such a major event produces some kind of cultural representation of it. If one compares these representations,

6 Obviously Jennings' comment was made before the suicide attacks by al-Qaeda upon the United States on September 11th, 2001.

essential differences in the public and private acts of remembrance can be observed. This examination of places and spaces of official cultural memory such as the speech, the memorial and the mural has shown that by means of material and non-material acts of remembrance the astronauts, who were passive victims of a technical disaster, were turned into sacrificial victims. It is my thesis that while national official memory has turned the victims of the Challenger disaster into heroes of space travel, the fragile and mortal aspects of the astronauts as victims of a technical disaster are glossed over and represented solely in private acts of memory in the form of the Challenger jokes. Larabee argues that:

'in the discourse of the Challenger disaster, the corpses of the shuttle crew had to remain behind the technological veil, in the interest of continuing manned space flight and the cultural renegotiation of the necessary body.' (Larabee 2000: 26)

The Rogers Commission report is an example demonstrating this: On the one hand the report opens with the now legendary photograph of the smiling astronauts, posing with the American flag and a toy model of the Challenger, on the other hand any discourse involving the bodies is notably absent. The official position of the Rogers Commission as well as NASA was that the crew died instantly, although a study of the footage evidently revealed that the fuselage containing the crew compartment plunged into the ocean intact (Larabee 2000: 22). Obviously the gruesome deaths of the seven astronauts had to be suppressed, not out of respect for the crew's families, but in the interests of continuing manned space flights. The same can be said about Reagan's motives: the speech of the American head of state is not only dedicated to the remembrance of the astronauts but, beyond that, to the economic interests of his home country. Moreover, the traumatic experience of the Challenger disaster, a consequence of human and technical failure, has difficulty gaining access to the cultural memory of the Americans because it cannot be integrated into a positive collective self-image (Assman 2006: 75). On the contrary, the jokes represent the disaster in a graphic, violent and bitter way. Whereas the memorial and the painting depict the seven astronauts as heroes, the jokes turn the crew into fish food (e.g. joke no. 4). Undoubtedly the heroization of the dead astronauts serves to bestow significance upon this man-made disaster. Another explanation for the glorification of the astronauts can be found by differentiating between natural and technical disasters. In contrast to the victims of a technical disaster, the victims of a natural disaster

are often considered accident casualties. They are not converted into mythically inflated victims – this ritualization and cultivation of the immolated victims has not been adapted to natural disasters: 'It is the technology and its constant improvement which is being hallowed by this means' (Mehrtens 1997: 63).

List of Illustrations

Fig. 1 'The Space Shuttle 'Challenger' explodes 73 seconds after take-off'. Wikimedia Commons. Available from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/Challenger_explosion.jpg [Accessed 4 November 2015].

Fig. 2 The Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery, USA. Photographed by K. Hoffmann, 2015. Private collection.

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