Surveillance and Security in the Domain of the Virtual: Deleuzian 'Societies of Control' and Anticipation in Steven Spielberg’s *Minority Report* and Showtime’s *Homeland*
Contents

List of Figures.................................................................................................................. 5

1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 6

2 Theory ......................................................................................................................... 8
   2.1 Deleuze & Guattari: Virtuality, Difference, and Becoming......................... 9
      2.1.1 The Virtual and the Actual................................................................. 9
      2.1.2 Difference and Becoming ................................................................. 11
   2.2 Beyond the Panopticon: The Shift from Discipline to Control ............... 13
      2.2.1 Foucault: Discipline and Panopticism.............................................. 14
      2.2.2 Deleuzian Societies of Control.......................................................... 16
      2.2.3 Anticipation: The Search for Control over the Processes of
           Becoming................................................................................................. 19

3 Security and Societies of Control in Minority Report............................... 21
   3.1 Social Organization: Formations of Power in Minority Report ............. 22
      3.1.1 Social Organization on the ‘Alloplastic’ Stratum............................... 22
      3.1.2 Precrime: A ‘Social Machine’ of Organization................................. 23
      3.1.3 The Sprawl: Social Disorganization.................................................. 25
   3.2 Continuous Modulation of Populations....................................................... 27
      3.2.1 Social Clustering and Inequality in Minority Report....................... 28
      3.2.2 Methods of Social Control: Markets and ‘Eyedentiscan’.............. 30
   3.3 Anticipation and Simulated Surveillance..................................................... 33
      3.3.1 Hyperreality and the Precogs’ Previsions......................................... 34
      3.3.2 Discipline and Anticipatory Subjects............................................... 38
      3.3.3 Precrime as Anticipatory Social Control.......................................... 40
   3.4 Security and ‘Homo Sacer’ ........................................................................... 43
      3.4.1 The End of Discipline: Preventive Detention in the Precrime
           Prison...................................................................................................... 43
3.4.2 Security and the Biopolitics of Precrime ........................................ 45
3.4.3 ‘Homo Sacer’ and the Future Murderer ........................................ 47

4 Virtual (In-)security in *Homeland* ........................................................................................................ 50

4.1 Paranoia and Voyeurism ......................................................................................................................... 51
  4.1.1 References to 9/11 and Mathison’s Paranoid Behavior .......................... 51
  4.1.2 Surveillance, Voyeurism, and Morality ................................................ 54

4.2 Security and Threat ................................................................................................................................. 58
  4.2.1 The Logic of Control and the Surveillance on Brody ......................... 58
  4.2.2 Terrorist Brody: Diffuse Threats and the Sleeper Scenario ............... 60

5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 63

Works Cited ................................................................................................................................................... 66
List of Figures

Figure 3-1: Crowd of business people walking fast (MR 00:21:29)..................29
Figure 3-2: Long shot of the Precrime prison (MR 00:31:01). .........................44
Figure 4-1: ‘Real media’ footage of the 9/11 attacks in the opening of Homeland (HL: “Grace” 00:00:45).................................................................52
Figure 4-2: Carrie Mathison surveilling Brody from home (HL: “Pilot” 00:26:04) ........................................................................................................56
1 Introduction

In the short story *The Minority Report* science fiction author Philip K. Dick creates a world where criminals are basically detained before they commit crimes:

“Many men have been seized and imprisoned under the so-called prophylactic Precrime structure,” General Kaplan continued […]. “Accused not of crimes they have committed, but of crimes they will commit. It is asserted that these men, if allowed to remain free, will at some future time commit felonies.” (Dick 99)

In his future society the conventional “post-crime punitive system” is successfully abolished and succeeded by the complete prevention of crimes through the predictive practice of ‘Precrime’ (Dick 72). Published in 1956 the story is ahead of its time by anticipating a trend that gained momentum only after the plane crashes that hit the World Trade Center (WTO) on September 11, 2001.

The day after newspapers labelled the attack as an “act of war” (*USA Today* A1), a “terrorist attack” (*LA Times* A1), and similar. This already suggests the joining of the previously separate concepts of war and terrorism that culminates in the phrase ‘War on Terror’ which was propagated by the Bush administration and first used by President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001 (cf. Wolfe 45). These ‘terrorist attacks’ were perceived as unprecedented and unthinkable – a new type of terrorism (cf. De Goede 155; 162). This ‘new terrorism’ seemed to demand a new type of counterterrorism. As a consequence, the Bush administration emphasized the perceived right of “self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists” in order to forestall future harm (*The White House* 6). This indicates a strategic shift from defense and reaction to the pro-active logic of preemption and prevention (cf. Lebovic 44). Dick’s *The Minority Report* depicts the dream of being able to predict and to prevent any future harm. This dream is particularly reflected in American homeland security policies since 9/11 but it also affects society in general. Borrowing terms from Dick’s short story, Zedner describes “a shift from a post- to a precrime society” in which the “precrime logic of security” tends to surpass the retroactive nature of criminal justice (262). What Zedner identifies is a temporal shift from post hoc crime detection to in advance crime prevention.

The anticipatory detection and elimination of threats is always a manifestation of *security* (cf. Anderson 228). The idea of this thesis is to examine
how the logic of security is represented in Steven Spielberg’s film *Minority Report* (2002) and Showtime’s television series, *Homeland* (2011—). Therefore, I consider, in particular, how the security approach is expressed by a mode of surveillance that differs entirely from the panoptic surveillance of Foucault’s disciplinary societies. Ultimately, the legal and moral concepts that underlie the security practices of Precrime (*Minority Report*) and of the CIA (*Homeland*) will be questioned. How are these security practices legitimized?

The transformation of – in the broad sense – policing from resolving past crime cases to the prevention of potential future crimes is not only a move forward on the timeline. In fact, it entails that “a specific ontological status” is given to “immaterial possibilities” (Martin and Simon 286). These immaterial possibilities are located in the domain of the virtual of which the future is one aspect. Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the inverse relation between the *virtual* and the *actual* an understanding of Deleuzian ‘societies of control’ (see chapter 2.2.2) and their anticipatory functions (see chapter 2.2.3) is established.

The larger part of this thesis examines *Minority Report* (*MR*) on the background of Deleuzian ‘societies of control’. In chapter 3.1 aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy are applied to the social organization of the society depicted in *Minority Report*. A continuously changing society demands equally continuous and mutable mechanisms of social control. Therefore, chapter 3.2 illuminates these mechanisms of control and their security function of separating different populations to prevent risky social constellations.

While the segregation of different fractions of a population represents a rather diffuse mechanism to prevent potentially damaging consequences, chapter 3.3 addresses the prediction and prevention of specific events, especially ‘future murder’. The crime fighting of future crimes provides a particularly vivid illustration of the temporal shift from the post-crime punishment of Foucault’s disciplinary societies to the precautionary logic of Deleuzian ‘societies of control’ and the specific ontological status of ‘future murder’ as it is depicted in *Minority Report*.

In chapter 3.4 the practice of Precrime is related to a biopolitical understanding of security, which views security as the proactive normalization of a population as a global mass. Therefore, the life preserving function of that
practice is opposed to the production of individuals that seem to be deprived of any legal status for the protection of the mass.

The other main part of this thesis focusses on the first season of *Homeland* (*HL*) and on the insecurity that is produced by the attempt to forestall any potential harm. The television series – sometimes regarded as “post-post-9/11” (Bryant) representation of the US’s struggle to cope with ‘terrorism’ – focusses on the relation between international, mainly Islamistic terrorism and American counterterrorism. This struggle is exemplified by the relation between the main characters CIA officer Carrie Mathison’s (Claire Danes) and the sleeper terrorist US Marine Sergeant Nicholas Brody (Damian Lewis).

Chapter 4.1 tackles Mathison’s practices of intelligence gathering and the underlying moral concepts. The focus is on Mathison’s paranoid behavior which is considered to be a metaphor for the cultural state of fear and paranoia in the post-9/11 US. The question of morality is addressed in particular by the representation of surveillance as voyeurism (see chapter 4.1.2). By contrast, chapter 4.2 examines the virtual character of threats and their representation in *Homeland*. How does the terrorist threat embodied by Brody constitute an argument for the implementation of Deleuzian societies of control?

2 Theory

The first part of the theory section develops an understanding of the terms *virtual* and *actual* based on Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* (*DR*) and Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative work *A Thousand Plateaus* (*ATP*). The inverse relation of the virtual and the actual as Deleuze and Guattari view it, will be vital for my discussion of surveillance and security in the domain of the virtual. The Deleuzian meaning of ‘virtual’ has to be distinguished from computer-related uses of the term where ‘virtual’ is often used synonymous to ‘simulated’. For instance, ‘virtual reality’ which usually refers to a computer simulated environment, a ‘simulated reality’ (cf. Banks 6).

The second part of this section describes a shift of theory from Foucault’s ‘disciplinary societies’ towards Deleuzian ‘societies of control’. Foucault employs Bentham’s Panopticon as a ‘diagram’ for the prevailing power relation in disciplinary societies. Deleuze recognizes disciplinary societies as a phenomenon
of the past and argues that they are in the process of being replaced by ‘societies of control’. Furthermore, societies of control are connected with a concept of anticipation, emphasizing aspects of future-oriented decision-making inherent in the Deleuzian societies.

2.1 Deleuze & Guattari: Virtuality, Difference, and Becoming

Much of the theory about the virtual and the actual is derived from the “Geology of Morals” chapter of A Thousand Plateaus. The “Geology of Morals” chapter – or ‘plateau’ as Deleuze and Guattari would refer to it (cf. ATP 22) – presents Arthur Conan Doyle’s fictional character, Professor Challenger, who holds a lecture on the relation of ‘strata’ and ‘the plane of consistency’. Chapter 2.1.1 explains the relation of the virtual (‘the plane of consistency’) and the actual (‘strata’) by mostly keeping to the geological terms of ‘stratification’ and ‘destratification’. Chapter 2.1.2 provides a transition from the metaphor of geology to the terms virtual, actual, and actualization. The established understanding of the virtual, the actual, and their dynamic and inverse relation is the bedrock for the introduction of the Deleuzian concepts of difference and becoming. These concepts express the idea of continuous change and, therefore, they are intrinsically future-oriented.

2.1.1 The Virtual and the Actual

An important aspect of Deleuze’s works is the distinction between the virtual and the actual which are interconnected through an inverse relationship (Holland 12). This relation is very different compared to the relation of the possible and the real. In Deleuzian thought, the possible is opposed to the real, while the virtual and the actual are both immanent to the real: “‘Potential’ and ‘virtual’ are not at all in opposition to ‘real’; on the contrary, the reality of the creative, or the placing-in-continuous variation of variables, is in opposition only to the actual determination of their constant relations” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 99). Thus, the virtual is not to be confused with the possible. In Difference and Repetition (DR), Deleuze regards the possible as a collection among which a certain ‘realization’ can be chosen (in whatever fashion). Thus, the possible is realized through transferring it to the real as some kind of copy or image. A certain possibility is realized by
negating different other possibilities – including the non-existence of that certain possibility (Deleuze, *DR* 207-12). What is possible and what is not, is always mapped on the apparent real:

Finally, to the extent that the possible is open to ‘realisation’, it is understood as an image of the real, while the real is supposed to resemble the possible. That is why it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like with like. Such is the defect of the possible: a defect which serves to condemn it as produced after the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it. (Deleuze, *DR* 212)

The virtual is “real without being actual” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 94; Deleuze, *DR* 208). The actual, therefore, is nothing else than the perceivable aspect of the real. According to Deleuze, “[v]irtuality possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved” (*DR* 212). Thus, the actual does not resemble the virtual, on the contrary, it is rather a solution to a problem posed by the virtual.

In *A Thousand Plateaus* the relation between the virtual and the actual is explained in geological terms of stratification and destratification. The plane of consistency or ‘the plane of immanence’ as it is also called (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 269-70), denotes the realm of the virtual which is subject to “stratification” or to “the organization of strata” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 148). These strata, on the other hand, are subject to destratification, which describes processes of dispersion and dissolution of strata onto the plane of consistency. Deleuze and Guattari describe strata as “acts of capture” comparable to “black holes” which try to seize everything that comes into their proximity (*ATP* 40). Stratification draws from the plane of consistency which can be described as “unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 43). Thus, the plane of consistency consists of unformed matter or is unformed matter or is just *matter* – a term that Deleuze and Guattari borrow from linguist Louis Hjelmslev (*ATP* 43). It is not empty but its content cannot be ‘seen’ since unformed matter is impossible to perceive. The plane of consistency does not feature any ‘structures’. Structures are created by processes of stratification. Thus, what is here labelled as structures are the mentioned strata. Stratification is the process of giving form to matter (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 43-4). However, the plane of consistency or the virtual is not a passive supplier of unformed matter
that stratification applies its forces on to fabricate forms and substances from it: “But beneath the forms and substances of the strata the plane of consistency (or the abstract machine) constructs continuums of intensity: it creates continuity for intensities that it extracts from distinct forms and substances” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 70).

These distinct forms and substances are created through stratification which organizes the flows of the intensive continuums of the plane of consistency and therefore builds “a layer that regulates the flow” in form of strata (Bonta and Protevi 150). Then, the result of the process of stratification is strata which are described as “layers” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 40). These ‘layers’ or strata “are continually being shaken by phenomena of cracking and rupture” and “some are swept away by lines of flight and movements of deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 55). Thus, strata are in a constant change due to stratification and destratification, which can be understood as two opposing but interdependent ‘forces’ or ‘effects’ or as “two […] different modes of existence” of the abstract machines (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 56). The plane of consistency strives towards continuous flows and therefore assimilates forms and substances along certain lines of flight or lines of deterritorialization. The plane of organization, on the contrary, tends towards unity of composition, territorialization, segmentarity, stable structures, form and substance. It is capturing intensities and giving form to matters (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 40-5). So, everything or all strata emerge by means of stratification from the plane of consistency and therefore leave the realm of that plane, since the plane of consistency is unformed matter. However, any existing stratum is not permanent. Through destratification it dissolves into the unformed matter of the plane of consistency and, therefore, leaves the realm of strata.

2.1.2 Difference and Becoming

What is described in the preceding chapter is an indefinite process of circular fashion (though, with ever changing results) that could be described by starting at any point. However, I start at the level of strata since at the strata level the processes at work become perceptible. The strata is not located on “the plane of consistency or immanence” since it is formed matter (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP
269-70). It is the product, the temporary residue of stratification. It “falls from the plane [of consistency or immanence] like a fruit;” as Deleuze claims in “The Actual and the Virtual” (“A/V”) with regard to the actual (150). Transferred into terms of ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, the actual is what has previously been called strata. Processes of de-/stratification or actualization form, change, and dissolve actual objects. Thus, actualization, stratification or the plane of organization forms actual objects, or all in all, the actual. According to Deleuze, “the actual is the complement or product, the object of actualization,” while actualization itself “belongs to the virtual” (“A/V” 149). However, substituting the term actualization for processes of stratification and destratification poses the risk of disregarding the inverse character implied by A Thousand Plateaus. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the destratifying effects that ‘erode’ the actual and therefore change its appearance. The actual is subject to destratification, implying that its actual objects are being destratified and eventually dissolve onto the plane of consistency or immanence and become unformed matter and pure intensities.

At the same time, the actual is the ‘material’ for destratification and, therefore, has great effect on the plane of consistency or on the domain of the virtual, respectively. These are perpetual and reverse processes (or possibly one bidirectional process?) that achieve neither a purely virtual state nor a state of absolute actuality. Thus, the actual is continually changed and developed by processes of actualization. Because of that nature of the relation of the actual and the virtual it is not the actual state of affairs expressed in being that interests Deleuze’s and Guattari’s philosophy but the virtual state of becoming (cf. Deleuze, DR 40-1). The destination or the end of all becomings is the “becoming-imperceptible on the plane of consistency” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 252). Thus, becoming emphasizes destabilizing effects and a state of constant emergence inherent in all actualizations.

Another crucial aspect that is connected to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s ideas about the virtual and the actual is the prioritization of difference over identity. For Deleuze, identity is the product of difference (Deleuze, DR 41). A color can only be identified in contrast to other, different colors. White, for example, is an idea, a concept, or an identity that only exists in its differential relations to other colors. These relations are virtual since they are not apparent on the entity in question.
Furthermore, these differential relations precede the actualization and constitute virtuality or virtual multiplicities (cf. Deleuze, *DR* 245, 249).

The geneses of any actualization are differential virtual multiplicities which are antecedent. Here, the opposition to the possible becomes evident. Any possibility is already identified or conceptualized, it is mapped from the real and therefore it is “retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it” (Deleuze, *DR* 212). Virtual multiplicities, by contrast, constitute a heterogeneous but infinite field – the plane of consistency or immanence. It is infinite in the sense, that difference is inexhaustible: for example the concept of white can be segmented into infinite different shades of white (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 45). The type of thought that Deleuze aspires is thinking of difference as “difference in itself” (Deleuze, *DR* 28-69). Difference in itself describes a “non-conceptual difference” that can be considered more potent than ‘difference between two concepts’ which is subordinated to identity (Deleuze, *DR* 13).

What is established by Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* and further elaborated in his and Guattari’s collaborative work *A Thousand Plateaus* are dynamic processes of actualization structured by a differential continuum of virtual multiplicities respectively the plane of consistency. The concepts of *difference* and *becoming* are grounded in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the relation between the virtual and the actual. The unstable, dynamic, ever-emergent state of the actual results in continual states of becoming while the inexhaustible, differential virtual creates difference. Eventually, everything becomes different from its previous self, such as a white wall might become grey over time.

### 2.2 Beyond the Panopticon: The Shift from Discipline to Control

Foucault’s concept of disciplinary societies and, particularly, his interpretation of Bentham’s Panopticon, have been prevalent in the academic discourse about surveillance and relations of power (cf. Bogard, “The Simulation of Surveillance” 18; cf. Boyne 285; cf. Haggerty and Ericson, “The Surveillant Assemblage” 607; cf. Haggerty, “Tear down the Walls: on Demolishing the Panopticon” 23; cf. Lyon “The Search for Surveillance Theories” 3-4; cf. Yar 254). Besides arguments to retain the Panopticon as an analytical tool (cf. Boyne) or to adjust it
to recent developments in society and technology\(^1\), it is claimed that panoptic discipline is in the process of being replaced by a logic of control (cf. Bogard, “The Simulation of Surveillance” 4, 9; cf. Deleuze “Societies of Control”; cf. Feeley and Simon; cf. Rose).

Chapter 2.2.1 introduces Foucault’s disciplinary societies and his concept of panopticism which he develops in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Based on Foucault, Deleuze argues that ‘societies of control’ are in the process of succeeding the disciplinary societies (see chapter 2.2.2). Control, as a dispersed and liquid principle of power, is replacing an ‘anti-nomadic’ and ‘fixing’ discipline (cf. “Societies of Control” 3; cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 218). Finally, in chapter 2.2.3 Deleuzian societies of control are connected with anticipation as it is shown that societies of control exceed the reactive concept of cause and effect (e.g. misconduct and punishment) and employ future-oriented decision-making to achieve command over the virtual sphere of the future.

### 2.2.1 Foucault: Discipline and Panopticism

In his work *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault describes the formation of “a disciplinary society” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 193). Such a society is, in particular, marked by a “descending” individualization. While “‘ascending’ individualization” describes a society organized around a pivotal sovereign power, such as a king or ruling families, ‘descending individualization’ expresses the reverse tendency of individualizing the subjects of a power which appears to be “more anonymous and more functional” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 193). This power “is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts, by comparative measures that have the ‘norm’ as reference rather than genealogies giving ancestors as points of reference […]” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 193). In the disciplinary system, described by Foucault, everyone is subject to processes of individualization. However, children, sick people, mentally ill people, and delinquents are more individualized than ‘normal’ people and, therefore, if one wishes to individualize a normal person it is meant to be done by suggesting that she or he appears to be

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\(^1\) See Haggerty for an enumeration of various “opticons” (Haggerty, “Tear down the Walls: on Demolishing the Panopticon” 26).
somewhat divergent from the norm (cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 192-3). Thus, the effective powers of disciplinary societies are visibility and “normalizing judgement” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 170).

The paragon of such a disciplinary system is Jeremy Bentham’s design of the Panopticon, a circular building featuring a watchtower in the center. Bentham considers it applicable for any institution that requires oversight over any individuals; may it be workers, patients, or prisoners. Yet, he put most of his thought about the Panopticon into his plans for a “Penitentiary Inspection-House” (Bentham 44). The premise of the building is “seeing without being seen” (Bentham 44). The watchtower in the center facilitates a 360°-view into all the apartments or cells that surround it. However, its position and lighting conditions prevent any sight into the watchtower. Thus, a condition is achieved in which the persons under inspection are not able to verify if they are being watched or not by the persons who are supposed to inspect them. Furthermore, any possibility of sight and communication between the inhabitants of the cells is blocked to achieve a state of solitude (cf. Bentham 40-1). The results of such architecture are “perfectly individualized and constantly visible” subjects of disciplinary power (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 200).

How do these mechanisms of disciplinary power take effect? The inhabitants of the Panopticon are permanently visible and they are aware of that fact. They must expect to be observed at any moment. Thus, the effects of surveillance are permanent, regardless of the inspector’s actual gaze. According to Foucault, disciplinary power should principally be “visible and unverifiable” (*Discipline and Punish* 201). Since it is not verifiable, the actual exercise of power becomes unnecessary. The Panopticon creates an unequal power relation. It is a machine that could be operated by anyone and even works on its own during a limited absence of the supervisor. The Panopticon is organized through “hierarchical observation” of the subject by the inspector (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 170). As Foucault puts it: “[a] real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation” (*Discipline and Punish* 202). This emphasizes the productive aspect of power. It is capable of producing a reality which influences the knowledge of individuals who are affected by it (cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 193). As a consequence, the subjects of such a constellation of power become the principle of their own subjection. They assume “responsibility for the
constraints of power” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 202). Due to the fact that the subjects in the Panopticon exercise the constraining effects of power themselves, it is sometimes referred to “panoptic self-discipline” (Bauman 85) or simply “self-discipline” (Yar 266).

Visibility (of the subject) is also a precondition for ‘normalizing judgment’ as the other pillar of disciplinary power. Normalizing judgment pursues a homogeneous society which has the norm as its imperative. Behavior is judged according to the norm and either rewarded or punished. Foucault distinguishes here between the more traditional “penal justice” with prohibition and punishment and discipline with its nuanced corrective approach that judges behaviors of a differential spectrum between the two poles of good and bad behaviors (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 180). The cumulated judgments of behaviors of an individual amount to a certain classification within the normative but stratified disciplinary society. Behavior that aligns to the norm is rewarded, and behavior that deviates from it gets punished. Gratifications and punishments are in their diversity adjusted to the various degrees of compliance and misconduct that have been established (cf Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*).

Although, normalizing judgment seeks homogeneity it produces differences and hierarchies which lead to individualization and to the ranking of individuals according to how distant they seem to be from a normative standard. Thus, differences gain importance as markers for a ‘gradual removal’ from a “homogeneous social body” in terms of classification (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 184). Hence, the subjects of panoptic surveillance seem to be continuously monitored and they are measured against the norm. Conformity can help individuals to advance socially while deviation from the norm has negative consequences from failing to achieve gratifications and social climbing to severe punishment and ‘social bankrupt’ at the bottom end of the scale.

### 2.2.2 Deleuzian Societies of Control

Deleuze’s ‘societies of control’ constitute a response to Foucault’s disciplinary societies according to which the societies of control “are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies” (“Societies of Control” 4). Following Deleuze, the shift from discipline to control, as a principle of power, is already
apparent in Foucault’s work: control is a “monster, one that Foucault recognizes as our immediate future”\(^2\) (“Societies of Control” 4). However, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault considers ‘methods of control’ to be a part of the disciplinary system:

While [...] the disciplinary establishments increase, their mechanisms have a certain tendency to become ‘de-institutionalized’, to emerge from the closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a ‘free’ state; the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted. (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 211)

These freely circulating and flexible methods of control can be considered to be leaving the realm of the disciplinary societies and to be moving gradually toward the societies of control. While the disciplinary society is “anti-nomadic” and tries to fix “the floating population” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 218) the society of control seeks to regulate the heterogeneous flows of the population. Thus, for Hardt and Negri “the society of control marks a step toward the plane of immanence” (329). Social structures are not ‘stratified’ into stable identities of *being* such as those that are produced in the disciplinary society. Therefore, the development toward the society of control creates a new type of subjectivity, one that goes beyond the stable identities of the disciplinary society. The society of control is marked by the production of “a subjectivity that is not fixed in identity but hybrid and modulating” (Hardt and Negri 331). In the disciplinary society individuals pass through different institutions (e.g. family, school, army, or factory). Each institution is like a different ‘mold’ that requires the individual to adopt a new identity: “Each time one is supposed to start from zero, and although a common language for all these places exists, it is *analogical*” (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 4). Control, however, is continuous. The discontinuous and distinct *molds*, the different disciplinary institutions, are being superseded by a *modulation*, a state of perpetual metastability. Formerly separated institutions move toward a metastable coexistence in which perpetual training tends toward replacing the school and in which military conflicts are increasingly fought by corporations (which might eventually replace factories as well as military

\(^2\) The term ‘monster’ does not necessarily imply that societies of control are ‘worse’ than previous forms of society. As Deleuze declares, “[t]here is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons” (“Societies of Control” 4).
services) (cf. Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 4-6). Existence in such a society is not fixed and anti-nomadic but fluid, processual, and nomadic – characterized by a perpetual metastability, a permanent state of becoming.

According to Hardt and Negri, the extremes of wealth and poverty have increased while the areal distances between both, the poor and the wealthy, have decreased (cf. 337). A result is “the close proximity of extremely unequal populations, which creates a situation of permanent social danger and requires the powerful apparatuses of the society of control to ensure separation and guarantee the new management of social space [emphasis added]” (Hardt and Negri 336-7).

As the term ‘management’ indicates, the logic of control is rather “actuarial” (Rose 331) than “transformative” (Feeley and Simon 452). While the disciplinary society tries to integrate conflicts by “imposing a coherent social apparatus” the society of control features a type of administration that becomes “fractal” and seeks to manage a continuum of differential multiplicities by employing different instruments (Hardt and Negri 340). Feeley and Simon emphasis the importance of methods of segmentation, such as identification and classification, to manage a heterogeneous population sorted by potential dangerousness (cf. 452). They see norms such as moral values to be on the decline as the standard against which crime as well as punishment is measured:

"[T]he new penology is markedly less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the individual offender. [...] It seeks to regulate levels of deviance, not intervene or respond to individual deviants or social malformations. (Feeley and Simon 452)"

The underlying development that becomes apparent is one that moves away from the old disciplinary aim of normalizing individuals toward the ‘biopolitical’ aim of regulating the heterogeneous flows of the population.3

The individual as such becomes less important: “In the societies of control [...] what is important is no longer either signature or number, but code: the code is a password” which marks access to information (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 5). The smallest units of organization are no longer individuals. Every

3 Foucault established the term “biopower” which refers to “power’s hold over life” (Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 239-43) in the form of “control of populations” through “segregation and social hierarchization” (Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1 141). Based on statistics, demographics, and such, biopower or biopolitics target collective phenomena of the population which only become pertinent at the mass level (cf. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 245-6).
individual can inexhaustibly be divided into “dividuals”, into discrete streams of information, while at the same time they can be combined and form “masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 5). Following Deleuze, the signature represents the individual and the number its position within the mass. Both, signature and number are replaced by code. Code dissolves the mass/individual pair through the production of ‘dividuals’ which are constituted of fragmental information that gets accumulated and can be combined and recombined for different purposes. As information has become the common mode of organization, the hierarchical observation, which is the mode of operation of panoptic power, has been substituted by the modulation of information through decoding and recoding (cf. Bogard, “Surveillant Assemblage and Lines of Flight” 106; cf. Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 5). Instead of normalizing individuals control seeks “to map out distributions of conduct across populations and to reshape the physical and social habitat” (Rose 332). The societies of control address the relations between (in-)dividuals which are expressed in differential flows of information – in its purest form – detached from any form of individuality. Codes regulate the flows of information in a way that is comparable to how strata regulate the intensities of the plane of immanence. These differential virtual relations, which are not apparent on the (in-)dividual itself, are sought to be modulated by methods of control.

2.2.3 Anticipation: The Search for Control over the Processes of Becoming

What will be attempted in this chapter is an exploration of the anticipatory function of the Deleuzian societies of control. As explained in chapter 2.1, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is not interested in the state of affairs but in the circumstances that lead to its emergence. Discussing his and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze explains:

Philosophy has always dealt with concepts, and doing philosophy is trying to invent or create concepts. But there are various ways of looking at concepts. For ages people have used them to determine what something is (its essence). We, though, are interested in the circumstances in which things happen: in what situations, where and when does a particular thing happen, how does it happen, and so on? A concept, as we see it, should express an event rather than an essence. (Deleuze, Negotiations 25)
The state of affairs as such is only a result of continual processes located within the domain of the virtual. Its differential multiplicities structure the actual as well as the intensive continuums of the virtual multiplicities feed on the actual. The processual character of an ever-emergent actual is emphasized by the term *becoming* which is contrasted with *being* which rather expresses a static perception of the world focused on entities and their identity. Thus, becoming means change over time. Being is just a point on the continuous line of becoming and “controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point” (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 4). Since becoming is influenced by the continuous processes within the virtual an efficient control has to seek command of the virtual and, thus, of the processes of becoming. According to Dillon, command of the virtual entails also command of the future because “the future is what the actual is in potentiality” (“Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)order” 537). In consequence, societies of control feature anticipatory behavior respectively future-oriented decision-making.

What is anticipation and how is it reflected in the societies of control? Reactive concepts of cause and effect have proven to be highly productive in many scientific areas and have basically dominated the field of physics (cf. Nadin 17-21). Anticipation, by contrast, reverses the relation of cause and effect: the effect arises – on a time scale – before the cause. The subtitle of Mihai Nadin’s *Anticipation* claims that “the end is where we start from” and, therefore, hints at the temporally reversed relation of cause and effect. Nadin’s critique of the determinism that has dominated sciences is that it limits the epistemological potential by keeping the premise of ‘cause before effect’ (cf Nadin 10). A stance, which is similarly expressed by Deleuze and Guattari:

And it is true that the human sciences, with their materialist, evolutionary, and even dialectical schemas, lag behind the richness and complexity of causal relations in physics, or even in biology. Physics and biology present us with reverse causalities that are *without finality* but testify nonetheless to an action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past, for example, the convergent wave and the anticipated potential, which imply an inversion of time. (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 431)
Thus, anticipation is present in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in the sense that there is ‘an inversion of time’ or a reversed relation of cause and effect. The virtual comprises the past that has led to the actualization of the actual state of affairs (which is the present) as well as the future which also influences present actions through desire and expectation (cf. Deleuze, DR 70-80). The virtuality of the past and the future structure the present or the actual, which is only an instant, a point in time (without any duration) in the process of the virtual future being actualized in the present and then becoming past (e.g. in the form of memory). Past and future are connected through the present and, therefore, relate to each other. In particular the influence that expectations and believes about the future have on the present, are considered by theorist of anticipation.

According to Pezzulo, Butz and Sigaud, “anticipation […] includes prediction but goes beyond mere forecasting in that it refers to processes which use predictive knowledge to coordinate behavior and, more importantly, to act in a goal-directed fashion and pro-actively to realize achievable and desirable future states while avoiding unsuitable ones” (4). What anticipation does is scanning the past to generate dynamic predictions about the future which modifies present behavior according to those predictions. The continuous control of becomings entails present actions that pertain to the future.

3 Security and Societies of Control in Minority Report

Minority Report was released in June 2002, less than one year after the September 11 attacks. The idea of “preemptive surveillance” (Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview 149) that is presented in Minority Report coincides with the strategic doctrine of preemptive and preventive action that was introduced in the same year in “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” as a response to the ‘terrorist attacks’ (cf. The White House 6). Lyon argues that the preemptive logic that rose to prominence in the (political) discourse of the post-9/11 era is illustrated in the film (cf. Surveillance Studies: An Overview 149). Although, production and filming took place before the events of 9/11 (cf. Schmitz), “one could be forgiven for concluding that Minority Report was made for the Homeland Security era following 9/11” (Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview 149).
However, in *Minority Report* the threat that is to be prevented from actualizing into harm is not that of an externally induced ‘terrorism’. It is not Al Qaeda or any other similar organization but inequality within the society itself that seems to pose a threat to the dominant social class. This section about *Minority Report* will provide an exploration of the mechanisms of segregation and of continuous control of the differential population depicted in the film. Particularly, preemptive or anticipatory surveillance and their legal and moral implication will be considered.

### 3.1 Social Organization: Formations of Power in *Minority Report*

Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of stratification is universally applicable. It is a theory of a dynamic, ever-emergent condition (a *becoming*) that can also be applied to social formations and accumulations of power. In the following I will briefly introduce Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of stratification or actualization within the social domain to examine the processes of stratification and destratification of the population depicted in *Minority Report*.

#### 3.1.1 Social Organization on the ‘Alloplastic’ Stratum

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between three major types of strata: the physicochemical stratum, the organic stratum, and the alloplastic stratum. The physicochemical stratum or “inorganic stratum” (Holland 63) refers to non-vivid processes of stratification such as crystallization. The second stratum is the “organic stratum” which relates to living organisms (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 60). Stratification in the organic stratum encompasses the ‘*transduction*’ of genetic codes and becomes apparent in the processes of evolution. Finally, what will be relevant here is the third type of stratum: the “alloplastic” stratum (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 60). In this stratum code is not genetic any more but “linguistic” or “digital” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 60). Processes of stratification in the alloplastic stratum exceed previous strata due to the linguistic ability to represent all the other strata and, thus, “achieve a scientific conception of the world” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 62). What is presented here is not a mere *transduction* or transmission of code as it is the case with genetic code in the organic stratum but a *translation* of the inorganic and the organic stratum into “a
sufficiently deterritorialized system of signs, in other words, into an overcoding specific to language” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 62). Thus, the alloplastic stratum is in reciprocal presupposition with the ‘external world’ and, therefore, enables its modification. Genetic engineering illustrates a possible effect of the alloplastic stratum on the organic stratum. For instance, in *Minority Report* (*MR*) the ‘creator’ of the Precogs, Dr. Hineman (Lois Smith), grows genetically designed plants in her greenhouse (cf. *MR* 00:54:48-01:01:55). Thus, information is translated into genetic code and, therefore, new organisms are created, or existing ones are modified. The alloplastic stratum “operates with symbols that are comprehensible, transmittable, and modifiable from outside” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 60). This socio-technological stratum is the domain of signs and languages as well as of tools and machines. It allows for social stratification and formations of power beyond the survival of the fittest and the reign of the strongest. On the level of alloplastic strata structures of social organization occur and can form complex social machines such as the State apparatus (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 60-8; 357-8).

Pure virtuality or the plane of immanence would be represented by a state of complete social disorganization. The opposite would be a State apparatus featuring completely stable, immutable, and distinct organs of power. Such a State would exist forever but, as stated earlier, every stratum remains unstable to a certain degree.

### 3.1.2 Precrime: A ‘Social Machine’ of Organization

Deleuze and Guattari define “social formations by *mechanic processes*” (*ATP* 435). By contrast, Marxist theory defines societies by *modes of production* (cf. Winders 486). Highly organized societies feature “distinct organs of power” which are perpetually defended to preserve them against any form of change (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 357). These organs of power are the result of the emergence of hierarchies that are stratified into stable social formations expressed by the existence of institutions⁴ (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 358). In *Minority Report* such an organ of power is the Department of Precrime. The Precrime

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⁴ In Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, social stratification on the alloplastic stratum is not a deliberate process commanded by humankind but an autonomous process of actualization or stratification. The idea that humanity proactively created the State apparatus as a social formation is, therefore, an illusion: “the illusion of constitutive man” (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 63).
system is a machine that establishes hierarchies and endows its agents with authority that places them on a hierarchically higher position compared to the ‘regular’ population. In addition, it arranges its subjects in hierarchical relations so that hierarchies become vertical (top to bottom).

At the beginning of the film Anderton is one of the agents of Precrime. He is the ‘Chief’ of the appertaining police force and almost at the top of the chain of command – only submitted to Lamar Burgess (Max von Sydow), the founder and director of Precrime (cf. MR 00:00:59-00:13:55; cf. MR 00:59:00-01:01:55). After being predicted to commit a murder, Fletcher as “second in command” takes over control of the Precrime force (MR 00:44:16-00:44:20). The promotion of the Precop next in charge indicates a linear chain of command which can be considered the result of a vertical hierarchy. Furthermore, the fact that the system deprives Anderton of any authority and even submits him to his former inferiors, shows that Precrime endowed him with power in the first place. Thus, Anderton’s power as Chief of the Precrime police force refers back to the institution as such. Anderton is what Deleuze and Guattari call “a man of power” backed by institutionalized hierarchical structures (ATP 357). Institutionalized power features a higher degree of stability than the leadership of primitive societies: “[t]he chief [of a primitive society] is more like a leader or a star than a man of power and is always in danger of being disavowed, abandoned by his people” (Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 357). Anderton cannot be abandoned by his inferiors as long as Precrime endows him with authority. In addition, the institutionalized power is maintained beyond his personal prestige and transferred to Flechter as the plot unfolds.

Precrime is subject to federal authority. The Department of Justice is a federal institution. As an agent of ‘Justice,’ Witwer is potentially superior to Anderton and Burgess. Therefore, he can demand access to the Precogs against Anderton’s will:

ANTEKTON: Cops aren’t allowed inside the temple.

[...
WITWER: So I’ll be the first one to go in there?
ANDERTON: Maybe you didn’t hear me.
WITWER: If it’s a question of authority—
ANDERTON: There is no question. You don’t have any.
WITWER: I have a warrant in my pocket that says different.
WITWER: This investigation of Precrime and its personnel is being conducted under the direct supervision and permission from the attorney general. I’m here as his representative which means you’re now operating under my supervision. (MR 00:23:37-00:24:31)

Eventually, Anderton acknowledges Witwer’s authority as an agent of Justice and defers to his wish to see the Precogs face-to-face (cf. MR 00:24:48-00:25:18). The institutions presented in Minority Report as well as its representatives are embedded in vertical, arborescent hierarchies. Most of the time individuals do not meet as equals but as superiors and inferiors in stable power relations produced by their institutional background. Precrime as an organ of power is subordinated to the State as the central power.

However, the formations of powers that are established in the stable social structures and institutions such as Precrime are only residues of the processes of stratification on the alloplastic stratum. They are exposed to destratifying effects of a floating population. It is in the interest of any formation of power or political power to regulate these heterogeneous flows in order to preserve the existing social structures and institutions which have been formed. Therefore, mechanisms of capture develop to prevent institutionalized power from being washed away by the “fluidity of the masses” (Virilio qtd. in Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 386). Thus, Precrime also functions as an instrument of social organization in the service of preserving formations of power such as the state.

3.1.3 The Sprawl: Social Disorganization

The poor quarters in Spielberg’s vision of Washington, D.C. in 2054 are referred to as “the Sprawl” (MR 00:34:19-00:34:22). In an urban context The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘sprawl’ as “the expansion of an urban or industrial area into the adjoining countryside in a way perceived to be disorganized and unattractive” (1800). ‘Disorganized and unattractive’ appears to be a description that matches the dirty and winding streets of the Sprawl. The dark and dilapidated streets and buildings of the Sprawl present a contrast to the well-lit, clear, and structured areas of the inner city. A coherent surveillance is not established and policing in general seems to be reduced to occasional raids as the behavior of the inhabitants suggests: while the children are afraid and seem to be raided for the
first time, older inhabitants of the building display a certain familiarity with the procedure. This displayed familiarity might originate either from the experience of previous raids or, at least, from knowledge of their existence. Accordingly, the Precrime officers appear to be experienced in executing these searches which indicates a certain frequency in regard to such operations. It seems that the police take action only in those cases where a certain danger is perceived to originate from the Sprawl, for example a fugitive future murderer such as Anderton (cf. MR 01:14:50-01:19:54).

The Sprawl is an open environment that remains in interaction with the privileged areas of the inner city. Basically, it is not the Sprawl that separates itself from the privileged areas. If anything, the privileged areas provide limited access and create blockages for certain populations as the presence of iris scanners mounted in the inner city suggests (see chapter 3.2.2). The central power in the guise of Precrime seems only to exercise its force to fulfil a function of a basic sorting. Only the dangerous are filtered out and taken into detention as the search for Anderton indicates. Thus, the Sprawl and its inhabitants are largely (although, not completely) detached from any central power.

Spielberg provides merely a glimpse at the social fabric of the Sprawl. Thus, what the audience perceives can only offer an impression of the area beyond the well-organized center of Washington, D.C. The spectrum of characters ranges from the eye-lacking mysterious drug dealer that is shown in the first presentation of the Sprawl (cf. MR 00:15:58-00:16:50) to the dubious surgeon and his equally strange nurse (cf. MR 01:03:00-01:11:36) who assume the task of replacing Anderton’s eyes. Besides that, by becoming a future murderer Anderton is also transformed into a part of the heterogeneous Sprawl population, detached from Precrime and any form of central power except for their attempts to capture him and his attempt to correct the seemingly corrupted system. All the individuals occupying the Sprawl seem to follow their own agendas. Cooperation is only temporal and manifests in small exchanges of money, goods, and/or services such as the purchase of drugs (cf. MR 00:15:58-00:16:50) or the replacing of Anderton’s eyes (cf. MR 01:03:00-01:11:36). The inhabitants of the Sprawl appear to meet as equals contrary to the hierarchical social structure exhibited by Precrime (see chapter 3.1.2). Anderton as the Chief of Precrime (before he is predicted to murder Leo Crow (Mike Binder)) has no superiority over the person
from which he buys drugs. Vertical hierarchies are flattened into horizontal, open circuits of communication. Social organization in the Sprawl is rhizomatic.\(^5\)

The population of the Sprawl seems to be disorganized or marginally organized. It seems to be heterogeneous to such a degree that its social stratification, its structures, are almost only singularities – without any organization – that tend to disappear on the plane of immanence (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 56). Deleuze and Guattari refer to such environments as “smooth spaces” in contrast to ‘striated spaces’ of organization (Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 479) Social organization does hardly emerge among the population of the Sprawl and the seemingly privileged and organized society of the inner city particularly represented by Precrime shows no real effort to create order in the area of the Sprawl. By contrast, characters such as the eyeless drug dealer actively resist the social organization by avoiding ‘eyedentification’ through iris scans, which is the common mode of identification (see chapter 3.2.2). Thus, he represents a movement of destratification, a line of flight, constantly eluding identification, localization, and, hence, organization through Precrime.

### 3.2 Continuous Modulation of Populations

In the previous chapters the different degrees of social organization are described by contrasting Precrime as an organizing force with the Sprawl as a ‘smooth space’ that seems to elude organization. The continuous process of ever-emergent social organization through processes of stratification and destratification implies equally continuous processes of social control to influence the becoming of the society.

Based on Deleuze writing, Hardt and Negri argue that societies of control are characterized by “extremely unequal populations” (Hardt and Negri 337). Referring to research on American “high poverty areas” (Jargowsky 30) I will examine the depiction of poverty in *Minority Report* and attempt to identify mechanisms of social control that might be employed to channel the development of the society presented in the film.

\(^5\) Rhizome is an image of thought of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. It is inspired by the botanical rhizome which is a subterranean stem that spreads out perpendicular in the form of meshes or networks. In contrast to arborescent structures, it features no pivotal points or positions but only lines that are interconnected. Swarms are an example for rhizomatic social organization (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *ATP* 6-8).
3.2.1 Social Clustering and Inequality in *Minority Report*

The populations of the societies of control are marked by increasing inequality. The answers that control provides aim at differentiation and segmentation rather than at social integration (cf. Hardt and Negri 339-40). Societies of control abandon the aim of the normalization of individuals and try to regulate the heterogeneous flows of the population. The challenge for control is not “to deal with erosions of frontiers but with explosions within shanty towns or ghettos” (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 7). Since the “too poor for debt” are “too numerous for confinement” the prison becomes less important while slum areas, such as the ‘Sprawl’ in *Minority Report*, gain in importance (cf. Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 7).

In *Minority Report* the “close proximity of extremely unequal populations” (Hardt and Negri 336-7) is illustrated by the juxtaposition of the better-off areas of Washington, D.C. and the Sprawl. The uptown of Washington, D.C. is presented as a clear, open, tidy, and well-lit area. By contrast, the streets of the Sprawl appear dark and narrow and are mostly shown at night times. The architecture of the upper-middle class areas features idyllic house with public play grounds and the inner city features futuristic skyscrapers, whereas the Sprawl only provides dilapidated apartment blocks with broken windows that are modestly furnished. Only few characters from the Sprawl are introduced in more detail to the audience. Those are the people who are in contact with Anderton, such as the drug dealer or the former doctor that does the illegal eye-surgery. A general view of the Sprawl population and its environment is provided when Precrime searches for Anderton after he has got his eyes replaced. He hides in a building that is dilapidated and inhabited by rats. Jargowsky lists dilapidated housing, litter, broken glass, and people “hanging out” on the streets (among other things) as characteristic features for poor neighborhoods (11). Therefore, it can be assumed that the people living in the Sprawl belong to the marginalized groups of the fictitious Washington, D.C. The first person that the Precrime officers encounter when entering the building stares at his own hand in fascination while dancing weirdly in circles. The person seems to be mentally ill possibly due to drug abuse. Another person is sleeping in the entrance hall and the remaining persons on the floor seem basically to be idle and random (cf. *MR* 01:15:11-01:15:30).
According to actress Pam Grier, “[p]eople get tired because their daily life is so hopeless” (qtd. in Mennel 153). These people seem to ‘hang out,’ as Jargowsky phrases it.

By contrast, the population of the inner city appears to be busy most of the time. Figure 3-1 shows a medium shot of the place in front of the Precrime Department shows a crowd of people in business dresses. The people carry briefcases and walk fast. They seem to be in a hurry. Few have stopped for conversation but the others walk straight into a certain direction appearing purposeful. While the Sprawl population moves in circles or remains inactive, the business people of the inner city move in straight lines and at high pace. It seems that the unproductive, the idle, and the poor are separated from the productive and successful.

What becomes apparent is the concentration of two different population groups. One is the integrated, productive, and seemingly well-off population group of the inner city that is represented by the homogeneous business crowd and an organized, futuristic environment. The other group is constituted by the poor people who inhabit the dirty and dilapidated Sprawl. Marcuse distinguishes two modes of the concentration of population groups which he refers to as “clustering,” (16). While a dominant social class might come together for purposes of self-protection and/or to promote their own interests and, thus, form an enclave, the inferior population group can be forced “to cluster in a defined spatial area, that is, a ghetto” (Marcuse 16). The formation of an enclave does not
entail domination or exclusion and is basically a type of voluntary clustering of a privileged minority. The opposite is “segregation” and describes the “process of formation and maintenance of a ghetto” through the exclusion of populations that are treated as inferior (Marcuse 16). The ruthless raids of Precrime that seem to be standard procedure suggest that the Sprawl population is indeed treated as inferior (cf. *MR* 01:14:50-01:19:54). Furthermore, the existence of a ghetto – predominantly inhabited by poor people – implies a form of segregation that is enforced by the dominant society and not voluntary. What seems to happen is certainly not the formation of an enclave but the formation and maintenance of a poverty ghetto, actively formed by practices of segregation of the dominant society.

3.2.2 Methods of Social Control: Markets and ‘Eyedentiscan’

In the previous chapter I argue that the social structure presented in *Minority Report* reflects processes of segregation which eventually lead to the emergence of poor quarters such as ‘the Sprawl’. What is described in chapter 3.2.1, are the symptoms, the results of segregation. In other words, the Sprawl is the actual residue of virtual processes of segregation. Since these processes take place in the domain of the virtual in terms of the alloplastic stratum they have to be derived to some extend from the actual. Therefore, the mechanisms of segregation are rather implied than directly illustrated.

The conditions depicted in the Sprawl appear to be inspired by the situation within American poor neighborhoods as the similarities between the Sprawl and Jargowsky’s findings on “high-poverty areas” suggest (Jargowsky 11; see also chapter 3.2.1). In simplified terms the segregation and clustering of poverty in American poor areas is mostly based on high income inequality and the subsequent socio-economic pressure to settle in areas that provide “low rents, public housing, or targeted service provisions” (Jargowsky 147). The mechanisms of segregation operate through housing markets, labor markets, as well as social networks. Thus, the problem of poverty does not necessarily originate from the location in question. There is reason to suspect that people with socio-economic problems are forced to move into poor and unattractive neighborhoods due to the market mechanisms (cf. Jargowsky 147). The population of poverty areas is
dynamically linked to the metropolitan area and its markets that are controlled by the dominating society. As Deleuze claims, “[t]he operation of markets is now the instrument of social control” (“Societies of Control” 6). Market control is a means of regulating heterogeneous flows of populations. Thus, market operations seem to have promoted the formation of the Sprawl in *Minority Report*. Furthermore, the market operations are virtual processes which allow for continuous control.

The contiguity of extremely unequal populations “creates a situation of permanent social danger and requires the powerful apparatuses of the society of control to ensure separation” (Hardt and Negri 336-7). Therefore, inequality is an issue of security. The most salient security mechanism, besides the Precogs, is the so-called “Eyedentiscan [sic]” system which consists of a network of scanners that is linked to a database (*MR* 00:45:59). With the help of previously stored images of a person’s iris, the scanners recognize their ‘eyedentity’. Based on that eyedentity access to certain facilities is granted or denied. The sorting function of the Eyedentiscan technology can be observed best by taking Anderton as an example. Due to his high status as the Chief of Precrime he is allowed to access facilities such as the Precogs’ ‘temple’ which are inaccessible for almost every other person. For instance, when Witwer demands access to the Precogs’ room it is Anderton who needs to unlock the doors for him by means of getting his eyes scanned. While the others are “[n]ot cleared for access” he is “[a]pproved for entry” (*MR* 00:24:59-00:25:06). While market manipulation operates on a macro level, Eyedentiscan can be considered to micromanage (in-)dividuals and their area of movement. Such a principle of social control is anticipated by Deleuze and Guattari:

Felix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on any given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position—licit or illicit—and effects a universal modulation (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 7).

In *Minority Report* (*MR*) the dividual electronic card is replaced by a person’s dividual biometric eyes. Apart from that, Spielberg’s vision of Washington, D.C.

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6 In certain respects Anderton resembles what Deleuze calls ‘dividuals’ constituted of dividable streams of information. In *Minority Report* the dividuality is particularly visualized by
seems to come close to Felix Guattari’s imagined city. The iris scanners establish a filter function at certain access points and, therefore, regulate the movement of everyone individually by rendering them either ‘approved for entry’ or ‘not cleared for access.’ Furthermore, the Eyedentiscan system enables the tracking of any person’s position that stays within reach of a scanner. This function is introduced to the audience during John Anderton’s escape from Precrime. When Anderton gets to know about the prevision of the future murder he is predicted to commit, he flees from Precrime and leaves the inner city. The iris scanners automatically ‘eye-dent’ him and send his position to the police (cf. MR 00:36:30-00:46:05). Thus, Eyedentiscan constitutes a “control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant” (Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 7). Permanent tracking is a feature of societies of control that is as well present in Minority Report: as long as individuals stay within reach of Eyedentiscan their position is known to Precrime.

By being marked as a future murderer Anderton’s area of movement is limited to the spaces that are untouched by the Eyedentiscan network. As stated earlier he has basically become a Sprawl inhabitant with very limited access since getting ‘eye-dented’ would bring his former colleagues to the scene. Anderton’s case exemplifies the different areas of movement for the different fractions of the population. As Chief of Precrime, Anderton has a high security clearance and is allowed access nearly everywhere. However, after being labelled as future murderer blockages emerge and certain areas become inaccessible as it is the case for delinquent Sprawl inhabitants.7

Methods of segmentation or segregation, in the form of identification and classification, are emphasized by Feeley and Simon as means to regulate a

the act of replacing one’s eyes as the primary source for identification. The identity of a person is derived from her or his specific dividual iris scan (cf. MR 00:24:59-00:25:06). The iris is the biometric feature that connects individuals with the system of continuous tracking (Eyedentiscan). The image of the iris is the isolated stream of information that is matched with the “data double” (Haggerty and Ericson 606), the assemblage of information stored in Precrimes’ database. Thus, what Eyedentiscan localizes are not individuals but the dividual eyes that are matched with the virtual abstraction, the data double of the presumed individual. The abstracted virtual individual is a combination of dividuals or “partial information objects” forming a fragmented whole (Bogard, “Surveillant Assemblage and Lines of Flight” 106). Eyedentiscan tracks the position of eyes which are coded as a representation of a person’s position and identity. Data doubles are discrete and virtual objects abstracted from their actual corporeal reference object (cf. Haggerty and Ericson 611).

7 However, the typical Sprawl population would not be able to access the Precogs’ temple. Thus, Anderton still has some advantages that derive from his earlier position in society and his specific knowledge.
heterogeneous population sorted by potential dangerousness (cf. 452). Thus, Eyedentiscan performs a security function by identifying, tracking, and excluding individuals from certain areas. The area of movement of any (in-)dividual can be continuously adjusted as Anderton’s different areas of possible movement indicate. His area of movement gets constrained after he is labelled as future murderer. Anderton’s area of movement is potentially reduced to zero because future murderers appear to be the most dangerous elements of society, the highest or absolute degree of segregation – imprisonment in Precrime’s prison, the “Department of Containment” (MR 00:29:32) – is reserved for them.

3.3 Anticipation and Simulated Surveillance

In Deleuzian thought the past and future are only dimensions of the present that appear in the form of memories or recordings of past events or in the form of desire, expectations, or beliefs about future events (cf. DR 70-80). Past and future are the virtual condition for the actualization of the present. Since the present is only the residue of processes of actualization every action pertains to the future to influence the actualization of emerging presents based on past experience. Therefore, anticipation, defined as acting proactively based on dynamic predictions “to realize achievable and desirable future states while avoiding unsuitable ones,” is essential to understand not only human behavior (Pezzulo, Butz and Sigaud 4). A particularly vivid example of anticipatory behavior is given by Rosen:

[I]f I am walking in the woods, and I see a bear appear on the path ahead of me, I will immediately tend to vacate the premises. Why? I would argue: because I can foresee a variety of unpleasant consequences arising from failing to do so. The stimulus for my action is not just the sight of the bear, but rather the output of the model through which I predict the consequences of direct interaction with the bear. I thus change my present course of action, in accordance with my model’s prediction. Or, to put it another way, my present behavior is not simply reactive, but rather is anticipatory. (Rosen 7)

The output of the predictive model in this case is based on knowledge of the potential dangers of the bear which was acquired previously. Thus, past information and future expectations (in form of an expected bear attack) generate predictive knowledge for anticipatory behavior (cf. Suddendorf, Addis and Corballis). Furthermore, anticipation reaches beyond the individual and is
suggested to be applied on the level of society. As Nadin claims, reaction “will certainly not make ‘terrorism’ disappear and will not help society in advancing prevention, in medicine, politics, social welfare, and many other areas” as long as the prevalent reactive mechanisms for “dealing with issues of extreme importance to humankind” are not complemented by anticipation (117).

3.3.1 Hyperreality and the Precogs’ Previsions

Precrime is a special police department which prevents murders before they happen. At the heart of Precrime are the “Precognitives” (MR 00:14:56-00:14:58), three genetically mutated individuals with psychic abilities. In the Precrime setup they are able to foresee future murders which they perceive in the form of pre-experienced episodes that are comparable to dreams. The Precogs are attached to an image producing machinery that records their prevision via a Brain-Computer-Interface (BCI). In the opening scene the Precogs perceive a dream-like vision of Howard Marks (Arye Gross), his wife, and her lover. It is shown how Marks stabs his wife with a pair of scissors and attacks her lover (cf. MR 00:00:59-00:01:55). The sequence is non-chronological, partly blurred, and in varying speeds. Right after the input is recorded Anderton searches the recorded material to identify and locate Howard Marks, whose case of ‘future murder’ serves as an example that introduces the procedure of Precrime (cf. MR 00:01:55-00:13:55). Marks case of future murder appears on Precrime’s radar due to the Precogs’ clairvoyant ability.

The Precogs’ previsions are recorded accounts of future events. Following Deleuze’s conception of time, memories and recordings belong to the virtual domain of the past. The Precogs’ previsions appear like memories and are recorded by the BCI – however, they depict a future event. In Bogard’s words, the Precogs’ previsions are “a kind of future ‘memory’” (The Simulation of Surveillance 34). Imagining a ‘future memory’ means “projecting a future as something already over,” a ‘future-past,’ hence, a simulation of the future (Bogard, The Simulation of Surveillance 34). However, it is claimed that “[t]he Precogs see the future and [that] they are never wrong” (MR 00:22:35-00:22:37). If that were true and the Precogs actually saw the future, a future that is predetermined and without any alternative, the previsions could be considered as
observations rather than simulations. But what the Precogs perceive cannot necessarily be interpreted as something comparable to normal eyesight. When the Precogs ‘see’ Marks murdering his wife and her lover the actual Howard Marks is in a different place and at a different time (cf. Kowalski 233). Thus, the Precogs do not ‘see’ the actual, present time person – who might not even have any intention of killing someone – but the future person in a future situation.

After Anderton escapes from Precrime he manages to reach Dr. Hineman’s adobe. Dr. Hineman is considered as the inventor of Precrime and Anderton expects information from her that may aid the attempt to prove his innocence. In the conversation with him she reveals the existence of the eponymous Minority Reports:

Dr. HINEMAN: The Precogs are never wrong. But occasionally they do disagree.
ANDERTON: What?
Dr. HINEMAN: Most of the time, all three Precognitives will see an event in the same way but once in a while, one of them will see things differently than the other two.
ANDERTON: Jesus Christ. Why didn’t I know about this?
Dr. HINEMAN: Because these Minority Reports are destroyed the instant they occur.
ANDERTON: Why?
Dr. HINEMAN: Obviously, for Precrime to function, there can’t be any suggestion of fallibility. After all, who wants a justice system that instills doubt? It may be reasonable, but it’s still doubt.
ANDERTON: Are you saying I’ve haloed innocent people?
Dr. HINEMAN: I’m saying that every so often, those accused of a Precrime might just might have an alternate future. (MR 00:58:15-00:59:00)

The existence of the Minority Reports suggests alternate futures that deviate from Precrime’s ‘official’ predictions which are treated as actual facts and are evidence enough for a conviction (cf. MR 00:03:29-00:03:43). However, as Kowalski points out, the Precogs do not have foreknowledge of a predetermined future. What the Precogs ‘see’ is a “conditional future” since the future murderers are stopped with the help of the Precogs’ previsions (233). The ‘true’ prediction of the actual Marks case would show Anderton arresting Howard Marks instead of Marks murdering his wife and her lover. The future presented by the Precogs is conditional in the sense, that it shows what would happen if the condition were that the previsions did not exist. As Witwer correctly remarks, “it’s not the future if you stop it” (MR 00:22:37-00:22:39).
The most striking instance for knowledge of conditional future (and even past) is illustrated after Anderton brought the Precog Agatha (Samantha Morton) to the house where his ex-wife Lara (Kathryn Morris) lives. Several years ago Anderton’s son Sean (Dominic Scott Kay) was abducted while they both were at a crowded, public swimming pool. The loss tore the couple apart whereupon Anderton moved out and also began to do drugs. In the scene Agatha sits in Sean’s room outlining how Sean’s life would have proceeded if he were not abducted:

ANDERTON: Agatha…
AGATHA: Sean... He’s on the beach now, a toe in the water. He’s asking you to come in with him. He’s been racing his mother up and down the sand. There’s so much love in this house. He’s ten years old. He’s surrounded by animals. He wants to be a vet. You keep a rabbit for him, a bird, and a fox. He’s in high school. He likes to run, like his father. He runs the two-mile and the long relay. He’s 23. He’s at a university. He makes love to a pretty girl named Claire. He asks her to be his wife. He calls here and tells Lara, who cries. He still runs. Across the university and in the stadium where John watches. Oh God, he’s running so fast, just like his daddy. He sees his daddy. He wants to run to him. But he’s only six years old, and he can’t do it. And the other men are so fast. There was so much love in this house. (MR 01:54:00-01:55:42)

The narrative of Sean begins with an episode from the time before he is abducted and instantly attracts the attention of John and Lara. Agatha seems to have knowledge of Sean’s actual past and of the way Sean’s life would have continued if he were not abducted. She envisions his life. However, this nether is Sean’s predetermined future, nor a possible future. The alternative vision of Sean’s life, provided by Agatha, is a simulation – created by setting the parameter of Sean being abducted to ‘not being abducted’. Thus, the Precogs – or at least Agatha (“the more gifted of the three” (MR 01:01:43-01:01:45)) – are able not only to prevision future events but also to envision, to simulate alternative pasts such as the part of Sean’s alternative life that relates to the period between his disappearance and the presence. Consequently, the Precogs’ (pre-)visions do not depict the reality in the form of past or future actualizations. What they provide are possibilities that are opposed to reality in a Deleuzian sense (cf. DR 207-212). As shown by the example of Howard Marks, the Precogs’ previsions do not get actualized due to Precrime’s efforts and, therefore, remain possibilities. However, the prevision causes the arrestment of Marks and strongly influences the
actualization of a different ‘reality’. The prevision possesses the “reality of a task to be performed,” for instance, the prevention of the foreseen murder (Deleuze, DR 212). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the virtual is “real without being actual” (ATP 94). The previsions exist and they are real but they do not depict reality. Instead they simulate reality and, therefore, represent possibilities.

The commission of the crime itself is absolute metaphysics. The Precogs see the future. And they're never wrong. (MR 00:22:32-00:22:37)

Contrary to what is argued above, the quote expresses the conviction that the Precogs’ previsions depict the reality. As argued so far, the previsions do not provide an account of a predetermined future and the film provides several examples of deviations between the predictions and how events actualize. For instance, when Crow grabs Anderton’s gun and commits suicide rather than being shot in an act of revenge as it was predicted by the Precogs. To emphasize the deviation cinematically the shot does happen several seconds after the point in time that was precisely foreseen (cf. MR 01:45:21-01:46:11). However, most of the time the actual events seem to double what the Precogs foresee – except for the differences that eventuate from the previsions itself. Even the ‘murder’ of Leo Crow approximates the prevision to such a degree that the Precops cannot identify the difference (cf. MR 01:46:11-01:47:27).

Due to the high accuracy the previsions are not recognized as simulations or predictions that allow for deviations but as depictions of the reality. As Dr. Hineman emphasizes “there can’t be any suggestion of fallibility,” otherwise the people would stop believing that Precrime’s actions are based on facts (MR 00:58:44-00:58:45). The actualization of these foreseen ‘facts’ is perceived as “absolute metaphysics” since “[t]he Precogs […] are never wrong” (MR 00:22:32-00:22:37). The Precogs previsions are not recognized as simulations but as reality. The previsions depict the reality without ever being mistaken, according to general believe. Only Dr. Hineman as the ‘inventor’ and Burgess as the founder and director of Precrime seem to know about the Minority Reports. These deviant reports suggest that the previsions are probabilities rather than predeterminations. Dr. Hineman and Burgess, however, show no interest in risking Precrime’s credibility. Burgess views Precrime to be a “noble minded
enterprise” that even justifies murder in the process of its inception\(^8\) \((MR\ 00:21:53-00:21:55)\). Dr. Hineman considers the Minority Reports to be “insignificant” \((MR\ 00:59:19-00:59:21)\) and Precrime to be “a perfect system”\(^9\) \((MR\ 00:57:57-00:57:58)\). Except for these two persons who used to consider themselves ‘mother and father of Precrime’ no one is privy to the secret \((cf.\ MR\ 00:59:04-00:59:07)\). Precrime produces simulations that are believed to be real.

According to Baudrillard, “abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it” \((Baudrillard\ 1)\). Similarly, the Precogs’ previsions are not abstractions of actual events but precede these events. Precrime intervenes based on the previsions and, therefore, eliminates any possibility of a different future to be actualized. Thus, in a way Precrime actively works towards making the future coincide with their predictions or simulations. As a consequence, the ‘profound reality’ is abolished respectively simulation has become the new real eradicating the difference between reality and simulation \((cf.\ Baudrillard\ 2-7)\). Precrime produces its own reality, a hyperreality, based on the disappearance of the difference between reality and simulation.

### 3.3.2 Discipline and Anticipatory Subjects

Nadin views reward mechanisms to be “driving anticipations” \((58)\). The expectation of a certain reward affects an individual’s choice of a future course of action \((cf.\ Nadin\ 58)\). Conversely, I argue, Foucauldian discipline functions through anticipation. On the one hand, individuals behave in a way to avoid punishment; on the other hand they desire rewards. According to Foucault, “punishment is only one element of a double system: gratification-punishment. And it is this system that operates in the process of training and correction” \((Foucault,\ Discipline\ and\ Punish\ 180)\). Thus, discipline works by manipulating

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\(^8\) In the process of establishing Precrime Burgess kills Anne Lively (Jessica Harper), the mother of one of the Precogs \((cf.\ MR\ 02:04:41-02:05:50)\).

\(^9\) Precrime can be considered perfect in the regard that it abolishes murder. However, Hineman also knows the inhumane conditions in which the Precogs (who are her former patients) are held and, therefore, the term ‘prefect system’ also seems to express some cynicism, possibly mixed with the hope that “the unintended consequences of a series of genetic mistakes” result in something good \((MR\ 00:56:42-00:56:45)\).
the subjects’ expectations of reward and punishment. In a disciplinary system the individuals refrain from performing actions that deviate from the norm since such actions are potentially noticed by the authorities and could result in undesired punishment or the absence of desired rewards. Important is a setup of power that renders the subjects constantly visible in order that their behavior is continuously noticeable. For discipline to function automatically the subjects have to be in “a state of conscious and permanent visibility” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 201).

Besides the visibility of the subjects the power itself should also be visible and, additionally, unverifiable. In Bentham’s Panopticon it is the central tower of the guard that renders the presence of the power visible to the inhabitants (cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 201). The achievements of the Precrime program are constantly presented to the public. Due to the aspiration to become a national program, the advantages of Precrime are communicated in promotional films that are presented on billboards which seem to be everywhere (cf. *MR 00:14:30-00:15:55*). But for the public the inner workings of Precrime remain inscrutable. Even Witwer who is sent from the Department of Justice to audit Precrime needs explanation to understand how it operates: “Tell me how all this works” (*MR 00:25:28-00:25:30*). All that the public knows is that “it works” as the slogan of Precrime claims (*MR 00:15:41-00:15:43*). Precrime, therefore, constitutes an omnipresent surveillance system that seems to render every individual visible to inspection in case of a future murder. Besides that, the system as such is highly visible for the ‘observed’ individuals. The effectiveness of Precrime is permanently presented to the public which even causes some people to worship the Precogs like gods (“I find it interesting that some people have begun to deify the Precogs” (*MR 00:26:21-00:26:26*)). By contrast, the method of operation of Precrime is kept opaque. As Foucault states, disciplinary power must be “visible” as well as “unverifiable” to establish the effect of continuous hierarchical observation (*Discipline and Punish* 201). An interruption of the ‘precognitive’ surveillance does not dissolve the self-disciplining effects of Precrime. These effects are evident in the radical decline in numbers of homicide, which are communicated in Precrime’s promotional video clips: “With just one month under the Precrime program the murder rate in the district of Columbia was reduced 90 percent” (*MR 00:14:57-00:15:06*). Even more important is the reduced
The number of attempted murders which particularly reflects the change in mental state of the seemingly surveilled population:

FLETCHER: They call it a Red Ball. With crimes of passion there’s no premeditation so they show up late. Most of our scrambles are flash events like this one. We rarely see anything with premeditation anymore.
WITWER: People have gotten the message. (MR 00:08:20-00:08:29)

The prospect of being observed and captured by Precrime, even before the murder is executed, apparently affects the people’s behavior. Precrime seems to produce self-disciplinary effects. The individuals regulate themselves and refrain from attempting murder to avoid capture which is perceived as a certainty. Since the Precogs are kept under disclosure no one outside Precrime can verify whether they are operational or not. Thus, things are arranged in a way “that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 201). The perfect setup of power renders its actual exercise unnecessary. Precrime is highly visible but unverifiable and, therefore, establishes permanent effects of panoptic self-discipline among the population – detached from the operational status of the Precogs. Thus, the subjects of the Precrime surveillance apparatus assume responsibility for their own subjugation. They are agents of discipline who exercise disciplinary power upon themselves. In discipline, anticipation – in the form of expecting reward or punishment for certain behaviors – is on the side of the subject. However, the occasional ‘Red Ball,’ such as the Howard Marks case, hints at the limits of discipline. Whenever discipline is going to fail, Precrime is ready to handle it in advance.

3.3.3 Precrime as Anticipatory Social Control

Relating to Baudrillard’s notion of the hyperreal, Bogard describes the simulation of surveillance as a form of “hypercontrol” (The Simulation of Surveillance 9). It is a manifestation of the wish to see “everything capable of being seen, record everything capable of being recorded, and accomplish these things, whenever and wherever possible, prior to the event itself” (Bogard, The Simulation of Surveillance 4). In Minority Report Precrime seems to hold the promise of every murder being seen and recorded prior to the actual event. Later in the film, the
scope of the Precogs’ abilities is, in fact, extended by the simulation of alternative pasts and futures, as the example of Agatha describing Sean’s alternative life indicates (chapter 3.3.1). This kind of knowledge could provide the authorities with the opportunity to ‘see’ and record everything, past and future and possibly their inexhaustible alternatives, basically the sphere of the virtual. However, the virtual is unformed matter and does not reveal anything (see chapter 2.1.1).

Simulation selects among the differential multiplicity of the virtual and, therefore, identifies or creates possibilities that “stand in for and verify the reality” in the form of a hyperreal that can be surveilled in a meaningful way in its entirety (Bogard, The Simulation of Surveillance 21). The potential to observe and record everything allows for prefect information and seems to produce certainty. In Minority Report every murder is recorded in advance and actions are taken to regulate the outcome of anticipated events. In the scene right after Anderton’s future murder is predicted, he and Witwer meet in the elevator. Witwer is about to confront Anderton with his drug abuse while Anderton thinks he was framed by Witwer who now might want to arrest him. The absence of the alarm that goes along with previsioned murders assures Witwer that Anderton will not kill him: “[n]ow put the gun down, John. I don’t hear a Red Ball” (MR 00:41:26-00:41:29). As there is no alarm, Witwer is certain that he will not be killed. In the next second the alarm sounds and Witwer is instantly in fear of his life (cf. MR 00:41:29-00:41:43). The alarm appears to be perceived as more real by Witwer than Anderton pointing a gun at him. Precrime foresees every murder with the result that no uncertainties seem to remain (with regard to murders). Thus, every individual appears to be perfectly visible and no murder remains ‘unseen’. However, it is not the actual individual that is observed in the case of a murder but a predictive model of the person, a representation generated by the Precogs. Bogard claims that surveillance and simulation are characterized by contradictive logics: “If surveillance is about the real, simulation is about the hyperreal, the more-than-real. Surveillance uncovers, but simulation, we could say, is cover” (The Simulation of Surveillance 21). Accordingly, in the film the actual individual is left outside the ‘inspector’s gaze’ while Precrime’s simulated surveillance seems to be comprehensive. However, it only targets the ‘cover’.

In its essence, the previsions used by Precrime represent a form of simulation or modelling of a future since it does not predict the ‘true’ future but a
simulated, conditional future; a future that depicts what would or could happen if Precrime did not exist. The information derived from these predictions is, then, used to modulate future circumstances to desirable ends by taking according actions in the present. In societies of control hierarchical observation ceases to be the common mode of organization. The continuous modulation of populations is achieved through decoding and recoding of information. Information becomes the crucial element for social organization. As Bogard claims, “there has been a shift to virtual forms of control” such as simulation, modelling and profiling (cf. Bogard, “Surveillant Assemblage and Lines of Flight” 106). ‘Regular’ inhabitants of Spielberg’s Washington, D.C. may be recoded as future murderers which equals a conviction (e.g. in the case of Howard Marks) and sets the Precops in motion to arrest before the crime.

The actions of Precrime are based on a predictive model. The cause for the Precops to act is located in the future reversing the temporal relation of cause and effect. According to Rosen, an anticipatory system is “a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its environment, which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions pertaining to a later instant” (Rosen 313). Related to this conception of anticipation, the Precogs’ previsions are the predictive model on which Precrime’s change of state is based. This change of state, for example from a neutral state to a state of alert, is a result of previsioned murders. Thus, Precrime represents a form of institutionalized anticipation, enabling anticipatory behavior on a societal level. The outcome is what Bogard calls “proactive normalization” (“Surveillant Assemblage and Lines of Flight” 106): authorities act (or react) based on the predicted behavior of their subjects and try to prevent them from preforming undesired acts or shape desired future behavior. In this case anticipation is on the side of the authority.

According to Bogard, theorizing about the simulation of surveillance is prone to approach scenarios that seem to belong to science fiction (cf. The Simulation of Surveillance 6-7). He argues that for “a perfect simulation of surveillance, of observational control, […] the question of its ‘staging’ would not arise, because everything would appear ‘too real’ to leave any room for doubt, for even the slightest suspicion that what was observed was in reality a simulation” (Bogard, The Simulation of Surveillance 31). Such a perfect simulation is
provided by Precrime. Neither the authorities nor the subjects seem to have doubts about the truthfulness of the Precogs’ previsions. Precrime’s preventive actions are based on the conviction that the previsions depict the reality and that the threat of a future murder is definite.

### 3.4 Security and ‘Homo Sacer’

Chapter 3.3 describes anticipatory or simulated surveillance as a mechanism that – particularly, in case of its perfection – produces a Baudrillardian hyperreality. The threat of a specific future murder is believed to be certain. According to Martin and Simon, “[t]hreat concerns are always future concerns, yet ‘security’ is produced through the pre-emption of unwanted (and unknowable) futures, by preventing them from becoming actualised” (286). Hence, the logic of security is anticipatory.\(^\text{10}\) By contrast, discipline is reactive and aims at the normalization of deviant individuals. The Paradigm for the normalization of individuals is Bentham’s prison design, the Panopticon.

The Precrime prison will be the starting point for my analysis of Precrime’s security function. It will be shown that, despite the panoptic layout, the normalization of individuals makes way for something different, namely the normalization of populations. The population as a whole is the target of what Foucault termed ‘biopower’ or ‘biopolitics’.\(^\text{11}\) Chapter 3.4.2 will examine Precrime as an instrument of the biopolitics of security.

The concept of biopolitics has influenced several of Agamben’s works such as *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (HS)* and *State of Exception (SE)*. In chapter 3.4.3 the ‘future murderer’ as a product of Precrime will be aligned to Agamben’s figure of ‘homo sacer’ and its condition of ‘bare life’ which is a result of the inclusion of the biological existence into the realm of political life.

### 3.4.1 The End of Discipline: Preventive Detention in the Precrime Prison

In Spielberg’s film the consequence of being predicted to commit murder is captivity. Judged as ‘future murderer’ suspects are arrested and put into a

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\(^\text{10}\) See also Anderson (228).

\(^\text{11}\) Throughout this thesis I will keep to Foucault’s synonymous use of the terms ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ (cf. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* 243).
condition of suspended animation. All future murderers are, then, ‘stored’ in a special prison inside the Department of Precrime. The prison features the central tower of the sentry surrounded by a plenty of giant tubes containing several prisoners stacked one on top of the other. These tubes are lowered into the ground and can be lifted to various heights to access prisoners on the different levels of the tubes. Figure 3-2 shows a long shot of the prison as the tubes rise and appear as a forest of glass and metal pillars. The round building with its central tower resembles the layout of Bentham’s Panopticon.

The prison design in *Minority Report* can be interpreted as a visual metaphor that links Precrime with Bentham’s Panopticon. However, despite the similar layout, the Precrime prison differs thoroughly from the Panopticon regarding its functioning.

As Cooper argues, the prison in *Minority Report* does not establish supervision of prisoners but rather ‘warehouses’ them (cf. Cooper). At their lowest position the prisoners are entirely located in the ground and, therefore, out of sight for the sentry. Furthermore, the film does not feature any apparent form of individual transformation. What transpires in the prisoners’ minds is left open for the audience to speculate. It is simply stated that they are ‘busy on the inside’ (cf. *MR* 00:31:30-00:31:34). But Bentham’s Panopticon aims at transforming the individual to “restore to the state the subject it had lost” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 123). Or in the notorious words that are supposed to be Bentham’s: the
Panopticon is “a mill for grinding rogues honest, and idle men industrious” (qtd. in Mitchell).

In disciplinary societies imprisonment is a means for corrective training which aims at normalization and at an eventual integration of deviant individuals into a coherent social body. By contrast, post-panoptic societies are characterized by an increase of “paralegal forms of confinement” such as “pre-emptive or preventive detention prior to a crime being committed or after a determinate sentence has been served” (Rose 334). The most dangerous elements of the population are locked up in order to protect all the rest (cf. Rose 334). In Minority Report future murderers are kept in a form of preventive detention imprisoned in their own bodies. At this point the film aligns with Philip K. Dick’s short story in which Anderton refers to “a detention camp full of would-be criminals” (72). The normalizing of prisoners does not seem to be a factor in the original short story as well as in Spielberg’s film adaption. In the film the prisoners do basically cease to exist for the surrounding world as any form of action is denied to them. Thus, their potential to threaten society is neutralized.

### 3.4.2 Security and the Biopolitics of Precrime

Biopolitics addresses phenomena that are not apparent on the level of the individual body but that become apparent by considering the population as a whole – on the level of the alloplastic stratum (cf. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 245; cf. Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 60). In contrast to sovereign power which is the power over death, biopower facilitates control over processes of life in terms of biological existence. While sovereign power consists of the power to take life, biopower makes live (cf. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 241-7). Thus, biopower necessarily involves politics of security. Biopolitics tries to install “security mechanisms […] around the random element inherent in a population of living beings as to optimize a state of life” (Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 246). In his lecture Security, Territory, Population Foucault attempts to further examine the topic of biopower which he connects with “apparatuses (dispositifs) of security” (6). Similar to his explanation of biopolitics as targeting populations,

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12 Marco Brambilla’s Demolition Man (DM) depicts efforts to normalize prisoners. By “synaptic suggestion” the prisoners’ subconsciousness is trained with abilities and attitudes that seem to be beneficial for the purpose of (re-)integration into the society (DM 00:07:36-00:07:40). Such efforts are not present in Minority Report, where prisoners seem to be merely stored in glass pillars.
security apparatuses aim at the continuous modulation of processes within a global mass (cf. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* 246; cf. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* 1-11). According to Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, there are no different types of biopolitics but only biopolitics that is always also security: “[…] Foucault concludes that biopolitics simply is a ‘dispositif de sécurité’” (“Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century” 266). ‘Apparatuses of security’ are ‘technologies’ of power that go beyond the traditional (geopolitical) understanding of security by including, for instance, socio-economic aspects such as insurance and health care (cf. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* 244; cf. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, “Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century” 267-8). Biopolitics attempts to manage life, to preserve it, and to optimize it on the level of the population.

To illustrate the field of application of biopolitics Foucault mentions statistical items such as the rate of reproduction, the birth rate, or the mortality rate. These population phenomena, and the presumed circumstances that cause them to vary, are the subject of biopower (cf. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* 243; cf. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, “Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century” 267-8). Biopower includes a diverse set of mechanisms that are based on the perception of the population as a global mass instead of a mere aggregation of individual bodies (Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* 1). In *Minority Report* a number of mechanisms that aim at modulating processes of the population can be identified such as market operations to distribute populations in terms of ‘economic value’ and productivity to reduce social dangers that are provoked by socio-economic inequality (see chapter 3.2.2). Similarly, Precrime is, in a sense, a biopolitical mechanism that aims at lowering the mortality rate or more specifically the homicide rate. In a promotional film that advertises Precrime’s achievements the voice over compares the murder rate of the time before Precrime with an epidemic:

> Just six years ago the homicide rate in this country had reached epidemic proportions. It seemed that only a miracle could stop the bloodshed. But instead of one, we were given three: the Precognitives. Within just one month under the Precrime program the murder rate in the District of Columbia was reduced 90 percent. (*MR* 00:14:32-00:15:05)
Precrime is presented as some kind of vaccination against the epidemic of murder which had afflicted ‘the District of Columbia’. It has effectively lowered the murder rate as an index of population development. The simile of Precrime as vaccination aligns with Foucault’s prime example of biopower: the vaccination against smallpox in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (cf. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population 57-8). Back then vaccination was still a ‘miracle’ detached from the medical theory of that time which was not able to rationalize the effects of it. Vaccination was solely based on “naked empiricism,” it was a “pure matter of fact” (Foucault, Security, Territory, Population 58). Similarly, it seems that the precognitive abilities that enable the Precrime program cannot be explained by the scientists in the diegetic world of the film and, thus, remain a ‘miracle’. Precrime is legitimized through ‘naked empiricism’ since it has reduced the homicide rate 90 percent and “effectively stopped murder” (MR 00:15:10-00:15:14). By using the example of smallpox Foucault illustrates the anticipatory character of apparatuses of security. Security, in the biopolitical sense that Foucault assigns to it, is preventative and based on empiricism. Thus, Precrime is a biopolitical ‘dispositif de sécurité’ that aims at the proactive normalization of the population as a whole.

3.4.3 ‘Homo Sacer’ and the Future Murderer

The opening scene of Minority Report shows the prevision of Marks murdering his wife and her lover. Shortly after the initial prevision Anderton arrives at Precrime and analyses the previsioned material that has been recorded. He constructs a coherent course of action from the Precogs’ unsystematic output. This kind of visual evidence is then provided to Dr. Katherine James (Ann Ryerson) and Chief Justice Frank Pollard (George D. Wallace) who function as witness and judge to confirm the validity of the presented case. This procedure is the juridical basis for Precrime to act and capture the previsioned perpetrator. The judge and the witness instantly validate the case, which renders Marks a ‘future murderer’ (cf. MR 00:03:29-00:03:43). Hence, the Precops set off to prevent Marks from committing murder and to put him under arrest in the Precrime Prison. As mentioned earlier (in chapter 3.3.1), the prevision of a murder is sufficient to be sentenced for future murder which equals actual murder since “[the Precogs] are
never wrong” (**MR** 00:22:35-00:22:37). The previsions are perceived as “future-past” as an event that already has happened, however, *in the future* (Bogard, *The Simulation of Surveillance* 34). Precrime creates the paradox situation of having memories or records (or recorded memories in the case of the Precogs’ previsions) that depict a future. However, memories and recordings belong to the virtual domain of the past (cf. Deleuze, *DR* 70-80). The past-like appearance of these predictions as well as the perceived complete determination of the events that are previsioned (“[the Precogs] are never wrong”) seem to render the traditional laws of the ‘post-crime society’ applicable:

In a post-crime society there are crimes, offenders and victims, crime control, policing, investigation, trial and punishment […]. Pre-crime, by contrast, shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so. In a pre-crime society, there is calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all these, there is the pursuit of security […] (Zedner 262).

In *Minority Report* there are offenders and victims of future crimes or ‘Precrimes’. The previsions are investigated in post hoc fashion by the Precrime detectives who interpret the Precogs’ output to solve the crime case. The consequence of this seemingly conventional policing is some kind of an abridged trial (that only seems validate what Precrime generates as visual evidence) and subsequent punishment.

Risk or uncertainty seems to be abolished by Precrime as surveillance appears to be comprehensive and in advance. Therefore, every murder can be prevented which creates an environment of utter security. However, the post-crime practices of investigation, trial, and punishment subsequent to a crime and the preventive or preemptive logic of security are conflicting. This contradiction is addressed by the auditor from Justice, Danny Witwer, in a conversation with Anderton’s team of Precops:

WITWER: I’m sure you all understand the legalistic drawback to Precrime methodology.

KNOTT: Here we go again.

WITWER: Look, I’m not with the ACLU on this, Jeff, but let’s not kid ourselves: we’re arresting individuals who have broken no law.

JAD: But they will (**MR** 00:22:23-00:22:38).
Precrime seems to arrest people ‘who have broken no law’ in the name of law. Law is applied to simulated crime cases that never actualize and, therefore, remain possibilities. The previsioned homicides are the virtual condition for individuals to be convicted as ‘future murderers’. However, what the previsions depict is opposed to the real by their nature of being possibilities (cf. Deleuze, *DR* 212). Thus, law is applied to the hyperreal of the simulation. The hyperreal marks the disappearance of the distinction between reality and simulation (cf. Baudrillard 2-7). The hyperreality of Precrime’s simulated surveillance and the fact that jurisdiction in *Minority Report* refers to the hyperreal, creates a ‘zone of indistinction’ were the state of exception in the form of the suspension of the law becomes the rule (cf. Agamben, *HS* 9). The ‘future murderer’ is deprived of any rights and detained in the Precrime prison without having broken any law. Based on the virtual threat of becoming a murderer which, at least to the authorities, appears indistinguishable from being an actual murderer, law is applied to the virtual domain and suspended from the actual. The juridical procedure of Precrime vaguely resembles a conventional legal system but actually regulates the suspension of law with regard to certain individuals. As the trial seems to merely validate the visual evidence, “an immediate coincidence of fact and law” is realized (Agamben, *HS* 172).

The ‘future murderer’ aligns with Agamben’s concept of “*homo sacer*” which is based on “[a]n obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order […] solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)” (Agamben, *HS* 8). ‘Homo sacer’ is the one who is allowed to be killed without punishment. He is excluded from protection through law and, therefore, put into a condition of ‘bare life,’ which is life without rights, mere biological existence that is exposed to death (cf. Agamben, *HS* 71-2, 88; cf. Downey 112). Equally, the future murderer is excluded from the protection through law due to the possible prospect of him becoming a murderer. What happens to the future murderer is the suspension of law (in form of denying him civil rights) that is prescribed by law. The future murderer resides in the ‘zone of indistinction’ where “governance through law and governance through management” intersect (Agamben qtd. in Raulff 611). The biopolitical management of risks and threats in advance seems to take precedence over the retroactive moral education of disciplinary post-crime societies. Future murderers
are treated as atrocious individuals that are arrested “not so much in the name of law and order, but in the name of the community that they threaten, the name of the […] potential victims they violate” (Rose 334). By means of preventive or preemptive action Precrime produces homines sacri. The protection of the biological well-being of potential victims produces individuals who are deprived of their legal status or whose legal status is hollowed out.

4 Virtual (In-)security in Homeland

Showtime’s Homeland first aired on October 2, 2011. It is an American television series based on the Israeli series Prisoners of War. The story revolves around Carrie Mathison (Claire Danes) and US Marine Sergeant Nicholas Brody (Damian Lewis). Mathison is a highly talented but mentally unstable CIA officer. During an unauthorized operation in Iraq she obtains the information that an American prisoner of war had been turned by al Qaeda and will be used to conduct ‘terrorist attacks’ on US territory. After being held captive for eight years U.S. Marine Sergeant Nicholas Brody is freed by a Delta Force-team. When Mathison’s CIA department is informed about the rescue of Brody, she suspects him to be the turned prisoner of war. To proof her assumption she runs a surveillance operation that targets Brody and his family. Her superiors have no idea about that secret operation and her mental condition.

First, Mathison is considered as a metaphor for the post-9/11 US and their struggle to cope with ‘terrorism’. Since the events in 2001 several inglorious facts about the practices of US agencies have come to light, such as the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” such as waterboarding and the extended application of surveillance (Blakeley 544). Focus is on the allegorical connection of Mathison’s personal paranoia and the 9/11 attacks. Particularly her surveillance activities and their representation as voyeurism are considered.

Following this, surveillance as a biopolitical mechanism to preserve life and to protect it from potential dangers is examined. A potential danger is the threat of terrorism that is presented by Brody as a sleeper terrorist. I will argue that the just cause of protecting lives and the severe threat posed by terrorism may serve as a legitimation of paranoia and surveillance respectively voyeurism.
4.1 Paranoia and Voyeurism

Carrie Mathison is largely characterized by deviant behavior and, in particular, by paranoia. Due to her paranoid delusions she is nearly unswerving in her attempts to reveal Brody as a sleeper terrorist. To illuminate Brody’s true identity she starts to secretly surveil him and his family. Her determination to protect society from terrorism at all costs is contrasted with the moral concerns of her social environment and the depiction of her surveillance operation as voyeurism. As Alex Gansa (one of the creators of Homeland) admits, “[t]he theme of voyeurism was very much at the center in our minds as we began to tell this story” (Lacob). The representation of surveillance as voyeurism can be considered to convey a morally charged message.

4.1.1 References to 9/11 and Mathison’s Paranoid Behavior

The first episode of Homeland premiered on October 2, 2011, about ten years after the 9/11 attacks. When Mathison justifies her unauthorized surveillance of Brody to her confidant and mentor Saul Berenson (Mandy Patinkin), the 9/11 attacks are one of the cornerstones of her argumentation:

MATHISON: Saul, please.
BERENSON: There isn’t anything to say.
MATHISON: I—I’m just making sure we don’t get hit again.
BERENSON: I’m glad someone’s looking out for the country, Carrie.
MATHISON: I’m serious. I—I missed something once before. I won’t—I can’t let that happen again!
BERENSON: It was ten years ago. Everyone missed something that day.
MATHISON: Yeah, everyone’s not me.
BERENSON: I understand that. I doubt a grand jury will.
(HL: “Pilot” 00:42:33-00:42:53)

Mathison expresses her concern to make sure that the US does not get hit again and apparently refers to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Additionally, the reference to 9/11 is further clarified by Berenson (“It was ten years ago”). Parts of Mathison’s justification that is quoted above find their way into the opening of the series that is shown from the second episode on. A voice over of Mathison stating “I—I’m just making sure we don’t get hit again” (HL: “Grace” 00:00:41-00:00:43) is followed by a brief shot of the World Trade Center (WTO) and smoke rising from its top levels (see Figure 4-1). The original footage of
September 11 is adjusted to the mainly black and white color scheme of the opening. Footage from the coverage of the attacks on the WTO features prominently in the opening of the series among other real media clips of ‘terrorist attacks’ and political statements that are mixed with footage from the pilot episode (cf. HL: “Grace” 00:00:00-00:01:33). Thus, the storyline of Homeland is closely linked to the events in 2001.

The attacks were considered as unprecedented and ‘unthinkable’ (cf. De Goede 155). According to Massumi’s concept of the “political ontology of threat” future disasters inherent the potential to be equally unthinkable and, therefore, even more devastating (52-3). Carrie Mathison’s work as an intelligence officer – as she seems to perceive it – is to make sure that the US does not ‘get hit again’ by another unthinkable and potentially worse attack, at all costs. This entails moving unmaterialized futures “into a realm of relative certainty” (Martin and Simon 288). It is said that you cannot prevent what you cannot predict. Thus, Mathison’s venture is it to think the unthinkable in order to be never surprised by an unthinkable, unknown, but potentially dangerous future state and, hence, being able to prevent it from being actualized. Consequently, Mathison thinks beyond the ‘working theories’ of her colleagues, expecting far worse scenarios. This becomes particularly distinct when she is in the hospital after having been hit by an explosion and being out of medication for her bipolar disorder:
MATHISON: There’s many, many, many, many, many more. The thing is, Saul, that Abu Nazir has methods and patterns and priorities. A single sniper? No. No. Abu Nazir doesn’t do that. He never has. He never will. He goes big. He explodes. He maims en masse. We know that.

BERENSON: Slow down. Slow down.

MATHISON: Facts—Facts are facts, and we have about a week— maybe less—to figure out the real target not this single shot to the president, spy novel 101 bullshit.

BERENSON: Well, actually, that’s the working theory.

MATHISON: Well, it’s wrong. I mean, it’s—it’s incomplete.

(HL: “The Vest” 00:06:30-00:07:01)

As Sedgwick claims, “[t]he first imperative of paranoia is There must be no bad surprises” (Sedgwick 130). Hence, Mathison’s efforts to suspect the worst and beyond represent a paranoid attempt to safeguard herself against bad surprises. According to Farrell, paranoia denominates a system of interpretation that is characterized by suspicion, grandiosity, and persecutory delusions (5). The persecutory delusions seem to be projected on the US rather than relating to herself but suspicion and grandiosity appear to correspond with Mathison’s behavior that is depicted in the series. For instance, she considers herself to be the only one capable of deciphering Nazir’s plan, emphasizing her importance for the protection of the US. This becomes particularly evident in a conversation with her father who takes care of her while she is “evening out” after the explosion that hit her (HL: “The Vest” 00:13:46-00:13:47):

CARRIE: I have to go to work.
FRANK: No way.
CARRIE: I’m okay. And they have a major situation that I know how to fix. I know how to stop it.
FRANK: Feels good out there, doesn’t it? Like you’re the queen of the world.
CARRIE: Yes! Exactly.
FRANK: But you’re not, Carrie.
(HL: “The Vest” 00:43:30-43:45)

In the course of the series the viewer learns that Frank Mathison (James Rebhorn) has a bipolar disorder similar to Carrie. It can be assumed that she inherited the disorder from her father. Thus, he is particularly capable of understanding and expressing her emotional life as the quote above suggests. Furthermore, her paranoia is connected with her bipolar condition. Being out of medication Mathison’s behavior becomes (even more) hysterical and paranoid. According to

13 Here I refer to the first names since Frank and Carrie share the family name Mathison.
Doane, hysteria and paranoia have been frequently related to the female in film (196). Thus, the representation of Mathison as a hysterical and paranoid woman can be considered stereotypical. By contrast, her father seems to have his disorder under control.

Referring to Mathison as a metaphor for America, TV reviewer Greg Dixon writes: “Carrie [Mathison] is America and America is a mad, paranoid, overacting blonde who – despite everyone around her telling her she’s a mad, paranoid, overacting blonde – just knows the world is out to get her”. Thus, the producers seem to comment on the US by aligning them with the stereotype of the ‘hysterical woman’ and ‘female paranoia’. Consequently, Homeland seems to allude to a paranoid nation.

4.1.2 Surveillance, Voyeurism, and Morality

The first scene of the pilot episode of Homeland shows Mathison who is in a field operation in Iraq. She is on her way to a prison to obtain information about an imminent terror attack from one of the prisoners. While heading to the prison she has her boss, David Estes (David Harewood), on the phone. Mathison wants Estes to influence the Iraqis so that they, at least, postpone the execution of the prisoner who is due to be executed within a short time. As Estes refuses to do so, she asks him to initiate a covert operation to extract him from the Iraqi prison but he, instead, urges her to stop pursuing her objective. However, Mathison goes on, eventually getting arrested while speaking to her imprisoned informer (cf. HL: “Pilot” 00:00:00-00:03:20). By conducting an unauthorized mission and “bribing” herself into an Iraqi prison, Mathison acts against direct orders of her superior and subsequently causes “an international crisis” (HL: “Pilot” 00:37:48-00:37:50). Hence, she is established as a character that tends to transgress certain restrictions for her convictions.

Subsequently, she does not only ignore orders but exceeds legal boundaries for the purpose of gathering intelligence. This is shown by her unauthorized surveillance mission on Brody that she runs in secret, concealed from her superiors at the CIA. During the installation of the surveillance screens the brother of the former CIA-technician Virgil (David Marciano) points out that they break “like 12 federal laws” (HL: “Pilot” 00:20:46-00:02:48). Similarly,
Virgil refers to the risk of being imprisoned when he confronts Mathison with her bipolar disorder: “Just tell me I’m not out here risking federal prison on behalf of a crazy person” (HL: “Pilot” 00:41:08-00:41:11). These comments emphasize the illegal status of Mathison’s private surveillance operation. Virgil and his brother comment on the legal aspects of the unauthorized operation and make clear that they all are committing crimes. What Virgil and his brother provide is a rather technical account of the legal state of affairs. They do not raise any moral concerns and, ultimately, they are freelance surveillance professionals and part of the operation.

The first person that expresses dismay in face of Mathison’s private surveillance operation is her mentor and close confidant Saul Berenson. When Mathison returns home from tailing Brody she finds Berenson sitting on her couch looking at the screens that were set up to surveil the rooms in Brody’s house. “You think for one minute you get away with this,” he asks her with scorn, and further advises her to get a lawyer. Again, it is referred to the illegality of Mathison’s activities. Moreover, Berenson’s emotional reaction suggests a moral layer that goes beyond the mere legal remarks of Max (Maury Sterling) and Virgil. According to Prinz, there is “overwhelming evidence for a link between emotion and moral judgment” that is provided by recent works in cognitive science (29). Thus, Berenson’s negative emotions towards Mathison could be perceived as a rejection of illegal surveillance. However, in the following it will be argued that he does not condemn her unauthorized surveillance operation but the fact that she has betrayed him.

Berenson extorts a FISA warrant from a judge of whom he has incriminating evidence, hence, committing a crime to render Mathison’s activities ‘legal-ish’ (cf. HL: “Grace” 00:09:25-00:11:26). Although, he expresses some concerns (“You think you still have a right to privacy with all this?” (HL: “Grace” 00:11:19-00:11:22)), his condemnation does not appear to be directed at surveillance as such or violation of the law. Instead, it is the fact that Mathison abused his trust and started to run a surveillance operation behind his back (and ultimately put his career at risk):

14 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) regulates the use of electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. Judicial approval for such surveillance is usually required in advance (cf. Seamon and Gardner 322-3).
Everyone lies in this business, I accept that. But we all draw lines somewhere and the two sides of that line are ‘us’ and ‘them’. And whatever we had, you and I, whatever trust we built up over a decade of me protecting you and teaching you everything I know, you destroyed it when you lied to me and you treated me like ‘them’. Like every other schmuck in this building. So when you say you understand, is that what you mean? (HL: Clean Skin 00:16:33-00:16:56)

The object of Berenson’s moral judgment is not so much the private surveillance operation but the fact of being lied to from an acquainted person who he assumed Mathison to be. Surveillance does not seem to be viewed critically by any of the main characters in Homeland. Berenson appears to be the only person who is attached to morality but even he, in a sense, tolerates Mathison’s surveillance operation on Brody and manages to turn it ‘legal-ish’ (although, it is still not an official operation). Thus, Berenson has his own private morality that seems differ from the moral code of the society. When Mathison justifies her unauthorized surveillance he admits that he understands her, but he doubts that a grand jury will understand their shared intelligence worker morality (cf. HL: “Pilot” 00:42:33-00:42:53). As Denzin argues, the “voyeur-investigator” follows her or his own moral code that “their version of society appears to require” (56). By contrast, the “official order of truth” is represented by the grand jury and by Max and Virgil’s references to the law (Denzin 56).

The theme of voyeurism is also addressed by the representation of the unofficial surveillance operation. The equipment is set up in Mathison’s private

Figure 4-2: Carrie Mathison surveilling Brody from home (HL: “Pilot” 00:26:04).
apartment. To surveil Brody she sits on her couch watching the surveillance screens that are placed on the coffee table in in front of her (see Figure 4-2). In one scene Mathison is shown eating potato chips while watching the screens together with Virgil, which creates a movie night atmosphere (cf. *HL*: “Grace” 00:31:06-00:31:09), or she is shown while lying on the couch in her pajamas (cf. *HL*: “Grace” 00:37:38-00:37:42). At one point Mathison refers to the surveillance of Brody and his family as a “reality show” (*HL*: “Clean Skin” 00:23:14-00:23:16). Apparently, the surveillance screens seem to replace a television set. In *The Cinematic Society: The Voyeur’s Gaze*, Denzin suggests that the cinematic gaze implies a voyeuristic position on the side of the audience (1). In *Homeland* surveillance footage is also shown to the audience who joins Mathison in watching Brody, while it is also watching Mathison and, thus, surveills the surveiller. Furthermore, the image of sitting on the couch and eating potato chips seems to reduce the distance between Mathison’s position and that of the audience.

For Hall, the cinematic presentation of surveillance in *Homeland* displays “an unsubtle joining of voyeurism and arm-chair (or couch) military intelligence gathering” (271). Particularly, when Mathison watches Brody and his wife engaging in sexual activities her surveillance practices approximate voyeuristic qualities. At first she tries to keep her professionalism, turns away from the screens, and takes off the headphones, but after a moment she puts them on again and continues watching (cf. *HL*: “Pilot” 00:29:52-00:30:13). It can be assumed that she does not expect to discover valuable information on whether or not Brody is related to terrorism in this scene. Moreover, Mathison seems to be aware of the moral underpinnings as she first turns away but later gives in to her urge to keep watching. Here, the line between duty (surveillance) and pleasure (voyeurism) is – at least – blurred.15 Thus, surveillance is represented as a somewhat shady method of intelligence gathering. However, aligning Mathison’s position with that of the audience mitigates the moral judgment that is implied through the depiction of surveillance as voyeurism. The overall thrust seems to be that

15 According to the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, “Voyeurism involves the act of observing unsuspecting individuals […] who are naked, in the process of disrobing, or engaging in sexual activity. The act of looking (“peeping”) is for the purpose of achieving sexual excitement” (American Psychological Association 532).
surveillance/voyeurism is ‘bad’ but everybody does it, for instance, in a less serious form when watching reality shows.

What *Homeland* presents are two conflicting moral concepts, one is the ‘official order of truth’ represented by the law (thereby also by the grand jury as a legal entity), and the other is Berenson and Mathison’s private morality. Their morality is not necessarily similar but they agree in disregarding to the ‘common morality’ to a certain degree. Moreover, the ‘common morality’ is addressed by the representation of surveillance as voyeurism. The analogy between Mathison’s surveillance practice and the position of the viewer potentially reduces the negative moral associations.

### 4.2 Security and Threat

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the “administration of a great organized molar security has as its correlate a whole micro management of petty fears, a permanent molecular insecurity” ([ATP](#) 215-6). According to this stance, achieving security is preceded by the detection of threats and fears. Conversely, without any threats no security would be required.

In the following, the relation between security and fear is exemplified by the surveillance on Brody and the threat that ensues from him as an unrecognized sleeper terrorist.

#### 4.2.1 The Logic of Control and the Surveillance on Brody

According to Foucault, surveillance is not limited solely to panoptic discipline. Its application is extended beyond the ‘exhaustive surveillance of individuals’ towards the monitoring of specific phenomena that are pertinent to the population as a whole (cf. *Security, Territory, Population* 57-66). Such phenomena could be the proliferation of diseases but also the distribution of conduct among populations (e.g. terrorism). Similarly, Deleuze views the application of disciplinary methods as well as the return of methods of sovereign rule to be subordinate to the new logic of control and, therefore, they appear in modified variations and with different purposes (cf. “Societies of Control” 7). For example, the CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” (Blakeley 544) can be considered an instrument of the sovereign societies that has reappeared within the
logic of control. ‘Enhanced interrogation’ is also depicted in the fifth episode of *Homeland* as a person of Nazir’s terror network is kept awake with loud music, air conditioning, and changing lighting conditions (cf. *HL*: “Blind Spot” 00:28:17-00:28:28). The detainee is forcibly kept awake to make him docile and to elicit information about Nazir and his plans. In this case, torture is an instrument of control that aims at obtaining information about potential future terrorist attacks rather than a ceremonial manifestation of sovereign power (cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 47). In the following it will be argued that the surveillance of Brody represents an example of surveillance as a method of control and, therefore, it is intrinsically directed at the population as a whole even when targeting individuals.

After a failed attempted to move Berenson to “authorize a surveillance package” on Brody (*HL*: “Pilot” 00:08:03-00:08:05), Mathison hires Virgil to install cameras and microphones in every room of Brody’s house in the absence of the Brody family. (cf. *HL*: “Pilot” 00:14:10-00:15:16). Later, after having set up the surveillance screens in Mathison’s apartment Virgil comments the appearing live footage with “hello, Big Brother” (*HL*: “Pilot” 00:25:23-00:25:25). Big Brother is the enigmatic dictator of Oceania, the totalitarian state in which the narrative of George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is set. The omnipresent phrase “BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU” reminds the (middle and upper class) inhabitants of Orwell’s Oceania of the fact that they are constantly surveilled (Orwell 3). Similar to the sentry’s tower of the pantopticon, the figure of Big Brother establishes the awareness in the subjects’ minds that they are constantly observed by the authorities.

By contrast, when Brody and his family return from Andrews Air Force Base, where his arrival was celebrated, they have no idea that they are under surveillance. They seem to consider themselves in safe privacy as, for instance, Brody and his wife engage in sexual activities. However, they are not unobserved as a hidden surveillance camera, that has been installed in the bedroom ceiling, films them (*HL*: “Pilot” 00:27:30-00:33:44). Moreover, Brody’s unawareness of being surveilled is made clear later on, when he and Mathison spend a weekend together. By knowing the type of tea Brody drinks, Mathison triggers the suspicion that she might have surveilled him. Hesitantly Mathison admits that she has spied on Brody as he continues to probe her (cf. *HL*: “The Weekend”
Thus, different from panoptic surveillance, the fact of being surveilled is concealed from Brody who is the targeted subject. As Rose argues, surveillance in the societies of control is of “low visibility” (326). Similarly, Marx considers “new surveillance” to be “less visible or invisible” (15). Consequently, the figure of Big Brother or the notion of the Panopticon does not seem to reflect the mode of surveillance that is depicted in *Homeland*.

Having “eyes and ears in every room” in the house of the Brody family (*HL: “Pilot” 00:15:10-00:15:12*), Mathison takes turns with Virgil to observe Nick Brody in search of suspicious behavior that might unmask him as a potential terrorist. Instead of normalizing individuals, the central work of “control professionals” (Rose 332) is organized around the acquisition and analysis of information for the purpose of identification and classification in order to manage a heterogeneous population (cf. Feeley and Simon 452; cf. Hardt and Negri 337; cf. Rose 332). The surveillance of Brody does not aim at disciplining him but at gathering information about him and his assumed connections to ‘terrorism’ and, particularly, to the terrorist leader Abu Nazir. Mathison seeks to know whether or not Brody is a sleeper terrorist in order to ‘classify’ and possibly segregate him from society. Thus, Mathison’s surveillance of Brody can be regarded as a method of control. It is *surveillance for information* rather than *surveillance to induce self-correction*. In short, Mathison seeks to reveal Brody’s identity rather than forming it. She aims at sifting out potentially dangerous individuals for the protection of the society.

### 4.2.2 Terrorist Brody: Diffuse Threats and the Sleeper Scenario

*Even a paranoid can have enemies*

—Henry Kissinger (qtd. in Schecter)

Chapter 4.1.1 argues that Mathison represents the stereotype of a hysterical and paranoid woman and, furthermore, that this stereotypical representation is metaphorically applied to the post-9/11 US as a nation, pointing at the cultural state of fear and paranoia that is perceived to be prevalent. By contrast, this chapter will examine the depiction of ‘terrorist’ threats as a source for the legitimization of a paranoid mindset and, thereby, of societies of control.
In the series the threat of a terrorist attack is embodied by the returned POW Nicholas Brody and the terrorist leader, Abu Nazir, who seem to be planning an attack on American territory. Throughout most of the first season some of Brody’s memories are shown in the form of flashbacks. Those memories reveal that he had close contact with Nazir which contradicts the statements to government agencies he made in follow-up interrogations after his rescue (cf. HL: “Pilot” 00:33:59-00:35:03). Since Nazir can be considered Homeland’s equivalent of Osama bin Laden (cf. Rouleau 22), the audience is led to suspect that Brody is part of some kind of terrorist plot. A suspicion that is shared by Mathison who seems to be the only character that is suspicious of Brody. The nature of Brody and Nazir’s connection, whether there will be an attack or not, and the shape of a potential attack are kept unknown for the larger part of the first season. The threat of a terrorist attack that is posed by Brody is diffuse and it is only taken seriously by Mathison and to a certain degree extended to the audience through the flashbacks of Brody’s time in captivity. Additionally, Mathison’s mentor and confidant, Berenson, might give some thought to it.

Since threat entails a felt quality rather than a concrete quality, it is a subjective experience. Threats are real but not actual. Thus, threats can be regarded as ‘virtual,’ since “the virtual is real without being actual” (Deleuze, DR 208; Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 252). In other words, threats are virtual to the effect that they cannot be perceived. However, the fact that threats are imperceptible does not make them disappear, instead it allows for their amplification. As Massumi asserts, “[t]hreat is not real in spite of its nonexistence. It is superlatively real, because of it” (53). The terrorist threats in Homeland are vague and based on the subjective interpretation of incomplete information. In comparison to the characters around Mathison, who are depicted as ‘normal’ persons (cf. Rouleau 22), she appears to be paranoid. However, while Mathison’s paranoid behavior seems to irritate most of her CIA colleagues (particularly after her mental disorder is disclosed), the audience has insights that seem to vindicate her behavior.

16 The first proof that Brody actually works with Nazir to commit an attack in the US is provided in episode eight (“Achilles Heel”) as Brody dissociates himself from Nazir and announces the end of their collaboration to one of Nazir’s middlemen (cf. HL: “Achilles Heel” 00:46:23-00:47:10). Later on Nazir manages to re-convince Brody of their cause.
In the diegetic world of the series, Brody is a celebrated war hero who is presented to the public as “a poster boy for the war” (*HL*: “Pilot” 00:08:11-00:08:14). Nothing seems to relate him to terrorism, terrorist plots, or Nazir. On the contrary, vice president Walden (Jamey Sheridan) and other politically involved people attempt to utilize his war hero image for political purposes and encourage him to run for congress:

WALDEN: I’m very impressed with the way you’ve handled coming back to the real world.
BRODY: Thank you, sir.
WALDEN: Representative Richard Johnson—mean anything to you?
BRODY: I watch the news.
WALDEN: How would you feel about running for his seat in the upcoming special election? I would consider it an honor to work with a man who’s actually fought the War on Terror who’s lived among the enemy and understands them. What do you think? You interested?
BRODY: Yeah. I’m interested.
WALDEN: Good news, good news.
BRODY: I need to talk to my wife first.
WALDEN: Is that a problem?
BRODY: To be honest, it could be.
WALDEN: Well, we need her on board. She’s half the story. War hero returns home after eight years’ imprisonment to his beautiful, loving wife. I’m sure you be able to convince her.
(*HL*: “Representative Brody” 00:07:50-00:08:52)

The vice president expresses the political value of the returned-war-hero story that he apparently wants to use to legitimize the ongoing ‘War on Terror’. The offer to run for congress and the compliment how well Brody handles his return after eight years of captivity emphasizes the seemingly perfect re-integration into his family life and into society. By contrast, at that point the audience knows that Brody is indeed part of a conspiracy that aims at killing the vice president and other highly ranked persons from politics and institutions of national security (cf. *HL*: “Crossfire” 00:41:06-00:41:44). Thus, Brody has become an ostensibly perfectly integrated member of society, a flagship citizen, but actually he is a sleeper terrorist.

From the point of view of prosecution, Chesney argues that “the sleeper dilemma” entails the problem of connecting the suspect with particular terrorist plots (28). Mathison’s experience of observing Brody aligns with Chesney’s claim. Despite her efforts to unmask Brody’s true identity, such as her unauthorized surveillance operation, she does not manage to prove his connection
to Nazir or ‘terrorism’ in general. According to Ericson the ‘sleeper scenario’ constitutes a juridical argument to erase “established principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law in the name of national security” (42). Moreover, it helps to facilitate the criminalization of suspects “for imagined future harm they might cause rather than past crime” (Ericson 42). Consequently, more emphasis is put on the suspicion as such compared to the actual crime. According to this stance, the depiction of Brody as a sleeper terrorist reinforces the narrative of the ‘sleeper scenario’ and provides justification for Mathison’s paranoia and, thereby, the cultural state of fear that Homeland initially seems to criticize.

The insecurity or vulnerability that is suggested by the sleeper scenario promotes an intensification of the continuous control of everyone to regulate not only social constellations but to ‘mircomanage’ individuals in order to separate out even the seemingly well integrated but potentially dangerous. Thus, Mathison’s surveillance is presented as a necessary evil on the background of the existence of terrorist threats.

5 Conclusion

The processual character of the ever-emergent actual is influenced by the continuous processes of becoming within the domain of the virtual. Therefore, societies of control reach out to control the virtual, the antecedent conditions that shape the actual. As Dillon claims, command of the virtual entails also command of the future since “the future is what the actual is in potentiality” (“Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)order” 537). The virtual comprises the complex relations that form the precedent conditions of any actualization. Addressing the virtual conditions of actualization in the present enables the modulation of future actuals. The stable hierarchical structure of Precrime and the fluidity of the Sprawl represent the reverse processes of stratification and destratification within the domain of the social, implying dynamics and constant change.

Furthermore, the social and economic differences between the Sprawl and the wealthier areas suggest the clustering of different populations through methods of segmentation and segregation which is considered to be characteristic of societies of control (cf. Deleuze, “Societies of Control” 7; cf. Hardt and Negri 339-40). Since market control aims at the socio-economic conditions rather than
the actual individual it can be considered as control of the virtual. The segmentation of populations according to their financial situation implies virtual methods of controlling the operation of markets that exert socio-economic pressure. Additionally, the Eyedentiscan system enables continuous tracking through the identification of every individual’s iris. At certain gateways the iris scanners allow for the real time regulation of the movement of individuals, enabling the regulation and separation of their potential paths.

The efficient regulation of potential or virtual paths, which are located in an imperceptible and unknowable future, requires that virtuality or potentiality is translated into concrete and meaningful possibilities. These possibilities are generated by the Precognitives which reduce the inexhaustibly ‘rich’ but determinate virtual to intelligible segments. These segments are interpreted by Precrime officers who create a coherent cause of events for each case of future murder. The operation of Precrime is based on two mechanisms. One mechanism is the generation and interpretation of previsions which creates possibilities respectively simulations of the future. The other mechanism actively works toward aligning reality to the simulation to the degree that a “profound reality” is absent, creating a Baudrillardian hyperreal (Baudrillard 6). Based on Precrime’s simulations individuals are coded as future murderers which is indifferent from being an actual murderer in the jurisdiction depicted in Minority Report. Subsequently, future murderers are not disciplined but removed as a threat in order to protect the society, in order to achieve security.

The practice of Precrime, in the form of arresting before the actual crime, is legitimized through the high accuracy of its methodology. Since the implementation of Precrime the murder rate within its area of operation is reduced 90 percent. The benchmark for Precrime is the global mass of the population based on “naked empiricism” (Foucault, Security, Territory, Population 58). Precrime is a biopolitical mechanism that aims at the proactive normalization of the population as a whole through methods of “segregation and social hierarchization” (Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1 141). The segregation and social hierarchization of heterogeneous populations reveal the limitations of the normative force of the law. Not all persons can be equal before the law. According to Agamben, the biopolitical management of populations inevitably requires the suspension of the norm, though, not its abolition (cf. Agamben, SE
23). Thus, a pseudo law is established. In the case of future murder the suspension of the law is rendered indistinct by making the law coincide with the facts generated by Precrime.

In *Homeland* the state of exception, the legally prescribed suspension of the law, is represented by Carrie Mathison. As a metaphor for the US her decision to disregard Brody’s rights of privacy and to put him under surveillance based on a “hunch” (*HL*: “Pilot” 00:08:16-00:08:17) marks a suspension of the law due to a ‘felt’ emergency. In a sense, she exercises sovereign power that is unmitigated by the law. However, in the diegetic world of the series she does break the law, as her confidants, such as Virgil and Berenson, point out. There are constraints to her ‘off-law’ actions. The “official order of truth” (Denzin 56), represented by the law and by her ‘normal’ colleagues, conflicts her private paranoid morality.

Technically, the state of exception is implied as Berenson exerts the FISA warrant and, thereby, renders Mathison’s former illegal surveillance mission “legal-ish” (*HL*: “Grace” 00:11:37-00:11:38). The term ‘legal-ish’ already hints at the blurred line between legal and illegal that is created by converging fact and law. However, instead of depicting a condition where the suspension of the law has become the rule, *Homeland* provides arguments for such a state of affairs. Brody enjoys a good reputation as a war hero and future politician. But eventually, it turns out that Brody is indeed a sleeper terrorist, which renders Mathison’s paranoia justified. By contrast, the ‘official order of truth’ with its legal and moral restrictions appears to be a hindrance for achieving security in the face of terrorist threats.

In *Minority Report* the conflict between the biopolitical management of populations and the ‘zone of indistinction’ in which jurisdiction and biopower intersect becomes apparent in the figure of the future murderer who is a ‘homo sacer’. Similarly, in *Homeland* Brody’s rights are infringed by Mathison in advance of any criminal activity. However, since Brody is a sleeper terrorist the infringement of his rights is legitimized in the end. Thus, the series seems to endorse a Deleuzian society of control to counter the dangers of a heterogeneous and fluid population, suggesting that everyone could be a sleeper terrorist. In the world of *Homeland* everyone is a potential or virtual ‘homo sacer’.
Works Cited


“Pilot.” — Episode 1.

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Unterschrift